




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HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY
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&c., &c., &c.

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C O N T E N T S.

BOOK LI.

	PAGE
THE INVASION	3.

BOOK LII.

BRIENNE AND MONTMIRAIL	113
----------------------------------	-----

BOOK LIII.

FIRST ABDICATION	207
CONCLUSION	444

BOOK LI.

THE INVASION.

Disorganisation of the French army on reaching the Rhine—Distress of our troops in Italy and Spain—Operations of Prince Eugene in Friuli, during the autumn of 1813, and his retreat to the Adige—Operations of Marshal Soult in Navarre, and his fruitless efforts to save St. Sebastian and Pampeluna—Retreat of Soult towards the Nive and the Adour—Marshal Suchet falls back on Catalonia—Deplorable position of France, where every preparation had been made for conquest, but none for defence—Public discontent against Napoleon, because he had not concluded peace after the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen—The Allies not aware of this position of affairs—Alarmed at the bare idea of crossing the Rhine, they think of making fresh proposals of peace to Napoleon—The Emperor Francis and M. Metternich more disposed to negotiate than the others—Causes of their pacific disposition—M. de St. Aignau, French Minister at Weimar, being then at Frankfort, is despatched to Paris, to offer to Napoleon terms of peace, having for basis the natural frontiers of France—Instant departure of M. de St. Aignau for Paris—His reception—Fearing to weaken his position by too hastily accepting the Frankfort propositions, Napoleon agrees to the meeting of a Congress at Mannheim, without expressing any opinion on the basis of the proposed peace—First care of Napoleon on returning to Paris—Discontent of the public against M. de Bassano, who is accused of having encouraged a war policy—He is replaced by M. de Caulaincourt—Some other minor changes in the administration—Levy of 600,000 men, and determination to add the additional centimes to all the contributions—Immediate Convocation of the Senate, to pass by simple resolution the proposal of the new levies and fresh taxes—Use Napoleon intends to make of the resources placed at his disposal—He hopes if the Allies allow him the winter to make his arrangements, to be able to force them back beyond the Rhine—His measures for the conservation of Holland and Italy—Secret negotiation with Ferdinand VII., and an offer to restore his Liberty and Throne, on condition that he will put an end to the war, and refuse the Spanish territory to the English—Treaty of Valençay—Embassy of the Duke de San Carlos to induce the Spaniards to accept this treaty—Conduct of Murat—His dejection quickly succeeded by the desire to become King of Italy—His intrigues at Vienna and Paris—He asks Napoleon to give him Italy—Napoleon, filled with indignation, is at first tempted to give vent to his feelings, but by an effort remains silent—Whilst Napoleon is making his preparations, M. de Metternich, discontented with the evasive answer made to the Frankfort propositions, demands an explicit reply—Napoleon determines at length to accept these, and consents to negotiate on the basis of the natural frontiers, and repeats the proposal of a Congress at Mannheim—Unfortunately, during the month frittered away, the

aspect of affairs had totally changed in the councils of the Allies—A violent party, headed by the Prussians, were desirous that the war should be carried on with vigour, that Napoleon should be dethroned, and France forced back within the limits that marked her frontiers in 1790—This party totally disapproved the Frankfort propositions—Alexander flatters all parties in order to rule them ultimately—England would have supported Austria in her pacific views, if a recent event had not induced her to continue the war—In effect, on the approach of the Allied armies, Holland rose, and Belgium threatened to follow her example—The hope of alienating Antwerp from France decided England to continue the war, and attempt the immediate passage of the Rhine—Austria, on the other side, carried away by the hope of recovering Italy, yielded to the views of England, and consented to continue the war—The Frankfort propositions are repudiated, and M. de Caulaincourt is informed that the Allied Powers will be made acquainted with his tardy acceptance of the proposed basis, but nothing is said about the continuation of hostilities—Forces at the disposal of the Allied Powers, in the event of an immediate resumption of hostilities—They have at their disposal an actual force of 220,000 men, which in spring might be increased to 600,000—They flatter themselves that Napoleon will not have quite 100,000 to oppose them—Various plans for the passage of the Rhine—The Prussians wish to march straight on Metz and Paris; the Austrians, on the contrary, contemplate returning to Switzerland, to effect a counter revolution there, and separate Italy from France—The Austrian plan obtains: The Passage of the Rhine at Bâle, on the 21st December, 1813, and the Revolution in Switzerland—Abolition of the act of mediation—Fruitless efforts of the Emperor Alexander in favor of Switzerland—March of the Allies towards the eastern frontier of France—Arrival of the Grand Allied Army at Langres, and Marshal Blucher at Nancy—Napoleon, surprised by the unexpected invasion, has no longer leisure to meditate over the great preparations he had contemplated, and finds himself with little more than the troops that remained at the end of 1813—He establishes the depôts of the different regiments at Paris, and despatches rapidly thither conscripts raised in the centre and west of France—He establishes at Paris extra magazines for the equipment of the new recruits, and forms of these recruits Divisions of Reserve, and Divisions of the Young Guard—Napoleon orders Marshals Suchet and Soult to send him each a detachment, and orders that of Suchet to march to Lyons, that of Soult to Paris—Napoleon sends at first the Old Guard under Mortier to Langres, the Young Guard under Ney to Epinal, then orders the Marshals Victor, Marmont, and Macdonald, to join Ney and Mortier with the remains of the Army of Germany, at Châlons, where he intends to join them with the troops organized at Paris—Before leaving the capital, Napoleon assembles the Legislative Body—Communications to the Senate and Legislative Body—State of feeling in these two assemblies—Desire of the Legislative Body to know what has taken place in the late negotiations—Communications made to this assembly—Report of M. Lainé on these communications—Adjournment of the Legislative Body—Sharp reproaches addressed by Napoleon to the members of this assembly—Attempt to resume the Frankfort negotiations—Embassy of M. de Caulaincourt to the *avant-posts* of the Allied Armies—Evasive reply of M. de Metternich, who, without entering into the question of the resumption of negotiations, declares that the Allies await the arrival of Lord Castlereagh, who is actually on his way to the head-quarters of the Allies—Last measures of Napoleon on leaving Paris—His farewell to his wife and son, whom he never beholds again.

HISTORY

OF THE

CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE

UNDER

NAPOLEON.

BOOK LI.

THE INVASION.

NAPOLEON had just brought back the French army to the Rhine in the most deplorable condition. The guard was reduced from 40,000 to 10,000 men. D'Oudinot's corps (the 12th), de Reynier's (the 7th), d'Angereau's (the 16th), de Bertrand's (the 4th),—all now collected into one body under General Morand—did not amount to twelve thousand fighting men on the day of their entrance into Mayence, which they were charged to defend. Marmont's and Ney's corps, appointed, under Marmont, to defend the Rhine, from Manheim to Coblenz, had not 8,000 men under arms. The second, under Victor, had at the utmost, 5,000 men to defend the Upper Rhine, from Strasbourg to Bâle. Macdonald's corps, and Lauriston's (the 11th and 5th), assembled under Marshal Macdonald, and, destined for the Lower Rhine, had not 9,000 efficient men to defend the banks of this noble river from Coblenz to Arnheim. The French cavalry, divided into four bodies, ill-mounted, or else actually on foot, could not muster 10,000 cavalry soldiers fit for service. The Poles, reduced almost to nothing, had been sent to Sedan, where their dépôt was, to try to recruit. In short, a mass of stragglers, without arms, without clothes, bearing about them the germs of typhus fever, with which they infected every place through which they passed, recrossed the frontiers in small troops. It was almost a repetition of the retreat from Russia, with this difference—that there remained about 60,000

men under arms, and that instead of falling back upon resentful Germany, we were retiring into France, where we indeed found a home, but a home desolate and laid waste. The disaster of Moscow might have appeared only an accident, but an accident mighty as the destiny that presided over our fortunes ; but the campaign of 1813 following upon that of 1812, bore witness to the total desertion of fortune, and the ruin of a system to which was opposed the interest as well as the good sense of the civilized world, and which even the vastest genius was not sufficient to maintain against the current of events.

If such was the condition of things in the locality where Napoleon had commanded in person, it was scarcely more satisfactory elsewhere ; and his lieutenants, whether in Italy or in Spain, had not been more fortunate than himself.

Prince Eugene, appointed to defend the Julian Alps, had succeeded in drawing upon the old sources that supplied the army of Italy, and by recruiting in Piedmont, Tuscany, Provence, and Dauphiné, he had succeeded in raising 50,000 soldiers, instead of 80,000, for which he had received orders.

Of these he had formed six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, the soldiers were young, but the officers were experienced, and with their assistance he had endeavoured to keep the Drave and the Save from Willach to Laybach, covering the Tyrol with his left wing, and Carniola with his right. After having maintained this extensive line of operations during the months of August, September, and October, constantly expecting the Neapolitans, who never came ; he had seen the Austrians present themselves in masses in the passes of Carinthia, he had seen his army dwindle down through the desertion of the Croats and the Italians, and he had successively fallen back, first upon the Isonzo, and afterwards on the Tagliamento. The defection of Bavaria, by opening all the passages of the Tyrol upon his left, had rendered his position still more difficult, and in his anxiety to cover at the same time Verona and Trieste, he had divided his army into two bodies. He had sent General Grenier to Bassano with 15,000 men, while he endeavoured with 20,000, by manœuvring between the Tagliamento and the Piave, to cover Friouli and Venice. It was the studying General Bonaparte's campaigns that inspired him with the idea of sending General Grenier into the valley of Bassano, for in returning through this valley, the General might throw himself upon the Austrian flank, while General Giflenga tried with some thousand men to oppose them in front between Trente and Roveredo. But it avails little to borrow the ideas of great captains, if we cannot, at the same time, possess ourselves of their precision and energy in execution. Thus General Grenier lost most precious time wandering uselessly about ; and Prince Eugene, who had at his disposal not more than 20,000 men to resist the Austrian column coming from Laybach, was afraid of being thrown back upon the Adige—that is to say, behind the entrance to the valley of Bassano, which would have separated him from General Grenier. He then

recalled the latter, in order to retire finally to Verona. He had thus abandoned to the Austrians Carniola, Friuli, the Italian Tyrol, and only kept the fortresses, that is to say, Osopo, Palma-Nova, and Venice. The necessity of leaving garrisons in these important fortresses, and the desertion of the troops, had reduced his army to 36,000 fighting men, whilst the adverse generals, Hiller and Bellegarde, had 60,000 at their disposal, independent of the Tyrolean insurgents.

Once established on the Adige, Prince Eugene again took heart, and attacking the Austrians, sometimes on his left towards Roveredo, sometimes in front towards Caldiero, he killed or captured 7,000 or 8,000 in various engagements. He had thus succeeded in inspiring his adversaries with a certain amount of respect; but he had in his rear, Italy, that had fallen away from us, in consequence of the sufferings entailed by the war, and whom the priests and the English were exciting to revolt, and whom Murat did not endeavour to win back to us; all these circumstances presented difficulties which rendered it doubtful whether Prince Eugene could maintain his position. He could only answer for his own fidelity, simply, alas! for his own. The desolating intelligence from Leipsig had confounded and thoroughly shaken the different courts of Italy, though they were all of French origin. As to Prince Eugene, the husband, as we have seen, of a Bavarian princess, his father-in-law had sent an officer to inform him of the imperative reasons that had detached Bavaria from France, and to offer him an Italian principality if he consented to abandon the cause of Napoleon. Prince Eugene, overwhelmed with grief in thinking of his wife and children whom he loved, and whom he feared soon to see deprived of everything, replied that being indebted to Napoleon for the position he held, he could not think of abandoning him, that he should soon, perhaps, be obliged to seek an asylum at Munich, but he was certain the King of Bavaria, would rather receive a son-in-law deprived of a crown than lost to honour. Prince Eugene, after this noble reply contented himself with communicating to Napoleon an exact account of the interview.

The close of the year 1813 had been still more disastrous in Spain than in Italy. We must remember that Napoleon, immediately after the battle of Vittoria, being exceedingly irritated against his brother Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, had dispatched Marshal Soult to Spain, to re-establish our affairs there, and to render his authority more impressive, had conferred on him the rank of imperial lieutenant. Marshal Soult, whose quarrels with King Joseph we have not forgotten, returning armed with power to order the arrest of this prince, if he resisted, had felt a vain-glorious satisfaction, which, unfortunately for our cause, he was doomed soon to expiate. In an order of the day, insulting alike to Joseph and to Marshal Jourdan, he had imputed our misfortune in Spain, not to circumstances, but to the incapacity and cowardice of those who had preceded him in authority, not foreseeing that he thus deprived himself of every excuse in the circumstances in which he was soon after placed. He had immediately entered on the

duties of his office, and turned his attention to the re-organization of the army. Instead of allowing it to be portioned out into the army of Andalusia, the army of the Centre, the army of Portugal, and the Nord, an arrangement that presented serious inconveniences, Marshal Soult distributed the army into simple divisions, commanded by excellent generals, of whom there was a large number in the army of Spain. The organization of this army had been originally so good that it had withstood every reverse. After having distributed the army into ten divisions, of which one was a body of reserve, he confided the command of the right to General Reille; he gave the centre to General Count d'Erlon, and the left to General Clausel. The latter, after the battle of Vittoria, having succeeded by a miracle of courage in reaching Saragossa, had entered France by Jaca, and had just joined Soult with 15,000 men. This movement had certainly the disadvantage of leaving Saragossa unprotected, but it possessed the advantage of concentrating our forces against the English, who were our most formidable enemies in Spain, and it was natural to expect some favourable result from the judicious employment of these troops. The army in Spain, in respect to military qualification, was unrivalled, especially since the losses we had experienced in Russia and in Germany. They were the bravest soldiers, the most warlike, the most inured to fatigue, that could then be found in Europe. But they were at the same time irritated, disgusted at seeing themselves during six years victimised, not alone to the carrying out of a disastrous enterprise, but to the incapacity and rivalry of their commanders. With immense confidence in themselves, the soldiers had none in their generals, with the exception of Reille and Clausel, and they consequently expected nothing but defeat. This want of confidence in their commanders completely destroyed the spirit of discipline which had been already considerably weakened by want and privation. Long unaccustomed to having food provided for them, and living solely on what they tore from a population they hated, and by whom they were hated, they looked upon themselves as masters of everything within their reach, and even if they returned to France, it was not probable they would change their mode of thinking, if they did not alter their manner of living. Covered with rags, enbrowned by exposure to the sun, discontented, arrogant, commanded by officers in a still more lamentable plight, and who dared not show their ragged garments, they presented the most heart-rending of melancholy spectacles, that of brave soldiers struggling with vice and want. A great general who could have obtained a mastery over their minds, and led them again to victory, might have rendered them the greatest army in the world.

Napoleon, for fear of disorganizing the only provinces in Spain where the war had not proved disastrous, did not wish to withdraw Marshal Suchet from Arragon, and for the reasons we have already mentioned, he chose Soult. This marshal, who had acquired great military fame, less, certainly, in Spain, where he had already served, than elsewhere, was not received by the army with unqualified confidence. However, he was capable of repairing much of the mischief

that had been done. He had to do with a formidable enemy, we mean the Anglo-Portuguese army, reckoning 45,000 English, and 15,000 Portuguese, elated with victory; and in addition to these 30,000 or 40,000 Spaniards, the best soldiers in Spain. It was certainly possible with 70,000 French to make head against this army, numerically greater than ours, but much inferior in quality, with the exception of the English.

Lord Wellington, even after the battle of Vittoria, hesitated to penetrate into France, so he besieged St. Sebastian and Pampeluna, rather to find a pretext for temporizing, than to obtain possession of these two posts, which were scarcely worth the trouble of a siege. To protect this two-fold enterprise against the reprisals of the French, he had distributed his army with considerable ability, and surmounted, as much as possible, local difficulties. St. Sebastian, as is well known, is situate on the borders of the sea, nearly at the mouth of the Bidassoa, and at the extremity of the valley of Bastan. Pampeluna, on the contrary, the capital of Navarre, is situate on the opposite side of the valley, and in the basin of the Ebro. Lord Wellington had confided the siege of St. Sebastian to the Spanish army of Freyre, assisted by one Portuguese and two English divisions. These troops were of course posted near the sea, at the extremity of the valley of Bastan. There were in the neighbourhood of St. Estevan, about the centre of the valley of Bastan, three English divisions, ready to make a descent on St. Sebastian, or to march through the valley, and throw themselves on Navarre, thus aiding the other three English divisions, that were covering the siege of Pampeluna, which was confided to the Spanish troops under General Morillo. With such a distribution of his forces, the English general thought himself tolerably well prepared to meet events whatever turn they might take. Had he however been attacked with promptness and secrecy, it is by no means certain that he could have defended himself on every side. Aware of this, he was not without uneasiness, and guarded his position with extreme vigilance.

The French army was distributed in the valley of Saint Jean-Pied-de-Port, which serves as a basin to the Nive, and runs to the sea in a direction almost parallel to the valley of Bastan. Saint Jean-de-Port, which encloses the famous defile of Roncevaux, is the most important place on the upper basin of the Nive; as Bayonne, situate at the confluence of the Nive and the Adour is the principal point *en route* to the sea. A body of troops might with pretty equal chance of success, debouch by this valley, and throw themselves either on the column that was besieging St. Sebastian, or on that which was besieging Pampeluna, always bearing in mind that they should act so as to prevent the concentration of the adverse forces. There were some reasons however in favor of an attack on St. Sebastian. In the first place, St. Sebastian was more closely pressed, then the road thither was short and good, the journey could be made direct through Yrun, whilst that to reach Pampeluna, it would be necessary to traverse the entire valley of Saint Jean-Pied-de-Port, and pass through the

defile of Roncevaux. Both plans presented pretty much the same amount of facility, but to succeed in the execution of either, precision and celerity would be needed to drive back from French soil, the enemy just ready to plant his foot upon it.

On the 24th July, Marshal Soult marched forth, at the head of almost his entire army, leaving General Vilatte, with the body of reserve, in advance of Bayonne, and bringing with him about eighty pieces of cannon, taken from the arsenal of Bayonne, and drawn by horses, saved from the disaster of Vittoria. On the 25th he had debouched in the upper valley of the Bastan, with General D'Erlon's corps, and in the valley of Roncevaux, with the corps of Generals Reille and Clausel. The latter had found little difficulty in driving back to Pampeluna the Portuguese and two English divisions that defended the entrance to Navarre. But the Count D'Erlon, to reach the Bastan, had encountered considerable opposition from General Hill, in forcing the *col de Moya*. He had, however, succeeded with a loss of 2,000 men, the enemy losing on that occasion 3,000. All would have been well, if on the following day, (the 26th) the Count D'Erlon had been able quickly to rejoin our right, commanded by Generals Reille and Clausel. But the entire of the 26th was lost in rallying the troops, which proves that a grave error had been committed by the commanders, in not debouching simultaneously by the valley of Roncevaux, in order to fall suddenly on the English divisions, scattered in front of Navarre. When on the morning of the 27th Count D'Erlon joined Clausel and Reille, the English were already in a strong position in front of Pampeluna. Their forces consisted of four divisions, two English, one Portuguese, and one Spanish; the situation was precisely one of those where we had always attacked at a disadvantage. Moreover, the enemy was about to be strengthened by two divisions, hastening by forced marches from the valley of Bastan. In fact, Lord Wellington, having on the night of the 25th, learned our approach, turned to profit the entire of the 26th, which we had lost, and brought up his forces from Bastan to Navarre. Even whilst awaiting the expected divisions, the English commander had four perfectly fit for action. General Clausel, whose precision of glance in estimating the strength of a position, equalled his energy in action, was averse to attacking the English in front, but recommended that the position should be turned by making an attack on Pampeluna; General Soult not coinciding in his opinion, a strong position was attacked in front, and we had the same fortune there as at Vimero, Talavera, Albuera, and Salamanca. We killed a large number of the enemy, we lost as many ourselves, and we remained at the foot of the position without having carried it. The combat was renewed on the 28th, but without greater success, for the English had been reinforced in the meantime. On the 29th our troops were obliged to return from Navarre into France, after having lost from 11,000 to 12,000 men, and killed or wounded 12,000 of the enemy in the space of four days. But these losses were much more severe for us than for Lord Wellington. We had exhausted our resources,

whilst his were yet in good condition. Our troops had displayed greater valour than ever, and if they had not triumphed, they were not disappointed in their hopes, for they had long since ceased to expect anything either from the ability of their leaders, or the kind favors of fortune. The soldiers soon resumed their habits of indiscipline, and sentiments of contempt for their generals; they were in part disbanded, and living at the expense of the French peasants. In this manner, desertion soon equalized the losses on both sides, and each army reckoned from 13,000 to 14,000 men less in the ranks. Unfortunately, the efforts made at the two sieges had produced little result, and Lord Wellington, confining himself to the investiture of Pampeluna, had turned his principal efforts towards St. Sebastian, where the French General Rey supported with the aid of 2,500 men, a memorable siege. Three times had he repulsed the English at the mouth of the breach, after having caused them enormous losses.

Although repulsed, the army, touched by the heroism of the garrison of St. Sebastian, wished to assist them, and Marshal Soult having returned to Bayonne, made an attempt to aid this brave garrison, which supported so nobly the honour of the French arms. He had passed the Bidassoa and attacked the heights of St. Martial, defended by the Spanish army and two English divisions. The result of this battle was the same as that of all those where we had engaged the English in a defensible position. We caused them great losses, equal or superior to our own, thanks to the valour of our soldiers, but we were obliged to repass the Bidassoa, then swollen with rain, and on the 8th of September we saw the garrison of St. Sebastian surrender, after one of the most noble defences recorded in history. Happily for us, the siege of Pampeluna furnished Lord Wellington sufficient reason for not entering France, at least immediately. Marshal Soult, with an army reduced from 70,000 to only a little more than 50,000 men, had established his left wing on the Nive, round Saint Jean-Pied-de-Port, whilst with his right wing he occupied the banks of the Bidassoa. His left wing being in a valley, his centre and his right in another, there was in his line of operations a lengthened elevation, and here the strength of the position was doubtful. To alter this state of things, he would have been obliged to abandon a portion of the French territory, and it was natural to suppose he would hesitate before making such a sacrifice.

In this manner were passed the summer and the commencement of autumn on the Bidassoa. On his side, Marshal Suchet had resolved, on learning the disaster of Vittoria, to evacuate the kingdom of Valencia, though the sacrifice was a painful one. It certainly would have been better not to imitate the error committed at Dantzic, Stettin, Hambourg, Magdebourg, and Dresden, but rather abandon the possession of the most important places, than that a general should leave in his rear garrisons that he could not assist, and whose absence diminished considerably the efficiency of our armies. But the reiterated instructions of the War Minister, founded on the value that was attached to keeping possession of the Mediterranean shore, had induced the

Marshal to leave garrisons in a great number of places. He had left 12,000 men at Sagonta, 400 in each of the forts of Denia, Peniscola, and Morella; 4,000 at Tortosa, 1,000 at Mequinenza, 4,000 at Lerida, the same number at Tarragona, with money, provisions, ammunition, good officers—in a word, every means of defence for a year. After having deprived himself of these detachments, he had returned to Arragon at the head of only 25,000 soldiers, but men in the vigour of health, well-dressed, well-fed, regretted everywhere by the people through whose territory they passed, and whom they had spared the horrors attendant on war. Marshal Suchet had at first wished to fall back on Saragossa, but Mina having seized it since the departure of General Clausel, he had been obliged to retire to Barcelona, and to abandon Arragon, in order to defend Catalonia against the Anglo-Sicilian army, which did not amount to less than 50,000 men. Judging that the garrison of Tarragona was not in a condition to make an effective defence, Marshal Suchet had for a moment resumed offensive operations, put the enemy to flight, reached Tarragona, blew up the works, and brought the garrison away, so that he now only left in his rear the garrisons of Sagonta, Tortosa, Mequinenza, Lérida, Peniscola, Morella, and Denia. It was quite enough in the existing state of European affairs! Not wishing to allow the enemy to attain a too decisive advantage, he attacked them anew at the *Col d' Ordal*, and after a most brilliant engagement, had forced the English to retire to the sea shore.

The events of the summer and autumn had thus been somewhat less disastrous in this part of the Peninsula than in the other, but if there and elsewhere the fortresses had been evacuated, we might have assembled a noble army of at least 40,000 men, amply provided with every necessary, and led by a chief who possessed the entire confidence of the soldiers; such an army would have contributed to defend our frontiers victoriously. Unfortunately, in the south as in the north, the vain hope of quickly recovering a chimerical grandeur had perverted the judgment of Napoleon, and deprived France of those resources which would have powerfully aided to avert her misfortunes.

Marshal Soult, in quest of French combinations, would willingly have made use of the army of Arragon, to make some important move against Lord Wellington. He at one time wished that Marshal Suchet, traversing Catalonia and Arragon, would join him by passing through Lerida, Saragossa, Tudela, and Pampeluna, with about 25,000 men. At another time Marshal Soult expressed a wish that Suchet, making an immense *detour* through Perpignan, Toulouse, and Bayonne, should join him to debouch *en masse* against the English. The former of these plans exposed Marshal Suchet to the risk attendant on a march of more than one hundred leagues, between the Anglo-Sicilian army, which amounted to 70,000 men, including the Catalonians, and the army of Lord Wellington, which reckoned 100,000 soldiers; that is to say, Marshal Suchet would be exposed to the danger of being overwhelmed by these combined forces, or of being thrust back into Spain, where he would have been, so to speak, cast

into an abyss. The second plan, by condemning him to a journey of one hundred and fifty leagues through France, would abandon all the fortresses in Catalonia, and on the frontiers of Rousillon, to the Anglo-Sicilian army, and this risk was to be incurred for a doubtful advantage, for it was by no means certain that Marshal Soult, not having been able to conquer the English with 70,000 men, would succeed in doing so with 90,000; his army not having been deficient on the former occasions in numerical strength. Each of these projects had been pronounced impracticable, and it was only the termination of the war in Spain which, in putting an end to the alliance between the English and the Spaniards, could rid us of both; excepting indeed that the English might, at a later period, appear off our coasts. At length, on the 7th of October, Marshal Soult's right wing having been surprised at Andaye, he had lost 2,400 men, and had been obliged to make to the enemy the first concession they had received of French territory. Pampeluna had opened its gates on the 31st, and Lord Wellington, having no motive to pause on the frontiers, had been led, almost in spite of himself, to cross.

The situation of our armies was then disheartening on every side. On the Rhine we had 50,000 or 60,000 men worn out from fatigue, followed by an equal number of stragglers and invalids, and having to contend with 300,000 men of the European coalition; in Italy we had 36,000 men in juxta position on the Adige with 60,000 Austrians, and burdened with the difficult task of holding Italy in check, that was weary of our rule, and of restraining Murat, who was ready to abandon us; on the frontier of Spain we had 50,000 veterans, disheartened by misfortune, scarcely able to hold the western Pyrenees against 100,000 victorious soldiers under Lord Wellington; and on this same frontier we had 25,000 more old veterans, in excellent condition certainly, but called upon to defend the eastern Pyrenees against more than 70,000 English, Sicilians, and Catalonians. Such was the exact position of our affairs, numerically noted down. Napoleon had, it is true, proved a hundred times with what prodigious rapidity he could create resources, but he had never before found himself in such distress. More than 140,000 of our best troops were dispersed in different European fortresses; there remained in France only deserted depôts, which even in 1813 had made an effort to drill raw recruits in two or three months, and had sent them forth, officered by the few experienced men they still possessed. Undoubtedly there were still in the regiments that returned to France experienced soldiers and officers, but the authorities were now about to send to them recruits, ill-dressed, ill-drilled, in order that these old soldiers might do for the recruits what the depôts had neither time nor capability to effect; in fact, they were to be constrained to employ in instructing these conscripts the time they would have needed for repose, if the enemy had left them leisure for any. Our fortresses, which would have served as a support to the army, were, as we have said, stripped of all means of defence. Sending an immense amount of war material beyond the frontiers had deprived our home fortresses of indispensable necessities. We had sent to

Magdebourg and to Hambourg what was wanted at Strasbourg and Metz, and to Alexandria what would have been needed at Grenoble. Even a part of the Lille artillery was still at the camp of Boulogne. But it was not alone the *matériel* of war in which we were deficient. Our engineer officers, so numerous, so skilful, so brave, were scattered through more than a hundred foreign cities. We had hardly time to form some cohorts of national guards to hasten to Strasbourg, to Landau, to Metz, to Lille. Thus, in order to conquer the world, which was now escaping from her grasp, France had left herself defenceless. Our finances, formerly so prosperous, managed with admirable regularity, were now as exhausted as our armies, through the chimera of universal domination. The municipal lands seized to liquidate the debt of 1811 and 1812, and to supply the deficiency of 1813, had remained unsold. It was doubtful whether purchasers could be found for ten millions. The paper which represented the anticipated price, sunk from 15 to 20 per cent., although nearly the entire of what had been issued was still in the coffers of the bank, and in those of the crown itself, which had taken more than seventy millions. The moral condition of the country was still more wretched, if possible, than the *matériel*. The soldiers, convinced of the folly of the policy for which they were pouring forth their blood, murmured aloud, though they were ever ready, in presence of the enemy, to sustain the national honour. The nation, deeply irritated that the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen had not been profited of to conclude a peace, looked upon themselves as sacrificed to a mad ambition, now that they had experienced the grave inconveniences of an irresponsible government. Disillusioned as to the genius of Napoleon, having never believed in his prudence, but having always had faith in his invincibility, they were at one and the same time disgusted with his government, doubtful of his military capability, and terrified at the approach of enemies who were advancing in masses; the French people, in a word, were morally broken down, at the very moment when, to avert the impending danger, they would have needed all the patriotic enthusiasm with which they were animated in 1792, or at least the confiding admiration with which the First Consul had inspired them in 1800. Never, in short, was a people in a state of more profound dejection called upon to encounter a more imminent peril.

To a certainty, if the victorious foreigners who suspected a part of these truths, had known them in their full extent, they would have paused on the banks of the Rhine only a single day, a sufficient time to provide ammunition and provisions, and would have crossed this river, which since 1795 had been regarded as an inviolable frontier; they would have marched straight to Paris, that city where, but a short while before, the Genius of Victory seemed to have taken up a permanent abode. But the allies, fatigued by their extraordinary efforts, even still astonished at their success, notwithstanding the two campaigns that had terminated to their advantage, felt disposed to pause on the banks of the Rhine. It was the last respite that fortune seemed willing to grant ere she abandoned us for ever.

More than one cause contributed to the mode of conduct then adopted by the Allies, but the glory acquired by the French nation was the determining motive. If the policy of Napoleon had raised the civilized world against him, the glory he had shed over the French people, the unexampled bravery with which we had supported his gigantic enterprises, the recollection of how the French nation had risen to a man in 1792, to repulse the aggression of all Europe, furnished a motive of reflection to the continental powers, who had most at stake in a contest with France. They hated us intensely, but they feared us quite as much. The idea of crossing the Rhine, and of braving within their own realm this people, who had inundated all Europe with their victorious armies, amongst whom there was not a man who had not borne arms, and where each individual might, indeed, blame the ambition of his chief, but who would, in all probability support him, with might and main, if the enemy, having touched the frontiers of France, should attempt to cross. These considerations disturbed, intimidated the most experienced of the allied ministers and generals. Besides, after having expelled Napoleon from Germany, what more was there to desire? Would it be wise after an unexpected triumph to tempt fortune again, to fail perhaps in a rash enterprise, to be repulsed beyond the Rhine, and all for want of having had the prudence to pause at that point? This would render Napoleon more exacting than ever, and awaken in him pretensions that were nearly extinct, and would condemn the Allies to an endless war, because they had not the good sense to make peace at the proper time, acting in this respect as unwisely as Napoleon had done at Prague. And then, had not the war already been sufficiently desolating? There was not an army in Europe that did not bear about with them strong testimony of how deeply they had suffered, not alone at Moscow, Lutzen, Bautzen, and Dresden, where they had been conquered, but at Katzbach, Gross-Beeren, Kulm, Dennewitz, and Leipzig, where they had been victorious. With the exception of the Prussians, amongst whom there prevailed a sort of national *furor*, excited by the influence of secret societies, the desire of peace was general amongst the military men of all nations. Though very brave and proud of their success, the Russians had not wished to cross the Oder, they were still more unwilling to cross the Rhine; they thought they had done quite enough in fighting their way from Moscow to Mayence, and that they really had no interest in going further. The Austrians, who had been fighting two and twenty years, and who had ejected from Austria and Germany the conqueror of Marengo, Aus-trelitz, and Wagram, were desirous of rest. They saw in the prolongation of the war only a means of satisfying the hatred of Prussia, and of increasing the influence of the Russians and English, with, at the same time, the risk of a general defeat. They were, therefore, strongly inclined to peace, which it now seemed probable could be made on a permanent basis. At the head of the military men most anxious for peace, was Prince Schwartzemberg. He was tired of the violence of the Prussians, the airs of superiority assumed by the

Russians, and the obstinacy of the English, and had spoken strongly in favor of peace, and in the camp of the Allies no one opposed the soundness of his arguments. And what was very extraordinary, the celebrated English commander, Lord Wellington, who was the first in Europe that gave a check to Napoleon's power, and whose fame was constantly increasing, even he seemed to hesitate on approaching the formidable frontiers of France. And yet, he could not be reproached with timidity, for in 1810 and in 1811 he had remained alone in arms on the continent, running at every moment the risk of being pushed into the ocean by the army of France. Even after the decisive battle of Vittoria, which had taken place at our very threshold, Lord Wellington had not advanced a step, and in reply to the urgent commands of his government, he said that a general ought to reflect seriously before placing his foot on the burning soil of France. Alas! our enemies who had so often misunderstood us, and who were doomed to misunderstand us again, flattered us still. They were not aware that a long misuse of our national strength had exhausted our resources, and that disgusted with a prolonged despotism, and indignant with a licentious ambition, the people of France had become isolated from the government, and were inclined to look upon the war as a matter interesting to the legislators exclusively, but in which the people had no direct interest. The error into which our enemies had fallen was not fated to be of long duration, but it was very general; they paid us the homage of trembling at the idea of putting a foot on French soil.

This pacific disposition, observable amongst the military world, with the exception of the Prussians, was less prevalent amongst the statesmen of the coalition, if we except M. de Metternich. This sagacious minister, who in 1813 had displayed a rare combination of tact and frankness, of determination, and of prudence, shrunk from the idea of exposing the fortunes of Austria to fresh risks, and in this respect as in many others, was entirely of the same opinion as his master. M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis had decided on war, because Germany called loudly for it, because the opportunity of re-establishing the affairs of Austria, and of saving the independence of Germany, was too glorious not to be profited of; but having attained their object, they did not wish, in attempting to win back all the former glory of Austria, to incur the risk of losing what they had already gained, and at the same time run the chance of increasing beyond measure, Russian preponderance in Europe, Russian preponderance in Germany, and English preponderance on the seas. Austria, certain of no longer having the grand duchy of Warsaw on her northern frontiers, and assured of recovering all she had been deprived of in Poland to constitute this duchy, and of regaining the frontier of the Inn, Tyrol, Illyria, and part of Friuli, and of no longer being obliged to maintain the Confederation of the Rhine, ought to consider, and did consider herself perfectly satisfied. The Emperor Francis, constant in adversity and moderate in prosperity, was decidedly of this opinion, and M. de Metternich, the faithful

interpreter of his thoughts, coincided with him entirely. As to the rest, the marriage of Marie Louise, concocted solely for the interests of the empire, added very little to these excellent reasons. But, if the Allies passed the Rhine, a question immediately arose, which had not yet presented itself to the minds of any but a few inconsolable old men, whose regrets had lately been converted into sanguine hopes, and this question was nothing less than the total overthrow of Napoleon himself. To resist his intolerable rule, to restrain, if possible, his excessive ambition, had been at first the desire of all his enemies; to hurl him from the throne of France had never entered into anybody's mind. However, to conquer a man, whose title to consideration was based solely on his victories; and after having conquered him in Russia, in Poland, in Germany, to conquer him perhaps in France itself, if the attempt were made; such a series of victories might naturally awaken the idea of attacking his person, and depriving him by the sword of a crown gained by the sword. The bare idea of such a possibility threw the Prussians into extacies of joy, and stirred the peaceful and calm-beating heart of Frederic-William. As for Alexander, whom Napoleon had personally humiliated, he had never dreamed of so splendid a vengeance, but presented by circumstances, he did not reject it; on the contrary, his most ardent wish was to enjoy such a revenge in its fullest extent. But, supposing the object attained, what was to become of the throne of France, thus rendered vacant? The Prussians cared little about that, provided they could hurl from the pinnacle of his grandeur, him, who so often had trampled them under foot, and Alexander was equally indifferent to consequences, if he could only be revenged for the contumelious contempt he had experienced from the haughty conqueror. But hatred blinded neither the Emperor Francis nor his minister; they were guided solely by a regard for the interests of Austria, and they asked themselves the question, if the Allies crossed the Rhine, what would they do on the other side?

As to Napoleon's being married to Marie-Louise, although the Emperor Francis was not a bad father, that circumstance touched him and his minister very slightly. They were influenced by very different feelings. No power in the world had suffered so much as Austria from the spirit of innovation, or had struggled so vigorously against it during three centuries. In the 18th century, she had encountered the great Frederich, and had lost Silesia. During the French revolution, she had encountered Napoleon, and lost the Low Countries Suabia, Italy, and the Germanic crown. If we go back even to the time of the Protestant reformation, we find her, under Charles V. struggling against Luther, that is to say, against the spirit of innovation. An abhorrence of revolutions was a hereditary policy of Austria's, suspended, perhaps, during a short interval under Joseph II., but soon resumed by his successors, and as active as far-sighted under Francis II. and M. de Metternich. They, therefore, asked each other, with an anxiety unshared by any of the Allies, to whom should they confide the government of this stormy France that

held in her hand, not alone the terrible sword of war, but the not less destructive torch of revolution. As to the Bourbons, who would have suited them in many respects, they scarcely thought of them, because that France and Europe thought still less of them, and besides, the capability of the Bourbons was doubtful. It did not appear either to the Emperor or his minister easy to replace a soldier of genius, who was willing to repress the spirit of revolution, from which he had himself arisen, not through prejudice, because he entertained none, but through the two-fold love of order and of power; thinking, then, less of the interests of Marie-Louise, than of the dangers of a French revolution, ready to burst forth again in all its horrors, the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich were not at all inclined to dethrone Napoleon.

Satisfied with the obtained results, and fearing rather than desiring the vacancy of the French throne, the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich decided, that once arrived at the banks of the Rhine, it would be better to make Napoleon fresh offers of peace, and, a most unexpected circumstance, England, the persevering enemy of the Bonaparte family, acquiesced in the views entertained by the cabinet of Vienna. The British cabinet having formerly loudly proclaimed their desire of reinstating the Bourbons on the throne of France, having suffered on this account during twenty years, the attack of the opposition, by whom they were reproached with carrying on a ruinous war, in which the interests of England were no ways involved; the English ministers at length seemed to fear this reproach, and by dint of defending themselves, in the end, ceased to merit the accusation. Lord Aberdeen, the British representative at the court of the Allies, one of the most upright and enlightened ministers that England ever possessed, he, too, was of M. de Metternich's opinion, and did not hesitate to say that if Napoleon made the necessary concessions it would be better to come to terms, and treat him in all respects as a perfectly legitimate sovereign.

Once arrived on the banks of the Rhine, the Allies were obliged to come to some resolution on this point. In fact certain antecedents necessitated them to do so. M. de Metternich, on the very morrow of Austria's coalition with the belligerent powers, and whilst all were still in Bohemia, even then M. de Metternich had proposed and obtained the general sanction to some important resolutions, all drawn up with the view of obviating the effects of that spirit of discord which usually prevails in coalitions. In the first place, as the sovereigns and their principal ministers were assembled, he proposed that they should not separate until the war should be terminated. Secondly, he had asked and obtained the nomination of a Commander-in-Chief who, as we have seen, was the Prince de Schwarzenberg. Thirdly, he had proposed as the object for which the war was to be carried on, not conquest, but the restitution to each sovereign of what he had lost. Now, this proposition might give rise to great uncertainty in the case of Prussia and Austria, both of which had during the past twenty years undergone such numerous transforma-

tions ; but to obviate these complications, the Austrian minister had specified that the condition in which Austria and Prussia actually were before the war of 1805, should be regarded as their normal state, and it was moreover decided that the reconquered provinces should be placed as pledges in the hands of the Allies. Lastly, M. de Metternich had induced the sovereigns to consent that the war should not be reckoned by campaigns or by years, but by periods measured by the importance of the results obtained. Thus, the progress to the Rhine and the arrival of the army there, was to constitute the first period. The second if they were constrained to undertake it, should terminate at the heights of the Voges and the Ardennes. The third period, if they were absolutely compelled to carry the war so far, should finish only in Paris itself. The consequence of these profoundly thoughtful resolutions was, that without reverting to the motive, the Allies, as each period terminated, paused before commencing the next, to examine deliberately whether peace might not be possible.

Thus, influenced by all the reasons we adduced, Austria, without being at all anxious to take the initiative in fresh negotiations, was still desirous of letting Napoleon know that this was the moment to treat ; she wished to advise him to act more wisely than he had done at Prague, and to endeavour, moreover, to conserve a throne, whose security had not hitherto been questioned, but which might soon become doubtful ; she wished to counsel him to guard carefully the fair territory of France, and to limit his ambition within the frontier, laid down by the treaty of Lunéville. The allied sovereigns and their ministers being at that moment assembled at Frankfort, chance furnished them an opportunity of communicating their opinion to Napoleon, an opinion at that time perfectly sincere, for they had not then crossed the Rhine.

M. de Saint Aignan had been formerly French minister at Weimar. This gentleman combined, with an enlightened intellect, a mild and conciliating temper ; he possessed, moreover, the advantages, at that time highly esteemed, of being the brother-in-law of M. de Caulaincourt, and it was well known, throughout Europe, that M. de Caulaincourt was the only person in the court of France, then so subservient to the will of Napoleon, who had the wisdom to uphold a peace policy ; and this fact, added to the important position he held, rendered him in the eyes of Europe one of the most respectable ministers of the French empire. His brother-in-law had been, by a forced interpretation of the rights of war, looked upon as a prisoner, when the Allies entered Weimar. He had been first banished to Toplitz, but afterwards recalled to Frankfort, where he was indemnified by every mark of personal respect for a temporary annoyance. He was asked to undertake a mission to Paris, for the purpose of suggesting to Napoleon the idea of a Congress, which should assemble immediately on the frontiers, and treat of peace upon the double basis of the natural limits of France, and a complete independence for all nations.

M. de Metternich was the first who made a confidential communication

to M. de Saint Aignan touching the nature of this mission. He assured him that Europe was desirous of peace, that she wished it upon honourable terms, and such as every nation in Europe might accept ; that she was well aware that, after twenty years of successive victories, France had acquired the right to be respected, and she should enjoy her privilege ; that it was not the intention of the Allies to try to re-establish the ancient order of things ; that Austria did not seek to recover all she had formerly possessed ; she would be satisfied to take a suitable and secure position. This was the limit of the pretensions made by the allied princes, and in proof of the sincerity of their intentions, M. de Metternich was commissioned to propose that France should be limited to her natural boundaries, that is to say—the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and nothing beyond. He added besides, that it was time for all parties to think of peace, and for France not less than for the rest of Europe ; and for Napoleon in particular, more than for any of the belligerent parties, for he had raised up against him a fearful tempest, and the personal irritation he had excited was constantly increasing ; that it inspired the combatants with a warlike rage it was difficult to repress ; that if he reflected wisely he would see that the sentiments that agitated Europe had penetrated into France itself, and it might happen that he should soon find himself as friendless in his own country as he was in the rest of the world ; that the time for entering into an honourable treaty was come, but if the propitious moment were allowed to pass, the war would become intense, implacable, and without hope of cessation until either the one party or the other should be destroyed. Besides, the allied sovereigns would not separate, they would in common make every necessary sacrifice ; their offers of peace were sincere, and they wished peace to be universal by land and sea ; Russia, Prussia, England herself wished it. It was now necessary to lay all distrust aside, for the desire to stay the effusion of blood was universal ; but it would be well not to fall again into the deplorable error committed at Prague, where in consequence of not believing in Austria, and of not coming to a determination in time, France lost an opportunity of making peace on terms that she could never hope to obtain again. To confirm what he said, M. de Metternich introduced successively M. de Nesselrode and Lord Aberdeen, who repeated in the most succinct but decided terms all that the Austrian minister had said. Lord Aberdeen affirmed, in the name of the British cabinet, that they did not wish either to degrade or humiliate France ; that they had no intention of disputing her natural frontiers, for they knew there were certain events to which it was better not to revert ; but he repeated that beyond these limits they were decided not to yield to France either territory, or actual authority, nor even influence, with the exception of what all the great Powers exercised on one another, when they were content to make use of the advantages of their position without abusing them.

Influenced by all he had seen and heard, M. de Saint Aignan did not entertain the slightest doubt of the sincerity of this language. He replied that taken by surprise, and not having any positive mis-

sion, he could listen to everything without disobeying instructions that he had never received, but he would report exactly what he had been commissioned to say. He however thought it better for the sake of correctness, that he should be furnished with a written recapitulation of the proposed conditions. M. de Metternich saw no difficulty in the matter, and remitted to M. de Saint Aignan a short but concise note containing the following enunciations.

"The allied sovereigns will not separate, but will remain united, whatever may happen, until peace is concluded. This peace must be general and prevail on the sea as well as on land. It must be founded on the principle of the independence of every nation within its limits, either natural or historical. The Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, will mark the frontiers of France, but she must confine herself within these limits: Holland is to be independent, and her frontiers on the French side shall be afterwards determined; Italy also must be independent, and her Austrian frontiers on the Friuli, as well as her French frontiers on the Piedmontese borders, will be a question of future consideration. The Bourbon dynasty must be restored in Spain." (This condition was a *sine qua non*.)

England also was to make restitution beyond the seas, and each nation was to enjoy an entire freedom of trade as should be laid down according to the laws of nations, &c. On this last point alone Lord Aberdeen raised some difficulties, but M. de Metternich, who acted as secretary, satisfied all parties by the use of those vague terms that we have reported. M. de Saint Aignan immediately set out for Mayence, bearing with him the most affectionate messages for M. de Caulaincourt. The purport of these verbal missives was that the Allies believed him so honourable and so upright that they were content to accept him as arbiter of the conditions of peace, if Napoleon would invest him with full powers for that purpose.

M. de Saint Aignan arrived on the 11th November at Mayence, and on the 14th at Paris. He did not delay to communicate his mission to M. de Bassano, who immediately forwarded the communication to Napoleon. This minister was, it must be admitted, considerably changed. Of his former dangerous infatuation, he now only preserved the exterior semblance. His disposition and turn of thought had yielded to the weight of events. He had, consequently, the wisdom to speak favorably to Napoleon of the propositions of Frankfurt. They were certainly generous and advantageous! What could we, in fact, desire beyond the Alps and the Rhine? What had we gained by passing these strong and well-defined frontiers? Nothing but the hatred of other nations, the constant effusion of their blood and ours, with thrones for some of the Emperor's family, the greater number of which were at that moment overturned, or made instrumental to our injury, because that our government of neighbouring people had assumed the humiliating form of foreign rule; and if, in short, either through pride or fraternal affection, the Emperor absolutely demanded some territory beyond the Rhine or the Alps, did not

the terms employed for fixing the limits of Holland and of Italy, offer an opportunity of obtaining these family indemnifications?

There was not the slightest ground for refusing the indirect but positive propositions of Frankfort. In fact, apoleon did not for a moment think of refusing, though his pride suffered severely, but he was now paying the penalty of his errors, for any concession was an admission of weakness. But not to accept instantly the propositions just arrived from Frankfort would be giving the Allies an opportunity of withdrawing their offer when they should discover the destitution of France, the dispersion of her resources from Cadiz to Dantzic, her moral dejection, her estrangement from apoleon; when, especially, the English people, elated by the accounts of the late successes of the Allies, should learn these things, they would wish to push their advantage to the last extremity. This danger existed, and it was, in fact, the most serious; but there was another also; it was being obliged to avow himself, what the Emperor feared the Allies would soon guess, and betraying by too ready concessions the powerlessness to which he was reduced.

Compliance on the part of a person less obstinate than apoleon, might have appeared dictated by a spirit of conciliation, but for him to yield every point immediately, to fall unhesitatingly into the views of the Allies, would be to acknowledge his utter distress. There, side by side with the danger of resisting, was the no less imminent peril of yielding; a not unfrequent consequence of erroneous conduct, which leads us into positions, beset with difficulties, and where there is as much to be feared from drawing back as from advancing.

However, the greatest error would be to display a spirit of obstinacy by furnishing those, who reluctantly made the propositions of Frankfort, an excuse to withdraw their offers; it was better to consent to everything, and that immediately, than run the risk of exposing a secret, which, after all, could not be long concealed. apoleon wished by replying promptly to evince an eagerness to negotiate, and having only required the afternoon of the 15th for reflection, he sent his answer on the 16th. But the terms of the reply were not happily chosen. There was no allusion to the proposed bases of negotiation, consequently no acceptance of these bases. Mannheim was mentioned as a place for the assembly of the future congress, a city, whose locality indicated the intention of entering on business without delay; in short, the reply contained ironical phrases, particularly bitter against England, *a-propos* of the independence of nations, which France, it was remarked, demanded both by sea and land. Such was the substance of the reply, a reply which certainly was not delayed, for it was instantly despatched to Marshal Marmont, who commanded at Mayence, with orders to forward it at once to Frankfort. The silence observed by the Emperor on the proposed conditions was, without doubt, a part of his policy, and intended to prevent the Allies divining his reduced position; for this silence seemed to indicate that he was quite ready to accept every proposition, but it had the disadvantage of discouraging the Allies, if they were sincere, and if they were not so,

it furnished them a plausible opportunity for withdrawing their offers.

When Napoleon arrived at Paris, he found the public there plunged in the most profound dejection, in fact almost in despair, but at the same time strongly excited against him. The police, however active they might be, or however arbitrary, could scarcely suppress the manifestation of this general feeling. Although nobody, not even a member of the government was in the secret of the negotiations of Prague, although Napoleon had made his ministers and even the chancellor of Cambaceres himself believe, that the Allies had tried to humiliate him, even to the point of depriving him of Venice, which was not true, the public were convinced that if the negotiations had failed, it was through his fault. The French could not forgive him for having neglected the favourable opportunities for concluding peace which the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen afforded. They regarded his ambition as extravagant, cruel to the mass of mankind, and fatal to France. After the disasters of 1813 added to those of 1812, the French people did not think themselves in a position to resist the formidable coalition, which from the Rhine, the Adige, and the Pyrenees threatened France with the invasion of a million soldiers. The newspaper writers, either gagged or bribed, and whom no person believed, even when they did speak the truth, had received instructions from the Duke of Rovigo upon the manner in which they were to represent the disasters of this campaign. The frost had served as an explanation of the misfortunes of 1812; the defection of the Allies was an excuse for the discomfitures of 1813. Besides these excuses another was found in the unexpected explosion of the bridge of Leipsig. But for the criminal conduct of the Saxons and the Bavarians, exclaimed the apologists; but for the fault of the officer, who blew up the bridge of Leipsig, Napoleon, after conquering the Allies, would have returned to the Rhine, bearing with him to France the terms of an honourable peace. Then there was no term of execration that was not lavished on the Bavarians and still more on the Saxons. They also persisted in declaring that Colonel Montfort was to be tried by court-martial for the catastrophe of the bridge of Leipsig, though whatever such persons might say, Colonel Montfort was perfectly innocent. Nobody believed these assertions, and like liars, who when they perceive they are not believed, raise their voices still higher, these bribed journalists repeated with more bitterness their appointed lesson, without obtaining more credence. "He wants to sacrifice all our children to his wild ambition," was the cry of every family from Paris, even to the extremity of the most remote provinces. They did not deny the genius of Napoleon, they did worse, they did not think of it at all, in order to avoid remembering his passion for wars and conquests. The horror which the guillotine formerly inspired the French people they now felt at the prospect of war. The universal topic of conversation was the battle-fields of Spain and Germany, the millions of dying, of wounded, and of sick, expiring without attendance on the fields of Leipsig and

Vittoria. They represented Napoleon as a kind of war demon, thirsting for blood, and happy only when surrounded by desolation and death. France, formerly disgusted with liberty after ten years of revolution, was now disgusted with despotism, after fifteen years of military rule, and the effusion of human blood from one end of Europe to the other. The violence of the prefects, in carrying off the children of the humbler classes as conscripts, and those of the higher classes to form guards of honour; worrying families whose sons did not respond to the summons by the demand for subsidies; employing moveable columns against the malcontents who traversed the country; often treating French provinces as if they were portions of a conquered kingdom, converting into compulsory taxes the pretended voluntary gifts proposed and acceded to by their representatives; the seizure at one and the same time of goods, horses, cattle; a suspicious police, reporting the slightest observations, and arbitrarily imprisoning those who were accused of making them, and always suspected of being present even when they were not; a deep misery in the seaports in consequence of the suspension of commerce; equal distress on the frontiers, across which our traffic formerly found a safe passage, but where a million foreign bayonets now intercepted the transport of a single bale of merchandize; in a word, an inexpressible and universal dread of invasion—all these evils, arising at the same time from the uncontrolled will of one individual, furnished a severe lesson, which effaced that of the revolution, and which, without rendering France republican, awakened a desire for a constitutional monarchy. All the old parties, which had almost sunk into oblivion, began again to revive. The revolutionists made some efforts, but it must be avowed, without effect. Some, but certainly not a numerous party, attached themselves to Napoleon through fear of the Bourbons, whom they hated; they wished to make him dictator, on condition that he would have recourse to extraordinary measures, and that he would call the people to a movement similar to that of 1792. But these were maniacs, dreaming of a past that could never be recalled. The movement of 1792 had been only a burst of indignation on the part of France, when unjustly assailed by all Europe; but now the cases were reversed, and allied Europe experienced against France as strong a sentiment of indignation as France had formerly entertained against the rest of Europe. The royalists, partizans of the house of Bourbon, revived by hopes excited by the priests, now more daring and more numerous than the revolutionists, began to raise their voices and obtain an audience. France had almost forgotten the Bourbons, from whom she had been separated by events of such magnitude that they seemed to occupy the space of centuries in the public mind; she feared, besides, the Bourbon manner of thinking, their accessories, their resentments; but terrified at the further prospect of Imperial government, and determinately repulsing republican rule, France began to think that the Bourbons, restrained by wise laws, might offer a means of escaping from despotism as well as from anarchy. As to the rest, it was only men of the highest order of mind that carried their views further. The mass of the people hailed the

name of the Bourbons in order to stop the cry of war, which was devouring their children, increasing taxation, and paralyzing commerce.

When a government begins to be in danger, an indubitable evidence may be found in the temper of mind displayed by the functionaries. In 1813 and 1814, the functionaries of the empire were low-spirited, dejected, discouraged, and though a certain number affected a violent zeal, the greater part without avowing it, entertained as inimical a feeling towards Napoleon as his greatest enemies, because they felt that in compromising himself, he had involved them all. But danger had infused somewhat of a spirit of independence into some of the higher functionaries. They told Napoleon at the close of 1812, and they repeated it to him at the end of 1813, that without peace, all would be destroyed, they as well as he. Soldiers of the highest rank that he had loaded with gifts, but to whom he denied leisure to enjoy them, maintained a sullen silence, or said harshly that no resource remained but to carry on the war. Two most sensible men, one a soldier, the other a government functionary, Berthier and Cambacérès, no longer concealed their consternation. Berthier fell ill; Cambacérès fell into a fit of devotion, which being utterly unlike any affection he had ever before manifested, was considered a visible consequence of profound dejection. Concealing his real opinion from Napoleon, as from one he deemed incorrigible, he asked permission to retire, in order to finish his days in repose and piety. Some others, less resigned, had manifested their vexation more openly. Ney, it is said, had given vent to violent expressions; Marmont had presumed upon the liberty of an old acquaintance to offer some advice; Macdonald, with a rather uncouth mixture of craft and simplicity, had expressed his opinion; M. de Caulaincourt had given utterance to his, with his accustomed courage, and a sort of respectful haughtiness. All were unanimous on one point—a desire for peace. And there was the Empress, who, without giving an advice, for she did not know who was right or wrong, did nothing but weep. She feared for herself, for her son, even for Napoleon, whom she loved at that time, as a young woman loves the man she has married.

This idea of peace, which pursued him like a bitter reproach, annoyed Napoleon, so much the more, because not having desired, when it depended on himself to obtain it, he now felt that desiring, he could no longer procure it, and that peace so long repulsed, at last eluded his pursuit. Strange and fatal vengeance, evolved from our own misdeeds. Europe had certainly just offered with sincerity to resume negotiations, but that sincerity might be doubted by one who was not in the councils of the Allies, and it was besides probable they would not persevere in the offer as soon as our weakness, which could not be long concealed, should become publicly known. Napoleon then had very little faith in the possibility of an acceptable peace, and only expected it from a last desperate struggle, kept up on our frontiers or beyond. This was why he addressed the following reply to all his censors, whether open or secret. "It is easy," said he to them, "to speak of peace, but it is not so easy to conclude it."

Europe seems to offer peace, but she does not wish it sincerely. She has conceived the hope of destroying us, and this hope, once conceived, she will never abandon, unless we can make her feel the impossibility of success. You believe that it is by humiliating ourselves, we shall disarm her; you are mistaken. The more yielding you are, the more exacting she will become, and from demand to demand, she will lead you on to terms of peace that you could not accept. She offers you the line of the Rhine and the Alps, and even some part of Piedmont. These certainly are favourable conditions; but if you appear willing to accept, she will soon propose the frontiers of 1790. Well, can I accept them—I, to whom the natural frontiers have been transmitted by the Republic? There has been perhaps a moment, when we ought to have shown ourselves more moderate, but in the actual state of things, too manifest a yielding on our part, would be an avowal of our distress that would render the prospect of peace more remote than ever. We must fight once more, fight desperately, and if we conquer, then we ought certainly hasten to conclude peace, and in such a work, believe me, none will be more eager than I."

Unfortunately each moment added to the correctness of Napoleon's assertions, for Europe learning gradually the full extent of our weakness, no longer thought of making any concession, and if we wished for peace now, we ought to be able to win it by force. But after having believed Napoleon too easily, when he did not speak sincerely, the Allies now refused to believe, when what he said was only too true. They only saw in the language we have just quoted, his obstinate temper, his insatiable passion for war (a passion that had once ruled him, but which had passed away for ever), and many persons who cared little whether the peace were honourable or not, whether France conserved or yielded her natural frontiers, provided the imperial throne was saved, and that they preserved their posts; such people said that *this man* (it was so they designated Napoleon), that *this man* was mad, that he was running to his own destruction, and would destroy them all at the same time. Thus the truth that Napoleon would not listen to, when it might have been profitably heard, now re-appeared under the most painful forms, evidenced, not alone in the strong cry of the people, but in the affliction of faithful friends, in the sulky ill-humour of selfish adherents, and often even in the insolence of the vilest courtiers, from whose breasts, despair at the loss of place had banished every feeling of respect.

When an erroneous opinion takes possession of the public mind, and this opinion is sure to be implacable, because it is erroneous, it demands a victim. There was one in those days that all the power of Napoleon could not refuse, we will not say, to the public, that was condemned to silence, but to his own indignant courtiers, and this victim was M. de Bassano. It was generally known, though the particulars had not been ascertained, that at Prague, France might have obtained a glorious peace, and that the Emperor had refused; it was

known that now again the Emperor had just received a very satisfactory proposition, and an ante-chamber rumour reported that he had not replied in a suitable manner; and for all these faults M. de Bassano was blamed; his pride and want of foresight having, it was said, caused all our misfortunes. It was said that instead of enlightening Napoleon as to the true state of things, M. de Bassano had done all he could to deceive him, as if any one could be responsible for the acts of so self-willed a character. M. de Bassano had been, undoubtedly, a complaisant minister, but more complying than dangerous, or it is doubtful if even by joining M. de Caulaincourt, he could have obtained a more favourable result at Prague. He certainly ought to have tried, and if he had not saved France, he would at least have exonerated himself. He was now overwhelmed with the common injustice that springs from passion; and M. de Caulaincourt, who owed him a grudge for not having supported his opinion at Prague; M. de Talleyrand, who amused his leisure by incessantly rallying him; both declared that to obtain peace, it was necessary to persuade the world they really desired it, and that the least humiliating mode of proving this disposition was to dismiss M. de Bassano.

Napoleon resigned himself to this sacrifice, the first, but useless expiation of his errors. He knew very well that M. de Bassano was not the real culprit, that an attack on the minister was a blow directed against himself, and though his sense of justice as well as his pride was wounded by the sacrifice, the Emperor consented to withdraw M. de Bassano from the administration of foreign affairs, for the danger was pressing, and he felt that on every side he was obliged to make sacrifices on the altar of public opinion. Thus, under despotic as well as under free governments, the instrument that has been used for the perpetration of a wrong is punished, only under an absolute government, the pride of the monarch is made to suffer, for he is obliged to condemn himself in punishing his tool. Besides, the avowal is at once vexatious and fruitless, because the sacrifice is made when the evil is irreparable.

The two authors of M. de Bassano's disgrace, M. Talleyrand and De Caulaincourt, were alone capable of filling his place. Napoleon first thought of the former, who had more weight in Europe than the latter, though he was less respected. M. de Talleyrand, with his wonderful political sagacity, saw the termination of the empire approaching; however he was not sufficiently assured of the event to refuse the direction of foreign affairs, a post to which he originally owed his greatness. But distrusting Napoleon's despotism as much as Napoleon distrusted his fidelity, he still set much value on remaining a great dignitary. Now, on this point, Napoleon had laid down for himself a principle, which was never to combine in the same individual the ministerial power with the quality of a grand dignitary. In his empire, such as he had desired it, the great dignitaries, emanating from the Royal authority, watching over the different branches of the administration, possessed somewhat of the inviolability of the monarch, as they also partook in some degree of his august character. Now, he did not wish his ministers to be

inviolable, and M. de Talleyrand less than another. But, M. de Talleyrand ardently wished to hold this position, particularly under such a master as Napoleon. Through the operation of these despicable motives, there was a misunderstanding, and M. de Caulaincourt became minister of foreign affairs. There could not be found a minister more estimable, more esteemed, or more welcome to the other governments of Europe.

Napoleon profited of the opportunity to effect some other changes in the ministry; some of these were the consequence of that which had just been accomplished; others were the result of a more remote design. In withdrawing M. de Bassano from the direction of foreign affairs, Napoleon did not intend to leave this faithful servant without office; he gave him the post of Secretary of State, where his duties brought him into the most intimate communication with the monarch. This was bringing him back to the starting-point of his ambition, but it was necessary to yield to public opinion, at that time stronger than Napoleon himself. M. Daru at that time held the office of Secretary of State. There were still fewer motives for removing from office a person, whose absence was not desired either by the public or the monarch. M. Daru, a minister, upright, firm, indefatigable, who had always accompanied Napoleon in his most difficult affairs, and shared his most trying dangers, was besides reputed to have given very useful advice on many occasions, and nobody could see a public advantage in his removal from office. Napoleon, who himself held these opinions, constituted M. Daru one of the two war ministers. General Clarke, Duke of Feltre, had the administration of the *personnel*, M. de Cessac that of the *matériel*. The latter had long done good service, and was capable of doing still more, but Napoleon, forced to make vacancies, allowed him to forestall the time of his retirement from office, and dismissed him with many well-merited marks of distinction. M. Daru succeeded M. de Cessac. And, lastly, Judge Reynier, Duke of Massa, a magistrate, upright and laborious in the discharge of his duties, but advanced in age, and no longer able to support the fatigues of office. Napoleon, though esteeming him highly, had already removed him temporarily in consequence of a long illness, and he profited of the present occasion to replace him permanently by M. le Comte Molé, whose intelligence, name, and manner of thinking pleased him. Napoleon, not wishing that this substitution of another in his place, should seem a disgrace for the Duke of Massa, resolved to make him president of the legislative body. M. de Massa was not member of the legislative corps, and consequently had no chance of being placed upon the list of candidates for the presidency, which this body had a right to present. But in those days, slight difficulties were not allowed to stand in the way. It was decided that a change should be effected in the constitution by means of a *senatus-consulte*, and that the legislative body should no longer contribute to the nomination of the president by a presentation of candidates. This was not a well-chosen moment to give offence to a body, that following the prevailing example of the times,

seemed to acquire courage in proportion as Napoleon lost his strength; however, the changes proceeded, and this *senatus-consulte*, less insignificant than it seemed to be, was prepared with several others more useful and more urgent.

The question now was, on the eve of the last terrible struggle against combined Europe, to raise men and money, to raise them in abundance and quickly. These two means, so essential to the carrying on war, were exhausted. In the preceding month of October, before leaving Dresden for Leipsic, Napoleon had commissioned Marie Louise to repair to the senate to procure the conscription of 1815, which was to furnish 160,000 conscripts, and besides, an extra levy of 120,000 men from the classes of 1812, 1813, and 1814 who were already disbanded. The senate had made no more difficulty of granting these 280,000 men, than it had made in abandoning to Napoleon so many victims of war, then lying buried in the plains of Castille, of Germany, of Poland, and of Russia. Unfortunately, these immense levies, whose prompt enrolment was so desirable, were more easily decreed than put into execution.

Amongst the 280,000 men, whose enrolment had been decided in October, we must consider as wholly unfit for service in the approaching conscription of 1815, those who, thanks to the system of forestallments had been sent as soldiers at 18 and 19 years of age, that is to say children, brave but weak, and incapable of supporting the hardships of war. Europe had seen thousands of these children perish, who, full of ardour on the battle-field, died of fatigue on the high roads or in the hospitals. Napoleon did not wish any more of these, and if he asked the conscription of 1815, it was with the intention of forming a body of reserve which would fill the depôts and occupy the garrisons. He could then only reckon on the 120,000 men of the former conscriptions. But to raise this levy, the only one that could be useful, would be extremely difficult, because it would be necessary to seek men already discharged, and who, having already on several occasions, furnished substitutes, would find themselves drawn as conscripts, a third and even a fourth time. This falling back on the conscripts, who had already served, though it procured soldiers of a better quality, was also attended by the grave disadvantage of exciting the most violent discontent, and requiring the most delicate management, which rendered the levies much less productive. Under these circumstances, married men could not be called out, nor men necessary to the support of their families, and thus, whilst 100,000 men were expected, they were glad to obtain 60,000.

Justifying himself by the pressure of circumstances, Napoleon conceived the idea of falling back on all the classes that had already served, and taking all the unmarried men, whose services were not indispensable to their families. Reckoning at 300,000, the men whom he might raise in this way, he caused a *senatus-consulte* to be drawn up, which authorized him to raise the number from the discharged classes, re-ascending from 1813 to 1803. These 300,000 men joined to the 280,000 decreed in October, raised to about 600,000 the levies,

about to be called out during this winter, and never, it must be said, had such exorbitant demands been made on a population, or any so destructive to future generations. It was not the opposition of the senate that was feared, but that of private families, and it was very doubtful whether, even threatened with legal compulsion, they could be brought to satisfy such demands. Certainly, if the 600,000 men, originally talked of, could have been assembled, drilled, and embodied in time, there would have been more than a sufficient number of troops to drive back the Allies beyond the frontiers. But, what with the public discontent on the subject of the war, and what with the prevailing opinion that it was carried on merely to satisfy Napoleon's personal ambition, how many amongst these 600,000 men would respond to the call of government; and above all, how much time would be needed to convert these recruits into disciplined soldiers? Nobody could say. Napoleon, nevertheless, accustomed to the submission of the people, and to the incapacity and tardiness of his adversaries, hoped to obtain a large proportion of the levies, and calculated on having to the approaching April to drill them for the coming campaign.

But whether these 600,000 men arrived a little earlier or later, it would be necessary to pay them, and Napoleon's finances, which had been so well administered during fifteen years, had now, like all the other branches of his power, sunk under protracted abuses. We have seen how his budgets of 750 millions (without reckoning the 120 millions for *les frais de perception*) had successively mounted to 1,000 millions, after the annexation of Rome, of Tuscany, of Illyria, of Holland, and the Hanseatic cities. The war, having since 1812 assumed gigantic proportions, the budget of 1813 had mounted to 1,191 millions, without the *frais de perception*. The expenses of the last war, those at least that were cleared by the budget, having mounted from 600 to 700 millions, it was supposed that this budget would touch 1,300 millions (1,420, including the *frais de perception*), at that time esteemed an enormous amount. Thus, within two years, the budget had mounted from 1,000 to 1,400 millions, and if we refer to the market prices of that period, we shall be able to estimate the actual amount of property this rate of taxation assumes to be in the country. Still it would be all as nothing if we could only make head against our difficulties. But, independent of the 100 millions in excess of our expenses, imputable to war, there was a deficiency of 70 millions in the revenue. It was then 170 millions, which by an excess on one side and a deficiency on the other, represented our real shortcomings for the year. But there was another deficiency still more embarrassing. Not being able to have recourse to a loan, and not wishing to have recourse to taxation, Napoleon had conceived the idea of selling the municipal property, and of realizing the value in advance, by means of bills on the *caisse d'amortissement*. 46 millions of these bills had been applied to the budget of 1811; 77 to that of 1812; and 149 to the budget of 1813. This expedient had completely failed. More than two millions of this municipal property

had not been sold, in consequence of the tedious formalities, the public distress, and the general distrust. The bills issued not having come into general circulation, were exposed to an increasing depreciation, and yet, perhaps at the utmost, more than from 25 to 30 millions had not been offered to the public, the precaution having been taken of distributing the greater part to the contractors. Notwithstanding these precautions, there was already a loss of from 15 to 20 per cent. There was thus at the same time a loss of the 272 millions, which were to have been raised by bills, and the 170 millions deficient in the budget of 1813, which made a total deficit of 442 millions; an overwhelming deficiency at a time when there were no means of raising credit, unless the public and private banks could be induced to receive the bills of the *caisse d'amortissement*. Ten millions had been given to the Bank of France, 62 millions to the *caisse de service*, 52 millions to the *douaine extraordinaire*, which exhausted, as we have seen, the last disposable means to be drawn from this source.

The privy purse of the crown remained, containing the savings Napoleon had made out of the civil list. Napoleon, as we have already said, thanks to an admirable spirit of order, had saved 135,000,000 from the civil list. He had placed 17,000,000 of this in the Mont-Napoleon at Milan, 8,000,000 in the Banque de France, 4,000,000 in the salt works. He had lent 13,000,000 to the *caisse de service*, and he had employed 26,000,000 in the purchase of bills of the *caisse d'amortissement*. There remained, besides, three or four millions to meet the current expenses of the crown, and 63,000,000 in gold and silver deposited in the vaults in Tuilleries, a last resource, which he guarded religiously, not as a means of providing for himself in a foreign country (such forethought was beneath his lofty ambition), but to sustain his last struggle against the universal rising of the nations.

With the exception of these 63,000,000, Napoleon had exhausted all the public banks to force them to take the bills that represented the value of the municipal property. Having found, in this way, the means of passing 150,000,000 of these bills, there remained of the total deficiency of 442,000,000, of which we have spoken, an actual deficiency of about 300,000,000, which there were no means of meeting, every resource being absolutely exhausted.

In such a state of things, the necessity of recurring to taxation became imperative. But if Napoleon, on the plea of necessity, had made the enormous demand of 600,000 men, he might easily, on the same plea, ask for a few millions in money. Moreover, taxation was the only source of revenue which had hitherto been carefully managed, the only source that remained intact, though indirect contributions, at all times unpopular, were then loudly decried under the name of *droits réunis*. But the direct taxation might still bear a fresh burden, and that, too, pretty heavy. By adding merely thirty centimes to the income tax of 1813, it was easy to raise 80,000,000, available on the instant. It was possible to obtain 30,000,000 more by doubling the *contribution mobilière*. It was therefore decreed in council, that

the payment of these sums should be required in the months of November, December, and January. There was an addition of one fifth made on the salt duty, and of a tenth on the indirect taxes. These extra taxes were expected to produce immediately 120,000,000, without over pressure, excepting, perhaps, pressing a little on the taxes that would be required for the year 1814. With these 120,000,000, with the ordinary taxes, with the treasure concealed in the Tuilleries, and certain postponements that state creditors were obliged to submit to, means were found to satisfy the more pressing wants.

The question now was to legalize these demands for money. Napoleon, by a decree dated from the banks of the Rhine, had fixed the 2nd of December for the assemblage of the legislative corps, hoping to be able to make use of this body to obtain extraordinary resources, and to awaken the patriotism of the nation. Already a certain number of the legislators had repaired to Paris; but they were not found quite so well-disposed as was desired, for, with the rapid increase of danger, and the no less rapid decay of Napoleon's prestige, the spirit of independence had revived in the public mind. Disagreeable discussions were therefore to be feared, and besides, however prompt might be the adoption of the proposed measures, they could not be effected before the middle of December, and the receipt of the money should then be deferred to January, whilst it was actually wanted at the moment. It was then resolved that the levy of the extra centimes should be made by a decree, by which means a month was gained. This manner of proceeding, which would be utterly impossible under a legitimate and regular *régime*, was authorised by more than one precedent. In fact, sometimes to furnish the equipment of cavalry soldiers, voted by the departments; sometimes in order to distribute more equally the *réquisitions*, by converting them into public contributions, the prefects had not hesitated to levy the additional centimes, by virtue of their personal authority; and whether through a feeling of necessity—whether through the habit of submission, nobody had complained. The Emperor might, surely, in the presence of absolute danger, venture as far as the prefects, and by a decree passed on the 11th November, the next day but one after his arrival at Paris, he commanded the immediate payment of the sums we have enumerated. The crime was not great if we compare it with the illegal arts the Imperial government had often committed; and besides, there was the excuse of the imminence of the danger. But this act, like many others, proves what value was then set on the laws. The meeting of the legislative corps becoming less necessary, since extraordinary levies had been raised by a simple decree, the assembly was adjourned from the 2nd to the 19th of December, in order to escape importunate discussions. The precaution, as we shall soon see, was not a wise one, for these legislators, all staying at Paris, and passing their time idly, or in imbibing the opinions of the capital, did not become more indulgent towards a government, basely flattered when all-powerful, freely criticised the moment it began to decline; and

threatened on the eve of its fall by a universal outburst. Another inconvenience attendant on the assemblage of the legislative corps, which the government wished to avoid, was the election of the fourth series (the legislative body was divided into five), whose powers expired at the commencement of 1813, and the election had already been deferred a year. To assemble the electors at this moment being attended with quite as much danger as assembling the deputies, it was decided to defer the election of the fourth series another year. This measure, and that which abolished the list of candidates for the presidency of the legislative body, that also of a fresh call for 300,000 men, raised simply by the authority of the senate, which was supposed to be always sitting and always submissive, as it actually was to the penultim hour of the empire. The assembly was convoked for the 15th November, and presented with these three measures.

The meeting of the senate was distinguished by unusual pomp. There was a desire to awaken the spirit of the nation, to speak to the people's heart, to excite their patriotic devotedness. Unfortunately, when nations are spoken to, either rarely or too late, the orators are liable to be listened to with distrust, or to be misunderstood. The government orator related in vain the late reverses of our armies, he declaimed in vain against the perfidy of our Allies, against the fatal imprudence committed at the bridge of Leipsig; he pointed out in vain what France had to fear from a victorious coalition; he produced little effect on an impassable and degraded senate; he wrought only one conviction, that indeed the danger was imminent, and that it was necessary to call on the nation to make great efforts without, alas! the hope of seeing such an appeal responded to after fifteen years' reckless and fruitless war. The 300,000 men to be drawn from the discharged conscripts were voted without a single objection. The adjournment of the election of the fourth series was also accorded, the motive alleged being that it was of pressing necessity to assemble the legislative body, rather a singular reason when the meeting of this body had been adjourned from the 2nd to the 19th of December, though the majority of the members was in Paris. And the motive adduced for the suppression of the list of candidates for the presidency of the legislative body was not less singular. It was that perhaps the proposed candidates might be ignorant of court etiquette, or be personally unknown to the Emperor. The senate did not question the substance nor the motives of the decrees; they voted them without observation, as they were ready to vote everything, even to the day when they voted the downfall of Napoleon himself at the bidding of foreigners.

These political, military, and financial measures had occupied Napoleon incessantly since his arrival in Paris. One of his first acts, and one which might be deemed fortunate, if it had not occurred somewhat late, was to transfer the foreign correspondence from M. de Bassano to M. de Caulaincourt. M. de Metternich, on receiving M. de Bassano's reply, which was at the same time enigmatical and ironical, had replied, after consulting the allied courts, and his reply

was pretty much to this effect:—"The Allies have learned with pleasure," he said, "that the Emperor has at length recognized in M. de Saint Aignan's mission a sincere desire for peace. They are also glad that he has pointed out Manheim as a place of assembly for the congress, and will accept his choice; but," he added, "the Allies do not see with the same satisfaction the care with which the French government avoids all explanation as to the fundamental basis proposed at Frankfort, and they feel compelled to demand, as a preliminary to all negotiation, the formal adoption or rejection of the basis."

It ought to have been a source of satisfaction to the French Emperor to find the Allies still insist on the adoption of the Frankfort basis, though it might now be doubtful whether they were sincere; but the Emperor ought to hasten and take them at their word ere they retracted the propositions. The fact of M. de Caulaincourt being now manager of foreign affairs left no doubt as to the character of the reply. He urged upon Napoleon the necessity of sending such an answer as ought to have been sent on the 16th November, and he succeeded. Without losing an instant he wrote on the 2nd December that, acceding to the proposition of a congress, and accepting the principle of the independence of all nations established within their natural frontiers, the Emperor had, by implication, accepted the primary basis laid down in M. de Saint Aignan's instructions, and that now, to remove all difficulty, these were expressly accepted; that these conditions demanded great sacrifices from France, but she would willingly make these sacrifices in the cause of peace, especially if England would give up the maritime conquests which France had a right to demand of her, and consent that the same principles of negotiation should obtain on sea as on land.

It is probable that had this reply been despatched eighteen days previously, events might have taken a very different course. But now many pretexts might be made as to a change of opinion on the part of the allied powers; if better informed of our distress, they wished to retract the offers they had made at Frankfort.

In consenting to treat on the basis of the natural limits of France, Napoleon mentally resolved to retain all he possibly could beyond these limits, and in the instructions to the plenipotentiary whom he had already chosen (it was M. de Caulaincourt), he laid down the following conditions:—In consenting that he should have nothing beyond the Rhine, it was yet to be understood that he was to keep on the right bank of that river, Kehl, opposite Strasbourg, Cassel, opposite Mayence, and the city of Wesel, situated on the right bank—but which had become in some sort a French city. As to Holland, he did not despair of keeping a part of that, by abandoning the Dutch colonies to England. In any case he was resolved to dispute the limits that separated Holland from France, and to propose, first the Yssel, then the Leck, and lastly the Nahal, a frontier from which he was resolved not to retire, and which would secure to him that portion of Holland he had taken from King Louis. He also wished it to be understood that Holland was not to fall again under the authority of the House of Orange, but that it should become republic.

As to Germany, he was satisfied to renounce the Confederation of the Rhine ; but on condition that no federal union should subsist between the German states, and that in restoring Magdebourg to Prussia, and Hanover to England, Hesse and Brunswick should be consolidated into the kingdom of Westphalia, independent of France, but governed by Prince Jerome.

Napoleon wished that Erfurt should be conceded to Saxony in indemnification for the grand duchy of Warsaw. He desired that Bavaria should preserve the boundary of the Inn, and this he proposed in order that he should not be obliged to give up Wurzburg, which would necessitate an indemnification to the Duke of Wurzburg in Italy.

In Italy, he was willing that Austria should have, besides Illyria, that is to say Laybach and Trieste, a portion of territory beyond the Isonzo, but on condition that France should advance as far into Piedmont as Austria into Friuli. All that France had possessed in the Milannaise, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Roman States, should form an Italian kingdom, alike independant of Austria and France, and governed by Prince Eugene.

The Pope was to return to Rome, but without temporal sovereignty. Naples should belong to Murat, Sicily to the Neapolitan Bourbons. The ancient king of Piedmont should have Sardinia alone.

The Ionian Isles should be incorporated with an Italian state, if Malta were ceded to Sicily. In any other case, the Ionian Isles should belong to France with the Isle of Elba.

Spain should be restored to Ferdinand VII., and Portugal to the house of Braganza. But England should not retain any of the Spanish or Portuguese colonies.

Denmark was to keep Norway. Lastly, an article was to be inserted which should describe in less general terms, the rights of the neutral flag.

Such were the conditions that Napoleon wished to present to the future congress at Manheim. Unfortunately, he erred widely in his reckoning, and notwithstanding his profound sagacity, spite of his clear knowledge of his position, a knowledge so clear as to make him doubt whether the Allies could seriously offer him the Frankfort bases, he had still the weakness to think these propositions would be listened to at Manheim. It is true that at this moment he entertained a hope which might justify his flattering dreams, could it be realized ; it was that the war would not recommence until April. If, in fact, the Allies, fatigued by this terrible campaign, should pause on the banks of the Rhine until April, and thus afford him four months to prepare his resources, he might, with the *débris* of his armies, and the 600,000 men voted by the Senate, muster at least 300,000 disciplined soldiers, and with this force combined under his powerful hand, he might thrust back from the banks of the Rhine, the enemy that would have dared to cross that river. It is certain that with 300,000 soldiers fighting on friendly soil, and within a circumscribed space, their martial spirit dilated by misfortune, the chances of success were manifold. But

would the enemy accord him these four months? Was it reasonable to suppose they would? That was the question, and on this question depended both his throne and our greatness; not our moral greatness, which was indestructible, but our material greatness, which was subject to ordinary laws.

As to the rest, the Emperor acted not as if he had four, but as if he had scarcely two months left for preparation, and he employed the resources put at his disposal with his characteristic activity, now excited beyond the ordinary pitch. The garrisons were the first places that needed looking after. They were distributed into two divisions; those of the Rhine and those of the Scheld, covering our natural frontier Huningue, BÉfort, Schelestadt, Strasbourg, Landau, Mayence, Cologne, Wesel, Gorcum, Antwerp; those of the interior, covering our frontier of 1790, Metz, Thionville, Luxembourg, Mezières, Mons, Valenciennes, Lille, &c., we only name the principal. Whilst Allesandria, Mantua, Venice, Palma-Novo, Osopo, Dantzic, Flessingue, and the Texel were defended by expensive works; places indispensable to our home protection, Huningue, Strasbourg, Landau, Mayence, Metz, Mezières, Valenciennes, Lille were left utterly defenceless. The scaling ladders were standing, but stepless; the pont-levis unfit for use. The guns were not mounted: there was a want of tools, of wood for blinds, of bridges of communication between the works, of horses for transport, of smiths and carpenters. The artillery and engineer officers, who had remained in the interior of the country, were nearly all old men, unfit to support the fatigues of a siege. Provisions had not yet begun to arrive, and money, which can supply so many wants, was not forthcoming, and it was doubtful whether it could be sent in time and in sufficient quantities. In a word, we wanted garrisons, and it was to be feared, that in forming them we might weaken the active army already so much impoverished.

We endeavoured to supply first, the most pressing wants. It was of imperative necessity to transport the dépôts of the several regiments from the first line of fortresses to the second, in order to disembarrass those that might be first attacked, and to put beyond the reach of the enemy those dépôts that were the sources that recruited the regiments. This measure, tardily undertaken, was difficult, for not only was it necessary to transport the men, both healthy and ill, from one place to the other, but also the superintendants and the magazines. The dépôts that were at Strasbourg, Landau, Mayence, Cologne, and Wesel, were transferred to Nancy, Metz, Thionville, Mezières, Lille, &c. Marshal Kellerman, Duke de Valmy, who had rendered such good service in the organization of troops, and who had commanded *en chef* at Strasbourg, Mayence, and Wesel, was appointed to the superintendence of Nancy, Metz, Mezières. This displacement was immediately commenced, notwithstanding the severity of the season.

Napoleon gave orders to the prefects to provision the garrison with the utmost speed, by paying, or promising to pay shortly, for the goods and cattle they were authorized to seize. They were to act in the same manner with regard to wood and any materials that might

be needed. The marshals commanding the active troops, Marshal Victor at Strasbourg; Marshal Marmont at Mayence; Marshal Macdonald at Cologne and Wesel; received instructions to occupy themselves as much with the organization of the different corps as with providing the garrisons. All the detachments remaining of the 32nd military division, that is to say, from the country between Hamburg and Wesel, formed the nucleus of the garrison of Wesel. The 4th corps, unfortunate *debris* of so many corps amalgamated into one, was entrusted with the defence of Mayence, under General Morand, its former *chef*. General Bertrand, who had commanded this corps in its last quarters, had been appointed Grand Marshal of the Palace in recompense for his fidelity. Strasbourg received some skeleton regiments that were to be filled up with conscripts and national guards. The known fidelity of Alsace permitted it to be entrusted to the national guards, a force of which Napoleon did not wish to make use except for garrison defences. Skeleton squadrons of artillery recruited hurriedly, furnished the *personnel* of this branch. As many good commanders as could be had were appointed, to whom were added some engineer officers, selected amongst the least aged of those that remained in France, and all were advised to employ the winter in drilling to the best of their ability. It must be acknowledged that the soldiers were not deficient in zeal.

The measures adopted for the three most important fortresses of the first line, Strasbourg, Mayence, and Wesel, were, with the exception of some local differences, carried out in all the others. In approaching old France, the National Guards were called on with more confidence to defend the country. We have just said that Napoleon was not much inclined to employ them. He of course distrusted them, because they might be, in a very disagreeable manner, the reflex of the public mind; however, his motives were not exclusively selfish. At the moment, when he demanded from the population nearly 600,000 men, he dreaded urging public discontent too far, by appealing to every class of citizen at the same time, and especially to that of fathers of families, who, for the most part composed the National Guard. Besides being deficient in the necessary equipments for his soldiers, he preferred giving clothes and guns to the army than to the National Guards. It was only in the frontier garrisons, when there was not time to throw in regular troops, that the National Guards, being ready drilled, and moreover imbued with a martial spirit, were allowed to enter and complete the garrison. The Emperor also made use of them in some large cities of the interior, when the public peace might happen to be disturbed in consequence of the general ferment, and he decided that in these cities, the principal inhabitants formed into battalions of Grenadiers and Chasseurs, armed and equipped at their own expense, and commanded by trustworthy officers, should be charged to maintain public tranquillity.

Napoleon turned his attention to the active army. To the divers woes that had assailed our troops since their return from Germany, there was now added one, more terrible than all the others—the

dreadful typhus. Originating in the over-crowded hospitals on the Elbe, imported thence to the Rhine by the wounded, the sick, the stragglers, it had made terrible ravages, particularly at Mayence. The 4th corps, which had been raised to 15,000 men, by the union of the 4th, 12th, 7th, and 15th corps, and subsequently increased to 30,000 by other additions, lost in one month half its number, and dwindled down to less than 15,000 men. From the soldiers, the contagion spread to the surrounding population, and death carried off as many of the one as of the other class. This horrible scourge had assumed, under the influence of famine, hideous and heart-rending forms. The constitution of many of our young soldiers had been so weakened by privations and fatigue, that their fingers and toes fell off piece-meal, gnawed by gangrene. The alarm became general at Mayence, and, at the earnest entreaties of the inhabitants, the authorities in the hope of diminishing the infection, had ordered the immediate removal of numbers of the sick to the interior. This proceeding had involved fresh calamities. The public roads were now seen covered with carts, each bearing thirty of these unhappy creatures, some dead, others expiring beside dead bodies, from which they could not separate. And now, the contagion began to spread from the first to the second line of fortresses, and the city of Metz was thrown into a state of terror, on learning that some soldiers had died in the hospitals of typhus.

Marshal Marmont, deeply touched by this spectacle, had laboured most strenuously to diminish the evil, and had at first prevented the removals which exposed so many unfortunate beings to perish on the high roads, and threatened with contagion our inland cities. He had seized every ship that could be converted into a hospital, and had translated the sick of one hospital to the other, without allowing them to pass from city to city. A local tax on the adjacent districts had provided for the wants of the sick, and the plague, thanks to the salutary measures adopted, had appeared, if not to diminish very much, at least to pause in its onward course. Notwithstanding these precautions, one of Marshal Marmont's regiments, the 2nd Marines, had been reduced in a month from 2,162 men to 1,054.

By the authority of the Emperor, Marshal Marmont had removed from Mayence those corps that were not indispensable to the defence of the place. The 2nd, commanded by Marshal Victor, had been already sent forward to Strasbourg; the 5th and 11th combined, under Marshal Macdonald, were sent to Cologne and Wesel. Marshal Marmont sent to Worms the 3rd and 6th, which were appointed to serve under him, and only left at Mayence the 4th, to garrison the place. Lastly, by order of Napoleon, he drew off from Mayence the Guard, both young and old, and subdivided them between Kaisers-Lutern, Deux-Ponts, Sareguemines, Sarre-Louis, Thionville, Luxembourg, Treves, &c.

Napoleon afterwards gave orders for the reorganization of the different corps. The greater part had become simple divisions, and contributed thus to form new corps. The only exception was the

2nd, quartered at Strasbourg, and located near its dépôts, where the means of supplying its wants with the greatest facility and completeness were near at hand. The first proceeding was to take out of the infantry dépôts all the tolerably well-drilled subjects they contained. Napoleon hoped to get an increase of 500 soldiers for each regiment, and immediately raise the infantry quartered on the Rhine to 80,000 men. The conscripts demanded by the late decrees from the discharged classes were to be sent to the nearest dépôts to be drilled and equipped as soon as possible, and according as they should have two, three, or four months instruction, might increase to 100,000, 120,000, or 140,000 men, the Rhenish army. The conscripts of these same classes belonging to the frontier departments, were to be thrown into the fortresses, draughted into some skeleton regiments left behind, and there the conscripts would be drilled into doing garrison duty. These would certainly have abundant leisure to be drilled and equipped provided they had time to arrive before our fortresses should be invested.

After having bestowed these cares on the Rhenish frontier, Napoleon turned his attention to the Belgian, which would be in greater danger, if the enemy contested our natural limits. He also thought of Holland, which covered Belgium. These two countries, ill-defended, were profoundly disturbed, and it was of urgent importance to send thither a considerable body of forces. The only resources at the command of General Molitor, who was entrusted with the defence of Holland, were some foreign regiments, of suspicious fidelity, and some weakly-constituted French battalions. These were small means to oppose Bernadotte, who at this moment was advancing on Holland with the greater part of his army, and Marshal Macdonald, at thirty leagues distance with the *débris* of the 5th and 11th corps, was not likely to be of much assistance to General Molitor. Napoleon made an effort to send him some reinforcements with the utmost expedition. He had long cherished his favourite idea of saving the powerful garrisons of Dresden and Hamburg, which would, undoubtedly, have been sufficient to maintain us in the possession of Holland and Belgium. But we have seen the fate of the garrison of Dresden, made prisoners of war, by a violation of every principle of justice; and as to that of Hamburg, whilst Marshal Davout was thinking of putting himself at the head of the troops, and marching towards the Rhine, the forces of Bernadotte inundating Westphalia, had obliged him to fall back within his retrenchments. There was therefore nothing to expect on this side, and so the defences of the empire were weakened by the abstraction of 70,000 excellent soldiers. As to the regiments of Marshal Davout, that had furnished the 1st corps, which was made prisoner at Dresden, and the 13th which was shut up in Hamburg, all had their dépôts in Belgium. Napoleon poured conscripts into these dépôts, hoping thus to compose an army of 40,000 infantry, that he intended to put under the command of the brave General Decaen. Throwing in this manner, conscripts and national guards into the fortresses, especially into Antwerp, he reckoned that this

army, called "*l'armée du Nord*," increased to 50,000 men, manœuvring between Utrecht, Gorcum, Breda, Berg-op-Zoom, and Antwerp, and protected by the inundations, would suffice to cover Belgium and Holland.

The army of the Rhine was then to commence seriously its own particular duties, without feeling any uneasiness to the conservation of the Low Countries, and to make head against the allied troops, that might assume the offensive, either by coming in separate columns through Cologne, Mayence, and Strasbourg, or pouring down *en masse* by one of these three roads. We have just seen that Napoleon by taking out of the dépôts the men already drilled, and replacing them by conscripts drawn from the discharged classes, who could in case of emergency be dispensed from passing through the dépôts, and might be sent directly to join the regiments; we have seen that Napoleon hoped, by these means, to raise first to 80, and afterwards to 140,000 men, the infantry established on the Rhine. He flattered himself that by reorganizing his cavalry and his artillery, he might increase the number to 200,000 in the spring, and ultimately to 300,000 by uniting them with the Imperial Guard. He intended to give this latter corps an extent that it had never yet possessed. To carry out this idea, he projected the following combinations.

Although attended by some serious inconveniences, the Guard, by its high military spirit, and admirable discipline, had rendered essential service in the last campaign, both by performing prodigies of valour on the field-battle, and by preserving in adversity a firmness that none of the other regiments displayed. The Guard was now reduced to about 12,000 infantry and from 3,000 to 4,000 cavalry. It consisted of two divisions of the Old Guard, grenadiers and chasseurs, two of the *moyenne* guard, fusiliers and *flanqueurs*, and four of the young guard, riflemen and light infantry. As the guard possessed many soldiers capable of becoming excellent sub-officers, it would be easy to increase its extent, without diminishing its spirit, or detracting from its oneness. Of all the corps of the army, it was that into which thousands of young men might be most easily incorporated, and where they would in the shortest time become soldiers. To facilitate his success in this project, Napoleon had another means, owing entirely to one man, and this man was the illustrious Drouot, a commanding officer of artillery in the guard, and an accomplished model of every warlike virtue. Drouot, simple in his manners, and even somewhat awkward in his address, had not at first been appreciated by Napoleon. But whilst in these incessant wars, ambition and fatigue increased simultaneously, and the slightest services were obliged to be highly recompensed, Napoleon had been struck by the conduct of Drouot, who knowing thoroughly every branch of his profession, and devoting himself to the discharge of his duties with indefatigable ardour, without seeking like many others to set a higher value on his services as difficulties increased; proportioning thus in silence his energy to danger and his zeal to the embarrassment of the government; having never flattered his master in prosperity, he

did not seek to worry him now by importunate advice, contenting himself with serving to the utmost of his ability the prince and country whom he identified in his affections and devotedness. Napoleon, like all despots of genius, was pleased with flattery, even when he did not believe it, but he could not help esteeming and seeking the society of honest men when he came in contact with them, and for this reason he had gradually acquired an affection for Drouot which increased with his reverses, and at the moment of which we now speak, he had resolved to confide to him the command of his entire Guard. He had perceived that the minister Clarke succumbed to the pressure of necessity, and even that his fidelity was beginning to be shaken. On this account he had begun to entertain serious distrust of him. He made Drouot an actual minister of the Imperial Guard without conferring any other title on him than that of his Aide-de-camp. All promotions were placed in his gift, and promotion ought to be rapid in a corps destined to increase considerably; he confided to him beside, his last resource, his "*poire pour la soif*," as he called it, his 63 millions, the fruits of his personal savings, certain that Drouot would equip the different corps of the Guard, with as much economy as could be hoped from the purest probity and the most watchful vigilance.

According to the instructions of Napoleon, the companies were to be increased from four to six in the battalions of the Guard. The battalions were to be increased to eighteen in the Old Guard, to eight in the *moyenne*, and to fifty-two in the Young Guard. The Old Guard was to be recruited with the picked men of the entire army, the *moyenne* and the Young Guard from the conscripts, taking care to choose the best. These different combinations, if put into execution, would give an increase of at least 80,000 infantry. With the cavalry, the artillery, the engineers, the parks, Napoleon expected that his forces would be little short of 100,000 men. He authorized Drouot to purchase horses, to order carriages for the guns, and to establish at Paris and Metz warehouses for equipping the soldiers. He advised him to do everything himself, to pay everything himself, without employing the mediatory services of the war minister. Drouot was to receive from the private treasurer of the Emperor whatever funds he might need.

With 200,000 soldiers of the line, and 100,000 of the Imperial Guard, Napoleon did not despair of repulsing from our land the allied armies that had dared to invade it. We shall soon see, by what he accomplished with 80,000, if this hope was presumptuous.

Napoleon next directed his thoughts to Italy and Spain. Prince Eugene was on the Adige with about 40,000 men, making himself respected by the enemy, and having a chance of being able to hold his position, notwithstanding the English attempt at debarcation, if Murat would limit his infidelity to inaction. Napoleon, not wishing to augment the number of Italians in the army of Prince Eugene, nor give Italy fresh pretexts for discontent, forbore to levy a conscription in that country, and determined to send from France a sufficient

number of conscripts. He had already raised to 28,000 recruits the portion destined for Prince Eugene in the levies voted in October, and he intended 30,000 for him out of the 300,000 men to be drawn from the discharged classes. He ordered they should be chosen in Franche-Comté, in Dauphiny, and in Provence, in order that they might have less distance to travel. Prince Eugene was to clothe these new troops from the abundant resources of Italy, then to draught them into the vacancies in his army, by which means he might have 100,000 combatants under his command in the month of April. In Italy, as elsewhere, the question was narrowed to a point—what time would elapse before the resumption of hostilities?

Lastly, though Napoleon had renounced Spain he had still an interest in the Pyrenees, now threatened by the Spanish, the Portuguese, and the English, all loudly avowing the hope of avenging the invasion of Spain by reprisals on France. The army of Arragon, under the command of Marshal Suchet, the so-called army of Spain, confided to Marshal Soult, amounted to twenty regiments each, and had their dépôts between Nîmes, Montpellier, Perpignan, Carcassonne, Toulouse, Bayonne, and Bordeaux. Napoleon ordered each of these armies to detach a *cadre de bataillon* from each regiment, which could be easily done, considering the diminution they had suffered in the effective force, and to send these skeleton battalions to Montpellier, Nîmes, Toulouse, and Bordeaux, where 60,000 conscripts from the discharged classes would be assembled. Each of these forty battalions receiving 1500 recruits was to send 500 to the armies of Spain and Arragon, which would recruit these armies to the amount of 20,000 men, and supply through the length of the Pyrenees a reserve of 40,000 to profit of events.

With these various resources assembled on the frontiers of Belgium, the Rhine, of Italy and the Pyrenees, Napoleon still pertinaciously believing he had four months before him, did not despair of overcoming the prodigious difficulties of his position. But the disposition to obey his demand for recruits diminished daily; and it was not the noisy language of venal journals—it was not the silence of the senate that could transmute this reluctance into ardent patriotism. The Emperor endeavouring to render the sacrifices required of the people less sensibly felt, desired that the levies on the three discharged classes of 1813, 1812, and 1811, should be finished first, and that the anterior classes should not be proceeded with for the moment. This first levy was expected to yield from 140,000 to 150,000 men. It was only after completing this levy that recourse was had to the earlier classes, always omitting the married men, those not likely to be very useful, or those whose services were indispensable to their families. For the same reason he wished these levies to commence in the provinces immediately threatened with invasion, such as Landes, Languedoc, Franche-Comté, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, provinces where the military spirit was most rife, and the danger most pressing. Still influenced by prudential considerations, Napoleon postponed the conscription of 1815, which could only supply soldiers whose extreme

youth would add another source of suffering to the many woes to which the army was already exposed. If peace did not put a speedy termination to the war, he would defer the conscription of 1815 to the close of the year.

But levying men was not the sole difficulty : it would be necessary to clothe and arm them, to provide saddle and draught-horses. Napoleon established extra magazines at Paris, at Bordeaux, at Toulouse, at Montpellier, at Lyons, at Nantz, &c., for the more expeditious making up of clothes for the army. Though to provide clothing was not found an easy task, it yet presented fewer obstacles than furnishing horses. However, France was less exhausted of saddle-horses than Germany ; she still possessed a considerable number of good ones. The draught-horses for the artillery and carriages were as good as could be wished. Five thousand had just been purchased. Napoleon ordered the purchase of as many more, and gave orders for ten thousand additional, for which ready money was to be paid ; and these twenty thousand horses would be sufficient, with the surplus already remaining, for carrying on the war in the interior. Saddle-horses were scarce. Drouot was in want of some for the Guard. Funds were forwarded to all the regiments to purchase in their respective localities as many horses as they could.

There was an abundance of powder, of lead, of iron of all kinds, bayonets and cannon, but there was a want of guns ; and this was one of the principal causes of our ruin. In the days of his prosperity, Napoleon had one million muskets in his arsenals. But in the campaign of Russia, 500,000 had been buried in the snows, and in that of Germany we lost 200,000, and in many foreign places great quantities of French arms had been sacrificed. All these losses had exhausted our arsenals. To establish forges for the manufacture of muskets, was much more difficult than to fit up stores for furnishing clothes and horses ; and yet, there was no use in raising men, if they could not be equipped. It was a strange feature that characterized this policy : vast preparations were made for invasion, none for defence ! France, when threatened by a foreign force, had more difficulty in procuring 300,000 muskets than 300,000 men to carry them !

Artificers were brought from the provinces where working in iron was best understood ; and these men were settled either at Paris or Versailles, in order to establish manufactories for the repair or construction of fire-arms. The same was done in many of the principal towns. Recourse was had to another means of procuring muskets, which was, disarming the foreign regiments, the fidelity of all being suspected, with the exception of the Swiss and Poles. On the same day, and in different parts of the empire, the Dutch, the Hanseatics, the Croats, and the Germans, were disarmed, and the cavalry dismounted. This measure procured a supply of some thousand muskets, and some hundred horses. The marine arsenals were afterwards emptied, and still Napoleon's passion for conquest was so strong, that he did not hesitate to send off 50,000 muskets to Italy at the

very moment when he was not sure of having sufficient for the defence of Paris.

Whilst the Emperor was thus endeavouring to reorganize his resources by prodigies of administrative activity, the idea occurred to him of obtaining some more, by a policy which was certainly wise, but adopted too late. He directed General Delort at Frankfort to enter into negotiations with the adverse generals for the surrender of the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder, on condition of the immediate return into France of the garrisons, with arms and baggage. If this condition were accepted, General Delort was afterwards to make overtures for the more important garrisons of Hambourg, Magdebourg, Wittenbourg, Erfurt, &c., The ratification of such a proposal would have procured the accession of 100,000 first-class soldiers, and would have yielded, it is true, an equal number to the Allies, by terminating the blockade of the fortresses. But whilst this arrangement would have given us back excellent soldiers, our enemy would have gained but very medium ones, and besides, in the state of destitution in which we were, 100,000 men were of more importance to us than 200,000 to the Allies. Unfortunately, this reason, which induced the violation of the capitulation of Dresden, left us little hope of succeeding in a negotiation of this kind.

But a still greater resource remained ; it was that which could be furnished by the army of Spain, if it could have been transported from the Pyrenees to the Rhine. In that army, in addition to number, everything was excellent, incomparable ; no troops in Europe were equal to the regiments of Marshal Suchet or Marshal Soult. The soldiers of the latter, the remains of armies that had been uniformly unfortunate, were, it is true, disgusted with the service, but the glory of defending the Rhine and under the command of Napoleon himself, would have certainly converted their disgust into ardent zeal. Nor is it venturesome to say, that had the 80,000 men commanded by the Marshals Suchet and Soult, been able to take up a position between the Rhine and Paris, the Allies would never have approached the walls of our capital. In order to place our Spanish army in this position, it would have been necessary to conclude a peace with the Spaniards ; but this peace, which in appearance ought to have been so easily affected by restoring to the Spaniards their king and their country, was more difficult, perhaps, than that which we hoped to conclude at Manheim. In fact, it was not sufficient that Napoleon should renounce Spain, in order that Spain should renounce him, or that he should re-cross the Pyrenees, in order to induce her not to cross them in company with the Portuguese and English. The punishment of offences would be slight indeed if merely ceasing to persist in them could avert their consequences.

Napoleon, as we have said, had for about two years past resolved to give up Spain, without explaining his secret reasons, of which, however, there are sufficient traces in our archives to remove any doubts the historian may entertain. Still, it was not possible that a man of his disposition would unconditionally sacrifice a conquest, and

he had flattered himself the preceding year that he would be able to retain the Ebro provinces. This last illusion was at length dissolved, and he had resolved to restore Spain, unconditionally, to Ferdinand VII., provided this prince would sign a treaty of peace and persuade his people to consent to the same. It is easy to imagine what the conditions of peace should be. In the first place, Ferdinand VII. and the princes detained with him at Valençay should be set at liberty; the fortresses and prisoners of war should be delivered up. On the other hand, the Spanish armies were to withdraw into Spain, and require the English to do the same. It would seem that after these mutual concessions, France and Spain could have nothing more to demand of each other. But adverse circumstances perplexed this position, which appeared at first sight so simple. The Spaniards panted for vengeance, and longed to retaliate on French soil the excesses that had been committed on theirs. The English, after having contributed to the deliverance of Spain, were not people likely to take their dismissal at a beck, and repass the Pyrenees at a notification from Cadiz or Madrid. Besides, an engagement existed between England and Spain, that one should not enter into negotiation without the other. In short, the Cortes exercising at this moment the royal authority were in no hurry to lay down their power at the feet of Ferdinand VII., and did not participate in the desire for his return, which the country as well as himself felt. In any case, the Cortes did not wish to restore his sceptre, except on condition that he should swear to observe the constitution of Cadiz. Influenced by these different motives, it might happen that neither the English nor the Spanish representatives would consent to the ratification of a treaty signed at Valençay, for the restoration of Ferdinand, on whom they set little value. Ferdinand himself, once at liberty, might care little about the treaty that had set him free, and say that nothing was due to those who had once proved treacherous, strengthening himself with the reason formerly alleged by Francis I., and never condemned by any juris-consulte, that a promise made during captivity is not binding. The conduct pursued in 1808 towards the royal family of Spain had been such that no person in Europe, not even in France, would have ventured to blame the prisoner of Valençay. Napoleon, the haughty lion, would have appeared under such circumstances, like a fox caught in his own snare.

If, on the contrary, through a natural sentiment of distrust, Napoleon detained Ferdinand VII. until the treaty concluded with him should be carried to Cadiz, and ratified by the regency, it was possible that by the contrivance of the English and the Cortes, this treaty might be rejected and declared void, on the plea that it was concluded in captivity, and that the ratification should be deferred until the return of the king of Spain. Ferdinand VII. would be the longer in prison, but that circumstance would annoy the English quite as little as the liberal Spaniards.

Considering the risk of seeing the treaty ignored either by Ferdinand, or by those who exercised the royal authority in his

absence, the safest course might have been to send the Spanish monarch back to his kingdom. But in sending him back the question might arise, would he keep his word ; of his fidelity on this point, his extreme piety might be considered a guarantee, whilst if the treaty were sent without the King, it was certain to be rejected by the English and the Cortes, both parties being most anxious to invade the south of France. M. de Caulaincourt thought it advisable to run the risk of trusting the King. Napoleon, who had no confidence in Ferdinand, and he had his private reasons for entertaining such distrust, wished to take a middle course, and after having concluded a treaty with Ferdinand, to send this treaty into Spain by a trustworthy man, who should endeavour to awaken in the breasts of the old servants of the crown the desire to see the Spanish dynasty re-established. They were to be encouraged still further by a promise that all the Spanish fortresses should be immediately restored. Moreover, the English and Spaniards, as it often happens with allies carrying on a common war, were not on good terms with each other, and it was probable that the Spaniards would not be sorry to be able to say to the English that they had no further need of them, in which case, the latter, deprived of the assistance of the Spanish armies, and having no longer an assured line of retreat across the Pyrenees, dare not remain upon the French frontiers.

It was influenced by these considerations that Napoleon shaped his conduct with regard to Ferdinand VII. He gave orders to M. de Laforest, who had been a long time ambassador at Madrid, to repair under an assumed name to Valençay, to confer in the strictest privacy with the Spanish princes, and to propose to them the following conditions of peace :—The reciprocal evacuation of territory, the return of Ferdinand VII. to Madrid, the liberation of prisoners, the retreat of the English.

Napoleon added to these many private conditions that did him honour, and which were as important to Spain as to us. The first was that Ferdinand VII. should pay to Charles IV. the pension promised by Joseph, and which had been very irregularly paid ; the second condition was that he should grant a complete amnesty to those Spaniards who had espoused the cause of France ; the third that Spain should retain not only her restored continental territories, but her colonies, and that none of the latter should be ceded to Great Britain. There was nothing in these conditions which Ferdinand either as a son, a king, or a Spaniard, could refuse. But another condition remained, not so easy to propose as the others, but to which Ferdinand, in his anxiety to obtain his liberty, might accede ; it was that he should espouse the daughter of Joseph Bonaparte. M. de Laforest had orders to reserve this condition for the last, and to propose the alliance only at the moment when the conference should be drawing to a close. This treaty being concluded and signed, a person confided in alike by the Spanish princes and the French ambassador was selected to carry it to the regency, and these precautions were observed in order that neither the English nor the chiefs of the liberal

party should have time to prevent the ratification of the treaty. This ratification once obtained, Ferdinand, accompanied by his brother, Don Carlos, and his uncle, Don Antonio, his fellow-prisoners at Valençay, should quit France to reascend the throne of Spain.

As soon as M. de Laforest had set out, Napoleon, in order that no time should be lost, sent to Lons-le-Saulnier for the Duke of San Carlos, a person of some consideration, and formerly very intimate with Ferdinand VII. Napoleon received the Duke in the most friendly manner, and in a long conversation, succeeded in bringing him round to his views. He then sent him off to Valençay, in order that he might second the efforts of M. de Laforest, who was doomed to meet with unexpected difficulties. That criminal Spanish business was condemned to punishments both great and small.

The appearance of M. de Laforest at Valençay occasioned great surprise to Ferdinand VII. This prince, a prisoner during six years, with his brother and uncle, had lived in profound ignorance of what was going on in Europe, but through the medium of some French journals that had fallen into his hands, he perceived that the Spanish war was indefinitely prolonged, that, consequently, his subjects were still defending themselves, that neither was Europe cowed since this incessant war was waged against her, and he had sufficient sagacity to perceive that his cause was not entirely lost. It was besides suspected that the parish priest of Valençay, who said mass for him and heard his confession, informed him of all he had an interest in learning, and probably acquainted him with the important events of 1812 and 1813. He might then not have been very much astonished at the communications made by M. de Laforest. But adversity and imprisonment had developed in a high degree the natural characteristics of this prince—distrust and dissimulation. All the powers of his mind, and he was not deficient, he employed in watching those around him, trying to discover if they sought to injure him; he was silent, he did not act, for fear of giving any advantage to the powerful enemy, on whose will he had been dependant during so many years. To dissimulate, to deceive even, seemed to him legitimate defences against the oppression to which he was subjected; and the policy that had conducted him from Madrid to Valençay seemed to justify his conduct. His distrust had reached such a degree, that he was on his guard with his most faithful servants, with those even who were detained in France for his cause, and whom he was always ready to regard as the secret agents of Napoleon. As to the rest, he was not very unhappy. Going to confession, eating and drinking well, walking for exercise, incurring no danger, constituted for him a species of comfort, to which he had become habituated. His mind, devoid of elasticity, had sunk beneath oppression, but in sinking had fallen back upon itself, and when an effort was made to draw him from this reserve, he obstinately resisted, like an animal at once timid and savage, whom the tenderest caresses cannot coax from his den. His brother, Don Carlos, was more lively without being more frank; his uncle was almost stupid.

When M. de Laforest suddenly informed Ferdinand VII. that Napoleon was thinking of restoring his liberty and throne, his first impression was that this proceeding was a cheat, used only as a cover for some hidden perfidy. The motives alleged by M. de Laforest, who wished to avoid the avowal of our misfortunes, and which consisted in saying that Napoleon was desirous of snatching Spain from the English and the revolutionists, were not of a nature to produce the desired effect on Ferdinand, who set himself to think what dark machination could be concealed beneath this unexpected proposition. In his first interview with the French deputy he listened quietly and spoke little, contenting himself with saying that, deprived of all communication with the external world, he knew nothing, and was consequently unable to form an opinion on any subjects; that he was in the powerful hands of Napoleon, that he was contented, that he did not seek to quit his retreat, and that he would never cease to be grateful for the manner in which he had been treated. Behold the effect that tyranny produces on those submitted to its influence! Napoleon now found himself in the position of not being able to induce Ferdinand VII. to accept either his liberty or his throne, at the very moment when it was the Emperor's interest to restore him both the one and the other. M. de Laforest saw clearly that it would be necessary to leave this distrustful and timid nature time for repose and reflection. He left, intending to see him next day.

Ferdinand VII., after having conferred with his brother and uncle, and reflected within himself, clearly understood that Napoleon must be in great straits, and that the offer of restoring his throne was sincere. But before listening to a proposition that appeared so attractive, he wished to know whether it might not be a snare, and whether his enemies were not endeavouring to betray him into dangerous or dishonourable engagements. Besides being at Valençay void of all authority over Spain, he had reason to fear, and this fear was well founded, that he might not be able to keep the engagements to which he would be obliged to subscribe. He resolved then, by acting more openly, to assume a more regal attitude, but to be still extremely circumspect.

In revisiting Ferdinand next day, M. de Laforest found him much more composed in his demeanour, taking his place between his uncle and his brother as their hereditary master, and speaking with the gravity and dignity of a king. He did not conceal that he now began to regard the proposition made to him, as serious, and that he divined the real cause, but he declared himself unable to fix on any line of conduct, deprived as he was of counsellors, and affirmed above all, that he was without authority, for he did not know whether a treaty signed at Valençay would be accepted and executed at Madrid. However, it was easy to perceive that he would not, for trifles, break off negotiations, or re-close his prison gates, now ready to open. He was evidently very anxious. M. de Laforest having offered him the services of his old preceptor, the Canon Escoïquis, then under *surveillance* at Bruges, his private secretary, Macanaz, who was under

surveillance at Paris, the illustrious Palafox, a prisoner at Vincennes, and lastly, the Duke of San Carlos, immured at Lons-la-Saulnier, he seemed to have no confidence in any of these men. It would seem that naming them at this moment was sufficient to blacken them in his opinion.

The conferences continued, and the evident sincerity of M. de Laforest, the striking simplicity of the conditions he proposed, produced in the end an effect on the mind of Ferdinand, above all, the desire of liberty exercised a powerful influence, he acquired gradually more confidence, and began to reason with great good sense on the proposals he had received. At length, the arrival of M. de San Carlos, who had seen and heard Napoleon, and could appreciate the sincerity of his intentions, swept away the last shadows of doubt that overclouded the prisoner of Valençay. Even M. de San Carlos was for a moment received with distrust by his master, but he soon made himself heard, and they then entered seriously on business. Ferdinand VII. had nothing to object to the proposition of returning into Spain, of re-ascending the throne, of paying a pension to his father, of keeping intact the continental and colonial territories of his ancient monarchy, even of pardoning the *afrancesados*. A marriage with the daughter of Joseph was less agreeable, but having so often solicited the hand of a Bonaparte princess it would be too late to affect disdain; but, in fact, there was no marriage he would not have contracted as a means to recover his liberty and throne. The difficulty was not then in the proposed union, it came from another quarter. To his dazzled eyes were presented an infinite number of things, very desirable and very much desired, and all were promised to him on condition that the Cortes or the regency should ratify the treaty he was to sign; thus what he ardently desired was made to depend on a will that was not his. He said frankly and showed clearly that what he commanded from a distance might not be executed. He spoke in an angry tone of the limits that certain men, whom he styled factious, had wished to impose on his royal authority, and did not conceal that, next to the French, he most hated the Spanish liberals. He showed that the surest way to obtain what they wished from Spain was to send him to Madrid, where nobody could have a pretext in his presence to refuse him obedience; but whilst he was detained at Valençay, his subjects might allege his captivity as a pretext for affecting not to believe the commands issued in his name. More than once he swore by all that was most sacred that he would keep his word as a king, as an honest man, and as a good Christian. And soon growing very warm, he flung aside all dissimulation, and exhibited a passionate desire to be free, to leave France, to reign, all which was very natural; and endeavoured with all his might to persuade them to adopt his proposition as the only one that offered a chance of success.

However, the instructions of Napoleon being positive, all were obliged to submit, and a treaty was concluded by which Ferdinand VII. was to return to Spain, as soon as the regency should have

ratified the treaty, and got it put into operation. The conditions were what we have already stated : the colonial and continental integrity of Spain, the restitution of the Spanish fortresses, the withdrawal of the French garrisons, the retreat of the Spanish and English armies beyond the Pyrenees, a general amnesty, and a pension to Charles IV. The marriage with the daughter of Joseph was not formally stipulated. Ferdinand declared that he would not contract any other, if he were free, but, he added, it was a subject that could only be discussed at Madrid.

The above mentioned conditions having been signed on the 11th of December, the next question was who would carry the treaty to Madrid in the name of Ferdinand. The envoy was already present, it was the Duke of San Carlos himself. It was agreed that this personage should repair in the greatest haste and most profound incognito to the army at Catalonia, in order to lull the vigilance of the English, which would be excited if he passed through the headquarters of Lord Wellington. He was to endeavour to reach Madrid, and press thence to Cadiz, if the regency was still sitting there, present the treaty, and get it ratified. The Duke of San Carlos was to persuade the subjects of Ferdinand VII., who were ruling in his stead, to think above all things of setting him at liberty, and to sacrifice everything for that object. He was at the same time expressly commissioned not to adhere to the constitution, or if obliged to do so, only with such reservations as would permit the breaking of any engagements he might be induced to make with rebels.

These things being arranged, the Duke of San Carlos set out from Valençay the 13th December, bearing with him the good wishes of the Spanish princes, who, having laid aside all dissimulation, testified an almost infantine impatience to be set at liberty. Satisfied as to the intentions of Napoleon, they consented to see the faithful followers, whom they at first appeared to distrust, the Canon Escoiquiz, the secretary Macanaz, and the defender of Saragossa, Palafox. Flattering themselves that this latter would have more influence with the Spaniards than the Duke of San Carlos, for he ought to be reverently listened to, if they had not wholly lost the faculty of memory, he was despatched by a different route with a copy of the treaty, and instructions to get it accepted.

Nobody will be surprised to learn that Napoleon had conducted this negotiation without the cognizance of his brother Joseph, who was almost as much a prisoner at Morfontaine as Ferdinand VII. was at Valençay. Joseph, as we must remember, had received orders after the battle of Vittoria, to shut himself up at Morfontaine, not to admit anyone, and not to go out, under pain of the severest penalties. Napoleon so strongly distrusted the excitable blood of the Bonapartes, even in the meekest of his brothers, that he did not wish to allow Joseph to go to Paris, lest he might throw difficulties in the way of the regency. He remembered the public commotions excited during royal minorities by the uncles and cousins of kings ; he had always before his mind the picture of Marie Louise defending her son

against her brothers-in-law. Notwithstanding these orders, Joseph had gone secretly to Paris, but solely for amusement, not for political intrigues. The Duke of Rovigo, interpreting to the letter the Imperial orders, had signified to Joseph that if he renewed his clandestine courses he would be obliged to interfere, upon which Joseph, already very much irritated by all he had been made to suffer, appeared very indignant.

Napoleon had not seen his brother since his return to Paris. He did not, however, wish that the negotiation with Ferdinand VII., which was nearly terminated, should be known to all Europe before Joseph was made acquainted with it. He commissioned M. Rœderer, his usual agent to go to Morfontaine, and inform Joseph of all that had been done, and endeavour to persuade him to resume quietly the rank of French prince, with a handsome revenue, and become a member of the regency, serving to the best of his ability, France, his last and only asylum. Joseph, on receiving this intelligence, complained bitterly of the treatment he had received, and spoke of his regal rights in a manner that would have excited a smile from a less satirical brother than Napoleon. He admitted that he had committed military errors, but not so great as was said; he declared himself ready to resign the throne of Spain, but in virtue of a treaty and on condition of receiving a territorial indemnity at Naples or Turin; nor did he seem inclined to resume the rank of French prince after having worn one of the greatest crowns in the world. His pretensions provoked an outburst of bitter sarcasms from Napoleon, some unjust and even cruel, the others well-founded, but, alas! uttered too late.

"Joseph has committed military errors," cried Napoleon, after hearing M. Rœderer's account of the interview, "but he does not think of them. For my part, I commit faults, I am a soldier, I may sometimes err in the exercise of my profession, but he commit faults! He is wrong to accuse himself, he has never committed any. It is true he has lost Spain, and he will never recover it. It is a decided fact, as decided as anything ever could be. Let him consult the least of my generals and he will see if it is possible to claim a single village beyond the Pyrenees. A treaty! Conditions! And with whom? In whose name! Even if I wished to make one with Spain, I would not be listened to. The first of all conditions for obtaining peace with Europe, a condition without which, it would be impossible for two negotiators to succeed, is the unconditional restitution of Spain to the Bourbons, happy if I can at this price get rid of the English, and bring up the armies of Spain to the Rhine. As to indemnifications in Italy, where shall I find them? Can I deprive Murat of his kingdom? It is doubtful if I shall be able to recall him to the duty he owes France and me. How should I be obeyed if I asked him to descend from his throne for the benefit of Joseph? As to the Roman states, I shall be forced to restore them to the Pope, and I am determined to do so. As to Tuscany, which is Eliza's; as to Piedmont, which belongs to France; as to Lombardy, where Eugene has so much difficulty in maintaining his ground, do I know how much of

these I shall be left? Do I even know if any part of them will be left me? To keep France with her natural limits, I should need a series of victories; to obtain anything beyond the Alps, I should gain still more. And if I were left a kingdom in Italy, could I for Joseph's sake take it from Eugene, that brave, devoted son, who has passed his entire life under fire for me and for France, and who has never given me a single cause of complaint. Where then does Joseph expect me to find an indemnity for him? There is but one part left for him to play; it is to be a faithful brother, a solid support to my wife and my son if I am absent, more solid still if I die, and help to save the throne of France, the sole resource that henceforth remains to the Bonapartes. He shall be a prince of France, treated as my brother, as the uncle of my son, sharing consequently in all the Imperial honours. If he act thus, he shall enjoy my favor, and the public esteem; he shall still occupy a distinguished position, and contribute to our common welfare. If he pursue an opposite course, and he is very capable of doing so, for he can neither endure labour nor idleness; if he cause any commotion during my life, he shall be arrested, and shall finish his reign at Vincennes; if he raise disturbance after my death, let the Almighty judge him. But probably he will contribute to overthrow the throne of my son, the only throne beneath whose shadow he can find dignity, affluence, or a trace of the grandeur he seeks."

These sagacious but coarse expressions carried backwards and forwards between Paris and Morfontaine, did not convince Joseph. He was agitated, ill, and suffering from many annoyances at the time; there were the severe sarcasms of Napoleon, a lost throne, beggared children, and his sole future prospect, obedience to the orders of an imperious brother, not tyrannical perhaps, but certainly harsh. In this depressed state of mind, he refused to take any part in what was going on at Valençay, and remained at Morfontaine, where Napoleon left him in his loneliness, saying that both he and the Spaniards could very well do without the signature of King Joseph, in restoring Ferdinand VII. the throne of Spain.

This period, when so many of the Bonaparte family were losing their thrones, was one of violent domestic agitation, which, added to the rest of Napoleon's cares, tended to embitter his existence. Jerome, who had retired successively to Coblenz, to Cologne, and to Aix-la-Chapelle, was staying at the last-named place, sad and miserable. He was anxious to return to Paris lest Napoleon might forget him in arranging the approaching peace, and Napoleon, who had more affection for Jerome than for any of his brothers, refused to yield to his wishes, because it was painful to him to have his dethroned brothers constantly before his eyes, particularly as their presence revealed in the most glaring colours the advancing ruin of the French empire. But though he refused Jerome permission to come to Paris, he had much more serious cause of complaint against Murat.

The unfortunate Murat had returned to Naples with an almost broken heart and a distracted mind. Of all the princes doomed at

this time to behold the dissolution of their ephemeral royalty, Murat was the most inconsolable. It seemed as if this soldier, born so remote from the throne, and to whom the possession of well-earned military glory ought to have been sufficient compensation for the loss of a crown, it seemed as if he could not now enjoy existence unless as a king. After the events of the last campaign, he could scarcely believe that Napoleon, even if he still held France, could extend his power beyond the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, or that beyond these limits he could either afford support or inflict punishment. If then he remained faithful to Napoleon he incurred the risk of not being supported, whilst there was very little chance of being punished if he deserted him. Undoubtedly by joining Prince Eugene, and bringing 30,000 well-disciplined Neapolitans to the support of the 40,000 French that were defending the Adige, there was a possibility of his disputing Italy with the Austrians, but only a possibility, not a certainty. If the two lieutenants of Napoleon were conquered they would be quickly dethroned ; if they conquered, in what position would they be ? And Murat especially, what would be his fate ? Sacrificed to Prince Eugene, of whom he was jealous, banished to the remotest part of the peninsula, limited to the kingdom of Naples, which would be very little worth without Sicily, and he had no certainty of being able to keep even that, for if Europe offered advantageous terms of peace, which involved the sacrifice of Murat, Napoleon would not be so good a relative and so bad a Frenchman as to refuse the sacrifice. Besides, though Murat was not endowed with a solid understanding, he was possessed of a certain acuteness, and he had often perceived that though Napoleon appreciated his valour, he set no value on his intellectual capacity, and this pointed contempt offended him mortally. Such were the considerations that had agitated, tormented the mind of Murat during his journey from Erfurt to Naples. Whilst he saw so much danger in remaining faithful to Napoleon, and so little in abandoning him, gloomy thoughts contributed to increase his agitation. He had not ceased to keep up a correspondence with the allied powers, even whilst he was in the camp of Napoleon, and performing feats of valour in his service. At the moment that he quitted Naples for Dresden he had with him agents of Lord William Bentinck, the English governor of Sicily ; these he abruptly dismissed when he set out for the French army ; a proceeding that surprised and offended Lord William. But he did not act in the same manner towards Austria, and retained at that court, Prince Cariati, as Neapolitan minister, and kept at Naples the Count de Mire as Austrian minister. M. de Metternich, profiting by this double means of communication, had incessantly sought to shake the fidelity of the Neapolitan court, for he well knew that if Murat instead of coming to the support of Prince Eugene's right, would attack that prince in the rear, Italy would be immediately lost to France and gained by Austria. Not content with trying to practise on the mind of the king, M. de Metternich had opened secret negotiations with the queen, whom he had formerly known at Paris, when

he was ambassador there, and had tried to make her forget her duty as a sister by exciting her feelings as a mother and a wife. Not only had he promised to leave Murat the throne of Naples, without Sicily, which the English made a point of giving to the Bourbons, but he had hinted the possibility of procuring him one of the finest kingdoms of Italy. Prince Eugene and the Princess Eliza being expelled with the French, and Piedmont reconquered, it was possible, still reserving a large portion for Austria, and re-establishing the Pope at Rome, to constitute a kingdom of Central Italy, whose ruler, according to Metternich, would be the chief prince in Italy, and a second-rank European monarch. These were the arguments M. de Metternich had used, and each day with increasing success.

In short, on one hand Murat encountered the greatest perils with Napoleon without the certainty of being supported by him in case of success; and on the other hand, the Allies offered him, besides the certainty of remaining King of Naples, the hope of becoming, in some sort, King of Italy, and this prospect captivated the unfortunate Murat, after having seduced the queen herself. The latter had been in the beginning the faithful representative of the French party at Naples, had resisted all the Austrian suggestions, and had endeavoured to win Murat back to Napoleon. But soon the danger increasing, she was overruled by the desire of preserving the crown for her children, she listened to the insinuations of M. de Metternich, and finished by becoming his chief agent with Murat. Wishing at the same time to give her conduct a colour in the eyes of the French minister, she pretended to have no longer any influence at the court, nor with the king, and to be obliged, as an obedient wife and devoted mother, to follow the policy of the Neapolitan cabinet. Murat having returned to his kingdom, found his entire court combined to urge him into those devious ways that terminated, not in a throne, but in an ignominious death, and left upon his memory an indelible stain. This prince, born with good and generous sentiments, endowed with some intelligence and heroic bravery, had not sufficient judgment to discern that if with France he ran the double danger of being abandoned by victory and by Napoleon, there was a certainty that the Allies after having made use of, and caressed him whilst they had need of him, would soon sacrifice him to the old Italian dynasties, and he should find himself thus at once dethroned and dishonoured. Not endowed with sufficient clear-sightedness to take in so distant a prospect, not possessed of principles lofty enough to prefer honour to interest, he remained some days agitated by a thousand conflicting sentiments, and finished by a deplorable defection.

Scarcely had he returned to his kingdom, than finding the queen come over to his opinion, he had resumed negotiations with the Austrian legation, and the only question he now raised was as to the extent of the advantages he could obtain. Passing suddenly, with the characteristic mobility of his nature, from the depths of despair to a delirium of ambition, he abandoned himself to the wildest

fancies, and flattered himself with soon becoming king and hero of the Italian nation. In traversing Italy, he had observed one almost general disposition amongst the people; that was a desire to become independent of both France and Austria. Undoubtedly, the nobles, the priests, even the people desired the return of Austria, because that for the one, it would be a restoration to their former position, and for the others, an exemption from conscription. The middle class, on the contrary, fascinated with the idea of independence, said it was well to escape from France, but not well to fall back into the hands of Austria. They did not see any reason for passing from one to the other, and becoming the plaything, the victim of foreign masters. Austria ought to be glad that Italy was no longer in the hands of France, and France that she was no longer in the hands of Austria: the independence of the peninsula ought to be, said the bourgeoisie, a desirable object for both powers, and even more advantageous than the direct possession would be to either, for Italy, subdued by one of the two powers, would be a dangerous instrument of attack against the other, whilst for the dominant monarch, she would be only a rebellious subject, always ready to become a furious enemy.

These ideas had taken possession of the minds of the most active and enlightened among the bourgeoisie. Murat, located in the most remote part of the peninsula, at equal distance between the French and Austrians, having an interest in securing himself without betraying Napoleon, capable, with his talents and military glory, of creating an Italian army, Murat had appeared to the independents every way qualified to become their hero. He could in fact say to the Austrians: "I am not France;" to the French: "I am not Austria;" he could say to all: "Do not provoke me, accept me as the least hostile—or rather as the most advantageous—means of securing the end you have in view, if you understand your true interests." The partisans of independence had already surrounded Murat, and lavished upon him promises and flattery, and Murat, in the excitement of his mind, thinking of many projects, and ready to undertake all, had listened favourably to the independents, and accepted them as his agents, so that at Florence, at Boulogne, and Rome, they celebrated his praises as the saviour of Italy, and announced, in prose and verse, his heaven-sent mission.

These ideas were not analagous to the general mode of thinking adopted by the Austrians; however, they did not absolutely discourage them, but allowed Murat, under the pretext of indemnifying him for Sicily, to hope for a large accession of territory in Central Italy. Murat, who in the wild flights of his ambition, put no bounds to his desires, began to fancy that perhaps Napoleon would afford him greater encouragement touching his new Italian kingdom than he had received from the Austrians. Having become, under the excitement of the time, more versatile than ever, he no longer perceived the danger he formerly dreaded from the French alliance, because he fancied it would afford him a greater chance of increased power, flattering himself that all the Italians would rise *en masse* if he promised

them independence and unity. He said within himself that if Napoleon would only allow him to proclaim this independence and this unity, and permit him to become the representative of the combined conditions, he would bring to Prince Eugene's assistance, not alone the Neapolitan army, but in addition, 100,000 Italians, who would all rise at his voice, and that thus he would secure his own safety, in increasing his power, in exalting his position, and, in addition to all these advantages, he would secure another, for, by being the ally of France, he could still keep in his service a large number of French officers, who constituted the principal strength of his army.

Such was the confused succession of ideas that whirled through the brain of this unhappy prince. First, in extreme dejection, he conceived the dreadful idea of abandoning France, and forming an alliance with Austria; from this idea he passed on to the ambitious hope of becoming saviour and king of Italy; and changing his views as his ambitious fancies became stronger, he in spirit abandoned Austria for France, hoping thereby to promote his projected aggrandisement. He formed the wildest schemes, and there was no defection, no alliance, to which he was not ready to give assent, according to the momentary aspect of his plans. Terrible torment that drives downward from ambition to despair; terrible torment that at Paris convulsed the mighty soul of Napoleon with tempests vast as his own genius, whilst at Naples it shook with racking fancies a kind but feeble-minded creature, endowed with no other force than the physical courage of a soldier. It was an afflicting variety of the malady that Napoleon had communicated to nearly all his followers. In fact, after having raised himself to the throne, he had made his brothers and lieutenants kings, princes, and grand-dukes, or flattered them with the hope of becoming so; witness Joseph, Louis, Jerome, Murat, Bernadotte, Berthier, and so many others, who had nearly reached the royal dignity; and if at this moment they were inclined to betray, or at least to serve him laxly, whom could he blame but himself, who had eradicated from their souls the noble love of national glory, and substituted in its stead, the mean passion of personal ambition.

At this very time, a personage arrived at Naples whose presence was calculated to increase the perturbation of Murat; it was the Duke of Otranto, M. Fouché, whom Napoleon had sent thither in all haste. Napoleon, in parting from Murat at Erfurt, had received from him evidences of affection that had touched, but not deceived him. When it was a question of penetrating the depths of the human mind, Napoleon possessed a kind of diabolical perspicacity that nothing could escape. He had suspected as he saw danger increasing, that Murat, that his sister even, would need to be strengthened in their duty, and that powerful influences should be opposed to the suggestions of the Allies. He had therefore thought of sending to them M. Fouché, who, since the entry of the Austrians into Illyria, had ceased to be a king, and was only a pro-consul without territory, remaining unemployed at Verona. He had judged M. Fouché the most proper confidant for Murat, considering the intrigues they had

both plotted in 1809. At that time, Murat and the Duke of Otranto, fearing the result of the Austrian war, had endeavoured to come to an understanding as to what was to become of the supreme power in France, in case Napoleon should be killed. Under such circumstances, the mutual confidence between Murat and M. Fouché must have been very great, and it was presumable that the same confidence might be re-established under circumstances not less critical. M. Fouché had therefore received orders to repair to Naples, and he arrived there at the very moment when Murat was most exposed to the influence of Austrian intrigues.

Although M. Fouché might receive the confession of a treason without being shocked, and though he was fully capable of understanding all that passed in the King of Naples' mind, still the latter seemed rather annoyed than comforted by his presence. He complained bitterly of Napoleon, spoke at great length of the services he had rendered him, and the bad treatment he had received on several occasions, especially after the retreat from Russia. He spoke too of Napoleon's disposition to sacrifice him if the peace of France with Europe depended on the sacrifice. He complained in a word, as a man complains who seeks an excuse for quarrelling, nor did he open his mind fully to M. Fouché, whom he judged must be, in the present case, necessarily attached to the French cause. Murat did not affect to conceal that it depended on Napoleon to win him back by treating him better, as if, after having bestowed on him his sister and a throne, Napoleon was still his debtor. In short, M. Fouché did not acquire much influence at the court of Naples, for the voice of duty could not sound effectively from his lips, and Murat was not in a state of mind to listen to political reasons. M. Fouché represented to him, with profound sagacity, that having risen with and by Napoleon, he was doomed to prosper, or to perish with him, but Murat, offended at the observation, remarked very flatly that what was true for a revolutionary regicide, such as M. Fouché, would not be true for him, a victorious soldier, indebted for every thing to his sword. As to the rest, however unprofitable the presence of M. Fouché might be in other respects, it contributed at least to the resolution Murat had taken of trying to come to an understanding with Napoleon, and becoming, with his concurrence, the king of independent and united Italy. If he succeeded in winning the attention of Napoleon, his fondest wishes were realized; if he failed, he had an excuse for quarrelling. In consequence of these reflections, he proposed that Napoleon should make two divisions of Italy, giving Prince Eugene all that was on the left bank of the Po, and giving Murat all that was on the right, that is to say, three-fourths of the Peninsula; he was also to permit him to proclaim Italian independence, and on these conditions, Murat promised to arrive on the Adige, not with 30,000 Neapolitans, but with 100,000 Italians. He begged Napoleon to reply immediately, for circumstances were pressing, and there was not an instant to lose if he wished to profit of the times.

Napoleon was not astonished, for he was prepared for any amount of ingratitude from the men whom he had raised to the height of worldly grandeur, but he was deeply indignant at the proposition of Murat, and justly so. Had Murat been a great politician capable of conceiving a vast moral idea such as the regeneration of Italy, his proposal might have been attributed to the warmth of a generous enthusiasm. But it was evidently only a pretext to colour over a mad ambition, or perhaps disguise an imminent treason. To demand from Napoleon as the price of his services, the patrimony of the church which was no longer in his gift; Tuscany, the appanage of his sister; Piedmont, a French province; the Legations, which were a part of Prince Eugene's territory; to make these demands, was to ask him to strip either France or his family, or to deprive himself of these valuable possessions, which in the approaching negotiations might serve to conclude an advantageous peace, by furnishing compensations for the legitimate conquests of France, such as the Alps and the Rhine. This proposal was in some sort, putting a dagger to the throat of a half-ruined brother-in-law, by trying to deprive him of territory that he ought either leave to his family, or sacrifice for his own preservation. Besides, Europe would never have consented to such a partition of Italy; and what Murat ought to have done, if he had had good sense, would be to join Prince Eugene, to defend Italy courageously with him; to conserve to France the pledges of peace, and to secure thus for each a throne which could only be durable as long as the Imperial dynasty ruled from the Alps to the Rhine. The example of Prince Eugene, who gave so noble an example of fidelity when his father-in-law furnished him a means and an excuse for joining the Allies, ought to have inspired Murat with more good sense and gratitude. Napoleon felt the ill-conduct of his brother-in-law with intense bitterness. To punish this ungrateful relative appeared to him at this moment one of the sweetest fruits of victory, should he be again victorious. M. de la Besnardière, manager of foreign affairs in the absence of M. de Caulaincourt, who had set out for the future Congress at Manheim, tried vainly to calm the Emperor, and to persuade him that however blameable Murat might be, it was necessary under existing circumstances to temporize. Napoleon burst into a passion, and would not listen to anything. "This man" cried he "is at once criminal and mad; he deprives me of Italy, perhaps of more, but at the same time he destroys himself. You will see that he will be one day obliged to beg from me a home and bread (strange and terrible prophecy), but I shall live long enough I hope, to punish his monstrous ingratitude."

Spite of the entreaties of M. de Besnardière, Napoleon would not temporize; the only concession he would make was to pass over the proposals of Murat in silence. To promise any part of what was asked, and thus consent to strip his family or France for the advantage of a madman, or to thunder forth against him the moral condemnation that he deserved, would have been a weakness or an imprudence, and Napoleon took the resolution of being silent. He allowed all the

Imperial family to write to Murat to point out to him his folly and his ingratitude, and the Emperor wrote to Prince Eugene, recommending him to be on his guard; he sent advices to his sister in Tuscany and to General Miollis at Rome, to close all the garrisons against the Neapolitan troops, if Murat, as there was reason to believe, should invade Italy, under pretext of sustaining the French cause. Murat, in fact, had not yet thrown away the mask, and still declared his intention of coming to the assistance of the French army on the Adige.

Such were the numerous occupations and the severe mental conflicts in which Napoleon passed the end of November and the beginning of December. As to the rest, if from time to time he roared like a lion that receives from afar the arrows of the hunters, held aloof by fear, he exhibited neither his anxiety nor his despair. He still flattered himself that he had four months to prepare, and he hoped in these four months to be able to assemble 300,000 men between Paris and the Rhine, to join to these the entire or part of the old bands of Spain, and with these combined forces to overwhelm the coalition, or crush them in his fall. Alternately animated by hope or meditating vengeance, he was seen active, animated, with flashing eye, walking rapidly to and fro in the presence of his anxious family, of his sorrowful ministers, and his weeping wife. Then he would stop, take his son in his arms, cover him with caresses, restore him to the Empress, and, as if he had found fresh strength in the sentiment of paternity, redouble his pace, uttering such phrases as—"Wait, wait, you shall soon see that my soldiers and I have not forgotten our trade. We have been conquered between the Elbe and the Rhine—conquered by being betrayed—but there will be no traitors between the Rhine and Paris, and you shall again behold the soldiers and the General of Italy. Those who will have dared to profane our frontier shall soon repent of having put a foot on French soil."

Still there was another means left, that of negotiation, and Napoleon was at length content to treat, with the natural limits of France as a basis and the conditions we have already mentioned. Unfortunately, the moment when the Allies were disposed to accord the natural limits of France had passed like a flash of lightning, in the same manner as the fortunate moment had slipped by at Prague, when France might have preserved all her glory of 1810. The equivocal reply to the propositions of M. de Metternich having drawn from him a formal demand as to the acceptance or rejection of the bases of Frankfort, the reply to this demand not being forwarded until the 2nd of December, and not received until the 5th, a month was thus lost, and in this month everything had changed. The Allies had attained a full knowledge of their strength, their transient fit of moderation had passed, and was replaced by all the vehemence of excited passion. From every quarter of Europe, the spirit of a counter-revolution was rising with tempest-like fury.

M. de Metternich, supported by the opinion of the military chiefs, who were weary of the long war, and apprehensive of the risks to which they would be exposed at the other side of the Rhine, had overcome the

pride of Alexander, the rage of the Prussians, the obstinacy of the English, and had induced the Allies assembled at Frankfort to accede to the propositions, of which M. de Saint Aignan had been the bearer to Paris. But the propositions had scarcely been despatched by the sovereigns and diplomatists than there arose a general expression of disapprobation. The suite of Alexander, composed of eminent Germans; the staff of Blücher, consisting of clubbists of the *Tugend-Bund*; the English representatives, in short, attached to head-quarters and holding various appointments: all would have preferred any other to the course that had been adopted, and cried out for an exterminating war against France and against Napoleon; against France, to reduce her to the limits of 1790—and against Napoleon, to dethrone him and bring back the Bourbons, not alone for the advantage of these princes, but as a tribute to the principle they represented.

To accord Napoleon a respite, of which he would profit to strengthen his army, and afterwards re-establish his domination, seemed to them a most impolitic course. To leave still existing in Italy, in Germany, and other places, numerous establishments founded by Napoleon—to continue in power, princes, either parvenus like himself, or members of old dynasties, who had become his accomplices,—seemed a weakness, a want of foresight, in short, a renunciation of victory at the very moment when it might have been rendered most brilliant and complete. According to these politicians, neither Prince Eugene nor Murat ought to be allowed to remain in Italy, spite of the services that were expected from the latter—nor any member of the Bonaparte family. The Bourbons ought to be re-established at Naples, the Pope at Rome, the Austrian archdukes at Florence and Modena, the house of Savoy at Turin, the Austrians at Milan and even at Venice. In Germany, not only ought the Confederation of the Rhine, that detestable work of Napoleon's, to be destroyed, but his allies in Bavaria and Wurtemberg ought to be punished, and dispossessed without compensation, of all they had acquired through France. There were some even who deserved to be punished in an exemplary manner, and amongst them was the King of Saxony, who ought to be dethroned, and replaced by the Duke of Saxe-Weimar; doing thus exactly the reverse of what had been done by Charles V. The King of Denmark deserved no better treatment, because he had persevered in opposing the designs of the coalition by refusing Norway to Bernadotte. As to the King of Westphalia, Jerome Bonaparte, his fall was already accomplished, and about that there was no more to be said. The Allies ought not to remain on the right bank, they ought to cross over to the left, and seize the ancient ecclesiastical electorates, Treves, Mayence, Cologne, in short, the Austrian Low Countries, independently of Holland, which nobody could think of leaving to France. With these vast territories re-conquered on both banks of the Rhine, a kingdom might be formed for Prussia, so as to render her more powerful than she had been under the great Frederick; states should be re-constituted for the princes deposed by Napoleon, such as the Princes of Hesse, Orange, Brunswick, Hanover; these

friends should be loaded with goods, and with them should be formed a Germanic Confederation stronger than the ancient, more firmly united against France, headed not by the Emperor of Austria, who was considered too moderate to be made Emperor of Germany, but by a Diet that should keep alive the strongest and most anti-French feeling that could be enkindled. Such were the views of the most ardent spirits, whether amongst the allied chiefs, or amongst the secondary agents that surrounded the numerous and ambulatory court of the allied monarchs.

The English, especially, having become more moderate under the influence of parliament that did not cease to reproach the ministers with their blind hatred against France, and besides, being represented at Frankfort by one of the sagest spirits, Lord Aberdeen, the English would have rejected so many projected subversions, if, in the number, there did not happen to be one that coincided with their own views, which was depriving France of the Low Countries, that is to say of Antwerp and Flushing. Still they scarcely dared hope for such a result, and restrained their pretensions within the limits of their hopes. It was strange that the Prussians, entertaining within their own hearts all the sentiments of the French revolution, had become, through hatred of the French, the most zealous promoters of the European counter-revolution. Loving liberty to a degree that alarmed their rulers, they wished, through a spirit of vengeance, to eradicate every trace of what the French revolution had effected in Europe. They were not content with winning over their own king, they enticed the Emperor Alexander, by flattery, calling him the king of kings, the supreme chief of the coalition, by attributing to him the great resolves of the war, by promising to conduct him to Paris; all of which excited the vanity of this prince to a delirious height. Alexander, complaisant by nature and by calculation, adding to his natural amiability a continual care to flatter the passions of all, cajoled the Prussians, whose courage and patriotism he did not cease to praise, in order to have them on his side against the Austrians, of whom he was jealous; he flattered the Austrians, by insinuating that the safety of Europe was secured at Prague; nor did he neglect the English, whom he styled models of perseverance, the first authors of the resistance that had been offered to Napoleon, the first conquerors of this conqueror, once believed invincible. Speaking so, whilst at Frankfort, he affected to support the more moderate in their opinions, he privately encouraged the most violent, and allowed them to give free vent to their feelings, in order to attach them more closely to himself. By these means he had succeeded in keeping together the coalition, which was threatened with disintegration, and acquired amongst the Allies a preponderating influence. There was then with Alexander, Count de Stein, a celebrated Prussian, who found an asylum at the court of Russia from the anger of Napoleon. He possessed considerable influence both with Alexander and the Allies. He had been placed at the head of a committee for the direction of German affairs, and administered for the profit of the allied armies, the territories re-

conquered from France, and whose restitution to the former possessors was not accomplished or even decided. These territories were those of Saxony, Hesse, Westphalia, Brunswick, Hanover, Berg, Erfurt, &c. As to the confederates of the Rhine, those allies that had betrayed us, this committee, not taking their defection into account, had taxed them in men and money double the amount they had formerly furnished to France. Hanover, Saxony, Hesse, Cassel, Berg, Wurtemberg, Baden, Bavaria, had been obliged to furnish a contingent of 145,000 men, and a subsidy of 84 million florins, the latter of which had been sent to Prussia, Russia, and Austria, in bonds bearing interest. The committee of German affairs was thus a kind of revolutionary committee, acting in the name of the public safety, and putting no bounds to its desires. Under pretext of giving up the direction of their affairs to the Germans, to whom it was due, Alexander abandoned them to themselves, on condition that they should side with him in case of need.

An extraordinary personage, a Corsican, a stranger by temperament, as well as through superiority of mind to all passions, excepting one, which was hatred, the celebrated Count Pozzo di Borgo, had taken refuge with Alexander, over whom he gradually assumed a marked ascendancy. And who was the object of this hatred which concentrated all the energies of his mind? will naturally be asked. It was that extraordinary man, like himself, a native of Corsica, and whose glory in dazzling the world had agonized the heart of Count Pozzo di Borgo. It certainly argued a rare degree of self-conceit to be jealous of such a genius as Napoleon, for it is only the great Frederic, Cæsar, Hannibal, or Alexander, if their hearts still feel the throbs of mortal emotion, who could have any pretension to be jealous of Napoleon. But how could an obscure individual, hitherto unknown, having never distinguished himself either in the field or at the bar, having been mixed up only in the insignificant squabbles of his native island, how could he possibly conceive a jealousy of the conqueror of Rivoli, of Egypt, and Austerlitz? Still, it was so, for human passions spring up without waiting the permission of either God or man; they are enkindled like those fires that ravage cities and plains, and whose origin is unknown. When a man of genius leaves the country of his birth, he leaves behind either fondly devoted friends, or enemies intensely jealous of his fame. The Count Pozzo was of the latter number with regard to Napoleon, but it must be admitted that on this occasion, he who felt was not unworthy of him who inspired the jealousy. In fact, Heaven had accorded to Count Pozzo a genius as admirable as that of war, of eloquence, or the fine arts; he was endowed with the genius of politics, that is to say, he was gifted with that sagacity which traces human events to their causes, unravels their complications, and foresees their consequence; which discovers the best mode of avoidance or interference; a rare gift, which great minds exercise for the benefit of their country, and little ones for their personal advantage; an endowment that loses in greatness what it gains in egotism, but which must rank amongst the highest intel-

lectual gifts, and which never allows its possessor to remain unknown, idle, or useless. Count Pozzo was, unfortunately for us, a proof of the truth of these assertions, for this man, who up to that period had enjoyed neither renown nor influence, a man who might be almost said to have no country, he it was who contributed in an extraordinary manner to the ruin of Napoleon, and consequently to ours.

He had traversed many countries for the sole purpose of injuring the man he hated ; he had gone first to England, then to Austria, then to Russia and Sweden, always quitting the courts that entertained a friendly feeling towards France, to repair to those that were inimical to her, and returning to the former when they had suspended relations with us, but still breathing forth wherever he went, the intensity of the passion by which he was inspired. He undertook every kind of mission. Sometimes he was sent to London to obtain necessary funds, at another time he was despatched to Bernadotte, whom he despised and ruled, to bring him at once to the battle-field of Leipzig. Now, holding the post of aide-de-camp to Alexander, he exercised with his Italian accent, his lively gesticulation, his proud flashing eye, a powerful influence, justified certainly by his unequalled perspicacity and precision of judgment. This man had revealed to Alexander the sad truth touching the real condition of France, and this he had told as correctly as though he traversed the country in its length and breadth, and yet he had not set foot there for years. "Do not be alarmed," he repeated continually, "at the idea of braving on his own hearth the colossal who has so long oppressed you ; you have already done the most difficult part ; you have brought him from the Vistula to the banks of the Rhine. From Frankfort to Paris the distance is only a step ; the difficulty, nothing. The prodigious forces of France have been squandered in foreign lands ; at home she has nothing ; the people of France, too, are disgusted, tired of the yoke they have so long borne. March forward then without delay, march quickly ; do not allow the giant, breathing time ; go to these Tuilleries that he has made his den, and worn-out France will give him up to you without resistance. You will be astonished at the ease with which you will accomplish this work ; but you must reach Paris. Your sword will have scarcely broken the chain that binds oppressed France, when she will herself deliver up to you, her tyrant and yours."

It was these formidable truths, ever present to the mind of the far-seeing Count Pozzo, that obtained him the decisive influence which he wielded in the fatal 1814. Alexander took pleasure in listening to him, for he felt all his passions rise beneath the influence of the Count's words ; after having heard him, he forgot the moderation of M. de Metternich, and wished, like the Prussians, to march forward, to cross the Rhine, and engage Napoleon in a last and deadly struggle.

When the propositions of Frankfort became known to the principal agents of the coalition, they were thrown into a violent state of agitation, and expressed the strongest disapprobation of the proceedings. To pause was in their opinion a disastrous weakness, for it

would give the common enemy time to re-construct his forces. To leave him France, with the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, was to secure him the means of constantly disturbing the peace of Europe. He ought to be deprived, not only of the Rhine and the Alps, but of France, where no rulers ought to be admitted but the Bourbons. Besides, it was necessary to re-establish the dynasties that had been unjustly despoiled, to re-establish the rule of right; in a word, to restore the ancient order of things in Europe. To succeed in all these objects, it was only needed to take one step, but that step should be taken instantly, without pausing to take breath, without delaying a single day.

Unfortunately, letters from France, the reports of secret agents and information furnished by the friends of the house of Bourbon confirmed these rumours, and unveiled each succeeding hour the true state of things in this same month of November, which Napoleon had lost in equivocal parleying, instead of employing it in positive replies which would have been binding on the authors of the Frankfort propositions. A graver event, and one certainly more easy to foresee now occurred. It served to give a new colour to affairs, and induced England, that had lately appeared less violent, to join the most ardent of Napoleon's opponents. The event to which we allude occurred in Holland.

Holland had submitted to Napoleon in 1810, when he had decreed the union of this country with France. She had submitted, in the first place, because at that period Napoleon was irresistible, and besides, many different interests had found momentary advantages in the union. The Dutch revolutionists, the Catholics, the merchants, had submitted to a revolution, which to one party represented the expulsion of the house of Orange, to another the depression of Protestantism, and to a third, commercial annexation with the greatest empire in the world. Perhaps that under a better system of politics, and with the blessing of peace, these diverse interests might have ultimately found beneath the Imperial sceptre a contentedness that would have silenced the voice of national independence; but it was far different. The chief treasurer, Lebrun, continued, like King Louis, to prefer the Orange party, who were rich and noble to the patriots who were neither. The quarrel with the Pope alienated the Catholics in Holland as well as in France. The maritime war reduced the merchants to deep distress, which soon spread to the other classes of society, and affected the humbler classes most. Smuggling being tolerated under King Louis, afforded some amelioration to the scourges of war, but the French custom-house officers having, since the union, deprived the Dutch commerce of this advantage, the evil had reached its height. The maritime inscription with the conscription being introduced into the country, added new afflictions to the universal distress, and then the spirit of patriotism burst forth with renewed violence. In 1813, Hambourg and the Hanseatic provinces having thrown off the Imperial yoke, the commotion extended to Holland, and called forth rigorous measures to stay its effects. A certain

number of unhappy creatures were condemned to the galleys or to death; six were executed at Saardam, four at Leyden, one at the Hague, and two at Rotterdam. These measures, instead of calming the public excitement, tended to increase it. The battles of Lutzen and Bautzen restrained for a moment without appeasing the discontent, which the battles of Leipzig had called forth in all its original strength. The chief treasurer, Lebrun, personally opposed to rigorous measures, had tried to keep well with everybody, but had only succeeded in getting credit for good but powerless intentions. General Molitor, commander of the troops, had won universal respect as a strict and upright soldier, who never profited of the force at his disposal for his private advantage. Notwithstanding the tact of the civil and military chiefs, the Dutch were determined, at the first opportunity, to send off, both the one and the other, without, however, offering them any violence. But the custom-house officers and the police, whom they detested, they were determined to massacre. Whilst things were in this state, numerous English emissaries in the interests of the house of Orange were traversing Holland, promising the support of England to the people if they rose. The latter replied, that at the first appearance of an armed force, they would proclaim the house of Orange, a family so long unpopular, but on which the hopes and wishes of the country were now centered. But an armed force was necessary. The English had certainly some thousand men ready to embark, but access to the roads was intercepted by formidable batteries, or by fleets riding at anchor. Admiral Missiessy, with the Antwerp squadron, defended the mouths of the Scheld and the Meuse; Admiral Verhuel, with the Texel squadron, defended the entrance to the Zuyder Zee. It was then only by land that any assistance could be rendered to the Dutch. Bernadotte had been commissioned, on leaving Leipzig, to deliver Hamburg, Bremen, and Amsterdam, by the aid of the army du Nord, but he had done nothing. He had led his entire force towards Holstein, for the purpose of reducing Denmark, and forcing the king to give up Norway. With this intention, and trying to get rid of Marshal Davout, who was the chief stay of the Danes, he concluded a treaty with him for the free evacuation of Hamburg, which left the marshal at liberty to return to Holland with 40,000 men. On the reception of this intelligence, the English and Austrian agents uttered loud exclamations, the former because they did not wish that 40,000 French should be sent into Holland, and the latter, because the cabinet of Vienna, at a time when they were labouring to propagate the system of mediation, had formed an alliance with Denmark, and taken it under their protection; both parties demanded that Bernadotte should be deprived of the command of those 80,000 men, whom he turned to his own private advantage; but Alexander, who had become strongly attached to Bernadotte, since they had jointly arranged the Finland affair, had moderated the general irritation, and the Swedish prince was only commanded to send a Russian and Prussian corps to Holland, which was done about the beginning of November.

At the approach of this auxiliary force, the Dutch had ceased to dissimulate. The entire force at General Molitor's command only consisted of some skeleton battalions, containing at most 3,000 men, 500 or 600 French gendarmes, a handful of custom-house officers, universally detested, though very honest men, 500 faithful Swiss, who had not a little contributed to excite the public indignation, and lastly, a foreign regiment, well disciplined, but in which there were 800 Russians, 600 Austrians, and 600 Prussians. This force was not competent either by numerical strength or the organization of the troops to hold the country. Admiral Verhuel commanded at Texel 1,500 Spaniards, who at the first signal might revolt, and force him to retire on board his ships.

The corps of Bulow, despatched by Bernadotte, having appeared on the Yssel, General Molitor issued from Amsterdam with all his disposable forces, and took up a position at Utrecht to guard the line from Naarden to Gorcum. This was the signal for insurrection. The Orangists, having assaulted the fishermen, the sailors, and the peasants, entered Amsterdam on the evening of the 15th November, preceded by women and children, and bearing the flag of the House of Orange. At this sight, all the populace rose, and, during the night, burned the barracks situate on the quays, where the custom-house officers and the agents of the French police lived. The populace committed no offence against the high functionaries, nor against the Chief Treasurer; they contented themselves with merely parading the insurrectionary flag beneath his windows. The only force that remained to the Chief Treasurer was about fifty gendarmes, faithful, indeed, but powerless against so general a movement. He summoned, during the night, the principal members of the rich commercial aristocracy, upon whom he had depended for support; he found them polite but cold, and perceived that if through prudence they had submitted to a powerful government that humored them, they returned at the first opportunity to a government that corresponded with their tastes and aristocratic habits. Seeing there was nothing to hope from these, the Chief Treasurer stepped into his carriage, and repaired to Utrecht, where he met General Molitor, then threatened in front by a force of 20,000 Russians and Prussians, attacked right, left, and rear by insurrections of all kinds, and having at the utmost, not more than 4,000 men under his command. General Molitor, in order not to be cut off from Belgium, soon retired to the Wahal, accompanied by the Chief Treasurer, who had experienced no worse treatment than a few popular hisses. Dating from this time, there was not a city in Holland that was not revolutionized. Leyden, the Hague, Rotterdam, Utrecht, established regencies almost entirely composed of Orangists, and soon the Prince of Orange, after having disembarked in Holland, entered Amsterdam amidst acclamations. It was announced that Holland, without defining the form of government, would again place herself under the protection of that ancient house, beneath whose rule she had passed through the most important crises of her history. As to the rest, few excesses were committed, and these were directed against the custom-

house officers, or the receivers of the *droits réunis*, who certainly ought not to have been made to expiate the faults of their government. The populace of the great cities, violent and fickle as usual, applauded the restoration of the Princes of Orange as warmly as they had applauded their fall, and the enlightened patriots tolerated their return as the termination of a foreign despotism. With the exception of Admiral Missiessy with the Scheldt fleet, and Admiral Verhuel with the Texel fleet, all Holland recognised the House of Orange. The English landed General Graham at the head of 6,000 men.

Any reflecting person could easily have foreseen in these events a dark prognostic for France herself. It was a ray of light to the English. This spontaneous revolution, which at the first appearance of the so-called emancipating bayonets, burst forth, and almost without violence, by an irresistible impulse, overturned the recent creations of the French empire, to re-establish the ancient order of things, showed the English that the same changes might be wrought elsewhere. On all sides, secret agents—merchants who went frequently from Holland to Belgium, Belgians pursued by the French police, all gave the same accounts, and said that if the allied troops would advance rapidly on Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, Bruges, they would find the people every where disposed to revolt against a government which during the past fifteen years had oppressed them by the conscription, the *droits réunis*, and a maritime war; that besides they would find the fortresses without arms, without men, and without provisions; that the magnificent Antwerp fleet would belong to whoever would seize it; and, in fine, that to secure success, the Allies had only to advance. So much was not needed to rouse the British passions, and induce the English government to adopt new and decisive resolutions. The reinforcements destined for Holland were immediately prepared; General Graham, and the Russian and Prussian generals, received orders to march at once on Antwerp; earnest remonstrances were addressed to Bernadotte requesting that he would cease to occupy himself with Denmark, and march with all his forces into the Low Countries, trusting to the Allies to secure him Norway as they had promised. Lastly, Lord Aberdeen received fresh instructions relative to the basis of a future peace.

The Frankfort propositions detailed in the note given to M. de Saint-Aignan, and in the subsequent letters of M. de Metternich, had caused great dissatisfaction in London. The people there could not understand like those at Frankfort, the danger involved in the passage of the Rhine. The Londoners were astonished that the campaign finished at Leipzig, and they could not understand why the armies should stop short on a road that seemed so promising, and whose termination presented such great advantages. England found the proposition very indigestible, of leaving France her natural limits, that is to say, the Scheldt and Antwerp, and she regarded it as a duty on the part of the Allies to deliver her from the disagreeable and constantly threatening presence of a French fleet at Flushing. Russia had found the existence of the grand duchy of Warsaw obnoxious; all Germany had desired the removal of the French from Hamburg, Bremen, and Magdebourg; Austria

did not wish their presence at Laybach and Trieste. All these desires had been satisfied. Should England be the only power whose wishes were to remain ungratified? And had she not a right to demand that the war should be continued, if a few additional efforts could deliver her from the presence of the French at Antwerp? The English politicians did not certainly approve all the subversive projects of the more excited members of the coalition, such as the dethronement of the Kings of Saxony and Denmark, but they adopted amongst those projects those which suited England and those which would oblige France to retire from Gorcum to Lille, or at least from Gorcum to Brussels and Ghent. In recovering Antwerp and Flushing, a combination was presented highly agreeable to England, which was to render Holland sufficiently powerful to oppose France, and the English ardently wished that the house of Orange could join the ancient United Provinces to the Austrian Low Countries. This combination was become an object of the most passionate desires of the English, since the spontaneous insurrection of Holland, which, it was said, would be soon imitated in Belgium, had revealed the possibility of pushing still further the advantages gained over Napoleon.

The instructions Lord Aberdeen had received to adhere to the Frankfort propositions were already a little out of date. The British Cabinet modified these instructions, and recommended their minister not to consider himself bound by the propositions of Frankfort. They prescribed to him as the formal conditions of England—the continuation of the war, the retirement of France within the limits of 1790, and an absolute silence in all treaties of peace touching maritime rights. It was not said that England would carry the war to such an extremity as to dethrone Napoleon, though this result would be the most agreeable to the secret wishes of the English people, but this wish was not expressed, because England had pledged herself to treat with the head of the French empire, and it would have been a shocking inconsistency to retract this engagement; but it was declared in a general manner that the war should be continued until France was circumscribed within the limits of 1790.

Lord Aberdeen was commissioned, in order to entice the continental powers by the bait of money, of which they stood greatly in need, to purchase the Antwerp fleet, should the capture be effected; the purchase money would have represented a half-year's subsidies. Lastly, to flatter Austria in particular—Austria, whose jealousy of Russia was already perceptible, Lord Aberdeen was commissioned to say to M. de Metternich, that if in some details England humoured Russia, on the whole she took part with Austria, because that on almost every point they agreed, and that England would always prefer sensible advice to the wild fancies of certain enthusiasts, but in return England expected that Austria would vote for the consolidation of a powerful kingdom in the Low Countries, which should extend from Texel to Antwerp.

Such were the instructions sent to the British legation precisely at the moment when Napoleon decided, but too late, to accept, purely

and simply the Frankfort propositions. Thus the month we had lost from November to December had left all the Powers time to reflect, especially England, that, enlightened by the insurrection in Holland, had conceived the hope and the desire of depriving France not only of Texel but of Antwerp. It is evident that a prompt and categorical adhesion given on the 16th November, might have placed the Allies at Frankfort in an embarrassment from which they could not have easily extricated themselves.

It is scarcely necessary to say that when these fresh instructions arrived at Frankfort, all there were prepared to receive them. All those who were desirous of advancing until Napoleon should be overcome, had spoken out and demanded that no account should be taken of the overtures made to M. de St. Aignan. The Emperor Alexander was only too well disposed to coincide in these views, through resentment against Napoleon as well as through the exuberance of his pride. To make a triumphant entry into Paris would be a revenge for the destruction of Moscow, that transported him with joy. Count Pozzo excited him by repeating that what had taken place in Holland would be re-produced in Belgium and in France, if the Allies hastened—if they boldly crossed the Rhine—if, in a word, they did not allow the common enemy time to breathe. The Prussians, ever spurred on by hate, ardently desired to advance. Blucher said, that for his part, were he free to act, he would advance to Paris. The Austrians even, though highly sensitive to the dangers to which they would be exposed beyond the Rhine, did not deny that vast advantages might be reaped there. Whilst England was endeavouring to gain Antwerp for the house of Orange, they could gain Italy for themselves and their arch-dukes. There was no lack of motives for continuing the war, although in the case of the Austrians, the danger of fresh risks was united to the vexation of seeing the ill-disguised preponderance of the Russians, and the brutal violence of the Prussians. But there was in this question a decisive reason for them as for everyone else, which was the wish of England; England that paid the Allies, and who, by her victories in Spain, had acquired a continental importance that she had never before possessed; and there was, besides, her all-powerful fleet. In short, she held the balance between the contending powers, and could make it turn on which side she pleased. It was consequently decided that the war should be pursued without relaxation. Prussia was moved to this resolution by a motive of vengeance; Russia through vanity; Austria through a selfish compliance with England; and England through the various motives that gave her an interest in the Scheldt; all were urged by the impulsion of events which were hurrying to the close a struggle so old, so embittered, so implacable. On the 10th December M. de Metternich replied to the note in which M. de Caulaincourt had adhered purely and simply to the message of M. de St. Aignan. The purport of the reply was that France was rather late in her acceptance of the Frankfort propositions, but that nevertheless he would communicate this tardy acceptance to the Allies. He did not say whether

in consequence of these communications military operations would be suspended, and as it had never been agreed since the rupture at Prague, that negotiations, in case they were resumed, should cause a suspension of the war, the Allies might, without violating any engagement, continue to advance, provided they continued their pacific policy. Therefore the pretended despatch of the French reply to the allied courts left sufficient time for action without exhibiting extraordinary inconsistency.

However, as England wished to carry on the war for the attainment of an object which was solely to her own advantage, it was but reasonable she should pay the expenses of the late campaign, and as all the belligerents were deficient in the money needed for these immense armaments, it was decided that England should be asked for new subsidies; and in order to point out the largeness of the amount needed, and the necessity of an immediate supply, there was sent to London a man who had already played an important part in the councils of the Allies—Count Pozzo. He set out for the purpose of laying before the British minister the budget of the winter campaign.

But in the hypothesis of an immediate resumption of hostilities, the question of what would be the best plan to adopt awakened serious consideration, and might give rise to grave dissensions in a coalition where the interests and the vanity of the different parties were in direct opposition, and where even the imperative need of conservation only kept up a harmony more apparent than real. Besides that, the allied forces were considerably reduced by the intensity of the struggle; they were also divided by the diversity of the objects that each had in view. The corps of Kleist, Klenau, Tauenzein, Benningsen, that had all taken part in the formidable affair of Leipzig, were left behind to blockade the Elbe fortresses. Bernadotte with the Swedes, with the Prussians of Bulow, with the Russians of Wintzingerode, under pretext of opposing Marshal Davout, had deviated from the principal object of the war, in order to snatch Norway from the Danes. This proceeding had deeply exasperated the Austrians, under whose protection the Danes were, and excited a general distrust of Alexander's sincerity, who was accused of encouraging Bernadotte under-hand, whilst he publicly blamed him. It was with difficulty that the new Swedish prince could be induced to give a detachment for the re-establishment of the house of Orange. There remained then on the Rhine only the army of the Prince Schwarzenberg, quartered between Frankfort and Bâle, and that of Marshal Blücher stationed between Frankfort and Coblenz, having in their ranks Bavarians, Badeners, and Wurtembergers. After the adjunction of the latter, and the losses of the campaign, the two armies were estimated at from 220,000 to 230,000 disposable men. It is true that the new German contingents having replaced the troops that were blockading the fortresses, and Bernadotte being recalled to add his forces to the main body, the Allies could now number on the Rhine 220,000 men; they hoped to raise numerous

recruits in Poland, Prussia, and Austria ; they had about 70,000 men in Italy, 100,000 on the Spanish frontiers, so that they would be able to attack France in March and April with 600,000 men. But for the moment, they could only collect 220,000 men, of whom 160,000 were Austrians, Russians, Prussians, and Bavarians, under the Prince of Schwarzenberg, and 60,000 Prussians, Russians, Wurtembergers, Hessians, and Badeners, under Marshal Blucher. It was a daring enterprise, that of crossing the Rhine in front of Napoleon with such forces ; but according to the accounts received, he had not more than 80,000 men, and it was therefore not believed imprudent to encounter him with 220,000. The Allies would have been still more determined had they known that he had not a force of more than 60,000 men to oppose a sudden invasion.

Still, the most enlightened personages at Frankfort looked with suspicion on the reports furnished by the agents of the coalition ; they could not believe that Napoleon had not at least 100,000 men under arms. They insisted therefore on the necessity of acting with the greatest prudence in the attempt to enter France. On this occasion each had a plan of his own ; the Prussians and the Russians had one, the Austrians another, all inspired by the desire, so common in war, of drawing round themselves the main body of the forces, and so becoming the centre of operations. The Prussians wished, with 180,000 men out of the 220,000, to cross the Rhine between Coblenz and Mayence, whilst another body should cross between Mayence and Strasbourg ; that they should advance boldly in the midst of the fortresses that defended this part of France, such as Coblenz, Mayence, Landau, Strasbourg, in the first line ; Mezières, Montmedy, Luxembourg, Thionville, Metz, in the second line ; they asserted that these fortresses could be quickly captured from the French, if they had only left small garrisons there, but if, on the contrary, in order to guard the fortresses, they had weakened the main body of the army, this weakness should be profited of ; the invaders should attack the main body, which they would be certain to defeat, and drive the remnant back to Paris, passing over the fortresses, which they could at a later period attack with the different corps called from the banks of the Elbe. The Prussian staff considered this plan of operation as both the most scientific and the most daring, for in one case, they would secure the fortresses, and so establish strongholds for themselves as they advanced ; in the other they would perhaps reach Paris in a few days' march.

The Austrians had another plan, dictated also by their private views, but perfectly rational, at least to judge by the results. They thought it would be imprudent to get entangled in this labyrinth of fortresses, extending from Strasbourg to Coblenz, from Metz to Mezières. They said this would be to *take the bull by the horns*. They maintained that without exhausting his resources, Napoleon would content himself with putting the fortresses in a position to resist a *coup de main*, and that he would himself be found manœuvring between them with his concentrated forces, ready to fall upon the

allied army ; they also asserted that the Allies would be more weakened by blockading these fortresses than Napoleon would be by defending them. The Austrians proposed a plan of operations radically different. The weak side of France was not, in their opinion, the north-east, from Strasbourg to Coblenz, from Metz to Mezières, where she was protected by several rivers and immense fortifications ; her weak point was due east, along the Jura, where, reckoning on the neutrality of the Swiss, she had never thought of erecting defences. The best plan then would be to take the road to Bâle, and cross the Rhine at that point, where it never freezes, to traverse Switzerland that was crying aloud for deliverance, and thus take France in the rear, a proceeding that would be productive of many advantages. It would cut off France from Italy, and deprive her of the assistance she might receive if Napoleon recalled Prince Eugene, and at the same time it would so isolate this prince, that he must succumb by the mere fact of his isolation.

It is easy to divine the motives which, independent of the real excellence of this plan, induced Austria to forfeit it. She wished to penetrate into Switzerland, to re-establish her influence there, and not alone deprive France of the assistance of Italy, but Italy of the succours of France. Switzerland was, in fact, in a state of extraordinary fermentation, and disposed to imitate the example of Holland, with this difference, that there was in Switzerland a very strong French party, with well-founded and legitimate pretensions. The cantons formerly dominant—and amongst these were to be found some of the democratic as well as the aristocratic, for ambition is not inherent to one principle more than another ; these cantons, in short, flattered themselves they could recover the territory they formerly ruled. The little cantons aspired to possess, as formerly, the Italian bailiwicks, Vatteline and Valais ; Berne was anxious to possess the Pays de Vaud ; Argovie had the same designs with regard to Porentruy ; the aristocratic families rencumbered with regret the authority they once exercised over the middle classes. On the contrary, the territory formerly subject, the classes anciently oppressed, did not wish, on any terms, to submit again to their former masters ; deplorable divisions, to which Napoleon had put a termination by the act of mediation. Unfortunately this noble act, worthy of the time when he concluded the Concordat, the peace of Amiens, and the peace of Lunéville, had been soon disfigured, like all the others, by his infractive genius. He had filled Switzerland with his custom-house officers, and even with his soldiers ; he occupied the Tessin with a detachment of the Italian army, which was a strong argument against Swiss neutrality. Moreover, in closely blockading Switzerland to prevent smuggling, he had, in certain manufacturing cantons, caused the labourers' wages to fall from 15 to 5 sous per day, and had rendered Switzerland as wretched as Holland. However, these evils had not made the liberated territories forget their independence, and if there were some of the ancient régime who cried out for the invaders, there was a party of the new school who opposed them with all their might. Switzerland was, at

this epoch, the only country that Napoleon had not entirely disgusted with French influence and the principles of our revolution. The struggle was therefore obstinate and intense between the two parties. The partizans of the old régime pressed Austria to advance into their country, and she desired nothing more earnestly than to gratify them, and to adopt a procedure that would restore her influence in Switzerland by re-establishing there the aristocratic power, and would secure her rule in Italy by cutting it off at the present moment from French aid.

The Prussians and Russians found fault with this plan, in the first place because it was dictated by the private interests of Austria, and would turn the allied army from the most direct route to Paris, and necessitate a wide detour, besides separating the main body of the army into many divisions, for it was absolutely necessary to keep an army in the Low Countries, and an intermediary army in the direction of Coblenz and Mayence, which, with the proposed army for entering by the Jura, would cause three divisions, and give Napoleon an opportunity of exercising his favourite tactics, and engaging his enemies in succession.

The English, who were generally disposed to take part with the Austrians against the Prussians and Russians, and who were besides offended at the authority assumed by Alexander, showed themselves favourably inclined to the plan of Prince Schwarzenberg. In addition to these reasons, they had especial need of the Austrians to establish the kingdom of the Low Countries, and were extremely desirous of withdrawing Switzerland from the influence of France. The Emperor Alexander, on the contrary, rejected the Austrian project from a variety of motives. Although at Frankfort the Allies overwhelmed each other with protestations of fidelity and devotedness, through fear of seeing the coalition dissolved; although Alexander added to his protestations a certain coquetry of manner, which, however innocent in his youth, had become tinctured with craft as he advanced in life; in short, notwithstanding all these flattering externals, the Allies were frequently on the point of coming to a rupture, and especially in a recent affair touching Bernadotte, whom the English accused of having totally neglected Holland, whilst the Austrians accused him of having outraged Denmark, and the Russians, though outwardly disavowing his acts, were suspected of encouraging him in secret. Alexander, openly convicted of duplicity, had exhibited considerable ill-humour, and was especially disposed to quarrel with the Austrians, who had on this occasion unveiled his secret plottings. Moreover, though flattering, in presence of the Allies, the violent party that advocated the extirpation of every trace of the French revolution, he flattered at the same time the Poles, and the German and Swiss liberals. He was thus a counter-revolutionist with some, and a liberal with the others, as much through sagacious foresight as through mobility of disposition; still his real inclinations were towards liberal principles, through opposition to the despotism of Napoleon, and as a consequence of his education. Brought up, in fact, by a Swiss colonel, Laharpe, having

had at his court, for the education of his sisters, governesses of the same nation, he had listened to their supplications, had appeared touched by them, and had protested that he would never allow a counter-revolution to be effected in Switzerland.

This question had finished by rendering the Allies uneasy as to the continuance of the coalition. However, Austria being determined on the plan of turning the fortresses, and marching at least as far as Bâle, and having obtained, thanks to the English, a majority of voices she had promised not to violate the Swiss neutrality, and to be content with approaching the frontiers, adding that if the Swiss rose spontaneously and appealed to the Allies, they could not refuse to pass through gates that opened of their own accord. Alexander had not positively disputed this reasoning; he had contented himself with denying that the Swiss demanded the violation of their frontier, and had consented to a general movement towards Bâle, on the conditions we have stated.

Consequently, from the 10th to the 20th of December, all the details of the march beyond the Rhine, were regulated. It was agreed that the military operations should be continued without pausing to negotiate; that Blucher, with the corps of York, Sacken, and Langeron, with the Wurtembergers, and the Badeners, comprising about 60,000 men, should prepare the passage of the Rhine between Coblenz and Mayence, and should advance afterwards amongst the French fortresses, that at the same time, the grand army of Prince Schwarzenberg, composed of Austrians, Bavarians, Russians, and Prussian and Russian guards, comprising nearly 160,000 men, should advance to Bâle, and cross the Rhine in the vicinity of this city, or at Bâle itself, if the Swiss should put an end to all scruples by opening the gates themselves; the Allies would thus turn the French defences, by penetrating through Huningue, Bâle, and Langres. These principles of action having been acceded to, the army marched forward. Blucher concentrated his forces between Mayence and Coblenz; the Prince of Schwarzenberg directed his course towards Switzerland, advancing to Bâle by Strasbourg. The sovereigns and the diplomatists quitted Frankfort for Fribourg.

The Swiss Diet, of whom the majority were sagacious men, who though they regretted the excesses Napoleon had committed in the days of his power, still retained a grateful recollection of his benefits, and did not desire either a counter-revolution or a foreign invasion. The Diet had sent agents to Paris, requiring that France should recognise the Swiss neutrality, and efface every trace of the acts that had rendered the neutrality illusory. Napoleon, obliged by circumstances to receive these demands, had at first withdrawn his troops from Tessin, and then declared that he looked upon Swiss neutrality as an essential principle of European law, which he had pledged himself solemnly to respect, and that he saw in his title of "Mediator of the Swiss Confederation," only a title commemorative of the services rendered by France to Switzerland, but not in any sense a title conferring any real power.

The Diet, armed with this declaration, had immediately despatched two deputies to the allied sovereigns, to ask that they, in their turn, should recognise a neutrality that France admitted in so explicit a manner. To this proceeding, the Diet joined another, which would have been very wise, if it had been seriously meant, and which consisted in assembling a federal army of 12,000 men, stationed between Bâle and Schaffhouse, under the command of M. de Watteville. Whilst they acted thus, the principal families in the Grisons, in the little cantons, and Berne, had sent secret emissaries to each of the sovereigns, saying that the Diet was a fallacious, an usurping authority, on which they set no value; and that the Allies ought immediately to cross the Helvetic frontier to aid the true and only legitimate authority, that of past times, and re-establish it for the benefit of the Allies.

And as the Swiss uttered speeches of a two-fold character, so also did the allied powers. In public, they said to the representatives of the Diet, that they regarded Swiss neutrality as an important principle of European law, and that they would endeavour for the future to render it inviolate; that for the present, without meditating any infraction of this neutrality, they could not pledge themselves to respect in every case a principle so often violated by France, and feebly defended by Switzerland herself. They cited, in support of this reasoning, the occupation of Tessin, the title of Mediator, assumed by Napoleon, the regiments in the service of France that had lately been recruited, and, in short, an event little noted, the borrowing of the Swiss territory, made by the Boudet division, in 1813, in order to pass into Germany. They did not speak more explicitly as to how far these precedents would influence the conduct of the Allies, they limited themselves to establishing their titles without saying they would use them. Under-hand, they insinuated to the Grisons, to the little cantons, to the people of Berne, that they ought to rise and overturn the Diet, that in this case the allied armies would enter into Switzerland, and *en passant*, restore to the Swiss Vatteline, the Italian bailiwicks, Valais, the Pays de Vaud, Porentruy, &c.

The reasons alleged by the diplomatists of the coalition had not great weight, for Tessin was evacuated, and its occupation had been, after all, only an insignificant punishment for flagrant acts of smuggling; the title of Mediator was only an act of gratitude on the part of the Swiss, entailing no dependence whatsoever on France; in short, the admission of the capitulated regiments into the service of the different powers had not been regarded at any period as a violation of neutrality. But in this great European conflict, law was only a vain word, and on the 19th of December, spite of repeated assurances to the Emperor Alexander, that the Allies would not enter Switzerland without being invited thither, Prince Schwarzenberg approached the bridge of Bâle, and took up a position in front of the Swiss troops under General Watteville. The Austrian generalissimo expected every moment an insurrection at Berne, which having overturned the Diet and set up a new government, he might then say he was summoned

by the Swiss themselves. Nevertheless, weary of waiting, the Prince of Schwarzenberg proceeded on the 21st of December to cross the bridge of Bâle, and the commander of the Swiss troops, looking upon it as impossible to resist all Europe in arms, and excusing his want of courage by his powerlessness, made a feint of protesting, and then ceded the passage without striking a blow. On the arrival of this intelligence, the movement so impatiently expected at Berne broke forth, and the Diet, which had been legally established in virtue of an excellent constitution, and had the recommendation of twelve years' successful and tranquil legislation, was declared void. Similar movements took place in divers cantons, and the Allies took advantage of these commotions which they had excited, instead of awaiting, to commit a flagrant violation of the law of nations. As to the rest, the Allies issued a proclamation, in which they declared they would henceforth invariably respect Swiss neutrality—that is to say, when they would no longer need to violate it, and when it would be their interest that it should be respected.

Alexander had been deceived, and having learned some days later that the commotions upon which the Allies justified their conduct, instead of proceeding, had followed the invasion, he was both offended and irritated to the highest degree. But he could scarcely complain, for Austria had done to him on this occasion what he had himself done frequently, especially in the affair of the Swedes against the Danes. Moreover, it would have been still more vexatious to break with the Allies than to be deceived by them, and he contented himself with complaining bitterly, and advising the Vandois and all the subject countries to remain quiet, and that he would not permit them to be placed under the old régime. The allied armies advanced and soon inundated Switzerland and Franche-Comté. The Bavarians took their way towards Bâle, the Austrians advanced on Berne and Geneva, in order to reach Besançon and Dole by crossing the Jura. Blücher, near Mayence, waited until the Austrians should have accomplished the wide détour they had undertaken, to cross the Rhine himself. Thus, on the fatal day of the 21st of December, 1813, the Empire, after more than twenty years of unexampled triumphs, was, by a terrible revulsion of fortune, invaded in her turn; and France, which far from being the criminal, had been the sufferer; France, after having severely suffered for the fault, was about to suffer severely in expiation, destined thus to be twice a victim—once of the wonderful man who had governed her gloriously but harshly, and next, victim to the monarchs who came to take vengeance on him.

Fearing above all things an insurrection of the populace, the Allies, on entering into France, made every effort to tranquillize the public mind. By a declaration published at Frankfort on the 1st of Dec., the Allies endeavoured to show that they did not wish to detract from the greatness of France. Prince Schwarzenberg ordered that the following proclamation should everywhere precede the allied troops:

“Frenchmen!

“Victory has led the allied armies to your frontier; they wish to cross,

"We do not make war on France; but we repulse the yoke that your government wishes to impose on our countries, which have the same claims to independence and happiness as yours.

"Magistrates, landed proprietors, labourers, remain in your houses; an enforcement of public order, a respect for private property, the most strict discipline, shall mark the passage of the allied armies. They are not animated by a spirit of vengeance; they do not wish to visit on France the numberless evils with which, during twenty years, she has overwhelmed her neighbours and the most remote countries.

"Their glory shall be to have brought to a rapid conclusion the woes of Europe. The only conquest they desire is that of peace for France, and for all Europe an assured tranquillity. We had hoped to find peace before touching French soil; we are now going to seek it there."

On learning what had occurred in Holland, and the first movement of the Allies towards the Low Countries, Napoleon had felt immediately the danger of allowing himself to be attacked on this side, for it was that part of the ancient conquests of France which his enemies were most disposed to contest, and to maintain the legal, it was necessary to secure the actual possession of the country. He had, therefore, hastened to send thither quickly all the disposable succours at his command.

In the beginning of the negotiations, Napoleon was desirous, as we have seen, of keeping Holland, not so much in the hope of retaining it definitely, as with the intention of using it as an object of compensation. But Holland having suddenly escaped from his hands, he had sent off, with the utmost expedition, some forces to the Wahal. He had despatched General Rampon to Gorcum, with the National Guards, raised in French Flanders, to garrison the place. He had sent the Duke of Plaisance, son of the chief treasurer, to Antwerp, with orders to enclose the Scheldt squadron in the basins, to withdraw the sailors, and give them occupation, some on board the flotilla, others in the city fortifications; he was also to assemble at Antwerp the neighbouring depôts, the conscripts, the custom-house officers, and the gendarmes returning from Holland. Napoleon had also sent General Decaen, whose services were no longer required at Catalonia, to Belgium, in order to organize there, as quickly as possible, the 1st corps, which was to be drawn, as we have seen, from the depôts of Marshal Davout. Perceiving clearly that this corps could not be reconstituted promptly enough to avert the first approach of danger, and wishing at any price to save the line of the Wahal, Napoleon had selected in his guard all the disposable men, to march without delay into northern Brabant. He sent, first, General Lefebvre-Desnoëttes with two thousand light cavalry, then Generals Roguet and Barrois, each with an infantry division of the Young Guard; lastly, he had sent Marshal Mortier himself to Namur, at the head of the Old Guard. If the enemy only meditated a winter campaign in the Low Countries, Napoleon flattered himself that he could thus mar their measures, and have time afterwards to transport his Guard where the danger should be most serious during the campaign. If, on the contrary, the chief efforts of the Allies

should be concentrated on Belgium, the Guard would be already present on the principal scene of operations. The public mind being greatly agitated in Belgium, and the people much disposed to imitate the example of the Dutch, Napoleon had sent thither an excellent officer of gendarmerie, Colonel Henry (now raised to the rank of General), and already distinguished by his services in Vendée. He advanced into Belgium at the head of some hundred gendarmes, chosen from the *élite* of that body.

Such had been the first orders given immediately after the insurrection in Holland, towards the end of November. The intelligence of the passage of the Rhine, near Bâle, on the 21st of December, without confounding had still strongly stirred Napoleon's feelings, for he immediately discovered the designs of his enemies; he perceived they no longer wished to negotiate with him, that the Frankfort propositions had soon become, what at first they were not, a decoy, thanks to the fault he had committed of not taking the Allies at the first word; he now saw they were determined to carry hostilities to the last extremity, even during winter, and that they were determined to finish the war with the remnants of those battalions that had contested the gigantic battle-fields of Dresden, Leipzig, and Hanau. There was no other course remaining than to defend himself with what remained of the troops that had fought these same battles, adding thereto whatever he could assemble in one or two months.

It was no longer a question of employing the winter and spring in raising 600,000 men, it was now necessary to make use quickly of those that the prefects had been able to tear from our desolated fields in the months of November and December, and unfortunately, the number was not considerable. The appeal to the classes of 1811, 1812, 1813, which was expected to yield 140,000 men, had only produced 80,000; good soldiers, it is true, and an appeal to the earlier classes had yielded at the utmost 30,000. Napoleon ordered that these conscripts should be distributed immediately, according to the localities in which they were placed, some in the dépôts of the old corps of Davout, situate in Belgium, others in the corps of Macdonald, Marmont, and Victor, dispersed along the Rhine. He ordered Marshal Marmont, not to suffer himself to be shut up in Mayence, but to issue forth, march to this side of the Vosges and collect on the way the conscripts originally destined to join him at Mayence. He ordered Marshal Victor to quit Strasbourg, and leave there, besides the national guards already stationed in the place, some skeleton battalions, with a portion of his conscripts, and to distribute the others in the ranks of the 2nd corps, which he commanded. The conscripts destined for Italy were stopped at Grenoble and Chambéry and ordered to Lyons, where Napoleon wished to form of the dépôts of Dauphiné, Provence, and Auvergne, an army to oppose the enemy in the passes of Switzerland and Savoy. The conscripts of Burgundy, Auvergne, Bourbonnais, Berry, Normandy, and Orleanais were ordered to Paris, to be employed there, some in the guard, the others in the dépôts that were to fall back on the capital at the approach of

the invading armies. The conscripts of the south were still to journey on to Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier, Nîmes, where the reserves of the two Spanish armies were being organized.

This first direction given to 110,000 men, showed the use Napoleon intended to make of the short time that remained to him. The corps of Macdonald, of Marmont, of Victor were to collect as many conscripts as they could, arm, equip, and drill them, advancing slowly to Paris. Here was a sufficient force to retard at least for some days, the progress of the invasion. Napoleon busied himself in creating an army of reserve, the detachments of which were to join him as they were formed. It was to be composed of the new battalions of guard, of which a portion was to be organized at Paris, and of the dépôts that were falling back on the capital, and which were to be filled with conscripts from the central provinces. It was not alone the dépôts from the Rhine that were assembled at Paris, all those that were not necessary to the defence of the eastern and southern frontiers were called thither, in order that they should be increased by as large a number as could be added. It was the old Duke of Valmy, so long superintendant of the dépôts of the Rhine, who was to discharge the same functions between the Rhine and the Seine. It was hoped that two divisions of reserve should thus be formed, and which were to be put under the command of the illustrious General Gerard, who had distinguished himself in the late campaigns. As soon as the conscripts should have arrived, be drafted into the different battalions, armed and half equipped, these two divisions were to set out to join the army, and be organized and drilled on the way. Napoleon had established in the capital clothing magazines, where he accelerated the activity of the workmen by high pay, in order that two or three thousand suits should be finished daily.

He acted in the same manner with regard to the cavalry, who were very much needed to resist the innumerable bands of Cossacks that the enemy were about to pour into France. He made the dépôts of cavalry that were between the frontiers and Paris, fall back on Versailles; those of Normandy and Picardy were also brought there, with the horse soldiers who had returned on foot through Wesel, and the necessary orders were given to equip and mount them. All the working saddlers and coachmakers of the capital were employed to make saddles and harness, and paid ready money. The prefects of the neighbouring departments were authorized to seize all the disposable horses, with the legitimate excuse that France must be defended from a Cossack invasion. It was announced that every horse fit for service should be paid for in ready money by the general commanding the cavalry dépôt. The expenses that the treasurer could not immediately discharge, were supplied from the private reserve of the Tuilleries.

In short, Napoleon, foreseeing that he would be obliged to supply his deficiency in infantry by additional force in cavalry, was making formidable preparations at Vincennes. The companies of artillery that were not needed in the fortresses, the field matériel that was not

indispensable, were brought to Vincennes, where, as we have already mentioned, conscripts, horses, and harness, were to be collected, and where from four to five hundred cannon were to be mounted.

These arrangements, notwithstanding the activity with which they were carried out, were far from corresponding to the extent and proximity of the danger. Twelve or fifteen thousand conscripts thrown precipitately into the skeleton battalions of the guards, twenty or twenty-five thousand draughted into the dépôts concentrated at Paris, offered only a feeble resource to the marshals who were to fall back on Champagne and Burgundy, with the débris of Leipsic and Hanau. Napoleon decided, however repugnant to his feelings, to make use of the National Guards. These offered ready-made soldiers, to whom in so imminent a danger it was very natural to have recourse. Napoleon ordered the prefects of Burgundy, Picardy, Normandy, Lorraine, and Brittany, to appeal to those municipalities where discontent had not extinguished patriotism, and ask them to furnish select companies of National Guards. The levy of 300,000 from the more remote classes, and of 160,000 men from the class of 1815, not having been, through want of time, raised in these provinces, the inhabitants had no cause to complain of too frequent appeals, nor could they refuse, whatever their political opinions might be, to make a last effort to repulse the common enemy from their native land. Napoleon appointed Paris, Meaux, Montereau, Troye, as places for the rendezvous of these National Guards. Alsace, and Franche-Comté were also to furnish some to occupy the defiles of the Vosges.

Unfortunately, there was a want of muskets to arm these troops, for spite of the manufactories established at Paris and Versailles, fire-arms did not arrive in sufficient quantities, and there was, as we have already said, more hands than muskets, though there had been so great an expenditure of human life from the walls of Moscow to the banks of the Tagus.

One resource remained, to which Napoleon was ready to appeal without considering the sacrifices it would entail; it was that which the two armies of Spain offered, which, assembled before Paris, would have numbered 80,000 or 100,000 admirable soldiers. With this resource alone, he would have the means of overpowering the Allies, and forcing them back into the Rhine. But it was doubtful whether he could get them up in time. The Duke of San Carlos, who had set out for the Catalonian frontier, had crossed and gone into Spain, and nothing more had been heard of him. The unhappy Ferdinand, as anxious to quit Valençay for the Escorial as Napoleon was to bring his soldiers from the Adour, was dying of impatience; but nothing came of it. Joseph, profiting opportunely of circumstances to escape from a false position, wrote to Napoleon to say that when France was on the eve of invasion, he could not think of making conditions or demanding compensation, and he only asked to serve France, no matter in what rank or in what place. Napoleon received him at Paris, restored his rank of French prince, as well as his place in the Council of Regency, and decided that without giving him, as formerly, the title

of "King of Spain," he should be called "King Joseph," and his wife "Queen Julia."

This arrangement, which had the advantage of re-establishing concord in the bosom of the Imperial family, was, up to this time, the sole result of the negotiations of Valençay. As all the troops could not be immediately withdrawn from the Spanish frontier, Napoleon wished that a part, at least, should come at once. He ordered the Marshals Suchet and Soult to hold themselves ready to march with their entire armies towards the North of France; and, meanwhile, Marshal Suchet was to send off 12,000 of his best troops to Lyons, and Marshal Soult 14,000 or 15,000 of his best to Paris. Relays were prepared along the roads to transport the infantry by post, as had been done in former times. Undoubtedly, the withdrawal of these two detachments weakened considerably the forces of the Marshals Suchet and Soult; but as these generals were only required to retard the advance of the enemy into the South of France, Napoleon hoped that with the remaining forces they would be able to effect this object. Besides, in accordance with prior orders, they had sent to Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier, and Nîmes, skeleton battalions, into which the conscripts of these departments, as they were hastily raised, equipped and armed, were drafted. It is true that hostilities having taken us by surprise there as on other points, before the anticipated month of April, there were, instead of 60,000 men, scarcely 20,000 in the four dépôts. Such as they were, however, in our extreme danger they were not to be despised.

After having given sufficient care to the creation of these forces, Napoleon turned his thoughts to the best way of employing them. Although at the first demonstration of the enemy towards Belgium, he might have supposed that their principal efforts would be directed to that quarter, still, since the passage of the Rhine at Bâle, he had no longer a doubt as to the intended course of the invasion. He saw that though the corps of Blücher was advancing from Mayence on Metz, in a north-easterly direction, still that the Allies intended to bear down on the east of France with the main body of their army, turn the defences, and march through Bédort, Langres, and Troyes on Paris. Napoleon made his preparations accordingly.

He ordered Marshals Marmont and Victor, who had just left the fortresses, to march along the range of the Vosges, and contest, as long, as possible with the enemy, the passage of these mountains, as he wished to force their ranks, or out-flank them at Bédort, in order to come down on Epinal afterwards, to oppose the column that was advancing to the eastern frontier. All those who were being drilled for the Young Guard at Metz, were to be concentrated at Epinal, under the command of Marshal Ney. The Old Guard, that had at first been sent on towards Belgium, now received orders to retrace their steps in the direction of Chalon-sur-Maine, and take up a position at Langres. Napoleon only left in Belgium the Roguet division, and even that was to remain only until General Decaen could combine the elements of a *corps d'armée*. The greatest efforts of the Allies being directed to

this side, Napoleon did not wish to leave there more than the forces indispensably necessary to oppose and retard the progress of the enemy that was advancing from the north.

In consequence of these orders, the corps of Marshals Marmont, Victor, Ney, Mortier, comprising at most 60,000 men, occupying the space between Epinal and Langres, along the heights that separate Franche-Comté from Burgundy, were to dispute with the invading masses, on the east, the entrance of the valleys of the Maine, the Aube, and the Seine; whilst Napoleon, with the troops that were being equipped at Paris, and those that were arriving from Spain, was to come to their assistance and give them the support of his presence. If Blucher, whose mission was to anticipate events, should arrive from the north-east, and advance from Metz to Paris, whilst Schwarzenberg should arrive at the same point by Langres and Troyes, Napoleon was not without resources against this new peril. Macdonald with the 11th and 5th corps, fused into one, and with the 2nd cavalry, amounting in all to 15,000 men, was to abandon the Low Countries, to keep close to Blucher, who had entered Metz, then to fall back on Chalons-sur-Maine, and join Napoleon, who after having thrown himself on Schwarzenberg, would fall back on Blucher, supplying numerical weakness by activity, daring, and energy; in a word, doing as well as he could, carrying the same spirit into the battle-field that presided in his government—despair. Fortune pours so many favours not alone upon the brave, but on the obstinate who persevere, and who force her to be kind at any price! Thus the conqueror who had led 650,000 men into Russia, after having left 100,000 in Italy, and 300,000 in Spain, had now at his command, to resist an European combination, about 60,000 soldiers, stationed between Epinal and Langres, 15,000 falling back from Cologne to Namur, 20,000 or 30,000 ready for duty in front of Paris, and perhaps 20,000 coming from the Pyrenees! This was all that remained of his immense armies, and independent of number, what shall we say of quality? Some untrained boys, unarmed, unclothed, drafted into the ranks with some old soldiers, worn out with fatigue; but all, both young and old, having French blood in their veins; and these, led by the genius of Napoleon, were going to fight for their native land against a world in arms, and, as we shall soon see, they performed prodigies of valour!

We must enumerate amongst the means of defence, the army assembled on the Rhone. The enemy having shown an intention of advancing to Geneva, and, as in that case, should Prince Eugene be conquered in Italy, they would be able to debouch by Savoy, it was absolutely necessary to provide for the defence of Lyons. Within the great arc of a circle, which Napoleon was about to describe round Paris, manœuvring between the two invading columns, he could certainly run from Metz to Dijon, but he could not extend his arm to Lyons without leaving the capital exposed to an attack either through Autun and Auxerre, or through Moulins and Nevers. Consequently Napoleon ordered Augereau, already no doubt very much fatigued,

but conserving some remains of energy and talent, to address the people, to assemble at Lyons the skeleton regiments, the conscripts, the National Guards, and to unite these with the 10,000 that Suchet would send him from Roussillon. If this old soldier of the Revolution understood his mission, he was to throw back upon Geneva and Chambéry that portion of the Allies who should have made an attempt on Lyon; then, freed from these assailants, he was to remount the Saône by Maçon, Châlons, Gray, and attack in the rear the main body of the army, invading Burgundy. Many circumstances might arise that would furnish him an opportunity of rendering immense services to France.

Thus, in a position apparently desperate, Napoleon did not despair, and his great mind never appeared less dejected or richer in resources. Whilst he hurried on with so much activity the completion of his preparations, he had besides political measures to take, in order to combine the moral with the material means at his command. After having left the members of the Legislative Corps so long idle at Paris, he had at length resolved to assemble them. He wished to make use of this body to awaken public opinion, to turn it again in his favour, and if they could not do this, at least to stir up a general feeling about the danger of France, now threatened with a fearful disaster.

There happened, on this occasion, what had happened frequently before, and which will happen frequently again, that opinion, restricted for a time in its expression, becomes afterwards more intense and more tempestuous in its manifestations. Authorities that would not permit the expression of public opinion, when this expression was harmless, and might even have been useful, have been obliged to suffer it inopportunely, and at a moment when, instead of criticisms, they stood in need of unconditional devotedness. Another inconvenience attendant on these tardy manifestations is, that the one party is incapable of uttering the truth, the other of hearing it; and that instead of being an assistance, this truth becomes a source of danger, and assumes instead of a counsel, the form of a threat.

The members of the Legislative Corps having come up to Paris with hearts imbued with the sentiments prevailing in their provinces, that lay desolated by the effects of conscription, requisitions, and the arbitrary measures of the prefects, who sometimes imposed taxes of their own free will, sometimes drove into exile the rich father who refused to allow his son to join the guards, or seized the granary which the poor labourer had hidden in the wood. To these real afflictions, which were neither an invention, nor a party cry, were added exaggerated notions, if such could be exaggerated, of what was passing in our armies, and these ideas were prevalent on every side, and even amongst members of the Government. Recitals, in which no circumstance was softened, were heard in all directions, of the misfortunes of the last campaign, the sufferings of our soldiers, who were left dying on the roads of Saxony and Franconia, the frightful ravages made by typhus on the Rhine, and the not less horrible calamities of the Spanish war. Sympathy for these woes was heightened when it was known how easily they might have been

averted. Although the public did not know that there had been a day at Prague, when a glorious peace might have been concluded, and that through a culpable obstinacy the propitious moment had been allowed to pass (this was the secret of Napoleon and M. de Bassano, who were interested in not proclaiming it, and of M. de Caulaincourt, who was too faithful a subject to reveal it), everybody was persuaded that if peace was not concluded, it was the fault of Napoleon, that the Allies had always been willing to make peace with him, that it was he who had never wished to make it with them. And now the inverse was true, now Europe, emboldened by success, after having vainly wished for peace, no longer desired it, and Napoleon now wishing for peace could not obtain it. The public made no distinction between one period and another. They accused Napoleon of a passed fault which he would never have repeated; they accused when they ought to have sustained him. Sad and fatal example of too-long concealed truth! It would be better, we repeat, to acquaint a people with facts at the time they happen, for they then experience at the proper time the impressions which such information is naturally destined to produce, but by delaying the intelligence we call up sentiments inopportunately, at a moment that ought to be occupied with different feelings. And so, the French people ought to have been indignant six months before the period of which we speak, and at this moment they ought to have held their peace and afforded Napoleon their support. They did exactly the contrary. And such is the baseness of the human heart, that those who had appeared most humble and most dazzled by the glory of the empire, now, that its prestige was passing away, were the least reserved in their condemnation.

A month passed at Paris in the midst of idleness, injurious reports, and vexatious excitement was not calculated to shed a calming influence over the members of the Legislative Corps. Every member of the Government had perceived their temper of mind and were troubled in consequence. It would be no easy task to change them. This Government, so accustomed to dealing with soldiers, displayed when it became necessary to deal with men, all the awkwardness and barbarity of despotism. To the Duke of Rovigo, as amongst his police duties, had always been confided the task of influencing the clergy or the members of the Legislative Corps as happened at the time of the council. To guess what might be the family necessities of one, or the desires of the *protégés* of another, and to satisfy these wishes by the presentation of places, or by other less avowable means, was a duty that the Duke de Rovigo discharged with an unscrupulous facility and a soldier-like frankness, which in those days supplied the place of independence of character. But if this mode of proceeding succeeded with some individuals, happily, with the greater number more noble means were needed, especially when the public mind was unusually disturbed. Thus, the enlightened servants of the government seeing clearly that in the present circumstances a few personal favours would have no weight, had said that the Duke of Rovigo ought to be pre-

vented from interfering in the affairs of the legislative corps. M. de Sémonville especially, the enemy of the Duke of Rovigo, whose place he was anxious to obtain, succeeded, through his friend M. de Bassano, in having this advice given to Napoleon, and Napoleon, whom the frankness of the Duke of Rovigo offended, told him very quickly that he was not to meddle again in the affairs of the great legislative bodies.

It was true that superficial means would no longer suffice when placed in juxta-position with the long-suppressed sentiments of afflicted France. Still, in the absence of these means, where was the person who could employ honest persuasion? The clever people who thought the skill of the Duke of Rovigo savoured of vulgarity, what resource had they to offer? Alas! none, for there is no skill that can prevail against mournful truths, universally and profoundly felt. It is true that a president, possessed of good manners and accustomed to act on the feelings of men, enjoying at the same time the confidence of his colleagues, might have obtained some influence over them, and shown them that, though justified in being angry at the past, they ought at the actual time to aid the Government with all their might, and by a decisive and patriotic effort repulse the foreign invaders. But, in order to indemnify the Duke of Massa, who had been deprived of his portfolio for the advantage of M. Mole, the Legislative Corps had been deprived of all participation in the choice of its president, and the Duke of Massa had been forced upon them. He was, no doubt, a worthy and upright magistrate, worthy of all respect, but grown infirm, not acquainted with any of the members of the Legislative Corps, not known by any of them, and displeasing to them because his mere presence was one of the last examples of the capricious whims of a despotism to which the ruin of France was attributed.

This president then could do nothing to overcome the difficulties of the position, and make his colleagues feel that far above the right of complaining of their own government, ought to be the duty of combining against the enemies of France. If honest and conscientious ministers could have appeared before the assembly, and in a dignified manner made the necessary avowals, beseeching all to silence their resentment and listen only to the dictates of patriotism, it would have been possible to dispense with these suspicious means that deal only with individuals, but in the Legislative Corps all remained silent, the ministers as well as the representatives. A government orator, a secondary and irresponsible person, pronounced a prepared harangue before the legislators, who replied by a harangue of the same kind, both fulfilling a vain formality void of interest. These proceedings presented no means of allaying public feeling, of speaking to the people, of pointing out their duty, and winning their attention and credence. It will, perhaps, be said that a free assembly instead of yielding assistance would have entailed embarrassments; we shall see by what happened whether a free assembly could have been more injurious than this enslaved and degraded Legislative Corps.

The members of the Legislative Corps assembled at Paris, their hearts filled with vexation, with alarm, with bitter sentiments of every kind, which would have needed vent, but which must be suppressed, when Napoleon opened the Legislative Assembly in person on the 19th of December. Amid a glacial silence, he read the following address, simply, nobly dictated, as everything was that emanated directly from himself.

“SENATORS, PRIVY COUNSELLORS, DEPUTIES—

“Splendid victories have shed glory over the French arms in this campaign ; unexampled defections have rendered these victories useless ; everything has turned against us. France itself would be in danger were it not for the energy and union of Frenchmen.

“In these perilous circumstances, my first thought was to summon you around me. My heart has need of the presence and affection of my subjects.

“I have never been elated by prosperity. Adversity would find me beyond its reach.

“I have often accorded peace to nations that had lost everything. From one portion of my conquests, I have created thrones for kings, who have betrayed me.

“I have conceived and executed great designs for the prosperity and happiness of the human race.

“A monarch and a father I understand how much peace adds to the security of thrones and the happiness of families. Negotiations have been commenced with the allied powers. I have adhered to the preliminary basis that they presented. I had hoped that before the opening of this session, the Congress of Manheim would have assembled ; but fresh delays, no ways attributable to France, have deferred this movement so ardently desired by all.

“I have ordered that all the original documents in the portfolios at my office of foreign affairs, shall be laid before you. You will appoint a commission to take cognizance of them. The speeches of my Council will let you know my wishes on this subject.

“Nothing, on my part, opposes the re-establishment of peace. I know and I participate in the sentiments of the French, I say emphatically the French, for there is no Frenchman who would desire peace at the expense of honour.

“It is with regret that I demand from this generous people new sacrifices, but they are commanded by the noblest and dearest interests. I have been obliged to reinforce my armies by numerous levies ; nations can only negotiate with security when they deploy all their military strength. An increase in the revenue becomes indispensable. What my Minister of Finance will propose to you is conformable to the system of finance I have established. We will meet every difficulty without having recourse to a loan, which gnaws into the future, and without paper money, the great enemy of social order.

“I am satisfied with the sentiments which under these circumstances my Italian subjects have manifested.

"Denmark and Naples have alone remained faithful to my alliance.

"The Republic of the United States of America continues with success the war against England.

"I have recognized the neutrality of the nineteen Swiss cantons.

"SENATORS, PRIVY COUNCILLORS, DEPUTIES FROM THE DEPARTMENTS TO THE LEGISLATIVE CORPS—

"You are the natural organs of this throne : it belongs to you to give an example of energy, that will render our generation glorious in the eyes of those yet to come. Let them not say of us, 'They have sacrificed the primary interests of the country ; they have recognized the laws that England tried in vain, during four centuries, to impose on France.'

"My people cannot apprehend that the policy of their Emperor would ever betray the national glory. For my part, I feel confident that Frenchmen will ever be worthy of themselves and of me."

In this speech, Napoleon announced that the documents relative to the Frankfort negotiations should be laid before the Assembly, these negotiations which seemed, no one knew why, completely broken off.

He hoped this communication would produce a useful result, the only one that could be hoped from the meeting of the Legislative Corps—it would be proof that he wished for peace, that he had frankly accepted the conditions as they had been laid down at Frankfort, and if this peace was not already signed, the fault was not attributable to him, but to the allied powers. A declaration from the Legislative Corps to this effect, might remedy, if not the exhaustion of the country, at least the general feeling of mistrust, and infuse into the minds of the people a certain amount of zeal, by persuading them that it was not to the ambition of the Emperor they were about to sacrifice themselves once again, but to the necessity of defending and saving themselves. However, before dissipating the distrust of the country, it would have been necessary to dissipate that of the Legislative Corps, which could only be done by very great frankness. M. de Caulaincourt, who had nothing to fear from this frankness, advised it strongly. But Napoleon, anxious to conceal many truths, could not follow this counsel. If the single report of M. de Saint Aignan were laid before the House, every one would have seen there that M. de Metternich had expressly recommended *not to act as at Prague*, that is to say, to allow the only moment in which peace could be concluded, to pass unprofitted of, which proved that at Prague they might have made peace and did not. If, moreover, they had produced the letter of M. de Bassano, of the 16th November, it would be evident that at the very time the Frankfort propositions were made, that the French Cabinet, instead of taking the Allies at their word, had replied in an equivocal and ironical manner, and that it was not until the 2nd December that a formal acceptance had been given ; and though the public were not aware how fatal the loss of this month had been, they would certainly have suspected that in losing it, precious time had been lost, for M. de Metternich was as cold and evasive in his despatch of the 10th of December, as he had been confiding and pressing in the first.

Frankness might then entail serious revelations ; but in addressing the representatives of the country, for the purpose of obtaining their support, it would be necessary at least to speak to them frankly, acknowledging past faults, and claiming credit for present sincerity, which the letter of the 2nd December put beyond doubt, and this in order to obtain from the Legislative Corps a formal declaration that the Government wished for peace, wished it on honourable terms, but did wish it.

Napoleon was willing that the communications made to the Senate should be more extensive than those made to the Legislative Corps, which were of a very restricted nature. The report of M. de Saint Aignan, for example, was to be presented, with alterations, that would efface all allusion to what had taken place at Prague. The letters of the 16th November, and of the 2nd December, were both produced, for it would be impossible in producing the document of the 2nd December, to repress that of the 16th November, as the one referred to the other. As to the mode of proceeding, it was agreed that the Senate and the Legislative Corps should each nominate a commission of five members, and that this commission should repair to the High Chancellor Cambacères, who would lay before them the appointed documents. Meanwhile, the Senate and the Legislative Corps were busy choosing commissioners to receive the communications of the Government.

The Senate appointed high personages, who, without being partizans, were incapable at this moment of committing the slightest imprudence. The Senate appointed Messrs. de Fontanes, de Tallyrand, de Saint Marsan, de Barbé-Marbois, de Beurnonville. These names revealed neither hostility nor complaisance. It was quite different with the Legislative Corps. The Government had indirectly insinuated certain preferences, but the Assembly took no notice of these intimations. This body had hitherto been too little engaged in politics to be divided into parties, which would have served to declare each member's political opinions distinctly, and was now groping for commissioners, as it were, in the dark, and were obliged to recur to repeated scrutinies to find out what it was they exactly wished. In the first place, they rejected the candidates favoured by Government, then, after mature reflection, they appointed distinguished, independent men, who enjoyed, without having caballed for it, the esteem of their colleagues. These were M. Lainé, a celebrated Bordeaux lawyer, who was formerly an ardent revolutionist, but had afterwards adopted more moderate opinions. He was honest but impassioned ; he was possessed of eloquence, studied, but brilliant and dignified. M. Raynouard, a literary man of considerable reputation, author of the tragedy of *The Templers*. He was warm-hearted, intellectual, and sincere. M. Maine de Biran, a man of contemplative mind, devoted to philosophic studies, one of the *savants* that Napoleon accused of ideology. And lastly, Messrs. de Flaugergues and Gallois ; these were less known than the others, but they were men of considerable intellect and decided partizans of political liberty. All, on the eve of a struggle with the

Government, were placed, without perceiving it, on the road to *royalism* (we mean by this denomination a decided inclination for the Bourbons, with laws more or less liberal), but they had not yet arrived at the term, at least the three first named, who, amongst the five commissioners, alone at that time enjoyed a certain reputation.

These selections having been made, each commission, headed by its president, sought an interview with the high chancellor. The commissioners, deputed by the Senate, were admitted first—that is to say, on the 23rd of December. The communications were made to them by M. de Caulaincourt himself. They listened to everything, said nothing, and after having heard the letters of the 16th of November and the 2nd December read, they did not entertain the slightest doubt as to the error that had been committed in not accepting purely, and simply, and instantaneously, the Frankfort propositions. In fact, such men as MM. de Talleyrand and de Fontanes perceived at once that it was the letter of the 2nd of December, which ought to have been written on the 2nd of November. M. de Fontanes was deputed to present to the Senate the report of the proceedings of the senatorial commission. It seems a strange contradiction that the communications prepared for the most experienced diplomatists were far from partaking of a serious character, but the reason was simply because they were a mere matter of form. The deputies of the Legislative Corps received the communications intended for them on the 24th, and this communication intended for persons far less important than those for whom the first was drawn up, was destined to produce far more serious results.

As if those who had devised these communications wished as much as possible to detract from the importance of the second, it was not the minister himself, but one of his subordinates, M. d'Hauterive—certainly a man of considerable merit—who was deputed to receive the members of the Legislative Corps, and to lay before them a report of the negotiations. These commissioners, like those from the Senate, were received at the high chancellor's. Instead of public personages of high rank, and coldly attentive, there now appeared men whose faces were unknown amongst the great—men anxious for information, impassioned, listening to what was told them, but desiring and demanding more. The report being read, they asked a fresh reading, and it was not refused. Their first impression was a species of astonishment. Some minutes before, they were all convinced that if war still prevailed it was owing to the obstinacy of Napoleon; and yet, not having before them the documents relative to the negotiations at Prague, having only the Frankfort acts, the propositions entrusted to M. de Saint Aignan, the reply of M. de Bassano of the 16th of November, that of M. de Caulaincourt of the 2nd of December, they were forced to admit that on the last-named occasion Napoleon had desired peace. Had these gentlemen been a little more accustomed to diplomatic transactions, and had they known what had taken place in European cabinets from the 16th of November to the 2nd of December, and how the time lost by us had been actively employed by our

enemies, they would have perceived the error that had been committed in not binding the Allied powers by the immediate acceptation of their propositions. However, perceiving between the letter of the 16th of November and that of the 2nd December a positive advance in the way to peace, they were desirous of seeing a still further progress. They wished the Emperor to bind himself solemnly to make every necessary sacrifice to obtain peace ; besides, they thought the proposed bases of the natural frontiers very vague—for in Holland, on the Rhine, in Italy even, there might be many points of contest—therefore the commissioners wished the Emperor should positively state to them what he would yield, and this they required in order that they might afterwards repeat the statement to the Legislative Corps, that is to say to Europe, and that then all parties should be bound, Napoleon as well as the Allies. This was, in their opinion, the only means of acting on the public mind, and inducing the people to think favourably of the Emperor's designs by proving to them that the efforts required of the French people were not to be expended in the attainment of unwise conquests, but in conserving the natural limits of France. M. Raynouard, with all the ardour of a southern temperament, proposed the following form of address :—

“SIRE,—You swore at your coronation to maintain the natural and necessary limits of France, which are the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees : we call upon you to be faithful to your oath, and we are willing to shed the last drop of our blood to aid you in fulfilling your obligations. But having observed your oath and secured our frontiers, neither France nor you will be longer bound by any motive, either of honour or of glory, and you will then be able to sacrifice everything to obtain the blessings of peace and to secure the interests of humanity.”

This truly original document, which was a demand for peace under the appearance of a demand for war, met the approbation of all the commissioners ; but for the moment they retired in order to have time for a little reflection, and to devise at their leisure the best mode of addressing the Legislative Corps, France, in short, all Europe.

M. d'Hauterive, who beneath a grave and rather pedantic exterior concealed an infinity of tact, made every effort to win the good graces of the different members of the commission and to induce them to act with reserve. But when a government has recourse to publicity, it is better to submit unreservedly and trust to the national good sense. But this cannot be done with safety, excepting where this national good sense has been trained by a long participation in public affairs, and it must be admitted that to make an appeal for the first time to such a tribunal, in delicate and dangerous circumstances, is running a great risk. It is plain that the Government did not wish to tell everything nor allow everything to be told to the commissioners ; but then it would have been better not to have assembled them, and yet how was it possible to demand such great sacrifices from the people, without addressing to them one single word ? It is not whilst maintaining such a silence that a government has a right to demand

from a people their last crown and their last man. Those who fall into the habit of making half revelations to a people concerning their affairs, ought to ask themselves the question, whether a day will not arrive when everything must be made public, and whether this day of reckoning will not be precisely that when it would be desirable that the revelations should be of the least painful character.

M. d'Hauterive took especial trouble in endeavouring to persuade M. Lainé who appeared the most influential man of the commission. He found in him, not a secret and zealous partizan of the house of Bourbon, as one would have been inclined to expect from the previous conduct of this illustrious personage, seeking to embarrass the actual government, in the hope of serving the future dynasty, but an honest man, deeply affected by the misfortunes of France and the tyrannical yoke under which she was bowed down. With regard to external policy, M. d'Hauterive found M. Lainé disposed, like his colleagues, to demand an explicit declaration of what sacrifices the Emperor was resolved to make for peace, as this was, in his opinion, the only means of obtaining from France a last effort, if even at this price she was still capable of one, so exhausted were her resources. M. d'Hauterive, profiting of the advantage that a *tête-à-tête* with a man of intelligence and sincerity always affords, endeavoured to persuade M. Lainé that it was impossible to lay before the commissioners a plan of negotiation because the Government could not publicly declare what they would yield or what they would not yield, for that would be telling their secret to an enemy who did not reveal his; neither could they present an *ultimatum*, that being a proceeding employed only at the termination of a negotiation when it became important to put an end to designedly-prolonged parleying, and when those who used it were in a position to enforce the imperative language in which it was couched.

Enlightened by these practical observations, M. Lainé promised to satisfy his colleagues on this point, and kept his word. In fact, after very warm discussions, the commissioners abandoned the demand of having laid before them a detailed enumeration of the sacrifices the Emperor was willing to make for peace, but they expressly declared that France would not recede from her natural frontiers, but she claimed nothing beyond; and these sentiments being sincerely declared, it became the duty of the Allies to explain themselves definitely on the Frankfort bases, which they had proposed, and which had been formally accepted by M. de Caulaincourt in his letter of the 2nd of December. This point being settled, they turned their attention to the subject of the home policy, and then the most violent expressions were launched against the despotism under which the empire groaned. Upon this subject each individual had serious grievances to allege: taxes levied without lawful authority, horrible vexations in the administration of the laws touching conscription, insupportable abuses in collecting contributions in kind, illegal arrests, arbitrary detentions, &c. As regarded these complaints, the facts were as numerous as varied, and at the very moment when the government stood in need of the utmost devotedness from the nation, the people were in a position to tell the governing authorities, that for the patriot citizen there were

two things equally sacred—his native land and the laws of his country. His native land, that portion of the earth where he was called into life, and which he is bound to defend against every invader ; the laws beneath whose shelter he lives, through which he is made conscious of a public authority, and whose rigorous observance he has a right to demand. His native land and the laws of his country are two sacred objects in the estimation of the true patriot. Every citizen, in devoting himself to the one, establishes for himself the right to inquire into the administration of the others ; every citizen has a right to say to a government that demands from him great sacrifices : “ I will not help you to drive a foreign foe from my country, if the reward of my exertions is to be oppression from a home despotism.”

All the commissioners were unanimous on these points, and came to the resolution of drawing up a moderate, but decisive declaration of their opinions. When the communications made by the Government were concluded, it became the duty of the commission to make out a report for the Legislative Corps, after which, they were to propose an address to the Emperor. To M. Lainé was confided the task of drawing up this report, and he did so in a spirit conformable to the opinions entertained by the Commissioners. The report stated that at Frankfurt, overtures of peace had been made to France, having for bases her natural frontiers, that on the 16th of November, France had favourably received this overture, and proposed a Congress at Mannheim ; that upon a second communication from M. Metternich, who did not think the acceptation of the natural frontiers had been sufficiently explicit, France formally accepted them on the 2nd of December, and that these became thenceforth, the bases on which negotiations were carried on. The report said further that it was a duty the Allies owed to France and to themselves, to adhere to what they had proposed, and that France, on her part, ought to shed the last drop of her blood for the maintenance of conditions so accepted. The report added that two objects of the highest consideration to every people ought to be, the integrity of the country and the maintenance of the laws, and on this subject the report laid before the Emperor in respectful terms and with entire confidence in his justice, an exposé of some acts of the public authorities of which the people had reason to complain. The tone of the report throughout was sincere, but grave and dignified.

The commissioners assembled on the 28th to submit the projected report, for as yet it was only a project, to the high chancellor and M. d'Hauterive.

The high chancellor, though believing the observations of the commissioners to be very just, was however alarmed at the effect this report might produce on all Europe, and still more on Napoleon himself. In the eyes of Europe it would pass for an act of indirect hostility to the Government, at a moment when the most perfect union was needed between the executive and the people ; with regard to Napoleon, it would offend him, and provoke acts of violence, the consequences of which, at such a time, might be very disagreeable.

The prudent high chancellor might have been right on these two points, but why had the representatives of the country been granted only this day, this day so long deferred, to give utterance to truths that must have found expression? Still, though the commissioners uttered complaints of the gravest nature, it might have been wiser to defer them. The high chancellor endeavoured to persuade them of this, and his fine and impressive countenance, well calculated to give weight to his prudent counsels, produced some impression on his auditors. Many changes were agreed to. M. d'Hauterive obtained one especially of great importance, taking good care not to avow the motive that prompted him to solicit the concession. The letters of the 16th of November and the 2nd of December, had been inserted in the report, and M. d'Hauterive feared that the public, better informed than the commissioners, might ultimately discover the real error—the too late acceptance of the Frankfort bases. He assigned as a reason for the proposed alteration that it might involve disagreeable consequences to publish documents touching a negotiation that had scarcely commenced. The copies of the letters in the report were consequently suppressed. Lastly, the high chancellor succeeded in having the complaints against the home government reduced to a few moderate phrases. In short, after having spoken of the declaration to be made to the allied powers, and of the defensive measures to be taken if this declaration were not attended to, the report added: "It is, according to the spirit of our institutions, the duty of the Government to propose the means it believes most prompt and most sure to repulse the enemy, and establish peace on a durable basis. These means will be efficacious, if the French are convinced that the Government no longer aspires to any glory but that of peace; these means will be sufficient, if the French are convinced that their blood will be shed only to defend their native land and well-administered laws."

"It appears then indispensable to your commissioners, that at the same time that the Government shall propose the most prompt measures for the safety of the state, his Majesty should be petitioned to maintain the entire and steady execution of the laws that secure to individual Frenchmen the rights of liberty, of personal safety, of property, and to the nation at large, the free exercise of political rights. This guarantee has appeared to your commissioners the most efficacious means of restoring to Frenchmen the energy necessary for the defence of their country, &c., &c."

Notwithstanding the extreme moderation of these phrases, the chancellor made fresh efforts to get them suppressed. M. de Caulaincourt lent his exertions, but neither could induce men indignant against the home administration, to abstain from so moderate a manifestation of their feelings, particularly as they might not have another opportunity of doing so, for it was not probable that the Government, which now in the hour of its defeat appealed to them, would be likely to do so, should the day of distress be succeeded by one of triumph. This was their excuse for a manifestation which, if it were ill-timed, was the fault of those who had afforded only this opportu-

nity for the expression of their feelings, and who gave them little hope of another. The commissioners were certainly told they would be listened to another time on this subject, but they did not believe it, and had good reasons for their mistrust.

On the 29th of December, the Legislative Corps being resolved into a private committee, M. Lainé read his report, which was listened to with religious attention and unanimously approved. M. Lainé, at the conclusion of the report, recommended the drawing up of an address to the Emperor in the same spirit. It was decided by a majority of 223 votes out of 254, that the report of the commission should be printed solely for the members of the Legislative Corps, in order that they may reflect on it, and vote for the proposed address after mature deliberation. From this moment, publicity was assured to the words of M. Lainé, especially amongst foreign nations, by whom they ought never to have been heard.

When the report was laid before Napoleon, he burst into violent anger on reading it, and exclaimed that he was insulted at the very moment when he stood most in need of support. He immediately summoned the privy council, and asked the ministers, with the air and tone of a man who had already taken his resolution, whether the sittings of the Legislative Corps ought to be any longer allowed. He pointed out not only the danger of allowing such a report, as that of M. Lainé's to be published, but the still greater danger of having within the walls of the capital an assembly that, at a dangerous crisis, at the approach of the enemy for example, might be guilty of some factious or imprudent manifestation, which would infallibly be attended with fatal effects. Sad and wide-seeing foresight, by which it would seem that Napoleon, piercing the future, already read his own history on the page of destiny, but this foresight came too late, and was incapable of supplying a remedy. How could Napoleon now prevent that this report had come into existence, and had been read before an audience of hundreds! How prevent that the Legislative Corps either dissolved or adjourned, should remain at Paris, ready to combine spontaneously for the prosecution of the most dangerous schemes! How many legislative bodies have been dissolved, and have been found at a dangerous crisis more formidable than if they had continued their legitimate sittings. Be this as it may, Napoleon asked his ministers whether it would not be better immediately to adjourn the Legislative Corps; in the first place, to prevent the members putting into execution the sentiments embodied in M. Lainé's report, and, secondly, to suspend the sittings of this body during a war that might only be terminated beneath the walls of Paris itself.

The chancellor, Cambacérès, combatted this proposition with his ordinary sagacity. The report, he said, was undoubtedly warm, and even factious, but it was done, and nothing could prevent its publication. Even should the Emperor succeed in preventing the publication in France, he could not forbid it in foreign countries. The adjournment of the Legislative Corps would be a more serious circumstance than the report itself, for the public would infallibly attribute to this

body sentiments much more hostile than those they really entertained. As to the annoyance that its sitting during the approaching campaign might cause, nobody could of course affirm that the members might not commit some imprudence, but that was an annoyance that could be provided for when the time came, without anticipating it by an ill-judged outburst. In fact, to dissolve the Legislative Corps, would be to proclaim to the world a disunion between the legislative bodies; it would be to declare that a rupture existed between France and the Emperor.

Each of the ministers adopted the sentiments of the chancellor, each thought the adjournment would work more mischief than the report itself. But touching the annoyances that might arise from the assembling of the Legislative Corps during the campaign, every body hesitated to give an opinion, and yet that was the point on which Napoleon's foresight rendered him most solicitous; for admitting the past evil to be irremediable, he wished to provide against the future, and he pressed each of the ministers to enlighten him on this subject. Perceiving that each when he came to this part of his discourse hesitated, Napoleon interrupted the discussion and put an end to it, by a few sharp, decisive words: "You see it clearly," he said, "you all agree in recommending me moderation, but no one ventures to assure me that the deputies will not take advantage of some disastrous day, of which there are so many in war, to make spontaneously, or at the instigation of some factious leader, an insurrectionary movement, and I cannot endure such a doubt. Any thing is less dangerous than such a possibility." Without listening to further remonstrance he signed the decree which adjourned on the following day—the 31st of December—the Legislative Corps, and he ordered the Duke of Rovigo to seize at the printing office and elsewhere every copy of M. Lainé's report, a report which has since become so famous.

The decree for adjournment being presented to the Legislative Corps produced amongst the members a profound sensation. In a moment it converted into enemies two hundred and fifty persons, who before that were profoundly submissive to the Government, and only meant to give utterance to a positive fact, useful to reveal, which was that the local government, imitating the conduct of the head of the empire, committed the most arbitrary acts, acts which constituted an actual tyranny. To the eyes of the general public, matters wore a still worse aspect. They believed that very serious things had been said in the Legislative Corps, and that most important revelations had taken place. The enemies, who were anxious for the overthrow of the Imperial Government were not slow to circulate a report that the Emperor had had an open rupture with the public bodies, that they had wished to induce him to make peace, that he had refused, and that consequently the torrents of blood that were doomed to flow were attributable to him alone. All this was true of past times, but was false at the actual moment, and was the idea most injurious to the Emperor's popularity that could take possession of the public mind.

This outburst, which, with a ruler of a different temperament to

Napoleon, would have finished with an article in the *Moniteur*, had, thanks to his constitutional irritability, far more deplorable consequences. On the following day (the 1st of January) he was to receive the Legislative Corps with the other public bodies. He seemed anxious to meet them, as if he feared to lose the opportunity of giving vent to the vexation with which he was oppressed. After having received the customary compliments he stepped forward abruptly, stood in the midst of the members of the Legislative Corps, and with a loud voice and sparkling eyes, spoke to them in language familiar even to vulgarity, but expressive, proud, original, sometimes true, but more often imprudent; bearing, in short, all the characteristics of the anger of a great man. He told them he had called on them to do good and they had done evil; to proclaim the unity of sentiment that subsisted between France and her monarch, and they had hastened to declare a disunion; that two battles lost in Champagne would not have been so injurious as what they had just done. Then apostrophising them vehemently, he said: "What do you wish for? You wish to seize on power, but what would you do with it? Which of you could wield it? Have you forgotten the Constituante, the Legislative Assembly, the Convention? Would you be more successful than they? Would you not all finish your career on the scaffold, like Guadet, Vergniaud, Danton? And besides, what does France need at this moment? It is not an assembly of deputies, it is not orators—it is a general. Is there one amongst you? And then, where are your credentials? France knows me—does she know you? She has twice chosen me for her chief by several million votes; and you, in the restricted space of the departments, she has elected you by some hundred voices, to come and vote for the laws that I, and not you, make. I look for your titles and I do not find them. *The throne in itself is only a frame-work of wood, covered over with velvet.* The actual throne is a man, and I am that man, with my indomitable will, my inflexible temper, and my wide-spread fame. It is I who can save France, and it is not you. You complain of abuses in the administration; in what you say there is some truth, and a great deal of falsehood. M. Raynouard has asserted that Marshal Massena seized the house of a private individual for the use of his staff. (This circumstance had occurred at Marseilles, where Marshal Massena had been Envoy Extraordinary.) M. Raynouard has lied. The Marshal took possession for a short time of a vacant house, and afterwards indemnified the owner for the use. It is not so that a marshal bowed down with years and covered with glory ought to be spoken of. If you had complaints to make you ought to have waited another opportunity, which I would myself have procured you, and then with some of my privy counsellors, perhaps with myself personally, you could have discussed your grievances, and I would have applied remedies where there was any reasonable grounds for complaint. But the explanation ought to have taken place in private, *for it is in the retirement of home and not in presence of the public that we wash our dirty linen.* But instead of that, you have bespattered me with mire. I am, I would have you

to know, a man whom you may kill, but whom you shall not insult with impunity. M. Lainé is a wicked man, in correspondence with the Bourbons, through the agency of the advocate Desèze. I shall keep my eye on him, and on those whom I believe capable of criminal conspiracies. As to the rest, I distrust you all together. The eleven-twelfths of you are well-meaning, but you allow yourselves to be led by designing men. Return into your departments ; tell France that no matter what might be said to be contrary, that the war is made against her not less than against me, and that she is now called on to defend, not my person, but her own national existence. I shall place myself at the head of the army, I shall repulse the enemy, I shall conclude peace, no matter what sacrifice it may cost what you call my ambition. I shall again summon you around me, I shall order your report to be printed, and you will be astonished yourselves that you had ever addressed me in such language and under such circumstances."

This ill-timed speech, which if it contained some truth, contained still more falsehood, (for if it was true that Napoleon alone could save France, it was equally true that he was the cause of her calamities, and if one alleged grievance was incorrect or exaggerated, a multitude of others could be proved that were unjust and insupportable) confounded all who heard it, and soon obtained a deplorable publicity. In fact every one related it after his own fashion, and the consequence was that Napoleon appeared to be opposed by the heretofore submissive representatives of France, that is to say, by France herself. The report of the Legislative Corps published *in extenso* could never have produced so unfortunate a result. It would have been seen in that, that there had been abuses in the home administration, and that the Legislative Corps wished to suppress them ; it would have been also perceptible that Napoleon's despotism began to be oppressive to the mass of the citizens, but it would have been also seen that the Legislative Corps wished for peace, wished it on the bases of our natural frontiers, that the Legislative Corps advised the Government not to yield these boundaries, and invited France to rise *en masse*. Such a declaration might well have induced the Government to endure a few censures, very light indeed compared to what they might have been.

Still, it was necessary to appeal to France, to endeavour to stir up her zeal, and Napoleon, for want of the public bodies who were little inclined to fall in with his views, conceived the idea of selecting commissioners extraordinary amongst the senators. He intended to choose the most distinguished personages, either military or civil, and send them into their respective provinces where they were supposed to have most influence, in order that they might facilitate the levy of the conscription, the payment of the taxes, the bringing in of the contributions in kind, the instruction and organization of the military bodies, the departure of the National Guards ; in fact, their mission was to accelerate the activity of the Government in every department. In order to carry out these views, they would need be endowed with extraordinary and unlimited powers.

Before their departure, Napoleon wished to see and speak with them. He was touched, it is true, and his emotion communicated to his language an o'er-mastering eloquence.

"I do not fear to acknowledge," he said, "that I have made war too long; I had conceived vast projects, I wished to secure to France the empire of the world. I was mistaken; these projects were not proportioned to the numerical force of our population. I should have been obliged to put them all under arms, and I now perceive that the advancement of society, and the moral and social well-being of a state, is not compatible with the converting an entire people into a nation of soldiers. I ought to expiate the fault I have committed in reckoning too much on my good fortune, and I will expiate it. I will make peace. I will make it on such terms as circumstances command, and this peace shall be mortifying to myself alone. It is I who have deceived myself; it is I who ought to suffer, it is not France. She has not committed any error, she has poured forth her blood for me, she has not refused me any sacrifice. Let her then enjoy the glory of my enterprizes, let her enjoy it unreservedly, I yield it to her.

As to me, I only reserve to myself the honour of displaying a courage difficult to attain, that of renouncing the highest ambition man ever entertained, and of sacrificing for the happiness of my people, projects of greatness that could only be accomplished by efforts that I no longer wish to demand. Go, then, gentlemen, announce to your departments that I am about to conclude a peace, that I shall no longer require the blood of Frenchmen for my enterprizes, for myself, as some people have been pleased to say, but for France, and to maintain the integrity of her frontiers. Tell them I only ask the means of expelling a foreign foe from our native land. Tell them that Alsace, Franche-Comté, Navarre, Bearn, are invaded. Tell them that I call on Frenchmen to come to the aid of Frenchmen; that I am willing to negotiate, but will only do so on the frontiers, not in the heart of our provinces, laid waste by a hoard of barbarians. I shall accompany my army both as a general and a soldier. Go, gentlemen, and repeat to all France, the sentiments by which I am animated."

In listening to these generous excuses of genius, acknowledging its errors, a kind of enthusiasm seized these venerable personages who were about setting out for the provinces, to endeavour to awaken the zeal of a dejected people. They crowded round Napoleon, pressed his hands in theirs, giving expression to the profound emotion with which they were seized. The greater part took leave to set off immediately for their destination. Alas! Why did he not address these noble expressions to the Legislative Corps? He would have then seen that truth is the most powerful means of acting on the minds of men, and perhaps far from being obliged to dissolve that assembly, he would have seen the members rise to a man to applaud his sentiments, and call on every Frenchman to follow him to the field of battle.

The aspect of affairs became every moment more threatening, and it became of urgent importance to send as quickly as possible, the remaining national forces to meet the enemy. The allied armies were

crossing our frontiers on every side. General Bubna, who had set out first, after having skirted the opposite side of the Jura, had borne down on Geneva, where there were only a few conscripts to resist the Austrians and restrain a disaffected population. General Jordy, who commanded at Geneva, having died suddenly, the preparations for defence became disorganized, and the Austrians entered the city without striking a blow. The Generals Colleredo and Maurice Liechtenstein, with the light troops and Austrian reserves, after having passed by Berne, had taken their way towards Pontarlier, with the intention of marching through Dole on Auxonne. The corps d'Aloys de Liechtenstein passing in like manner through Pontarlier, was to come down on Besançon to mask that place, whilst General Giulay, traversing Porentruy, was to advance through Montbéliard on Vesoul. Marshal Wrede, with the Bavarians and the Wurtembergers, had thrown bombs into Huningue, attacked Belfort, and sent out cavalry to reconnoitre Colmar. The Prince of Wittgenstein blockaded Strasbourg and Kehl; the Russian and Prussian Guards had remained at Bâle with the allied sovereigns. Such was the distribution of the army of Prince Schwarzenberg after the passage of the Rhine. His project, after he should have crossed the Jura and turned our defences, was to advance with 160,000 men of the old Bohemian army through Franche-Comté, and take up his position on the high grounds of Burgundy and Champagne, whence the Seine, the Aube, and the Marne flow towards Paris, whilst the old army of Silesia, commanded by Blucher, and 60,000 strong, crossing the Rhine at the same time at Mayence, should advance amongst our fortresses without attacking them, leaving the task of blockading them to the troops in the rear. The two invading armies were to unite at the Upper Marne, between Chaumont and Langres, in order to advance *en masse* towards the angle formed by the Marne and the Seine. Blucher, in fact, had on the 1st of January, 1814, crossed the Rhine at three points—Manheim, Mayence, and Coblenz—without meeting any greater resistance than the great army of Prince Schwarzenberg had encountered along the Jura range. Thus the prestige of the inviolability of our frontiers was doomed to be destroyed in many places at the same time.

In fact, it would have been difficult, in the actual state of our forces, to oppose any resistance to this mass of invaders. Along the Jura frontier, where the attack was unexpected, there were no troops stationed; but General Mortier, who had at first been ordered to Belgium with the Old Guard, returned by forced marches from the north to the east, through Rheims, Châlons, Chaumont, and Langres. On the Alsatian frontier, Marshal Victor, with the 2nd infantry and the 5th cavalry corps, was at Strasbourg, where he had scarcely time to give his troops a little rest and incorporate a few conscripts. This corps, which in drawing upon all the dépôts in Alsace ought to have furnished thirty-six battalions and three divisions, did not reckon, after having hastily embodied all the disposable conscripts, more than from eight to nine thousand infantry, ill armed and badly clothed. The displacement of our dépôts, which had been put in the rear, had

added very considerably to the difficulty of recruiting. However, Marshal Victor had in the 5th cavalry corps nearly four thousand old dragoons of Spain, incomparable soldiers, and moreover deeply irritated against the enemy. At the appearance of the masses that debouched by Bâle, B  fort, and Besan  on, the Marshal had avoided encountering them on the way from Colmar to B  le; he had, on the contrary, fallen back on Saverne, and taken up a position on the Vosges, after having left in Strasbourg about eight thousand conscripts and national guards, under General Broussier, with sufficient supplies. This brave Marshal was visibly disconcerted. However, his noble cavalry had fallen on the Russian and Bavarian squadrons that had advanced against them, had defeated, and put them to the sword.

On the Mayence side, the Duke of Ragusa, on receiving intelligence of the passage of the Rhine, effected on the 1st of January, retreated with the 6th infantry and the 1st cavalry corps, leaving in Mayence the 4th corps, commanded by General Morand, and reduced by typhus fever from 24,000 to 11,000 men. He had been joined on the way by the Durutte division, that had been sent on to Coblenz, and which was cut off from Mayence, where it could not gain admission. The Duke's first impulse was to hasten to Alsace to the assistance of Marshal Victor, but seeing Alsace invaded by the enemy, and almost abandoned by our troops, who had already gained the summit of the Vosges, he had taken up a position on the other side of these mountains, that is to say, on the Sarre and the Moselle, in order to effect a junction with Marshal Victor in the direction of Metz, Nancy, or Luneville. He too had encountered great difficulties in recruiting his corps, owing to want of time and the displacement of the dep  ts. He had about 10,000 foot soldiers, and 3,000 cavalry composing the 1st cavalry corps, and these he was obliged to weaken by leaving some detachments at Metz and Thionville.

Marshal Ney had two divisions of the Young Guard that he concentrated at Epinal. We were then about to have on the opposite side of the Vosges the Marshals Victor, Marmont, and Ney, between Metz, Nancy, and Epinal, and on the high ground that separates Franche-Com   from Burgundy, that is to say at Langres, we had Marshal Mortier with the Old Guard, both falling back, but at the same time confronting, on one side, Blucher, who was advancing from Mayence to Metz, amidst our fortresses, and on the other side Schwarzenberg, who had flanked them by violating the Swiss neutrality, and who was advancing from B  le and Besan  on on Langres.

Thus Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Com  , were invaded. The enemy promised everywhere to the people the greatest forbearance, and in the commencement kept their word, through fear of provoking a general rising. Terror had seized our rural populations. The peasants of Lorraine, of Alsace, of Franche-Com  , bellicose by temperament and through the influence of tradition, would have

willingly risen against the enemy if they had had arms to fight with or troops to sustain them in the conflict. But they, as well as all the inhabitants of France, wanted money, and the quick retreat of the marshals discouraged them. Overwhelmed by despair they submitted to the enemy.

The retreat of the armies was accompanied by the less regretted retreat of the principal functionaries. The Imperial government, after mature deliberation, had ordered the prefects, sub-prefects, &c., &c., to retire with the troops, in order to create an additional embarrassment for the enemy—that of being obliged to appoint an administration in the invaded provinces. It was the recollection of the annoyances we had experienced in conquered countries, especially where the governing authorities had withdrawn, that caused the adoption of this measure by the government, a measure strongly opposed by the Duke de Rovigo. It would, perhaps, have been wise to have acted thus in a country where there existed no party hostile to the government, and ready to rise at the approach of the Allies. Unfortunately, in France, twenty-five years of revolution had left numerous parties that Napoleon, if conquered, could no longer restrain, and amongst these there was one, that of the ancient régime, the similarity of whose opinions with those of the Allies induced them to hope everything from the invaders. The absence of the governing authorities in France was, therefore, attended with very disagreeable results. In fact, the disaffected, no longer under the surveillance of the prefects, sub-prefects, and police, gave vent to their hostile feelings at the approach of the enemy, and rose when they had advanced some way to aid them in forming administrations favourable to their views; they were even preparing to proclaim the Bourbons. These sentiments did not prevail in the rural districts, where the people were deeply irritated by the long train of ills entailed by the invasion. But in the cities, where the ferment of opinion is generally strongest, the hatred of the Imperial government was general, and as the ills entailed by the invasion were little felt by the citizens, the most dangerous manifestations burst forth, not alone on the part of the royalists, but from all those who were weary of despotism and of war. Thus France was invaded at the very moment when suffering, exhausted, and torn by faction, she was no longer able to renew the noble example of patriotism she had exhibited in 1792; and it was not the least of the errors committed by the Imperial government that France was obliged to show herself in this state to the European coalition.

On the approach of the soldiers of Prince Schwarzenberg towards Langres some of the chief inhabitants of the city, aided by a populace tired of conscription and the *droits réunis*, threatened to rise against the troops of Marshal Mortier. At Nancy the municipal authorities and some influential persons of the country had received Marshal Blücher with great honours, and even offered him a banquet. The Prussian General had spoken to them of the good

intentions of the Allies, of their desire to deliver France from her tyrant, and he was eagerly listened to by people whose hearts were torn by the miseries attendant on a protracted war.

Our armies retreated, leaving behind them defenceless peasants, whose last supplies they were often obliged to seize, and cities exasperated against the Imperial government, willingly giving ear to the promises of the Allies, who presented themselves not as conquerors but as liberators. One additional circumstance completed the misery of this picture. The few survivors of our glorious armies, disheartened by suffering, humiliated by continued retreats, gave utterance to their discontent, and often re-echoed the remarks of the urban populations. The old soldiers did not desert their standards, but the conscripts, especially those who belonged to the departments through which the armies were passing, made no scruple of quitting the ranks, and the Marshals Victor and Marmont had already, in this way, lost some thousands.

An ocular witness of this distressing position of affairs, a faithful aide-de-camp of the Emperor, General Dejean, had made him an exact portraiture of these things, and assured him that all was lost, if he did not hasten by his presence to apply a remedy. In the Low Countries, affairs did not wear a better aspect. Marshal Macdonald seeing himself out-flanked on the right by Blücher's column, which had crossed the Rhine between Mayence and Coblenz, had summoned to his aid the 11th and 5th infantry and the 3rd cavalry corps, besides what remained of the troops returned from Holland, and had retired to Mezières with about 12,000 men, leaving only very small garrisons at Wesel and at Maestricht. General Decaen, being sent to Antwerp, had assembled there a garrison of from 7 to 8,000 men, composed of sailors and conscripts, and had, moreover, thrown 3,000 men into Flushing and 2,000 into Berg-op-Zoom, but had abandoned Breda which could not be defended, and Willemstadt which could have been defended, and which was an important point on the Wahal. The desertion of this latter place was much to be regretted, for after having lost Holland, it would have been a great advantage to preserve, between Holland and Belgium, the water-line which offered the most defensible frontier. But General Decaen, being able to perform only a part of his task, had preferred Antwerp and Flushing to all the other places. He had taken up a position, with the guards, in advance of Antwerp, resolved to defend energetically this great arsenal, which had so long excited the violent hatred of England, and kept alive an incessant solicitude on the part of Napoleon.

The public danger could not be more alarming, particularly if we consider that since the letter of the 10th of December, in which M. de Metternich acknowledging the receipt of the note of the 2nd of December, had declared that he was about to submit it to the allied courts, the French Cabinet had received no further communication. This silence, joined to the offensive movement of the armies, seemed to indicate that the allies no longer thought of

negotiating, and that henceforth their sole thought would be to accomplish our destruction.

Whatever might be the activity of Napoleon, he could not be ready to face the enemy before a considerable portion of France should be invaded, and meanwhile he was obliged to submit to the annoyance of seeing the best provinces—the best, both materially and morally—occupied by the enemy. To these difficulties was added the danger of permitting seditious manifestations in the great cities, and of allowing the name of Bourbon to be there publicly proclaimed. In such a state of things, it would have been happiness to obtain an armistice even on severe conditions, for the progress of the invasion would have been by this means suspended, and if the Emperor did not succeed in coming to terms with the allied powers, he would at least gain the two months, still indispensable to the completion of our means of defence. Napoleon had too much sagacity to believe that his enemies, whose advance a severe winter had not interrupted, would suspend their march to listen to mere parleying. He was even convinced that they had abandoned the idea of negotiating, and no longer wished to conclude a peace except within the walls of Paris. Nevertheless, a trial would cost nothing, and, in case of failure, the worst that could happen, would be to remain as he was. Besides, according to what M. de Saint Aignan had seen, and according to reports received from the invaded provinces, there existed between the Allies, serious dissensions. Austria, so rumour said, was offended at the pretensions of Russia and inclined to peace. In fact, the Emperor Francis, independent of the love he bore his daughter, was not inclined to augment the importance of Russia, or to satisfy the maritime jealousies of England; and if he got what he desired in Italy, it was possible that he might pause in his course. Then, if Austria abandoned hostilities, all the Allies would be obliged to do the same. To these suppositions, which were not devoid of probability, there was but one to oppose, but that one was very plausible; it was, that through fear of a rupture, all the Allies, including the Austrians, would refuse every personal advantage, however great. If amongst these opposite chances, the fortunate one turned up, France was saved, and therefore Napoleon did not hesitate to make a last attempt to negotiate, however small might be the hope of success.

He at first thought of sending to the camp of the Allies, M. de Champagny (the Duke de Cadore), who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs, prior to which he had been Ambassador at Vienna, where he had won the esteem of the Emperor Francis. However, the very natural reflection afterwards suggested itself that to negotiate with the allied monarchs, too important and influential a personage could not be chosen, and acting on this consideration, Napoleon determined to send M. de Caulaincourt himself. He confided to him the double mission of treating for peace, and, if it could be done without testifying too much alarm, to try to obtain

an armistice. As to peace, the conditions were still the same that we have already mentioned, that is to say, the line of the Rhine, but the great line, that which following the course of the Wahal, cuts off North Brabant from Holland. The idea of excluding the House of Orange was abandoned, as well as the hope of creating in Westphalia a State for King Jerome. In Italy, France, yielding part of the territory to Austria, without requiring anything for herself, persisted however, in demanding an appanage for the Princess Eliza, and if possible for the brothers of Napoleon, Jerome and Joseph. The difference between these terms and the project of peace drawn up by Napoleon, on the morrow of the Frankfort propositions, was not great. With regard to the armistice, M. de Caulaincourt, in order to win over Austria, was to offer her under-hand, the fortresses of Venice and Palma-Novo, which implied the concession of the line of the Adige. Those of Hambourg and Magdebourg were also to be immediately delivered up to Prussia, still with the object of obtaining a suspension of arms. The natural consequence of the evacuation of these four fortresses in Italy and in Germany would have been the speedy return of the garrisons, which would have given an addition of 10,000 men at least to the army of Italy, and 40,000 to the army of the Rhine.

The only objection that could be made to the sending M. de Caulaincourt, was the difficulty of presenting himself to the ministers of the coalition, when no place had been appointed for negotiation, and the mention of Manheim in M. de Bassano's letter of the 16th of November had led to no result. However, the Emperor was in a position where the whispers of self love must be hushed, and, as the danger was every moment increasing, it was ultimately agreed that M. de Caulaincourt should repair without delay to the French outposts, that he should then write to M. de Metternich, saying that in consequence of the assurances brought in his name by M. de Saint-Aignan, and his formal invitation to renew negotiations, the Emperor did not wish that any delay on the part of France should prolong for one hour the ills entailed by war; that M. de Caulaincourt, had therefore repaired to the out-posts, ready to set out for Manheim, or any other city the allied monarchs might please to appoint.

If when M. de Caulaincourt arrived at the outposts he should be left there in a humiliating position, which was possible, there would be at least some compensation for this humiliation, for it would prove that Napoleon desired peace, that no difficulty was now offered by his obstinacy, and the knowledge of the ill treatment received by his envoy might win him back the good opinion of the French.

Matters having been thus arranged, M. de Caulaincourt set out on the 5th of January for the French outposts, leaving M. de la Besnardière, the most skilful clerk in the department, to replace him in the administration of foreign affairs. Napoleon was preparing to set out soon himself to support with his sword the negotiations that M. de Caulaincourt was exercising his influence to resume.

M. de Caulaincourt repaired to Luneville, a place rendered famous by a treaty concluded in happier times, and on arriving at the foot of the Vosges, he met our armies retreating precipitately, and preceded in their retreat by the flight of all the public functionaries. He heard the remarks of the troops and the people, he saw the wretchedness of the officers, the desertion of the young soldiers, and the newly-awakened audacity of the royalist party, who, without being popular, obtained a hearing when they spoke of peace, legal rights, even of liberty. A worthy citizen and a brave soldier, M. de Caulaincourt was overwhelmed with grief when he saw our provinces invaded, and our armies put, as it were, to rout. To his grief as a citizen was added his sorrow as a father, for his private fortune, that is to say the property of his children, was involved in the destiny of Napoleon, and he was deeply afflicted at the danger that threatened the imperial throne. He hastened to describe to Napoleon things as they were, and point out the dejection of certain military chiefs who were not faithless, but discouraged, and he begged him, after reflecting deliberately on his position, to send him more acceptable conditions of peace. At the same time he wrote to M. de Metternich, saying that, astonished at his silence, which seemed inexplicable when he referred to the communications of M. de Saint-Aignan, he had come expressly to obtain a reply, which he awaited at the outposts, ready to repair to any place that the Allies might appoint for entering into negotiations.

This demand for an explanation having reached M. de Metternich through M. de Wrede, the former was not a little embarrassed, for after the pacific demonstrations the Allies had made, to refuse to treat would have been a gross, even a dangerous inconsistency, both parties being equally anxious to gain the good opinion of the public, whether in allied Europe or in France. M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis were still disposed to negotiate with increased ambition, it is true, touching Italy, but the imagination of the other allies was too strongly inflamed, since that, in compliance with the wishes of England, and in obedience to the strong impulse of German passions, hostilities had been again renewed. The unexpected facility with which they had penetrated into Switzerland and France had persuaded them that they had nothing more to do but to march forward in order to put an end to the war in a manner conformable to their most extravagant desires, and to hear them speak one would have said they had no other enemy to fear than their own dissensions. These, it is true, were very great. Alexander, still discontented at the entrance into Switzerland, did not wish that the popular party should be oppressed for the advantage of the aristocratic, whilst Austria acted in a manner directly opposite. Austria did not wish the Danes to be sacrificed to the prince of Sweden, or the king of Saxony to Prussia, and Alexander wished directly the contrary. The Tyrolese begged to be placed immediately under the government of Austria,

and Bavaria demanded that she should be first indemnified for the loss. England thought only of establishing the dynasty of the House of Orange, in order to shut out France from the Scheldt, and Austria before consenting to this measure, wished that England should promise to support her against Russia. In such a chaos of contending interests, it would be difficult to come to a resolution on any subject, more particularly on that of suspending hostilities, a subject more likely than any other to excite differences of opinion, and awaken angry feeling.

Intelligence now arrived of good augury for the Allies. This was the approaching arrival of Lord Castlereagh himself, who did not fear to quit the Foreign Office, in order to represent England amongst the allied sovereigns. Up to this time England had had as agents, Lord Cathcart, a brave soldier, but little skilled in diplomacy, and Lord Aberdeen, a man of enlightened mind, but accused of being too pacifically inclined. It was not sufficient in this assemblage of sovereigns, where each power was represented by emperors, by kings, or by prime ministers, to have merely ambassadors, whatever might be their merit. The British Cabinet decided then to send the most eminent of its members, Lord Castlereagh, to the ambulatory Congress of the Coalition, to moderate the passions that prevailed there, to maintain union, and to obtain the fulfilment of England's desires, and these desires being satisfied, to take part on every other question, with the moderate against the extreme party. In short, Lord Castlereagh's mission, which seems natural enough, was to preach moderation to the Allies, but to bate nothing of England's pretensions. He was, besides, to enter into explanations touching the war budget of Count Pozzo, and to make free use of English money for the accomplishment of his views, throwing from time to time, not his sword, but his gold, into the balance. No man was better suited than Lord Castlereagh to fulfil such a mission. His name was Robert Stewart; his brother, Charles Stewart, afterwards Lord Londonderry, accredited to the court of Bernadotte, was one of England's most active and most zealous agents. Lord Castlereagh, descended from an Irish family, inherited an ardent and energetic temperament, but tempered in him by lofty reason. His intellect, strong and far-seeing, his temper cautious and firm, he was capable of acting at the same time with vigour and with prudence; exhibiting in his manners the proud simplicity of an Englishman, he was called to exercise, and he did exercise, a great influence on the Allies. He was, on almost every question, furnished with absolute powers. With his temperament, with his instructions, it might be almost said that it was England herself that was transplanted from her sea-girt home, and appeared in the camp of the Allies. Having left London about the end of December, and having abode some time in Holland, to give advice to the Prince of Orange, he was not expected at Fribourg until the latter end of January. None of the coalition thought of taking a decided resolution before his arrival, or of giving a reply to any

diplomatic communications. A strong rivalry already existed between the Allies, to know who should see, who should converse with him first, in order to gain him as a partizan. Alexander had let Lord Castlereagh know, through Lord Cathcart, that he hoped to be the first to have an interview with him.

The expected arrival of Lord Castlereagh furnished M. de Metternich a means of replying to the French envoy. He let M. de Caulaincourt know that England having come to the determination of sending her Minister of Foreign Affairs to the camp of the Allies, they were obliged to wait his arrival before fixing the place, the object, and the direction of fresh negotiations. Besides this official reply, M. de Metternich wrote a private letter to M. de Caulaincourt, polite and flattering as regarded himself personally, but very obscure as regarded matters of business. The purport was that the Allies still wished for peace, that they hoped it, that there was no cause to despair of it, but that they must still wait patiently. As to the rest, there was not a word in allusion to the possibility of a suspension of hostilities. This letter was accompanied by one from the Emperor Francis to Maria Louisa. This Prince had believed his daughter to be ill; he inquired after her and received a letter, to which he replied. He expressed much affection for Maria Louisa, a great desire for peace, but not so ardent a hope of attaining it; he also expressed a resolution of labouring sincerely for that end, and lastly he gave utterance to the vexation of encountering serious difficulties in the general confusion of ideas, the result of the confusion of things that had prevailed during the past twenty years.*

M. de Caulaincourt transmitted these several replies to Napoleon, and not wishing to draw upon himself public attention, which would add to the humiliation of his position, he waited at the out-

* I give here this instructive and interesting letter, which shows plainly the personal feelings of the Emperor of Austria towards his daughter, his son-in-law, and France.

26th December, 1813.

DEAR LOUISA—I received yesterday your letter of the 12th of December, and it gave me much pleasure to learn that you are in good health. I thank you for the kind wishes you offer me for the new year; they are welcome, for I know your sincerity. I offer you mine with all my heart.

As to peace, be persuaded that I do not desire it less than you, than all France, and, as I hope, your husband. It is only in peace that happiness and safety can be found. My views are moderate. I wish everything that can secure the duration of peace, but in this world it is not sufficient merely to wish. I have important duties to fulfil towards my Allies, and unfortunately the question of the future peace, which I still hope is near, is very complicated. Your country has overturned long-established ideas. When we come to debate these questions, we have to contend with well-founded complaints or with prejudices. But peace is not on that account less ardently desired by me, and I hope we shall soon be able to reconcile our peoples. In England there is no manifestation of ill-will, but great preparations are being made. This necessarily occasions delays, until things are put *en train*; then all will go on prosperously, please God.

I am delighted with the account you give of your son; your brothers and sisters are well according to the last accounts I received, so is my wife. I too, am in good health.

Believe me ever your affectionate father,

FRANCIS.

posts, until the arrival of Lord Castlereagh, which was daily expected, should lead to more serious communications.

Napoleon was too well aware of the real state of things to be surprised at the reception M. de Caulaincourt got. Each day was marked by a fresh retrograde movement of his armies, and he could no longer defer placing himself at their head. Marshal Victor, more and more frightened at the number of the enemy, had finished by re-crossing the Vosges, after having abandoned all the defiles. The heroic cavalry of Spain, not sharing the Marshal's panic, always rushed upon the enemy's squadrons and cut them down when they came in contact. Marshal Victor had fallen back successively on Epinal and Chaumont, and had taken up his position on the Upper Marne, near Saint Dizier, having lost through fatigue and desertion between 2,000 and 3,000 men. In this state, he had remaining, at the utmost, 7,000 foot soldiers and 3,500 horse. Marshal Marmont, after having tried to oppose Blucher on the Sarre, had fallen back on Metz, had paused there a short time, to leave the Durutte division which had been cut off from Mayence, and which he had picked up on the way, in garrison. He then retired to Vitry. He had remaining about 6,000 foot soldiers and 2,500 horse. These two Marshals had been joined on the Upper Marne by Marshal Ney with the two divisions of the Young Guard, re-organized between Metz and Luxembourg, whilst Marshal Mortier, after having advanced to Langres with the Old Guard, fell back towards Bar-sur-Aube, followed closely by General Giulay and the Prince of Wurtemberg.

Napoleon had flattered himself that the corps of Marmont, Victor, Macdonald, whilst retreating might recruit and raise their number to 15,000 each. They certainly had received some reinforcements, but desertion, and the necessity of providing for the defence of the fortresses, had reduced them to the small number we have cited. The Guard that Napoleon had hoped to raise to 80,000 infantry did not amount to more than 30,000, of whom, from 7,000 to 8,000 were in Belgium under General Roguet and Barrois, 6,000 under Marshal Ney near Saint-Dizier, 12,000 under Marshal Mortier at Bar-sur-Aube. It is true that 10,000 had just been drilled at Paris. The horse guards, out of 10,000 fit for service, had 6,000 mounted, of whom half were with Mortier, and half with Lefebvre Desnoëttes. The latter had returned in all haste from the Scheldt to the Marne. Of the divisions of reserve that were formed at Paris by drafting conscripts into the dépôts, one, scarcely amounting to 6,000 men, had set out before being completed, under the command of General Gérard, to reinforce Marshal Mortier on the Aube; the other had repaired to Troyes, under General Hamelinaye, and reckoned scarcely 4,000 conscripts, wholly undrilled. The horse reserve, formed at Versailles by the combination of all the cavalry dépôts, had already furnished 3,000 horse soldiers, whom General Pajol, covered with still-gaping wounds, had led to Auxerre. Such were the resources

that the rapid succession of events had permitted Napoleon to assemble in January. We must add to these, the National Guards that came from Picardy to Soissons, from Normandy to Meaux, from Bretagne, and from Orleanais to Montereau, and from Burgundy to Troyes.

Napoleon did not despair with these feeble means of making head against the storm. He ordered that the two divisions of the Young Guard should be completed as quickly as possible, and that the organization of the divisions of reserve should be continued by means of the dépôts and conscripts. He ordered that the men should not remain a single day in Paris; as soon as they were provided with a vest, a schako, shoes, and a musket, they were to set out for the army, no matter how little drilling they might have gone through. He infused new vigour into the clothing magazines established at Paris, but he encountered more difficulty in providing fire arms than any other necessary. There were at Vincennes only 9,000 new muskets and 30,000 old; workmen were every day employed at the latter, to render them fit for service. There was scarcely enough to arm the men that were drafted into the dépôts as they arrived. The artillery, that had been crowded into Vincennes, drawn by horses, picked up anywhere and everywhere, was to be sent off immediately to Châlons, where our forces were about to assemble. The private treasure of Napoleon supplied the funds, which the public Treasury was inadequate to. M. Molliou, an excellent administrator of the public money in times of peace, but taken by surprise in these extraordinary circumstances, had not been able, notwithstanding the additional centimes, to supply the expenses of the army. Napoleon, out of the 63,000,000*f.* that remained of his personal savings, had given 17,000,000 to General Drouot for the Guards, about ten to the Treasurer for the different other services, eight for fresh horses, clothing, and the manufacture of fire-arms, and one to his brothers, now crownless and penniless kings. He intended to bring 4,000,000 with him, and 23,000 or 24,000 were to be left at the Tuilleries to provide for urgent or unforeseen wants.

If the troops of Spain could have been brought up, they would have been at this moment a most valuable aid. But no intelligence had yet been received of the reception given to the Duke de San Carlos, nor anything further relative to the treaty of Valençay. Ferdinand VII., waiting with continually increasing impatience the opening of his prison doors, was in as great ignorance as the French Cabinet.* This silence was a bad omen, and in any case the Emperor could not withdraw the troops from the frontier before knowing whether the French or English would cross the Pyrenees. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Napoleon ordered Suchet to send 12,000

* The work of M. Fain, which on this point contains more than one error, although founded principally on the documents of the Duke of Bassano, describes Ferdinand VII. as arriving at Madrid on the 6th of January. This prince did not leave Valençay until the 19th of March.

men to Lyon, and General Soult to send 15,000 men to Paris as quickly as possible. To these he joined two of the four divisions of reserve formed at Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier, and Nîmes. The four did not amount to more than 18,000 conscripts, instead of the 60,000 he had flattered himself with being able to raise; but they were composed of skeleton regiments borrowed from the army of Spain, and all good soldiers. Napoleon sent the Bordeaux division to Paris. It amounted to about 4,000 men; that of Nîmes, which amounted to about 3,000 men, was sent to Lyon. Such was his distress, that even these resources were become of actual importance. The division sent to Lyon was to serve as an addition to Augereau's army; the division sent on to Paris was to augment this assemblage of troops of all kinds, the Young Guard, battalions drawn from the dépôts, National Guards, old bands of Spain; and from these he hoped to draw, as soon as they were ready, sufficient men to sustain the terrible struggle that was about to take place between the Seine and the Marne. Lastly, he made preparations for the defence of the capital.

More than once, even in the hey-day of his prosperity, had Napoleon, by a kind of prescience which revealed to him the consequence of his errors without teaching him to avoid them, more than once we say, even then, had he, in fancy, seen the armies of Europe at the foot of Montmartre, and after each dark-boding vision had he resolved to fortify Paris. But again, carried away by the torrent of his thoughts and his passions, he had lavished millions on Alessandria, Mantua, Venice, Palma-Nova, Flushing, Texel, Hambourg, and Dantzic, and had neglected the capital of France. If he had commenced to fortify Paris in the days of his prosperity, the Parisians might have smiled, and there would have been no harm done. In January, 1814, such a proceeding would have made them tremble, and would have augmented the disaffection of some, and the consternation of others. However, in Napoleon's opinion, were Paris beyond the possibility of danger, the success of the approaching campaign would be secure; for, if in manœuvring between the Aisne, the Marne, the Aube, and the Seine, which flow concentrically towards Paris, he had been certain of a common focus where they all unite, he would have acquired a liberty of action which would have given him, with his genius, with his perfect knowledge of the locality, and holding possession of all the passages, an immense advantage over enemies embarrassed in their progress, always ready to repent of having advanced too far, and whom he might probably have surprised in some false position, where he would have overpowered them. On this account he was continually thinking of fortifying Paris, but he feared the moral effect of such a precaution. He had ordered a committee of engineer officers, appointed especially for the inspection of fortresses, to draw up a plan for the defence of Paris, with instructions to keep the matter a profound secret. As the plans they proposed required immediate and conspicuous labours, he had abandoned them, and had contented himself

with selecting, quietly and unostentatiously, sites where redoubts could be erected. He prepared great palisades, which were to serve either to strengthen the enclosure, or as *tambours* before the gates. In short, he wished to collect within the walls of Paris a supply of artillery and munitions of war, deferring, until the last moment, to organize with the aid of the inhabitants and the dépôts an obstinate defence for the great city that contained his last resources and his family, which was the seat of his government, and the key to the entire theatre of war.

He commanded some other measures relative to Belgium, to Italy, to Murat, and to the Pope. Discontented with General Decaen, on account of the evacuation of Willemstadt, he replaced him by General Maison, who had distinguished himself so much in the late campaigns. The instructions he gave the latter were to establish himself in an entrenched camp in front of Antwerp, with three brigades of the Young Guard, and whatever battalions of the 1st corps should be formed. He was to endeavour to keep the enemy on the Scheldt by the threat of falling on their rear if they marched towards Brussels. The Emperor ordered Macdonald to fall back on the Argonne, and from thence on the Marne with the 5th and 11th corps, and the 3rd cavalry. He ordered Prince Eugene to send him, if he could, without compromising the line of the Adige, a strong division, which, passing through Turin and Chamberg, should strengthen Augereau. The Emperor still persevered in the same silence with regard to Murat, who became every day more pressing, and threatened to join the Allies, if Italy, on the right of the Po, were not ceded to him. In short, not knowing what to do with the Pope at Fontainebleau, whence he might be carried off by the enemy, and not wishing to restore his liberty for fear of complicating the affairs of Italy, he made him set out for Savona, under the conduct of Colonel Lagorsse, who, in discharging the duty of a gaoler had combined respect with vigilance. The Austrians not having been able hitherto either to force the Adige, or to approach Geneva, Savona was still a safe place.*

These arrangements having been made, Napoleon resolved to set out. The Empress was to act as regent during his absence, as she had done during the preceding campaign, the High Chancellor, Cambacères, acting as Privy Counsellor. Joseph was to assist and even take the place of the Empress if she left Paris, for though determined to defend Paris *a outrance*, Napoleon had not resolved to leave his wife and son exposed to bombs and balls, perhaps even to captivity, if the Allies succeeded in forcing the hastily-got-up

* M. Fain, and other writers, have asserted that Napoleon sent the Pope to Rome this very day. This is an error demonstrated by authentic documents. The departure from Fontainebleau was certainly the commencement of the journey that brought the Pope to Rome; but it was not commanded with the intention of actually sending him there. It was at a later period that Napoleon gave orders that he should return to Rome, and this from motives that we shall explain in their proper place. The state papers contain instructions from Napoleon, and letters from Colonel Lagorsse, that leave no doubt on these points.

defences of the capital. In case the Empress retreated to the interior of the empire, Joseph and the other brothers of Napoleon who might happen to be at Paris, were expected to give an example of courage to the National Guard, and die, if necessary, to defend a throne more important to them than those of Spain, of Holland, or of Westphalia, for it was not only the greatest, but the only one that remained to the family.

Besides these precautions taken against the external foe, Napoleon had thought also of taking some against the internal enemy, that is to say, against the plotter whose object was to restore France either to the republicans or the Bourbons. The chancellor, Cambacères, and the Duke de Rovigo, had received orders to extend their *surveillance*, even to the princes of the imperial family, and in particular to certain dignitaries, such as M. de Talleyrand, for example, who constantly inspired Napoleon with the most extraordinary apprehensions. Though deprived of the most active of his associates, the Duke of Otranto, who was sent on a mission to Murat, M. de Talleyrand was still much to be feared. Napoleon saw distinctly in him the man around whom his enemies, of all kinds, would throng, to erect a new government on the wreck of the overthrown empire. After having felt a decided liking for M. de Talleyrand, and having inspired him with similar sentiments, now feeling himself deprived of the surest means to please—prosperity—remembering, besides, how often, on many occasions, he had offended this great personage, he thought he had done enough to earn his hatred: he reckoned on it, he made sure of it. He feared him, especially since the name of the Bourbons had been revived, for though his past life and opinions ranked him as a supporter of the Revolution, still the ancient Bishop of Autun, now a prince and a married man, was of such high birth, and endowed with such nobility of mind, he possessed so many means of being useful, that his peace might be easily made with the Bourbons. Napoleon saw in him a formidable instrument of counter-revolution. With such presentiments, he ought either to have rendered him powerless to do harm, or attached him to the Imperial interests; but notwithstanding his strength of mind and energy of character, Napoleon, as too often happens with persons slumbering on the brink of a precipice, pursued, with regard to M. de Talleyrand, an unsteady line of conduct. He left him full possession of his liberty; he was still a great dignitary and member of the council of regency, and instead of conciliating whilst leaving him so powerful, Napoleon, on the contrary, made him the most bitter reproaches on the eve of his departure, so strongly did the bare sight of M. de Talleyrand excite, torment, and irritate him. He told him that he knew him thoroughly, that he was not ignorant of what he was capable of doing, that he would keep a strict eye on him, and that at the first doubtful step he took he should make him feel the weight of his authority. Then, after the most violent invectives, he went no further than mere words,

and contented himself with ordering the Duke de Rovigo to keep the strictest watch as well over M. de Talleyrand as over some other high functionaries then out of favour. The Duke de Rovigo was not a man to hesitate in the execution of his orders whatever they might be, but what could he do against a skilful adversary who conducted himself too cautiously to give a hold to his enemies, and who besides was haloed with a mighty fame? It would be dangerous to strike him incautiously, and M. de Talleyrand knew well how to profit of the moment when he might dare anything against an enemy almost entirely deprived of the means of defence.

Napoleon, on the eve of his departure, wished to see and harangue the officers of the National Guard, to whom he was about to confide the interior and exterior safety of Paris. The National Guard of the capital was composed, not of this popular class, courageous and strong, as capable of bravely defending what is confided to them, as of, through their clumsiness, destroying it. The Parisian National Guard was composed of men in easy circumstances, adverse to revolutions, who did not forget that Napoleon had saved France from anarchy, though they condemned him for having precipitated her into a dreadful war. These men detested the republic and had no sympathy for the Bourbons. Napoleon having resolved to fight at the head of his soldiers for the French territory, determined to confide to the National Guard the care of defending his wife and son against any republican or royalist movement that might be attempted within the walls of the capital. He received the officers of this guard at the Tuilleries, with his wife on one side of him and his son on the other. Then advancing into the midst of the guards, and pointing to this child, lately the heir of such high fortune, now perhaps doomed to exile, even to death, he told them he was going forth to defend them and their families, and drive back from their land the enemies that had dared to cross the frontiers, but in going forth he left, as a deposit in their hands, all that was dearest to him, next to France; he left his wife and his son, and set out with a tranquil mind, confiding such pledges to their honour. The sight of this great man, reduced, after having performed so many prodigies, to such extremities, holding his son in his arms, confiding him to their devotedness, awakened in the Guard the most profound emotion, and they promised, in all sincerity, never to consent that any other than he should mount the throne of France. Alas! they believed what they said! Which of them, in fact, though there was a wide field then open to conjecture, which of them could foresee at that moment the far different scenes that should soon take place in these same Tuilleries, and should confound, not alone the sagacity of those who then occupied them, but that of their successors and the successors of their successors!

Napoleon set out next day for Chalons, and in taking leave of his wife and son, without knowing that he embraced them for the last time, pressed them warmly in his arms. His wife wept, apprehensive of never beholding him again. She was indeed destined

never to behold him again, but it was not the bullets of the enemy that deprived her of the sight of her husband! She would have been much surprised, had any one told her then, that this husband, at that moment the object of all her anxiety, should die in a remote isle of the ocean, the prisoner of all Europe, and forgotten by her. As for him, he would not have been astonished had he heard the prediction, for he was prepared alike for utter abandonment, or extreme devotedness from men whom he knew thoroughly, and towards whom, nevertheless, he acted as if he did not know them.

END OF THE FIFTY-FIRST BOOK.

BOOK LII.

BRIENNE AND MONTMIRAIL.

ARRIVAL of Napoleon at Châlons-sur-Marne on the 25th January—Dejection of the marshals and confidence of Napoleon—His plan of campaign—His project of manœuvring between the Seine and the Marne, in the conviction that the allied armies would divide to follow the course of these two rivers—Suspecting that Marshal Blücher had advanced to the Aube for the purpose of joining Prince Schwarzenberg, he determined to attack the Prussian General first—Brilliant conflict at Brienne on the 29th January—Blücher is thrown back on Rothière with considerable loss—At this moment the Allied Sovereigns assembled round Prince Schwarzenberg deliberate whether it would not be better to pause at Langres to negotiate before carrying the war further—Arrival of Lord Castlereagh at the camp of the Allies—Character and influence of this nobleman—The Prussians through a spirit of vengeance, Alexander through a feeling of wounded pride, wish to carry on the war *à outrance*—The Austrians wish to treat with Napoleon as soon as they can do so honourably—Lord Castlereagh supports the latter on condition that they will oblige Napoleon to retire within the limits of 1790, and that depriving him of Belgium and Holland, a large kingdom should be formed, of these for the House of Orange—Eagerness of all parties to satisfy England—Lord Castlereagh having obtained what he wished, influences the Allied Courts to consent to opening a congress at Chatillon, whither M. de Caulaincourt is summoned to propose to him that France should retire within her ancient limits—The political question having been decided in this way, the military question was resolved by the engagement that took place between Blücher and Napoleon—Prince Schwarzenberg comes to the aid of the Prussian General with the entire Bohemian army—Position of Napoleon, having his right on the Aube, his centre at Rothière, his left at the wood of Anjou—Bloody battle of Rothière on the 1st February, 1814, in which Napoleon, with 32,000 men resists for an entire day 100,000 combatants—Retreats in good order on Troyes the 2nd of February—The almost desperate position of Napoleon—Having fallen back on Troyes, he has not 50,000 men to oppose to the Allied Armies, that might number 220,000—Filled with the most mournful sentiments, he still does not lose courage, and makes his arrangements on the supposition of the enemy committing a serious error—His measures for the evacuation of Italy, recalling to Paris part of the armies that defend the Pyrenees—Order to contest the possession of Paris to the last extremity, and to send thence his wife and son—Meeting of the Congress of Châtillon—Insulting proposals made to M. de Caulaincourt, which consist in restricting France to the limits of 1790, and debarring her all interference in European arrangements—Grief and despair of M. de Caulaincourt—During this time the military error that Napoleon has foreseen is made—The Allies divide into two bodies, one under Blücher is to follow the Marne and outflank Napoleon's left in order to make him fall back on Paris, whilst the other descending the Seine should also force him back on Paris, to overwhelm him there under the combined allied forces. Napoleon setting out on the evening of the 2nd February from Nugent, with the Guard and Marmont's corps, advances on Champ-Aubert—He finds there the army of Silesia, divided into four corps—Battles of Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, of Chateau-Thierry, of Vauchamp,

which took place on the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 14th February—Napoleon captures 20,000 of the Silesian army, and kills 10,000 with scarcely any loss to himself—Hardly disengaged from Blücher, he falls, passing through Guines, on Schwarzenberg, who had crossed the Seine, and obliges him to re-cross in disorder—Battles of Nangis and of Montereau, the 18th and 19th of February—Considerable loss of the Russians, the Bavarians, and the Wurtembergers—A delay that occurred at Montereau permits Collaredo's corps, which was on the point of being taken, to escape—Great results obtained in a few days by Napoleon—Situation completely changed—Military events in Belgium, at Lyon, in Italy, and on the frontier of Spain—Revocation of the orders sent to Prince Eugene for the evacuation of Italy—Return of Ferdinand VII. to Spain, and of the Pope to Italy—The Allies, startled by these checks, determine to demand an armistice—Prince Wenceslas de Liechtenstein is sent to Napoleon—Napoleon feigns to give him a good reception, but is resolved to pursue the Allies without relaxation; he makes a verbal convention for the pacific occupation of the city of Troyes—Unexpected result of the first period of the campaign.

BOOK LII.

BRIENNE AND MONTMIRAIL.

Having left Paris on the morning of the 25th, Napoleon arrived the same evening at Châlons-sur-Marne. The road was already thronged with fugitives, soldiers, and peasants. The inhabitants of Châlons, to whom the presence of the Emperor gave confidence, cried out repeatedly : *Vive l'Empereur !* but they always added : *a bas les droits réunis*, so general was the disaffection against the established regime become. It was, to say the truth, the cry of local egotism against the most necessary taxes, which the flatterers of the people, to whatever class they belong, have always promised to abolish, without having ever been able to find a substitute, but at this moment the cry signified : *down with the Imperial Government*. But the opinion of the Challonais touching the Imperial regime, was tinctured by annoyances they experienced as vine-dressers of Champagne. Napoleon took no notice of this, and appeared gentle, calm, friendly, and won every heart by the tranquillity of his demeanour.

Berthier had reached Châlons before the Emperor. The old Duke de Valmy, still charged with the administration of the dépôts, had repaired there from another quarter. Marmont and Ney arrived at Châlons. They were greatly troubled in mind, though generally little disturbed by the appearance of danger ; but now, having only the *débris* of their armies, they earnestly demanded reinforcements, and flattered themselves in seeing Napoleon arrive, that reinforcements would quickly follow. Unfortunately he only brought himself ; it was a great deal certainly, as events soon proved, but not sufficient to resist the mass of enemies now pouring down on France. His lieutenants said that of course troops were coming up after the Emperor. "No," he replied coolly, and after having confounded them by this reply, he revived them soon by the boldness and profundity of the views that he exposed to them. It seemed as if, escaped from the gnawing cares that consumed him at Paris, and again become a soldier, he recovered, on

resuming his professional duties, his serenity of mind, and discovered resources where no other person could have thought of finding any. He spoke at considerable length with his marshals, and showed the position of affairs to be nearly as follows.

His forces, were reduced, so to speak, to what the marshals brought with them:—Victor had nearly 7,000 foot soldiers, and 3,500 horse; Marmont had 6,000 foot, and 2,500 horse; Ney had 6,000 foot. These three marshals could, besides, bring into the field 120 pieces of artillery, pretty well mounted. At a distance of twelve leagues, that is to say, at Arcis-sur-Aube, General Gerard had a reserve of 6,000 men; at Troyes, a distance of eighteen leagues, Marshal Mortier had 15,000 soldiers of the Old Guard, infantry and cavalry; these different troops amounting in all from 46 to 47,000 men. Lefebvre Desnoëttes arrived with the light cavalry of the Guard, amounting to 3,000 horse, with some thousand infantry, either of the Young Guard, or battalions drawn from the dépôts, which made a total of more than 50,000 men, in the quarter most threatened by the enemy. These troops did not comprise, it is true, the second division of reserve, which was being formed under General Hamelinaye at Troyes, the cavalry that was being drilled on the Seine, under Pajol, and the National Guards. The number was certainly small, opposed to 220,000 or 230,000 tried soldiers that were marching against the capital, without mentioning those that were daily expected. At Paris, two divisions of the Young Guard were being formed, and some new infantry battalions; several divisions of the army of Spain were advancing by the Bordeaux Road, and Macdonald was coming at last, through the Ardennes, with 12,000 men. But these reinforcements would be greatly outnumbered by those the enemy expected, and for the first shock, France had only 50,000 men to oppose to 230,000. Napoleon did not tell the entire truth to his lieutenants for fear of discouraging them, but he did not withhold much. Still, according to his view of things, there was nothing to be frightened at. The enemy's forces were numerous, but divided, and it was impossible for the Allies to avoid great errors, of which the Emperor would profit. The Allies were advancing by two routes, that of the east, from Bâle to Paris; that of the north-east, from Mayence to Paris, and it was difficult for them to do otherwise, having to combine operations with those of the army in the Low Countries. Independently of this forced separation between the army of Blücher—the ancient army of Silesia, and that of Schwarzenberg—the ancient army of Bohemia—the enemy was divided still further, from minor motives. Blücher had left troops to blockade Mayence and Metz; the columns of Schwarzenberg were far distant from one another; that of Bubna had taken the route through Geneva; that of Colleredo came by Auxonne and Burgundy; the columns of Giulay and of the Prince of Wurtemberg through Langres and Champagne; that of Wrede through Alsace. Lastly, the column of Wittgenstein, which was in the environs of Strasbourg. There were still some detach-

ments around Besançon, Belfort, Huningue, &c. It was not possible that so many scattered corps could be directed with such skill as to concentrate their operations at the same moment on the point where they were to fight. Besides, the physical structure of the locality must necessarily involve them in errors, of which the Emperor hoped to profit.

In advancing towards the capital of France, either by the north-east, or by the east, we arrive, after having passed the Meuse or the Saône, on the border of a basin of which Paris is the centre, and towards which the Marne and the Seine flow, forming an angle, whose sides unite at a common apex, which is Paris. Blucher was advancing at this time, along one side of the angle, taking his course towards Dizier on the Marne; Schwarzenberg advanced along the other side, pursuing Mortier along the Seine. Napoleon might come down rapidly either on the one or the other, no matter which, with what forces he could assemble. To the 25,000 men of Ney, Victor, and Marmont, Napoleon was about to add the detachment of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, with an immense quantity of artillery. He could, after re-ascending the Marne as far as Saint-Dizier, turn quickly to the right, combine his forces with those of Gérard and Mortier, and come down with 50,000 men on Schwarzenberg's column. The probable result would be a glorious success.

This first advantage would stop the too confident march of the Allies. Should the war be prolonged, the French might, by manœuvring skilfully in this angle formed by the Seine and the Marne, obtain other and perhaps considerable advantages. On one side, the Duke de Valmy was to occupy the different passages of the Marne by raising the National Guards and barricading all the bridges; on the other side, Pajol, with the cavalry and the National Guards, was to take the same precautions on the Seine, and carry up his operations to the Yonne, which is, so to speak, a detached arm of the Seine.

Between these two lines of the Marne and the Seine, there is an intermediate line, that of the Aube, which increases the difficulties for the invaders, and the means of resistance for the invaded. The enemy, induced, sometimes by choice, sometimes by necessity, to divide their forces between these different rivers, and not having possession of the passages which we exclusively occupied, would furnish a thousand opportunities of fighting, which should be quickly seized, and Napoleon was not the man to neglect such opportunities. During this time the troops from Spain and the interior would arrive, the people, animated by success, would again take courage, Augereau should return from Lyon to Besançon, and attack the enemy in the rear; the commanders of the fortresses were to make frequent sorties against the feeble forces that were blockading them, and if fortune were not absolutely adverse, bright prospects might yet dawn for France; and Caulaincourt, so strengthened, might finish by signing an honourable peace. "All is not lost," exclaimed Napoleon. War offered so many chances if one

would only persevere. No one was conquered but he who was willing to be so. Without doubt, there would be adverse days; they would sometimes be obliged to fight with odds of three to one, even of four to one; but Napoleon had done so in his youth, how much better could he perform the same feat in his ripened manhood. Besides, of all the *débris* of the ancient army, an excellent and numerous artillery had been preserved, so that there were five or six pieces of cannon to every thousand men. Bullets were quite as good as balls. The Emperor and his soldiers had partaken of every species of glory; there was yet one to acquire that would crown all the others and surpass them, that of resisting and conquering adverse fortune; after which the Emperor and his soldiers should retire to the bosom of their families and grow old together in this France, which, thanks to her heroic soldiers, after so many different phases of fortune, should have preserved her true grandeur—her natural frontiers—and acquired, moreover, an imperishable glory.

In uttering these noble sentiments, Napoleon looked calm and smiling; he looked as if his youth had returned, he appeared to believe all he said, and, in fact, he did believe a great part of it, so clearly did his genius-lighted mind foresee chances hidden from others. And so he ended by bestowing part of his confidence on his lieutenants, and left them less dejected than he had found them. The most animated on this occasion, he who displayed the best disposition, was Marmont. Ney was dejected. The hero of Moskowa seemed to have never recovered his spirits since the day of Dennewitz.

During the night even, Napoleon, who did not retire to rest, ordered the Duke de Valmy to assemble at Châlons the detachments that were falling back—the dépôts were to continue their route to Paris—to raise the National Guards in every direction, and to barricade the boroughs and cities that had bridges across the Marne. He also enjoined Macdonald, who had completed his retrograde movement, to stop at Châlons to guard the course of the Marne. He ordered Mortier to quit Troyes and join Gérard on the Aube, an intermediary line, as we have said, between the Seine and the Marne, and to hold himself in readiness either to receive him or to come to him. He ordered Pajol to keep a strict watch over the bridges of the Seine and the Yonne, such as Nogent, Montereau, Sens, Joigny, Auxerre, and to manœuvre his cavalry far enough on the right, to intercept any parties that might endeavour to advance as far as the Loire.

On the morning of the next day, the 26th, Napoleon advanced towards Vitry. Lefebvre Desnoëttes had joined him. With Lefebvre, Marmont, Ney, and Victor, he had in all from 33,000 to 34,000 men. The enemy occupied Saint Dizier. Napoleon ordered Victor to drive them from their position, a command that was obeyed with extraordinary vigour. The presence of Napoleon had restored the courage of all. The French entered Saint Dizier,

after having made some prisoners from the Russian corps of Landskoi. We shall now relate what meanwhile occurred amongst the Allies.

Weary of waiting for Lord Castlereagh, and spite of his desire to be the first to speak with him, Alexander, who assumed that his presence was necessary everywhere, and who was often useful in many places, thought proper to take up his abode at head quarters, saying that without him the Allies would do nothing but quarrel and take faulty proceedings. He had repaired to Langres, whither the allied sovereigns and ministers had accompanied him. A considerable portion of the army of Prince Schwarzenberg was disposed between the Upper Marne, and the Upper Aube, between Chaumont and Bar-sur-Aube, awaiting Blucher, who was coming up by Saint Dizier. Now serious consultations were held, conformable to the divisions laid down by M. de Metternich touching the various periods of the war. The first term had been reached when the Allies touched the banks of the Rhine, the second was accomplished when they crossed the Vosges and the Ardennes, and now the third and most difficult remained—to march on Paris. Opinions were divided on the question of this last period of the war, and all reckoned on Lord Castlereagh, who had at length arrived, to settle the difficulty. Meanwhile, not to prolong an unbecoming silence, M. de Caulaincourt was informed that Châtillon-sur-Seine would be the spot for future negotiations. It was with difficulty Alexander was induced to make this concession, for he was already disposed to treat only within the walls of Paris. But he was now induced to yield because he had selected the locality for the new congress in France, in order to inflict on Napoleon the humiliation of negotiating in the centre of his invaded provinces. Meanwhile the different divisions of the allied armies were tending to a common centre. Whilst the army of Prince Schwarzenberg was disposed around Langres, Blucher, after having quitted Nancy, had traversed Saint Dizier, had left the Russian detachment of Landskoi there, in order to spread a belief that he was about to make a descent on Châlons, following the course of the Marne, whilst, on the contrary, he quitted the Marne to follow the course of the Aube, in order to join Schwarzenberg, to animate the main body of the army by his presence, to put an end to all indecision, and induce the Allies to march boldly on Paris. Having left the corps of Count de Saint Priest in the neighbourhood of Coblenz, a part of the Langeron in advance of Mayence, and the York corps in advance of Metz, he arrived with the Sacken corps and what remained of the Langeron. He had, on the way, fallen in with the advance guard of Wittgenstein, commanded by Pahlen, and so arrived at the head of more than 30,000 men. He had crossed transversely from the Marne to the Aube, at the very time that Napoleon reached Saint Dizier. The Marne in the upper part of its course, that is to say at Saint Dizier, is only about ten or twelve leagues distant from the Aube.

Such was the situation of the Allies on the evening of the 27th of December, when Napoleon entered Saint Dizier. He learned there, from the prisoners, and from the inhabitants of the district, whom he interrogated with a tact peculiar to himself, that Blucher, at the head of 30,000 men, had passed in advance of him, with the intention probably of joining the column that was in pursuit of Mortier on the Aube. He did not hesitate a moment, and immediately resolved to pursue the Prussian General until he should have overtaken and beaten him. Being able to cut off his means of communication, and intercept the supplies that might arrive from the corps left in the rear, with, moreover, the possibility of overtaking him before he should have joined Schwarzenberg, the Emperor had every chance of finding Blucher in an unfortunate position, of which he would not fail to profit.

Napoleon might, in re-ascending the Marne as far as Joinville, have reached an excellent chaussée, which by the way of Doulevant and Soulaire, abutted on the Aube in the direction of Brienne, but it would cost a day to gain this advantage. He preferred, therefore, turning directly to the right, and advancing directly by a cross road which abutted on the Aube at the heights of Brienne. The country here was bestudded with woods and valleys, and might be traversed in two marches. He ordered Marshal Mortier and General Gerard to remain upon the Aube, and to keep their position, whilst he should take measures to join them. He directed what had arrived of Marmont's corps, with the Duhesme division of Victor's corps, to pass by the Joinville chaussée at Doulevant, which he did not like to take himself; he added to these the dragoons of Briche, to scour the country, and occupy the Nancy road, by which the troops that Blucher had left behind might arrive. With Victor, Ney, all the cavalry, and about 17,000 or 18,000 men, he marched on Brienne by the cross road leading from Eclaron to Montierender. There had been frost on the preceding days; on the 28th, the first day of the march, it rained. It was extremely difficult to traverse these roads, which were only used by wood-cutters. Fortunately, the artillery horses were excellent; besides, with the assistance of the peasants, who willingly gave the aid of their hands as well as the assistance of their horses, the Emperor and his troops arrived, though at a late hour, at Montierender. In traversing Eclaron they found the inhabitants overwhelmed with grief at the ravages committed by the enemy. Notwithstanding the moderation which the Allies had promised to exercise on their first entrance into France, they had soon relapsed into the ordinary habits of invaders, which barbarity on the part of the Russians, and a blind hatred on the part of the Prussians, rendered in the present case more cruel than usual. They pillaged and ravaged through inclination, even when they were not prompted by necessity. The afflicted peasants had addressed their complaints to Napoleon, who afforded them some relief out of his private treasure. He promised, moreover, that their church, which had been destroyed, should be rebuilt.

On the following day, the 29th, Napoleon left Montierender for Brienne. The soldiers found now, as on the evening before, much difficulty in marching on roads broken up by the rains. At length, about three or four in the afternoon, Grouchy, who commanded the cavalry of the army, and Lefebvre Desnoëttes that of the Guard, having debouched by the wood of Anjou, discovered, in a slightly undulated plain, the cavalry of Count Pahlen, supported by some light battalions of Scherbatow. A little further on was seen the small town of Brienne, with its chateau built on an eminence, and embosomed in trees, and further still, the Aube. Numerous troops were seen along the banks of the Aube; they appeared to be retracing their steps. We shall explain the cause of these various movements.

Blucher having arrived at Bar-sur-Aube, a small town situate on the Aube, much higher up than Brienne, had fancied that Mortier was endeavouring to pass this river to join Napoleon near the Marne, and he resolved to prevent him. He had, consequently, advanced on Brienne, Lesmont, and Arcis, intending to cut down the bridges of the Aube. But having learned the sudden appearance of Napoleon, he hastened to retrace his steps, and at this moment he was crossing, at the head of the Sacken corps, the town of Brienne, intending to return to Bar-sur-Aube. In order to cover this movement, Count Pahlen, with his cavalry and some light battalions of Prince Scherbatow, closely watched the plain and the border of the wood by which the French army was expected to debouch. General Olsouvieff guarded the approaches of Brienne, which the grand park of Prussian artillery was crossing, in falling back on Bar.

No sooner did Lefebvre Desnoëttes recognize the squadrons of Count Pahlen than he rushed upon them with his light cavalry, and forced them to fall back on the battalions of Scherbatow, that were formed in squares. The Russian cavalry had taken shelter behind these battalions, and placed themselves on the right of the enemy's line, consequently facing our left. During this time, Olsouvieff had deployed his forces in front of the town, and the Sacken corps, arrested in its retrograde movement, had taken up a position beside Olsouvieff, in order to protect Brienne, which it was most important to occupy, that the Prussian park of artillery might defile in safety.

The French infantry being still entangled in the wood, Napoleon was obliged to cannonade the Russian line, which his horsemen could not touch, and during more than two hours hostilities were limited to an exchange of bullets, which could not be other than destructive. At length, Ney and Victor began to debouch, and Napoleon ordered an instant attack. Victor had left the Duhesme division with Marmont, and Ney had only two weak divisions of the Guards; we had on our side at the utmost from 10,000 to 11,000 infantry, and 6,000 cavalry. Blucher had at least 30,000 men. Still, Napoleon did not hesitate, for it was no longer a question of

numbers, but of time. He sent Ney straight forward on Brienne with two columns; he ordered a brigade of Victor's corps to advance on the right towards the chateau of Brienne, and disposed the remainder of this corps on his left, so as to threaten the road from Brienne to Bar, a movement which must render the retreat of Blucher certain.

These arrangements secured from the commencement the desired success. We had very few of the old troops; the Young Guard consisted of conscripts, scarcely clothed, and who had never fired a musket. They were called the "Maria Louisa," in compliment to the Regent, under whose rule they had been raised and organized. But they were drafted into the skeletons of the old regiments, and led on by Marshal Ney. These young lads supported a violent fire, without yielding an inch, and forced the Russian infantry, though three times their number, to fall back on Brienne. Unfortunately an accident that befel our left wing detracted from this success. Near this wing, the feeble column of Victor that Napoleon had sent forward on the road to Bar, in order to threaten Blucher's line of retreat, was confronted by the entire Russian cavalry, which had been brought up on this side, whilst ours was on the opposite. Suddenly attacked by several thousand cavalry, Victor's infantry were, so to speak, taken by surprise and forced to fall back. Napoleon, who was in the midst of then, ran the most imminent danger, and saw some pieces of artillery captured before his eyes. This retrograde movement of our left cooled the ardour of Ney. But at this very moment, Victor's brigade, that had been despatched towards the right, succeeded in turning Brienne, forced their way through the chateau park, attacked and carried the castle itself. Blucher and his staff narrowly escaped being made prisoners, but the son of Chancellor Hardenberg was captured. On our side we lost the brave Rear Admiral Baste and some of the marines of the Guard, who on this day terminated a heroic life by a glorious death. The capture of this important position produced a serious impression on the Russians. Ney now attacked them briskly, entered Brienne close on their rear, and carried the town at the very instant that the enemy's artillery passed through. Blucher, annoyed at the result of this encounter, and fearing for the rear of his park of artillery, wished to make a last effort to retake Brienne and occupy it at least for some hours. He made, in fact, about ten in the evening, a furious attack on the town and chateau at the head of the Sacken infantry. The attack on the town was, under favour of night, at first successful, for our young troops were taken by surprise. But a brave officer, commander of the Ender battalion, and who was guarding the chateau with a battalion of the 56th, forced back the assailants into the town, and our soldiers, now recovered from their surprise, either captured or killed them all. This success revived the courage of our troops, they drove the Sacken infantry out of the town, and our artillery, which was numerous, firing as correctly as the darkness would permit, covered the Russians with grape shot.

It was eleven at night when this combat finished. The confusion was so great that Napoleon did not think he could get a lodging in the chateau. He lay in a neighbouring village, and found himself for a short time, on regaining his bivouac, surrounded by Cossacks; he was on the point of being carried off. Berthier, thrown down in the mud, was drawn out all bruised.

On the morning of the next day the French were able to see their position more clearly. They then discovered that they had been fighting against 30,000 men, and that Blucher was retiring through the vast plain that extends beyond Brienne on the road of Bar-sur-Aube. The French pursued him with a hundred pieces of artillery, and kept up an incessant and destructive fire as far as the village of Rothière, where Blucher stopped.

This battle was highly honourable to our young soldiers, who, fighting with two to one against them, had conquered the most experienced of the allied troops, led by their bravest general. Unfortunately it was not against odds of two to one, but of five to one, they would soon be obliged to fight, to make an effort to save France! The enemy had left in our hands about 4,000 men, either killed or wounded. On our side, about 3,000 were put *hors de combat*. But as we remained masters of the battle-field, our wounded could not be reckoned as lost. The moral effect of this battle was more important than any material advantage that resulted from it. Our soldiers, utterly dispirited when Napoleon joined them at Châlons, began to recover their courage on seeing him, in fighting again by his side, and resuming, under the mighty momentum of his genius, the habit of conquest.

Though Napoleon had not obtained all the advantages he hoped from a sudden irruption amongst the dispersed corps of the Allies, still he had made them feel his presence; he had shown them that they could not reach Paris without firing a shot, as they had flattered themselves from the facility of their first movements, and he had placed himself between them and the capital, so as to block the way. With regard to the object in view, no position could be more happily chosen than Brienne.

The River Aube, on which Napoleon had just paused after the occupation of Brienne, divides into two parts, as we have said, the space lying between the Marne and the Seine. Having taken up his position on the Aube, Napoleon was at almost equal distances from the Marne and the Seine, being able, in two short marches, to reach either the one or the other in order to stop the enemy, who would wish to advance on Paris either by Chalons or by Troyes. Having at Brienne the main body of his forces, having besides a body of troops at Chalons, and another at Troyes, with the power of reinforcing alternately either the one or the other, and satisfied, in any case, to fight with troops infinitely superior in number, he was certain of arriving in time on whichever of the two routes should be most threatened. It was not very probable that the enemy would overstep this angle to carry the war beyond

the Marne or the Seine. Blucher, in fact, was obliged to keep up a communication with the troops that were operating in the direction of Belgium, as Schwarzenberg was obliged to keep up a communication with those that were acting in the direction of Switzerland, so that each was somewhat restricted, Blucher in a northerly and Schwarzenberg in an easterly direction. Being obliged, besides, under penalty of the most imminent peril, not to remove at too great a distance from one another, they were unavoidably obliged to follow—Blucher the Marne, Schwarzenberg the Seine, unless they combined to march in a single column on Paris.

It was after having profoundly studied this state of things that Napoleon made his arrangements.

At this moment the two columns of the enemy seemed to constitute but one, of which Troyes and the banks of the Seine would be the natural direction. Napoleon, therefore, determined to concentrate the largest body of troops in the direction of Troyes. For this reason he sent Marshal Mortier, with the Old Guard of Arcis, towards Troyes. He placed General Gérard, with the Dufour division and the first division of reserve, at Piney, half way between Brienne and Troyes. We must remember that at Troyes the second division of reserve had commenced to be formed, under General Hamelinaye, and that it yet amounted only to 4,000 men. Napoleon ordered that it should be raised to 8,000 as quickly as possible, and should be meanwhile reinforced by all the national guards of Burgundy. With Hamelinaye and Gérard, who reckoned 12,000 men, with the Old Guard which comprised 15,000, Marshal Mortier had at his command 27,000 men. Napoleon hoped to add to these, within a few days, the 15,000 that were coming from Spain, which would form a total of 40,000 men, of whom 30,000 were the best troops in the world. By joining Mortier with the 25,000 under his own command, and this he could do in one long march, he would have 65,000 men to oppose to the grand army of Schwarzenberg, and this, in his position, was a considerable force, and, considering his mode of tactics, almost sufficient to dispute the country. He bestowed, at the same time, fresh cares on the defence of the Seine and the Yonne, and he repeated his orders to send to Pajol, besides the small Bordeaux reserve, all the disposable cavalry at Versailles. Pajol was, with these means at his disposal, to guard Montereau, Sens, Joigny, Auxerre, and scour the banks of the Loing canal with his cavalry as far as the Loire, in order to observe any attempt that Schwarzenberg might make beyond the presumable circle of his operations.

Towards the opposite side, that is to say, towards the Marne, Napoleon renewed his orders to General Macdonald, to advance on Châlons with all the troops he could bring from the Rhenish provinces; and he reiterated his commands to the Duke of Valmy to assemble at Ferté-sous-Jourarre, at Meaux, and at Chateau Thierry, as many of the National Guards as he should have time to assemble;

he was to barricade the bridges of these different cities, and to collect as much provision as he could from the surrounding country. In this direction the force was not so strong as in other quarters, but it was only Blucher who could show himself here, and that by separating from Schwarzenberg, in which case, Napoleon having his eye on him as a hunter on his prey, was ready to pursue and attack him either in rear or flank. At the same time he renewed his solicitations for the organization of fresh battalions at Paris, and for fresh squadrons at Versailles, in order to add quickly 15,000 to the 25,000 then under his command. If he succeeded in getting these reinforcements he would be very nearly in a position to make head against all his enemies, for by joining Mortier near Troyes with 40,000 men, his numbers would amount to 80,000; if he joined Macdonald near Châlons, he could increase his troops to 55,000, and this would be nearly sufficient either against Schwarzenberg or against Blucher. Napoleon gave particular attention to tracing the military route of the army from Paris to the banks of the Aube, and he decided that the troops should pass through Ferté-sous-Jouarre, Sézanne, Arcis, and Brienne, which was the most central direction, and whither he ordered munitions of every kind to be brought. Foreseeing that he should frequently have to manœuvre from the Aube to the Marne, he ordered Sézanne to be surrounded with pallisades, and large supplies of provisions and arms to be lodged there. At Brienne, where he was encamped, he fixed his position so as to profit to the utmost of the physical structure of the locality. At Dienville, on the Aube, he established his right wing, which was composed of Ricard's division, detached from Marmont, and of Gérard's, which in case of attack had orders to hasten from Piney to Dienville. He fixed his centre, consisting of Victor's troops, at the village of Rothière, in the midst of a plain intersected by the high road, and with these was the guard as a reserve. Lastly, he placed his left wing, consisting of Marmont's corps, at Morvilliers, upon the high ground in front of the wood of Anjou. He ordered each chief of division, and especially Marmont, to surround himself with earthworks, in order to compensate for our numerical inferiority in the very probable event of an approaching attack. Thus encamped on the Aube, at almost equal distances from the two routes that the Allies would be likely to take, he awaited two events;—first that his resources, which were in process of preparation, should be completed; and secondly, that his enemies should commit some gross error. Of this last chance he did not despair, for he knew his adversaries well, and he considered his situation much improved since the battle of Brienne. He wrote in this tone to his wife, to Joseph, to the Chancellor Cambacérès, to the Dukes of Feltre and Rovigo, in order that at Paris they might repeat what he said, that so the inhabitants might be tranquillized and become more zealous in providing the supplies he had ordered.*

* Historians and writers of memoirs not having read the correspondence of Napoleon, and not understanding the motives of his actions, pronounced him mad for

During this time grave questions were being discussed in the camp of the Allies, questions both political and military. The political question was whether the Allies should treat with Napoleon; the military, whether they should pause at Langres, or whether they should immediately commence the third period of the war, without having ascertained, by an exchange of verbal communications, that peace was impossible. As might naturally be expected, the more ardent spirits, at whose head were the Prussians and Alexander, influenced by the motives we have already noticed, wished neither to negotiate nor to pause. The moderate party, at whose head were the Austrians and some prudent men of the different allied nations, desired the contrary. The task of deciding between these two parties devolved on Lord Castlereagh, who had at length arrived at head quarters.

Each party, in order to win the good graces of the English nobleman, had accorded him beforehand the chief object of his mission, that is to say, the creation of a kingdom of the Low Countries, which would procure England the advantage of depriving France of Antwerp, and of placing the estuaries of the rivers under a power capable of defending them, and would place her in a position to demand from Holland, as a recompense for such noble gifts, the Cape of Good Hope, which is the Gibraltar of the Indian ocean, as the Mauritius is its Malta. Lord Castlereagh had moreover to confide to the Allies another project, which he felt some embarrassment in speaking of; this was the projected marriage of the Princess Charlotte, heiress to the throne of England, with the heir of the House of Orange, a project which at any other time would have excited strong opposition. But Alexander listened to the revelation of Britain's various ambitions with the smile he accorded to all whose passions he wished to enlist in his favour, and testified his readiness to consent to every desire, without exception, expressed by England. This English project involved on the part of Austria a personal sacrifice, that of the Austrian Low Countries, for in this universal falling back on the past, the Low Countries would naturally have reverted to her. But as for Low Countries, she preferred the lands of Italy,

having stayed at Brienne after the battle of the 29th, and after having shown himself desirous to fight a second battle with such disproportionate forces. It is easy to see, from the explanation we have just given, whether he was mad, and whether it is wise to judge such a man, without having studied his motives of action in authentic documents. Marshal Marmont, in his *Memoires*, cries out against the orders Napoleon gave him to entrench himself at Morvilliers. General Koch, an excellent military writer, and of much sounder judgment than Marshal Marmont, asks how any one could think, with 30,000 men, of fighting a second battle against all the allied armies. It is clear, from what we have stated, what were Napoleon's real intentions. The enemy being able to operate both in the direction of Troyes and Châlons, Napoleon's object was to take up a position that would enable him to advance on whichever of the two routes should be threatened, not intending, as has been laid to his charge, to seek a general battle, but endeavouring to provide against eventualities with the small forces at his command, that is to say, with almost nothing. Nothing is left us but to admire the vastness of his genius and his stern determination of character in a situation so extraordinary, one to which history scarcely offers a parallel.

and she assented to the views of England after she had been assured that she should receive, in Italy, an indemnification for her sacrifice. There was a last point on which Lord Castlereagh laid considerable stress; it was that no question should be raised about maritime rights. Will it be believed? Here, where those powers were assembled that were desirous of forming a navy, the question of maritime rights was scarcely glanced at; it was looked upon as a private affair, concerning at most France and England, and which ought, as a matter of course, to be regulated according to the wishes of the latter. Thus, everything had been conceded to Lord Castlereagh—the kingdom of the Low Countries, the union by marriage between this kingdom and England, and, lastly, the silence of civilized Europe upon the legislation of the seas.

These concessions having been made, the next question was, with whom would Lord Castlereagh side,—with those who wished for peace, or with those who demanded an uncompromising war? His own desires once gratified, the powerful Englishman was again become perfectly rational, and, for example, on the question of negotiating or not negotiating with Napoleon, exhibited both good sense and diplomatic ability.

Radically, this question meant that the Allies did not wish to have anything more to do with Napoleon, and that they were resolved to dethrone him and replace his dynasty by another. This question presented great difficulties to Lord Castlereagh, whether with regard to England, or to Austria. The English ministers, disciples, and successors of Mr. Pitt, had long been reproached, as we have said, with keeping up against France a dynastic war, and they were so much in the habit of defending themselves before parliament against this charge, that they continued to make the defence, even when the English people themselves, encouraged by success, were no longer supposed to look upon the conduct of the ministers as blameable. As to Austria, it would be very embarrassing to the Emperor Francis to be told that the Allies wished to bring him to Paris that he might deprive his own daughter of a throne. Moreover, if the expected vacancy of the throne of France inspired Lord Castlereagh with the hope of seeing it filled by the Bourbons, whose restoration he ardently desired, it also awakened his fear of Bernadotte, for whom the Emperor Alexander had conceived an extraordinary liking since the interview at Abo, and the discussion of the Norwegian question had caused an intimacy to spring up between the courts of Russia and Sweden.

Having given profound attention to all these considerations, Lord Castlereagh came to the sage conclusion that it was better not to be precipitate, but allow the restoration of the Bourbons to arise from the position of affairs, without seeking, by interference, to alter the course of events. He said to both parties that they had publicly offered to enter into negotiations with Napoleon; that to refuse now to send plenipotentiaries, not only to Manheim, the place

pointed out by France, but to Châtillon, the place indicated by the Allies, would be to exhibit to the eyes of Europe, an inconsistency that would be really embarrassing, and would be strongly condemned in England; it would be, he contended, necessary to negotiate with Napoleon, absolutely necessary, in order to maintain the dignity of the Allied Powers. To Alexander, who was so anxious to get to Paris, and to the Prussians, who were thirsting for vengeance, he said in private, that by adopting this line of conduct, they did not bind themselves in any way, for in offering Napoleon, purely and simply, the frontiers of 1790, they might be sure of a refusal; and even if he did accept the offer, he would be so humiliated, so weakened, that the one party ought to feel themselves revenged and the other tranquillized; but if, on the contrary, he did not accept, then the Allies would be free, and Austria, having herself pronounced for the frontiers of 1790, would be obliged to yield and abandon an intractable son-in-law, with whom it was impossible to come to any treaty; and thus, by not hastening events, they would gradually bring things to the point they wished, without incurring the charge of inconsistency, and without offending the court of Vienna, whose concurrence in the present war was indispensable. To Austria, Lord Castlereagh gave entire satisfaction by supporting the opinion of those who wished the negotiations should be carried on at Châtillon. He told the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, that though he believed it difficult to establish a permanent peace with Napoleon, he considered it advisable to try to negotiate with him; that touching the question of what dynasty should occupy the throne of France, England had taken no resolution; she had even tried to dissuade the Bourbons from repairing to the continent. He added that England would sincerely endeavour to conclude a peace; but if Napoleon refused the offer now made, all further treaty should be broken off, and that in this case, the throne of France becoming vacant, Austria, guided by her conservative spirit, and understanding thoroughly Bernadotte's character, would naturally prefer the Bourbons to this adventurer, who demanded so high a price for trifling services. To all these propositions Lord Castlereagh received a full assent from the Emperor Francis and his minister, who immediately replied that they were bound in honour to assent to the proposal of treating with Napoleon, that a sense of self-respect compelled them to take the same course, for, after all, the Emperor Francis could not forget he was a father; but, if Napoleon would not on any terms listen to reason, they were determined to break with him for ever, however painful such a course might be to the father of Maria Louisa. They did not regard the regency of the latter in the name of the King of Rome as anything serious. Bernadotte was only a momentary whim of Alexander's, of which it would be folly to think seriously, and should Napoleon be dethroned, Austria would prefer the Bourbons as his successors to all others. Every thing was thus satisfactorily arranged between Lord Castlereagh

and Austria, whom he took care to satisfy touching her material interests.

Austria, in fact, feared that the coalition after having made use of her services might trick her; for example, that Russia, in order to get a better portion of Poland, might give up Saxony to Prussia, which would necessitate an indemnification for the House of Saxony in Italy, a combination which was already spoken of at this period. She also entertained other subjects of fear, upon all of which Lord Castlereagh tranquillized her, pledging the word of England for the accomplishment of all Austria wished.

By a mixture of good sense, tact and firmness, and a certain simplicity of manner, peculiarly English, Lord Castlereagh acquired thus rapidly a considerable influence amongst the Allies, an influence to which his position certainly contributed very much; for arriving the last, with abundant resources at his command, amongst people whose interests and opinions were utterly opposed to each other, he possessed all the means of turning the balance to which side he would, and therefore found all willing to subscribe to his wishes in order to secure his aid in the fulfilment of theirs. Lord Castlereagh carried out his views with very little intrigue, and acting in a simple, straight-forward manner, exercised a decisive influence on the destinies of Europe.

Things having been arranged as we have just related, the Allies resolved on the 29th of January, the very day of the battle of Brienne, to send plenipotentiaries to Châtillon. These plenipotentiaries were, on the part of Austria, M. de Stadion; for Russia, M. de Rasoumoffski; for Prussia, M. de Humbolt; for England, Lord Aberdeen. With the latter were joined Lord Cathcart, the English ambassador at the Court of Russia, and Sir Charles Stewart, English Minister in Prussia. It was also arranged that Lord Castlereagh should go to Châtillon to observe personally the progress of the negotiations, to direct them if necessary, and to ascertain by observation whether a beneficial result could be hoped from these negotiations. England was known to be so deeply interested in yielding nothing beyond the ancient limits of France, and in getting rid of Napoleon, if she could find a favourable opportunity of doing so, that none of the Allies distrusted her, or thought of restricting her influence at the future Congress. M. de Metternich might also have gone to Châtillon, but besides that he wished to remain near the allied sovereigns, he felt embarrassed at the idea of meeting the French negotiator, and preferred leaving this disagreeable office to M. de Stadion, who, being an old enemy of France, would experience no other embarrassment at seeing her ill-treated, that what might arise from the effort to repress any ill-timed manifestation of delight.

The conditions the Allies were about to propose to France were, we may now say so, after the lapse of half a century, indecent. Not only was France required to retire within the limits of 1790, though none of the Allies was willing to submit to a similar resti-

tution, but she was required to give an immediate answer to the proposition, and to reply with a "yes" or "no." Moreover, she was to be debarred all interference in the fate of the countries she was called on to give up. What was to be done with Poland, with Saxony, with Westphalia, with Belgium, with Italy; how Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Switzerland were to be treated; in all these questions France was to have no voice. France, without whose interference the fate of an European village had never been decided; France was to have no opinion on the spoils of an entire world, of which she was at this moment herself despoiled. It is true that Napoleon had often abused the rights of a victor, but amidst the intoxicating smoke of Rivoli, of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Friedland, he had never treated the conquered thus, above all, the conquered who were crushed! But at this moment, France was not crushed; her enemies advanced upon her soil, so to speak, in trembling, and promising to treat her well. Without doubt, she, or rather her government, had committed faults, but in one day they had been all effaced, and if we only call to mind that two months prior to this time the Allies had offered France her natural frontiers, with earnest importunities to accept them; that, after a moment's hesitation she had replied by a formal acceptance, which, in justice, was binding on those who made the offer; if all these circumstances are taken into consideration, we will be pardoned for saying that the conditions proposed at Châtillon were indecent. And though the triumph of Napoleon might be that of an insupportable despotism, still that he might triumph was the wish of every honest man whose judgment was not perverted by the influence of party spirit. It was he, certainly, who had exposed us to these humiliations, but a criminal who defends his native land, becomes identical with the soil for which he fights!

Whilst the plenipotentiaries were preparing to set out for Châtillon, M. de Metternich took the precaution of sending M. de Floret in advance, under pretext of securing accommodation for the numerous diplomatists of the Congress, but in reality to give M. de Caulaincourt, who had just arrived at Châtillon, the frankest, and, we must say, the wisest advice, if adopting it had been compatible with Napoleon's glory. M. de Metternich had not yet replied to the request for an armistice that M. de Caulaincourt had been directed to make him. He explained himself now on this subject by saying, that if he had not spoken of it, it was because such a proposition had no chance of being favourably received; that he had preserved silence on the subject and would continue to do so, lest an unfair advantage might be drawn from the circumstance. The Allies, he said, wished for peace or nothing, they wished it quickly, and on the terms that were about to be proposed. France need not distrust the English; they were amongst the most moderate of the Allies, and to place confidence in them, especially in Lord Aberdeen, would be wise; she ought to seize, as on the wing, the present opportunity of negotiating, of which, if she did

not profit, it would never again return; that in case of refusal on the part of France, the Allies would adopt ideas of subversion, to which Austria, though with regret, could offer no resistance; that the Emperor Francis would be afflicted for the fate of his daughter, but should not be the less faithful to his Allies, to whom he was bound by the interests of the Austrian monarchy, and by great obligations contracted during the last war; he implored his son-in-law to think seriously of these things, and to consent to sacrifices, necessitated by circumstances. As for himself, as Emperor of Austria, he had been obliged to make many sacrifices; he had made them, but, at a later period, had been able to re-establish Austria in her proper position. It was then necessary to submit to necessity, in order to avoid greater and irreparable misfortunes.

M. de Floret was forbidden to take any steps relative to the conditions of peace, or to make the slightest revelation respecting them. But the advice he was commissioned to communicate was enough to indicate that peace was not to be offered on the Frankfort bases.

The political question having been settled, the military question remained to be solved. The Prince de Schwarzenberg, who held in the military world a position similar to that which M. de Metternich held in the political, found himself naturally at the head of those who wished to pause at Langres, either to see the effect of the negotiations, or to escape the dangers of a march on Paris. The allied armies would have to encounter Napoleon, who would be as much strengthened in approaching the focus of his resources as the Allies would be weakened in withdrawing from theirs; they should prepare for a decisive battle, and this, with a General such as he, with soldiers exasperated as his were, was always hazardous, and this battle, if they did not gain it, would deprive them in one day of the fruits of two years unhopèd-for success. To these considerations were added others, arising from the difficulty of obtaining subsistence. In fact, they were obliged to incline towards the Marne rather than towards the Seine, on account of the troops left to blockade the fortress, and in advancing they would find themselves in the midst of barren Champagne, where they would have wine and not bread, whilst they should abandon to Napoleon fertile Burgundy. This was an additional motive for awaiting the result of the negotiations, and the arrival of reinforcements, before involving themselves irretrievably. There were, besides, some hidden thoughts, peculiarly Austrian, to which Prince Schwarzenberg did not give utterance, but which influenced his conduct. He said within himself, that the entrance of the Allies into Paris, so much desired by Alexander, would be, undoubtedly, a triumph for this prince, but could not be one for the father-in-law of Napoleon; that besides, to disturb still more the balance of power in Europe by pushing the success of the coalition to its extreme term, would be to disturb that balance for the advantage of Russia, without procuring any profit to Austria.

These reasons, some of which were found in the sequel to be faulty, were nevertheless of great weight. But whilst these points were being discussed, the intelligence suddenly arrived that Blücher, though obliged to leave half his troops behind at Mayence and Metz, had taken up his position in advance of the great army of Schwarzenberg, and was going to encounter Napoleon with the small remaining portion of his forces. After such an event there was no longer time for deliberation, and it became indispensable to go at once to the assistance of the rash Prussian General. An ultimate line of proceeding could be afterwards determined on. In fact, on the 30th January, the morrow of the battle of Brienne, Prince Schwarzenberg put all his corps in motion on both banks of the Aube. Blücher had retired a little behind Rothière, on the woody heights of Trannes. Prince Schwarzenberg placed behind him the corps of General Giulay and of the Prince of Wurtemberg, who, whilst pursuing General Mortier, had paused at Bar-sur-Aube. He ordered his left, composed of all the Austrian reserves under Prince Colloredo, to advance on Vandœuvre, on the left bank of the Aube, in order to threaten the right flank of Napoleon, and hold Marshal Mortier in check. He placed his right, composed of Bavarians, at Eclance, a little beyond Trannes, and sent orders to Wittgenstein, who had already reached Saint-Dizier, to advance as quickly as possible to Soullaines. The d'York corps, that had been left before Metz, also received orders to repair to Saint-Dizier. Lastly, in the centre, where the prince of Wurtemberg and General Giulay had already come to the support of Blücher, he placed as a last reinforcement—the Russian and Prussian Guards.

This was an immense accumulation of forces, for Blücher, after the battle of Brienne, had kept full 28,000 men, reckoning those of Sacken, Olsouvieff, and Pahlen. General Giulay and the Prince of Schwarzenberg did not bring less than 25,000 men. Marshal de Wrede got credit for a like number, as did the Prince of Colloredo. The Russian and Prussian Guards were estimated at 30,000, Wittgenstein's corps at 18,000, and that of d'York 15,000 men. The whole comprised, consequently, 170,000 men, of whom 100,000 were concentrated round Rothière. Opposed to these troops was Napoleon, with one wing on the Aube, the other on the woody heights of Anjou, and the village of Rothière as sole defence for his centre. What troops had he in this position? Thirty thousand men if we may judge by the combat of the 29th of January, and perhaps 40,000 or 55,000 if Mortier, who was known to be at Troyes, could have joined him. Now or never was the moment to pounce upon him, before he could receive reinforcements, and overwhelm him with the 170,000 men who were already concentrated within the space of a few leagues, and of whom 100,000 were already assembled in the plain of Rothière. These decisive reasons put an end to the discussions of the preceding days, and it was resolved that a general engagement should take place. Besides, between Chaumont and Bar-sur-Aube there were no means of procuring provisions, so that it was

necessary to advance or retire. To retire did not suit anybody's views, so that a battle, the result of any forward movement, was inevitable. Calculating on the temerity of Napoleon, on his headlong impulses, the Allies thought it possible that he might take the initiative, and they were willing to allow him to do so, for they were placed on the wooded plains of Trannes and Eclance, and it would be their advantage to await him there.

The entire 31st of January was passed in this expectation. Napoleon having remained motionless, it was decided that the Allies should go to seek him in the plain of Rothière. There was a certain space to be crossed, the different corps were already pretty far removed from each other, the roads were clayey and difficult to traverse, though the weather was cold, and in consequence of these various reasons the battle could not commence at an early hour. Marshal Blücher, to prevent delay, doubled the number of horses to each piece of artillery; but this precaution obliged him to leave half his artillery behind. He employed the morning in passing from Trannes to Rothière. The plan of operation agreed on was as follows:—

Marshal Blücher was, with Sacken, Olsouvieff, Scherbatow, and Pahlen, to attack and take Rothière, which appeared to him easy, for there was no obstacle but a village, situate in the midst of a wide plain, rising in an almost insensible acclivity. During this time, General Giulay was to advance on Dienville, to carry the bridge of the Aube, that supported Napoleon's right wing, whilst the Prince of Wurtemberg, acting on the opposite side through the woods of Eclance, was to carry Giberie and Chaumeuil, small villages connected with the wood of Anjou, where Napoleon had placed his left wing. Lastly, Marshal de Wrede was to attack this left wing, formed by Marmont's troops. In order to accomplish this, he would be obliged to ford a muddy and wooded stream that runs at the foot of the village Morvilliers, and having crossed it, he should carry Morvilliers, and afterwards cross an unprotected and concave-shaped plain, bordered by the wood of Anjou. Behind the 70,000 men who were to be engaged in this manner, the Russian and Prussian Guards were to march as a reserve, which would increase the number of combattants to 100,000. Lastly, at the two extremities of this line of battle, Colloredo, who was at the left of the Aube, Wittgenstein and d'York, who were crossing the forest of Soulaines, were, by executing a double circular movement, to surround Napoleon with 70,000 men, distributed along the two wings. What chance that he could extricate himself, even if he had thirty, forty, or even fifty thousand soldiers under his command?

Such was the opinion the Allies formed of the situation of the French army. This situation was, at the least, quite as disadvantageous as they believed. It was not 50,000, it was not even 40,000 soldiers that Napoleon could oppose to the 170,000 that the Allies led against him; he had at the utmost 32,000 men. He

had besides, it is true, a well-selected position, the resources of his own genius, and the devotedness of his soldiers! We shall see what use he made of the means at his command.

From early morning he had remarked an extraordinary movement amongst Blücher's troops, and knowing that the Prince of Colloredo had appeared at the other side of the Aube, in the direction of Vandœuvre, he was inclined to quit the banks of this river and fall back on Troyes, with the intention of joining Mortier, and making head against the mass of the Allies that seemed to be taking this route; but about the middle of the day, he learned from some fugitives and from the manifest dispositions of the enemy, that he was about to be attacked in front, at Rothière. Once convinced of this fact, it would not have been consistent with his temperament, nor would it have been good tactics, to retire. He resolved to make head against the storm, and warmly receive the expected attack, and to retire afterwards, when he should have shown that he was neither discouraged nor conquered.

Napoleon, as we have said, had placed his right wing at Dienville on the Aube, where the Dufour division was posted under General Gérard, and the Ricard division, detached from Marmont's corps. His centre, formed of Victor's troops, was posted at Rothière, intersecting the high road, and extending as far as Giberie; his left was drawn up in front of the wood of Anjou, protected by the stream and village of Morvilliers. This last, composed of Marmont's corps, which at this moment was reduced to the Grange division, did not number more than 4,000 men. There were, certainly, several pieces of cannon, that Marshal Marmont disposed skilfully, so as to check the Bavarians, should they attack the stream and village of Morvilliers. Lastly, with two divisions of the Young Guard, with all the cavalry, and a numerous artillery, Napoleon held himself in reserve behind Rothière, a little towards the left, so as to aid either Marmont or Victor. It is certain, from the rolls called over that morning, that he had not more than 32,000 men under his command.

The firing did not commence until about two in the afternoon. Blücher, after having traversed with some difficulty, the space that separated him from our positions, advanced on Rothière in two strong columns, one composed of the troops of Sacken, the other of those of Olsouvieff and Scherbatow. A brisk cannonade commenced on both sides, but as we were well supplied with artillery, it was no advantage to the Russians that Blücher commanded on that day. The latter soon wished to operate more seriously, and directed masses of infantry to advance against the principal houses of Rothière. It was the Duhesme division of Victor's corps that occupied this village. Our young soldiers, well sheltered in the houses and gardens with barricades at all the outlets, replied by a determined fire to the attempts of Blücher's soldiers, and succeeded in arresting their progress. Marshal Victor, who appeared dejected on leaving Strasbourg, had recovered all the energy of youth, at

this important moment, and he was in the thickest of the fight giving an example to his soldiers, who nobly imitated him.

Whilst that at the centre Blucher was struggling with these difficulties, General Giulay having defiled behind him, in order to reach Dienville, encountered there our right wing, drawn up in front of this town, on the banks of the Aube. General Gérard had dispersed a part of his troops within the town, and the remainder in the plain in connection with Rothière, and under the protection of a great many pieces of artillery. General Giulay received at first, like Blucher, by a strong cannonade, was not more successful, and endeavoured, in vain, to enter the town himself. He lost a great number of soldiers in these vain attempts. To obtain a better chance of success by attacking Dienville on both sides of the Aube, he transported the Fresnel brigade to the left bank of this river, by the Unienville bridge situate a little higher up. This brigade, after having crossed the Aube and arrived before Dienville, found the bridge barricaded, and themselves exposed to a brisk musketry fire from a multitude of sharpshooters, that lay ambushed along the bank of the river. The brigade, under these circumstances, took up a position on the summit of a hillock opposite Dienville, and directed a brisk cannonade across the Aube. The Dufour division drawn up on the opposite bank, supported this discharge with extraordinary firmness, and replied by a not less destructive fire.

Thus, on our right as well as on our centre, the Allies had encountered a most obstinate resistance. On our left, the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg, after having cleared the wood of Eclance, had tried to carry the little hamlet of Giberie, that flanked Rothière, and establish a line of communication with the wood of Anjou, occupied by Marmont. There was here a detachment of Marshal Victor's, that overpowered by numbers, was obliged to abandon the hamlet. But Marshal Victor, putting himself at the head of one of his brigades, retook Giberie and repulsed the Wurtembergers to a considerable distance. Lastly, at the extremity of this battlefield, where the Allies' line was sweeping round our left flank, the Bavarians, after having debouched by the forest of Soulaïnes, and deployed along the brook of Morvilliers, were stopped by Marshal Marmont, who had chosen an admirable position for his artillery, of which he made a most formidable use.

Thus, after two hours of violent cannonade and fusillade, the enemy had not gained on any side an inch. But they could not brook to be held in check by an army that did not appear to number more than 40,000, whilst they had about 100,000 men, without reckoning the two extreme wings.

The allied troops tried to make a decisive effort about four in the afternoon. Blucher, behind whom the Russian and Prussian Guards were drawn up, marched sword-in-hand on Rothière, whilst at the pressing solicitation of the Prince of Wurtemberg, the Emperor Alexander sent a brigade of his Guards to second this

prince in the attack on Giberie. The conflict then became terrible. The Sacken columns entered Rothière and were driven back; they again forced their way in, having only to contend with the Duhesme division, which did not, at most, amount to more than 5,000 men. This division, led on by Marshal Victor in person, did not abandon the post until half their number was cut to pieces. During this time, in order to occupy the space between Rothière and Giberie, the cavalry of the Guard, followed by their artillery, threw themselves on the cavalry of Pahlen and Wassiltsikoff, and threw them back on the infantry of Scherbatow. But arrested by the Russian infantry, and charged in flank by a corps of dragoons, they lost in this affair, some of their cannon that they had not time to bring away. The Prince of Wurtemberg, supported by the Russian Guards, entered Giberie; and the Bavarians, on their side, ashamed of seeing their progress arrested by Marmont's few soldiers, at length crossed the stream that stood in their way, carried the village of Morvilliers, and debouched in the plain that lies at the foot of the wood of Anjou. This movement was made for the purpose of getting out of range of our artillery, which was doing great execution.

The moment was critical, and Napoleon, who had not ceased to direct every movement, himself exposed to a hail of projectiles, now resolved, though night was already closing in, not to leave his adversaries in possession of so many advantages. Feeling that it was only after intimidating the enemy that he could make a retreat either with honour or in safety, he ordered the two divisions of the Young Guards, his last resource, to advance rapidly on the enemy's two principal points. He ordered the Rothenbourg division, under Marshal Oudinot, to advance on Rothière, and overturn every obstacle in the way, whilst he took himself the command of the Meunier division, and advanced to the left, between Marmont, who had fallen back on the village of Chaumeuil, and Victor, who had lost Giberie. These young troops, led on by Napoleon and Oudinot, advanced with the resolution of despair. The Meunier division, stationed between Chaumeuil and Giberie, stopped short the progress of the Bavarians and the Wurtembergers. Oudinot, at the head of the Rothenbourg infantry, deployed his troops without flinching beneath a terrific fire, drove back the enemy's opposing masses, and even succeeded in taking possession of the village of Rothière. Night was already far advanced; the men fought desperately hand to hand in the village, and it was ten at night when the enemy could no longer molest our retreat, that the heroic Oudinot fell back from Rothière on Brienne. Our retrograde movement was executed in good order, covered by the divisions of the Young Guard and Milhaud's dragoons, who alternately charging and charged, kept their ground, but with loss of the artillery, which it was impossible to bring away. The quantity of artillery was too great in proportion to the infantry, to be protected, and therefore, after using the cannon we abandoned them, but saved the gunners

and horses. As to the rest, whilst the centre, composed of the Guard of the cavalry and the *débris* of Victor's troops, retired without molestation, the left, under Marmont, escaped fortunately through the wood of Anjou, and the right, under Gérard, that had behaved so gallantly at Dienville, fell back without check along the Aube, after having killed or wounded a considerable number of the enemy.

Thus finished this terrible day, where the resistance of 32,000 men against 170,000, of whom 100,000 were engaged, was, it may be said, a phenomenon in military warfare. This resistance was owing to the skill and energy of General Gérard, to the good use Marshal Marmont made of his artillery, to the heroic devotedness of the Marshals Oudinot and Victor, and above all, to Napoleon's indomitable tenacity of purpose. But for his iron will he would have been driven into the Aube. His mode of action naturally made the enemy pause, and so, for the moment, saved his fortune. We lost about 5,000 men killed or wounded, and put *hors de combat* 8,000 or 9,000 of the enemy, thanks to the advantage of our position and the extensive use of our artillery. This difference, though a satisfaction in one sense, was no great military success, for the smallest losses were much more seriously felt by us than very large ones would be by the coalition. We sacrificed fifty pieces of artillery, but saved our artillerymen and horses, which proves that we abandoned these cannon, and that they were not captured by the enemy. Napoleon fought this battle with such disproportionate numbers only to cover his retreat; during the night he crossed the bridge of Lesmont without confusion, and reached Troyes in good order. As the entire night would be occupied in defiling, and as he might be attacked by the enemy at the break of day, he left Marmont's corps, which was only composed of the Lagrange division on the right of the Aube and on the heights of Perthes, so as to make Blücher believe that the entire French army was there ready to renew the combat. This corps did not run any serious risk, for it was protected by the narrow but deep Voire, and held all the bridges, behind which the men were sure to find refuge, should they be too briskly attacked.

In fact, the next day, the enemy, fatigued with the combat of the previous evening, and not waking very early, advanced on one side towards the bridge of Lesmont, and on the other towards the heights of Perthes, and paused in a kind of doubt on seeing Marmont's corps drawn up in battle array. Whilst the enemy were inquiring of one another where the French army was, we had defiled quite close to them by the bridge of Lesmont, and Marmont himself, after having played his part in keeping up the illusion, withdrew, by passing the Voire at Rosnay.

However, Marmont was pursued along the Aube by Marshal de Wrede. After having occupied the heights of Perthes for a considerable time, and in a threatening attitude, he had crossed the bridge of Rosnay before the eyes of the Bavarians, and then has-

tened to destroy it. But closely pressed, he had only been able to tear off the *tablier*, and had left the piles standing, whose tops rose some feet above the water. Whilst he was drawing up his few remaining troops in order of battle on the other side of the Voire, he perceived some detachments of the enemy attempting a passage below Rosnay. He first sent some cavalry to oppose them, but finding these not sufficient, and that from two to three thousand men had already crossed the river, he hastened to the spot with a few hundred men, for if this passage were not effectually opposed, his corps might be cut off from the Aube, and Napoleon, then thrown back into the midst of Wittgenstein and d'York's troops, which means, in other words, he would be surrounded and taken. Marmont immediately rushed sword in hand on the detachment that had crossed the Voire by the aid of some piles and planks, attacked them briskly, and forced them back into the river. At this sight, the cavalry made a desperate charge, and in the twinkling of an eye, cut down or made prisoners a thousand men. This exploit having been accomplished below Rosnay, Marmont was recalled to Rosnay itself by a like attempt. Foreseeing that a passage might be attempted at this half-destroyed bridge, he left a very intelligent captain of artillery in ambush there, with his company. This captain had allowed a certain number of the enemy to pass one by one over the dismantled piles of the bridge, and had then shot them when within musket range. Marmont's arrival finished them. Thus a body of about 3,000 French had, during an entire day, stopped the progress of 25,000 Bavarians, and had killed or captured more than 2,000 men. This double battle was a real advantage, for by exciting to the highest degree the confidence of our soldiers in themselves, and by rendering the Allies infinitely more circumspect, it contributed to retard their movements, which permitted us to accelerate ours, the only resource that remained in the reduced state of our forces.

Napoleon having crossed the Aube without accident, passed the 2nd of February at Piney, and the next day, the 3rd, fixed himself at Troyes. This last battle, so energetically sustained against forces so superior in number, though a great military achievement, exposed us to great danger. The Allies had assembled all their forces between Bar-sur-Aube and Troyes, and if they persevered in marching, thus combined, on Paris, it was doubtful whether the French, even in resisting to the last man, could arrest their progress. After the battle of the 29th of January, and the combat of the 1st of February, the utmost amount of troops that remained to Napoleon, was from 25,000 to 26,000. Mortier, whom he had just joined at Troyes, had perhaps 15,000 men, General Hamelinaye, 4,000, which raised the entire number of our disposable forces to 45,000 men. Prince Schwarzenberg, with Wittgenstein and Blucher, commanded full 160,000 men, deducting the losses of the two last battles; and this was not all, for Blucher was about to be reinforced, not only by d'York, who was coming from Metz, but by Langeron, who was ready to

come from Mayence, and Kleist, who was withdrawing from the blockade of Erfurt, all three of whom were to be replaced by troops hastily raised in Germany. It was impossible for the French to say to what number the allied armies might amount within a few days. It was possible that they might find themselves, with 40,000 or 50,000 men opposed to 200,000, and then what defence could they make? The soldiers still reposed an unshaken confidence in Napoleon, though some amongst the younger deserted; but the commanding officers, who on the field of battle gave an example of the utmost devotedness, and who had sufficient experience to perceive the danger of an almost desperate situation, but not sufficient genius to discern the real extent of our resources, abandoned themselves, when no longer under fire, to utter dejection. They were plunged in profound sadness, which they made no effort to conceal. This dejection spread gradually to the inferior ranks, and winter, with its sufferings and its privations, was not calculated to dispel the gloom. In Franche-Comté, in Alsace, in Lorraine, the inhabitants had displayed excellent dispositions, and a true spirit of fraternity with regard to the army. At Troyes and its environs, where the disposition of the people was less friendly, where the burdens of war were already severely felt, and where the people were strongly irritated against the government, the reception given to the army was not very cordial, and vexatious conflicts between the soldiers and the peasants added still darker shades to the gloomy picture.

Napoleon, though deeply affected, was not, however, utterly cast down. He still discovered resources, where nobody suspected any, endeavoured to make others perceive them, and displayed, not serenity or gaiety, which would have been an unbecoming affectation under such circumstances, but a tenacity of purpose, and an indomitable firmness, quite sufficient to plunge into despair those who might have wished to see him more disposed to submit to the pressure of events. Neither disturbed nor disconcerted, above all not exhibiting the slightest weakness, supporting bodily fatigue and trouble of mind with a firmness superior to his physical strength, ever in the thickest of the fight, with steady eye and clear-toned voice, he bore the penalty of his faults with a degree of resoluteness that might have effaced them, could great qualities be a sufficient excuse for the ills they have often caused mankind.

Still, the confidence that Napoleon displayed, though in part simulated, was not without foundation. If he had only 45,000 men, including those he brought back from Brienne, and Mortier's Old Guard and Hamelinaye's small division, he expected 15,000 old soldiers who were coming *en poste* from Spain, and who had already arrived at Orleans. This reinforcement would increase his army physically to 60,000 men, and morally to still more. The brave Pajol, who, with 1,200 horse and 5,000 or 6,000 National Guards defended the bridges of the Seine and the Yonne that he had barricaded, as for example, Nogent-sur-Seine, Bray, Menteau, Sens, Joigny, Auxerre, expected 4,000 of the Bordeaux

reserve. There would be within a few days at Paris two divisions of the Young Guard completely fit for service. There were besides twenty-four regimental depôts that had been transported to Paris, and which would furnish by the help of conscripts, twenty-four battalions of from 500 to 600 men each, which would afford, reckoning the two divisions of the Young Guard, four divisions of infantry of more than 20,000 men. Here were besides, accoutrements for some thousand horsemen at Versailles, and wherewith to mount eighty cannon at Vincennes. Here were 30,000 additional soldiers that would, within eight or ten days, raise the total of Napoleon's forces to 90,000 men. Lastly, at Montereau, at Meaux, at Soissons, brave fellows thronged to be drafted into the skeleton regiments of the National Guards, where they could utilise their patriotism. All was not lost if we could only preserve our *sang-froid* a few days longer. Unfortunately there was a deficiency of two things at Paris, not of men, we repeat the assertion, but of money and muskets. As to money, when M. Mollien, quite at bay, did not know where to find 100,000 francs, an order on the treasurer of the civil list realized the sum at the Tuileries. It was not so easy to procure arms. There were, as we have said, 6,000 new muskets besides 30,000 old that wanted repairs. The workmen laboured to render the latter fit for service, but the daily repairs scarcely supplied the daily demand, and the reserve of arms fit for service diminished visibly. Clothes were made tolerably fast; horses began to arrive. Napoleon was writing incessantly to Joseph and to Clarke, endeavouring to stimulate the idleness of the one and the incapacity of the other; he traced for them from point to point what they were to do; sent every day intelligence of his personal affairs to the Empress and Prince Cambacérès; begged them to keep up their spirits and preserve their tranquillity of mind, assured them that nothing had yet been lost, that the enemy had not gained any decisive advantage, and that by constancy and energy all would be saved.

Whilst he was endeavouring to prepare his resources and inspire confidence in them, there remained one happy and fast-approaching chance, which was in reality his sustaining mental force, and of whose realization he had a presentiment. At the actual moment he was threatened with a great and fatal battle, fought beneath the walls of Paris against forces that quadrupled his. This was the sad probability, if the enemy persisted in advancing *en masse*. But might not the enemy's forces divide? Amongst the different routes of the Yonne, the Seine, the Aube, the Marne, might they not be tempted to divide, to extend themselves, either to seek provisions, or to keep up a communication with the troops in the north and east, or, in short, from a thousand different motives? Would not Blücher, who had forces on the Marne and further off, for he left General Priest on the frontiers of Belgium, would he not go to meet them? Schwarzenberg, who had forces on the Geneva route and even as far as Lyon, would he not extend an arm to Dijon?

To these chances might there not be added moral causes of separation; such as jealousies, dislikes, the desire of acting independently of each other? For example, would not Blucher advance along the Marne, leaving Schwarzenberg on the Seine, in order to be more free to follow his own plans? Napoleon suspected strongly these possibilities, and on the second day of his retreat from Troyes his suspicions became almost certainty.* If things were really so, his plans were fixed; he would leave a corps in front of Schwarzenberg, then making a covert and rapid movement, he would pursue and overwhelm Blucher, after which he would return and attack Schwarzenberg. But he did not speak of this project lest his secret might be divulged and come to the ears of the enemy, through an indiscretion on the part of the staff. The presence of a compact mass, four times superior in number to the French army, was a cloud that dimmed every eye and terrified every heart. The French saw themselves obliged to fight a pitched battle beneath the walls of Paris, with forces so disproportioned that victory would be impossible; they wished at any price to dispel this danger, and to dissipate it by establishing peace on any terms. Having arrived on the 3rd of February at Troyes, Napoleon was, in fact, assailed by the remonstrances of M. de Berthier, who had always been prudent, and by M. de Bassano, who had become so since our late misfortunes. That we ought to make a treaty on any terms at Châtillon was their fixed opinion, expressed in the most urgent manner.

And we could certainly make a treaty, for the plenipotentiaries of the different allied powers had just arrived at Châtillon, all willing to subscribe to peace, but on the double bases of the frontiers of 1790, and of our exclusion from all future European arrangements. Received with frigid politeness, M. de Caulaincourt had easily divined that severe propositions were prepared for him, very different to the Frankfort bases. M. de Floret, secretary to the Austrian Legation, commissioned to give in secret friendly advice to the French negotiator, without explaining himself categorically, had said:—"Make a treaty on any terms, for this opportunity is like that of Prague, like that of Frankfort; once neglected, it will never return."

M. de Caulaincourt, alarmed at this advice, and wishing to know what were the sacrifices about to be demanded from France, had not been able to obtain any explanation from M. de Floret, but he ascertained very clearly that the Emperor would be obliged to submit to much greater sacrifices than those demanded at Frankfort, if he wished to save Paris, and with Paris, the Imperial throne. He had therefore written to Napoleon, to beg additional powers to negotiate, for the instructions that enjoined him to demand not only the Scheldt, but the Wahal; not only the Alps, but a part of Italy; not only a legitimate influence over the fate of the provinces given up, but the possession of a portion of them for Napoleon's bro-

* Napoleon made some obscure but positive observations on this subject to the War Minister.

thers; these instructions presented a terrible contradiction to the actual state of things. M. de Caulaincourt had asked for additional powers without saying to what extent; he had made the request on his knees, not like a man who stoops to power to save his fortune and his life, but like a worthy citizen who submits to humiliation for the love of his country. Distrusting M. de Bassano, whom he did not like, and by whom he was not liked, whom he erroneously looked on as the cause of Napoleon's obstinacy, he had written to Berthier, to pray him, in the first instance, to send him exact information as to the situation of military affairs; and in the next place, to beg him—the noble and faithful companion of the Emperor's dangers—to use all his influence to induce him to yield to the pressure of circumstances.

Thus Napoleon had to endure, not only the letter of M. de Caulaincourt, but the most earnest entreaties of Berthier, and of M. de Bassano himself, who now was far from urging his master to resistance. Fresh intelligence arriving on every side, quickened still more the zeal of those who surrounded Napoleon. In fact, the Austrian corps seemed to have extended along our right beyond the Yonne. From four to five thousand Cossacks had advanced beyond Sens, and were threatening Fontainebleau. On our left towards the Marne, the aspect of things was not less threatening. Marshal Macdonald, who had received orders to fall back on Châlons, and take up a position there, had been driven out by the enemy and forced to retreat to Chateau-Thierry. It was even said that he was thrown back on Meaux. The 11th and 5th infantry corps, the 2nd and 3rd cavalry that he brought with him, and that Napoleon estimated at 12,000 men at least, were reduced to 6,000 or 7,000. Bands of fugitives, after having quitted the army, had wandered between Meaux and Paris, spreading everywhere bad news. The Parisians fancied they saw the enemy pouring down on them by three routes, that of Auxerre, that of Troyes, that of Châlons, and only on one of these three did they discern a force capable of protecting them—that which Napoleon commanded in person, and which had, so report went, the advantage in the combat of the 29th of January, but the disadvantage in that of the 1st of February. Movements in Vendée were spoken of, and this country, lately so tranquil and grateful to Napoleon, appeared ready to revolt. In short, to add to the general dismay, it was announced that Murat, even he, the brother-in-law of the Emperor, to whom he owed his throne, had just then burst every bond of political alliance, of love of country, and of family ties, by making a hostile movement in the rear of Prince Eugene. This influx of bad news had completely uprooted public tranquillity. The Empress, dreadfully alarmed, was incessantly sending either for Joseph or the Chancellor, to confide to them her vexations, for at sight of the approaching danger, she was dying of fear for her husband, her son, and herself. There was a report current in Paris that the court was about to retire to the Loire, and every day an anxious

crowd assembled round the Tuilleries to make sure that the carriages in which the Empress and the King of Rome every day took a drive in the wood of Bologna, were not travelling carriages intended to set out for Tours.*

These circumstances irritated Napoleon without shaking his resolution. Where everybody saw subjects of fear he rather perceived causes of hope. He suspected, indeed, that an Austrian corps was advancing towards him, and he was thinking of throwing himself on these troops and overwhelming them. The danger of Macdonald, the manner in which he was pursued, induced him to believe that the main army of the Allies had divided, and thrown one wing on the Marne. It was what he had all along wished for and hoped. On this account he had sent Marmont forward to Arcis-sur-Aube, and had enjoined him to reconnoitre even as far as Sézanne and Fère-Champenoise, that so he may become acquainted with all the enemy's movements, and be ready to take advantage of the first error.

But the Emperor felt called on to reply to the entreaties of M. de Berthier, of M. de Bassano, and of M. de Caulaincourt, and, above all, he felt the necessity of allaying the alarm that prevailed at Paris. "Further powers to treat," he said, "what did they mean by these expressions? Did they mean sacrifices in Holland, in Germany, in Italy, he was ready to make them. The Wahal! He was ready to abandon it, and fall back on the Meuse and Scheldt, provided that he might keep Antwerp. He would sacrifice Cassel and Kehl, though these points were the real suburbs of Mayence and Strasbourg. He would even dismantle Mayence to tranquillise Germany; but on condition of keeping the Rhine. In Italy he would give up everything, even Genoa, provided he might conserve the Alps, and, if possible, something for the faithful Prince Eugene. But to consent to retain less than France, the veritable France, whose limits had been fixed by the Revolution of 1789, would be hopelessly to dishonour himself. But the Allies, he said, did not in reality wish to treat with him; they wished to destroy him, his dynasty, and, above all, the results of the French Revolution. In fact, the proposal to treat was only a lure. If there were any sincerity in the late proposals to negotiate, it was probably because the Allies were concocting conditions so humiliating that he would be dishonoured by accepting them, and this dishonour would serve as a counterpoise in public opinion to the influence of his character, and the force of his genius. But it was impossible for him to con-

* According to my established habit of never making imaginary descriptions, I wish to mention that I have borrowed these particulars, not alone from the correspondence of King Joseph, part of which has been published, but also from those of Prince Cambacères, of the Duke of Rovigo, and the Duke of Fe'tre, which are unpublished, and remarkable for minuteness of detail. The circumstances recorded in my pages, are painted in warmer colours in the letters from which I have drawn the facts. I rather soften than heighten the account, knowing that we must always make allowance for the exaggeration of the time in which the events occurred, though this very exaggeration is a distinctive mark of the epoch, and which must be preserved by the historian, in some degree.

sent to such things. To descend from the throne, to meet death itself, would be for him, who was only a soldier, a trifle contrasted with dishonour. The Bourbons might accept the France of 1790; they had never known any other, and it was that which they had the glory of creating. But he, who had received from the Republic, France, with the Rhine and the Alps, what could he reply to the republicans of the Directory, if they flung back on him the fulminating apostrophe he had addressed to them on the 18th Brumaire! Nothing: he should stand confounded. He was asked to do what was impossible, for he was asked to consent to his own dishonour."

Shall we dare avow it, we who during this long recital have not ceased to blame Napoleon's policy, we who condemned as useless, irrational, and even fatal, every project of ambition that extended beyond the Rhine and the Alps? It seems to us that on this occasion Napoleon's view of matters was more correct than that of his advisers; but as it always happens, when a man has been long acting erroneously, he was neither listened to nor believed when he was in the right. His diplomatic agents, disillusioned too late, his generals, worn out from fatigue, conured him to remain Emperor of no-matter-what empire, because whilst he remained Emperor they would retain the position they then held. France might be circumscribed in her limits, but she would still be great, because she would still be France, and they would lose nothing of their individual greatness. In their eyes the Rhine, the Alps, constituted perhaps the grandeur of Napoleon and of France, but in no way touched their personal importance. Sad process of reasoning, which fatigue rendered excusable in worn-out soldiers, and fear made pardonable in justly-alarmed diplomatists. Undoubtedly the conquests that Napoleon had made from the Rhine to the Vistula, from the Alps to the Straits of Messina, from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar, were not worth the blood they had cost, and, indeed, would not have been worth the life of one man. But, on the other hand, Frenchmen might have been legitimately called upon to shed the last drop of their blood to defend the natural frontiers of France, Napoleon might have been lawfully required to risk his throne and his life for the same object, and, in our opinion, after so many errors, after so many follies, so many extravagances of every kind, he alone was right when he said that his honour was demanded when he was asked to yield an inch of the natural frontiers of France, those frontiers conquered by the Republic, and which had been transmitted to him as a deposit. But the one party, through affection, the others through exhaustion, all influenced by the desire of self-conservation, said to him—"Sire, save your throne, and in saving that you will save everything."

The entreaties addressed to the Emperor were becoming more candid and more frequent. In short, the alarm increased from hour to hour. Napoleon not wishing to individualize the sacrifices he was willing to make, and counting on the pride of M. de Cau-

laincourt, and on his patriotism, sent him a *carte blanche*. This was the term used. He had well-founded hopes, from his knowledge of M. de Caulaincourt's character, that the latter would not see, in the *carte blanche*, authority to consent to great sacrifices, but if, however, great sacrifices were needed to snatch Paris from the hands of the enemy, he was free to act and might save the capital. Strange deception—practised with regard to himself, with regard to M. de Caulaincourt, with regard to his honour, as he understood it, for in the actual state of things, he either yielded nothing or he abandoned the natural frontiers; strange deception, and we must add, sole weakness of this great man, which was wrung from him by the importunities of his lieutenants and his ministers, and which, however, as we shall soon see, was but of short duration.

Having forwarded these additional powers to M. de Caulaincourt, the Emperor gave some orders suited to the extreme circumstances in which he was placed. The obstinate silence he had observed towards Murat had at length determined the latter to enter into negotiations with Austria. It was a defection as blameable as that of Bernadotte, but induced by less vicious motives. Inconstancy of character; the insatiable desire to reign; fear; an intense jealousy of Prince Eugene, had at first disturbed and at last corrupted the heart of Murat. His wife, it must be said, was much more guilty than he, for, bound to Napoleon by the closest bonds of duty, she had, when in converse with the French minister, affected the greatest grief and a total loss of influence with her husband, and was at the same time carrying on negotiations with the Allies through the intervention of M. de Metternich.* The conditions of Murat's treason were as follows: Murat was to keep Naples and give up Sicily, for which he would be indemnified by an Italian province. He promised in return to march with 30,000 men against Prince Eugene. He had kept his word, he had advanced towards Rome, had sent forward a division against Florence, another against Boulogne, without saying precisely what he was about to do, for he still retained sufficient good feeling to blush for his conduct, and he had sufficient craft to hide from the French officers, whose services he greatly needed, that he was going to employ them against France. He had asked General Miollis to give him up the castle of Saint-Ange, and had requested the Princess Eliza to let him take possession of the citadel of Leghorn, pretending that the occupation of these places was necessary to carrying out the Emperor's designs. General Miollis and the Princess Eliza had refused.

This intelligence, as may be easily conceived, had irritated Napoleon exceedingly, but he had dissembled his feelings through consideration for the numbers of French living in Italy. He had ordered the Duke of Otranto to visit Murat's head quarters again, and agree to the surrender of the fortified posts that the King of

* This sad fact, in the midst of so many others, can no longer be doubted, since the publication of Lord Castlereagh's papers. It is there quite evident that the queen was the principal agent in the negotiations.

Naples demanded ; but he had sworn in his heart to be revenged for this black ingratitude, and he, on the spot, devised a means of embarrassing Murat in a most serious manner. Murat, in his treaty with Austria, had under the vague term of a province in the Peninsula, hoped to get possession of all central Italy. To send back the Pope to Rome at this moment would be to put an almost insurmountable obstacle in the way of Murat's ambition. Napoleon had, as we have already seen, sent Pius VII. to Savona, and the Pontiff had been along the way received by the people with the warmest expressions of respect and affection. Napoleon ordered that the Pope should be conducted to the outposts, with the respect with which he had always been treated, announcing to him that he was free to return to Rome. Thus finished this other drama, so similar to that of Spain, by the sending back of the Prince whose states the Emperor had designed to seize in taking possession of his person, and whom he was only too happy to set at liberty now, in the hope of drawing some advantage from a recantation, dictated by the embarrassment of his own circumstances.

But what was more important than either Murat or the Pope, was to profit of the opportunity of abandoning Italy to herself, another tardy retraction, but very useful if it had been made in time. As long as Murat continued inactive, Prince Eugene could, by defending himself on the Adige, keep his position in Lombardy, spite of some attacks made by the English on his right and his rear ; but should Murat take him in the rear, on the right bank of the Po, he would have no further means of resistance, therefore Napoleon ordered him to fall back as speedily as possible on Turin, Suza, Grenoble, and Lyon, to come to the assistance of France, whose preservation was far more important than that of Italy.

Thus occupied in undoing what he had done, Napoleon gave his last orders with regard to Ferdinand VII., who was burning with impatience to recover his liberty. Intelligence had at length been received from the Duke of San Carlos. He had *en route* met the Spanish regency, that, after long hesitations, had quitted Cadiz and determined to come to Madrid and hold their sittings in the city, where, during three centuries, the Government of Spain had resided. The Duke of San Carlos had seen at Aranjuez the members of the regency and the principal personages of the Cortes. Their reply had been given without either doubt or hesitation. At first, none of them wished to separate from the English, with whom they hoped soon to invade the south of France ; neither were they anxious to bring back Ferdinand VII., and restore him authority which they had conserved for him, and of which, it was very easy to foresee, he would soon make a bad use. Influenced by these combined motives, they refused to subscribe to a treaty made by a captive, and with many protestations of regret, obedience, and devotedness, they declared they could not consider themselves bound to recognize the signature of the King until he stood on Spanish soil, in the full enjoyment of his liberty. They cited, in justifica-

tion of their conduct, a very plausible reason, which was an article of the Constitution of Cadiz, which said expressly that any stipulation signed by the King in a state of captivity should be deemed void. The Duke of San Carlos had been sent back to Valençay with this article of the Constitution, upon which, the unfortunate Ferdinand seemed plunged into despair.

There was no longer time for hesitation; it was better run the risk of being deceived, but take, at the same time, the chance of finding Ferdinand VII. faithful to his word, than to detain him prisoner; a fact which was the radical cause of the war with the Spaniards, and obliged us to leave on the Adour, troops of which we had the most urgent need on the Marne and the Seine. Consequently, Napoleon commanded the liberation of Ferdinand VII. and the other Spanish princes detained at Valençay; he ordered that they should immediately join Marshal Suchet, requiring that they should pledge their word of honour for the faithful execution of the Valençay treaty. Napoleon was thus making an effort to recover the troops that garrisoned Sagonta, Mequinenza, Lerida, Tortosa, and Barcelona, who would immediately recross the Pyrenees. If Marshal Soult, who was detained at Bayonne by the presence of the English, could not be brought up to Paris, Marshal Suchet, who was not placed in similar circumstances, and who was opposed by an army infinitely less formidable, might be brought back to Lyon. Napoleon reiterated his orders, to send thither all the troops that were not indispensably necessary at Rousillon, and to prepare to follow himself with the rest of his army. Should Marshal Suchet arrive at Lyon with 20,000 men, and join Eugene with 30,000, the fate of the war would be evidently changed, for the Allies would not remain between Troyes and Paris when 50,000 old soldiers were advancing from Lyon to Besançon.

These orders being expedited during the days of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th of February, days that Napoleon employed in observing the movements of the enemy, he also gave some others relative to the defence of Paris. The feeling of alarm went on increasing in this capital at every retrograde step made by Marshal Macdonald on the Marne, for the fugitives from the army and the surrounding country spread terror as they fled. Joseph had asked for instructions touching the Empress, the King of Rome, and the Princesses of the Imperial family; he asked whether in case of danger he should keep them in Paris. There was certainly no question of evacuating Paris; Napoleon had, on the contrary, given orders that it should be defended to the last extremity, but, if the enemy appeared, should one of the Princes remain with extraordinary powers and orders to resist to the last, and send beyond the Loire the Imperial family, the Empress, the King of Rome, the ministers, and chief dignitaries? This question was openly discussed in the streets of the capital, and proved how strongly the public mind was agitated. Louis, ex-King of Holland, who had returned to

France since the misfortunes of his brother, proposed, that should the court and members of the government leave, he would close the gates and make a determined defence, which he was very capable of doing. Many sensible people thought it would be better not to send away the Empress and the King of Rome, for their departure would be looked on as an abandonment of the capital, which would offend and alarm the Parisians, and would seem to prepare a void that would quickly be filled by the Bourbons. M. de Talleyrand, who clearly saw the reign of these Princes approaching, and had received many secret assurances of their kindly feeling towards himself, and though he neither liked them nor felt any confidence in their abilities, still he was revolving in his mind the means of recovering under their dynasty the influence he had lost with Napoleon; but as he did not wish to compromise himself too soon or irrevocable with the latter, he seconded Joseph and the Empress with great apparent zeal, giving them what he believed to be the best advice. In his opinion, to send away the Empress from Paris would be most imprudently to give up the place to the Bourbons, who would have in their favour the *prestige* of twenty-four years of misfortune, and the still greater *prestige* of the peace they would be instrumental in procuring France. Joseph, not wishing to take anything on himself in such a matter, had earnestly begged Napoleon to express his wishes positively on the subject. As to the Empress, she had neither opinion nor will, and in concert with Cambacérès, who, as we have seen, was become very pious, she ordered prayers to be said, which in the Catholic Liturgy are called the forty hours.

Napoleon, whom all the adversities of the war had not been able to shake, exhibited strong marks of impatience on receiving the courier from Paris, who brought him several times a day sad accounts of the uneasiness manifested by the members of his government. "You are afraid," he said to those to whom he had entrusted the administration, "and you infect those about you with the same fears. The position of affairs is serious, *but the danger does not lie where you think*. You do well to pray, but you pray like terrified people, and if I followed your example, my soldiers would believe themselves lost. Throw up round Paris the works I have ordered; arm and clothe my conscripts, make them practice target shooting, send them to me as fast as they shall have acquired the primary notions of a soldier's duties, seize the fugitives and draft them into the regiments, collect provisions and arms, keep yourselves cool, and do not change your opinion with every new idea thrown off in the heat of public excitement, keep my directions always before your eyes, obey them, and *leave the rest to me*. I know that some Cossacks have appeared near Sens, that Macdonald has allowed himself to be driven back on the Marne, but keep yourselves quiet, the enemy shall pay dearly for their mad temerity. Once more I say, keep yourselves quiet; do not listen to every one that offers advice, do not talk with the first comer, exert yourselves, keep your mind to yourself, and *leave the rest to me*."

Such were the wise and energetic counsels that Napoleon addressed to Cambacérès, to the war minister, and to his brother Joseph. As to the Empress, he only gave her an account of his health, some succinct and tranquillizing details touching the army, all expressed in an affectionate and firm tone; but his resolution was taken as to what he should do with her and the King of Rome if the enemy appeared before Paris. He wished that the capital should be defended, for he knew very well that were it left open to the enemy, a government would be immediately established there, over which he would have no control; but though determined to dispute energetically the possession of the capital with the enemy, he had no intention of leaving his wife and son there. By keeping them in his possession he believed that he kept a bond with Austria that human respect would preserve intact. If, on the contrary, these precious pledges escaped from his hands, he said within himself that the Allies would not fail to seize upon Maria Louisa, and take advantage of her weakness to compose a regency that would exclude him from the throne, or the Austrians might bring her and the King of Rome to Vienna, and lavish every care on them, as people do to a virtuous girl who has had the misfortune to make a bad marriage. They would treat him as an adventurer who was not worthy of the wife they had given him, and he would perhaps be banished to some distant prison; and his son would be brought up at Vienna as an Austrian prince.

This prospective, as it rose before his mental vision, shook him to the very depths of his soul, and made him forget another, not less alarming prospect, that of Paris left vacant before the Bourbons, who were approaching. He was undoubtedly right, for it was true that his son and his wife would be taken from him, that his son would be educated as a foreign prince, and that his wife would be given to another husband; but it was not the less true that were Paris deserted, his enemies would take advantage of the circumstance to establish the Bourbons there. It was not such or such an evil that was to be apprehended; it was a conjunction of every species of evil, which in punishment of his faults, was by the decree of Providence about to descend on his devoted head.

His mind ever occupied with the danger of allowing his wife and son to fall into the hands of the Austrians, Napoleon ordered Joseph, in a letter dated the 8th February, to carry out his intentions as he had expressed them at parting, to leave Louis at Paris with extended authority, to remain there himself if necessary, to defend the capital to the last extremity; but to send up the Loire, the Empress and the King of Rome, with the princesses, the ministers, the grand dignitaries, the treasure of the crown, and not to give credence to secret enemies, such as M. de Talleyrand, with whom he had temporized too long. In short to follow his instructions, and not any others. "The fate of Astyanax," he added, "prisoner to the Greeks, has always appeared to me the most unhappy of all human destinies. I would rather see my son's throat cut, and his body flung into the Seine, than to see him in the hands of the Austrians to be led to Vienna."

Napoleon afterwards pointed out in what manner Paris was to be defended. As no defence in masonry had been erected, for fear of alarming the inhabitants, he contented himself with ordering palisades and artillery to be got ready. Now that the alarm was at the height, and that there was nothing left to conceal, he ordered the enclosure called "l'octroi" to be strengthened with palisades, and, together with the palisades, he ordered *tambours* to be constructed before the gates, and redoubts to be erected on the sites already indicated; these were to be protected by artillery, and behind these improvisatrised works, the National Guards were to be placed, armed with fowling pieces, should there be a deficiency of muskets. What confidence would he not have felt, what liberty of action would he not have acquired, had he those magnificent walls, which, thanks to a patriot king, now enclose the capital of France.

Napoleon had sojourned from the 3rd to the 8th February, first at Troyes, then at Nogent, foreseeing the commission of a fault by the enemy, from which he expected his safety. He soon thought he saw the first symptoms of what he expected. In fact, the morrow of the battle of Rothière, the Allies had held at Brienne a grand council, to consider what advantage they could draw from Napoleon's position, which seemed to them desperate. It was not to a force of 30,000 men, they had supposed him reduced after the battle of Rothière, but from 40,000 to 50,000, amounting with those of Mortier to perhaps 70,000, and with these numbers, so far above the reality, they thought him lost, provided, as they said, they did not commit any gross faults. After many discussions, the following plan of operations was resolved on.

Whatever might be the numerical superiority the Allies possessed over Napoleon, they always feared to encounter him face to face, and risk the fate of the war on a decisive battle. They wished to manœuvre and force him back on Paris, bringing up successively, all the allied armies to overwhelm him beneath a crushing mass of enemies, as they had done at Leipzig. There were on the right of the Allies, forces left to blockade the fortresses. There were, as we have said, the d'York corps left before Metz, the Langeron before Mayence, that of Kleist before Erfurt. These corps replaced by others, and ready to advance to the Marne, comprised that of d'York, which numbered 18,000 men; that of Langeron, 8,000, (only the half of this corps was disposable); that of Kleist, 10,000, that is to say, about 36,000 men, without reckoning Saint Priest's corps, and divers detachments of Bernadotte's, which were all at this moment falling back towards Belgium. It was not possible to leave the corps of d'York, Langeron, and Kleist isolated on the Marne, within range of Napoleon, instead of directing their services to the common object. It was agreed that Blucher should join these with more than 20,000 men still under his command, which would raise to about 60,000 the ancient army of Silesia, and give it an independent position. Blucher was to manœuvre at the head of this army on the Marne, and driving back Macdonald on Châlons,

Meaux, and Paris, he would find himself in the rear of Napoleon, who would be consequently obliged to fall back. Then Prince Schwarzenberg, who would have at least 130,000 men after the departure of Blücher, should follow Napoleon step by step in his retreat. If Napoleon turned on Prince Schwarzenberg, Blücher would take advantage of the movement, to make a fresh step forward, and thus advancing, the one along the Seine, the other along the Marne, they would finish as these rivers did, by meeting at Paris, where they would overwhelm Napoleon under the mass of the European armies assembled round the capital of France. In the meanwhile, they were so strong, even apart, that if Napoleon wished to fall on one of the two allied armies, either was sufficiently strong to make head against him. Blücher with 60,000 men thought he had nothing to fear. Prince Schwarzenberg, much less presumptuous, thought he could resist him with 130,000 men. Besides, at the distance they then were from Paris, the Seine and the Marne were sufficiently close to allow them to help one another, particularly as they had a large number of cavalry. It was agreed, in fact, that Prince Wittgenstein should take up a position on the Aube, where he would form a line of connection by means of the 6,000 Cossacks of General Sesliavin, on one side with Blücher, who was to march along the Marne, and on the other with Prince Schwarzenberg, who was to march along the Seine. With such precautions, they did not apprehend any misfortune, nor especially any of the accidents which might be expected when they had to do with the inventive genius of Napoleon. The Allies were perfectly contented with the apparent advantages of their position, and Blücher, who saw in the adopted combination his own independence, with the chance of arriving first at Paris, willingly consented to the arrangement, as did Schwarzenberg, who expected to gain thereby a deliverance from the most troublesome and the most imperious of his collaborators.

In consequence of these arrangements Blücher advanced on the 3rd from Rosnay to Saint-Ouen, on the 4th from Saint-Ouen to Fère-Champenoise, and finding d'York's corps already engaged with Marshal Macdonald near Châlons, he made every effort to get in advance of the Marshal, and by this means force him to retire on Epervain and Château-Thierry. Macdonald after his long retreat from Cologne to Châlons had only 5,000 foot and 2,000 horse. He was at Château-Thierry the 8th February, followed by d'York's corps along the Marne, and threatened in flank by Blücher, who, following the route of Fère-Champenoise and of Montmirail, hoped to get in advance of him at Meaux. Paris was thus left exposed to the enemy, and it was this evident danger that threw the inhabitants into the most intense alarm. Prince Schwarzenberg, on his side, after having carefully felt his way before Napoleon, whose slightest movement he feared, was advancing slowly on Troyes, having with his formidable adversary, rear-guard engagements, that were becoming every day more sharp. Suddenly, he conceived doubts

and uneasiness. He had just learned that French troops had appeared at a distance on his left, that is to say, on the Yonne, at Sens, at Joigny and at Auxerre—they were the troops of Pajol. Rumours had also reached him from more distant points. He had learned that a French army was being formed at Lyon under Marshal Augereau, that this army had assumed the offensive against Bubna, that the troops from Spain were seen coming *en poste*, that the heads of the columns were already near Orleans. He immediately asked himself whether Napoleon did not meditate some movement on his left flank beyond the Seine and the Yonne, and whether the Lyon army, the troops that were seen on the Yonne and those that were coming from Spain were not troops prepared for this dangerous movement. A prey to anxiety, he advanced a little towards the left, whilst Blucher advanced a little to the right, a movement that sensibly increased the space that separated them. Lastly, Prince Schwarzenberg brought Wittgenstein from the right bank of the Aube to the left, that is to say, from Arcis to Troyes; he left de Wrede before Troyes, with a reserve in the rear, he sent Giulay to Villeneuve-l'Archeveque, and Colloredo to Sens, flattering himself that by these precautions he protected his left flank. Some Cossacks had been left with the object of forming a connection between the two armies, but the intervening space was now much increased. This experienced general thinking that he was defending himself from one danger, was exposing himself, as we shall soon see, to another much more serious, for in war it is not one danger we must keep in view, but every; it is not one side of our position, it is the entire we ought to embrace with a wide-seeing, prompt and steady glance.

On the 6th and 7th February, Napoleon on the watch, like a tiger ready to spring upon his prey, kept an eye on his opponents with an ever-increasing joy, the last he was destined to experience. He had long hesitated between two courses. One moment he wished to throw himself on Colloredo and Giulay who had imprudently ventured between the Seine and the Yonne, then he thought of advancing along the Marne and attacking Blucher, but on the 7th he hesitated no longer. The importance of the results to be obtained by placing himself between Schwarzenberg and Blucher, and the necessity of aiding Macdonald and Paris as quickly as possible, decided him to advance along the Marne, and he commenced his movement against Blucher with unspeakable satisfaction. He had, by extraordinary exertion, from the 4th to the 7th of February, obtained some battalions from the dépôts in Paris. He had with these resources somewhat recruited Marmont and Victor's corps as well as the divisions of Generals Gérard and Hamelinaye, and by the aid of detachments arrived from Versailles, he had somewhat reinforced his cavalry. Lastly, he ordered the first division that had arrived from Spain to march on Provins. On the 5th he had ordered Marmont to advance from Arcis on Nogent, and had repaired thither himself from Troyes, covering his move-

ments with strong rear guards, in order to hide his march from the enemy. Arrived at Nogent, he commenced to execute his design. Marmont, whose mind was active enough, had also conceived this same design, but in a confused manner, for he already regarded the execution as impossible, when Napoleon, without troubling himself about what was passing in his giddy head, ordered him on the 7th to set out from Nogent with a rear guard of cavalry and infantry and to advance on Sézanne, a place provided by the Emperor's orders with abundant resources. As soon as Marmont should have seen his way clearly, he was to be followed by his entire corps. On the 8th Napoleon despatched Ney with a division of the Young Guard and the cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes along this same route of Sézanne. He prepared to set out himself on the 8th with Mortier and the Old Guard. These three corps amounted to about 30,000 men.

However, whilst the troops were advancing along the Marne, Paris ought not to be left undefended on the Seine side. Napoleon left on the Seine Marshal Victor, with the 2nd corps; the Generals Gérard and Hamelinaye, with their divisions of reserve; and behind them at Provins, Marshal Oudinot, with the division of the Young Rothenbourg Guard and troops drawn from the army of Spain. Victor was charged to defend the Seine from Nogent to Bray, and Oudinot was to come to his assistance at the first sound of his cannon. Pajol, with the battalions that had arrived from Bordeaux, with the National Guards and his cavalry, were to keep watch over Montereau and the bridges of the Yonne as far as Auxerre. Lastly, the two divisions of the Young Guard, whose organization was now completed at Paris, had orders to take up a position between Provins and Fontainebleau. The total of these troops did not amount to less than 50,000 men, and those drawn up behind the Seine in the bend which this river forms from Nogent to Fontainebleau, would give Napoleon time to return and do against Schwarzenberg what he should have accomplished against Blucher. These plans were at the least as plausible as those of the adverse generals. It remains to be seen which corresponded best with the distances, time, and actual circumstances of the war. Napoleon set out on the 9th with his Old Guard to pass from the Seine to the Marne, ordering that his absence should be kept a profound secret. Full of hope, he wrote a few words to M. de Caulaincourt to raise his courage, and to induce him to use less freely the *carte blanche* that he had given him, without, however, lessening his powers. In fact, if the Emperor succeeded, the conditions of the peace would be very different. Consequently in setting off on this expedition, he carried with him the fortunes of France and his own!

Whilst the Emperor was marching towards Nogent, our unfortunate plenipotentiary suffered at Châtillon the greatest vexations that an honest man and a good citizen can experience, and was, at the same time, subjected to the most humiliating treatment.

The diplomatists of the coalition had arrived at Châtillon on the

3rd and 4th of February. They did not delay to visit M. de Caulaincourt, testifying the highest respect, which, they wished to be understood, was accorded to his personal character. It was agreed that the five should show their credentials, and that the negotiations should commence within a few days. Meanwhile, M. de Caulaincourt endeavoured at the dinners and soirées where they met, to obtain some information, but though polite, he found the members of the congress impenetrable. The only one amongst them to whom he could have opened his mind, in virtue of the secret communications of M. de Metternich, was M. de Stadion, the Austrian minister, but he was a personal enemy of Francis; the malevolent representative of a friendly court. Next to him, there was M. de Floret, lower in rank, but more friendly; but he spoke little, sighed often, and let it be understood that the battle of Rothière was a great error, for it deeply affected the position of affairs. As to the conditions of peace, though they could not be much longer concealed from us, M. de Floret said no more on the subject than the others. M. de Rasoumoffski, formerly the interpreter of Russian passions at Vienna, was almost impertinent about everything that did not personally touch M. de Caulaincourt. M. de Humbolt made no manifestation of his sentiments, still it was easy to see the Prussian in him, but, it must be admitted, in a mollified form. The most friendly of all the ministers were the English, especially Lord Aberdeen, a perfect model of the representative of a free state, by the simplicity of his manners and the mild gravity of his demeanour. Lord Castlereagh, who was not to take any part in the conferences, but was come to direct them, like a master who gives orders without making his appearance, had astonished M. de Caulaincourt by his pacific assurances and protestations of sincerity. He insisted so strongly and frequently on the fixed resolution of treating with Napoleon, that it was impossible to avoid perceiving the general policy of the English, which professes to make war for interests, purely national, and not in support of any dynasty. And so, Lord Castlereagh incessantly repeated that the plenipotentiaries could come to terms immediately, and, if they wished, an interview of one hour would be sufficient for the purpose. But on what bases were they to come to terms? On this point not one would consent to anticipate by a single day, the solemn declaration of the conditions of peace. "They must be very harsh," thought M. de Caulaincourt, "since they dare not produce them, and they no doubt wish to promulgate them as an European law, to which no contradiction is to be offered." Every time the French plenipotentiary endeavoured to gain any confidential information from a plenipotentiary, if by a chance that seldom occurred, he found himself alone with one, the latter broke off the conversation. If, in the society of several, he addressed one, the person addressed raised his voice, that no one might suspect him of having any secret intelligence with France. It was evident that all feared this ideal and formidable being called "the coalition," and that none would,

at any price, offend it. To say to the representative of France, or hear from him anything that was not common to all, would have appeared an infidelity, of which no person would dare to render himself guilty. Lord Castlereagh alone acting like a man, who was above all suspicion, saw and heard a few words in private from M. de Caulaincourt in their various interviews, but it was only to repeat this fastidious declaration that the Allies wished for peace, that it might be concluded in an hour, if the plenipotentiaries could only agree. Agree on what? Here was the everlasting question, to which no reply was given.

M. de Caulaincourt waited thus four mortal days without obtaining any explanation; he spent his time divining what was not expressed, and the result was repeated solicitations to the Emperor for fresh instructions. On the 5th February, the plenipotentiaries produced their credentials, declaring that the representatives of the four principal powers, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, would negotiate for the different courts of Europe, great and small, with which France was at war. This was a convenient mode of proceeding, but one that revealed the common yoke that weighed so heavily on all the members of the coalition. The representative of England announced, at the same time, that the question of maritime rights was not to be made a subject of negotiation, as it was a question that Great Britain would not submit to the discussion of anyone, not even of her Allies, because it was a question that did not depend on the fleeting resolution of man. The British representative would have willingly added that it was a dogma, about which no compromise could be made.

We were not in a position to offer any opposition, for we had at that moment things more important than maritime rights to defend. However, M. de Caulaincourt, for the honour of truth, made some observations, which were listened to in glacial silence, and obtained no reply. M. de Caulaincourt did not insist, and other business was proceeded with. It was agreed that during the sitting of this congress, every proposition should be made in writing, and replied to in the same manner, and if these propositions suggested any verbal observations, a protocol, kept with the greatest exactness, should conserve these observations. This was a new precaution to prevent distrust among the Allies. M. de Caulaincourt, offering no opposition to these formalities, begged that the plenipotentiaries would proceed to essentials, and declare the conditions of peace. But they would not, either that day or the following, open this grave subject, under pretext that they were not yet ready. At length, on the 7th, after causing M. de Caulaincourt these long delays, one of the plenipotentiaries, acting in the name of all, read in a solemn and peremptory tone, the following declaration:—

France was, as a first and most important condition, to retire within the limits of 1790, and never pretend to any authority over territories situate beyond these limits, and, moreover, she was not to interfere in the allotment that should be made of these countries,

so that not only would she be deprived of Holland, Westphalia, and Italy, which was natural enough, but she should forego her privilege as a first-rate power, to give an opinion on what was to become of these vast countries, and the Allies wished to act in this manner touching the kingdoms beyond the Rhine and the Alps, as well as for those that were on this side, so that in giving up Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, she was not to be consulted on what was to be done with them. Lastly, the French plenipotentiary was required to say "yes," or "no," before the negotiations were carried further. Never had a conquered nation been treated with such insolence, and conquered we were not yet, for at Brienne we had been conquerors, at Rothière 32,000 French had, during an entire day, kept in check 170,000 of the enemy, and the enemy had not been able to surround these 32,000 French, nor overwhelm them, nor cut off their retreat.

All present were so impressed with the enormity of these propositions that no person seemed willing to make a comment on them, those most hostile to France, fearing to weaken them by any commentary; the more moderate not wishing to undertake the task of justifying them. A profound silence succeeded this communication. M. de Caulaincourt, who could with difficulty control his emotion, declared that he had many observations to make, and demanded a hearing. After some hesitation, the sitting was adjourned to the evening of the same day, in order to hear M. de Caulaincourt.

Observations on this extraordinary communication came thronging to his mind. In the first place how could these propositions be reconciled with those of Frankfort, propositions that could not be denied, since to the recognized conversation of M. de Saint Aignan, there had been added a written note, which recapitulated them; since M. de Metternich, on receipt of M. de Bassano's evasive reply, had insisted on obtaining an explicit acceptance of the propositions! This acceptance having been sent, the authors of the Frankfort propositions were bound by their own act, and how was it possible that they could now make propositions so diametrically opposite? And still further, in considering these things with reference to the balance of power in Europe, how could the Allies, after having declared when they set foot on the soil of France, that they did not seek to contest her justly acquired greatness, how could they think of restricting her to the frontiers of the time of Louis XV., when since that period three of the Continental Powers had dismembered Poland, when since 1790 all the Continental Powers had made considerable acquisitions, which completely changed the proportions of the different states? If, in order to secure the peace of Europe, there had been a general return to the limits of 1790, was it not just that each state should restore what it had since acquired, that Austria should not think of retaining Venice; that Prussia and Austria should not keep what they had filched from the small German States, and especially from the ecclesiastical; princes that Prussia, Austria, and Russia should

restore the portions of Poland they had possessed themselves of at the last partition? Was it not, in fact, just, that England should restore the Ionian Isles, Malta, the Cape, the Mauritius, &c., &c.? To make France alone shrink back within her ancient limits, would be to destroy in Europe, to the general detriment, the necessary balance of power, and if, as experience has since proved, France might remain great, and very great, even after the loss of some provinces, she would owe it to the energy and intellectual power of her people, that is to say, to her moral grandeur, of which her enemies could not deprive her, though they might of her material greatness! Certainly there was nothing which conquerors might not assume the right to do, and this argument would cut short all discussion, but in such a case it would have been better not to utter these insidious words, of which the enemy made use on crossing the Rhine, and to avow that force and not justice was to serve as a rule of conduct to the Allied Powers. France would, in that case, have known what she had to expect from her invaders. But this was not all. How could the Allies demand immense sacrifices *en bloc* without entering into details, without determining the more or the less which was an important point in the case; for in the Low Countries, in the Rhenish provinces, along the Swiss and Alpine frontiers, there remained many questions, that according to the sense in which they were solved, would afford various results? And these portions of territory about to be given up, was it possible to abandon them without knowing to whom they would be ceded? To give them up, for example, to a great or a little power, to yield a territory on the left of the Rhine to a little state like Hesse, or to a large state like Prussia, would constitute an important difference. To refuse an explanation on any of these points was an unjustifiable proceeding, scarcely permissible with an enemy on whose throat the adversary's foot was already planted, and France, if unfortunately she was one day to find herself at the feet of her enemies, was not yet in that position. And if her representative submitted to all or part of these sacrifices, it could only be from a desire to put an immediate termination to a cruel war, to avoid a battle whose result would be perhaps decisive of the safety or total defeat of France; in short, to save Paris; but would it be possible to make these mournful sacrifices, unless M. de Caulaincourt was first assured that the moment he gave his consent, the Allies would instantly desist from their adverse proceedings?

These considerations, so natural, so indisputable, M. de Caulaincourt essayed to unfold on the evening of the 7th, and did so, under a feeling of bridled indignation. He was a soldier, and he would have preferred to die fighting side by side with the last soldier of France, against these insulting enemies, than vainly wrestle in a negotiation with men, who would neither listen nor reply to him. But he was willing to suffer everything to profit of an opportunity of making peace, if it occurred, and with the greatest calmness of manner, through which, however, his vexation of spirit was perceptible, he

referred to the Frankfort propositions, which had been formally proposed and formally accepted; he objected to the acquisitions, that the different powers had already made or intended to make in Poland, in Germany, in Italy, and above all, on the seas; he wished to know especially what was to become of the provinces of which France was to be deprived, and lastly what would be the recompense of the sacrifices to which France might consent; whether, for example, a suspension of hostilities would be the immediate consequence?

The first observations, those that referred to the Frankfort propositions, visibly embarrassed the ministers of the Allied Powers. In fact, no reply could be made, and if nations acknowledged any other umpire than force, the negotiators would be instantly condemned. M. de Rasoumoffski, the haughty Russian that represented the Emperor Alexander, replied that he did not know what was meant. M. de Stadion, who represented the Austrian cabinet, and was the principal and direct author of the Frankfort propositions, asserted that they were not mentioned in his instructions. But Lord Aberdeen, the most sincere and upright person present, who had witnessed the overtures made to M. de Saint-Aignan, who had discussed the terms of the Frankfort note, how could he deny these facts? So he limited himself to stammering forth some words that proved his embarrassment as an honest man, and then all these diplomatists opposing to the reasoning of the French minister a sort of general clamour, exclaimed with one voice that these questions were not under discussion, that the Frankfort propositions were not the subject before them, but those of Châtillon, that it was upon these, and not upon the others they were called to pronounce in the present sitting, that they were commissioned not to discuss but to present them, and to learn whether they would be accepted or rejected, and in a very decided manner they let it be understood that it was to be either peace or war, war to the death which should follow, that an immediate decision should be come to by replying on the spot either "yes," or "no." M. de Caulaincourt seeing there were no means of forcing an explanation from men who wanted a yes, or no, demanded an adjournment of the conference, which was accepted, and then the assembly broke up.

M. de Caulaincourt was alternately plunged in grief, or excited by indignation, for in the propositions that the plenipotentiaries had dared to present to him, the form was as insulting as the substance was disheartening. Certes, Napoleon had abused the rights of a victor, but never to this degree. He had often required a great deal from his enemies, but he had never humiliated them, and when on the morrow of the battle of Austerlitz, Alexander, who was on the point of being taken prisoner with his army, begged forbearance in a note written with pencil, Napoleon replied with a courtesy in which he was not now imitated. In any case, Napoleon was not France, the faults of the one were not the faults of the other, and people who laid such stress on regarding Napoleon as distinct from

France ought not to have made the latter suffer for the faults of the former. However this may be, M. de Caulaincourt saw very clearly that to stop the onward march of the Allies he would be obliged to pronounce these terrible words of a pure and simple acceptance of the proposed terms; but to bar the entrance of the enemy into Paris he was ready to use the unlimited powers with which he was furnished. This excellent citizen, devoted to France and the Imperial dynasty, committed now the error (perhaps the first with which he could be charged) of thinking more of Napoleon's throne than of his glory. He totally forgot that it would be more glorious for Napoleon to perish than to cede the natural frontiers; that the question involved his honour as well as the true greatness of France, and that however unfortunate she might afterwards become, no greater sacrifice could be demanded of her than that actually required; that even under the Bourbons she would be allowed the frontiers of 1790, and that consequently, for Napoleon as for France, it would have been as well to risk everything; and the noble-minded M. de Caulaincourt, who had been so often in the right when his master was in the wrong, happened on this occasion not to perceive so clearly as the Emperor the true position of things. He was, therefore, ready to yield, one condition always understood—an assurance that the enemy would immediately cease hostilities. But to yield everything demanded, without a certainty of saving Paris and the Imperial throne, was, in his eyes, an afflicting humiliation, without any compensation. In his despair he had recourse to the only one amongst the plenipotentiaries in whom the feelings of a man were discernable beneath the frigid reserve of the diplomatist; he tried to learn from him whether the terrible sacrifice demanded by the Allies, would at least procure a suspension of hostilities. Lord Aberdeen, to whom he applied, taking all possible care, according to agreement, to avoid any private communication with the French representative, gave him to understand, however, that a suspension of hostilities could only be obtained by an immediate and unreserved acceptance of the proposed terms, and that hostilities should cease only on the ratification of the acceptance of these terms. This was almost asking an unconditional surrender, and that too without being sure of life being spared, because in the interval between the acceptance and ratification, a decisive battle might take place, and the fate of France be decided by arms. It was therefore not worth while to have recourse to political precautions, since they would form no defence against the intervention of force. Thus, though M. de Caulaincourt had a *carte blanche*, he dared not give a formal consent to the acceptance that the Allies wished to force from him, and he wrote to head-quarters to communicate his anxieties to Napoleon; but the very next day he received from the Russian plenipotentiary the extraordinary declaration that the sittings of the Congress were suspended. The Emperor Alexander, it was said, wished to have some fresh communications with his Allies, before any further conferences were held. This last intelligence threw M. de Caulaincourt com-

pletely into despair. He fancied he now saw the downfall of Napoleon irrevocably determined, and in his profound grief he wrote to M. de Metternich in the strictest confidence, to ask whether in case he made use of his powers and accepted the imposed conditions, he would obtain a suspension of hostilities. This was perhaps making too open an exhibition of his despair; this despair it was true, was that of an honest man and an excellent citizen, and the avowal was made to the only one amongst the diplomatists who was not anxious to abuse the privileges of victory; but there are positions in which men must hide beneath a stern exterior the noblest sentiments of their souls. M. de Caulaincourt had nothing more to do than await a reply from M. de Metternich on one side, from Napoleon on the other.

In the state in which things then were, it was only the cannon placed between the Seine and the Marne, and the silence at Châtillon which could operate any change in this horrible position of affairs. Napoleon was *en marche*, and in setting out, he had sent word to M. de Caulaincourt not to be in a hurry. He was on the eve of playing his last stake, and he did it with the confidence of an experienced gambler, who does not doubt the success of his last calculations.

We have seen in the preceding pages, the position of the armies when Blucher quitted Prince Schwarzenberg, whilst Napoleon keeping an eye upon him, was lying in wait at Nogent-sur-Seine. The Prussian General, d'York, descended the Marne in pursuit of Marshal Macdonald, who, threatened in the rear by d'York and on the flank by Blucher, had no other resource than to retire rapidly on Meaux. Blucher, marching at equal distance from the Marne and the Aube, through Fère-Champenoise and Montmirail, had sent Sacken forward, and followed with Olsouvieff, Kleist, and Langeron. On the 9th February Macdonald had retired to Meaux, the position of the enemy being as follows: General d'York with 18,000 men was at Château-Thierry on the Marne; Sacken with 20,000 Russians was on the Montmirail road; Olsouvieff with 6,000 Russians at Champaubert, and lastly in the rear, at Etoges, Blucher with 10,000 men of Kleist and 8,000 of Capzewitz, these latter constituting the remains of Langeron. Here were at least 60,000 men dispersed between Châtillon and Ferté-sous-Jouarre, a part on the Marne and part on the road that separates the Aube from the Marne. If Napoleon, whose clear-visioned glance had foreseen this state of things, could only fall opportunely on forces so dispersed, he might obtain the most unforeseen and important results.

By a most fortunate chance—fortune's last favour—Champaubert, through which Napoleon was to reach the Montmirail road, was only guarded by 6,000 of Olsouvieff's Russians. He found the point nearly unprotected by which he could advance into the midst of his enemies, and found himself in a position to say that he had hit Achilles in the heel. On the 7th February he ordered Marmont to advance with a portion of his cavalry and his infantry, and

march from Nogent on Sézanne, informing him that he was about to follow in person. On the 8th he sent forward in the same direction a division of the Young Guard and a part of the cavalry of the Guard under Marshal Ney. On the 9th he set out himself with the Old Guard under Mortier, and passed the night at Sézanne. The way from Nogent to Champaubert was a cross-road, badly kept, as at that time all the second-rate roads in France were, and beyond Sézanne it was almost impracticable for heavy waggons. At two leagues from Sézanne, at Saint-Prix, we find the extremity of the Saint-Gond marshes, and in the midst of these marshes we see the little river called Petit-Morin, which runs at the foot of the high grounds, crossed by the chaussée that passes from Montmirail to Meaux. The artillery found great difficulty on the 9th in reaching Sézanne. They, moreover, met Marshal Marmont, who had at first exulted in the idea of throwing himself into the midst of Blucher's scattered corps, and who, after having advanced on the 7th as far as Chapton, had suddenly turned back, declaring the marshes of Saint-Gond impassable, the high grounds covered with enemies, the plan a failure, &c., &c. Napoleon troubled himself little about the Marshal's change of opinion,* and ordered the

* We think it our duty to enter here into some details on a historical question, suggested by Marshal Marmont's Memoirs relative to the affairs of Champaubert, Montmirail, Vauchamps, &c. This Marshal, whose intellect was more brilliant than solid, died with the conviction on his mind, that he was the author of the brilliant tactics displayed at Montmirail, tactics that procured Napoleon, on the eve of his downfall, five or six of the most glorious days of his existence. We shall see on what the Marshal founded his opinion, and on what grounds he relates the circumstance in his Memoirs. He had been staying at Arois-sur-Aube and at Nogent-sur-Seine from the 2nd to the 6th February, and whilst in these places he perceived the movement of Blucher, and with natural instinct, he wrote to Napoleon, proposing to attack the Prussian General. On the 7th he received orders to advance on Sézanne, and even with less *amour-propre* than he possessed, he might have believed himself the instigator of this brilliant manœuvre. This is what he relates in his Memoirs, quoting his own letters and those he has had in reply, and in these details he is perfectly correct. But he does not add two circumstances, one of which he was ignorant of, and the other he had perhaps forgotten, but both of which totally alter the aspect of the case. In the first place, it was not until the 6th that he wrote to Napoleon, whilst the Emperor had on the 2nd announced his project to the War Minister, a project that was at the same time his last remaining hope, and depended on an error of the enemy, which Napoleon, with his eagle glance, foresaw before it was committed. From the 2nd to the 6th he had arranged everything according to his own views, without saying anything on the subject to Marshal Marmont, who knowing nothing of what Napoleon was thinking and writing, believed himself the sole author of the projected combination. Besides, Marshal Marmont does not relate, how, having arrived at Chapton, he lost courage, fancied the movement impossible, turned back, and on the 9th wrote Napoleon a letter of four pages, advising him to abandon the project, of which, during his remaining life, he believed himself the author. Napoleon, as we have seen, laid little stress on what had alarmed Marmont, because he viewed things as a whole, certain that if there were some thousand men at Champaubert, it was not possible that Blucher's 60,000, of whom he had received intelligence at the same time from Vertus, Etoges, Montmirail, and Château-Thierry, could be all at Champaubert, he therefore advanced, convinced that he would reach his destination, and urged besides by the powerful motive, that in his situation it was necessary to risk everything for the success of this grand movement. We shall now see who was right, he or his lieutenant, and who was really the author of the admirable operation in question. We have already furnished many proofs of the difficulty of arriving at historical truth, and the fact we are now discussing is a fresh example. Yet Marshal Marmont was an

troops to march *en masse* on the little village of Saint-Prix, crossed by the *Petit-Morin*, and to surmount, at any cost, the local difficulties. He had received reports from various quarters which proved that there were Russians at Montmirail, that there were some in the rear at Etoges, and that there were Prussians on the Marne. Knowing with what enemies he had to do, he was convinced that they would not march so as to present on every side an impenetrable mass. Having, with Marmont, Ney, and Mortier, 30,000 of his best troops, he was certain that by choosing judiciously the point of attack and bringing all his forces to bear upon it, he would soon find himself in the midst of the enemy. But there was one dangerous step to make, it was to cross the marshy lands that lie between Sézanne and Saint-Prix. The local authorities, when called on, promised to assemble all the horses of the country. The peasants, animated by the best sentiments, and above all, exasperated by the presence of the enemy, thronged in crowds, and at ten in the morning were ready between Sézanne and the *Petit-Morin* to aid with their hands and horses.

On the 10th of February at the break of day, the troops set forward. Marmont marched at the head with the cavalry of the 1st corps and the Ricard and Lagrange divisions, comprising the 6th infantry corps. In approaching the *Petit-Morin*, the marshy surface yielded considerably, but the peasants, by the aid of hands and horses, extricated the cannon, and all arrived safely at the bridge of Saint-Prix. Some of Olsouvieff's sharpshooters were posted along the borders of the *Petit-Morin*; the French dispersed them and crossed the bridge. The cavalry of the 1st corps advanced in full trot. Having passed the *Petit-Morin*, they entered a valley at the bottom of which lies the village of Baye. On ascending the opposite side of this valley, we find a kind of plateau, in the midst of which stands Champaubert. Olsouvieff provided with abundant artillery, had placed on the border of the plateau twenty-four pieces of cannon that commanded the valley through which the French were making their way. The cavalry of the 1st corps dashed forward, spite of Olsouvieff's cannonade, rushed on the village of Baye, followed by Ricard's cavalry. Horse and foot entered the village *pêle mêle*, and ascended the heights close in the rear of the Russians. There was, a little to the left, another village, called Bannai, and here the Russians were posted in great strength. The Guard marched thither and expelled them. The French commander could now deploy his forces on the plateau, whose surface is tolerably

intelligent man, an eye witness, and in a position to say: "I was there." This is why Napoleon in one of his letters says with as much wit as penetration, that *his officers knew what he did on the field of battle as correctly as the strollers in the Tuilleries knew what he wrote in his cabinet*, which implies that he alone, embracing in his glance the entirety of the operations, knew the motive of each. And for this reason, it is in his orders and his correspondence that we must seek this secret, and not in the thousand recitals of eye-witnesses, which have undoubtedly a legendary value, but restricted, touching only the material fact operated before their eyes, and rarely extending to the true significance of the fact.

even, sprinkled here and there with clusters of trees; and now the Montmirail road was discernible; of this it was needful we should take possession. The road ran from our right to our left, from Châlons to Meaux, crossing the village of Champaubert that lay before us. We were nearly a league distant from this important point.

At this moment the French discovered a corps of Russian infantry about 6,000 strong, accompanied by a great deal of artillery, but very little cavalry, retiring precipitately, but in tolerable order. General Olsouvieff, who commanded this corps, had just learned that Napoleon was advancing at the head of considerable forces; he perceived his danger to be extreme and became alarmed.

Napoleon had hastened to Marmont, whose infantry was advancing flanked by the 1st cavalry corps. The important point was to reach the Montmirail road as soon as possible, and expel the enemy, who occupied it. In any case, the movement was of great importance, for if Blücher had already got in advance of our left in the direction of Meaux, we could cut him off from Châlons and his line of retreat; if he had remained in the rear of our right we should cut him off from any of his lieutenants who might have got in advance of him, and we should thus advance into the midst of the army of Silesia, with an almost certainty of destroying it piecemeal. When Napoleon arrived, Marmont had just sent forward the 1st corps of infantry on the right; Napoleon despatched in the same direction, General Girardin, with the two squadrons he had brought with him, to disperse some groups that were retiring along the Châlons road. The alarm of the enemy redoubled at this aspect, and they retired precipitately. Marmont, with his infantry, pushed them briskly on Champaubert, and General Doumerc with the cuirassiers charged them in the plain on the right. The Russians, completely routed, threw themselves in disorder into Champaubert. Marmont entered the village at the head of Ricard's infantry, with fixed bayonets, whilst the cuirassiers of Doumerc, turning to the right, cut off all communication with Châlons. Olsouvieff, driven out of Champaubert by our infantry, and flung on our left by the cuirassiers, was at the same time separated from Blücher, who had remained behind at Etoges, and thrown back on Montmirail, where there was no other resource than to take refuge with Sacken, who was at a great distance, and might already have sought shelter behind the Marne. In this embarrassment, Olsouvieff had retired near a lake, surrounded with trees; this place was called "the Desert." Ricard debouching direct from Champaubert, and Doumerc advancing from the right to the left, fell upon him. In an instant his infantry gave way and were partly cut in pieces by the cuirassiers, partly made prisoners. 1,500 killed or wounded, nearly 3,000 prisoners, amongst whom were General Olsouvieff and his staff, together with twenty pieces of cannon, were the trophies of this glorious day. This was fortune's first favour since the commencement of the campaign, and it was a great one, less

from the immediate result obtained, than from the ulterior results that might be hoped. In fact, according to the report of prisoners interrogated by Napoleon himself, it was ascertained that Blucher was in the rear, that is to say, at Etoges; that Sacken was in front, in the direction of Montmirail, that d'York was higher up towards the Marne; and that consequently the French were now in the midst of the army of Silesia, that in the succeeding days a great quantity of booty would be obtained, and perhaps the aspect of affairs totally changed.

And now Napoleon experienced an emotion of deep-seated joy. He had felt nothing like it for a long time. After having doubted of everything, he, who during so many years had never doubted anything, Napoleon's faith in his good fortune revived, and he began to think himself nearly re-established on the pinnacle of his greatness. Supping at Champaubert in a village inn, with his marshals, he spoke of the vicissitudes of fortune with that cheerful philosophy we all experience when evil days give place to good, and in a rare outburst of confidence he exclaimed:—"If to-morrow I should be as fortunate as I have been to-day, within fifteen days I shall drive the enemy back upon the Rhine, and from the Rhine to the Vistula there is but a step." This was his last transport of joy, which we must not grudge him, and we would share it with him were the *dénouement* of this great drama, not so well known to the present generation.

The mode of proceeding on the following day, which might have suggested some doubts to another, was quite clear to Napoleon. Fallen like a thunderbolt in the midst of the enemy's columns, he might have hesitated as to which he should first attack, that of Blucher on the right, or that of Sacken on the left. If he advanced immediately towards the right, Blucher had the means of escape by falling back on Châlons, whilst that by marching to his left he was certain of reaching Sacken, who would be caught between Champaubert and Paris, and, moreover, in overwhelming Sacken, he would draw Blucher towards him, for the Prussian General would not certainly allow his lieutenants to be overpowered without hastening to their assistance. Taking in with his ordinary quickness of perception, every aspect of his position, Napoleon, on the morning of the 11th, advanced without any hesitation to the left, followed the Montmirail road, and left on his right, in front of Champaubert, Marshal Marmont, with the Lagrange division and 1st cavalry, to restrain Blucher, whilst he should engage Sacken and d'York, whom he might meet apart or combined.

Napoleon arrived about ten in the morning at Montmirail, at the head of his column, amounting to nearly 24,000 men, with Ney, Mortier, the cavalry of the Guard, and the Ricard division. He crossed Montmirail, and debouched on the high road, where he took up his position opposite the Russian troops, who were hurrying forward. It was Sacken turning on us with his accustomed impetu-

osity. What had taken place amongst the Allies is fully descriptive of the confusion and worthlessness of their counsels.

Blucher, as we have seen, had advanced along the Marne to surround Macdonald, whom the Generals d'York and Sacken were briskly pursuing, the one upon the right bank of this river, the other along the left, after which, the army of Silesia, Macdonald being defeated, was to advance on Paris, the object of the ardent longings of the Allies. Meanwhile, Schwarzenberg was to advance towards the capital, along the course of the Seine, and as we have already said, he had inclined a little towards the Yonne, and so increased the space that separated him from Blucher. Fearing that Blucher might reach Paris before him, he had begged him, at the earnest entreaty of the Emperor Alexander, to stop outside the walls of Paris, and await the allied sovereigns there. Surely such presumption and inconsistency deserved chastisement.

Blucher had received these orders at the same moment that he learned the arrival of Napoleon at Sézanne, and he did not know what to do, for impetuosity is not clearness of perception, especially when one is called on to choose between two courses equally perilous. General Gneisenau was of one opinion, General Muffling of another. They had tried to induce Sacken to come up, passing through the French columns; an order which offered no special means of safety, was, to fall back on Montmirail, or to take refuge behind the Marne with General d'York, should the danger be so great as was said. If, on the contrary, they had been alarmed without cause, Sacken was authorized to set out in pursuit, passing through Ferté-sons-Jouarre, towards Paris. On receiving intelligence of the sudden appearance of Napoleon, Sacken, instead of retiring behind the Marne, retraced his steps, in order to have the honour of fighting the Emperor of the French, and had invited General d'York to cross the Marne at Château-Thierry, and advance along the Montmirail route to witness or assist at his triumph. General d'York had only accepted this invitation in part, and had advanced a short way towards Montmirail, but always supporting his rear on Château-Thierry.

Napoleon having debouched by the Montmirail route, saw Sacken, who was returning from Ferté-sons-Jouarre, and perceived at a distance on his right, troops that were coming from the banks of the Marne by the Château-Thierry route, but who did not appear in a hurry to take part in this grave business. These were General d'York's troops. The first operation to be executed was to bar Sacken's way and get rid of him, and afterwards attack the other comer, who was discernible in the direction of Château-Thierry. The French were still on the plateau they had ascended the previous evening in taking possession of Champaubert, and in advancing on Montmirail they had on their left the declivity of this plateau, whose foot was bathed by the Petit-Morin. About half way down this declivity the little village of Marchais is situate. Napoleon placed Ricard's division here to oppose Sacken on this side, whilst

that on the high road he had deployed his artillery and posted his cavalry *en masse*. In this attitude the Ricard infantry defending at Marchais the extremity of the plateau, the cavalry and artillery intercepting the high road, Napoleon could wait the junction of Ney and Mortier, who had remained behind.

Sacken having arrived with his 20,000 men, and seeing the high road occupied, perceived that it would not be so easy as he had at first thought to overthrow Napoleon in order to join Blücher. He now only thought of cutting his way through the enemy. The high road appeared to be blocked up by a compact mass of cavalry. On his right and our left, he saw along the woody declivities that slope towards Petit-Morin, a possible outlet, of which he could make himself master, by seizing the little village of Marchais. He directed a strong column of infantry towards this village, whilst he was endeavouring to take possession of small clusters of houses and farms also situate on the side of the high road, and called "l'Épine-aux-Bois" and "Haute-Épine." A brisk engagement took place at the village of Marchais, between the column of infantry sent by Sacken and the Ricard division. The latter made a vigorous resistance, lost and retook the village, and finished by keeping possession, whilst the mass of our cavalry posted on the high road, protected our numerous artillery, and was in return protected by them.

It was now two o'clock in the afternoon. The roads were frightfully bad, and the Guard had found great difficulty in traversing them. The first division of the Old Guard, under Friant, having at length reached the plateau, Napoleon prepared to deal the enemy a mortal blow. Sacken had strongly occupied l'Épine-aux-Bois, situate like the village of Marchais on the flank of the high road, but a little more forward in relation to us. This position seemed difficult to carry without great loss of life, but once carried, everything was decided, for the enemy's troops that had advanced on our left, between Marchais and the Petit-Morin, would inevitably be made prisoners, and Sacken had no other resource than to sacrifice them, and take refuge with the *debris* of his corps, near General d'York on the Marne. Napoleon, in order to render the attack on l'Épine-aux-Bois less bloody, made a feint of yielding the position near Marchais, in the intention of drawing Sacken thither, and thus inducing him to withdraw some of his troops from l'Épine-aux-Bois. At the same time he put his cavalry in movement, which had hitherto remained motionless on the high road. These orders, given with vigorous precision, were executed in the same manner.

At a signal from Napoleon, Ricard made a feint of falling back and abandoning Marchais, whilst Nansouty advanced with the cavalry of the Guard. At this sight Sacken hastened to profit of the advantage he fancied he had obtained, and with a portion of his centre, quitted l'Épine-aux-Bois, to seize Marchais, leaving on the high road only a detachment, for the purpose of keeping up a communication with General d'York. Seizing the opportunity,

Napoleon despatched Friant with the Old Guard to l'Epine-aux-Bois. These old soldiers, who combined the fire with the self-possession of tried courage, advanced without firing a shot, crossed a little ravine that separated them from l'Epine-aux-Bois, and then advanced with fixed bayonets. In the twinkling of an eye they made themselves masters of the position, and cut down all who opposed them. During the performance of this vigorous act, Nansouty, after having advanced along the high road, turned suddenly to the left to oppose the troops of Sacken, who had overpassed l'Epine-aux-Bois, made a desperate charge upon them, and scattered some in the direction of the Petit-Morin, and obliged the others to fall back. The latter, obliged to retreat, still fighting, left in serious danger the troops that were engaged on our left, between Marchais and the Petit-Morin. Napoleon then ordered Bertrand, with two battalions of the Young Guard, to advance on the village of Marchais to assist Ricard to retake the place. These battalions, rallying Ricard's infantry, entered Marchais with fixed bayonets, whilst the cavalry of the Guard, under General Guyot, pursued and sabred the fugitives. In consequence of these combined movements, all who had ventured between the high road and the Petit-Morin, were either made prisoners or killed, even on the flank of the plateau. In the space of a few minutes, from four to five thousand prisoners were made, thirty pieces of cannon were taken, and our cavalry left between two and three thousand men dead on the plain. Sacken had no other means of safety than a hasty retreat, and, under favour of night, to repass from the left to the right of the high road (left and right with regard to us), and rejoin General d'York, who had advanced cautiously, but whom Napoleon had held in check near the village of Fontenelle, by sending thither the second division of the Old Guard, under General Mortier.

This day—the 11th—named from Montmirail, was still more brilliant than the preceding. Out of 20,000 men, Sacken had lost 8,000, either killed, wounded, or made prisoners, and this glorious triumph had cost us at the utmost only 700, or 800 men, for the old soldiers Napoleon had employed on this occasion knew how to manage, so as to inflict much injury on the enemy, without sustaining great loss themselves. The succeeding days promised still greater results, for the entire army of Blücher, taken in detail, was about to receive the chastisement due to presumption.

Everything indicated that Sacken, flying towards the Marne, was about to rejoin the Prussian General d'York, near Château-Thierry, and that consequently it was in that direction the French ought to march. Thus the third part of the army of Silesia was now in its turn isolated, and forced in this state to confront Napoleon. The next day, in fact, the 12th of February, Napoleon set out with the second division of the Old Guard, under Mortier, one division of the Young Guard, under Ney, and all the cavalry, thinking

these forces sufficient to overthrow an enemy already in disorder. He left behind, in the direction of Montmirail, the first division of the Old Guard, under Friant, another of the Young Guard under Curial, in order, if needful, to succour Marmont, who was left in front of Blücher, and to have forces within reach of the Seine, should the necessity arise of hastening thither to stop Schwarzenberg's progress. The excellence of Napoleon's tactics consisted in only doing what was indispensable, in doing it at a proper time, quickly, and with energy.

He set out on the 12th of February, and quitted the Montmirail road, which runs parallel to the Marne, to advance in a perpendicular direction on that river. He there found General d'York with about 18,000 Prussians and 12,000 Russians—the remains of Sacken's corps—formed in column on the Château-Thierry route. The greater part of the enemy's infantry was massed behind a stream near the village of Caquerets. A company of the Guard, acting *en tirailleurs* a little below the village, dispersed the enemy's sharpshooters, crossed the stream, and forced the Prussians to retreat. The French passed through the village and advanced into the plain, the two infantry divisions and the Guard deployed. Napoleon, who had brought up the cavalry on his right, ordered them to advance in full gallop on the flank of the enemy's infantry and reach Château-Thierry before them. This order was immediately executed. At sight of this, General d'York sent his cavalry to resist ours, but General Nansouty, with the squadrons of the Guards of Honour, and those of the Guard, rushed on the Prussian cavalry, threw them back on Château-Thierry, sabred a part and captured all the light artillery. Nothing could equal the ardour of our brave horsemen, whose courage was raised to the highest point by a sense of the danger that threatened France and their devotedness to the Emperor himself.

During this rapid movement, made by our cavalry in order to reach Château-Thierry before General d'York, we had succeeded in separating from the main body of the enemy a rear guard of three Prussian and four Russian battalions. General Letort, commanding the Dragoons of the Guard, anxious to surpass, if possible, all that the cavalry had performed for some days past, charged the seven battalions with five or six hundred horses, broke their lines, killed a great number, and took 3,000 prisoners, with a great quantity of artillery. Infantry and cavalry then threw themselves, *en masse*, on Châlons. Prince William of Prussia had advanced with his division, to prevent us continuing the pursuit. He was in his turn overthrown, after a loss of 500 men. The French entered Château-Thierry *pêle-mêle* with the enemy, and made many prisoners. The inhabitants, irritated at the conduct of the Prussians, intoxicated at the same time with joy and anger, gave no quarter to d'York's soldiers, now surprised in an isolated position; they killed or led them prisoners to Napoleon. Unfortunately, the enemy had destroyed the bridge of Château-Thierry, which stopped short our

pursuit. Napoleon had still one hope. In setting out to execute this succession of movements, he had informed Marshal Macdonald what he was about to do, had ordered him to pause at Meaux, and in whatever condition his troops might be, to return by the right bank of the Marne, promising that he would find there the finest booty imaginable.

Arrived at Château-Thierry, Napoleon waited with confidence, employing the time in re-constructing the bridge of the Marne, and reckoning that Macdonald, who ought to appear on the other side, would capture thousands of prisoners, and a vast quantity of artillery. But the day passed and Macdonald did not appear. This Marshal, who was accustomed to regular warfare, in which he excelled, felt irritated against Napoleon, his generals, and his soldiers, because that he had been brought from the banks of the Rhine to the gates of Paris with 6,000 men in a state of disorder, and instead of attributing these mischances to circumstances, he found fault with everybody, and wholly occupied with the state of his troops, instead of making use of them as they were, he had employed his time in re-organizing them with the resources he had received from Meaux. He consequently did not appear on the right bank of the Marne at the decisive moment that Napoleon wished to see him.

This disappointment, which somewhat curtailed the consequences of Napoleon's grand manœuvre, could not, however, prevent the great results it had already produced. He had conquered, without losing more than 1,000 men, three of Blucher's corps, and there only remained one more to strike—that of Blucher himself—in order to have overthrown in detail the army of Silesia, one of the two that threatened the empire, and this too, the most formidable, if not in number, at least in energy. He had already captured from 11,000 to 12,000 men, and killed or wounded from 6,000 to 7,000. Should Blucher too, take a place amongst the conquered, Napoleon would have nothing left to desire touching the army of Silesia.

Napoleon, as indefatigable now as in the palmy days of his youth, resolved not to lose a moment in deriving from this series of operations, all the advantages that he might still hope. He employed the remainder of the 12th and the greater part of the 13th in repairing the bridge of the Marne, in order to send Mortier, in the absence of Macdonald, towards Soissons in pursuit of d'York and Sacken's corps, and whilst he watched over these arrangements, he kept his eye fixed on Montmirail, where Marmont was placed in advance of Blucher to observe his movements, nor did he forget the Marshals Victor and Oudinot, who were stationed on the Seine, with orders to keep Schwarzenberg in check. On the Montmirail side Blucher had given no signs of life, and Marmont had remained at Etoges without attempting an attack. On the Seine side the situation of things was less peaceful. Prince Schwarzenberg, after having allowed his troops to repose for a short time at Troyes, marched them along the Seine, where he occupied the sweep be-

tween Méry and Montereau, and tried to force a passage at Nogent-sur-Seine, at Bray, and even at Montereau. Marshals Victor and Oudinot resisted to the utmost of their power with the resources Napoleon had left them, but earnestly requested his return. He every day gave them intelligence of his proceedings, and each succeeding day brought better news; he encouraged them to hold their ground, promising to return to their assistance as soon as he should have finished with Blucher.

Napoleon had thus passed thirty-six hours at Château-Thierry, when, on the night between the 13th and 14th, he received from Marmont the serious but gratifying intelligence that Blucher, who, during the three days of the 10th, 11th, and 12th had remained motionless, had at length resumed the offensive, and was marching on Montmirail, probably at the head of considerable forces. Napoleon immediately set out. He had, as we have seen, left at Montmirail, Friant, with the strongest of the Old Guard, Curial, with a division of the Young Guard, and had ordered the Leval division that was coming from Spain to advance to the same point. A cavalry division, drawn from all the dépôts, combined at Versailles, had also arrived at Montmirail. Napoleon ordered all these troops to advance from Montmirail to Champaubert, to support Marshal Marmont. He sent thither from Château-Thierry Musnier's infantry division of the Young Guard, and all the cavalry of the Guard under the command of Ney. At the same time he despatched towards Soissons, Mortier, with the second division of the Guard, with Colbert's lancers, and the guards of honour of General Defrance, ordering him to pursue *à outrance*, the conquered troops of Generals d'York and Sacken; he then set off in full gallop, in order to reach the place of destination before the troops that he was bringing. He arrived about nine in the morning at Montmirail, and found everything just as he could have wished, for it seemed that in these latter days fortune could refuse him nothing that could tend to render his triumphs more glorious.

Blucher, after having waited intelligence from d'York and Sacken during the 11th and 12th, flattering himself that they had fallen back safe and sound on the Marne, had at length thought of coming to their assistance, by advancing to Montmirail, with the troops of Capzewitz, the Prussian corps of Kleist, and the remains of d'Olsouvieff's corps. These troops, amounted in all to 18 or 20,000 men. Blucher had, besides, sent to Prince Schwarzenberg, begging him to send the Wittgenstein detachment across through Sézanne, confident that with this detachment, and with the troops under his command, he could effect on Napoleon's rear a diversion strong enough to free d'York and Sacken, who would thus be put in a position to remount the Marne, and join him through Epernay and Châlons. This was an irrationable mode of reasoning, for in advancing in this way, he might encounter Napoleon, just victorious over Olsouvieff, Sacken, and d'York, and returning with his

combined forces to throw himself on the general of the army of Silesia, and conquer the chief after having conquered his lieutenants.

On the morning of the 13th, Blucher had quitted Vertus, ascended the plateau on which Champaubert and Montmirail are situate, and forced Marmont to retreat, who having only 5,000 or 6,000 men to oppose to the forces of the Prussian General, had retired successively on Champaubert, Fromentières, and Vauchamps. It was from the latter place that Marmont had, on the evening of the 13th, written to Napoleon. On the 14th, expecting the Emperor's arrival, he evacuated Vauchamps, and took up a position a little in the rear, on the Montmirail route.

Napoleon having joined Marmont on the 14th, about nine in the morning, offensive operations were instantly resumed. Marshal Marmont, in abandoning Vauchamps, had taken up a position on a woody height, on whose summit he had placed his artillery. Blucher marching with his accustomed confidence, sent the Prussian Zeithen division forward to Montmirail before him. This division had scarcely got outside Vauchamps, when it was received with a terrible discharge of artillery, that caused great loss, and forced the division to return to the village. Immediately after, Marmont ordered the Ricard division to advance on Vauchamps, in order to carry this village, and under favour of the surrounding woods, try to turn the enemy, on the left, by help of General Grouchy's cavalry, and on the right by Lagrange's infantry division.

Though these movements were executed with extraordinary vigour, they were opposed by great difficulties. The Ricard division having penetrated into Vauchamp, found there the Ziethen division, determined to make a vigorous defence, and was obliged to fall back. The Ricard division returned to the charge, entered Vauchamps a second time, and would have had great difficulty in keeping the place, but for the movements on the two flanks of the village. Grouchy, after having made a *detour* through the woods, poured his troops into Vauchamps on the left, whilst the Lagrange division effected a similar movement on the right, by traversing the wood of Beaumont. Blucher, suspecting from the vigour and simultaneousness of the movements that were being operated around him, that Napoleon himself was present, resolved to fall back. But it was no longer time to do so with impunity. On one hand, Ricard's infantry making a last effort on Vauchamps, drove out the Ziethen division, and on the other hand, Grouchy, debouching abruptly from the woods, threatened to cut off his retreat. This division, formed into squares, tried at first to make head against our cavalry, but vigorously charged by Grouchy's squadrons, the lines were broken, and part of the men laid down their arms. The rest sought refuge with the main body of the Prussian troops. Our horsemen made about 2,000 prisoners, took a dozen pieces of cannon, and several standards. A thousand men, either killed or wounded, were left at Vauchamps and the environs.

But Napoleon hoped to gain still greater advantages over Blücher's troops. He ordered that the Prussian General should be pursued without relaxation, and himself directed the pursuit during half the day. Marmont, at the head of the Ricard and Lagrange infantry, supported besides by the Leval Spanish division, marched forward on the high road that leads from Montmirail to Châlons, through Vauchamps and Champaubert. He had in front the artillery of the Guard, commanded by Drouot, and on his wings, Grouchy's cavalry on one side, and the cavalry of the Guard and of General Saint Germain on the other. It was in this order he pursued Blücher, who was retiring in two compact masses, that of Kleist on the left of the route, that of Capzewitz on the right, with his artillery and baggage on the route itself. The Prussian General had very little cavalry to protect his infantry.

From eleven in the forenoon to three in the afternoon the French kept up the pursuit, pouring bullets and often grape shot on the enemy. In this way they reached Janvilliers, Fromentières, and Champaubert. The pursuers perceived that two of the enemy's battalions, posted in a wood, had remained behind. They were surrounded and obliged to surrender. At the same time, Grouchy seeing that in order to obtain the mastery over all or part of the two masses of enemies that were advancing along both sides of the route, it would be necessary to forestall their arrival at the entrance of the woods that surround Etoges, conceived the design of dashing through the woods as fast as his horses could go, in order to precede Blücher. For this purpose he ordered the light artillery to join him as quickly as possible. Whilst he was executing this movement the artillery cannonaded at every pause Blücher's two columns. This kind of warfare continued to the close of the day, when the Prussians were seen suddenly to stop, and their lines immediately bristled with bayonets. Grouchy had, in fact, got in advance of them with a portion of his squadrons, and attacked them on the left, whilst General Saint Germain did the same on the right with the cavalry lately arrived from Versailles. Blücher, placed in the midst of his infantry, did all in his power to infuse his spirit into his troops, and succeeded in bringing them in pretty good order, as far as the entrance of Etoges, but not without experiencing considerable loss. General Grouchy, though deprived of his artillery, which had not been able to follow him, charged Blücher's infantry several times, and penetrated their ranks sword in hand, whilst General Saint Germain did as much on his side. And here, by the instrumentality of cold steel alone, the French killed some hundred men, and took more than 2,000 prisoners, besides several flags and pieces of artillery. On arriving at the border of the woods that lay between them and Etoges, they were obliged to pause.

The French had already taken, killed or wounded, about 7,000 of Marshal Blücher's men. But Marmont ambitioned still more spoils. He suspected that the Prussian General would pass the

night at Etoges, and that his harassed troops would scatter themselves confusedly through the village, or in the neighbouring forest, and he thought that by appearing suddenly in the midst of them during the night, he would throw them into great disorder, and above all, drive them beyond Etoges to the foot of the plateau, which, during so many days, had been the theatre of war. Destined, in all probability, to again defend this position, whilst Napoleon carried his arms elsewhere, Marmont fixed his mind on taking up a position at Etoges itself, whence he could command the route of Vertus. He therefore resolved to make a night attack on Blücher.

But Marshal Marmont had only a small body of forces at his disposal, for his soldiers were already dispersed in the environs, looking for provisions. Marmont was followed by the Leval division, which Ney asserted was under his command. After a pretty warm discussion between the two Marshals, Marmont took a detachment of this division, and with one of his regiments of marines, dashed into the wood under favour of the darkness, and came suddenly down on Etoges, at the moment when the enemy, worn out by fatigue, began to enjoy a few minutes repose. This unexpected attack was crowned with success. Prussians and Russians, attacked before they could resume the defensive, were thrust out of Etoges, and obliged in the middle of the night, to fly to Bergères and Vertus. The French made a large number of prisoners, amongst whom were the Russian General Orossoff himself, with his staff. The latter part of this day Blücher lost more than 2,000 men, and a large quantity of artillery.

This day—the 14th—named after Vauchamps, cost Blücher from 9,000 to 10,000 men, either killed, wounded, or made prisoners. It would not be possible to put a more glorious termination to this admirable train of operations. Napoleon had set out on the 9th of February from Nogent-sur-Seine, he arrived on the 10th at Champaubert, where, on that day, he took or destroyed Olsouvieff's corps, and on the 11th, conquered at Montmirail, Sacken's troops. On the 12th he beat and drove back on Château-Thierry d'York's troops, employed the 13th in rebuilding the bridge of the Marne, for the purpose of sending Mortier in pursuit of the enemy, and on the 14th returned to Montmirail, and attacked Blücher, who had maladroitly thrown himself in his way, as if to furnish him an opportunity of overwhelming the last of the four detachments of the army of Silesia. Thus, almost, without fighting a regular battle, Napoleon had in four quickly-succeeding combats, entirely disorganized the army of Silesia, captured or killed 28,000 out of 60,000 men, carried off an immense quantity of artillery and flags, and severely punished the most presumptuous, the bravest and the most embittered of his adversaries. Surely Napoleon had now reason to be proud of his army and of himself, and of the last scintillations of his wondrous star, wondrous, even amidst calamity!

Napoleon sent on immediately to Paris the 18,000 prisoners he

had made, in order that the Parisians might see them with their own eyes, and that in beholding these trophies, worthy of the wars of Italy, their faith in the genius and good fortune of their Emperor might again revive.

The Parisians had learned in succession the un hoped-for triumphs of Napoleon, and excepting some, carried away by party spirit or hatred of the Imperial dynasty, had rejoiced at his success. The announcement of columns of prisoners had excited to the highest degree the expectation of the Parisians, who hoped to see them defile on the boulevards, within two or three days. But they scarcely dared indulge a sentiment of joy, for at the same time that they learned the defeat of Blücher and his lieutenants at Champaubert, at Montmirail, at Château-Thierry, and at Vauchamps, they also learned that Schwarzenberg was ready to force the passage of the Seine from Nogent to Montereau, and that Platow's Cossacks had appeared in the forest of Fontainebleau. Unhappy Paris, from whose bosom, during twenty years, fulminating terrors had been launched upon many European capitals; she was now, in her turn, a prey to the most terrible anguish. Victory even was no guarantee against these alarms, for, one enemy was no sooner beaten on the Marne than another appeared on the Seine, and tranquillized as to the state of things at Meaux, she was alarmed by the apprehension of what might occur in the direction of Melun and Fontainebleau. Earnest entreaties had reached Napoleon from Paris, imploring him to return to the Seine. On this account he had abandoned Marmont before the close of the battle-day at Vauchamps, and returned to Montmirail, to give new orders and prepare for new combats.

We shall now relate what had taken place in the great army of Prince Schwarzenberg. When Napoleon had quitted the Aube and the Seine for the Marne, the allied sovereigns had repaired to Troyes, and their army going in advance had occupied the course of the Seine from Nogent to Montereau, and had even endeavoured to extend the line to the Yonne, in order to avert the danger of being outflanked on the left. The declared object of the grand army of Bohemia was to march on Paris along the two banks of the Seine, by Fontainebleau and Melun, whilst the army of Silesia, following the course of the Marne, should arrive at Paris by Meaux. The expectation of entering the capital of France, inflamed, at this moment, the imagination of Alexander. Whilst the Emperor Francis lived in a retired manner at Troyes, receiving little society, and visiting only M. de Metternich, the Emperor Alexander, ever in a state of feverish activity, passed from one detachment of the army to the other, affecting to direct everything, and incessantly advising Blücher to await his arrival before entering Paris. The King of Prussia, to please the patriots of his staff, yielded to all the whims of his ally, but with the awkwardness of a sage, ill-fitted to play this empty and restless part. It is in this state the Allies were found by a trustworthy eye-witness, the brave

and learned General Reynier, who had been exchanged for General Count de Merveldt (both had been taken prisoners at Leipzig), and who, when this change was effected, had passed through Troyes, on his return to Paris. General Reynier was presented to the allied sovereigns, and listened to their observations with extreme attention.* The Emperor Francis conjured him to repeat to his son-in-law the advice he had so often given him—to yield to the pressure of circumstances, and give up what was demanded of him since he could not retain it. He bade him also reflect on the position of Austria at the actual time, in order to learn that submitting to the harsh necessities of the present, was often only a means to secure future advantages. The King of Prussia had, according to his wont, said scarcely anything, but Alexander had spoken with extraordinary vivacity. He had, in the first place, asked General Reynier when he expected to reach Paris, and the General having replied that he hoped to be there on the 14th or 15th of February, Alexander said: "Very well, Blucher will be there before you; Napoleon has humiliated me and I will humiliate him; and, I am so far from making war on France, that were he killed, I would desist immediately." "It is then for the Bourbons that your Majesty makes war," said General Reynier. "The Bourbons," rejoined Alexander, "I care not for them. Choose a leader amongst yourselves, amongst the illustrious generals who have contributed so much to the glory of France, and we are ready to accept him." Alexander, then entering into the most extraordinary and confidential communications, hinted to General Reynier the project of putting Bernadotte on the throne of France, as Catherine, forty years previously, had placed Poniatowski on the throne of Poland. On hearing this disclosure, General Reynier had greatly disconcerted the Czar by expressing the contempt which the military men of France had conceived for the conduct and talents of the new Swedish Prince. Alexander, surprised and displeased, dismissed General Reynier, who immediately set out for Paris, to offer his services to Napoleon, an offer highly meritorious in his circumstances, for he had rejected the most flattering offers of Alexander, to remain faithful to France in her misfortunes. General Reynier was Swiss by birth, but French in heart and act.

Wounded pride and the desire of vengeance dictated at this moment every act of the Emperor Alexander. It was under these influences he had suspended the sittings of Congress, assuming as a reason for not resuming them that M. de Caulaincourt had not immediately accepted the Châtillon propositions. He displayed in this matter a dogged determination, and wished to prevent all further negotiation. M. de Metternich, aided by Lord Castlereagh,

* No sooner had General Reynier arrived at Paris, than he made a faithful report of these conversations, which was immediately sent to Napoleon. This report, one of the most curious of the secret documents of the time, is worthy of entire credit, for General Reynier was incapable of disfiguring the truth, and besides, his report accords with all that the diplomatic despatches, French and foreign, tell us, touching the head-quarters of the allied sovereigns.

combated this wish of the Czar. The Austrian minister persevered in his policy of not carrying too far a struggle, which beyond a certain point, would only tend to give a preponderance to Russia. The English minister, ready to abandon warfare, if Antwerp and Genoa were given up to him, had, in opposing the Emperor Alexander, made use of the letter that M. de Caulaincourt had secretly addressed to M. de Metternich, and in which he asked if, in accepting the proposed bases, he would at least obtain a suspension of arms. Supporting their arguments on this letter, the Austrian and English ministers said that France being ready to yield to the wishes of the Allies, there was no motive for carrying hostilities further; that such a course would be only to incur useless risks for a purpose which could not be the avowed object of any of the allied powers. In fact, the Emperor Francis could not declare to Europe that he was going to make war for the purpose of dethroning his daughter, and the British Cabinet, though public opinion was become greatly modified in England, could not avow to Parliament that the war was being carried on for the purpose of re-establishing the Bourbons. Lord Castlereagh was now in a position to deprive France of Antwerp and Genoa, and should he expose himself to a reverse by outstepping the object of his mission, it would be impossible for him to appear either before the House of Lords or Commons in England. In short, in prolonging hostilities, there was a risk that France, as a nation, might rise against them, for already, in some parts, the peasants were arming, the convoys of the Allies were intercepted, stragglers from their army were killed, and this danger seemed likely to increase, and must necessarily add considerably to the difficulties of this envenomed struggle. As neither Austria's troops nor England's gold could be dispensed with, and as M. de Metternich as well as Lord Castlereagh had displayed remarkable firmness on this occasion, the other Allies had consented to the resumption of conferences. Accordingly, the plenipotentiaries, who were still at Châtillon, received a copy of preliminaries, whose acceptance would put an instant stop to hostilities; but the form was so humiliating, that an acceptance would be considered equivalent to entering Paris. This was a consolation expressly prepared for the Emperor Alexander. He was satisfied, hoping that Napoleon would not accept these new offers, and meanwhile, he urged Prince Schwarzenberg to march on Paris, to spare himself the mortification of arriving there after Marshal Blücher, or being stopped by the signing of peace at the moment he should be about to enter the capital.

As a consequence of these considerations, Prince Schwarzenberg had advanced in a direction parallel to the Seine, from Nogent to Montereau. He ordered the Wittgenstein corps and the troops of Marshal de Wrede to advance on Nogent and Bray; the Wurtembergers were to advance on Montereau, and those of Colloredo and Giulay on the Yonne, these latter having orders to cross the river and advance on Fontainebleau. The Russian and Prussian reserves

were to remain under Barclay and Tolly, between Troyes and Nogent. Wittgenstein and de Wrède having presented themselves at Nogent and Bray, were received at Nogent by General Bourmont, whom Marshal Victor had left there with only 1,200 men. This General, after a heroic combat, repulsed the enemy with a loss of 1,500 men. But at Bray, the Allies found only the National Guard, and forced the passage. Marshal Victor seeing the passage of the Seine forced at Bray, did not dare remain behind at Nogent, and retired on Provins and Nangis. Marshal Oudinot, borne along in this retrograde movement, and having only the Rothenbourg division to bring in aid, had followed the retreat of Marshal Victor, and both had taken up a position on the little river Yères, which crosses the Brie and falls into the Seine, near Villeneuve-Saint-Georges. The two marshals, drawn up behind this narrow river, awaited the coming of Napoleon. The brave General Pajol, always on horseback, spite of his gaping wounds, could not keep his position at Montereau, when Bray and Nogent were abandoned; he had joined General Alix, who had just defended Sens with the greatest vigour, and had fallen back from the Yonne on the Loing canal and from the Loing canal on Fontainebleau.

Thus, on the 14th of February, the day that Napoleon completed at Vauchamps the defeat of the army of Silesia, the troops of the army of Bohemia were posted in this manner: the Prince of Wittgenstein was at Provins, the Marshal de Wrède at Nangis, the Wurtembergers at Montereau, the Prince of Colloredo in the forest of Fontainebleau, General Giulay at Pont-sur-Yonne, the Cossacks in the neighbourhood of Orleans, Maurice de Liechtenstein with the Austrian reserves at Sens, and Barclay de Tolly, with the Russian and Prussian Guards, between Nogent and Bray. Some intelligence of Blucher's defeat had reached the head-quarters of the Allies, but they were not yet aware of the extent of his reverses, and they flattered themselves they could reach Paris by Fontainebleau or Melun.

On learning this melancholy state of things, Napoleon, with his wondrous activity, which knew no limits but the physical strength of his soldiers, immediately left Vauchamps for Montmirail, followed by the Young and Old Guard, and all the cavalry. He left Marshal Marmont the task he had already confided to him, that of holding a position between the Seine and the Marne, from Etoges to Montmirail, to keep a close watch on the *débris* of Blucher's army, and to aid Mortier, who had been sent in pursuit of Sacken and d'York in the direction of Soissons. Then Napoleon made arrangements to advance to the Seine and encounter Prince Schwarzenberg.

A grave question now presented itself to the mind of Napoleon. Would it be well to go straight from Montmirail to Nogent by Sézanne (the route he had taken before), reach the Seine by the shortest way, and so fall unexpectedly on Prince Schwarzenberg's flank; or, whether, would it be better, to follow the retrograde

movement of the Marshals Victor and Oudinot, whom it was supposed had been forced to retire still further since the last intelligence; would it be better to fall back to the banks of the Yères, join the two marshals, and, combined with them, attack Prince Schwarzenberg in front, and drive him back on the Seine that he had crossed? Were it always possible during war, to have timely information of the designs of the enemy, Napoleon might have known that the different corps of the army of Bohemia, were dispersed between Provins, Nangis, Montereau, Fontainebleau, and Sens, and then throwing himself into the midst of them with 25,000 men by the road that leads from Sézanne to Nogent, which was the shortest, he would have taken in flank the scattered corps of the enemy, joined with his right, Victor and Oudinot, thrown back in succession, Wittgenstein and de Wrède on the Prince of Wurtemberg, and all three on Colloredo, and destroyed or made prisoners a portion of those that had crossed the Seine.* But Napoleon having employed five days in fighting the army of Silesia, was ignorant of what had occurred in that of Bohemia, and in this ignorance of the actual state of things, was obliged to shape his conduct according to probabilities. Now, the great probability was that the marshals, after having fallen back a considerable distance, would have fallen back still further, that they would have paused behind the little river of Yères, that Schwarzenberg would be close upon them, attacking them with at least 80,000 men, having perhaps already conquered them, and in this case, by advancing directly on Nogent or Provins with only 25,000 men, Napoleon would incur the risk of meeting Schwarzenberg returning with 80,000 which would be a serious matter, before he should be joined by the two marshals. Besides, all the cross-roads from Montmirail to Nogent and from Montmirail to Provins were detestable, and might be impassable for his troops. For this reason, which was sufficiently strong, and from prudential motives, the safest course, instead of advancing direct to the Seine, was to fall back on Yères, as the marshals themselves had done, and join them by the paved route from Mont-

* I must here reply to the ill-founded reproach, that General Koch, in his excellent and conscientious work on the campaign of 1814, addresses to Napoleon, for not having marched directly from Montmirail to Provins, instead of falling back on Meaux. General Koch, always clear-sighted and impartial, is the only writer of the period that deserves entire confidence; however, even he is sometimes mistaken especially as he had not access to the Emperor's correspondence, for which reason he could not know or appreciate the motives that dictated the acts he criticises. It is, as we have already frequently repeated, with extreme reserve that any one should pronounce on Napoleon's conduct, and we may safely say, that when he errs, which seldom happens in his military combinations, he has been excited by his political feelings, or has been left in a forced ignorance of the enemy's movements. But in any other case, we may affirm with confidence, that his movements are calculated with incomparable depth and foresight. It is necessary then, before giving an opinion, that we should read all that remains of his written intentions, and be convinced that when we cannot discover his motives in the two causes we have just named, that they can be found in the facts themselves, if studied with greater attention. In short, it rarely happens, that in re-perusing these facts we do not find fresh cause to admire his genius, even whilst we deplore the unlicensed ambition that led to his ruin.

mirail to Meaux, from Meaux to Fontenay and Guignes, and this combination would raise his army to 60,000 men, which would be sufficient to drive back Prince Schwarzenberg on the Seine. Instead of taking the Austrian General in flank, Napoleon would attack him in front, but it might be that instead of finding his army in one solid mass, the French would find them dispersed in different corps, and it would not then be impossible to treat them as they had treated Blucher.

This was the only plan concordant with good sense, and Napoleon, who in his military projects always combined prudence with boldness, did not hesitate to adopt it. He, the same evening, ordered his Guard, both young and old, infantry and cavalry, the Leval Spanish division, and the cavalry of General Saint-Germain, to make the next day—the 15th—a forced march as far as Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and he set out himself for Meaux, in order to superintend the movements of his troops.

Having arrived on the afternoon of the 15th, at Meaux, he there resolved upon his final arrangements. It was on Meaux that General Macdonald had fallen back after the retreat that had so much afflicted him, and it was at Meaux that he had tried to reorganize his *corps d'armée*. This corps, with the *débris* he had brought back, with some battalions, drawn from the dépôts in Paris, and with all the National Guards that could be collected, were distributed into three divisions, amounting in all to about 12,000 men. Napoleon despatched them immediately by the route that leads from Meaux to Fontenay, to the Yères, this little stream of water, behind which all our forces were concentrated. He ordered Marshals Victor and Oudinot, who had retired to this spot, to keep their position, and informed them that he would join them next day—the 16th. The noble cavalry brought from Spain had already marched beyond Paris, to the number of 4,000. They were the finest troops in the world. Napoleon posted them at Guignes, where he supposed the principal battle of the campaign would take place. The two divisions of the Young Guard, organized at Paris, had just left, under General Charpentier and Boyer, to advance along the left bank of the Seine, and occupy the Fontainebleau route. Napoleon might certainly have brought them up on the right bank of the Seine, and combined all his resources in the neighbourhood of Guignes, but it would be risking too much to leave Paris unprotected along the left bank, as the Allies had sent a considerable number of their forces in that direction. He had consequently sent these two divisions forward on the Essonne, recommending them to fight to the last extremity, and so endeavour to protect Paris on the left bank of the Seine, whilst he would endeavour to free the capital on the right bank by a decisive battle. Lastly he gave directions necessary to make him sole master of the passages of the rivers, along which he was manœuvring; he gave orders for preparing provisions along the routes, and also to collect the field-labourers' carts, in order that the soldiers of the

Guard, transported on these carts, might be able to make double or treble stages. The next day he set out from Meaux, and arrived by Fontenay at Guignes, at the very moment when the Marshals Victor and Oudinot, flung back on the Yères, were disputing possession of the banks of that river with the van of Prince de Wittgenstein and the Marshal de Wrède. This state of things justified the resolution Napoleon had taken, for once united to the two Marshals, he need no longer fear Wittgenstein and de Wrède, as he should find himself at the head of 60,000 men, wherewith to oppose 50,000, and the result would undoubtedly be a signal success.

Napoleon considering that though a great mass of the enemy's forces lay before him, still Schwarzenberg's entire army could not be there, for he received intelligence of the enemy's presence at the same time, at Montereau, at Fontainebleau, and Sens, and even in the environs of Orleans. He consequently concluded that more than half the grand army of Bohemia did not lie before him, and he resolved to immediately assume the offensive. Though his guard and the Leval division had not arrived, he had under his command, including the troops of the three Marshals, Oudinot, Victor, Macdonald, and the Spanish cavalry, about 35,000 or 36,000 men and these he thought sufficient, when he was present, to attack 50,000. Besides the 25,000 men, who were coming up, would join in a few hours, and he made arrangements to commence fighting at the break of day.

Effectively on the 17th, he was on horseback from early morning directing in person the movements of his troops. Marshal Victor's troops having formed the rear guard in the retreat from the Seine to the Yères, now naturally constituted the van-guard. This Marshal advanced, having in the centre the Dufour and Hamelinaye divisions of reserve, and these troops he did not hesitate to expose, because they belonged to General Gérard; the wings were formed of the Duhesme and Chataux divisions of the 2nd corps, Marshal Victor's own troops, which he spared as much as possible. On the right the cavalry of the 5th corps, under General Milhaud; on the left, the cavalry of Spain, under General Treilhard, marched deployed, ready to charge *a outrance*. Marshal Victor was followed by the Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald. In the rear, but at a distance of several leagues, the Guard, travelling on carts, covered the route from Meaux to Guignes.

Hardly had Marshal Victor set out from Guignes for Mormant, than he perceived Count Pahlen with 2,500 foot, and about 1,800 horse soldiers; these formed the vanguard of the Prince de Wittgenstein. Here was noble prey that presented itself at the commencement of the operations against the army of Bohemia. General Gérard, who showed himself superior to others, and even seemed to outdo all his former deeds during this severe campaign, advanced at the head of a battalion of the 32nd; young soldiers, draughted into an old skeleton regiment, renowned in the Italian campaigns. He entered Mormant sword in hand, and drove out

Count Pahlen's infantry, who had taken refuge there in the hope of being assisted by the Bavarians, who were posted at Nangis. Deprived of this shelter, the Russian infantry was obliged to cross the open space that separates Mormant from Nangis. Drouot, debouching from Mormant with his artillery, covered the Russians with grape-shot, whilst that on the left, the Count de Valmy, with the squadrons lately arrived from Spain, and on the right, Count Milhaud with the dragoons that came the preceding year, attacked the enemy with drawn swords. The squares of Russian infantry, spite their solidity, were broken and all captured with their artillery. Their cavalry was overtaken before they could save themselves by flight, and a great part made prisoners or destroyed. This affair cost the Russians 4,000 men, reckoning prisoners with the killed and wounded, and eleven pieces of cannon.

This commencement promised Prince Schwarzenberg's army treatment pretty similar to what Blucher's army had experienced. However, it was necessary that the French should keep up an incessant pursuit, if they wished to obtain the result they had a right to hope, and Napoleon consequently accelerated the forward movement of the different corps. The French advanced rapidly on Nangis, throwing back at the same time the Russian troops of Wittgenstein, whose van-guard they had already annihilated, and the Bavarian troops, that retired to their *corps de bataille*. The success of this new series of operations depended essentially on the immediate passage of the Seine, for if Napoleon succeeded in crossing that river, before all the enemy's corps had repassed, and especially those that had ventured as far as Fontainebleau, he was almost sure of encountering in detail those that should be latest in returning. He therefore advanced rapidly towards the bridges of Nogent, Bray, and Montereau that lay before him. He sent Marshal Oudinot forward through Provins to Nogent, with part of the cavalry of Spain, under Count de Valmy; and sent Marshal Macdonald to Bray, by the way of Donnemarie. As to himself, he turned to the right, followed by Marshal Victor's troops, and advanced on Montereau, passing through Villeneuve. Not knowing which of these three bridges would be easiest to retake, Napoleon determined to attack the three at the same time. By marching boldly forward the French might carry one or two of the three bridges, and then it would be possible to cross the Seine in time to cut off the retreat of those corps of the enemy that had advanced too far.

In advancing on Villeneuve, Marshal Victor, still preceded by the Dufour and the Hamelinaye divisions, headed by General Gérard, met a little beyond Valjouan, the Bavarian division, Lamotte, that was seeking to escape, and that had very little cavalry to oppose to ours. The Lamotte division occupied the high road transversely; the left wing was strongly supported by the village of Villeneuve, the right deployed in a little plain, surrounded by trees. Gen. Gérard, who was actively engaged in every encounter with the enemy, advanced on Villeneuve with a battalion of the 86th, carried

the place at the point of the bayonet, and thus deprived the Lamotte division of the support of this village. The division was then obliged to retire across the little plain that lay behind, and seek refuge in the woods. This was a favourable moment for our cavalry to charge. General Lheritier, who commanded a portion of Milhaud's dragoons, was on the spot, and if he had profitted of the opportunity, the fate of the Lamotte division was decided. Our soldiers, always intelligent, called loudly on the cavalry, but whether General Lheritier awaited orders from Marshal Victor, that did not arrive, or whether it was that he did not perceive the favourable opportunity, certain it is he remained motionless, and the Bavarian infantry crossed the open plain unmolested. Happily, General Gérard, guided by a peasant, had skirted the border of the wood, and now suddenly debouched with his infantry on the flank of the Lamotte division that was retiring in squares. He attacked these squares at the point of the bayonet, broke several, and now received most timely help from General Bordessoule, who, observing the immobility of the rest of the cavalry, rushed upon the enemy with three hundred young cuirassiers, just arrived from the dépôt at Versailles. These brave beginners, with an ardour and ferocity not unfrequently displayed by young soldiers, charged the Bavarian broken lines with impetuosity, and sabred a great number of the enemy. This division lost on this occasion 1,000 men, but the French might have taken or destroyed the entire. Our troops now advanced to Salins, where Marshal Victor stopped to pass the night, though he had orders to march to Montereau. He wished General Gérard to go there; but the latter, whose troops were harassed by a long march and two engagements, were unequal to the task, and it was the duty of Marshal Victor, whose two divisions had not fought during the day, to form the head of the column by night. The Marshal did nothing of the kind; he was fatigued, ill, dejected, discontented with Napoleon, who had reproached him with having badly defended the Seine; in a word, he was suffering, morally and physically, though still ready to re-appear on the battle-field, and prove himself an officer as intelligent as brave. He passed the night at Salins, at a league from the bridge of Montereau, where great advantages awaited us, had our activity corresponded to the urgency of circumstances.

Napoleon, overwhelmed with fatigue, had taken a moment's repose at Nangis, intending to rise in the middle of the night, according to his custom, to issue orders, which it was necessary to give at night, that they might reach their destination by break of day. He rose at one, and learned that Marshal Victor had remained at Salins. His irritation was extreme, for all the reports received the evening before, announced that the enemy in retiring, had taken precautions to dispute with us the possession of the bridges of Nogent and Bray, which was but too easy to accomplish. In fact, the high grounds, which at Montereau border and command the Seine, are at Bray and Nogent far in the background, and conse-

quently afford no prominent position from which the bridges could be fired on. On the contrary, villages extending along both banks and well barricaded, offered posts, which the army of Bohemia, concentrated on account of its retreat, could long dispute with us. There now only remained the bridge of Montereau, and this bridge was so much the more important, as, if the French crossed it, it would be possible to cut off Colloredo's corps, that had ventured as far as Fontainebleau, and so deprive the enemy at one blow of about 15,000 or 20,000 men, which would be a signal triumph. Napoleon ordered Marshal Victor to quit his bed instantly, summon the troops from their bivouac, and march to Montereau. He also prepared to go there himself. Before setting out he ordered Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald to carry, if possible, the one Nogent, the other Bray, but if they failed, to fall back on him, that all may debouch on Montereau. The Guard having made a day's journey on carts, had arrived at Nangis; Napoleon ordered them to follow Victor to Montereau.

A resolution was taken on this day, which attested the importance of our recent success. When Napoleon arrived that evening at Nangis, he met the Count de Paar, an aide-de-camp of Prince Schwarzenberg, who had come *a l'improviste*, to demand a suspension of arms, a suspension that M. de Caulaincourt had vainly offered, a few days before, to purchase, by the most bitter sacrifices. How came it that so much self-confidence, haughtiness, and severity on the part of the Allies, had suddenly given way to so much prudence and moderation? The sovereigns assembled at Nogent around the Prince de Schwarzenberg, after having first heard vague reports of Blucher, had soon learned in detail the extent of the reverses experienced by this fiery-spirited General, and conscious of Napoleon's presence by the severe attacks they had just experienced themselves, they suddenly conceived opinions more modest than those they had entertained up to the preceding evening. The army of Bohemia was, in fact, in a very serious position, for this army was advancing abreast in a battle-line of more than twenty leagues in extent, from Nogent to Fontainebleau, and in four columns, of which one or two ran imminent risk of being surrounded and destroyed, should Napoleon get in advance of them at the passage of the Seine. To put an instant stop to his further progress was of the highest importance, and spite of the customary remarks of the party that advocated war *a outrance*, Prince Schwarzenberg, despising them on this occasion, took the resolution of immediately sending an aide-de-camp to Napoleon, proposing that both parties should pause where they were, saying that certainly it was owing to his ignorance of what was going on at Châtillon, that the Emperor had carried hostilities so far, that the conferences, temporarily suspended, had been resumed, on bases admitted by M. de Caulaincourt himself, and that within a few hours, they should probably learn that the preliminaries of peace were signed. Such an assertion must be regarded either as a fraud or an evidence of extraordinary simpli-

city. M. de Caulaincourt had not accepted the insulting propositions made by the Allies; he had limited himself to demanding confidentially of M. de Metternich, whether the summary acceptance of their propositions would be at least productive of a suspension of arms, and this enquiry he had made in a moment of despair on the morrow of the battle of la Rothière. But to suppose that after the battles of Champaubert, Montmirail, Château-Thierry, Vauchamps, Mormant, and Villeneuve, to suppose, we say, that after such combats, Napoleon would consent that France should be circumscribed within her ancient limits, and what was still worse, renounce the privilege of having an opinion on the fate that was prepared for Italy, Germany, Holland, and Poland, this was truly a strange presumption, and equal at least to that of which we have more than once accused Napoleon.

Be this as it may, it was the substance of what the aide-de-camp of the Prince de Schwarzenberg was commissioned to propose at the French head-quarters. So Napoleon was expected to pause in the midst of victory, and consent to his own and France's degradation.

He listened with an ironical smile to the intelligence that a messenger had arrived from the Allies; he would not admit him to his presence, but he consented to receive Prince Schwarzenberg's letter, saying that he would reply at a later period. In fact, he did not know what was the nature of the propositions to which the message he received referred. Having but rarely held communications with M. de Caulaincourt, from whom he was separated by the entire army of Bohemia, Napoleon was quite ignorant of what had taken place at Châtillon; he did not know that after the most abhorrent propositions had been made to M. de Caulaincourt, that the latter had written confidentially to M. de Metternich: he did not know that the Austrian minister had regarded the letter of M. de Caulaincourt as an official document, and as such, had transmitted it to the Allies, and that in order to induce Napoleon to pause in his successful career, it was not only required that France should shrink back within the limits of 1790, but she was also required to renounce her position as an European Power. Napoleon was ignorant of all these details, or he would have given the Austrian envoy a very different reception. In the proposal the Allies made to him, he only saw a desire of arresting his victorious progress, without suspecting the nature of the conditions of peace, to which allusion was made. And it certainly was not probable that he would consent to sheathe his sword at the moment when by a last successful effort, he might hope to change the entire aspect of affairs. He therefore deferred his reply, and continued his march. But fearing that M. de Caulaincourt, whose mind was a prey to the most horrible torments, and whose society at Châtillon was composed of enemies who would hide from him our success, fearing that under such circumstances he might yield under the difficulties by which he was beset, and make too extensive a use of

the powers entrusted to him, Napoleon, before mounting his horse to set out for Montereau, wrote him the following letter :

“Nangis, 18th February.

“I gave you a *carte blanche*, in order to save Paris, and avoid a battle, which was the last hope of the nation. The battle has been fought; Providence has blessed our arms. I have taken between 30,000 and 40,000 prisoners; I have captured 200 picces of cannon, a great number of Generals, and destroyed several armies, almost without striking a blow. I yesterday came up with Prince Schwarzenberg’s army, which I hope to destroy before it repasses our frontiers. You ought to assume the same attitude; you ought to do everything to obtain peace; but my desire is that you should not sign anything without my orders, because I alone understand my position. As a general principle, I only desire a solid and honourable peace, and it can only be such on the bases proposed at Frankfort. If the Allies had accepted your propositions of the 9th, there would have been no battle; I would not have incurred any risk at a moment when the least reverse might have brought ruin on France, but on the other hand, I should not have learned the secret of my adversary’s weakness. It is but fair that I should enjoy the advantages of fortune that are offered to me. I desire peace, but it shall not be one that will impose on France conditions more humiliating than those of Frankfort. My position is now certainly much better than when the Allies were at Frankfort; they might then defy me, I had obtained no advantage over them, and they were far from my territory. But now things are very different. I have gained immense advantages over them, advantages that find no parallel in my military career of twenty years, a career, too, not wholly devoid of glory. I am ready to put an end to hostilities, and allow the enemies to return quietly to their own homes, if they sign preliminaries based on the Frankfort propositions.”

If the Allies conjured up illusions for themselves, Napoleon, it was plain, did the same for himself, and instead of contenting himself with rejecting what was unpleasant, he demanded what, under the circumstances, he could not obtain.

Whilst Napoleon employed the first hours of the morning of the 18th in this manner, Marshal Victor had at length marched on Montereau, and arrived there at a very early hour. General Pajol, after having rallied his troops in the wood of Valence, had advanced with his cavalry and some battalions of the National Guards. He reached the borders of the wood of Valence, at the very moment that Marshal Victor debouched opposite the little hillock of Surville, which commands the Seine and the little town of Montereau. This hillock, which descends in a tolerably gentle slope on the Valence and Salins sides, breaks on the Seine side in an abrupt declivity. From the top of this eminence, we perceive the little town of Montereau lying at the foot, and the two rivers that mingle their waters at this spot as well as the bridge of the Seine, are objects of great importance, for which the two armies were about to

contend desperately. If the French succeeded in quickly getting possession of the hillock, it was possible, by dashing up to the bridge, which was of stone, and less liable to be destroyed than one of wood, to get possession of that too, before the enemy could cut it down. But to attack the hillock was not a slight undertaking, the Wurtembergers being stationed there in great force. It was the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg that occupied the position. This Prince, whom Napoleon had formerly treated very ill, and whom the Emperor Alexander, on the contrary, loaded with favours, intending even to give him in marriage, his sister, the Archduchess Catherine; this intellectual and brave Prince sought to distinguish himself, and efface by his services to the Allies, his father's long devotedness to the French Empire. On the possession of the bridge of Montereau depended the safety of the Austrian corps of Colloredo, that had ventured as far as Fontainebleau, and whose retreat was impossible, should the French cross the Seine, before this corps had fallen back at least as far as Moret or Nemours. But, notwithstanding the danger of the position, the Prince of Wurtemberg was resolved to resist, at the risk of being driven from the hillock of Surville into the Seine.

The Prince de Wurtemberg had ranged his infantry from Villaron to Saint-Martin, facing the route by which the French were advancing. His rear was covered by the hillock of Surville. He was, besides, protected by a large quantity of artillery.

General Pajol, ever brave and intelligent, had endeavoured to advance with his cavalry on the rear of the Wurtemberger's position, in order to take possession of the high road that runs behind the hillock of Surville, and make a rapid descent on the town of Montereau. But stopped by a destructive fire from the artillery, he was obliged to wait the execution of his project until Marshal Victor's infantry should have made their attack on the hillock.

One of the Marshal's divisions, commanded by his son-in-law, General Chataux, a distinguished officer, arrived first, and exhibited great impatience to repair the fault that Napoleon had just blamed so severely. This division advanced with impetuosity on the hillock of Surville, with their right towards Villaron, their left towards Saint-Martin. The soldiers, led on with spirit, tried to escalate the position which was protected by *clotures*. They succeeded at first, were afterwards repulsed, and made repeated attempts without attaining their object, notwithstanding prodigious efforts of courage.

General Chataux did not spare himself, but his very impetuosity involved a danger, that of exhausting this brave division before it could be supported, and thus uselessly shedding most precious blood. Soon the Duhesme division arrived, with the Marshal himself, and this division replaced that of Chataux, which advanced more to the right to attack the hillock on the least precipitous side. The brave General Chataux marching at the head of his soldiers, was struck by a ball before his father-in-law's eyes, and fell dying into his arms. This fatal accident damped the ardour of the attack on the right,

and the Duhesme division on the left, attacking the position on the least accessible side, was not likely to succeed, when General Gérard arrived with the Dufour and Hamelinaye divisions.

Napoleon, informed of the difficulties of the attack, and displeased with Marshal Victor, had sent General Gérard orders to take the chief command, which General Gérard did immediately. Seeing that the artillery of the Wurtembergers caused us serious annoyance, the General combined all his batteries, as well as those of the 2nd corps, and directed 60 pieces of cannon against the Wurtembergers in order to break their ranks by this violent fire, before attacking them hand to hand. He caused them so much damage, that wishing to free themselves from this murderous fire, they attempted to fall on our cannon and carry them off. General Gérard allowed them to advance, then rushed on them at the head of a battalion, and forced them back on their position at the point of the bayonet. At this moment Napoleon arrived with the Old Guard, and Pajol, after having driven back the enemy's cavalry, threatened to turn the hillock of Surville. At this aspect, the firmness of the Wurtembergers was shaken, and they thought of retreating across the bridge of Montereau. But time was not allowed them for this movement, the French attacked them *en masse*, ascended the hillock and dislodged them by main force; Pajol setting off in full gallop at the head of a regiment of chasseurs, dashed into the high road which runs behind the hillock of Surville, forming at this point a rapid descent, and attacked the Wurtembergers, who were accumulated on the declivity, whilst the artillery of the Guard, with their cannon directed against the hillock itself, riddled them with balls. On their side the brave inhabitants of Montereau, who only awaited the moment to rush upon the enemy, began to fire on them from the windows. The scene was soon one of complete butchery. The Prince of Wurtemberg narrowly escaped being taken, and in escaping left behind 3,000 of his men either killed or wounded, and 4,000 prisoners, with the greater part of his cannon. The most important object, the bridge, remained in possession of Pajol's chasseurs, who crossed it in full gallop, whilst a mine exploded beneath, without carrying away the key-stone. Napoleon, stationed on the hillock of Surville, whence he directed himself the operations of his artillery, experienced at this sight, an exceeding great joy, which he made no effort to conceal. In fact, he expected the most brilliant result from this glorious feat of arms.

Once master of Montereau, Napoleon's first care was to send his cavalry beyond, in order to learn the position of the Austrian corps, commanded by Colloredo. But this corps had already had time to return to the Yonne, and at this moment formed the rear-guard of Prince Schwarzenberg. It was, therefore, no longer possible to overtake them with troops already fatigued, of whom some, as the 2nd corps of the Paris reserve, had fought all day, and others, as the Imperial Guard, had marched incessantly during seventy-two hours, making double stages during the

day, and passing the night on carts. It was necessary then to pause, and take time to let the army pass by the lately conquered bridge of Montereau, and afterwards advance *en masse* on Prince Schwarzenberg, to surprise and destroy his various detachments if they found them dispersed, and give battle if they found them concentrated, a battle which the French would fight with the prestige of victory in their favour, and the consciousness that Napoleon had then actually under his command 60,000 men.

Though the bridge of Montereau had been carried twelve hours too late, Napoleon still had reason to be content with the last eight days. In fact, it was but a week since and he was falling back from Brienne to Troyes, not knowing whether he would be able to defend Paris, and yet within this short space of time, he had cut Blücher's army in pieces, and put to flight that of Schwarzenberg. Here was a change of position, sufficient to satisfy the pride even of the conqueror of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland. Napoleon could now, if he did not exaggerate the political bearings of his success, terminate this war, in obtaining, if not all the Frankfort conditions, at least some of the most essential, and above all, with stipulations bearing no resemblance to the insulting propositions of Châtillon. However, Napoleon was not satisfied because he had not collected all the fruit he had a right to expect from his admirable tactics, and he quarrelled with several of his lieutenants, who had not, on this occasion, done all he expected from them. Right or wrong, he complained of Digeon, General of Artillery, who had badly supplied the artillery on the eve and even the day of the combat of Montereau; he complained of General Lheritier, who had not charged the Bavarians at the battle of Villeneuve; of General Montbrun, who had not sufficiently defended the bridge of Moret on the Loing, (this was not the celebrated Montbrun, who died, as we must remember, at the Moskowa); of Marshal Victor, whom he accused of having made an ill-conducted retreat from Strasbourg to Châlons, of having feebly defended the Seine, of having held back the troops at the battle of Villeneuve, of having slept at Salins, instead of marching on to Montereau—in short, of exhibiting on all occasions, a dejection mingled with ill-humour, which gave bad example. Many replies might have been made to the reproaches addressed to these different officers. As to Marshal Victor, though he did not merit the anger of which he was the object, still it must be acknowledged, that he exhibited too much dejection, and seemed to recover his spirits only in presence of the enemy, or under the immediate orders of Napoleon. It must also be admitted that his family were amongst those who exhibited the least zeal for the Empress. Napoleon knew it, and it was under feelings arising from these different circumstances, that he had deprived the Marshal of his command to confer it on General Gérard. This blow, joined to the death of General Chataux, had plunged the unhappy Victor into the profoundest grief. He had remained all day in the thickest of the fight, even when he had no

right to issue orders, repressing the tears, which welled up, through grief at the death of his son-in-law, and vexation at the censure passed on him. He repaired the same evening to the castle of Surville, where he found Napoleon, his mind divided between joy, at the glorious triumph he had obtained, and vexation at the drawbacks with which it was accompanied. Napoleon, on seeing Marshal Victor, could not restrain his anger, and totally forgetting the day of Rothière, reproached him with his conduct during the past two months, and to those reproaches on military topics, he added those of a political character, and finished by telling the Marshal that if he were fatigued or ill, it would be better to seek repose and leave the army. The Marshal, to whom the order to withdraw at this crisis appeared a disgrace, replied that he was about to shoulder a musket and take his place in the ranks of the Old Guard, where he should find a soldier's death beside his old companions in arms. Napoleon, deeply moved by the Marshal's emotion, extended his hand, and consented to keep him near his person. He could not deprive General Gérard of the command of the 2nd corps, which he had that morning conferred on him, and which that General deserved so well, but he indemnified the Marshal in another manner. Two divisions of the Young Guard—Charpentier and Boyer, had just left Paris; these had been posted along the Essonne, to cover the capital on the left of the Seine. Napoleon formed of these a corps of the Guard, and gave the command to Marshal Victor. To place this Marshal about the Emperor's person, and thus relieve him of all responsibility, was a measure that at the same time soothed his feelings, and restored his military importance, for, freed from the anxieties of a higher command, he again became one of the most efficient officers in the army.

On the next day—the 19th—Napoleon wished to march immediately on Nogent, continue his pursuit of Prince Schwarzenberg, and fight a pitched battle, if he could force him to accept it, but the necessity of making all the troops then under his command, pass over the single bridge of Montereau, involved the loss of the entire day. These troops consisted of the two Paris divisions of reserve, the 2nd corps, the Imperial Guard, the Spanish division, and lastly, Marshal Macdonald's corps, which had not been able to cross the Seine at Bray. Whilst these troops employed the time in defiling by the bridge of Montereau, Napoleon was taking measures to overtake the enemy as soon as he could, and if possible, to execute a flank movement for this purpose. The bridges of Bray and Nogent having been destroyed, he ordered preparations to be made for the passage of Marshal Oudinot's corps, near Nogent. As to that of Marshal Macdonald, we have seen that he had brought his corps up to Montereau. Napoleon's project was, after having cleared Montereau, to turn to the left, and follow the course of the Seine as far as Méry, which is not far from the confluence of the Seine and Aube. Having arrived at this point, he intended, instead of following Prince Schwarzenberg along

the Troyes route, to leave a single corps to observe his movements, and with the main body of his own forces, to cross the Seine, at Méry, and advance along the right bank, whilst Prince Schwarzenberg advanced along the left; and now, having no longer an enemy in front, Napoleon's troops could march quicker and eventually repass the Seine, above Troyes, and give Prince Schwarzenberg battle in a position, which was not alone his line of retreat, but his line of communication with Blücher. These were two considerable advantages and of the greatest consequence. Here was an instance of the inexhaustible inventiveness of Napoleon's genius. No sooner was one plan frustrated, than he devised another, equally practicable and beneficial in result.

Napoleon advanced with the main body of his forces to the left towards Nogent; however, not to break off all communication with the Yonne, and not to overcrowd the high road of Troyes, he ordered Marshal Macdonald to advance a little to the right, through Saint-Martin-Bosny and Pavillon, whilst General Gérard was to advance a little still more to the right, through Trainel and Avon. He ordered General Alix, the brave defender of Sens, to re-occupy the banks of the Yonne, with the National Guards and General Pajol's cavalry. The wounds of this latter General, in consequence of unheard-of fatigues, had again opened. Napoleon, after loading him with rewards, had sent him to Paris, and gave his post to General Alix. He made some additions to the Old Guard; he added two noble battalions, composed of the Old Gendarmes of Spain, which raised to eighteen battalions, the division of the Old Guard that he had with him (the other was in the direction of Soissons, with Marshal Mortier), and he added besides, several companies of young soldiers, whose duty would be to issue from the ranks and act as sharp-shooters, whilst the old veterans remained in line, immovable as walls. Napoleon reiterated his orders that at Paris, fresh battalions of infantry, and at Versailles, fresh squadrons of cavalry should be incessantly formed. He also ordered portable bridges to be constructed, with boats collected on the Seine, for on account of the want of this appurtenance of war, the passage of French rivers had become as difficult for us as the passage of foreign ones, and was a continual obstacle to the success of our military combinations.

Napoleon employed in making these arrangements, the 19th and 20th of February, which his troops passed in crossing the Seine at Montereau, and advancing towards Nogent. He had momentarily taken up his residence* at the château of Surville, and had great

* We have already made the observation that from want of acquaintance with Napoleon's correspondence, persons often reproach him with faults that he has not committed, or with intentions that he never entertained. The two days passed at Surville furnish a fresh example of this. Various critics, French as well as foreign, after having asked why, on quitting Blücher, Napoleon did not march direct from Montmirail to Provins, and fall upon Prince Schwarzenberg's flank, instead of making a detour in the rear, through Meaux and Guignes, now ask why he did not cross the Seine at Nogent or Bray, instead of crossing at Montereau alone; and why,

need of the time thus afforded him, for it was not alone the troops immediately under his command that engaged his attention, he had during these two days to arrange for all those that defended the various frontiers of France, and who needed his surveillance no less than the others, and who wanted above all the momentum that his spirit alone could impress. General Maison, who had been sent into Belgium to replace General Decaen, with whom Napoleon found fault for having abandoned Willemstadt and Breda, had endeavoured to make head against the various perils with which he was surrounded. Profiting of the moment, when he had at his disposal the Roguet and Barrois divisions of the Young Guard, he made a descent on the English under General Graham, and on the Prussians under General Bulow, and had obliged them to evacuate Antwerp; but being soon after deprived of the Roguet division, having only that of Barrois at his command, with some battalions hastily organized in the dépôts of the ancient 1st corps, the whole not amounting to more than 7 or 8,000 men fit for active service, he had been reduced to the alternative, either of shutting himself in Antwerp, or of leaving this place to try and protect Belgium. He chose the latter part, which was the wisest, and left in Antwerp 12,000 men with the illustrious Carnot, whose services Napoleon had accepted, when they were so nobly offered at this trying moment. General Maison then advanced to Brussels, afterwards to Mons and Lille, throwing here and there into the fortresses of the North, what provisions he could collect, with half-clothed, half-armed conscripts, that he managed to get from the dépôts. Whilst Carnot supported with invincible firmness a fierce bombardment, which, however, did not damage the fleet—the great object of England's anger—General Maison manœuvring with a handful of soldiers between the three fortresses in the north of France, had, as

after having selected Montereau, he lost two entire days at the castle of Surville? A perusal of Napoleon's letters will furnish a reply to all these questions. At Nogent and Bray, the nature of the locality, flat and bestudded with villages on both banks, offered the enemy such chances of resistance, that there was no hope of forcing the passage, and besides, the bridges being of wood, it was scarcely possible to preserve them from destruction. At Montereau, on the contrary, it was possible, thanks to the hillock of Surville that commanded the opposite bank, to seize the passage more easily; moreover, the bridge being of stone, there would be more time to save it. The event proves that Napoleon was right. Lastly, the hope of seizing the corps that had advanced as far as Fontainebleau was a last great motive for preferring the passage at Montereau. And Napoleon did try to pass the three bridges at the same time, hoping most from Montereau, which was the only point where he succeeded. It is then evident that he did all he could do. As to the time lost on the 19th and 20th of February, his correspondence proves that he was burning with impatience during the hours employed in traversing the bridge and little town of Montereau. This defile being passed, the entire day of the 20th was needed to concentrate the troops on Nogent to the left. Consequently, not a moment was lost, and Napoleon, who traversed on horseback in three hours, the distance that his army could only accomplish in twenty-four, might very well stop at Surville, and devote the 20th to his general affairs, which did not less urgently demand his attention, than those immediately before his eyes. It is quite clear that now as ever, he is right and his critics wrong, when the question touches military operations exclusively. But to be thoroughly convinced of this truth, it would be necessary to read his orders and correspondence, to which historians have not hitherto had access.

far as circumstances would permit, saved our frontier and kept up an active force ready to fall on any detachments of the enemy that came within their reach.

Napoleon, who, in his perilous position, was exceedingly difficult to please, incessantly urged General Maison not to occupy himself exclusively with the fortresses, but to attack in the rear the troops that had marched through Cologne on Champagne, and tormented with unmerited reproaches this General, who had no need of stimulation, for he had shown himself skilful, vigorous, and indefatigable in the defence of this frontier.

Napoleon was more just when he reproached Augereau, but in this instance too, from the habit of demanding more, in order to obtain less, he was too exacting. Augereau, old, wearied, even disgusted, had however recovered his ardour at sight of the danger that threatened France, and which was peculiarly manacing to men, whom, like him, the revolution had compromised. It is true he had at Lyon, three thousand conscripts, draughted into old regiments, but there were no magazines, no victuals, no artillery, no horses. Unfortunately, Augereau was not endowed with that creative activity that enables a man to draw from a large population all the resources it can afford. He had nevertheless endeavoured to feed and clothe his conscripts through the instrumentality of the Lyonnaise municipality; he brought from Valence some artillery, he recalled from Grenoble the feeble Marchand division, and sent aide-de-camps to Nîmes to seek there the division of reserve, which, like that of Bordeaux, had been intended to pass from the south to the north. By these means he had succeeded, in the beginning of February, in assembling, besides the thousands already at Lyon, 3,000 men that had come from Nîmes, and what was still better, 10,000 old soldiers, detached from the army of Catalonia, and with these forces he prepared to commence the campaign. But he wished to give his troops some days repose before encountering the enemy. It was undoubtedly a matter of vast importance that he should take the field, for his appearance alone in the direction of Châlons and Besançon would cause extreme alarm in the rear of the allied armies, and perhaps determine the retreat of Prince Schwarzenberg, which had not yet commenced. Napoleon, burning with impatience, wrote Augereau the following letter, which merits a place in history.

“Nogent-sur-Seine, 21st February, 1814.

“The Minister of War has just laid before me the letter you wrote him on the 16th. That letter annoyed me very much. What! six hours after receiving the first detachments that came from Spain, you were not in the field. Six hours rest was sufficient for the men. I won the battle of Nangis with the brigade of dragoons, that arrived from Spain, and who had not drawn breath from the time they left Bayonne. You say the six Nîmes battalions want clothes and arms, and are undrilled. What miserable reasons to offer to me, Augereau; I have destroyed 80,000 enemies with battalions

composed of conscripts, that had not cartouche-boxes, and were scarcely clothed. The National Guards, you say, are contemptible I have 4,000 here, from Angers and Brittany, in round hats, no cartouche-boxes, but that have good muskets; I have turned them to good account. There is no money, you say. And whence did you expect to draw money? You can only expect money when we shall have torn a receipt in full from the hands of the enemy. You want horses; take them wherever you can find them. You have no stores; this is too ridiculous. I command you to set out within twelve hours after the receipt of this letter to take the field. If you are still the Augereau of Castiglione, keep the command; if your sixty winters oppressed you too heavily resign the command to the oldest of your general officers. France is threatened and in danger; she can only be saved by daring courage and willing service, not by vain temporizing. You must have more than six thousand picked men with you; I have not so many, and yet I have destroyed three armies, taken forty thousand prisoners, two hundred pieces of cannon, and three times saved the capital of France. The enemy is flying in every direction. Be the first on the battle-field. This is not a time to act as we have done in these latter days; we must resume the arms, and call up the spirit of '93. When the French soldiers see your plume waving in the van of the battle, and your breast exposed to the fire of the muskets, you may lead them whither you please."

The army of Italy was not far distant from Augereau. Napoleon had sent orders to prince Eugene to re-pass the Alps and come down to Lyon, but these orders had arrived late, and not until Prince Eugene was already engaged in sharp combats with the Austrian army. Finding his right turned by the Austrian detachments, that English ships had landed on this side of the Adige, Prince Eugene had been obliged to abandon this river, which the army quitted with extreme regret. He had taken up a position behind the Mincio, his left at Goito, his right at Mantua, with a determination to make himself respected. In fact, seeing the Austrians occupied in passing the Mincio, on his left, in the direction of Valeggio, he had left a third of his army under the command of General Verdier, and crossed the river himself, passing over the the bridges of Goito and Mantua, then making a rapid flank movement, he had brought the entire mass of his soldiers to bear upon the Austrians as they were marching to the point where they intended to cross the river. He killed, wounded, or made prisoners between six and seven thousand men in the plains of Roverbella. He captured besides, a considerable quantity of artillery. The affair cost us about 3,000 men. Our loss was relatively, very considerable, but our troops had displayed the greatest vigour, and their young General exhibited military talents that were beginning to ripen. The Austrians in confusion regained the Adige, deferring their project of conquest until Murat should have fulfilled his promises.

Such was the intelligence that M. de Fascher, an Aide-de-camp of Prince Eugene, brought Napoleon, at the very time that the battle of Montereau was fought. It was a delicate subject, and one requiring profound deliberation, that of persisting in the determination to evacuate Italy, after a splendid victory on the Mincio, and still more splendid victories between the Marne and the Seine. When Napoleon had commanded this evacuation, he had done so, not alone on account of the necessity he was under of concentrating his forces, but in the hope that the troops he should draw from Italy would arrive on the Rhône in time to be useful there. The present position of affairs called for fresh consideration. Certainly, if Prince Eugene had been able to bring to Lyon, in time, the 30,000 soldiers that had just gained the battle of Roverbella, if he had been able to join these to General Suchet's 50,000 veteran troops, and that with such a force he had fallen, passing through Dijon, on the rear of Prince Schwarzenberg, it is probable that none of the Allies would have repassed the Rhine, and such a result would undoubtedly have repaid every imaginable sacrifice. But Napoleon, who learned too late, that the Allies intended to make a winter campaign, had not sent orders to Prince Eugene, until the end of January, to return to France, and the Prince was then engaged in the most difficult operations, from which he could not withdraw until victory should have crowned his arms. In fact, were the order for his recall persevered in, it would be impossible for him to be at Lyon before the end of March, and by that time Napoleon should either have yielded to his enemies, or been victorious over them. Moreover this retreat would be the voluntary abandonment of Italy, that is to say, the loss of a pledge which would be of such vast importance at Châtillon. Though at the actual time, Napoleon was only fighting for the line of the Rhine, still to hold firm possession of the Mincio and the Po, would be a means of facilitating the concession of the Rhine, by way of compensation. Having then little chance of bringing back the troops of Prince Eugene in time, and many chances of preserving Italy, which was of very great importance with regard to the negotiations, he took the resolution—which experience has since shown to be a deplorable one—not to abandon Lombardy. Though his reasons for this line of conduct were of incontestable value, he was evidently influenced by the confidence inspired by his late successes, and this is to be regretted, for the safest course would have been to recall Eugene with his thirty thousand men. In war, the chain of events is so easily prolonged, that we ought never to neglect a prudent precaution through fear of its being too late.

Napoleon had also to consider the position of the armies that were defending the Pyrenees, and whose assistance would have been so useful to him. Marshal Suchet was incessantly asking permission to evacuate Barcelona, and some of the fortresses in Catalonia. As to those of Lower Catalonia and the kingdom of Valentia, such as Sagonta, Penisscola, Tortosa, Mequinenza, and

Lerida, the time was past when they could have been opportunely evacuated. By withdrawing 7,000 or 8,000 men from Barcelona, and as many from some other small garrisons, and joining these 15,000 to the 15,000 that remained under his command after the division that had been sent to Lyon, Marshal Suchet would have at his disposal 30,000 soldiers. With such a force, he might still decide the fate of France, were he summoned to Lyon in person. He awaited the reply of the war minister until the 11th of February, when not having received any intelligence he returned to the frontier, leaving 8,000 men in the fortress of Barcelona, which he did not dare to abandon without a formal order. Napoleon endeavoured to repair this fault, which was exclusively imputable to the war minister, by giving Marshal Suchet orders to evacuate, not alone Barcelona, but all the posts he still occupied, and thus to create for himself a *corps d'armée*, with which he was to march on Lyon, leaving in Perpignan and the fortresses of Roussillon, only the garrisons, indispensably necessary.

Marshal Soult, thanks to Lord Wellington's temporizing system, had kept his position, not on the Bidasoa, nor the Niva, which he had lost, one after the other, but on the Adour and the *gave d'Oleron*. He had placed four divisions in Bayonne, under General Reille, two on the Adour under General Foy, and four behind the *gave d'Oleron*, which he commanded himself. General Harispe formed his extreme left at Navarreins, he formed the centre himself at Peyrehorade at the confluence of the *gave d'Oleron* with the Adour; General Reille formed his right at Bayonne. Master of the navigation of the Adour, he could provision Bayonne and supply with victuals and munitions of war every portion of his army. Thus posted behind the angle of two rivers, with about 40,000 veteran troops (deducting the 15,000 sent to Napoleon,) he held his adversary in check, who dared neither to advance without the Spaniards, for fear of not being sufficiently strong, nor penetrate into France with them, lest they might excite an insurrection amongst the French peasants by pillaging. The English General delayed to assume the offensive until, in the first place, the rains, which were very abundant, should cease, and secondly, until his government should send money to pay the Spaniards, which was the only means of preserving discipline amongst them.

Napoleon, still flattering himself to be able to draw some resources from this brave army, sent fresh orders to Marshal Soult to fill up the vacant places in his regiments with conscripts, and to be ready to send him at the shortest notice 10,000 men. Not wishing to leave Bordeaux unprotected, on account both of the moral and political importance of this city, Napoleon determined not to borrow these troops from Marshal Soult excepting he found himself at the last extremity. His late successes gave him reason to hope that he would not be forced to take this step.

The two days passed at Montereau, during which the troops were employed in crossing to the other side of the river, had been,

as we have seen, very usefully employed. Before leaving Montereau, Napoleon thought he ought to reply to the letter that Prince de Schwarzenberg's aide de-camp had brought him.

He had just learned what had taken place at Châtillon since the resumption of the conferences. On the 16th of February, M. de Caulaincourt received a private letter from M. de Metternich, in which this minister informed him of the efforts he had made to surmount the ill feeling that prevailed in the allied courts, acknowledging that to attain his object, he had made use of M. de Caulaincourt's confidential letter. He also informed the French plenipotentiary that by formally accepting the Châtillon bases, hostilities might be immediately stopped. M. de Metternich, in conclusion, earnestly begged M. de Caulaincourt to profit of this opportunity to conclude peace, "for," he said, "it will be the last."

The next day—the 17th—the plenipotentiaries assembled, and declared they would resume the conferences, only on receiving a positive affirmation from the French plenipotentiary, that he was ready to submit to the conditions proposed in the last sitting. They afterwards presented a series of preliminary articles, more insulting if possible than the protocol of the 9th of February. The import of these articles was that France should retire within her ancient limits, with some slight alterations of the frontier line, which did not alter in any way the general principle: she was not to interfere, in any way, in the fate of the ceded territories, nor in the general regulation of the European States; she was merely to be told that Germany should compose a federal state, that Holland, united to Belgium, should constitute one kingdom, that Italy should be independent of France, and that Austria should hold possessions there, the extent of which the allied powers would determine at a later period; that continental Spain should be restored to Ferdinand VII.; that in return for these sacrifices, England should give up Martinique, and Guadaloupe besides, if Sweden required it, but she was to keep the Isle of France and the Isle of Bourbon. As to the Cape, Malta, and the Ionian Isles, there was no more said of them than of all the possessions given up by France in Italy, Germany, and Poland.

Such were these articles, that were already laid down in the protocol of the 9th of February, but in a less explicit and less offensive manner; they were now offered as conditions for an armistice, which France had not officially demanded, and for which, above all, she had not promised to pay such a price.

M. de Caulaincourt listened calmly to these propositions, and said that, probably the Allies did not wish for peace, since to offers radically so vexatious, they added forms so insulting. He added, that he would receive a copy of these articles, in order to submit them to his sovereign, and that at a proper time he would communicate with the plenipotentiaries on the subject. They asked whether he had a counter-project to propose; he replied that he would present one at a later period; and we must say, notwith-

standing our respect for a man, who through pure patriotism had undertaken a most painful task, that the fear of compromising the interests of peace, hindered him perhaps from giving vent to his indignation. The diplomatists, in fact, who were opposed to him, believed, that though he might consider the propositions oppressive he would still accept them, and if they should have difficulties to encounter, they would arise from Napoleon's inflexible temper. It would have been better had M. de Caulaincourt exhibited as much indignation as Napoleon himself would have done. Such conduct might have compromised, not peace, which could always be obtained on the proffered conditions, but the imperial throne, and M. de Caulaincourt ought, like Napoleon, to have preferred honour to the throne. We must, however, admit, that though Napoleon might have reasoned in this way, M. de Caulaincourt, his minister, was not equally free to do so, for next to France, the throne of his master ought to be the chief object of his solicitude. Be this as it may, M. de Caulaincourt gave the most prudent advice to Napoleon. He said he was well aware that the proposed conditions of peace were not acceptable, but there were no means of ameliorating them; that, in fact, the Emperor could never obtain peace on the Frankfort bases, except by driving the Allies into the Rhine, but that, profiting of his late victories to effect a compromise, he might be able by satisfying England, to obtain better conditions than the limits of 1790, still he could never get what he understood by the natural limits. It was indeed possible by giving up Spain, Italy, all that he held of Germany, Holland and Belgium, to retain Mayence, Coblenz, and Cologne—in a word, to secure the Rhine by abandoning the Scheld. And certainly, peace, on such conditions, would be very satisfactory, if not to Napoleon, at least to France. With one more victory the Emperor might be sure of it, and it was wise to give him this advice. M. de Caulaincourt, without entering into details as to how much of the natural limits ought to be sacrificed, implored Napoleon not to be obstinate, and told him, very justly, that he was mistaken if he believed that his recent victories had replaced him in the position he held at the time the Frankfort bases were proposed, but that he might still obtain peace on terms approaching those of Frankfort, by presenting a moderate counter-project.

When Napoleon received these communications at Montereau, the blood rushed to his brow, and he immediately wrote the following letter to M. de Caulaincourt:—

“I look upon you as a man under compulsory confinement who knows nothing of my affairs, and whose opinions are formed on the reports of impostors. As soon as I arrive at Troyes, I shall send you a counter-project. I thank Heaven for receiving your despatch, for there is not a Frenchman whose blood it will not make boil with indignation. This is why I wish to draw up my ultimatum myself.

“I am very much displeased that you did not explain formally, that France, in order to be as strong as she was in 1790, must have

her natural limits as a compensation for the partition of Poland, the destruction of the Republic of Venice, the secularization of the German clergy, and the great acquisitions made by the English in Asia.

"Say that you are waiting orders from your government, and that it is very natural you should be obliged to wait, since your couriers are obliged to make journeys of seventy-two hours, and of three you have yet received no tidings. In retaliation, I have ordered the arrest of the English couriers.

"I am so excited by the infamous proposals you have sent me, that I feel myself already dishonoured by having placed myself in a position where such proposals could be made to you. I shall let you know, from Troyes or Châtillon, my intentions, and I believe I would rather lose Paris, than see such propositions made to the French people. You are always talking of the Bourbons, I would rather see the Bourbons in France, on reasonable terms, than submit to the infamous propositions you have sent me.

"Surville, near Montereau, 19th February, 1814.

His first emotions having subsided, Napoleon, appreciating the good advice of M. de Caulaincourt, consented to continue the negotiations, but no longer on the bases he had commissioned his plenipotentiary to bear to Mannheim, and which comprehended the Rhine as far as the Wahal, a kingdom for Prince Jerome in Germany, one for Prince Eugene in Italy, and a part of Piedmont for France. These demands were no longer urged; the new bases only asked the limits *pures et simples*, that is to say, the Rhine as far as Dusseldorf; beyond Dusseldorf, the Meuse; nothing in Italy but an indemnity for Prince Eugene, and lastly, France's right to take part in regulating the fate of European states. Napoleon did not limit himself to this official communication; knowing that there existed more than one cause of misunderstanding between the Allies, that the Austrians were notoriously tired of the war, and offended at the affected supremacy of the Russians, he conceived the idea of replying to the proposals made him by addressing a letter himself to the Emperor Francis, and by having Major-General Berthier write one to Prince de Schwarzenberg. In these two letters, drawn up with extraordinary care, he endeavoured to speak the language, as he understood it, of sound policy and good sense. He said an appeal had been made to victory, and victory had decided; that his soldiers were still as great as ever, and would soon be as numerous; that he had full confidence in the result of this struggle, should it be prolonged; that notwithstanding he was marching at that moment on Troyes, and the approaching engagement would take place between a French and an Austrian army, that he believed he would conquer, and that his confidence on this point ought not to astonish any one; but that having experienced the chances of war, he was willing to consider this supposition as doubtful, and would therefore reason on a double hypothesis. Should he conquer, the coalition would be annihilated,

and the Allies would find him as exacting as ever, a line of conduct that would be authorized by his dangers and his triumphs. But if, on the contrary, he were conquered, the balance of power in Europe would be disturbed a little more than it already was, and that to the advantage of Russia, and at the expense of Austria: that the latter would be a little more constrained, a little more dictated to, by a haughty rival; that consequently Austria would gain nothing by a battle, which on one hand would deprive her of all the fruits of the battle of Leipsic, and on the other would render her more dependant than she was on Russia; that whatever Austria might desire, in Italy, for example, France would immediately concede to her, as soon as she consented to repass the Alps; that thus, without reckoning the ties of blood, which ought to have some influence, the true interest of Austria was to conclude peace, on the conditions she had herself offered at Frankfort.

To these reasons, mingled with many sweet and flattering words addressed to the Emperor Francis, Napoleon added others not less specious in a letter, intended for Prince de Schwarzenberg, and well calculated to touch the memory of this Prince, to awaken his military prudence, and stir up his pride, which the Russians and Prussians were incessantly offending. Both these letters were sent as a reply to the last proceedings of Prince de Schwarzenberg. Unfortunately, though very cleverly reasoned and written, they did not quite accord with the moral position of the allied powers, which Napoleon, in the midst of his camp, could not fully appreciate. Undoubtedly, had Austria been less strongly linked to the coalition, if she had not feared to break up this coalition, which, once broken, left her within the iron grasp of Napoleon, if she had not so deeply distrusted the character of the latter, she might have listened to considerations, which in many respects accorded with the policy of the Emperor Francis, with the wisdom of his Prime Minister, and with the wounded self-love of the Commander-in-Chief. But it was natural to suppose that Austria, instead of keeping these letters private, would show them to her Allies, in order to place her good faith above all suspicion, and that then there would be fresh protestations of fidelity, and that the bonds of the alliance would be more closely serried in order to resist an enemy, who alternately played the part of the lion and the fox. There was therefore more risk than gained by these communications with the court of Austria.

Be this as it may, Napoleon, after having attended to all his various concerns, and finding his troops amount to the number he desired, left the château of Surville on the morning of the 21st, crossed the Seine at Montcreau, and re-ascended the river as far as Nogent; he found the country everywhere so ravaged, that despairing of victualling his troops, he earnestly implored that provisions should be sent from Paris. Even at Nogent, everything was in a frightful state, in consequence of the late engagement. He granted out of his private purse assistance to the sisters of charity, who

had ventured under the fire of the enemy in order to attend the wounded soldiers. He also gave relief to those of the inhabitants who had suffered most.

The next day—the 22nd—continuing to remount the Seine, he advanced in the direction of Méry, a point where the course of the Seine turns, and instead of continuing from west to east, describes a line from north-west to south-east, running from Méry to Troyes. Napoleon followed the high road to Troyes, bringing with him the troops of Marshal Oudinot (division of the young Rothenbourg Guard and the Boyer d'Espagne division), the Old Guard, Ney and Victor's division of the Young Guard, the cavalry reserve, and lastly, the artillery reserve. On the right, through the cross-roads, Marshal Macdonald advanced with the 11th corps; a little more to the right General Gérard advanced with the 2nd corps and the Paris reserve. On the other bank of the Seine, in the neighbourhood of Sézanne, Grouchy was preparing with his cavalry and the Leval division to join Napoleon, by the way of Nogent, and Marmont, with the 6th corps, occupied the country between the Seine and the Marne, for the purpose of observing Blücher's movements, and combining his forces with those of Marshal Mortier, who had orders to advance on Soissons. Napoleon's forces, including the troops of Grouchy and Leval, but not those of Marmont, amounted to about 70,000

Napoleon was still expecting and most anxious for a battle; since the commencement of the campaign until now, he had not had 70,000 men under his command, without reckoning Marmont's troops, that one day's march sufficed to join with his. Thus, as we have already said, seeking a combination that might render this battle decisive, Napoleon had abandoned the design of pursuing Prince de Schwarzenberg along the high road of Troyes, and had conceived the project of crossing the Seine at Méry, and remounting the river rapidly along the right bank, leaving Prince de Schwarzenberg on the left; he would thus reach the high ground of Troyes before his opponent, and then recrossing the river, offer him battle between Troyes and Vandœuvre, after having mastered his line of retreat. Should this plan be executed, the most important results would undoubtedly ensue.

On the morning of the 22nd, orders having been given for the carrying out of these designs, our vanguard drove back Prince de Witgenstein's rear-guard towards Châtres, and threw themselves afterwards on the bridge of Méry, which is very long, because it spans several arms of the river and a great deal of marshy ground. This bridge, built on piles, had been half-burned; nevertheless, our sharp-shooters, running on the tops of the piles, kept up a keen combat with the enemy's sharp-shooters, and succeeded in getting possession of Méry. But soon, a violent conflagration bursting out in the city stopped our progress. The Russians had set fire to Méry. The heat became so intense that we were obliged to cede the place, not to the enemy, but to the flames, and regain the banks

of the Seine. At the same moment numerous troops appeared outside Méry, and there was no passing beyond. These troops that made their appearance, were neither the Russians of Prince de Wittgenstein, nor the Bavarians of Marshal Wrède, who might have been naturally expected in that direction, but the Prussians themselves, whom the 15th Mortier were pursuing from the Marne, and who, for some time past, had seemed to take no part in the warfare. Within seven days they had rallied and returned, with whom? under what leader? Here are questions that might naturally be asked, and which Napoleon asked himself with well-founded astonishment.

His inquiries were soon satisfied by prisoners and reports that arrived from the banks of the Marne. Since the Emperor had beaten in detail the four corps of the army of Silesia, these corps had endeavoured to recover their defeat, and had partly succeeded. Finding themselves briskly pursued along the Soissons route, the Generals d'York and Sacken had turned to the right, and marching through Oulchy, Fismes, and Reims, had regained Châlons, where Blucher had appointed to meet them. Combined with the *débris* of Kleist and Langeron, they formed a force of 32,000 men. The pride of this army had been deeply humiliated. Composed of the most ardent spirits amongst the Russians and the Prussians, having at their head the daring Blucher, and all the confederates of the Tugend-Bund, they were inconsolable at having experienced such terrible reverses, especially as they had mocked the timidity of the army of Bohemia. For this reason, the desire of again appearing in the battle-field was intense among Blucher's soldiers, and they possessed the merit of wishing to repair their disaster at any risk. An opportunity had seemed to offer of which they had eagerly profited.

Marmont, after the terrible day of Vauchamps, had stopped at Etoges. This break in the pursuit, on the part of the French, indicated clearly that Napoleon, repeating against the army of Bohemia the manœuvre that had succeeded so well against the army of Silesia, had fallen upon Prince de Schwarzenberg. This conjecture amounted to certainty, when it was remembered that Prince de Schwarzenberg having advanced as far as Fontainebleau and Provins, Napoleon could not allow him to come nearer Paris without making an attempt to stop his progress. Nothing now remained for the army of Silesia but to advance immediately from the Marne to the Seine, where they would probably find the Marmont detachment that had been left to observe Blucher's army, and on which they would revenge themselves for the four terrible days of defeat they had experienced.

These resolutions being taken, Blucher had given his troops only two days' repose, and had sent courier after courier to Prince de Schwarzenberg to inform him of his new enterprise. The arrival of considerable reinforcements had confirmed him in his projects. He had had hitherto only about half of the Kleist and Langeron corps.

The remainder of these two corps, which had been replaced by others in the blockade of the fortresses, had now joined. The corps of Saint-Priest, at first sent in the direction of Coblenz, arrived also; and on the 18th, Marshal Blucher, marching from Châlons to Arcis, had received a reinforcement of from 15,000 to 16,000 men; so that his army, which Napoleon had reduced from more than 60,000 to 32,000, was already suddenly increased to 48,000 combatants, and was consequently in a position to make a formidable move—so true is it that in war passion often supplies the place of genius, substituting the power of the will for that of the intellect.

Blucher had therefore set out for Arcis, and having learned on the way that Prince de Schwarzenberg, fallen back on Troyes, was waiting his arrival there, in order to engage the enemy; he advanced in a straight line on Méry, to arrive sooner at the meeting place, and be able to fall on the flank of the French army, which he believed to be still pursuing the army of Bohemia.

Napoleon, finding Blucher on the right bank of the Seine, could not any longer think of throwing his troops into that quarter. Though he did not for a moment imagine that the Prussian General could have so soon assembled an army of 50,000 men, he cared little for his appearance, and did not despair of meeting Prince de Schwarzenberg hand to hand on the morrow or next day, and overthrowing him. His soldiers again believed in their own superiority, he in his good fortune, and they all marched forward joyfully to the great battle that was about to take place. Napoleon resolved to march the next day, the 23rd of February, on Troyes.

But whilst he was seeking this battle, his principal adversary avoided the encounter. Prince de Schwarzenberg was justly alarmed at finding himself in the presence of Napoleon, whom he believed at the head of considerable forces, and he dreaded to risk the fate of the coalition on a battle. He had received exaggerated reports as to the number of troops arrived from Spain, and as to their valour he had experience of that at the battle of Nangis. He did not estimate Napoleon's forces at less than 80,000 or 90,000 men, their spirits flushed with victory and the consciousness of being in a remarkable position. Separated from Blucher, of whose near approach he was not aware, he was reduced to 100,000 men, in consequence of the battle he had fought and the detachments he had been obliged to send off. These 100,000 men were not so concentrated as the 80,000 attributed to Napoleon, and it did not appear wise to Prince de Schwarzenberg to venture a hundred against eighty, when with 170,000 he had been held in check at La Rothière by 50,000 (this was the number erroneously attributed to Napoleon on that day). And then, should the Allies be beaten, they would be at one blow flung back upon the Rhine, and so lose, in one day, the fruits of the two campaigns of 1812 and 1813, which would render the common oppressor more exacting, more tyrannical than ever. As for the Russians and the Prussians, ruled by passion, and who had much to gain by victory, if they had much

to lose by defeat, there might be, on their side, cogent reasons for incurring great risks; but for the Austrians, who ran the chance of losing in one day what they had gained in a year, and the possession of which Napoleon offered to secure to them without fighting—they, to whom victory only promised an augmentation of Russian preponderance—truly, the prolongation of the warfare would not be worth the trouble to the Austrians. Napoleon's double letter, though involving the disadvantage of too openly revealing his intention of creating dissensions amongst his enemies, had not, however, failed to excite some discontent, by awakening in the Austrian mind very natural reflections. One disquieting circumstance was, moreover, added to those that already existed in favour of an armistice. Whilst the Allies had received positive intelligence of the arrival of a powerful detachment at Paris, by the Orleans route, a report was circulated that a still stronger detachment, commanded by Marshal Suchet in person, had arrived at Lyon from Perpignan; but in the stirring times of war, the public mind becomes impressionable, and facts are exaggerated to a stature that renders them falsehoods. The Count de Bubna, posted between Geneva and Lyon, fearing to be attacked by 50,000 or 60,000 men, begged immediate assistance, and prognosticated dreadful calamities if his entreaties did not meet proper attention. What, in fact, would become of the Allies, were a battle fought and lost in Franche-Comté in their rear? To prevent so calamitous an event, it would be necessary to send immediately 20,000 men to the assistance of Count de Bubna, which would be, in fact, to reduce the main army to 80,000, and so stand before Napoleon with forces of nearly the same numerical strength as his; this would be a serious indiscretion. There was certainly Blücher, whose actual force Prince de Schwarzenberg was ignorant of, but he knew the obstinacy of his temper to be such, that he could not flatter himself with having at his disposal the 40,000 or 50,000 men that the Prussian General might bring with him.

Influenced by these reasons, which were of some weight, the prudent Prince de Schwarzenberg thought it better to avoid a pitched battle, and to fall back on Brienne, Bar-sur-Aube, and Langres, and to wait there the coming reinforcements, sending at the same time 20,000 men to the Count de Bubna; and meanwhile, in order to avert an attack from Napoleon, Prince de Schwarzenberg thought it advisable to reply to his double letter, and to propose an armistice—an armistice which might perhaps lead to peace, or if it did not lead to peace, might afford time to make sure of victory.

These considerations were debated the same day—the 22nd—in a council held at head-quarters, in presence of the three sovereigns, the generals, and ministers of the coalition. Alexander, lately so hot-headed, dared not become suddenly the apostle of temporisation, but both his sentiments and language were less haughty than before. The violent party, though deprived of Blücher and his staff, who were at Méry, found, however, some speakers who declared that to

fall back would be a weakness, of which the moral effect would certainly be fatal; that in the position in which the Allies then were, they should either conquer or perish; that by a junction with the army of Silesia, their forces would be nearly double those of Napoleon, and that consequently they must conquer, for it would be degrading to suppose they could be vanquished when they fought with the advantage of two to one on their side; that in any case they had no other resource, for a retrograde movement would totally ruin the affairs of the coalition; that to return to Langres would be to go back to a country poor in itself, and impoverished still more by the recent visit of the armies—they could not find provisions there, and the retreat on Langres would soon involve a retreat on Besançon; that falling back in that manner would restore Napoleon all his prestige as well as all his partizans, and induce the French peasants, who had already killed several of the allied soldiers that wandered from their ranks, to rise *en masse* and slaughter all who would not be formed into *corps d'armée*; that, in short, to hesitate, to fall back, was to perish.

No person could at this moment say whether the advocates of the prudent or the impetuous policy were right. If the latter estimated correctly the respective forces of the two armies, the former yielded to well-founded fears when they refused to stake all for all against Napoleon, for if he gained the battle—and in the actual disposition of his troops he had many chances of gaining it—the Allies would be thrown into the Rhine. We are, therefore, justified in saying that Prince de Schwarzenberg, though his calculations exhibited a certain timidity, was more in the right than his adversaries.

Be this as it may, the moderate party insisted, and as late events had added to their influence what Blucher and his partizans had lost, and as the Emperor Alexander supported Blucher's party less warmly, Prince de Schwarzenberg's opinion prevailed, and the proposition of an armistice was resolved on. This proposition did not pledge the Allies to anything, neither as to the conditions of the peace nor the conditions of the armistice. Should the proposition not be accepted, it would at least occupy Napoleon's attention some hours, and perhaps delay his march a day, which would be a matter of importance. If, on the contrary, the propositions were accepted, the Allies would find time to concentrate their forces, the one party at Langres, the other at Châlons, and reinforce their number considerably; and an acceptance would also afford a chance—which was the secret wish of Austria—of resuming pacific negotiations with greater hopes of success, for, hostilities once suspended, they would not be lightly resumed. The advocates of war *à outrance* consented to this proceeding, in the hope that it would lead to no result, and might perhaps procure a respite for a few hours, which all parties admitted would be an incontestable advantage. Prince de Schwarzenberg made choice of Prince Wenceslas de Liechtenstein to send to the French head-quarters, with the proposal of

appointing commissioners, who, at the outposts of the two armies, should arrange the conditions of the armistice.

On the 23rd, Napoleon was marching from Chartres on Troyes, when, within sight of the latter city, Prince Wenceslas de Liechtenstein presented himself and delivered Prince de Schwarzenberg's message. Napoleon, seeing the persistence of the Allies in demanding an armistice, concluded much too quickly that they were in a difficult position, and resolved to appear to listen to them, but without pausing in his progress, as it was not his part to extricate them from their embarrassment. He was elated by success, by the consciousness of the great deeds he had just accomplished, by the hope of those he would yet achieve, and felt no prudential promptings that might induce him to seem modest or circumspect—on the contrary, to boast might be his best policy. He adopted it, therefore, as much because it suited his feelings at the moment as because it accorded with the calculations he had made.

Prince Wenceslas having largely complimented him on the great deeds he had lately performed, Napoleon listened with visible satisfaction, talked a great deal of what he intended to do, exaggerated in an extraordinary manner the extent of his forces, complained of the insulting propositions that had been made him, and passing from one subject to another, asked if it were true that several of the Bourbon princes had already arrived at the head-quarters of the Allies. In fact, the Duke d'Angoulême had tried to get a reception at Lord Wellington's head-quarters; the Duke de Berry was on board a frigate at Belle-Ile, endeavouring by his presence to excite the people of Vendée; and lastly, the father of these two princes, the Count d'Artois himself, acting as representative of Louis XVIII., who had retired to Hartwel, had gone to Switzerland, then to Franche-Comté, to obtain admission to the head-quarters of the Allied sovereigns. However, none of these princes had yet succeeded in his enterprise.

The envoy of Prince de Schwarzenberg hastened to disavow, on the part of Austria, any participation in plots against the Imperial dynasty, and affirmed, which was true, that the Count d'Artois had been dismissed from head-quarters. This declaration gave Napoleon more pleasure than he cared to testify; he said he was about to consider the proposition that had been made him, and that he would send a reply from the city of Troyes, into which he intended to enter immediately.

This confidence, which it was very well to display to the Prussians and the Russians, was not so well-timed with regard to the Austrians, who were desirous of peace, and to whom hopes of attaining it ought to have been held out, in order to induce them to moderation in their views, or at least to hesitation in their counsels.

Having arrived at the gates of Troyes, Napoleon found there the rear-guard of the Allies, determined to make a defence; they even threatened to burn the city, if the French persisted in forcing an immediate entrance. Such a threat coming from the Russians was

something too serious not to command attention. A verbal agreement was made by which the one party was to leave Troyes the next day—the 24th—and the other was to enter the city, neither striking a blow, or at least committing any act of aggression or resistance that might endanger the city. Accordingly, on the next day, the last of the allied troops departed peacefully from Troyes, and our soldiers entered the town in the same manner. And Napoleon—who twenty days before had passed through this city almost a defeated man, his mind filled with dark presentiments, not knowing whether he should be able to defend Paris, and even necessitated to order that his wife, his son, the members of his government, and his treasury, should be removed from the capital—Napoleon, we say, now reappeared at Troyes, after having, with a handful of men, put to flight all the armies of Europe; and he beheld the Allies, late so insolent, now praying him, if not to lay aside his sword, at least to allow it to rest for a few days in the scabbard. Wondrous change of fortune! which proves that a man of determination and genius, by persevering in warfare, can sometimes draw unexpected and fortunate opportunities from circumstances apparently desperate. But was this last change of fortune sufficiently decisive to serve as a permanent basis for the future? Painful doubt, which it became the task of prudence united to genius to convert into certainty. With regard to the Allies, it would be necessary to combine the most skilful diplomacy with victory, in order to reduce the boasting of one party without depressing the moderation of the other, and seize, so to speak, on the wing, the favourable opportunity for arranging a very difficult task, that of negotiating propositions, intermediate between those of Frankfort and Châtillon. That was the problem that remained to be solved. Napoleon, unfortunately, trusted too much to his wonderful change of fortune to be prudent, and it is true that at this moment he was justified in indulging the strongest hopes, if he only looked at external appearances. Ah! that we, too, could indulge the same hopes, and conjure up, even for an instant, a flattering illusion during this sad recital of past events, for in 1814 the question at issue was not the fate of a man, no, nor of that which, next to our native land, is perhaps the most interesting consideration in the world, the destiny of a great man—no, it was the destiny of France that was at stake—France, half whose greatness might still be preserved, and for whom Mayence might be saved by the sacrifice of Antwerp.

BOOK LIH.

FIRST ABDICATION.

INTERNAL state of Paris during Napoleon's late military operations—Secret party intrigues—Position of M. de Talleyrand; his views; mission of M. de Vitrolles to the allied camp—Conference of Lusigny; instructions given to M. de Flahaut relative to the conditions of the armistice—Efforts on our part to prejudice the question of the frontiers, by tracing the line of separation of the armies—Retreat of the Prince de Schwarzenberg to Langres—Grand council of the Allies—The war party wishes that Wintzingerode and Bulow's corps should be united to Blücher's army, in order to put the latter in a position to march on Paris—The difficulty of withdrawing these corps from Bernadotte removed in an extraordinary manner by Lord Castlereagh—The latter profits of this opportunity to propose the treaty of Chaumont, which binds the coalition for twenty years, and thus becomes the basis of the Holy Alliance—Joy of Blücher and his party: his march to join Bulow and Wintzingerode—Peril of Marshal Mortier, who was sent beyond the Marne; and of Marmont, who was left between the Aube and the Marne—These two marshals succeed in combining their forces, and giving a check to Blücher, whilst Napoleon hastens to their aid—Rapid march of Napoleon on Meaux—Difficulty of crossing the Marne—Blücher, protected by the Marne, tries to overpower the two marshals, who have taken up a position behind the Oureq—Napoleon crosses the Marne, joins the two marshals, and sets out in pursuit of Blücher, who is obliged to retire on the Aisne—The almost desperate position of Blücher, now threatened to be pushed into the Aisne by Napoleon—The reduction of Soissons, which gives the Allies the command of the bridge of the Aisne, saves Blücher from certain destruction, and procures him a reinforcement of 50,000 men, by the union of Wintzingerode and Blücher—Critical situation of Napoleon, and his impassible firmness on this sudden change of fortune—His first impulse, to march upon the fortresses, collect the garrisons, and fall, with 100,000 men, on the enemy's rear—It is necessary first to face Blücher, and give him battle—Napoleon captures the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, and crosses the Aisne with 50,000 men, in sight of Blücher's 100,000—Perils of a battle to be fought with 50,000 men against 100,000—Reasons that decide Napoleon to capture the plateau of Craonne, in order to advance to Laon, by the Soissons route—Bloody battle of Craonne, fought on the 7th March, in which Napoleon carries the formidable positions of the enemy—After having seized the Soissons route, Napoleon wishes to penetrate into the plain of Laon, to complete the defeat of Blücher—New and more sanguinary battle of Laon, fought on the 9th and 10th March, and the issue undecided, through Marmont's fault, who allowed himself to be surprised—Napoleon is obliged to retreat on Soissons—His indomitable energies in an almost desperate position—Saint Priest's corps having approached, he charges, cuts the corps in pieces, in the neighbourhood of Reims, after having killed the General—Napoleon, finding himself in danger of being enclosed between the armies of Schwarzenberg and Blücher, resolves to execute his great project of marching on the fortresses, rally the garrisons, and fall on the rear of the Allies—His directions for the defence of Paris during his absence—Consternation of the capital—The Council of Regency being consulted, wishes that the propositions of the Congress of Châtillon should be accepted—Indignation of Napoleon, who threatens to shut up in Vincennes, Joseph and all those who speak of submitting to the conditions of the enemy—Events that have taken place in the South, the battle of Orthez, after which Marshal Soult advanced on Toulouse, leaving Bordeaux unpro-

tected—Entrance of the English into Bordeaux, and the Bourbons proclaimed in that city on the 12th March—Vexatious effect produced by these events at Paris—Napoleon, seeing the alarm of the capital, towards which Prince Schwarzenberg has advanced considerably, determines, before marching on the fortresses, to present himself suddenly in the rear of Schwarzenberg, and divert his course from Paris to attack him—Movement from the Marne to the Seine, and passage of the Seine at Méry—Napoleon finds himself unexpectedly facing the army of Bohemia—Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, fought on the 22d March, on which occasion, 20,000 French opposed, during an entire day, 90,000 Russians and Austrians—Napoleon at length resolves to recross the Aube, and protect himself by this river—He advances on Saint-Dizier, in the hope of drawing the army of Bohemia after him—His project for advancing as far as Nancy, to rally there 40,000 or 50,000 men from the different garrisons—*En route*, he is joined by M. de Caulaincourt, who has been obliged to leave the congress of Châtillon, in consequence of his refusal to accept the propositions of the Allies—Termination of the congress of Châtillon and the conferences of Lusigny—Napoleon does not regret what he has done, and does not yet despair of success—During this time, the armies of Silesia and Bohemia, between which he had ceased to manœuvre, have combined their forces in the plains of Châlons, and deliberate on what course to adopt—Grand council of the Allies—Military reasons show the importance of pursuing Napoleon, whilst political reasons tend to an opposite course, that of marching on Paris, and trying to effect a revolution in the capital—Intercepted letters of the empress and the ministers, determine the Allies to march on Paris—Influence of Count Pozzo di Borgo in producing this determination—Movement of the Allies towards the capital—Marmont and Mortier, being cut off from Napoleon, encounter the entire allied army—Disastrous day of Frère Champenoise—Retreat of the two marshals—Sudden appearance of the allied army before the walls of Paris—Incapacity of the war minister, and neglect of Joseph, who have made no preparation for the defence of the capital—Council of Regency, where it is resolved that the government and court should retreat to Blois—Instead of organizing a popular defence of Paris, they conceive the foolish idea of fighting a battle outside the walls—Battle of Paris, fought on the 30th March, by 25,000 French, against 70,000 of the allied soldiers—Bravery of Mortier and Marmont—Forced capitulation of Paris—M. de Talleyrand wishes to remain at Paris, and obtain a mastery over the mind of Marmont—Entrance of the Allies into the capital; their precautions; their conduct with regard to the different classes of the population—Polite attentions of the crowned heads to M. de Talleyrand, whom they make, in some sense, arbiter of the destinies of France—Events that take place in the army during the march of the Allies on Paris—Brilliant combat of Saint Dizier; fortuitous circumstance that undeceives Napoleon, and shows him, at last, that he is not followed by the Allies—The evident danger of the capital and the voice of the army, make him determine to retrace his steps—His hasty return—Napoleon, in order to arrive sooner, separates from his troops and arrives at Fromenteau between eleven o'clock and midnight, at the very moment when the capitulation of Paris was signed—His despair, his irritation; he quickly recovers himself—He suddenly conceives the project of throwing himself on the Allies dispersed in the capital, and scattered on the two banks of the Seine; but as his army has not yet joined him, he hopes to gain, by opening negotiations, the three or four days that must elapse before they can join him—He commissions M. de Caulaincourt to go to Paris to engage Alexander in negotiations, and he retires to Fontainebleau with the intention of concentrating his army there—M. de Caulaincourt accepts the mission confided to him, but with the secret resolve to sign a peace on any conditions—Reception given by the Emperor Alexander to M. de Caulaincourt—This prince, disarmed by success, becomes the most generous of conquerors. However, he promises nothing, except a becoming personal treatment for Napoleon—The allied sovereigns, with the exception of the Emperor Francis, retire to Dijon, and hold a council at M. de Talleyrand's, to decide on the form of government suitable to France—Legitimate principles happily expressed and strongly supported by M. de Talleyrand—Declaration of the crowned heads that they will not enter into further negotiations with Napoleon—Convocation of the senate—Formation of a provisional government, at the head of which is M. de Talleyrand—Joy of the royalists; their efforts to get the Bourbons immediately proclaimed—Journey of M. de Vitrolles in search of the Count d'Artois—M. de Talleyrand, and some enlightened men by whom he is surrounded, moderate the movement of the royalists, and wish that a form of constitution should be drawn up which should be the express condition of the return of the Bourbons—Eagerness with which Alexander enters into these views—Napoleon's dethronement pronounced on the 3rd April, and a form of

constitution drawn up by the senate, as once monarchical and liberal—Fruitless efforts of M. de Caulaincourt in favour of Napoleon, both with Alexander and Prince Schwarzenberg—He is sent to Fontainebleau to persuade Napoleon to abdicate; meanwhile the Allies endeavour to seduce the heads of the army—In compliance with the advice of M. de Talleyrand, the principal attempts at seduction are practised on Marshal Marmont, who, at Essonne, forms the head of the colonne de l'armée—What takes place at Fontainebleau during the proceedings at Paris—Great projects of Napoleon—His conviction that, if seconded, he can overwhelm the Allies in Paris—His military arrangements, and his extreme confidence in Marmont, whom he has stationed on the Essonne—Evasive replies that he makes to M. de Caulaincourt, and his secret resolves for the morrow—Next day, the 4th April, he assembles the army and announces his determination to march on Paris—Enthusiasm of the soldiers and officers, lately so dejected—Consternation of the Marshals—The latter, assuming the representation of the wearied ones, remonstrate with Napoleon—Napoleon asks them if they wish to live under the Bourbons; on their unanimous reply that they wish to live under the King of Rome, he conceives the idea of sending them to Paris with M. de Caulaincourt, to obtain the transmission of the crown to his son—Whilst he feigns to carry on this transaction, he is still resolved on a great battle in Paris, and makes every preparation for that object—Departure of the Marshals Ney and Macdonald, with M. de Caulaincourt, to negotiate the regency of Maria Louisa, and the abdication of Napoleon—Their meeting with Marmont at Essonne—Embarrassment of the latter, who acknowledges to them that he has secretly negotiated with Prince Schwarzenberg, and promised to join the Provisional Government with his corps d'armée—On their remarks he withdraws the promise made to Prince Schwarzenberg, and orders his generals, whom he has taken into his confidence, to suspend their movements—He accompanies to Paris the deputation commissioned to negotiate for the King of Rome—Interview of the Marshals with the Emperor Alexander—This prince, staggered for a moment, defers his decision to the following day—During this time, Napoleon having sent Marmont to Fontainebleau to prepare his great military operation, the generals of the 6th corps think they are discovered, quit the Essonne, and execute Marmont's suspended project—This intelligence decides the allied sovereigns, and the cause of the King of Rome is indefinitely abandoned—M. de Caulaincourt is sent to Napoleon to obtain his abdication *pure et simple*—Napoleon, deprived of Marmont's corps, and no longer able to attempt any serious movement, resolves upon abdicating—Return of M. de Caulaincourt to Paris, and his efforts to obtain a suitable treatment for Napoleon and the Imperial family—Generosity of Alexander—M. de Caulaincourt obtains the Isle of Elba for Napoleon, the Grand Duchy of Parma for Maria Louisa and the King of Rome, and pensions for all the princes of the Imperial family—His return to Fontainebleau—Napoleon attempts to commit suicide—His resignation—Loftiness of his sentiments and his language—Constitution of the senate, and entrance of the Count d'Artois into Paris on the 12th April—Enthusiasm and hopes of the Parisians—Departure of Napoleon for the Isle of Elba—General view of the greatness and errors of the Imperial reign.



BOOK LIII.

FIRST ABDICATION.

NAPOLEON wished to afford some comfort to the Parisians, who had of late been so terribly alarmed; he wished to make them enjoy his triumphs, and he wished above all to raise their spirits, which would be a serious advantage with regard to the organization of his forces, for little public aid can be obtained from a dispirited people. Influenced by these considerations, he had commanded a military and religious ceremony, for the reception of the standards, and the entrance into Paris of the twenty-five thousand prisoners captured from the enemy. He wished that these prisoners, crossing Paris from east to west, should traverse the entire extent of the boulevards, in order that the Parisians might be visually assured of the reality of the wonders performed by their Emperor. The difficulties of Napoleon's position must serve as an excuse for this ostentatious display.

When the approach of these prisoners was announced, all the population of Paris thronged to the boulevards, to see defile before them Prussians, Austrians, and Russians, marching disarmed, headed by their officers and generals. The prisoners, indeed, displayed no arrogance in their demeanour, neither did they seem utterly dejected; it was easy to discern in their faces a very different expression from that formerly manifested by the captives taken at Austerlitz and Jena. There was a certain look of confidence and real pride at having been captured so close to our capital.

Though the people of Paris were tired of the Imperial rule, and perfectly well aware of the bad effects of a despotism, which, after having formerly carried war even to the gates of the Kremlin, now brought it back to the foot of Montmartre, still the mass of the people, yielding to the impression of the moment, could not help applauding Napoleon's late successes, and experienced an intense satisfaction in beholding defile before them these foreign soldiers conquered and captive, whom they had feared to see enter Paris as conquerors and destroyers. As to the rest, with a delicacy natural to the French people, they offered no offence to the prisoners. Their

thoughtlessness, alas! had been too great. After the first emotion of triumph, the French lookers-on experienced a movement of pity, and more than one kind and compassionate creature offered an alms, that was received with sincere gratitude.

At court, affairs assumed a calmer aspect. Numerous visitors flocked round the Empress and the King of Rome, and amongst them were conspicuous those high functionaries, who, having believed the Imperial throne to be in danger, had, by removing to a distance, hoped to escape being crushed in the ruins. They reappeared in high spirits, though some seemed rather anxious about the reception they should receive, but all lauding the glorious campaign whose rashness they had condemned some days before; and they who, within the forty-eight hours, had declared that the Emperor was mad not to accept the frontiers of 1790, now exclaimed against so dishonouring a peace, and protested aloud that the Frankfort bases ought to be the absolute condition of the future peace. Maria Louisa was too little acquainted with our country to understand and judge these men; besides, she was now almost as much agitated by joy as she had before been by fear, but she gave all her visitors a kindly reception, and began to flatter herself that she should soon see a return of those glorious days that inaugurated her arrival in France.*

This joy, the thoughtlessness it induces and excuses, was by no means discernible amongst the adverse parties. Though these parties were distinct—the old revolutionists and the royalists—still both agreed in regretting the success of Napoleon, though the revolutionists experienced an emotion something like joy, so much did they dread the foreign powers and detest the Bourbons. The royalists, after having for a moment hoped the return of their beloved princes, asked themselves now, with vexation, whether they must suddenly abandon this hope. They sought an excuse for their secret wishes in the misfortunes that Napoleon had brought on France, and said within themselves that any hand, even that of a foreigner, ought to be welcome, if it delivered them from so odious a despotism. Still they contented themselves with forming wishes, and remained completely inactive. Whispered conversations between members of the ancient nobility and the clergy, malevolent reports, in which our reverses were exaggerated and our triumphs disputed, with an inert resistance to the measures of the administration, these constituted their entire efforts against the Imperial government. The emigrants, who since the revolution had lived abroad with the Bourbon princes, had almost lost the habit of corresponding with their friends in the interior of France. They made an effort to

* I do not fancy any thing. I quote these details from the correspondence of the Minister of Police, and from that of the High Chancellor, who informed Napoleon of the most minute details. I inform the reader of this for the hundredth, and happily the last time, for I am near the end of my task. But I do not weary of defending my responsibility as a historian, and this is a scrupulosity that the reader will pardon me, for it will prove to him, I hope, my love of truth.

resume their connections now, but met no encouragement, and indeed in the provinces threatened with invasion no one would have dared to aid them in proclaiming the Bourbons. A few royalists scarcely dared to venture a manifestation in the cities, already securely occupied by the allied armies. At Troyes, two old chevaliers of Saint Louis had presented a petition to Alexander, praying the re-establishment of the Bourbons. This was an act of imprudence, for which these unfortunate men paid dearly. At Paris, two members of the old nobility were talked of—the Messrs. de Polignac—who, having been transferred from a jail to a madhouse, had escaped, and gone at every risk to offer to the Count d'Artois their faithful services.

It was evident that nothing serious could be attempted by these men, who, during twenty-five years, had been too much estranged from French affairs to possess any influence in the country. It would be necessary that members of the actual government, some of whom were discontented with Napoleon, who had ill-treated them, and others who were desirous of securing a position for themselves under the new *régime*, should stretch forth a hand to the royalists if a plot of any importance were to be framed, every precaution being taken to conceal the movement. Something of the kind was actually attempted, but with profound secrecy and fear.

Of all the malcontents whom the Imperial *régime* had created, the most conspicuous—he who most occupied the minds of the friends of the Bourbons, as well as the friends of the Bonapartes—was M. de Talleyrand. He was the object of the hopes of the one party and of the fear of the other, and though he was in a position to play a great part, and on the eve of doing so, both parties greatly exaggerated what he could or what he would dare to do. Were the decisive moment come, Napoleon completely conquered, and the enemy in possession of Paris, it was incontestible that M. de Talleyrand was the only man capable of constructing a new government on the ruins of the overthrown dynasty; but to believe that he had either the ability or the will to take the initiative in a revolution, whilst the *drapeau tricolor* still floated on the Tuileries, was a groundless terror on the part of the Imperial police, and a pleasing illusion cherished in the royalist coteries. M. de Talleyrand's ill-will towards the Emperor was undoubtedly as strong as it could be, but neither the means at his disposal nor his personal courage were commensurate with his inclination. By refusing the portfolio of foreign affairs, two months previously, because he would not be allowed at the same time to keep his rank of grand dignitary, he had almost broken off his connection with the Imperial house, and, as we have seen, Napoleon had, on the very eve of his departure for the army, treated him in a manner calculated to awaken his most lively fears. He had learned from hints thrown out by persons connected with the Bourbons—what, indeed, he knew before—that the aid of a married bishop would be favourably received by these pious princes, for there is no difficulty that cannot

be overcome, when there is a question of services—not services already rendered, but which are to be rendered. Some persons have a very pliant memory—they forget or remember according to the interests of the hour. M. de Talleyrand, with his profound knowledge of men and things, had nothing to learn in his quality of politician; having finished with the Bonapartes, it was easy to recommence with the Bourbons. But he well knew the Duke of Rovigo—easy-mannered, familiar, even friendly with the persons upon whom he was acting as a spy, but capable, upon any serious suspicion, or at the first order from Napoleon, of laying his coarse soldier hand on the flowing mantle of a grand dignitary. Influenced by these considerations, M. de Talleyrand was extremely circumspect.

At his mansion in the *Rue Saint Florentin*, which has since become celebrated, M. de Talleyrand received, amongst other persons, the Duke de Dalberg, the Abbé de Pradt, and the Baron Louis.

M. de Dalberg was descended from the illustrious Dalbergs of Germany, and nephew to the Prince Primate. He was first an enemy, afterwards a friend to the Imperial dynasty. During the time when church property was being secularized, he came in for a large share, but he afterwards quarrelled with Napoleon, because the latter had transferred the lands of the Prince Primate to Prince Eugene. The Duke de Dalberg was short of stature; in manner, a mixture of the French and German; his countenance was animated, his temper lively; his opinions were frankly liberal, and his intellect strong and subtle. He had often given vent to his discontent at M. de Talleyrand's with a freedom that had brought his young wife into disgrace at court. He was annoyed at this, and did not conceal his vexation. The Abbé de Pradt had been banished to his diocese since his unfortunate embassy to Warsaw, an affair difficult in itself, and rendered still more so by the defects of the Abbé's temper. He had returned to Paris since our late reverses, and mingled his observations with those of the Duke de Dalberg in a tone that could not fail to attract the attention of the police, even had they been far less observant than they really were. Baron Louis had formerly taken minor orders, but afterwards abandoned the idea of entering the church, and devoted himself to the study of political economy. He was endowed with a true genius for finance, and a spirit at once active and persevering. He was an advocate of that legitimate liberty which sound policy sanctions; he detested the Imperial *régime* from motives dictated by an enlightened reason, and was always happy to associate with men of high intellect whose opinions corresponded with his own.

These personages and some others met frequently at M. de Talleyrand's, and there gave utterance to their sentiments. The petulant Abbé de Pradt declared with his characteristic vivacity and without circumlocution, that the Bourbons ought to be put in the place of the Bonapartes: the Duke de Dalberg spoke less openly,

though he was equally desirous of effecting the same object, and capable of working more systematically for the attainment of his ends. Baron Louis wished that a termination should be put to a despotism which during the last two years had exceeded all bounds. M. de Talleyrand heard all this with his ordinary air of languid indifference. He listened with attention sufficient to encourage the speakers, without compromising himself personally. Sometimes however he gave utterance to his sentiments with one of his visitors, rarely with two; but he always selected the Duke de Dalberg, of whose hardihood, dexterity, and numerous connections he was well aware, and from whom he might expect efficacious aid. He looked upon the Abbé de Pradt as a giddy-brain, and considered the Baron Louis as a profound financier, both useful on certain occasions, but he gave neither his confidence, for at that moment he did not need either the brilliant talents of the one, or the solid qualities of the other. He listened to their observations with a smile at once approving and evasive, and after having heard their opinions, he issued from his house and went to pay a visit to the Duke de Rovigo, under pretext of asking the news of the day. To the Duke, he testified the most lively interest in the success of the French army, affected to regret the inability of the greater number of Napoleon's agents, and said it was very unfortunate that so great a man should be so ill-served. In all this the Duke of Rovigo coincided, for this minister, discontented with the greater number of his colleagues, complaining of being no longer listened to by Napoleon, regretting that he was separated from M. de Talleyrand, was one of those who would listen to any reasonable criticism of the existing state of things, provided the censure sprang from a spirit of devotedness to the Imperial government, and not from a desire to overthrow it. With the Duke de Rovigo, M. de Talleyrand affected to be of the number of those who blame because they love, still he only half deceived his clear-sighted interlocutor, but he deceived him sufficiently to weaken the effect of the remarks uttered at the mansion, Rue Saint-Florentin. Having returned to his own house, M. de Talleyrand again listened to those daring conversations, but acknowledged only to the Duke de Dalberg his desire to withdraw from an insupportable yoke; with him he talked over the means, but was yet far from discovering them. To attempt anything whilst the Allies were still so distant from Paris, seemed to him impracticable. One idea had great weight both with the Duke de Dalberg and M. de Talleyrand: it was, that by manœuvring between the Seine and the Marne, and prolonging the negotiations at Châtillon, the Allies were preserving for Napoleon his only chances of safety. To break off all negotiation with him, and then point him out to France as the only obstacle to peace; to take advantage of an interval between the rejection of one set of propositions, and the framing of others, and seize upon the capital; these were, in their opinion, the only means of putting an end to the war. The Allies should have no sooner reached the gates of Paris, than

their friends inside would rise in their favour, and declare Napoleon dethroned. By these means they would break in his grasp the sword which it was impossible to wrench from him.

These were the ideas which M. de Talleyrand and the Duke de Dalberg wished to communicate to the allied sovereigns, but it is a singular proof of the little intercourse that existed between these in the city and those outside, that they had not been able to find anyone who might act as intermediary. Thus, though the Messrs. Polignac had succeeded in escaping, they had brought no communication from M. de Talleyrand nor from the Duke de Dalberg, the only men, at that moment, able to serve the Bourbon cause.

There was, however, at Paris, a gentleman of Dauphiné, possessed of high intelligence and courage. He had served formerly in the army of Condé, and, though still a royalist in feeling, had kept up a connection with his compatriot, M. de Montalivet, who had obtained for him the title of Baron and that of Inspector of the Imperial Sheepwalks. Notwithstanding the slender tie with which these demi-favours had attached him to the empire, he felt his heart bound at the slightest hope of again seeing the Bourbons in France. This Dauphinois gentleman was M. de Vitrolles. Fond of coming into contact with men in place, both through curiosity and ambition, he had made the acquaintance of the Duke de Dalberg, who knew all the restless spirits of the time and was known by them. The Duke introduced him to M. de Talleyrand, whom he sometimes visited. M. de Dalberg looking for a bold-spirited deputy, who would venture to repair to the head quarters of the Allies, and make known there his opinions and those of M. de Talleyrand, thought of M. de Vitrolles, and found him quite ready to undertake the journey. The difficulty was in accrediting M. de Vitrolles to these great personages—sovereigns and ministers—who held their sittings at Langres, at Brienne, and at Troyes, as the exigencies of the war required. One man alone could give credentials that would secure a reception to the person that should come in his name, and this man was M. de Talleyrand. But he would never confide to anyone whomsoever, a positive proof of his having acted against the established government, and he had refused to send anything but very sensible advice, which could be transmitted verbally to the allied sovereigns and ministers. M. de Dalberg, who never hesitated when he could advance a step towards his object, did what M. de Talleyrand would not venture to do. A German by birth, he had frequently met M. de Stadion at Vienna; he furnished M. de Vitrolles some tokens, sufficient to prove incontestably that the bearer came from him, and sent him forth charged to relate what we have already explained, and what the Count Pozzo di Borgo repeated every day to the Emperor Alexander, that is to say, that the Allies ought to break off all communication with Napoleon, and march without delay on Paris. The armistice, which appeared to be in process of negotiation at the out-posts, and intelligence of which had already reached Paris, was, in the eyes of the Duke de Dalberg,

an additional reason for informing the Allies immediately, that, to negotiate with Napoleon was to stretch out to him a supporting hand at the very moment that he was about to fall. After having seen the sovereigns and the foreign ministers, M. de Vitrolles was to visit the Count d'Artois, who was reported to be at that time in Franche-Comté, and give him good advice, of which this prince stood more in need than the ministers of the coalition. M. de Vitrolles set out by the Sens route, with fictitious passports, and this he effected without the knowledge of the Duke de Rovigo. The secret of his mission was confined to himself, M. de Talleyrand, and the Duke de Dalberg. Being obliged to traverse the French and allied armies, he had numerous difficulties to overcome, and could not arrive very speedily at the head-quarters, whither he was bound.

Whilst these secret plots were being prepared, which, however, contributed much less than his own errors, to the fall of Napoleon, the latter had entered Troyes, and turned his attention to the conditions of the proposed armistice. The armistice, considered as a means of allowing the Allies to gain time whilst he lost it, presented no great advantages, for he wished, on the contrary, to meet them as soon as possible and fight a decisive battle. But the armistice would be useful to him as a means of negotiating more directly, more immediately under his own eye, and whilst the impression of his late successes was still vivid. He had, therefore, consented to send one of his aides-de-camp to the outposts, and had confided this mission to the Count de Flahaut.* His instructions were to refuse a suspension of hostilities during the negotiation, for Napoleon was unwilling, for the sake of exchanging a few remarks that might never produce any result, to allow Prince Schwarzenberg to escape. He was further instructed to require a preamble, declaring that the treaty for peace should be on the Frankfort bases, and, lastly, to draw the line of separation between the belligerent armies in such a way as to imply that Mayence and Antwerp were to belong to France. Should these conditions be accepted, Napoleon could, in fact, lay down his arms, for he would probably have no further occasion to resume them, as he was resolved not to continue the struggle, if the Allies allowed him to retain the line of the Rhine and the Alps. But to lay down his arms without a guarantee of the Frankfort bases, would be, in his eyes, to lose all the advantages he had lately acquired, fortune having now, as he believed, declared in his favour.

M. de Flahaut left Troyes on the 24th, the very day that Napoleon entered the city; he repaired to the village of Lusigny, about three leagues distant, and found there M. de Schouvaloff on the part of Russia, M. de Rauch to represent the interests of Prussia, and M. de Langenau for Austria. At this moment, Marshal

* These instructions are still at the office of the Secretary of State. They were not, as has been said, purely verbal. Their purport has, therefore, been very clearly ascertained.

Oudinot, pressing the enemy's rear-guard on Vandœuvres, was riddling with balls the very place where the negotiators were about to assemble. At M. de Flahaut's request, the Marshal turned his arms elsewhere, and the village of Lusigny was declared neutral ground.

The envoys of the allied powers appeared to desire a prompt solution of the impending difficulties. M. de Flahaut announced without delay the conditions of which he was the bearer, and he proposed two things—first, the continuation of hostilities during the negotiations, and, secondly, the insertion of a preamble ratifying the Frankfort bases. These two points were not of a nature to please the other envoys, for the first proposal deprived the armistice of its principal interest, and the second gave it a signification contrary to the designs of the coalition. Evidently discontented, the three-commissioners replied, that they had not authority to treat diplomatic questions. To procure a short suspension of hostilities, and to fix temporarily the boundaries on which the belligerent armies should pause, constituted, they said, their sole mission. They wished to leave immediately, but M. de Flahaut detained them, and begged them to ask for fresh instructions, promising to do the same himself. They consented to remain at Lusigny, on condition that all the commissioners should write to their respective head-quarters for fresh instructions.

Napoleon, though he was firmly resolved not to yield on the question of the natural frontiers, and that for this reason he did not wish to interrupt the course of his successes, excepting to be assured of the Frankfort bases, still he was not wholly indifferent to the advantage of concluding an armistice, which would be equivalent to signing the preliminaries of peace, and which would induce a momentary tranquillization of the intense animosity excited against him. He therefore abandoned the preamble, which it was difficult to insert in a mere armistice, and consented to the continuation of the negotiations, hoping, by some happy circumvention to return to his original object. If, for example, in fixing the limits that were to separate the armies, he could persuade the Allies to leave him Antwerp, as a boundary in the Low Countries, and Chambéry, in the direction of Savoy, he would induce, from this concession, the strongest presumption for the definite regulation of the frontiers. He consequently authorized M. de Flahaut to continue the negotiations commenced at Lusigny, even though the preamble touching the Frankfort bases should not be accorded; but he was to propose that the allied armies should retire beyond Antwerp in the Low Countries, and that in Savoy they should not advance to Chambéry, to which they were then very near. If the allied commissioners accepted this line of demarcation, it would be a presumption in favour of the natural frontiers, which, without being equivalent to the mention of the Frankfort bases, would be, in point of fact, an acceptance of the natural frontiers.

It was according to these instructions that M. de Flahaut was to continue the negotiations at Lusigny. General Langenau, who

had fallen ill, had been replaced by General Ducca, who was bearer of the most pacific assurances and advice from the Emperor Francis. The new Austrian envoy was charged earnestly to advise Napoleon, through M. de Flahaut, not to persevere in continuing the war, for the present opportunity was the last when he could, under the influence of his recent successes, treat advantageously. The advice was excellent, if by making certain sacrifices Napoleon could obtain better terms than the frontiers of 1790—if, for example, by giving up Antwerp and Brussels, he could retain Mayence and Cologne. But if this advice meant that, in order to save the dynasty, it would be necessary to abandon all the acquisitions made by France since 1790, the advice, which it was natural to a father-in-law to give, would be unbecoming in Napoleon to follow, and his determination to perish, though his ruin should involve that of thousands of men, was more consonant with his real glory and the true interests of France.

In the official conferences, Messrs. de Schouvaloff, de Rauch, and Ducca declared, as might have been foreseen, that they had met merely to consider some military arrangements; that all consideration touching other subjects was entirely foreign to their mission; that they had received formal instructions to abstain from such matters; and that, consequently, the required preamble was inadmissible.

This declaration not having produced on M. de Flahaut's part a rupture of the conferences, the commissioners proceeded to the discussion of the line of demarcation. The French commissioner proposed his conformable to the views we have explained; the allied commissioners proposed theirs, conformable to the political resolutions of their courts. They wished to advance northwards as far as Lille; they consented to retrograde a little in Champagne and Burgundy, leaving the possession of Vitry, Chaumont, and Langres an open question, but they obstinately refused any concession touching Chambéry, and thus, like Napoleon, they reproduced indirectly in the conditions of the armistice the fundamental pretensions of their respective courts. The discussions continued, and the deputies again applied for fresh instructions, which would necessarily prolong the negotiation for some days.

The conferences might have been broken up now, for it was easy to see that the deputies would not come to an agreement, unless some important military events occurred immediately. But it did not suit either party to break off just then, for these negotiations, not causing a suspension of hostilities, did no injury to either side, and Prince Schwarzenberg hoped, that during the negotiations, Napoleon's military operations might in some degree be relaxed. Napoleon, on his side, though firmly determined to continue the struggle, still feeling the necessity of peace, did not wish to close this way of obtaining his object by negotiation, which now opened to his view. He could at any moment shut it up by a single word, and by leaving it open he had a resource in case of necessity, and

the means of arresting the up-raised arm of the combatants. He, therefore, allowed his commissioner to discuss with those of the Allies the innumerable sinuosities of a line of demarcation, which, commencing at Antwerp, was to terminate at Chambéry.

During the two days that the negotiations lasted—the 24th and 25th February—Napoleon was unfortunately guilty of an act of vengeance, the combined result of premeditation and anger.

On entering into Troyes he was assailed by cries from a portion of the population, denouncing certain individuals, guilty, as they said, of having treated with the enemy during their stay in the capital of Champagne. Though everybody was tired of the Imperial *régime*, still, at the sight of foreigners and at the name of the Bourbons, this unanimity of opinion disappeared to give place to the old party divisions. The partizans of royalty, on making their appearance, awakened in the hearts of the revolutionists a very natural anger, especially when they saw the royalists appeal to the enemies of France to secure the triumph of their cause. At Troyes, two chevaliers of Saint Louis, Messrs. de Vidranges and de Gonnault, displayed the white cockade, and presented an address to Alexander, praying the restoration of the Bourbons. It was the first manifestation of this kind that the allied sovereigns had met since their entrance into France, and Alexander, with a sentiment of humanity that does him honour, did not omit remarking to those who had indulged in this exhibition of royalty, that nothing was more variable than the movements of armies, alternately exposed to advance or retire; and, above all, that nothing being more uncertain than a change of dynasty in France, he feared they had committed an imprudence which might be fatal to them. Spite of this observation, the imprudence was committed, and the royalists of Troyes had done nothing to extenuate it. They had, on the contrary, displayed a kind of ostentation, indicative certainly of courage, in decking themselves with the white cockade.

The people of Troyes, though many royalists were to be found amongst them, were very much irritated against those who had appeared to sympathise with the enemy. On this account, denunciations smote the ears of Napoleon on every side when he entered the city. On hearing what had taken place his anger blazed forth and he ordered the arrest of those who had been pointed out to him as criminals. Reflection, instead of calming his passion, rather served to excite it. At this moment the news arrived of the sudden appearance of the Count d'Artois in Franche-Comté, whilst the Duke d'Angoulême appeared in Guyenne, and the Duke de Berry off the coast of Brittany. It might happen that the royalist movements would serve the allied armies, and even produce a bad effect at Paris. Napoleon, therefore, resolved to stop these party movements by a severe measure, which, falling on one or two rash men, would have the effect of restraining others. The crime committed at Troyes could easily be proved, the law was unquestionably clear on the matter, and the process of military law which the

condition of the country warranted, was rapid and certain in execution.

Napoleon gave orders to arrest the accused, and bring them before this exceptional tribunal. M. de Vidranges, one of the two accused, had taken flight. M. de Gonault, an old white-headed man, who had been drawn into this affair by others, had not thought of escaping. He was arrested, judged, condemned, and delivered over to the power of the military law.

An excellent man, equerry to the Emperor, and devoted to his person—M. de Mesgrigny—a native of Champagne, anxious to save his compatriots, threw himself, with the family of the criminal, at the feet of Napoleon. The latter, whose anger was quick but transient, was touched at the sight of the suppliants, and said: "Well, let him be pardoned, if there is still time." The friends of the accused hastened to announce the pardon, but the unfortunate old man was already shot.

Napoleon sincerely regretted this event, but when thousands of human beings were falling every instant around him, he was not the man likely to dwell long on such incidents. He again turned his attention to that theatre, where he was called on to direct the most important events, and which succeeded each other with wondrous rapidity. At this moment, in fact, new movements were discernible on the part of the enemy, which had the effect of exciting his genius to the creation of new and formidable combinations.

Prince Schwarzenberg had fallen back on Chaumont, having left at Bar-sur-Aube the Bavarians of the Marshal de Wrède, the Russians of Prince Wittgenstein; and along the Aube the Wurtembergers of the Prince Royal, with the Austrian corps of Giulay. He had at Chaumont even the Russian and Prussian guards, and a corps of grenadiers and cuirassiers, that constituted a part of the Austrian reserve. He had detached a portion of Colloredo's corps through Dijon on Lyon, to go to the relief of Bubna. His forces were consequently greatly diminished; he had not more than 90,000 men under his command.

Blucher had remained between the Seine and the Aube, manœuvring from Méry to Arcis with 48,000 men, awaiting impatiently a signal for the pitched battle, in which he flattered himself to be able, not alone to avenge his recent humiliations, but to seize the keys of Paris. When his staff learned that the Commander-in-Chief had abandoned the idea of fighting this battle, and had even fallen back on Langres, there was, as may be easily supposed, a violent outcry raised against the Austrians, against their weakness, their duplicity, and intrigues. The temporising Austrian, Prince Schwarzenberg, was treated as men of his stamp have always been by their irritable *confères*. The Prussians said that if the troops of Maria Louisa's father abandoned the cause of the Allies, that should not prevent them from marching on Paris; they would be able to make their way to that city, spite of Napoleon, and spite of his boasting soldiers, that now thought themselves all-victorious.

The Prussians certainly had reason to feel proud and self-confident, when they thought of Montmirail and Vauchamps.

And yet in this fiery-spirited Prussian staff there was no authority for action, but what was assumed in disobeying the King of Prussia; and though they were quite willing to make use of this species of authority, they were not daring enough to venture a march on Paris with 48,000 men. They had recourse to the usual means. They applied to the Emperor Alexander, whom they were sure of bringing over to their opinions by flattery, and accordingly sent emissaries to ask him two things—liberty of action for the army of Silesia, and a considerable augmentation of troops, which could be easily procured. This augmentation might consist of the addition of Bulow and Wintzingerode's corps, the one Prussian, the other Russian; that after leaving detachments in the Low Countries to blockade the fortresses, were advancing through the Ardennes. These troops should, indeed, be withdrawn from Bernadotte, under whose command they then were; but there were many causes of complaint then existing against the Swedish Prince. The Prussians questioned his capacity, his courage, and his honesty. They pronounced him to be a soldier without energy, and a traitor to the interests of Europe, occupying more than 100,000 men in his own affair of Norway, and thus endangering the safety of the coalition, through want of sufficient forces to concentrate on a defensive point. Bernadotte had, it is true, at last marched to the Rhine, whither he had been preceded by Bulow and Wintzingerode's corps. "But," the Prussians said, "he would always make use of these troops for the advancement of his personal views, trying to become, for example, Emperor of the French, if from the throne of Sweden he could spring upon that of France." By withdrawing Bulow and Wintzingerode's 50,000 men from Bernadotte, and putting them under the command of Blucher, the latter would have 100,000 men under his command, and might, by advancing on Napoleon's rear, dissipate the phantom that kept Prince Schwarzenberg motionless, through terror, at Chaumont.

Such were the sentiments that Blucher's envoys were commissioned to express to the Emperor Alexander, and these sentiments were likely to be well received, with the exception of what was directed against his *protégé*, Bernadotte.

Alexander listened to what was said with much satisfaction and goodwill. Some days had elapsed since the mischances of Nangis and Montereau, and his lively imagination, having recovered the shocks then experienced, was again inflamed in contemplating the prospect of entering Paris, which was now laid open before him. He listened favourably to Blucher's propositions, and convoked a council of the Allies, to take them into consideration. The discussion was very warm. Besides the three sovereigns, there were present at this council, Messrs. de Metternich, de Nesselrode, de Hardenberg, Lord Castlereagh, Prince Schwarzenberg, and the principal Generals of the coalition. Alexander condemned the

armistice and the temporizing system, insisted on the necessity of carrying on the war with vigour, and declared that, for his part, he was willing to carry it on with his faithful ally the King of Prussia, should the others abandon him, upon which the Emperor Francis demanded whether he was no longer numbered amongst those of the coalition that could be reckoned on. Thereupon the allied sovereigns shook hands, and agreed upon the necessity of acting promptly and vigorously, so as to leave no respite to the common enemy. After some explanations more unanimity of opinion was found to exist amongst them than was at first expected. Both sides admitted that the armistice compromised no principle, for it did not even suspend hostilities, and the only proposition that could either directly or indirectly derogate from the propositions of Châtillon had been carefully removed. There was consequently no change in the actual position of the allied powers. They had certainly paused at Chaumont, but it was the result of a very natural prudence that they should remain at a distance from Napoleon, whilst they were obliged to lessen their own strength by sending to Count de Bubna, at Dijon, succours that were declared indispensable. As to the rest, the formation of a powerful army that might act on Napoleon's flanks and force him to fall back was an excellent project, to which no objection could be made if the means existed of carrying it into effect. To grant Marshal Blücher perfect liberty of action and increase his army to double the present number was not objected to by any one. The great difficulty consisted of depriving the jealous and susceptible Bernadotte of two corps that constituted the chief part of the forces under his command. He had already complained and even threatened, because it seemed to him that his services were not rated as highly as they deserved, and he hinted that he might possibly retire to his tent and withdraw his aid. Different causes had concurred to ruffle his temper. Austria continued to protect Denmark against Sweden and had refused to admit a Swedish plenipotentiary to the Châtillon congress. As to this second point, it must not be forgotten that England, Prussia, Russia, and Austria were empowered to treat for the allied estates, great and small, and certainly Prince Bernadotte's personal worth did not confer so much importance on Sweden as to entitle her to be classed as a sixth great power. To these two causes of discontent was added a third, more intense in its action though not so openly avowed. The English minister, often indirectly questioned as to the projects of the coalition with regard to the throne of France, had told the inquisitive Bernadotte flatly that the allied powers were not making war for the purpose of substituting one dynasty for another, that questions of home government did not concern them, that they would allow France to choose for herself should another revolution break out, but that as far as the English were concerned they considered the Bourbon alone fit to replace the Bonaparte dynasty. The new-made Swede, who would willingly have again become French, to

obtain the throne of France, displayed from the time of this explanation, extreme ill-humour at the slightest contradiction. The Allies certainly did not fear him, still a disturbance of any kind in the affairs of the coalition, whilst all their forces were engaged against Napoleon, would be of some importance, and they feared to get into difficulties by depriving Bernadotte of the most considerable portion of his army.

The Allies were only stopped by this apprehension, and Alexander, notwithstanding his desire to satisfy the hot-tempered Blücher, hesitated, as well as the other members of the council, when Lord Castlereagh rising suddenly and acting as a Providence that determines everything, asked the military men whether they really considered the addition of Bulow and Wintzingerode's corps necessary to the army of Silesia. Having received a reply in the affirmative, he declared that he would take upon himself to smooth away all difficulties with the Prince Royal of Sweden. This declaration put an end to all hesitation, and it was decided that Blücher should receive the addition of Bulow and Wintzingerode's corps, with permission to manœuvre between the Seine and the Marne, in whatever way he believed most advantageous to the general interests of the war. Alexander dismissed Blücher's emissaries filled with joy, and it must be said, in relating to them what had taken place, he very much exaggerated what the advocates of active measures owed to him on this occasion.

But what means did Lord Castlereagh possess of arranging everything by his own authority? We shall explain this in a few words. In the first place, his mind was clear-sighted and firm, he was consequently able to seize at once, the essential points of an argument. In the next place he held in his hands the power that springs from money, and in the present instance, this was a very great power, considering that Sweden was not rich enough to pay her army. To have or not to have twenty-five millions, was the same for Bernadotte, as having or not having a Swedish army. Besides, Sweden, surrounded on every side by the English navy, durst not venture one false step. And lastly, Lord Castlereagh possessed the means of soothing the Prince of Sweden's pride. A German corps, drawn from the different principalities lately separated from France, had been embodied in Hanover, and paid by England. This corps amounted to 25,000 men, commanded by General Walmoden. There were 7 or 8,000 English in Holland under General Graham. The Prince of Orange was busy recruiting the Dutch army, and had already assembled from 10,000 to 12,000 men, who were also to receive their pay out of British subsidies. Lord Castlereagh need only say a word, and all these troops passed under the command of such or such a general. He decided they should be placed under the orders of the Prince of Sweden, who would then combine under his authority, besides Swedes and Danes, who had been forced to give in their submission, Germans, English, and Dutch, including the Prince of

Orange. The command of such a variety of troops would give him in the North, the appearance of a king of kings, which ought to satisfy his pride, and indemnify him for the troops of which he was deprived.

Bernadotte was made acquainted with these arrangements, and an order immediately despatched to the corps of Bulow and Wintzingerode to place themselves under the command of Marshal Blucher.

Lord Castlereagh profitted of what had occurred to render the coalition a fresh service, not less important than the preceding.

The want of union amongst the Allies was deeply felt, and it was feared every moment that the present coalition might dissolve, like all those which during the last twenty years had fallen beneath the sword of Napoleon. The bare thought of such an event was alarming, for if the Allies committed the error of breaking up the coalition, the tyrant of Europe, as they called the Emperor of the French, would again become as powerful, and more malignant than ever, and would not fail to trample on his present opponents. This well-founded fear obtained in the highest degree in the allied camp, and yet did not prevent disagreeable remarks, ill offices, and violent private quarrels. The late letters from Napoleon to the Emperor Francis and Prince Schwarzenberg, which the Austrian cabinet had too much tact to conceal, had increased the general feeling of apprehension, and though the fidelity of Austria did not appear to be shaken, still it was desirable that the bonds of the coalition should be drawn closer, in order to convince Napoleon that neither his profound cunning nor his formidable sword could sever the ties that bound his enemies together.

Lord Castlereagh was now revolving in his mind some striking measure by which the union of the allied powers might be more firmly cemented. Happily, an opportunity, the natural result of circumstances, soon presented itself. This was the conclusion of the new financial arrangements, which the three powers had incessantly solicited, since it had been decided that the war should be carried beyond the Rhine, and it was on this account Count Pozzo had been sent to London. These fresh arrangements offered an opportunity of binding the Allies more closely together than anything that had yet occurred, for they could now stipulate with what intentions, for what length of time, and in what proportion, each should contribute to the common cause, and they should also consider what kind of alliance should be formed to secure, after the great struggle should be terminated, the results that had been obtained. It was in accordance with these views, that Lord Castlereagh projected, and ordered to be drawn up, a new treaty, that he resolved to offer for signature to the allied courts. This treaty, besides the general object of cementing the union of the allied powers, had a particular object, exclusively English; that of increasing Great Britain's continental importance, and so securing her the means of carrying out certain views which she had very much at heart.

Lord Castlereagh consequently devised a solemn alliance between England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, by which each of these powers was pledged to furnish a permanent contingent of 150,000 men, until the present war should be terminated in a manner conformable to their wishes. The 600,000 men that this combination would place at the disposal of the coalition, did not include the levies to be supplied by the secondary powers, and which, united to the others, would furnish a total of 800,000 men. England, not being able to contribute 150,000 men from her own troops, undertook to subsidize foreign soldiers. She had 100,000 men in Spain, including English, Portuguese and Spaniards, and it would be easy for her, with Hanoverians, Germans of different states, and Dutch, to raise a new contingent of 50,000 men.

Great Britain would thus acquire, independent of her maritime importance, a continental influence almost equal to that enjoyed by the three continental powers. To this she was able to add an influence peculiar to herself, that of money, and Lord Castlereagh took upon himself to offer an annual subsidy of six millions sterling, to be paid during the entire duration of the war; and this money was to be equally divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Thus England contributed a double aid to the common undertaking; a triple aid, indeed, if we take her navy into account, and the assistance she rendered ought naturally to give her a decisive authority over the other powers, and be a pledge that the conditions of the future peace should be based on her wishes.

It was further stipulated that the Allies should promise not to listen to any private proposition, but to treat in common with the common enemy, according to the accepted conditions. Lord Castlereagh, wishing, moreover, to provide for the future, and to bind the Allies to the work they should have accomplished, conceived the project of maintaining the coalition for twenty years after the conclusion of the approaching peace. Each of the Allies should be bound, after the close of the war, to keep on foot 60,000 men, making a total of 240,000, for the service of whichever of the allies France might attack, if, after the conclusion of the peace, she renewed her aggressions against her neighbours. This was a means of guaranteeing the existence of two kingdoms, whose creation England earnestly desired; that of the Low Countries, because it deprived us of Antwerp, and that of Piedmont because it robbed us of Genoa.

There was an idea that began to find favour amongst the diplomatists of the coalition; it was, not only to grant possessions on the left of the Rhine to the House of Orange, but also to grant some to Prussia, in order to establish an unceasing source of jealousy between that power and France. This idea had originated with Mr. Pitt, in 1805, and was adopted by Lord Castlereagh, as it seemed an important means of strengthening the new kingdom, that was to be created by the union of Belgium and Holland. This projected arrangement, which was advantageous to Prussia, though

it compromised her with us, was not likely to meet any opposition; for to overthrow France, and bind her in iron fetters after having overthrown her, was at that time the wish, the hope, the joy of all Europe. But these events also furnished each of the sovereigns an opportunity of gratifying his private interests. Thus, for example, Russia demanded as a recompense for the arrangements to which she lent her aid, that Holland should give her a full receipt for the loans contracted at Amsterdam. England, as we have already seen, in order to complete her work, wished to marry the Princess Charlotte, heiress to the British crown, to the son of the Prince of Orange, and thus unite, in some sort, under the same sceptre, the three kingdoms of the British Empire, and the new monarchy of the Low Countries.

In burdening England with enormous expenses, the new treaty afforded her such great advantages, that the bold-minded minister had not hesitated to propose the conditions, and insisted on their acceptance as a point which he would not yield. Consequently, Lord Castlereagh presented the project to the allied powers, in conjunction with whom he governed Europe.

The proclamation of a new alliance that was to exist during the entire duration of the war, and be valid for twenty years after the conclusion of peace, in order to maintain the new European edifice about to be created, ought to be agreeable to all the contracting powers! for, even after the conclusion of peace, they might still fear ulterior enterprises on the part of France. The propositions of Lord Castlereagh were, therefore, accepted and signed at Chaumont, on the 1st of March. This was the famous treaty of Chaumont, which was the bases of the Holy Alliance, and which, during nearly forty years, influenced European policy, until Europe at length perceived it was not by France alone that the balance of power might be disturbed.

This treaty was signed amid the universal joy of the Allies, who were all well pleased at being closely united and largely subsidized, with the exception of Austria, who, whilst she saw in the new alliance tranquillizing assurances against the projects of France in Italy, did not find there any guarantee against the enterprises of Russia in Poland and the East. Lord Castlereagh did not stop here in his labours. He proposed and carried the resolution of persevering some time longer, but the period was to be limited, in negotiating at Châtillon. Peace had been offered to Napoleon on condition that France should retire within her ancient limits, and to be consistent with themselves, they ought, if he were willing to treat with him. Besides the stipulations of Chaumont, by giving to the coalition a duration of twenty years, was sufficiently reassuring against any attempts he might make for the recovery of his ancient conquests. But if he prolonged the negotiations with the evident intention of occupying the time of the Allies, and trifling with them, they would fix a term, after which the negotiations should be broken off, and a definite resolution taken of treating with him no longer,

which would be equivalent to an European declaration of his dethronement. But until that time arrived, no measures opposed to his dynasty could be sanctioned, and the Count d'Artois, in Franche-Comté, and the Duke d'Angoulême, in Guyenne, were not to be received at the head-quarters of the belligerent powers.

These measures were, with regard to the interests of the Allies, so wisely planned, that they received a prompt and universal assent. It was by these measures that Lord Castlereagh established his personal influence, and, above all, the influence of his country in the European coalition. He wrote to his cabinet, that carrying out these projects would, no doubt, cost England a great deal, but he was sure of their being generally approved, for the question at issue had been either to seize or to lose the first place amongst the European powers, and he had not hesitated to secure that position, whatever it might cost the British treasury. He certainly had no cause to fear the rejection of his project, whatever might be the number of promised millions. England has always been made to pay for her greatness, and has rarely erred in the estimate of her worth.

As soon as these matters were determined, an order was despatched to the plenipotentiaries of the four cabinets, directing them to inform M. de Caulaincourt that they awaited a reply on the part of France; that if the proposed preliminaries were not approved, France might send others, which should be discussed in a spirit of conciliation, provided they did not deviate too widely from the principles laid down; but, after a certain period had elapsed, the congress of Châtillon should be dissolved, and all further negotiation abandoned.

No sooner had Blücher and his advisers, Gneisenau, Muffling, and others, learned the resolution adopted by the Allies of allowing them freedom of action, and reinforcing them with 50,000 men, than they again indulged the ambition which had already proved so fatal to them, that of being the first to enter Paris. They scarcely paused to examine whether, before they undertook this new offensive movement, it would be better to wait the junction of the 50,000 men destined for their support, and they immediately resolved to advance to the right, though in a slightly oblique direction—that is to say, towards the Marne—where they could more promptly rejoin Bulow and Wintzingerode, who had already set out, the one towards Soissons, the other towards Reims. In their feverish impatience, they preferred joining these troops on the way, whatever danger might result from their isolated march, than to await their arrival in the vicinity of Prince Schwarzenberg, where the armies of Silesia and Bohemia might afford each other mutual assistance. They said to themselves, and with truth, that by this movement they would draw Napoleon towards them, and free Prince Schwarzenberg, but they did not add, that it was at the risk of involving themselves in imminent danger that they could free him from the enemy. Moreover, having seen some light troops galloping on their flank, they

hoped in advancing towards the Marne to encounter Marshals Marmont and Mortier, apart from Napoleon, and thus find an opportunity of revenging themselves for their recent defeats. What they did not take into consideration was, that the movements of the French army were very differently calculated from that of the Allies, and were not so much exposed to the chances of war.

However this may be, on the 24th February Blucher, who had advanced as far as Méry, recrossed the Aube at Anglure, and advanced to Sézanne. Perceiving, though not very clearly, the perils of this march, he sent word to Prince Schwarzenberg that in order to free him from his enemies he was about to expose himself to great danger, and begged him earnestly, as soon as he should be freed from the presence of Napoleon, to advance, in order to render to the army of Silesia the same service that the latter was about to render to the army of Bohemia.

We have already seen what was the position of the Marshals Mortier and Marmont, whilst Napoleon was returning from the Marne to the Seine, to fight the battles of Nangis and Montereau. Marshal Mortier, who had been ordered to follow in the rear of d'York and Sacken towards Soissons, had not been able to overtake these two generals, who, by making a movement to the right, had escaped to Châlons; but Mortier retook Soissons, which had momentarily fallen into the enemy's possession. In pursuance of Napoleon's orders, which recalled him to the Marne, he had fallen back on Château-Thierry, and arrived there the very day that Blucher commenced the execution of his new projects. As to Marshal Marmont, placed between Etoges and Montmirail, so as to be in communication, on one side with Marshal Mortier on the Marne, and on the other with Napoleon on the Aube, he had successively occupied Etoges, Montmirail, and Sézanne. Having seen Blucher cross the Aube at Anglure on the 24th, and return to Sézanne on the 25th, he had retired in good order on Esternay, behind the Grand-Morin, after having killed some of the enemy, without losing a man himself. His plan of action was now clearly laid down; it was, on seeing himself separated from Napoleon by Blucher's late movement, to fall back on the Marne, and there join Marshal Mortier, and dispute the country inch by inch with the enemy, until Napoleon should arrive to their assistance. He had sent word to Mortier, who was then at Château-Thierry, to proceed towards Ferté-sous-Jouarre, whither he would advance from another direction; he also informed Napoleon of what had taken place, praying him to come up as soon as possible.

On the morning of the 26th, Blucher having recommenced his pursuit, Marmont continued his retrograde movement as far as Ferté-Gaucher, then turning towards the Marne, he took the road to Ferté-sous-Jouarre. Blucher continued the pursuit of the previous evening without overtaking Mortier, and, when he saw him take the direction of Ferté-sous-Jouarre, instead of going towards Meaux, strong doubts sprang up in his mind. He did not

comprehend that Marmont going to Ferté-sous-Jouarre in preference to Meaux, must have had serious reasons for a movement that removed him still further from Paris, and that these reasons could be no other than the desire of joining Mortier as soon as possible; neither did he perceive that, allowing the two Marshals the advantage of uniting their forces—an advantage which he could not contest with them—he ought to have thought of cutting them off from Paris, and for that purpose hastened himself to Meaux. This very natural thought did not occur to Blücher, and though he arrived at Jouarre at a very early hour, and might have had possession of Meaux before night, he lost the evening in trying to discover what he could not divine, under the pretext so often alleged by generals who do not know the value of time, of granting necessary repose to his troops.

On the next day—the 27th February—having at length comprehended that the two Marshals, having combined their forces at Ferté-sous-Jouarre, must be naturally solicitous to reach Meaux, the direct route to Paris, he ordered Sacken to advance from the left on Meaux, and sent Kleist straight forward on Sammeron, to cross the Marne at that point, by means of a portable bridge that he brought with him. Besides being desirous of intercepting the route to Paris, on both banks of the Marne, he also wished to cross that river with the main body of his forces, and take up a stronger position on the other side, in case Napoleon, as was very probable, should leave the army of Bohemia and come in pursuit of that of Silesia.

But the two French Marshals were more alert than Blücher, and, whilst on the morning of the 27th, he had scarcely fixed his plans, they were at that very moment marching towards Meaux, for the purpose of resuming communications with Paris, which the urgent necessity of effecting an union between their forces had obliged them to suspend for a while. Blücher did not estimate their combined forces, taking into account their labours and losses, at more than 14,000 men, excellent soldiers no doubt, but a small number to cut their way through 50,000 enemies, whom they might encounter on the route to Meaux. Happily they took measures to protect their movements, with as much skill as promptitude.

The Marne, between Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Meaux, describes numerous windings, whose edges are bordered by the Paris route, like a tangent touching successively several circles. At Trilport the road touches one of these contours, crosses the Marne and leads to Meaux. The two Marshals set out before daybreak, in order to reach the bridge of Trilport, take possession of it, cross the Marne and seize on Meaux. Moreover, wishing also to take possession of the Paris route that runs along the right bank of the Marne, they had ordered General Vincent to cross to this bank by the bridge of Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and take up a position behind the Ourcq, which in the neighbourhood of Lizy approaches the Marne very closely, without, however, uniting with that river, and forms with it an

almost continuous line of defence. Thus established behind the Marne and the Ourcq, with their right at Meaux and their left at Lizy, they might keep the enemy in check during three or four days, receive, meanwhile, reinforcements from Paris, and await, without incurring any great risk, the arrival of Napoleon, who would not fail to fly to their assistance as soon as he should have learned their position.

These excellent arrangements were as skilfully executed as conceived. On the morning of the 27th, before Blucher could discern their movements, the two Marshals glided, so to speak, between the enemy and the Marne, along the road that runs on the left bank, tangent to the different windings of this river, crossed the bridge at Trilport, leaving the Ricard division to defend the bridge, and advanced to Meaux. Whilst Marshal Marmont, after crossing the Marne, arrived at Meaux by the right bank of the river, General Sacken arrived there by the left. Some Russian detachments had already entered the city at the south side, when the Marshal charged them at the head of 200 men, drove them back and shut the gates. Meanwhile, General Vincent had crossed the Marne at Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and taken up his position at Lizy, behind the Ourcq.

The two Marshals had thus succeeded, with 14,000 men, in evading 50,000, and Blucher, who ought to have captured both the one and the other, experienced the confusion of seeing them established safe and sound behind the Marne and the Ourcq; whilst the position of affairs, lately so perilous for them, was now about to become so for him. This movement being completed on the 27th February, the Marshals sent Napoleon an account of what they had done; they also sent to Joseph, demanding all the reinforcements he could possibly spare from Paris. In fact, the question now was, to save the capital; and the resources Paris contained could not be more usefully employed than in being sent immediately to Meaux.

Napoleon, informed on the 25th, of Blucher's movement towards the Marne, and knowing the presumptuous character of this General, was fully prepared for the imprudence he was about to commit, and resolved to make him pay dearly for his rashness.* Without losing

* The Duke de Ragusa, as usual, ignorant of Napoleon's motives, and judging his conduct very superficially, reproaches him for not having set out on the 27th, and makes it appear that he received intelligence of Blucher's movement on the 24th, and asserts that had he made a movement two days earlier, the destruction of the army of Silesia would have been inevitable. The correspondence gives a decisive reply to this reproach. Intelligence of Blucher's movement, which was sent to Sézanne on the 24th, did not reach Napoleon till the 25th, and on that very day he despatched Victor from Méry to Planey, and Ney from Troyes to Aubeterre. Consequently there was not an hour lost. On the 26th, when Blucher's intention was fully evident, Napoleon continued this movement, but did not set out himself until the 27th, in order to give his troops time to advance. The news arrived on the 25th, and, on the 27th, his troops had reached Herbisse, beyond the Aube. It would, therefore, have been impossible to act with more rapidity, and when we consider what steadiness of judgment and vigour of character are needed to form instant resolutions during actual warfare, especially in a position so serious as that of Napoleon, a position where the first false movement

a moment, he ordered Marshal Victor, who was stationed between Troyes and Méry, to reconstruct the bridge of Méry on the Seine, and to advance to Plancy and cross the Aube at that point. He ordered Marshal Ney to march to Aubeterre, and cross the Aube at Arcis. His intention was to leave Troyes privately, with 34,000 or 35,000 men, leaving about the same number before that city, throw himself on Blücher's rear, and force him back on the Marne, where the Marshals Marmont and Mortier would receive him at the point of the bayonet.

On the morning of the 26th, the former intelligence being confirmed, he despatched the remainder of the guard from Troyes, and resolved to set out next day himself, to direct this new movement, which, if it succeeded, might put an end to the war.

In adopting this resolution, it would be necessary to leave before Troyes, a force sufficient to awe Prince Schwarzenberg. Napoleon confided to the Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald, and to General Gérard, the task of defending the Aube, concealing, at the same time, his absence as long as possible. Marshal Oudinot had, besides the Rothenbourg division of the Young Guard, the Leval division brought from Spain, half of the Boyer division, also brought from Spain, and Count de Valmy's cavalry; Marshal Macdonald had the 11th corps with Milhaud's cavalry; General Gérard had the 2nd corps, recruited with the Paris reserve and the Saint-Germain cuirassiers. The entire amounted to little more than 30,000 men. Napoleon ordered them to overthrow all the enemy's posts beyond Aube, and to occupy the course of this river strongly, both above and below Bar-sur-Aube. He particularly recommended that after his departure, the soldiers should frequently shout *Vive l'Empereur*, in order that his absence might not be suspected.

He brought with him Marshal Victor, commanding the Boyer and Charpentier divisions of the Young Guard, Ney with the Meunier and Curial divisions of the Young Guard, and the 2nd brigade of the Boyer division, from Spain. Friant with the Old Guard, Drouot with the artillery reserve, and, lastly, from 9,000 to 10,000 cavalry, belonging either to the guards or the dragoons of Spain; the entire amounting, as we have just said, to 35,000 men. By a union with the two marshals the total would be raised to 50,000.

Before leaving Troyes, Napoleon took, according to his custom, diverse measures, relative to military and political administration. The conscription, instead of the decreed 600,000 men, had only yielded 120,000 and, for some time past, furnished none. The people profitted by the shocks the Imperial authority had received, to disobey a law that was universally detested. Instead of from four to five

might have caused his ruin, we cannot sufficiently admire the precision and vigour of conduct of a captain, who, in an hour after having received intelligence, puts his troops *en marche*, and remains behind only to hide his projects longer from the enemy, and to give, whilst his troops are marching forward, orders, that embrace all the armies and the government of a vast empire.

thousand conscripts that hitherto had arrived daily at Paris, and that were drafted hastily into the skeleton regiments of the guard or the line, there did not now arrive a thousand. But it was quite different in the departments traversed by the enemy; there, a patriotic fury raged, and numbers of young men were willing to enlist. Napoleon ordered a sort of levy *en masse* in the invaded provinces, under pretext of calling out, in these departments, the National Guards for the defence of the country, but not wishing to leave these men in the regiments of the National Guards, on which he set no great value, he ordered them to be drafted into the regiments of the line, with a promise of liberation as soon as the enemy should be driven beyond the frontier. He reiterated pressing entreaties that provisions should be sent to Nogent, by the Seine, and, besides, a pontoon train, without which all his movements would be as difficult as though he were in an enemy's country. To these orders he added an injunction, often addressed to his wife, his brother Joseph, the high-chancellor, Cambacérès, and the war minister, not to be afraid, at least not to allow their fear to appear; to execute his instructions promptly and punctually, and then, as he was in the habit of saying, *to leave the rest to him*, promising, if they seconded his efforts, that he would soon drive the Allies into the Rhine.

The commissioners appointed to negotiate the armistice, and who had been assembled since the 24th, at Lusigny, had not ceased to discuss the limits that should separate the belligerent armies. Napoleon, on setting out, had enjoined M. de Flahaut to continue the negotiations, and even to yield different points, provided the fortress of Antwerp and the city of Chambéry were included in the line of demarcation. Though he did not expect any beneficial result from these discussions, yet he did not wish to close any way that led to negotiation. M. de Caulaincourt still advised him to give up a part of the Frankfort bases, and asked him for a counter-proposition, which the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon earnestly demanded, conformably to the orders sent from Chaumont. Napoleon dictated a reply for these plenipotentiaries. M. de Caulaincourt was to say that the desired counter-propositions were being drawn up at headquarters, but that, amidst so many multiplied military movements, it was not astonishing that the Emperor of the French, who was at the same time the head of the government and the head of the army, had not found time to complete such a work. He was, meanwhile, to declare, that the project presented at Châtillon being, not a treaty of peace, but a capitulation, it would never be accepted; that France ought, even for the common good, preserve her ancient position in Europe, and in order to do so, she ought to receive an equivalent for the extension of territory acquired by Prussia, Russia, and Austria, at the expense of Poland, by Germany at the expense of the Ecclesiastical States, by Austria at the expense of Venice, and by England at the expense of the Dutch, and of the Indian princes; that, consequently, France ought to expand herself far beyond the limits of 1790; and that, moreover, she would never

consent that the fate of the states she gave up should be decided without her sanction. In this way Napoleon hinted upon what bases he intended to negotiate, but without declaring explicitly what frontier line he wished to keep, which he was not disposed to do until he should have achieved new and decisive victories. He counselled the Duke of Vicence to propagate the belief that he was still at Troyes, busy in concentrating his resources there, and drawing up a treaty in reply to that of Châtillon. He also wished that the Council of Regency should examine the Châtillon propositions, and give an opinion on them. He flattered himself that all the members of the council would be unanimous in expressing their indignation.

Having despatched these various and serious affairs, Napoleon left Troyes secretly, on the morning of the 27th February, crossed the Aube at Arcis, and, following his columns closely, passed the night at Herbisse, at the house of a poor country priest, who could offer no other accommodation than what his humble vicarage afforded, but which he offered cordially, not alone to the Emperor, but to his numerous staff. After a frugal and cheerful repast, they passed the night on chairs, tables, or on straw, calculating that the present movement in Blucher's rear would be as profitable as the former. Everything promised a similar result, and Napoleon might, without presumption, reckon upon it.

The next day, the 28th February, he continued his march. He could choose between two courses, either to follow Blucher through Sézanne and Ferté-sous-Jouarre to Meaux, or to advance directly through Fère-Champenoise to Château-Thierry. By taking this latter direction he secured the advantage of intercepting Blucher's most important communication, for he could cut him off at the same time from Châlons and Soissons, and separate him from Bulow and Wintzingerode. But there was more than one danger involved in this plan of operation; it would leave the Marshals Marmont and Mortier too long contending with Blucher before Meaux, it would abandon to the latter the principal route to Paris, and, in short, furnish him a line of retreat, far better than that of Châlons or Soissons—we mean the route from Meaux to Provins, which would allow him to fall back, in case of danger, on Prince Schwarzenberg. To pursue Blucher by Sézanne, Ferté-Gaucher and Ferté-sous-Jouarre, was therefore the safest proceeding, whether for the purpose of cutting him off from the high road to Paris, or coming more quickly to the succour of the two marshals; in short, to inflict on him a punishment similar to that he had received at Montmirail and Champaubert; for, if Blucher made an effort to join Prince de Schwarzenberg on the Seine, Napoleon would anticipate him there. If he threw himself behind the Marne, to take a covered position there, he would be followed and hemmed in between the Marne and the Aisne, without any means of escape, precautions having been taken to defend Soissons. Thus Napoleon, in executing a bold manœuvre, chose at the same time the safest course, for he pos-

sessed the rare talent of not overstepping the line that separates daring courage from imprudence—in a word, he could be at the same time rash and cautious. Unhappily, it was only in war he combined these two antagonistic qualities.

He marched, therefore, on the morning of the 28th, with his 35,000 men, through Sézanne, on Ferté-Gaucher and Ferté-sous-Jouarre. Notwithstanding the rapidity of his movements, he was not able to reach Ferté-Gaucher that day, and passed the night between Sézanne and Ferté-Gaucher. The next day (the 1st of March) he slept at Jouarre, and reached Ferté-sous-Jouarre at an early hour on the 2nd. During Napoleon's march on the Marne, Blucher, who at length perceived the danger of his position, had not endeavoured to extricate himself with the celerity that common prudence would have dictated. He had, at first, wished to place the Marne between him and Napoleon, and crossed the river at Ferté-sous-Jouarre, which place had remained in his hands since the retreat of Marmont and Mortier. He destroyed the bridge of this town, and established himself on the Ourcq, to try and force the position of the two Marshals, whilst Napoleon, checked by the Marne, would be obliged to remain a spectator. This was an imprudent calculation, for the Marne could not restrain Napoleon more than thirty-six hours, and, if to carry out these fruitless attempts, Blucher lingered on the banks of the Ourcq, he ran the risk of being attacked in the rear and enclosed between the Marne and the Aisne in a truly perilous position. Things went on in this way; and whilst Napoleon was rapidly advancing, Blucher was losing his time in vain attempts on the line of the Ourcq. He had attempted to transport Kleist's corps across the Ourcq, but Marmont and Mortier, throwing themselves on Kleist, had forced him to repass the river with considerable loss. Whilst the two Marshals thus held their position, Joseph sent them reinforcements consisting of 7,000 foot soldiers, and 1,500 horse, of the Guards and Line. These troops had been incorporated on the 1st of March, and on the 2nd, when it was known that Napoleon had arrived on the Marne, they were ready to receive orders.

Blucher, stationed beyond the Marne, and along the Ourcq, which he had not been able to force, found himself between the two marshals who defended the Ourcq, and Napoleon, who was preparing to cross the Marne. He had excellent reasons to expedite his movements, for the danger was every moment increasing. Nevertheless he persevered in his former plan, and lost the entire 2nd of March lingering along the line of the Ourcq, to try whether he could not fight the two marshals before the eyes of Napoleon, who could not cross the Marne. Having encountered a valiant resistance on every point of the Ourcq, he resolved to decamp on the morning of the 3rd, in order to draw nearer the Aisne, and join either Bulow, who was coming by Soissons, or Wintzingerode, who was coming by Reims. But he should now find himself between the Marne, that Napoleon was about to cross, and the

Aisne, where the only bridge within his reach was that of Soissons, of which we were masters ; besides the country between the Marne and the Aisne, which he was about to traverse, was marshy and become almost impracticable in consequence of a sudden thaw. His position was consequently most alarming, thanks to his own imprudence and the profound calculations of his adversary.

During these proceedings, Napoleon having arrived at the banks of the Marne, was burning with impatience to cross. To effect this object he employed the marines of the Guard, and such was their activity that the bridge was reconstructed during the night of the 2nd-3rd of March. The intelligence that arrived every moment was calculated to excite his impatience to the highest degree. The peasants who came from the other side of the Marne were glowing with patriotism, like all who had caught a sight of the enemy, and drew a dreary picture of the state of the Prussian army. In fact this army, filled with recollections of Montmirail, of Château-Thierry, of Vauchamps, and knowing that they were pursued by Napoleon, expected a terrible disaster. The state of the broken-up roads added to their alarm, and they foresaw that they should be obliged to abandon at least their cannon and baggage as soon as Napoleon should have crossed the slender barrier that separated him from them. All this was an inducement to the Emperor not to lose time, and, according to his wont, he did not lose it. Intelligence from Troyes was also another motive for expediting his movements. He learned that Prince Schwarzenberg having discovered the secret of his departure, had resumed offensive operations, and was again driving forward on Troyes and Nogent the marshals who had been left to guard the Aube. This circumstance, though it rendered despatch on his part imperative, troubled him little, for he felt confident that after discomfiting the army of Silesia, he would be able to fall back on the army of Bohemia, and make it retreat faster than it had advanced. Suddenly, at sight of the complicated movements of his adversary, Napoleon conceived a great military idea, whose execution might involve the most important results. To fall immediately on Schwarzenberg, after beating Blücher, appeared to him a fatiguing movement that might not yield any decisive result. He devised another plan of operation. The intelligence he had received that Bülow and Wintzingerode's corps had arrived in line, proved to him that the Allies were strangely neglecting the blockade of the fortresses, and left them invested by forces as contemptible in number as in quality ; it would therefore be possible to make use of the garrisons against the enemy, as they had made use of the blockading troops against us ; he could thus turn to profit what, in his highly expressive language, he called "the dead forces." He consequently resolved to call out all the disposable troops in the fortresses, and form them into an active army, from which important services might be expected. Into the fortresses of Belgium, Luxembourg, Lorraine, and Alsace, conscripts had been thrown who, drafted into the skele-

tons of old regiments, must have acquired a certain amount of military instruction during the two months and a half that the campaign had lasted. Having lately often led to battle conscripts who had been only fifteen days under drill, Napoleon might consider men who had been two months and a half enlisted, disciplined soldiers. Admitting these premises, it would be possible to draw from Lille, Antwerp, Ostend, Gorcum, and Berg-op-Zoom, about 20,000 men, or at least 15,000. Double that number might be drawn from the fortresses of Luxembourg, Metz, Verdun, Thionville, Mayence, Strasbourg, &c. If then, after overthrowing Blücher, Napoleon, who had about 50,000 men, could add to these 50,000 more, in advancing by Soissons, Laon, and Reims on Verdun and Nancy, he would find himself at the head of 100,000 men in the rear of Prince Schwarzenberg, and without doubt the latter would not wait that opportunity to return from Paris to Besançon. At the first suspicion of such a project, the commander-in-chief would retrace his steps, pursued by the exasperated peasantry of Burgundy, Champagne, and Lorraine, who, utterly cast down at first by the rapidity of the invasion, had afterwards exhibited sentiments of the purest patriotism. Schwarzenberg would thus arrive half vanquished, to fall hopelessly beneath Napoleon's sword. This daring project was certainly executable, for the men on whom he calculated existed, and the journey to collect them did not involve an expenditure of much labour or time. In fact, the distance from Soissons to Reims, from Reims to Verdun, from Verdun to Toul, was not greater than the army had already traversed in crossing alternately from Schwarzenberg to Blücher. Besides, two or three days more were of little consequence, when the bare announcement of the projected movement would have the effect of drawing the enemy from Paris to the frontiers, and freeing the capital. Thus the war might be terminated at once, if fortune favoured the execution of the plan, for certainly Prince Schwarzenberg—whose numbers were already reduced to 90,000 men, by the loss of the detachment sent to Laon—pursued by the peasantry of the provinces, could not resist an army of 100,000 men, commanded by the Emperor in person.

Napoleon, therefore, ordered General Maison to leave at Antwerp only a few seamen, the National Guards, and the forces absolutely necessary to resist an enemy, who did not think of making a regular attack; he was to do the same in all the fortresses in Flanders, and prepare to march on Mézières with what troops he could assemble. He gave similar orders to the governors of Mayence, Metz, and Strasbourg. All were ordered to leave in the fortresses only those troops that were indispensably necessary, and supply the deficiency by the National Guards; they were to summon the garrisons from the least important villages, and advance from Mayence and Strasbourg to Metz, from Metz to Nancy, to join the main body. The small numbers that blockaded our fortresses could not prevent these combinations, if the commanders of the

garrisons acted with vigour. In any case, Napoleon coming to their aid would free those who might have encountered any serious obstacle. Trustworthy men were sent in disguise to carry these orders, which it was not difficult to dispatch to their destination, for with the exception of Mayence we had intelligence from all our fortresses; so complete was the blockade.

Full of this project, on which he founded most rationable hopes, Napoleon, after crossing the Marne on the night of the 2nd-3rd March, set out in pursuit of Blucher, whom it was necessary he should put *hors de combat*, or at least remove to a distance, in order to execute the plan he had just conceived. The reports of the morning all agreed in representing Blucher in the deepest embarrassment. In fact he was driven back on the Aisne, which he could only cross at the bridge of Soissons, that belonged to us. He could certainly escape by a movement to the right that would bring him towards Fère-en-Tardenois, and towards Reims, a movement that would afford him an opportunity of escape by remounting the Aisne, and crossing nearer the source, where there was a sufficiency of bridges, and where he would meet Bulow and Wintzingerode. But Napoleon was not a man to leave this resource to his adversary. For this purpose, after crossing the Marne, he remounted the river towards the source, by the high road that leads from Ferté-sous-Jouarre to Château-Thierry. He had thus the double advantage of advancing faster, and of reaching the direct road from Château-Thierry to Soissons, by Oulchy. Once on this road he would outflank Blucher, and he was certain of taking possession of the only road open to the Prussian General, that of Reims.

Having arrived at Château-Thierry Napoleon ceased to advance to the right, and marching directly on Soissons, he drove Blucher briskly back on Oulchy. At the same moment the Marshals Mortier and Marmont having recrossed the Ourcq on our left, and debouched from Lizy and from May, set out in pursuit of the enemy. A sudden frost that occurred on the morning of the 3rd, rendered Blucher's retreat less difficult. His danger, however, was not less great, for the road to Reims was about being closed against him. At Oulchy the Ourcq again makes its appearance, and Marmont had a sharp engagement at that place with Blucher's rear-guard. He took or killed about three thousand of this rear-guard, and forced the remainder to cross the Ourcq in disorder. The passage was thus assured on the morning of the next day for the Marshals Mortier and Marmont, who were advancing at the head of their combined troops. Another advantage was also obtained, it was that of occupying Fère-en-Tardenois with our extreme right, and cutting off the route to Reims. There remained to Blucher no other way of crossing the Aisne than at Soissons, of which we were masters. We had at length laid hold of our irreconcilable enemy, and were about to suffocate him in a brassy embrace.

Napoleon had brought up his van-guard as far as the village of Rocourt, whilst Marmont's troops were at Oulchy, and he that night

slept at Bezu-Saint-Germain, his mind filled with the highest and best-founded hopes he had ever conceived.

In fact, on the next day—the 4th March—he set out, calculating on a decisive engagement during the day. Still fearing that Blucher might escape on the right, the Emperor himself took up a position at Fismes, the only route leading to Reims that was still practicable, whilst Marmont and Mortier pushed forward on Soissons by Oulchy and Hartennes. Whatever course Blucher took he would be forced to fight, with the Aisne at his back, and with 45,000 against 55,000 men. We had not been accustomed in this campaign to a superiority of numbers on our side, and Blucher would now, inevitably, be thrust into the Aisne. Whether he paused at Soissons and fought there, with the river in his rear, or re-ascended the Aisne, his position would be just the same. If he halted before Soissons, Napoleon, uniting his left with Marmont and Mortier, would fall on him within three or four hours; if he advanced along the Aisne, to reconstruct a bridge there, or make use of that of Berry-au-Bac, Napoleon could fall more directly on him from Fismes, and forming a combination with the two marshals, surprise him by a flank movement, and place him in the most critical position. Blucher's destruction was therefore inevitable, and what was to become of Bulow and Wintzingerode, who were hovering about the vicinity, waiting to join him? What would become of Schwarzenberg, left alone on the Paris route? The destiny of France was about to change, for whatever at a later period might become of the Imperial dynasty (a secondary consideration in the present solemn crisis), victorious France would have preserved her natural frontiers. Every moment brought us fresh presages of victory. The greatest dejection prevailed amongst Blucher's troops, whilst ours were burning for battle. At every step the French fell in with waggons that had been abandoned, or with stragglers from the enemy's line. Eleven or twelve hundred of these unhappy creatures had fallen into our hands.

Suddenly, Napoleon received the most unexpected and afflicting intelligence. Soissons, that was the key to the Aisne—Soissons, that he had taken especial care to provide with sufficient means of defence—Soissons had opened its gates to Blucher, and given up to him the passage of the Aisne. Who was it that had thus suddenly changed the face of things, and converted into a serious danger for us that which, a few hours before, had been an imminent peril for the enemy? Blucher, in fact, had not only escaped our pursuit, and stood protected by the Aisne, which, from having been an advantage for us, was now changed into an obstacle, but had also joined Bulow and Wintzingerode, and so raised the number of his troops to 100,000 men. Who, then, we repeat, had been able to reverse our position and destroy our hopes? A weak-minded man, who, without being either a traitor or a coward, or even a bad officer, had been terrified by the threats of the adverse generals, and had delivered up Soissons. We shall now relate how this event had

occurred, the most fatal in the annals of our history, next to that which, a year later occurred between Wavre and Waterloo.

Soissons had once fallen into the hands of the Allies, in consequence of the death of General Rusca, and had been wrested from them by Marshal Mortier, when the latter had been sent in pursuit of the Generals, Sacken and d'York. In obedience to the orders of Napoleon, who felt all the importance of Soissons, in the present circumstances, Marshal Mortier had provided, by every means in his power, for the preservation of this post. The place, which had long been neglected, was not in a state to offer great resistance to the enemy; but, with artillery and provisions, of which there was no deficiency, and certain sacrifices that circumstances authorized, we could have held the place for a few days, and thus remained masters of the passage of the Aisne. According to written instructions, that Napoleon had revised, and which had been sent to Soissons, the buildings in the suburbs were to be burned, because they impeded the defence; then the bridge of Aisne was to be undermined, so that it might be blown up, should circumstances become desperate—a measure that would, at least, deprive the enemy of the bridge, should the French not be able to hold it. The Poles lately withdrawn from Sedan had been sent to garrison the place, Napoleon not being very well pleased with them at the time. It was true that to their despair at seeing their country devastated, was added the affliction of profound personal misery, and the noble Polish troops of former times were now reduced to 3,000 or 4,000 men, ill-armed and ill-equipped. However, seeing the extreme peril of France, every one amongst them who could hold a sword or a musket had offered to serve. A thousand cavalry soldiers, under General Pac, had joined the Imperial Guard, and a thousand foot soldiers had assembled at Soissons. These were to be reinforced by 2,000 National Guards. The Governor of the town was General Moreau (no relation of the celebrated Moreau), who had not the reputation of being a bad officer. Unfortunately, to him was confided the worst defended part of the town.

On the 2nd and 3rd March, two masses of the enemy's soldiers appeared in sight, the one advancing along the right, the other along the left bank of the Aisne. It was Bulow, who coming from Belgium, advanced towards Soissons along the right bank of the river, and Wintzingerode, who coming from Luxembourg, through Reims, approached by the left bank. Both felt the great importance, both to Blucher and themselves, of the post they were about to attack. In fact, Soissons was the only issue by which Blucher could cross the barrier of the Aisne, and for the others, it was the only means of delivery from an isolation that became every moment more perilous. Should they not succeed in seizing this bridge, they would be obliged to fall back, the one along the right bank of the Aisne, the other along the left, to effect a junction higher up, and leave Blucher alone between the Aisne and Napoleon. Thus, after having on the 2nd March cannonaded the town during the entire

day, without any great result, on the 3rd they used the strongest threats to General Moreau, trying to intimidate him by threatening to put the entire garrison to the sword.

The place could not resist more than two or three days ; for attacked by 50,000 men, and garrisoned only by 10,000, with the defences in a bad condition, it would be impossible to resist even for a short time. The 2,000 National Guards, destined to join the Poles, had not arrived ; the houses in the suburbs that impeded the defence had not been destroyed ; the bridge had not been mined, which was the Governor's fault. These circumstances were all adverse ; but the Poles, who were tried soldiers, offered to hold out to the last extremity ; besides, the report of cannon was already heard in the direction of the Marne, which indicated the near approach of Napoleon, and proved the importance of the post, a fact, which the earnest efforts of the enemy would alone be sufficient to prove. In ordinary circumstances, to surrender would have been very natural, for the lives of a garrison ought always to be saved when to sacrifice them can be of no avail, but under the circumstances we are now considering, it became a sacred duty to await the attack of the assailants, and perish even to the last man rather than yield. An engineer officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Saint Hillier, pointed out the duty and possibility of resistance, at least during twenty-four hours. Nevertheless, General Moreau, shaken by the threats addressed to the garrison, consented to give up the place on the 3rd March, and only employed one day discussing the conditions. He wished to depart with his artillery. Count Woronzoff, who was present, said in Russian to one of his generals ; "let him take his artillery if he wishes, and mine too, and allow us to cross the Aisne." Our enemies were very compliant, and in according to General Moreau a capitulation in appearance the most honourable, they made him consummate an act that nearly cost him his life, that deprived Napoleon of his empire, and France of her glory. On the evening of the 3rd, Bulow and Wintzingerode shook hands on the Aisne, and thus on the 4th, Blucher found a gate open, which ought to have been closed, and received a reinforcement that raised his army to a hundred thousand men, besides being saved in the twinkling of an eye from the consequences of his own faults and the terrible fate Napoleon had prepared for him.

Some historians, apologists of Blucher, have asserted that the danger he incurred was not so great as Napoleon had been pleased to say, for Blucher might have been reinforced at least by Wintzingerode, who, coming from Reims, was on the left bank of the Aisne, and this junction would have raised the Prussian army to 70,000 men against 55,000. In the first place, no numerical force could have remedied Blucher's false position, for, arriving on the 4th at Soissons, when Napoleon was the same day at Fismes, he would have been obliged either to cross the Aisne that lay before him, by help of temporary bridges, or he should have re-ascended the banks of the river, a distance of ten leagues, with the French

army on his flank. The advantage of 70,000 men against 55,000, a numerical difference which, at that time, was not new to us, was nothing in comparison to so false a military position. Besides, it is almost certain that Wintzingerode not being able to effect a junction with Bulow on the 3rd, would have retraced his steps on the 4th, to recross the Aisne twelve or fifteen leagues higher up, that is to say, at Berry-au-Bac. Blucher would, therefore, have found himself during an entire day isolated between Napoleon and the fortified post of Soissons.

The disaster was, therefore, as certain as anything could be in war; and Napoleon, on learning that Soissons had opened its gates to the enemy, was overwhelmed with grief; for the danger that had lately menaced Blucher was now turned against him. Blucher, in fact, was now at the head of 100,000 men, and the Aisne, which lately threatened his destruction, was become his strongest defence. As to us, we should be obliged either to cross the Aisne with 50,000 men in sight of 100,000, which would be an act of great temerity, or return to the Seine, without knowing what to do there; for how could the French army face that of Bohemia without having conquered the army of Silesia. We can easily understand that Napoleon wrote the following letter to the war minister.

“Fismes, 5th March, 1814.

“The enemy was in the greatest embarrassment, and we were hoping to gather on this very day the fruits of some days labour, when the treason, or the stupidity, of the Commander of Soissons, delivered that place to the enemy.

“On the 3rd, at noon, he marched out, with the honours of war, and brought with him four pieces of cannon. Let this wretch be arrested, as well as all the members of his war council; let him be impeached before a military commission, composed of generals, and for God’s sake act so that they may be all shot within twenty-four hours on the *Place de Grève*. It is time to make examples. Let the cause of the sentence be fully explained, printed, and distributed in every direction. I am obliged to throw a temporary bridge across the Aisne; this causes me a loss of thirty-six hours and annoys me dreadfully.”

And yet Napoleon only knew part of the truth, for he was not aware that Blucher’s force now doubled his in number. All he knew was that Blucher had eluded his grasp, and that to overtake he must pursue him beyond the Aisne. The misfortune was already sufficiently great, and of a nature to disconcert any one but himself. If, after such a discomfiture, Napoleon had been embarrassed and had lost a day or two devising new plans, we ought not to be astonished, if we reflect on the conduct of the greater number of commanders.* But it was not so with him. Though the Aisne

* General Koch says, Chapter xiv: “the Emperor, whose plan was disconcerted by so unexpected an event, remained an entire day in uncertainty, and manifested his

was now to Blucher as great an advantage as it had lately been a disadvantage, though he was reinforced in a proportion of which we had no idea, Napoleon did not renounce pursuing him; he wished to fight him hand to hand, for it would be impossible without having beaten Blucher to fall on Schwarzenberg. In fact he would soon find himself trapped between Blucher, who was in close pursuit, and Schwarzenberg, who would have conquered the marshals left to guard the Aube; this would be a fearful and untenable position. It was incumbent on Napoleon, at any risk—should he even be defeated in the attempt, for he was certain of a still greater defeat by not making the effort—it was incumbent, we say, on Napoleon to pursue Blucher beyond the Aisne, and to set out instantly, before the enemy should have thought of rendering the bridges impracticable. Napoleon gave his orders on the morning of the 5th, immediately after receiving the intelligence that grieved him so deeply.

Napoleon had, during the night, sent General Corbineau to Reims, to seize the place—the most important point of communication with the Ardennes—and make himself master of the troops and provisions that Wintzingerode must necessarily have left behind, wishing to secure the passage of the Aisne, which was the essential object of the moment, Napoleon had ordered General Nansouty, with the cavalry of the Guard, to advance to the Bridge of Berry-au-Bac, built in stone, and over which was the high road from Reims to Laon. He also ordered a detachment of cavalry to advance on Maisy, situate on our left, and throw a temporary bridge across at that point; he, at the same time, ordered Marshal Mortier to repair without delay to Braisne, to prepare other means of crossing the river at Pontarcy. His intention was to have three bridges on the Aisne, that he should not be forced to debouch in sight of Blucher, which might render the operation impossible. Undoubtedly had the vigilance of the enemy equalled his, the French would have found the 100,000 men of the army of Silesia behind the presumed point of passage, and, opposed by such a force, 50,000 men, however brave they might be, could not have crossed the Aisne. But it may safely be said, that by not losing time, however little remains, we shall arrive soon enough to disconcert the precautions of our enemies. Napoleon, who had learned from long experience how great, in general, is the carelessness of commanders, did not despair of finding the Aisne ill-guarded, and of being able to effect the passage without striking a blow.

embarrassment by the divergent and daring nature of the operations he undertook." This is a very excusable error in one who has read neither the orders nor the correspondence of Napoleon. He was certainly very much annoyed, but not disconcerted, as we shall see; and he ordered, without losing an hour, the new arrangements that circumstances required. The cause of General Koch's error is, he supposes, that the reduction of Soissons having taken place on the 3rd, Napoleon must have known it on the 4th, on account of his proximity. But the correspondence proves that he did not know it until the morning of the 5th, because the Generals Mortier and Marmont, did not know it till the evening of the 4th. The orders for the passage of the Aisne were given on the morning of the 5th; there was, therefore, neither hesitation nor loss of time, which, under the circumstances, is certainly a matter of astonishment.

In effect, whilst that on his right, General Corbineau entered Reims and seized 2,000 of Wintzingerode's men, and a quantity of baggage, General Nansouty, with the cavalry of the Guard and the Poles under General Pac, met Wintzingerode's Cossacks in front of the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, charged full gallop, overthrew them, and crossed the bridge close in their rear, spite of some light infantry left to guard it. The rapid conquest of this stone bridge rendered an attempt on the others unnecessary, for the main body of the enemy being still at a distance the French were able to debouch immediately, and Napoleon made every exertion during the nights of the 5th—6th, as well as during the afternoon of the 6th, to make his troops defile by Berry-au-Bac, in order to take up a position on the right bank of the river, before Blucher could oppose his intention. "It is a slight benefit," said Napoleon, on learning this success, "in compensation for a great ill."

It was not a slight benefit, if transported beyond the Aisne, he could gain a victory, but it would be difficult to gain a victory, Blucher having 100,000 of the best of the allied troops, whilst we had only 55,000 men, of which two-thirds were half-clothed, undrilled conscripts, but who participated in the heroic despair of our officers, and fought with unexampled devotedness. But Napoleon was no longer in a position to count his enemies, he was obliged at all risks to fight, for to fall back on Schwarzenberg without having conquered Blucher, would be to induce the latter to pursue him, and thus expose himself to destruction, hemmed in between the two allied generals. As to the project of marching on to the fortresses to draw out the garrisons, it was equally impracticable, before having beaten Blucher, for otherwise the French would have him close on their track, following them everywhere, and that so nearly, that they could not take a step unobserved by this troublesome adversary. To fight was therefore obligatory, no matter how great the number of enemies, or how vast the local difficulties we might have to encounter.

Blucher was very much displeased at Wintzingerode's negligence in guarding the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, but he ought only to have blamed himself, for nothing is done correctly where the Commander-in-Chief does not oversee the work in person. He, however, dissimulated his annoyance. Wintzingerode commanded the Russians, and it was necessary to act cautiously with haughty and susceptible allies; besides, he was still master of a very strong position, easily defended, and from which he intended to resist the threatened approaching attacks of Napoleon.

After passing the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, following the high road from Reims to Laon, we have on the right, vast tracts slightly undulated, whilst on the left, we skirt the foot of the Craonne heights, then crossing some wooded hillocks, we descend by Festieux into a humid plain, in the midst of which suddenly appears the city of Laon, built on an isolated peak, and surrounded by high and antique walls. The heights of Craonne, which we see to the left, after cross-

ing the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, are only the extremity of a lengthy plateau that borders the Aisne as far as the environs of Soissons, and forms on one side the bank of the Aisne, on the other that of the Lette, a little river, alternately wooded and marshy, running parallel to the Aisne, and communicating by several valleys with the plain of Laon.

It was on this plateau of Craonne, which is several leagues in length, and which juts out like a species of promontory, after we have passed the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, that Blucher had taken up a position with his army and the fifty thousand men that had joined him. Each commander had naturally taken his station according to the direction from which he had advanced. Wintzingerode having come by Reims, had advanced to the heights of Craonne by Berry-au-Bac, whilst Bulow, having journeyed by Fère and Soissons, had marched between Soissons and Laon. Blucher, with Sacken, D'York, Kleist, Langeron, having crossed the Aisne at Soissons, had re-ascended the banks of the river, and found themselves, part on the plateau of Craonne, part on the borders of the Lette, between the Lette and Laon.

On the morning of the 6th, Napoleon, having effected the passage of the Aisne, wished to try the enemy's position, and ordered a brisk attack on the heights of Craonne. The town of Craonne was first carried, but not without great labour and loss of blood. Then Ney and Victor, entering a valley between the abbey of Vauclerc on the left, and the chateau of Bôve on the right, endeavoured to seize the heights where the Lette rises. They attacked the position with the determination to make themselves masters of it. But after losing several hundred men, they perceived the position could only be carried by a serious attack, that is to say, by a regular engagement. Instead of uselessly shedding precious blood, they thought it better to pause, until they should come to a decisive resolution. Ney and Victor encamped at the foot of the heights. The first division of the Old Guard under Mortier took up a position at Corbeny, the cavalry of the Old Guard were stationed at Craonne and in the environs. The second division of the Old Guard passed the night in the rear of Berry-au-Bac, a little on this side of the Aisne, at Cormicy. Marmont was *en-route* for this point, to form the rear-guard of the army, and flank it during the grave operations that were about to be undertaken.

It had become necessary, as we have already said, to fight a battle, however doubtful the result might be, in consequence of the numerical strength and the position of the enemy, for without having conquered Blucher, Napoleon could neither fall back on Schwarzenberg nor seek the garrisons on the frontier. But the plan of battle gave rise to more than one question. To make a direct attack on the plateau of Craonne, which runs to a length of several leagues between the Aisne and the Lette, in order to thrust back the enemy on the Lette, and from the Lette into the plain of Laon, would be to grapple at once with the worst difficulties the case presented; it

would be, as the proverb says, *to take the bull by the horns*. There was a means that seemed less difficult; it was, instead of pausing on the left and giving battle there, to defile to the right, follow the high road from Reims to Laon, by Corbeny and Festieux, and descend into the plain of Laon, where probably, descending *en masse*, we might drive the enemy back on the Laon. But besides that, there was more than one obstacle to surmount on this route, the road to Paris would be by this movement left unprotected, and the enemy, being masters of Soissons, would be able, conquered or victors, to return to the Marne and the Seine, join Schwarzenberg and march on Paris with 200,000 men. Undoubtedly the same thing would happen, did Napoleon, as he intended, advance to the frontiers to call out the garrisons; but he did not think of executing this project, until he should have weakened Blucher by a great defeat, after having seriously shaken the moral strength of the Allies and revived in a proportionate degree the courage of the Parisians and of the army. It would therefore be necessary to attack Blucher in such a way as to keep up a communication, on one hand, with Soissons, and on the other, with Laon, (an important consideration that military critics have not taken into account,) and therefore, there remained but one means, which was to ascend the plateau of Craonne on our left, and to make this—our first success—our first aggressive act against Blucher. Once arrived on the plateau, a road lay before us that leads to Soissons. We could follow this route and by an effort of our right wing, throw our enemy on the Lette, then by a second effort, force them into the plain of Laon, and if we ultimately succeeded in depriving them of Laon, we should have terminated the series of operations against Blucher in the most decisive and desirable manner. Napoleon could certainly have adopted a middle course, as for example, not attempting to carry the plateau of Craonne, not advancing along the route from Reims to Laon, but effecting a passage between both by means of a ravine, that opened into the valley of the Lette, and thus advance in close column into this valley, having on the left, the heights of Craonne, on the right, those of Bôve. But to effect this movement, it would be necessary to pass through a narrow gorge, in the midst of woody and marshy villages, where we should run the risk of seeing the enemy rush upon us from the heights that border the Lette on all sides; we should have needed veteran soldiers, coolly intrepid, to venture into this cut-throat pass.

The carrying of the plateau on the left by a sudden effort, was better suited to our young impetuous troops, supported by two divisions of the Old Guard; and besides, if the position was strong, there was the advantage of having to do only with a wing of the Allies, separated from the remainder of the army by so many obstacles, that succours could not easily be brought up.

Napoleon decided that his left wing should attack the Craonne plateau. On this plateau was stationed the entire infantry of Wintzingerode, at that moment under the command of Count

Woronzoff; the entire of Sacken's corps with the Langeron in reserve, making in all 50,000 men, well provided with artillery. Blucher, judging by the attempts of the previous evening and the direction of our movements, which he could easily discern from the heights he occupied, had divined that we intended to attack the Craonne plateau, and by the advice of M. de Muffling, quartermaster general of the army of Silesia, he had resolved to form nearly the entire of his cavalry into a single mass, make them advance along the high road from Laon to Reims, into the open country, and precipitate them, to the number of twelve or fifteen thousand horse on our right flank and our rear. If he succeeded, he would cut us off from Berry-au-Bac and then throw us into the Aisne. The combination might involve grave consequences for us, but to produce such a result two events must occur; we must fail in our attempt to carry the plateau, and the second division of the Old Guard, as well as Marmont's corps, must be broken by the enemy's cavalry; it was not very probable that either event would take place.

This cavalry expedition was confided to Wintzingerode, who was looked upon amongst the Allies as the most alert of their van-guard officers; and it was on this account he had left his cavalry and light infantry to Count Woronzoff. Almost the entire of the allied cavalry were to advance on the Lette, through the woody country that forms the two banks of this little river, and having crossed the Lette, they were, after making a long detour, to remain *en masse* on the high road from Laon to Reims. Kleist was to support Wintzingerode with his infantry, the d'York cavalry was to watch the two banks of the Lette, Bulow was ordered to guard the Laon, whilst Woronzoff, Sacken, and Langeron were to defend to the last extremity the Craonne plateau,

On the morning of the 7th March Napoleon determined on his plan of attack. We have said that the plateau of Craonne consisted of a succession of flat-topped heights, extending between the Aisne and the Lette, which they separate, and reaching the environs of Soissons. It was the most salient part of this plateau, forming, as we have just seen, a kind of promontory in the midst of the plain of Craonne, that was to be attacked. Had it been necessary to escalate this plateau at one stretch, the task would have been too difficult. There was what might be called a first step; this was the little plateau of Craonne, rising above Craonnelle, a point fortunately occupied by our troops since the previous evening. This first step would serve as a *point de depart*, by which we could ascend more easily to the main plateau. In order to render the operation less destructive, Napoleon resolved to second it by two flank attacks—a movement favoured by the nature of the ground. Two ravines descended from the plateau; one, that of Oulches, situated on our left, reached the Aisne; the other, that of Vauciere, situated on our right, opened into the valley of the Lette, in the midst of which stands the celebrated abbey of Vauciere. The two ravines abut, one

on the right the other on the left, on the flanks of the plateau, at a place called the "*ferme d'Heurtebise*," and offered facilities for attacking in the rear the troops that defended the principal position. Ney, with his two divisions of the Young Guard, supported by a portion of Nansouty's cavalry, was to enter into the valley of Oulches, whilst Victor, with the two divisions of the Young Guard, passing through that of Vaclerc, was to debouch on the plateau, in the direction of the *ferme d'Heurtebise*, and in proximity to Ney. Napoleon, in the centre, with the Old Guard, the artillery reserve, and the bulk of the cavalry, had taken up his position on the little plateau of Craonne, ready to command an attack on the great plateau when the movement of his wings would render it possible. At the same time, Marmont was coming from Berry-au-Bac to protect our rear. All our troops having been obliged to defile in succession by the single bridge of Berry-au-Bac, the greater part of our artillery was left behind—a circumstance very much to be regretted in sight of an enemy who had assembled in front of his position a considerable number of cannon.

At ten in the morning, Napoleon gave the signal for attack. Victor on the right advanced into the Valley of Vaclerc, Ney on the left, into that of Oulches. Victor, with a brigade of the Boyer division, advanced into the park of Vaclerc, where he found Woronzoff's infantry, in a strong position, and protected by a numerous artillery, firing from the summit of the plateau. After sustaining considerable losses, Victor made himself master of the park of Vaclerc. Above him, on the side of the hill, rose houses and gardens in tiers. The enemy had placed reserves here, that were to fall on the Boyer division, but the movement was executed too late. This division, solidly established in the buildings and gardens of the abbey, did not yield the post they had conquered. The enemy poured on them a murderous fire from their howitzers, and set in flames the buildings where they were lodged, but, spite the conflagration, they held their position.

Meanwhile was heard from the other side of the plateau, in the valley of Oulches, the cannon of Ney, who was opposed by Sacken, in his attempt to carry the *ferme d'Heurtebise*. The plateau being narrowed at this point, there was very little space between the extremity of the ravine of Oulches and that of Vaclerc, so that the two marshals were fighting in close proximity to one another. Ney had entered the valley of Oulches with his two divisions and Nansouty's cavalry. He had formed his cavalry into two columns, and had advanced under a fearful discharge of grape, for the Russians stationed large quantities of artillery at every outlet. The soldiers of Ney, young and enthusiastic, supported this fire bravely, and reached the confines of the plateau, but, having arrived there, they were met by Sacken's infantry, who received them with a sharp fire of musketry, and drove them back to the bottom of the ravine. However, the fate of the war depended on the result of this battle, and Ney did not wish that the result should be determined by the

bad conduct of troops under his command. Undiscouraged, he rallied his soldiers at the bottom of the ravine; with that soul-stirring warmth they never resisted, he spoke to them, revived their drooping courage, and conceived the design of forming them into one column, and leading them to the charge at a running pace, so that the enemy should not have time to use their muskets. The soldiers form in column, with the resolution either to conquer or perish; they advance through the ravine, and, having reached the extremity, dash forward, the marshal at their head, under a hail of balls; with the rapidity of lightning, they fall on Sacken's infantry, that, taken by surprise, cannot sustain the shock, and are obliged to fall back. The infantry, thus disconcerted, retrogrades to a little hamlet called Paissy, leaving to Ney's two divisions sufficient space to deploy. Whilst Ney's left establish themselves on the plateau, his right fall on the farm of Heurtebise; enter, spite the enemy's resistance, and kill all who occupy the place. After some moments, Sacken's infantry, having recovered their first emotion, endeavour to regain the place they had lost, but Ney's soldiers, now enjoying equal advantages of position, are determined not to yield the border of the plateau so dearly purchased; both sides fire nearly *à bout portant*. Victor, encouraged by Ney's success, has no idea of doing less himself. The Boyer division, after seizing the abbey of Vauclerc, wished to debouch on the plateau, and established themselves with the Charpentier division on the borders of a little wood, that extends from the abbey of Vauclerc to the hamlet of Ailles. Having taken up a position there, they supported unflinchingly the fire of sixty pieces of cannon. These two flank attacks having freed the centre, Napoleon, at the head of the Old Guard, ascended the plateau, almost without striking a blow, and took up a position opposite the farm of Heurtebise. He thus formed a line, connecting Ney's attack with that of Victor. The delay of our artillery left us exposed to the fire of the enemy's numerous cannon. To compensate for this disadvantage, Napoleon sent four of Drouot's batteries, that immediately deployed between Ney and Victor. The fire was then less unequal, but still terribly destructive, and, though exposed to a shower of bullets and grape, the Charpentier and Boyer divisions kept their post with unshaken firmness.

On the left, in the centre, on the right, we had made good our footing on the plateau, but this was not enough; it was necessary to keep the place, to extend our lines, and drive off the enemy. The moment had come when the cavalry ought to sustain the infantry, for beyond the farm of Heurtebise the ground opens out. Nansouty's cavalry, having followed Ney through the ravine of Oulches, and having debouched with him on the plateau, pass between the intervals of his battalions, and rush on the enemy—the Polish lancers and horse chasseurs at the head, the grenadiers in reserve. These brave horsemen, finding here space to deploy, advance in full gallop, cut their way through several Russian squares, force them back on the hamlet of Paissy, whence it is only a step to drive

them into a ravine parallel to that of Oulches, and leading to the Aisne; but in falling back the Russian infantry unmask a line of artillery, that pours grape on our cavalry, and stops their advance. They are obliged to return in order to avoid this destructive fire, and are pursued by twelve Russian squadrons. The latter in their turn, charge with such impetuosity that they outride the horse grenadiers of the guard, who had remained in the second line. At sight of this sudden storm of cavalry, Ney's young soldiers lose their presence of mind, and fly towards the ravine of Oulches, whence they had so bravely advanced to the conquest of the plateau. It was in vain that Ney, throwing himself into the midst of them, appealed with his strong voice and energetic gestures; they continued to flee, seized with inexplicable terror, a phenomenon not unfrequent with young troops, whose susceptibility renders them as prompt to retreat as to attack. Napoleon, stationed a little in the rear, watching over the vicissitudes of the battle, sends Grouchy, with the remainder of the cavalry, to fill the void just made in the line of battle, and extend a veil, which, hiding the scene from our fugitives, might allow them to recover their presence of mind. Grouchy arrives, occupies the appointed place, and is about to charge, when he falls wounded from his horse. Deprived of their leader, our cavalry remain motionless. Still, however, they protect Ney's efforts to rally his infantry. Towards our right, Victor, at the head of the Boyer and Charpentier divisions, resolutely maintains his position on the confines of the wood of Ailles; but being severely wounded, General Charpentier takes his place. Napoleon, fearing that his wings, which could hardly keep their position on the confines of the plateau, might ultimately yield, sent forward a division of the Old Guard to deploy between them. These old soldiers advance with a determined step between our two wings, whilst, at the same moment, twenty-four pieces of artillery, so long expected, arrive. This remedies our inferiority in artillery, and it is time, for Drouot's cannon are nearly all dismounted. These twenty-four pieces of artillery formed into a battery, between the troops of Ney and Victor, soon commence to pour forth their fiery torrents on the Russians, causing them considerable loss. Sacken's and Woronzoff's infantry, after resisting some time, yield in their turn, under repeated discharges of grape; they retreat, and leave us in possession of the ground. A simultaneous thrill runs from one end of our battle line to the other; our soldiers wish to pursue the enemy. Victor's troops, making a last effort, seize the village of Ailles, and establish themselves definitely on the right of the army. Ney's troops do not remain behind, and our entire line crosses the plateau, which sometimes widens, sometimes narrows, and drives back Sacken's and Woronzoff's infantry on that of Langeron. The Russian cavalry endeavour in vain to make a charge to cover this retreat, our chasseurs and horse grenadiers dash forward and repulse them. Having taken refuge behind the infantry, they form, and try to return to the charge; our dragoons drive them back again.

Our troops thus traverse victoriously the summit of the plateau; their left on the Aisne, their right on the Lette, overtopping by some hundred feet the beds of these two rivers, and driving before them the 50,000 men of Sacken, Woronzoff, and Langeron. The pursuit continues in this fashion during a space of two leagues, that is to say, as far as Filain, and as the enemy appeared at this place desirous of descending into the valley of the Lette, our left, animated by a sudden reactionary emotion, briskly urge their descent. Our artillery, compensating for their tardy arrival, pursue the enemy to the entrance of the valley, and cover them with grape, until they find a shelter in the woody depths of the bed of the Lette.

Night was approaching; and nothing indicated that we need fear an attack on our flanks or our rear. In fact this irruption of Wintzingerode's 15,000 horse, a project, of which Napoleon was not aware, but whose possibility he admitted, and against which he had taken his precautions, by leaving a division of the Old Guard and Marmont's corps at the foot of the Craonne heights, had not yet been executed at the close of the day. Notwithstanding the solicitations of Blucher, who attached much importance to this combination—Wintzingerode's cavalry having entered the valley of the Lette in the midst of a woody and marshy country, where they embarrassed the infantry of Kleist, and were in turn embarrassed by them—had not reached Festieux until very late in the day, and had not dared, at that hour, to attempt an enterprise, that presented dangers as well as advantages. Blucher was therefore obliged to content himself, for that day, with the loss of the plateau of Craonne.

Such was this bloody battle of Craonne, consisting of the conquest of an elevated plateau, defended by 50,000 men and a numerous artillery, and attacked by 30,000 with a few cannon. The tenacity on the one side, and the intrepidity on the other, had been admirable; and on our side, the Boyer and Charpentier division had displayed, besides intrepidity, extraordinary firmness under fire. Ney had been, as usual, one of the heroes of the day. The Russians had lost from 6 to 7,000 men, and no one will be surprised to learn that, debouching under a terrible fire, we had lost from 7 to 8,000. Our loss would have been greater, had not our artillery—delayed, not by any fault of theirs, but by the distance—come at length, and compensated by its ravages those we had sustained. Could we next day draw any useful consequences from this noble effort made by our army? Had the blood of our brave soldiers flowed for the benefit of France? Such was the question to be resolved within the forty-eight hours: and whose solution, alas, did not depend on the genius of Napoleon, for had it depended on that, it would not have been one moment doubtful.

Napoleon, though satisfied with this first result, and touched by the devotedness of his troops, was deeply absorbed in thought next day, but his determination to fight, resulting from the necessity of conquering Blucher, before falling back on Schwarzenberg, was still the same. He only deliberated on one point, that was to de-

cide, now that he was master of the plateau of Craonne, by which side he should descend into the plain of Laon. But here again a necessity, almost as absolute as that of fighting, obliged him to march by the chaussée of Soissons to Laon, and this was the necessity of placing himself between these two cities, in order to occupy the Paris route. Unfortunately this chaussée presented much greater difficulties than that of Reims, in advancing to the plain of Laon. Having arrived at that part of the plateau that lies between Aizy and Filain, we should be obliged to turn to the right, descend into the valley of the Lette, between Chavignon and Urcel, and enter a defile, bordered on the left by wooded heights and on the right by the stream Ardon, that runs from Laon, and is bordered by marshy prairies. We meet on the way, successively, the villages of Etouvelles and Chivy, and debouch afterwards by the chaussée of Soissons into the plain of Laon. To lead the entire army into this narrow defile, where there was only the breadth of the chaussée to manœuvre, was extremely dangerous. In fact the enemy occupying strongly the villages of Etouvelles and Chivy, could bring us to a full stop. However, we had no choice of operations, for to proceed to the right and take the high road from Reims to Laon, which crosses the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, would be leaving the high road to Soissons unprotected, and had Napoleon been from the beginning satisfied to take the route to Reims, it would not have been worth while to lose 7,000 men to conquer the plateau of Craonne. The serious necessity of remaining in the vicinity of Soissons having outweighed every other consideration in the first battle, ought to be of equal importance in the second. Consequently, Napoleon, who, on the evening of the 7th, had bivouaced on the plateau, took up a position on the 8th between Ange-Gardien and Chavignon, at the entrance to the defile that leads to the plain of Laon. This day he gave his troops that they might rest, and that Marshal Marmont might have time to fall into line.

Napoleon wished to make use of Marmont's troops to remedy as much as possible the inconvenience of the position in which he was obliged to place himself. Marshal Marmont had just received from Paris a fresh division of reserve, composed, like those commanded by General Gérard, of battalions of the line, hastily formed in the dépôts. This division comprised 4,000 conscripts, drilled, like the others, during fifteen or twenty days, but led by officers whose courage was raised to the highest pitch by the danger of France and the threatened honour of our arms. This division, placed under the orders of the Duke of Padua, raised Marmont's troops to 12 or 13,000 men, and increased the total of Napoleon's forces to 48 or 50,000, deducting the losses incurred at the battle of Craonne. Napoleon resolved to send the Duke of Ragusa's corps along the route that he did not wish to take himself—that leading from Reims to Laon. This corps passing through Festieux, and having no great difficulties to conquer, would take up a position on our right in the plain of Laon, and by attracting the attention of the enemy, would facili-

tate to our principal column the passage of the defile between Etouvelles and Chivy. Undoubtedly there was danger, even with this precaution, for Napoleon debouching on the left through a narrow defile, and Marmont debouching unprotected on the right into the plain of Laon, at a distance of three leagues, they might be separately overwhelmed without being able to render each other any assistance. But what was to be done? On what side was there not danger, and even greater danger than that they were braving? It was not possible in fact to turn away from Blucher without having beaten him; it was not possible to follow *en masse* the route from Reims, without leaving that of Soissons unprotected, which was the high road to Paris; therefore debouching by the defile from Etouvelles to Chivy, was the result of a concatenation of necessities to which the Emperor was obliged to submit, diminishing as best he could the difficulties of the operation. There was evidently a better chance of forcing the defile if we aided the attack on the left by an accessory demonstration on the right. Besides, the obstacle once overcome, Napoleon by advancing rapidly to the right, to aid Marmont, and the latter proceeding cautiously into the plain of Laon, the principal danger of the operation might be avoided. As to the rest, we must repeat, there was only a choice of perils. The greatest of all would have been to hesitate and not to act.

The 8th having been devoted to refresh and rally the troops, Napoleon resolved on the morning of the 9th to advance into the humid plain of Laon. The daring Ney was to lead the van, and force the defile from Etouvelles to Chivy. To facilitate the execution of his task, Napoleon commanded General Gourgard to lead, during the night, some light troops across the wooded hillocks that overlooked our left, and turn the defile by appearing suddenly on the flank of the chaussée between Etouvelles and Chivy. The Roussel division of Dragoons had orders, as soon as the defile should be passed, to dash in full gallop on the city of Laon and endeavour to enter *pêle-mêle* with the enemy.

Marshal Ney, to insure success, set out on the 9th, before day-break, whilst the allied troops were still sunk in profound sleep. The second light infantry, under the conduct of this intrepid marshal, rushed in close column on Etouvelles, surprised and put to the sword Czernicheff's vanguard; and, after taking possession of the little village, threw themselves on Chivy, which they also mastered. It even happened that General Gourgard's little column that had been sent to turn the defile, having encountered greater difficulty than the principal column, did not reach Chivy until after Marshal Ney had taken possession of the place. General Gourgard joined Ney at the moment he was entering the plain of Laon. Roussel's division of dragoons then dashed in full gallop on the chaussée, but their progress was arrested by grape poured from a battery of twelve pieces; the leader of a squadron and some men were killed. The cavalry were, therefore, obliged to pause and wait the arrival of the infantry before they could attack Laon. As to

the rest, the defile they had believed so formidable was happily cleared, and the entire army could now deploy in the plain. Ney took up a position in advance of Chivy, opposite the Semilly suburb. Charpentier placed himself on the left with Marshal Victor's two divisions of the Young Guard; Mortier was stationed on the right with the second division of the Old Guard, and with the Poret de Morvan division of the Young Guard. Friant, at the head of the principal division of the Old Guard, took his place in the centre towards the rear. Lastly, came the cavalry and the artillery reserve, making a total of 36,000 combatants. Marmont, at three leagues to the right, separated from Napoleon by the wooded heights, was stationed on the Reims route, waiting the sound of our cannon to venture into the plain.

A thick fog overspread the valley in the middle of which Laon is built; scarcely were the spires of the city discernible rising above this vapour as from a sea. Favoured by the fog Ney threw himself on the Semilly suburb, situate at the foot of the height on which the town stands; Mortier, on the right with the Poret de Morvan division, advanced on the Ardon suburb, situate in a similar manner. The vivacity of the attack, the dash of a successful commencement, the fog, all contributed to the success of this two-fold attempt. Within an hour we made ourselves masters of the two suburbs.

But we soon perceived through the fog, that began to clear off, the singular site that was to become our battle-field, and the enemy might recover their spirits on seeing distinctly the small number of soldiers that had attacked 100,000 men.

Laon is built on a triangular peak, not unlike a tripod, and about 200 metres in height. This eminence commands on every side the verdant valley by which it is surrounded. The old town, enclosed by embattled walls and towers, occupies the entire summit of the hill. At the foot in the plain there are to the south the two suburbs of Semilly and Ardon, of which we had just taken possession. To the north there was the suburb of Neuville on the left, of Saint Marcel in the centre, and de Vaux on the right, that we could not see, because the city hid them from us. Blucher, after having ceded the plateau of Craonne to our efforts, was determined to dispute the plain of Laon by taking strong hold of the wall-crowned rock that commanded it, and of the suburbs built around. He possessed too much courage, too much patriotism, too much pride, to abandon to 48,000 men, a battle-field where he headed 100,000 men; a battle-field whose defence was easy and whose importance was incontestible; and, after abandoning which, nothing would remain for him but to retreat without knowing where to pause, for the army of Silesia was separated from the army of Bohemia, so that a junction was impossible. The fate of the war then depended on the possession of Laon, and for both parties it became a matter of necessity either to become masters of the city or perish.

Blucher had an additional motive for making a determined resistance. In consequence of the jealousy that prevailed between the

Prussians and Russians—though they were the most united amongst the Allies—a false notion prevailed amongst the latter that at Craonne the Prussians had knowingly allowed them to be worsted by the enemy. This prejudice, unreasonable as the prejudices generally are that spring up between allies making war in conjunction, had caused a serious misunderstanding between them, and a battle, where no person would spare himself, was become, besides the military necessity we have already noted, an absolute moral and political necessity. Influenced by these different reasons, Blucher had resolved to defend Laon *à outrance*, and he had for that purpose made excellent arrangements.

The Prussian troops that had not fought on the previous evening were distributed—part on the hill of Laon, part in the plain, opposite the suburbs of Semilly and Ardon, that we had just carried. They were to defend the principal post—that of Laon itself. On the side towards our left and the enemy's right, Woronzoff was placed between Laon and Clacy, opposite the woody heights through which we had debouched. The corps of Generals Kleist and d'York, combined into one, were stationed at the opposite extremity—that is to say, at our right and the left of the enemy facing the Reims route, by which Marmont was expected. There remain Sacken and Langeron, that Blucher had placed behind the hill of Laon, hidden from our view as from our fire, and able, as circumstances may require, to advance either on the Soisson chaussée or on that of Reims. Blucher, ignorant of our plan, did not know on which side the principal attack would be made; he had only learned from his scouts that the French troops were advancing along the two routes, and it was on this account he placed a great body of reserve behind Laon to be sent wherever the danger should be greatest.

As soon as the fog cleared off Blucher ordered the Semilly suburb, lying at the extremity of the Soissons route, to be attacked. Ney had taken possession of the suburb. Blucher also commanded an attack on the suburb of Ardon, situated a little to the right of the Soisson route. Mortier had made himself master of the suburb, that he might be ready to aid Marmont. Woronzoff's infantry attacked Semilly, and that of Bulow did the same at Ardon. As customary in an offensive attack, the Prussians displayed great vigour, entered the two suburbs, and dislodged our soldiers. Already even, Woronzoff's column, that had carried Semilly, was advancing *en masse* along the Soissons chaussée, and this movement would cut off the means of retreat from Mortier's troops, who, driven out of Ardon, were scattered in confusion on the right. At this sight, Marshal Ney, putting himself at the head of some squadrons of the Guard, dashes on the Prussian infantry, stops their onward course, gives his own infantry time to rally, and leads them on Semilly, of which he victoriously regains possession. Whilst Ney was performing this exploit in our front, General Belliard, on our right, replacing Grouchy in the command of the cavalry, put himself at the head of the dragoons of Spain (Roussel division), charges in his

turn Bulow's infantry, defeats them, and opens to Mortier the road to Ardon.

After having several times taken, lost, and retaken these suburbs of Semilly and Ardon, situate at the foot of the rock of Laon, the two armies remained grouped around these two points, and bitterly exasperated against each other. The enemy regained possession of half a suburb, were driven out, and immediately returned again. Napoleon, burning with impatience, despatched aide-de-camp after aide-de-camp to Marshal Marmont, to hasten his approach; for he flattered himself, with reason, that the sudden appearance of this marshal would produce a moral panic amongst the Allies, of which he would profit to force them from the foot of this hill, to which they were so strongly attached. But three leagues of marsh and wooded hills to traverse, and a cloud of Cossacks, left little hope of communicating with Marmont.

Meanwhile Napoleon, believing that, were there any means of dislodging Blucher from this fatal rock of Laon, it would be by outflanking him, ordered the brave Charpentier, with his two divisions of the Young Guard, who had covered themselves with glory the preceding evening, to file along the wooded heights that surround the plain, and carry the village of Clacy on our left, whence they could advance and turn Laon by the Neuville suburb and the route de la Fère.

This order was bravely executed. The sharpshooters advanced through the woods, to divide the attention of the enemy; whilst General Charpentier, skirting the foot of the heights, traversed successively Vaucelles, Mons-en-Laonnois, and at length reached the village of Clacy, that was occupied by one of Woronzoff's divisions. Friant, with a division of the Old Guard, followed to support him if necessary. Charpentier fell on Clacy with such vigour that he entered, spite of a most determined resistance on the part of the Prussians. Our young soldiers, infuriated by the spirit of carnage, bayoneted some hundreds of the enemy. We made some hundred prisoners. This success on our left was of sufficient importance to influence the fate of the battle, for it gave us some chance of turning Blucher. It was neutralised, however, on our right, by the loss of the Ardon suburb. Bulow threw himself, for the last time, furiously on that point. The Poret de Morvan division had their general killed, and were obliged to fall back. But, in the centre, Ney had remained master of the Semilly suburb, that commanded the chaussée of Soissons. On the right, if we had lost Ardon, we had taken possession of the village of Semilly; on the left, we held Clacy, whence it was possible to turn Laon. There was evidently a positive advantage gained by the main column, commanded by Napoleon in person; and, spite our numerical inferiority, we might still hope to conquer the plain of Laon, so deeply bedewed with blood; but we could only hope to conquer on condition that on our extreme right, that is to say, on the Reims route, success should crown our efforts.

Effectively, on the Reims route, Marmont had at length debouched from Festieux into the plain of Laon. His cannon was heard at two in the afternoon, and filled Napoleon with hope, Blucher with anxiety.

He had advanced along the Reims route, on the village of Athies, in sight of the enemy's cavalry, with the young division of Padua at the head of his column. He had repulsed the attacks of the cavalry, and had drawn near to the village of Athies. The troops of d'York and Kleist had possession of the place. Marmont, who heard the cannon of the Emperor, and who felt the necessity of doing something on this day to aid his designs, thought he ought to carry Athies. Wishing to render the attack as easy as possible to his young troops, he placed forty pieces of artillery in his front, and cannonaded the village unceasingly. He afterwards commanded the Duke of Padua's infantry to make an assault, and the place was carried. The day drawing to a close, he paused and established himself on the spot that conquest had made his.

Up to that point all went on well, and that day, though we had only accomplished half our work, promised good results on the next, if we could only compensate for our numerical inferiority. This was a serious difficulty, for we were fighting under a disadvantage of two to one, and with young troops against the veteran bands of Europe. However, such extraordinary feats had been performed during this campaign, and especially on the two previous days, that, if on the morrow the French troops dashed vigorously from the point they had already reached, Marmont thus drawing towards him the principal mass of the enemy, Napoleon could bring his troops from Clacy, on the rear of Laon, and the victory would be almost certain. But that affairs should assume this aspect, a fortunate combination of circumstances would be needed. In the first place, the French should combine at a great distance, and then advance through woods, through marshy plains, and crowds of Cossacks, and afterwards pass the night, especially Marmont, in very unsafe positions.

Marmont, unprotected at the village of Athies, in the midst of the plain, awaited Napoleon's instructions, which he had sent Colonel Fabvier, at the head of five hundred men, to learn. Was it well of Marmont to remain stationary, or ought he not rather, after having during the day caught a sight of the immense masses of the enemy's cavalry, to have taken up a position for the night in the rear, towards Festieux for example, a kind of little hillock by which he had debouched into the plain and where he would have been in perfect safety. But the mistaken fear of abandoning the spot he had conquered in the afternoon, restrained him, and deterred him from making the retrograde movement that prudence would have suggested. What was still less excusable, as he did remain amidst hordes of enemies, was the not multiplying precautions against a night attack. With a characteristic thoughtlessness that detracted from his good qualities, Marmont deputed to his lieutenants the duty of providing for the common safety. The latter

allowed their young tired soldiers to scatter themselves in the neighbouring farms; they did not even think of protecting the battery of forty pieces that had cannonaded Athies with so much success. It was young marine-gunners, little accustomed to land service, that tended these cannon, and they had not taken the precaution to place their guns on the avant train, so that they might be able to remove them at the first appearance of danger. Everybody, commander and officers, trusted to the darkness of night, of which they ought, on the contrary, to have entertained the deepest distrust.

There were, alas! only too many reasons for distrusting this fatal night, for Blücher, as soon as he heard Marmont's cannon, believed that the attack by the Reims route was the true attack, and that the other, which had occupied the day on the Soissons route, was only a feint. He consequently decided to bring down the mass of his army on the Reims route. He immediately put into motion Sacken and Langeron, who had remained *en reserve* behind Laon. They had orders to make a circuitous march round the city, and join Kleist and d'York; Blücher, besides, sent part of his cavalry, which on that side could not fail to be useful. The day was far advanced when this movement was terminated; still the Prussian General was not willing to bind himself to preparatory arrangements, and conceived the design of profiting by the darkness to effect a night surprise, by leading on his cavalry *en masse*.

Towards midnight in fact, when Marmont's soldiers least expected it, a mass of horsemen dashed upon them, uttering terrific cries. Old soldiers accustomed to the vicissitudes of war would have been less surprised, and sooner rallied; but a sudden panic spread through the ranks of this young infantry, that took flight in every direction. The artillerymen, who had not thought of arranging their pieces so that they might be easily removed, fled without thinking of them. The enemy, amid the darkness, become mixed with us, and make part of the tumult; whilst their horsed artillery pursue us, firing grape, at the risk of killing Prussians as well as French. All hurry on in indescribable disorder, not knowing what to do, and Marmont is carried away at the same pace as the rest. Fortunately the 6th corps, which formed the nucleus of Marmont's troops, recover a little of their *sang froid*, and stop at the heights of Festieux, where it would have been so easy to find a secure position during the night. The enemy, not daring to advance further, suspend the pursuit, and our soldiers, delivered from their presence, rally at length from their disorder.

This accident, one of the most vexatious that could befall a general, particularly on account of the consequences it involved, cost us materially only some pieces of cannon, two or three hundred men put *hors de combat*, and about a thousand prisoners, the greater number of whom returned next day; but our enterprise, already so difficult and complicated, was defeated. On learning during the night this deplorable skirmish, Napoleon gave way to the most violent anger against

Marshal Marmont; but giving way to anger would not repair the mischief, and he immediately began to think what was best to be done. To give up the attack and retire would be to commence a retreat that must lead to the ruin of France and his own. To attack, when the movement confided to Marmont was no longer possible, and when he would be confronted by masses of the enemy assembled between Laon and the Soissons chaussée; to attack under such circumstances would have been rash. Either course seemed to lead to destruction. Listening only to the promptings of his own energetic soul, Napoleon determined to make a desperate attempt on Laon, and see whether chance, so fruitful of events in war, might not do for him what the most skilfully-laid plans had not been able to effect.

Napoleon was about to throw himself on Laon when Blücher anticipated him. The latter had first thought of sending half his army against Marmont, believing his to be our principal column. But in his staff numerous voices were raised against this project, and it was proved to him that, above all things, he ought to oppose Napoleon in front of the city of Laon. Blücher, who was ill that day, and more inclined than usual to yield to the advice of his lieutenants, had, therefore, suspended the prescribed movement, and determined to direct his efforts straight before him, that is to say, on Clacy, whence Napoleon threatened to turn his position.

At the very moment that Napoleon was putting his troops in motion to renew the attack, three divisions of Woronzoff's infantry, advancing on our left, deployed around the village of Clacy, intending to carry the place. General Charpentier, who had replaced Victor, was at Clacy with his own division of the Young Guard and that of General Boyer, both very much reduced in number by the late engagements. Ney had on his side advanced to the left to support General Charpentier; he placed his artillery a little in the rear and diagonally, so that he could take the Russian masses *en écharpe* that were about to fall on Clacy. At nine in the morning an obstinate engagement commenced around this unfortunate village, whose site, happily for us, was slightly elevated. General Charpentier, who during the past days had displayed as much energy as skill, allowed the Russian infantry to advance within musket shot, and then received them with a terrible fusillade. The officers and sub-officers exposed themselves incessantly, seeking to compensate for the want of training in their young soldiers, who, in every respect, exhibited an unexampled devotedness. The first Russian division was received with so destructive a fire that they were driven back to the foot of the position, and immediately replaced by another that received like treatment. The assailing troops were exposed, not alone to the fire from Clacy, but to that of Marshal Ney's artillery, which, happily posted as we have just related, committed fearful ravages in the enemy's ranks. In truth, some of the projectiles from this artillery knocked off some of our soldiers at Clacy, but in the enthusiasm that prevailed we only

thought of checking the enemy and destroying them, no matter at what price.

The same attack, renewed five times by the Russians, failed five times through the heroism of General Charpentier and his soldiers. The Russians, repulsed, fell back on Laon. Napoleon, again conceiving some slight hopes, and flattering himself with having, perhaps, tired out the tenacity of Blucher, ordered Ney's two divisions (Meunier and Curial) to advance straight on Laon, through the Semilly suburb, which we had not evacuated. Our young soldiers, led by Ney to the hillock, overturned everything before them, ascended one side of the triangular peak of Laon, and taking advantage of the conformation of the land, which here was hollowed and receding, they succeeded in attaining the walls of the city. But Bulow's infantry stopped them at the foot of the ramparts, then pouring forth showers of grape, forced them to redescend this fatal height, before which our good fortune deserted us. Napoleon, however, who did not yet abandon the hope of driving Blucher from his position, sent Drouot at the head of a detachment to a great distance on our left, to try whether it would not be possible to advance along the route of La Fère and annoy the enemy sufficiently to make him let go his hold.

Drouot, whose sincerity was never called in question, having, after a daring reconnaissance, pronounced this last attempt impracticable, Napoleon was obliged to admit the belief that Blucher's position was impregnable. The positions of each had been so during the last twenty-four hours; Blucher had been as powerless against Clacy and Semilly as Napoleon against Laon. But Napoleon's position would not continue impregnable twenty-four hours longer, should Blucher execute his project of marching *en masse* by the route from Laon to Reims, to drive Marmont back on Berry-au-Bac and cross the Aisne on our right. It was therefore impossible for Napoleon to remain where he was; he was obliged to retrace his steps and fall back on Soissons. However painful this determination might be, still, as it was indispensable, Napoleon made up his mind without hesitation, and the next morning, the 11th of March, he repassed the defile of Chivy and Etouvelles, to fall back on Soissons, whilst Marmont, posted on the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, defended the Aisne above him. The enemy took especial care not to pursue this angry lion, the thought of whose return made even a victorious enemy tremble. Napoleon could therefore return to Soissons without disquietude.

These three terrible days—the 7th at Craonne, the 9th and 10th at Laon, had cost Napoleon about 12,000 men; and if they cost the enemy 15,000, that was a poor consolation, because our adversaries had still 90,000 soldiers, whilst we had little more than 40,000, including even the small division of the Duke of Padua, who had come to reinforce Marshal Marmont. But the worst of all was, not the numerical but the moral loss, and the military consequences of the last operations.

To neglect Schwarzenberg a moment, in order again to discomfit Blücher, and afterwards return to Schwarzenberg, either by falling directly on the latter or by first calling out the garrisons; such was the last project Napoleon devised, and which ought, if fortune did not prove a traitor, enable him to drive his enemies from France. But not having beaten Blücher, though he had chastised him severely, he was about to be pursued by this indefatigable adversary in going to attack Schwarzenberg, and he thus ran the risk of seeing them both combine to overwhelm him. The danger was palpable and difficult to avoid.

Napoleon returned deeply dejected to Soissons, but less dejected than his soldiers, who comprehended perfectly well the position of affairs, and began to fear that their efforts would be powerless to save France. But the inflexible spirit of Napoleon, enlightened by his great experience, which had shown him that the chances of war are inexhaustible, and that affairs are never desperate provided a general perseveres—the inflexible spirit of Napoleon was not cast down. He still reckoned on the erroneous movements of the enemy, and flattered himself that a fault of the presumptuous Blücher, perhaps of the prudent Schwarzenberg himself, would restore him the good fortune he had lost. As to the rest, he was still placed between his two adversaries, and consequently in a position to prevent their junction; he had still some resources at Paris; and, if he abandoned the capital to itself, to advance towards the fortresses, he would necessarily command still greater reinforcements, with which he might perhaps change the face of things. He preserved a firmness of mind, of which few warriors have given an example, perhaps not one, for no man ever fell from so high an eminence into so fearful an abyss. He had, in fact, excited the anger of the entire world against himself personally, and had completely lost the affections of France. He still possessed, it is true, an admirable corps of officers, formed in his school, and filled with a pious despair, which they communicated to the heroic youth of France who joined them as they marched; all advancing to the slaughter together. Besides, he still retained his inexhaustible genius, and a well-founded pride in the great deeds he had accomplished; and he was not disturbed, for, without doubt, even in his fall, he saw visioned before him that indestructible glory which to the latest posterity shall halo his name. Having returned to Soissons, which the enemy had not dared to keep, he watched, with his eye fixed on his enemies, which of them should commit the fault of which he hoped to profit. He had been in the town twenty-four hours busied in distributing bread and shoes to his young soldiers, to whom he also allowed some repose, and whom he also tried to drill a little better, when one of his numerous pursuing enemies chanced to come within his reach. This was General Priest, who brought a new detachment, called off from the blockade of the fortress, and replaced by German militia. He had advanced from the Ardennes on Reims, and had repulsed from this city Cor-

bineau's detachment. This detachment consisted of 15,000 soldiers, Russians and Prussians, commanded by an excellent officer, unfortunately French, whom hatred of the *régime* of 1793 had driven to Russia, and who had not returned when this *régime* had ceased to bedew France with blood. These 15,000 men were not a prey of sufficient importance to indemnify Napoleon for his late losses; but, falling on them, he would at least prove that it was still dangerous to be in his neighbourhood, and might render his enemies more circumspect. Whilst waiting a better chance this was not to be despised.

Whilst Blucher was stopped on the banks of the Aisne by Marshal Marmont's presence at Berry-au-Bac, Napoleon prepared to go from Soissons to Reims to overthrow Saint-Priest's corp. On the evening of the 12th, he ordered Marmont to leave at Berry-au-Bac whatever forces were indispensably necessary, and to advance to Reims with the rest, whilst he repaired there by the route of Fismes. They were the following morning—the 13th—to effect a junction within a league of Reims. The greatest secrecy was commanded and observed.

On the night of the 12th March, Napoleon, after having ordered thirty pieces of cannon to be formed into a battery at Soissons, behind *sacs à terre et des tonneaux*, after having destroyed every obstacle that impeded the defence, after having left as a garrison some fragments of battalions and a good commander, he set out for Reims, enjoying the demi-satisfaction that the success he was about to achieve inspired. At the break of day he met Marmont's corps and the marshal himself, whom he reproached, but yet not so severely as he might have done; he then urged forward to Reims the 30,000 men he had assembled for this *coup de main*.

On the way Napoleon fell in on the right, at the village of Rosney, with two Prussian battalions that were making soup. He disturbed their repast by making them all prisoners, spite of a certain amount of resistance on their part; he soon after found himself opposite Reims. Napoleon, who wished to cut off the entire of Saint-Priest's corps, conceived the idea of sending his cavalry across the Vesle, and making them advance beyond Reims, to cut off the retreat of the imprudent enemy that had fallen into his snares. But the allies had destroyed the bridge it had cost him so much time to rebuild, and he was forced to content himself with driving back on Reims Saint-Priest's troops, who had issued from the city to defend the heights. The French attacked the enemy with the greatest vigour; and, after a very short combat, drove them from the heights upon the town. Then the Emperor ordered the regiments of the Guard of Honour to rush upon them. General Philippe de Ségur, who commanded one of these regiments, turned the extreme left of the enemy, overthrew their cavalry, and captured eleven pieces of cannon. The Russian infantry taken in the rear by this movement rushed towards Reims. They wished to defend the city gates, but the French demolished them with cannon shot, and then

entered the town *pêle-mêle* with the Russians; they made 4,000 prisoners. This rapid *coup de main*, which scarcely cost us a few hundred men, deprived Saint-Priest's corps of 6,000—the remainder retreated. M. de Saint-Priest lost his life on this occasion.

This success, without restoring to Napoleon the ascendancy he possessed after Montmirail, had, however, the good effect of encouraging his soldiers and restraining the enemy, who now felt the necessity of weighing their least movement in presence of such an enemy. Napoleon paused at Reims to profit of any favorable circumstances that might arise.

The situation of affairs, both political and military, had undergone a serious change during the ten or twelve days the Emperor had been engaged combating Blücher. On quitting Troyes, he had ordered Marshal Oudinot, General Gérard, and Marshal Macdonald, to continue to pursue Prince Schwarzenberg and drive him beyond the Aube, though he still pretended to negotiate an armistice at Lusigny. He had at the same time ordered his lieutenants, who had under their command more than 30,000 men, to make the soldiers at the outposts cry, "Vive l'Empereur!" in order to persuade the enemy that he had not left. But this illusion had endured only four-and-twenty hours. The manner in which the Austrian General had been pursued after the Emperor's departure was sufficient to prove his absence, and Prince Schwarzenberg, who had promised to resume offensive operations as soon as Napoleon's attention should be directed from him, had fulfilled his promise on the morning of the 27th February. Wishing to bring back to the Aube the French troops that had crossed the river in pursuit of him, he sent Marshal de Wrède towards Bar-sur-Aube, and Prince Wittgenstein in the direction of the bridge of Dolancourt. He kept under his own command Giulay and the Austrian reserves.

Marshal Oudinot and General Gérard had taken up a position on the Aube and Marshal Macdonald on the Seine. The two former, whose peril was greatest, having on the morning of the 27th perceived that the enemy had resumed offensive operations, had changed their position—General Gérard to Bar-sur-Aube and Marshal Oudinot to Dolancourt, to dispute at these two points, the passage of the Aube. Marshal Oudinot, thinking the situation of Dolancourt bad, for it was overlooked on every side by high grounds, and thinking, moreover, that a retrograde movement would reveal too clearly the absence of Napoleon, had determined to take up a position in advance of the Aube, and defend *à outrance* the heights of Arsonval and of Arrentières. Leaving the Pacthod division of the National Guards to cover the bridge of Dolancourt, he sent to the heights beyond, the two brigades of the Leval division and the remaining brigade of the Boyer division. These three divisions brought from Spain, supported by the dragoons, also from Spain, and comprising seven thousand foot soldiers and two thousand horse, with, at the utmost, thirty pieces of artillery, could

with great difficulty hold their ground, in sight of the enemy's hundred pieces of artillery. The Montfort and Chassé, brigades first exposed to a shower of grape, and afterwards attacked by the Austrian cuirassiers, had not yet yielded an inch, but repulsed every assault, whilst the Count de Valmy, fording the Aube, came to their assistance. These two infantry brigades, completely surrounded by the enemy, without exhibiting the slightest emotion, assisted alternately by the Pinoteau brigade and by the dragoons of Spain,—who charged at full gallop the formidable Austrian artillery and killed the gunners beside the cannon—kept possession of the battle-field during the entire day. At length, towards night, seeing the remainder of the grand army of Bohemia ready to fall upon them, they quitted the heights, regained the banks of the river, and effected their retreat in good order. This admirable combat, sustained on one side by, from eight to nine thousand men, first against thirty, and afterwards against forty thousand, had cost the enemy, three thousand, and us, two thousand men. Had Napoleon only had such soldiers, the result of this great struggle would certainly have been different.

Whilst Oudinot with the troops from Spain, so well defended the heights before Dolancourt, General Gérard, on his side, had checked the Bavarians before Bar-sur-Aube, and had killed several without losing many of his own troops, thanks to the barricades by which he was covered. Macdonald, hearing the cannonade, had hastened from the Seine to the Aube to co-operate in the defence of the attacked posts.

Although this sharp combat, in which Prince Wittgenstein had been seriously, and Prince Schwarzenberg slightly wounded, was of a nature to render the army of Bohemia still more prudent than usual, still it was easy to discern by the number of troops engaged, that this *corps d'armée* only served as a screen, and that Napoleon was elsewhere. Had Prince Schwarzenberg entertained a doubt on this subject, it must have vanished at seeing before him, at the utmost, eight or nine thousand men. Thenceforth his project of retreating on Chaumont, was abandoned, and whether that he was goaded by the reproaches of the allies; whether that he was jealous of keeping his word, pledged to the army of Silesia, he resolved to advance, and at least recover his position at Troyes, whilst Blucher continued to run the chances of an isolated march. Consequently, on the 28th he put his troops in motion, and the three French Generals, judging with reason, that the Aube was not tenable, and that Troyes even might be turned on every side, had fallen back on the Seine, between Nogent and Montereau, the rear guard engaged all the way in sharp skirmishes. Prince Schwarzenberg had followed them, had again taken possession of Troyes, and occupied the banks of the Seine from Nogent to Montereau. He had made a firm resolution that Blucher, advancing on Paris, should not advance alone.

The situation of affairs, considered in a military point of view,

had assumed a very gloomy colouring during the ten or twelve days employed by Napoleon in contending with Blücher. Politically considered, things had become wonderfully worse.

The conferences at Lusigny had been definitely abandoned, because Prince Schwarzenberg had no further need of them to free himself from Napoleon's pursuit, and because Napoleon persisted in bringing forward the frontier question under the veil of an armistice. On entering Troyes, the prince had dismissed the commissioners, who had endeavoured for a moment to arrest the effusion of blood by an armistice. As to the rest, he did so with regret, and solely constrained by the spirit that prevailed amongst the allies.

At Châtillon, in like manner, things were on the eve of a rupture. We have already said that when, on the 1st of March, at Chaumont, Lord Castlereagh had induced the Allies to sign a treaty, he had also persuaded them to fix a term, after which they would no longer wait M. de Caulaincourt's counter-project. The term fixed was the 10th March, and M. de Caulaincourt was informed that after that date, the congress would be dissolved, and all further negotiation deferred till either Napoleon or the Allies should have succumbed. Prince Esterházy had been sent secretly by M. de Metternich, to M. de Caulaincourt, to repeat his former advice, of treating, treating, at any price, for should the present opportunity pass unprofitted of, the allies would never renew negotiations with Napoleon, and besides, they contemplated depriving him, not alone of the Rhine, but of his throne. M. de Caulaincourt had sent this intelligence to head quarters, imploring the Emperor to allow him to cede some points of the Frankfort bases; for if he persisted in his determination, the negotiations would be instantly broken off, and not only his imperial rank, but his very existence would be at stake.

The information transmitted by M. de Caulaincourt, and which he had gained from the secret but sincere counsels of Prince Esterházy, was strictly true. To the impatience to enter Paris that Alexander experienced, to the furious hatred that influenced the Prussians, were now added the urgent solicitations of the royalist party. M. de Vitrolles, despatched, as we have seen, with a commission accredited by M. de Dalberg, but not by M. de Talleyrand, had succeeded, after many detours, in reaching the head-quarters of the Allies, and had obtained admission by using the tokens of recognition he brought from M. de Stadion. Though he was wholly unknown to the allied ministers, they, after some time, accorded him their confidence, as they listened to his sincere and impassioned language, as they listened, above all, to the names of the high personages under whose authority he acted. This was the first important communication the allied sovereigns had received, and it had the effect, not alone of affording them satisfaction, but of redoubling their courage, by holding out the hope of finding within Paris itself a party that would open the gates for them, and, having

secured their entrance, would aid them to constitute a government with whom they could negotiate; this hope, so strong when they had first crossed the Rhine, and which had since become so weak, on witnessing so few manifestations in favour of the Bourbons, now revived, and strengthened considerably their determination to advance. The Allies questioned M. de Vitrolles in detail about the state of Paris, they complained of knowing nothing on the subject, and repeated the old story, that, not having made war either for or against any dynasty, they would not think of dethroning Napoleon excepting France manifested a decided wish to that effect, in which case they would be happy to aid in delivering her from the yoke that weighed so heavily on her and on Europe. Upon this, M. de Vitrolles, adducing the names of MM. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg, who had great weight in the allied camp, much more than men of higher rank amongst the royalists; on this, we say, M. de Vitrolles replied, that France, trembling under the Imperial tyranny, dared not manifest her real sentiments; that, besides, knowing that the European courts were negotiating with Napoleon at Châtillon, she was still less disposed to raise the standard of revolt against him, a standard which the sovereigns in arms had not themselves dared to raise; but if they broke off definitely with Napoleon, the allied monarchs would see burst out on every side a unanimous demonstration in favour of the House of Bourbon. It was unfortunately true that the aversion of France to despotism and to war had weakened her horror of foreigners, and though she had completely forgotten the Bourbons, she would willingly accept any government whatsoever that would release her from sufferings that had become insupportable. This truth, undoubtedly much exaggerated by the envoy of MM. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg, had naturally made a profound impression on the ministers and sovereigns assembled at Troyes, and they informed M. de Vitrolles that they were obliged to continue the conferences at Châtillon to a certain date; that if Napoleon accepted the frontiers of 1793, they would treat with him; that, in the opposite case, they would break off, and then listen to whatever could be said in favour of another government, provided that this government was agreeable to the French people, and seemed likely to be permanent. But the partizans of war à outrance, though they had no reason to be excited, had, on learning the late intelligence, felt a still greater desire to break off the negotiations at Châtillon, and to march on Paris. This was the motive of the repeated and secret advice that Austria sent to M. de Caulaincourt. A few moments more, and the entire aspect of things would be changed.*

* The principal personage employed in these negotiations, M. de Vitrolles, has, in his spirited and yet unedited memoirs, given an account of his mission to the allied camp. I am indebted for a sight of these memoirs to the kindness of the gentleman in whose possession they are. I am therefore sure of the correctness of the recital I have just made, the more so as I have compared M. de Vitrolles' testimony with that of some of the principal personages of the time, and my narration is the result of these compared testimonies.

At Paris, too, things assumed a most threatening aspect. Napoleon had, as we have seen, sent the treaty proposed by the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon to the Regent, Maria Louisa, flattering himself that these dishonouring propositions would call up the indignation of all in whose veins French blood flowed. The different papers relative to the negotiation had been laid before a council held in presence of Maria Louisa and Joseph, on the 4th March. Napoleon, who had so much altered the truth with regard to the Prague negotiations, and even to those of Frankfort, had resolved this time to tell the entire truth, because he hoped it would excite an outburst of anger. Alas! the truth now only confounded those who heard it, enervated as they were by a long continued despotism. There were amongst the members of this council, good citizens and honest men, but they were as much afraid of offending Napoleon by advising an immediate peace, as they were of displeasing the public by recommending a prolongation of the war. They were, in fact, alarmed at being called on to deliberate on so grave a question. There were also present on this occasion, besides the Empress and Joseph, the grand dignitaries, the ministers, and some presidents of the *Conseil d'Etat*. After the different papers had been read, all observed a long silence, the combined result of surprise and terror. Then Joseph, who presided, having compelled each by a personal appeal to break silence, the twenty members stammered out their opinions in an embarrassed manner, and with a brevity that indicated, not energy but weakness. The proposed treaty, they all admitted was most humiliating; indeed, some, who did not hesitate to call things by their right names, declared it to be an actual capitulation. "It was to be hoped," they said, "that the genius of the Emperor, which had already accomplished so many prodigies, would effect one more, that of driving back the enemy, and forcing the concession of more favourable conditions. However, they did not know the precise state of affairs; the Emperor alone knew that; he alone could judge and give an enlightened advice on the subject—which was very true, thanks to the form of government—but if, however, the position of things was as desperate as was said, and as it seemed, judging by appearances, would it not be better to treat on the bases of the ancient frontiers, than to allow foreigners to enter Paris? It was impossible to hide the fact, that if foreigners entered the capital, they would not respect the glorious dynasty under which France then existed; foreigners would attempt a total change in the home government, and that was a calamity that ought to be averted at any cost. Undoubtedly, to lose Belgium would be a serious loss, but it was better to lose Belgium than France, and, above all, the throne. Besides, after all, France such as she had been under Louis XIV., having her emperor at her head, would be still great, for her greatness did not depend on having one or two provinces more or less. Napoleon had given sufficient proofs of possessing a warlike genius, it was to be desired that he should now find time to exhibit a genius for peace, and

procure his country as great an amount of happiness as he had already done of glory. Then France would soon recover the effects of her late drains, and would find an opportunity of regaining what the violence of foreigners might at present deprive her of. But, in any case," said these servile men, who ardently wished for peace, without daring to avow their wishes, "in any case, if His Imperial Majesty, who alone knew the real state of things, and was alone in a position to judge accurately—if His Imperial Majesty was inclined to accept the proposal of the ancient frontiers, the Council was of opinion that His Majesty might do so without detriment to his honour, for his true honour was the interest of France, and the interest of France was immediate peace."

Certainly the interest of France was peace, but it was her interest a year, two years, six years earlier, and that would have been the time to say so. To continue the war now involved danger only to the reigning dynasty; France, under the Bourbons, would be neither smaller nor less influential than the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon wished to render her; it is even certain that the dread of Napoleon influenced the Allies very much in their desire to weaken France; were she under the Bourbons they would be much less solicitous to reduce her natural and secular power. Things having arrived at the point, at which they were, there was no danger in risking a few battles more, which might lead to a settlement whose conditions would be a compromise between the ancient and modern frontiers, by which we might secure Mayence by sacrificing Antwerp. One man alone, whose name deserves mention—M. de Cessac—recorded his vote against accepting the Châtillon propositions. With this single exception, all the members of the Council of Regency exhibited an unprecedented subservience. The most daring expressed in a more decided tone the same cowardly feeling. "Peace or war as the Emperor pleases." Such was their sole opinion, but it signified that, if by chance the Emperor should prefer war, it was what they, too, desired.*

Napoleon had always manifested extreme contempt for those large assemblies where questions of war or politics are debated, because in reality those whom he met in such places were men fashioned by despotism—the greater number having no opinion of their own, very few amongst them capable of forming one, and these endeavouring to discover the wishes of the ruler as a guide to theirs; others were contradictions either through bad temper or discontent. This council, had Napoleon been present, would have justified his opinion, and revealed the effects of the *régime* under which he had pressed down France, and under which he was about to sink himself. As to the rest, he would be very much disappointed, for he had wished to excite a burst of patriotic indignation, and he received, on the contrary, an humble and trembling supplication for peace, a suppli-

* The report of this Council is still extant with the recorded opinion of each member; and, should it ever be published, it will be seen that I have not exaggerated in any particular.

cation written under the influence of two sources of fear—fear of him, and fear of the enemy.

But the humility that these advisers testified in presence of his wife, his brother, and his faithful chancellor Cambacérès, was flung aside when they no longer found themselves confronted by these formidable witnesses—they then gave vent to very different language. Their submission to Napoleon's wishes was suddenly transformed into fury against his obstinacy. "*This man is mad,*" was the expression echoed on every side. "He will get us all killed," said men that had never appeared on a battle-field. Amongst the men particularly attached to Joseph—and these, generally speaking, were the civil or military *employés* who had sought at Madrid the advancement they could not find at Paris—it was insinuated that it would be better to place in Joseph's hands the power of saving France. These friends of Joseph, very ill-treated by Napoleon, who accused them of causing our misfortunes in Spain, now repaid his ill-treatment with disparaging remarks, and said it would be better to proclaim a regency, of which Joseph should be president, for with him Europe would be more willing to treat than with Napoleon. They asserted this to be an adroit manner of soothing the pride of the allied sovereigns as well as of Napoleon himself, and of delivering France from the rule of a man whose genius was only suited to war, and confiding her destinies to one whose genius was essentially that of peace. This was a plainly-spoken wish that Napoleon should abdicate and Joseph take his place. But it was only the most rash—that is to say, the most discontented, who dared to hold this language. Those who confined themselves to wishing that a speedy termination should be put to the war, and had no idea of subverting the throne, contented themselves with saying that, in reply to the debate provoked by Napoleon, it would be right to send him an address containing a formal demand for peace.

These sentiments obtained so much, that Joseph, adopting the opinions of those who wished to facilitate peace on Napoleon's part, by making pacific demonstrations, thought proper to consult M. Meneval, whose fidelity was unalterable, and commissioned him to write to head quarters to know whether a peace movement would be agreeable to the Emperor, and in what form he would wish it to be made. M. Meneval declared that he would inform the Emperor correctly of everything that occurred, and would afterwards listen to what it was lawful for him to hear. He therefore wrote immediately to Napoleon, with the delicate reserve which he was capable of, combined with the most perfect frankness.

Napoleon, on arriving at Reims, found M. Meneval's letter, and several others, that gave him a clear idea of the state of affairs. Thanks to his wondrous sagacity, which distrust heightened but did not confuse; he guessed everything; perhaps that in the first moment of excitement, he exaggerated a little what he divined. He was especially displeased because the Duke de Rovigo, not wishing

to compromise anyone, and not attaching much importance to the opinions of those who surrounded Joseph, had sent him no report of what had occurred. With the promptitude and utter want of discretion, that too often characterised his manner of acting, he wrote the following letter to the Duke de Rovigo. In this document we find only evidences of a dreary despotism, nor would it deserve to be quoted did it not, at the same time, exhibit an inflexibility of character very extraordinary under the circumstances.

“To the Minister of Police.

“Reims, 14th March, 1814.

“You do not inform me of anything that is going on at Paris. People there talk of an address, of a regency, and lay a thousand plots as stupid as absurd, and which could only be conceived by a fool like Miot. These people do not know that I, like Alexander, cut the Gordian knot. Let them know that I am still the same man that I was at Wagram, and at Austerlitz; that I do not wish for state intrigues; that there is no authority but mine, and should events become pressing, it is the Empress-Regent who alone possesses my confidence. The king (Joseph) is weak-minded, and allows himself to be seduced into intrigues that may prove fatal to the State, and above all, to him and his advisers, if he do not quickly return to the right path. I am displeased at learning all this from another source than from you. Be assured that had an address been drawn up, opposed to the governing authority, I would have had the king, my ministers, and all who signed it arrested. These men spoil the National Guard; they spoil the Parisians, because they are themselves weak-minded, and do not understand the temper of the country. I want no tribunes of the people. Let the people not forget that I am the great tribune; they will then do what is conducive to their real interests, which are the constant object of my thoughts.”

After this vexatious experience of the men that surrounded him, Napoleon took upon himself to reply to the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon. He had already commanded M. de Caulaincourt to use every means to prolong the negotiations and prevent a rupture, without, however, conceding the proposed bases. The question still was of the counter-project, required within a fixed time, and which Napoleon without actually refusing, felt extreme repugnance to present. He renewed his instructions this time, in terms as prudent as honourable.

“Ask,” he wrote to M. de Caulaincourt, “whether the proposed preliminaries, to which you are requested to present a counter-project, are the *dernier mot* of the allies. If it is so you break off immediately, whatever may be the consequence, and we shall tell France to what the allies have tried to subject us. If, on the contrary, as is very probable, you are told, it is not their *dernier mot*, you will reply that we on our side, referring incessantly to the Frankfort bases, have not uttered our *dernier mot*, but they cannot

require that we should offer in a counter-project, the sacrifices they wish to force from us; for," he added, "*if they wish to flog us they will not, at least, oblige us to lay on the whip ourselves.*"

Napoleon wished that M. de Caulaincourt, by entering into a discussion of details, should learn precisely what it would be necessary to sacrifice and what it would be still possible to retain; for the disadvantage of offering a counter-project was, that in our ignorance of the definite intentions of the allies on each point, we might yield what it was possible for us to keep. He authorised M. de Caulaincourt to abandon in the first instance Dutch Brabant, that is to say, the part of Holland of which, in 1810, he had deprived his brother Louis. This was a very slight concession, for the frontier, extending from the Wahal to the Meuse, was what was called the natural frontier, or the *Frankfort bases*, and secured to us the Scheld and Antwerp. Napoleon also authorised his plenipotentiary to renounce the different spots of territory we possessed on the right bank of the Rhine, as annexations of the left bank, such as Wesel, Cassel, and Kehl. We thus, though keeping possession of the left, abandoned the bridges that secured us a facility of landing on the right bank. Napoleon also consented to demolish the fortifications of Mayence and reduce the place to a mere commercial town. He was willing to resign all that France possessed beyond the Alps and all the states governed by his brothers, either in Germany or in Italy, without requiring any compensation except for Prince Eugene. The sacrifice of Spain had been long since made; Napoleon again formally renounced that kingdom, and as to our colonies, he authorised M. de Caulaincourt to declare that France would yield some of her factories in India (those that we still possess) without the isles of France and Réunion; she would give up Guadeloupe, but not the Saintes; she would resign Martinique, but not her other possessions in the Antilles. These were all of so little value that Napoleon was willing to abandon them, if he could retain some continental possessions. He ought to have said "France prefers free trade with the colonies of every other nation that have been independent, or are about to become so, to possessions in the new world, that are at the same time valueless and difficult to defend." Should M. de Caulaincourt not succeed in getting each point discussed, he was to draw up a counter-project on these bases, and await the reply, whatever it might be.

These instructions, which had already been despatched from Craonne and renewed at Reims, with a little additional latitude, but without exceeding what we have just reported, were only a reproduction of the Frankfort bases, and could not prolong the negotiations beyond a few days. M. de Caulaincourt was deeply afflicted on receiving these instructions, for, though he loved his country as a good citizen, he also loved and wished to save the ruling dynasty, even at the expense to Napoleon's personal glory, a diminution of which he looked upon as an inevitable and deserved

punishment for his faults. But, bound by absolute orders, having exhausted every pretext he could devise to defer the fatal term some days beyond the 10th March, he was at length obliged to explain himself. He did so; but, when in an elaborate note, which he attempted to read to the plenipotentiaries, he undertook to discuss the preliminaries presented on the 17th February, and to prove that they were a violation of a positive treaty, for the Frankfort bases formally proposed, had been accepted with equal formality; that the frontiers, to which the Allies now wished to limit France, deprived her of the relative power which she ought to retain, in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe; that the possession of the left bank of the Rhine was scarcely a sufficient compensation to her for the partition of Poland, the secularization of the ecclesiastical States, the destruction of the republic of Venice, and the conquests of the English in India; when, we say, he undertook to expatiate on these considerations, seven or eight of the plenipotentiaries present raised a simultaneous outcry, threatened to break up the meeting, and hear nothing further if the present plenipotentiary persisted to dilate on such a theme. It was, they said, a counter-project that the Duke de Vicence was to present, and not a critique; it was a counter-project he had promised, and for which they had patiently waited a month—which they were commissioned to demand, with orders to leave off if they did not obtain it.

M. de Caulaincourt did all in his power to calm and induce them to accept his note. He only succeeded, after enduring the most bitter recriminations, and on promising to present a counter-project, and that within twenty-four hours.

Effectively, on the 15th, M. de Caulaincourt presented a counter-project, conformable to the bases we have quoted. After enumerating the sacrifices we were ready to make, in a manner calculated to make the most of our concessions—such, for example, as the surrender of Westphalia, Holland, Illyria, Italy, and Spain—the document further stated that France consented that Holland should be restored to a prince of the House of Orange, with an increase of territory; (this increase was no other than the restitution of Dutch Brabant;) that Germany should be organized in the manner already proposed by the plenipotentiaries—that is to say, *the states should be rendered independent and united by a federal bond*—Italy, too, was to be free, with the exception that Austria was to hold possessions there, whilst France would retire to the Alps, it being always understood that Prince Eugene and the Princess Eliza were to be allowed an apanage; lastly, that the Pope was to return to Rome, and Ferdinand VII. to Madrid. France was also willing that England should keep Malta and the greater part of her acquisitions. But this detailed enumeration of the concessions made by France naturally implied that she intended to keep the Rhine and the Alps—that is to say, Antwerp, Cologne, Mayence, Chambéry and Nice, as she did not expressly say she was willing to give them up.

On this occasion M. de Caulaincourt was not interrupted by the

plenipotentiaries, for he had fulfilled the condition of presenting a counter-project; he was listened to in frigid silence, but without any expression of astonishment. Scarcely was the reading of the document finished when the plenipotentiaries rose, and, after formally acknowledging the presentation of our counter-project, announced they were about to send it to the head-quarters of the allied sovereigns; they also announced that the negotiations might be now looked upon as definitively broken off, and that within forty-eight hours they would leave Châtillon. The English, and especially Lord Aberdeen, who, during the entire proceedings, had always observed the strictest politeness, assured M. de Caulaincourt that they deeply regretted not being able to conclude peace on the conditions they had proposed, which would have prevented the effusion of blood, to which they could now see no end; that on these conditions they would have treated honestly with Napoleon, that they would even have recognised him as Emperor, which England had not yet done. These declarations, which bore the stamp of perfect sincerity, profoundly affected M. de Caulaincourt, who, not having been able to secure the grandeur of the empire, had wished at least to save the empire itself. This illustrious citizen, who had represented France after Jena and Friedland, and had been loaded with the caresses of trembling Europe, was, in his present grief, which he could not conceal, a striking example of the fickleness of fortune, an example which the plenipotentiaries ought to have looked upon with lively fear. But diplomatists are not more philosophic than other men—the present intoxicates them, so that they forget the past and the future!

The counter-project, presented on the 15th March, was to be answered at latest within two days—that is to say, on the 17th—and the Congress was to be dissolved on the 18th. M. de Caulaincourt sent the reply immediately to Napoleon at Reims.

Napoleon had anticipated this, and had taken his resolution. Having arrived at Reims on the evening of the 13th, he resolved to pass the 14th, 15th, 16th, and perhaps the 17th, there, in order to allow his troops some repose, and to fuse some into certain corps organized too hastily at Paris, and to take cognizance of the proceedings of the Allies before definitely determining on his own. Though his second movement against the army of Silesia had not been as successful as the first, though he had been deceived in his hopes by the loss of Soissons, and by the result of the battles of Craonne and Laon, still Blucher had been severely chastised, and Prince Schwarzenberg, though he had come from the Aube to the Seine, had not dared to advance beyond Nogent. This prince seemed to hesitate to take another step until Napoleon should have more fully revealed his designs. At length the battle of Reims, a small indemnification for the most bitter disappointments had, however, produced a most strong impression on the Allies. Napoleon did not, therefore, consider himself conquered, and he still waited

some false move on the part of his adversaries, to rush upon them with the rapidity of lightning.

The plan which he still preferred to any other was to advance towards the fortresses, collect the garrisons, and intercept the enemy's lines of communication. He was much encouraged to pursue this plan by the arrival at Reims of General Janssens, with five or six thousand men, drawn from the fortresses of the Ardennes, who, combined into a compact corps, had scathlessly traversed the invaded provinces. Napoleon had already, as we have seen, ordered General Maison to withdraw from Lille, Valenciennes, and Mons, in fact from all the Belgic fortresses, whatever troops were not indispensably necessary to guard the walls during a few days; of these he was to form a small army and join the troops coming from Antwerp. He ordered Carnot, who still held the English in check before Antwerp, to keep with him only the Marines, and the most recently organized battalions, and to send his best men, to the number of about six thousand, to General Maison. He had ordered General Merle to leave Maestricht and the fortresses on the Meuse; he commanded Generals Durutte and Morand to leave Metz and Mayence (orders that had been received and were about being executed); in this manner he reckoned on being able to draw from the fortresses, from Antwerp to Mayence, about fifty thousand men. He had no need to go to Mayence or to Metz to collect these diverse detachments; a simple movement on the upper Marne, through Châlons, Vitry, and Joinville—a movement that would not draw him far from the circle of his operations—would enable him to collect this reinforcement, and, joined to the troops he already had between the Seine and the Marne, would raise his army to one hundred thousand men, and, besides, place him in the rear of his enemies, which was the most certain way to draw them to a distance from Paris. To this great design there were, however, two important objections—the want of defensive works round Paris, and the moral condition of this great city. Napoleon, as we have said, had, through fear of alarming the population, deferred to the last moment the erection of the necessary works. Around the capital of France, where now rise eleven or twelve leagues of walls and sixteen citadels, there were not even earthen redoubts. Some palisaded batteries in front of the gates were the only works that had been erected. Twelve thousand men of the National Guards, selected amongst the most peaceful and least stirring citizens, and fifteen or twenty thousand men from the dépôts, with a numerous artillery force, composed the garrison. These forces, headed by an energetic commander, would have been sufficient to resist the enemy for some days, especially if the inhabitants of the suburbs could have been supplied with muskets. But the moral state of the capital presented the great difficulties of the defence. The inhabitants, divided between hatred for foreigners and detestation of a despotism, which, after twenty years of victory,

now brought armed Europe before the gates of the capital, were ready to side with the first occupant, and a party of clever malcontents could, as soon as the enemy appeared, become the active instruments of a revolution, already effected in the minds of the people. This was the weak point of the empire, more dangerous than that created by an almost annihilated military power. Had Napoleon been a legitimate prince, that is to say the descendant of an ancient dynasty, or a wise prince, who had preserved the confidence of the country, he might have seen the enemy enter Paris, as Frederick the Great had beheld a similar event in Berlin, without being involved in irreparable misfortune. For him, on the contrary, the entrance of foreigners into his capital, facilitated by the want of defensive works, was not a military reverse, but the almost certain cause of a revolution.

These were undoubtedly grave objections against any plan that involved Napoleon's further removal from Paris, but the system of fighting alternately against Blucher and Schwarzenberg, in the angle formed by the Seine and the Marne, having become almost impracticable—firstly, because the enemy was too clearly aware of the design; and, secondly, because Napoleon having retired to the extremity of the angle, the two adverse armies in approaching him would be fused into one—a change of tactics was therefore absolutely necessary, and no plan was better than that which, increasing his army by 50,000 men, placed him in the rear of the enemy. Having no choice, Napoleon tried to persuade himself that the political danger was not so great; that the Parisians would not dare to throw off his authority; and, besides, having his brothers at their head, they would be able to defend themselves. He did not picture to himself then, because he had not experienced it, how great is the irresolution and weakness of the public mind, when a government is morally undermined, and its popularity departed. Whether through necessity, or blinded by self-illusion, he adopted the project, so admirably planned in a military sense, of marching towards the fortresses; to secure the success of this plan, it was only necessary that Paris should hold out five or six days.

However, before commencing this daring manœuvre, Napoleon wished to give a few days' rest to his troops, to make some indispensable arrangements, and see whether he could not, before withdrawing still further from Paris, fall on the rear of one of the invading armies, that of Bohemia for example, which, having taken up a position at Nogent, already presented a flank towards him. It was thus the four days passed at Reims, from the 14th to the 17th March, had been employed. He had left General Charpentier at Soissons, with some *débris*, sufficient to defend the place; he had re-organized, by fusing them together, the four divisions of the Young Guard, composing the corps of Victor and Ney; he had ordered to be sent from Paris, under the conduct of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, about three or four thousand of the Young Guard, two thousand mounted horse soldiers of the same corps, the miserable

remnant of the Polish troops, a new reserve division composed of National Guards drilled in the dépôts, and lastly an immense park of artillery. This reinforcement would supply him with 12,000 additional men. He had already received nearly 6,000 from the fortresses of the Ardennes, under General Janssens, and with these different reinforcements, it would be possible for him to raise his army to 60,000 men. If to these he joined the corps of Macdonald, D'Oudinot, and Gérard, he would have 85,000 combatants under his command; and the number would be increased to 135,000, should his march towards the fortresses be as successful as he hoped.

The repose accorded to his troops having appeared to him sufficient, and his arrangements being completed, he resolved to leave Reims on the morning of the 17th, and repair to Epernay, in order to judge better of what he ought to do under existing circumstances. Paris had two causes of alarm; the renewed approach of Prince Schwarzenberg, whose vanguard had reached Provins, and what had befallen the army of Spain, between Bayonne and Bordeaux. Posted on the banks of the Marne at Epernay, Napoleon would see whether it would be better to fall immediately on Prince Schwarzenberg's rear, and arrest his advance towards the capital, or persevere in the project of marching towards the fortresses. His arrangements were made the evening before with a view to these two objects, for whilst bringing up the mass of his forces on Epernay, he sent Ney with the infantry of the Young Guard to Châlons. If he wished to advance on the fortresses, he had only to direct his corps to follow Ney in the direction of Châlons, or, on the contrary, to make them fall back towards Fère-Champenoise, if he decided on attacking Prince Schwarzenberg. Ney, who was in the van, would not have a greater distance to march to Fère-Champenoise, whether he went there from Châlons or from Epernay.

Having left Reims on the morning of the 17th, Napoleon reached Epernay the same evening. He left Mortier at Reims, to second Marmont in the defence of Berry-au-Bac, and gave both an injunction to hold Blücher in check for some days, by successively disputing the passages of the Aisne and the Marne. When Napoleon reached Epernay, he learned that Prince Schwarzenberg had advanced far beyond the Seine. The latter was now so far advanced in the direction of Paris, that to fall upon his rear seemed a well-directed *coup-de-main*, as important as that of Montmirail, and politically necessary on account of the consternation prevailing in the capital. In fact, the Parisians were calling aloud for Napoleon, for they could not behold foreign bayonets approaching their gates without invoking the aid of his arm. The events at Bayonne and Bordeaux had added to the terror of the Parisians. These events, very serious, as we shall soon see, had inspired the enemies of the government with enthusiastic hopes which ought to be immediately crushed. Napoleon, influenced by these motives, did not hesitate to set out for Fère-Champenoise in order to pass from the Marne

to the Seine. On the morning of the 18th, the entire army marched in that direction.

Before following the Emperor in this new series of operations, we shall briefly retrace the events that had just occurred on the Spanish frontiers, and which had so powerfully disturbed the public mind. Marshal Soult had continued to occupy the Adour with his right wing, and the *Gave d'Oleron* with his centre and left, whilst Lord Wellington had not yet made up his mind to move forward. But the English General having received the means of satisfying the wants of the Spaniards, had commenced offensive operations with eight English, two Portuguese, and four Spanish divisions. He ordered two English and two Spanish divisions to blockade Bayonne, then with the remainder, about sixty thousand men, he marched against Marshal Soult, who had abandoned the *Gave d'Oleron*, and had taken up a position at the *Gave de Pau*, in the neighbourhood of Orthez.

Marshal Soult, after having left an entire division at Bayonne (independent of the garrison), after having sent Napoleon two infantry divisions and several cavalry brigades, had still six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, amounting in all to 40,000 veteran soldiers. If this number was not sufficient to secure a victory, which might be more difficult as the English were present, it was at least sufficient to dispute the country inch by inch, and cover Bordeaux. Bordeaux was at this moment the capital of the south. There prevailed there, besides the discontent peculiar to maritime cities whose commerce had been cut off, during twenty years, a religious and royalist spirit, common to all the southern provinces; so that every sentiment most opposed to the Imperial régime, obtained at Bordeaux. The Duke d'Angoulême, son of the Count Artois and nephew of Louis XVIII., had hastened to the Spanish frontier, but had not been received by Lord Wellington, thanks to the care taken by the English, to deprive this war of all appearance of a dynastic question. But he hovered in the rear of the head-quarters, and his appearance caused an extraordinary agitation in the country, a feeling not exhibited in Franche-Comté and in Lorraine, where the arrival of the Count d'Artois had not produced any sensation. Numerous Royalist emissaries had already appeared at Bordeaux, and a single movement of the enemy would suffice to produce an explosion.

These were the causes that had decided Napoleon to leave so large a portion of his troops between Bayonne and Bordeaux, and which ought to have induced, on the part of his lieutenant, the most energetic efforts to stop the progress of the English army. On this account, Napoleon had frequently recommended Marshal Soult to display the greatest vigour, and do as he was doing—that is to say, to be the first and last under fire; for when he required unlimited devotedness from his troops, the best means of obtaining it was to give the example.

On the 26th February, Marshal Soult took up his position a little in the rear of Orthez, on the heights that border the *Gave de Pau*,

having on his right General Reille, in the centre Count d' Erlon, and on the left, at Orthez, General Clausel, each with two divisions. The latter covered the route of Sault de Navailles. The cavalry watched the banks of the Gave. Each wing was drawn up in two lines, the second ready to support the first.

On the morning of the 27th February, Lord Wellington passed the Gave, and attacked with five English divisions the French right wing, commanded by General Reille; whilst at the opposite extremity, General Hill, with an English division, and some Portuguese and Spanish troops, attacked General Clausel at Orthez. The contest was long and violent, and General Reille on the right, as General Clausel on the left wing, worthily sustained the honour of our arms. General Clausel had maintained his position at Orthez without yielding an inch; and General Reille, obliged to fall back upon a second position, was, nevertheless, certain of being able to keep his place if, by a vigorous use of the second lines, the battle was recommenced against an enemy visibly exhausted. The French might, it is true, be conquered after this new effort, as our sole reserve consisted, besides the divisions engaged, of General Paris' brigade, composed of the residue of all the other corps. It might also happen that the French would conquer, and in that case the result would be important. These are questions whose solution depends on temperament, for the mind becomes confused in the consideration. Marshal Soult, considering that this was the only army that remained in the south of the empire, had thought it wiser to retire, and had effected his retreat on Sault de Navailles, after having killed or wounded 6,000 of Lord Wellington's troops, and left three or four thousand on the field of battle. The French had retired in admirable order, and inspired the enemy with a feeling of profound respect.

But Soult had abandoned valuable territory, and that, too, at the close of a day which, without being a lost battle, would have all the appearances of one; for the enemy would be authorised to call it so, as it enabled them to advance, and because the ill-disposed populations of the South would give it no other designation. After this battle of Orthez, there was not a point where the French could rest until they reached the Garonne. Bordeaux would be left unprotected, and the great political interests to which Napoleon had sacrificed 40,000 men—who, had they been brought up to the Seine, might have saved the Empire—was about to be compromised. There was only one resource; it was that Marshal Soult should make Bordeaux the basis of his operations, and the terminus of his retreat. He would, in this case, be obliged to fight another battle at the risk of being beaten; and afterwards, beaten or not, he would be obliged to fall back on Bordeaux, establish a vast camp around this city, and defend himself as General Carnot was doing at Antwerp. It is true that Bordeaux had not the walls of Antwerp; but it had better—it had a noble army that, making this city the base of operation, ought to be invincible. Should Soult's

army only hold its position fifteen or twenty days, it would be sufficient to give Napoleon time to decide the fate of the war between Paris and Langres.

Marshal Soult, fearing encounters with the English, which had always been unfortunate, (thanks, it must be said, to our generals and not to our soldiers,) had thought proper to manœuvre, and, instead of covering Bordeaux directly, to go up towards Toulouse, thinking that the English would not dare to advance on Bordeaux whilst he was on their flanks and rear. Such calculations, very rational on the part of Napoleon, of whom the enemy was afraid, were not so well suited to his lieutenants, who were far from inspiring the same amount of alarm. Events soon proved this. In fact, Lord Wellington, who, by summoning to him a portion of the troops stationed round Bayonne, had under his command more than seventy thousand men, despatched ten or twelve thousand towards Bordeaux, a sufficient number to incite insurrection in that city, and kept sixty thousand men to pursue Marshal Soult in the direction of Toulouse. This he did not fail to do. Whilst Marshal Soult took the road to Tarbes, Lord Wellington despatched Marshal Beresford from Mont-de-Marson, with a column of English and Portuguese troops, and the latter, finding Bordeaux defenceless, on the 12th March, the General and the Prefect, who had at most twelve hundred men under their command, retired to the Dordogne, and the royalists of Bordeaux, seconded by the merchants, who were impatient for the re-establishment of commerce, called aloud for the restoration of the Bourbons. The Duke d'Angoulême hastened to the city, and the restoration of the ancient dynasty was proclaimed in presence of the English, who did nothing, hindered nothing; contenting themselves with repeating that the home government of France did not touch them, that they had only one mission—to provide the means of subsistence for their troops and guarantee the safety of those amongst the inhabitants who trusted to their honour. Count Lynch, (the Mayor of Bordeaux,) putting himself at the head of the movement, made a proclamation in which he announced the re-establishment of the Bourbons, and seemed to say it was for the purpose of restoring her legitimate princes to France that the allied powers had taken arms. Lord Wellington, following his instructions as closely as though they were a military watchword, wrote to the Duke d'Angoulême to protest against the Mayor of Bordeaux's proclamation, and to declare that the overthrow of one dynasty or the re-establishment of another was not, by any means, the object of the allied powers, a fact which he would himself be obliged to explain before the public, if the Bourbons did not retract the assertions they had ventured to make.

This was carrying a respect for appearances too far, when in reality the Allies did desire what the Mayor of Bordeaux had announced. However this may be, it was not less true that the enemy, taking advantage of a false move of Marshal Soult, had entered

Bordeaux, which had been left unprotected, and furnished the Royalists a favourable opportunity of proclaiming the restoration of the Bourbons in the south of France. The example was one of serious import and might provoke imitation. It seems to us, who can reason calmly fifty years after the event, that this ought to have been enough to determine Napoleon not to quit the vicinity of Paris. But, besides that Napoleon did not know to what point he had alienated the hearts of the people by his system of continual war, he was over-ruled and rendered powerless by the impossibility of long disputing the possession of Paris outside the walls, and the necessity of going to seek his last resources on the frontiers. But, even before executing this movement, he resolved, as we have just seen, to make a violent attack on Prince Schwarzenberg's flank, in order to draw the Austrian general towards him, or at least retard his march on the capital. This was the cause of Napoleon's sending his troops in the direction of Fère-Champenoise. He arrived there on the evening of the 18th, and on the way, the cavalry of the Guard, falling in with Kaisarow's Cossack's, cut them in pieces and threw them back on the Seine. They bivouaced at Fère-Champenoise and in the neighbourhood.

The next day, the 19th, Napoleon, after deliberating whether he would march on Arcis or Plancy, advanced towards this latter point, because all reports concurred in representing Prince Schwarzenberg as already arrived at Provins, and Napoleon thought that by drawing nearer to Provins he would have a better chance of finding himself in the midst of the scattered columns of the army of Bohemia.

But in reasoning thus, Napoleon was not fully aware of the last movements of the enemy. Encouraged by the results of Craonne and Laon, Prince Schwarzenberg had at first sent on a van-guard as far as Provins, without having determined to attempt anything decisive, for besides his customary prudence, he was restrained by a fit of gout. But no sooner was he informed of the battle of Reims, than he dreaded some fresh enterprise on Napoleon's part, and hastily returned to Nogent. Besides, the Emperor Alexander, uneasy at learning there were fresh troops at Châlons (Ney's troops had been seen advancing towards this city), began to fear that Napoleon, turning from Châlons on Arcis, might attack the mass of the allied armies in the rear, and hastened from Troyes to communicate his fears to Prince Schwarzenberg, whose head-quarters were between Nogent and Méry. The Austrian Generalissimo, generally less daring in his projects than the Emperor Alexander, was also less easily disturbed, and without being so persuaded as the Russian monarch of the imminence of the danger, recalled his too-scattered troops to Troyes on the 18th, with the intention of concentrating them at Bar-sur-Aube, in order that he might not remain exposed to a flank movement of his formidable adversary.

Thus on the 19th, whilst Napoleon at the head of his cavalry was advancing in full gallop on Plancy, Marshal de Wrède, who had

been left to guard the Aube and the Seine, between Arcis, Plancy, and Anglure, was retreating to Arcis, Wittgenstein's corps (now called Rajeffsky's), those of Prince de Wurtemberg and General Guilay, were falling back on Troyes, and the reserves, under Barclay de Tolly were being concentrated between Brienne and Troyes.

Napoleon, in debouching by Plancy, had gone a little too much to the right, that is to say, a little too much towards Paris, and was soon convinced of his mistake in seeing the retrograde march of the different columns of the army of Bohemia. Nevertheless, knowing by experience that by throwing himself boldly into the midst of the retreating troops there was greater probability of gaining great advantages than of encountering strong resistance, he unhesitatingly crossed the bridge of Plancy, with the cavalry of the guard, and, after passing the Aube, advanced on the Seine. He left General Sebastiani, with the Colbert and Exelmans divisions on his left, to observe the enemy in the direction of Arcis, and with Letort's cavalry of the Old Guard he proceeded directly to the bridge of Méry, on the Seine. Méry, being occupied by the enemy, Letort crossed the Seine at a ford higher up, and fell on Prince de Wurtemberg's rear-guard. He sabred some hundreds, and effected a capture of great value, that of a pontoon train, belonging to the army of Bohemia. If Napoleon had been in possession of this instrument of war a month earlier, he might possibly have freed himself from all his enemies. A pontoon train had been sent him from Paris, but so cumbrous as to be useless. He was, therefore, delighted to get possession of a well-constructed portable bridge, light and easy of transportation. After this daring reconnaissance, Napoleon left Letort in the direction of Méry, with orders to pursue the retreating columns of the enemy, recrossed the Seine in person, and slept at Plancy, on the Aube.

This day the relative position of the armies was rendered clear. Prince Schwarzenberg was retiring in great haste, through the mere fear of finding the French army on his right flank: what would his alarm be did he suppose the Emperor in his rear? The Paris route was now freed from the presence of the enemy, and Napoleon resolved to profit of this, as well as of the small amount of firmness displayed by Prince Schwarzenberg, to resume the execution of his project of advancing on the fortresses, collecting the garrisons, and, having thus doubled his forces, take a position in the rear of the enemy. It seemed a well-founded hypothesis that Prince Schwarzenberg, already retreating, would accelerate his pace, when Napoleon arrived at Vitry, at St. Dizier, at Toul, and at Nancy; and certainly Blücher would not advance when Schwarzenberg would be retreating*.

Consequently, Napoleon made the following arrangements. He ordered Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald, and General Gérard,

* I take these details from the correspondence of Napoleon, where we find retraced day by day, and hour by hour, his resolutions and his movements.

who were now freed from the presence of the enemy, to retrace their steps through Provins, Villenauxe, Anglure, and Plancy, and join him at Arcis by the right bank of the Aube. Ney, advancing to Arcis, along the same bank, would arrive there on the same day as the Young Guard, and Friant at the same time as the Old. Napoleon resolved to repair to Arcis himself, on the morning of the 20th, with the cavalry of the Guard, remounting the Aube by the left bank. After having rallied Ney, Friant, Oudinot, Macdonald, Gérard round Arcis, and gathered *en marche* some spoils of the enemy; after having received the *convois* sent from Paris under Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, he intended to advance straight from the Aube to the Marne, and go to Vitry, Saint Dizier, perhaps even to Bar-le-Duc. Marshals Mortier and Marmont, who had been left at Reims, and at Berry-aubac, could easily join him by Châlons, and Napoleon gave them orders to that effect. Every thing was ordered so that Napoleon was to advance on the fortresses with 70,000 men. Having made these arrangements, Napoleon wrote to Paris, saying what he was about to do; he recommended every one to preserve a cool self-possession, and exhibited great confidence himself. This confidence was partly affected and partly sincere, for he fully understood the skilfulness of his plans, and had little doubt of their success.

The next day—the 20th March—a day more than once memorable in the course of his life—Napoleon left Plancy to retrace his course along the left bank of the Aube, with a portion of his cavalry. Letort had left another portion round Méry, to seize baggage and prisoners. General Sebastiani with the Colbert and Exelman's divisions, had made the first move and advanced on Arcis. In his extreme confidence, Napoleon had not deigned to recross the Aube and advance under cover; he marched on Arcis by the same route he had traced for the different detachments of his cavalry.

Having arrived at Arcis about the middle of the day, (Arcis-sur-Aube) he found General Sebastiani very thoughtful, in consequence of what he had seen *en route*. Marshal Ney, who had just arrived with his infantry along the right bank of the Aube, appeared quite as anxious as General Sebastiani. Both, after having repulsed the Bavarian vanguards, thought they perceived between the Aube and the Seine—that is to say, between Arcis and Troyes—the entire army of Bohemia. If it were so, they had no time to lose in quitting Arcis, which is on the left bank of the Aube, and cross to the right, and put this river between them and the enemy. Though, by the union of all the troops ordered to repair to Arcis, the French would number 70,000—that is to say when Oudinot, Macdonald, Gérard, and Lefebvre would have arrived, and 84,000 at Vitry when Mortier and Marmont would have joined—still, at the actual moment, they did not amount to more than 20,000. There were 5,000 cavalry of the Guard; Ney brought from 9,000 to 10,000 infantry of the Young Guard, and Friant 5,000 to 6,000 of the Old. There were not sufficient to resist Prince Schwarzenberg's 90,000 soldiers, concentrated between Arcis and Troyes.

Napoleon, who had seen from Méry, Schwarzenberg's columns in retreat, could not imagine that this prince would think of halting between Troyes and Arcis, to risk a battle there. A slight reconnaissance made on the Troyes route by a young officer, confirmed his opinion, and induced him to post Ney's infantry in advance of Arcis, a little to the left, at Grand-Torcy's; he at the same time sent messengers along the other bank of the Aube, to hasten the arrival of his Old Guard and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, whose approach was announced. The latter was bringing about 6,000 men. In this attitude, Napoleon resolved to await events, which could not fail to occur within a few hours. And effectively, affairs shortly assumed an alarming aspect.

Prince Schwarzenberg, though not rash, possessed the firmness of an old soldier, and after having made his principal corps fall back from Nogent on Troyes, he could not, with 90,000 men, retreat further before 30,000 or 40,000, the number he believed Napoleon to command. Besides, he was weary of the insinuations and continual boasting of the Prussians, and he wished to prove that he was as capable as they of encountering the terrible Emperor of the French. He therefore resolved to turn to the right, advance on Arcis, and accept battle if offered, and thus, prevent the French in any case, from falling on Troyes, and making fresh captures. With this view, he ordered the Bavarians to advance from his right on Arcis; he sent the Rajeffsky, Wurtemberg, and Guilay corps straight forward on Arcis, and connected these two masses by the guards and reserve corps. About two o'clock he found himself before Arcis.

General Sebastiani, piqued by some expressions of Napoleon, who had not treated his fears seriously, dashed along the Troyes route with a few squadrons, to ascertain more clearly what he thought he had seen the first time. The ground beyond Arcis, in the direction of Troyes, being deeply undulated, is capable of concealing great numbers of troops. General Sebastiani, having crossed the first risings of the ground, perceived the Bavarian and Austrian cavalry advancing *en masse*, and returned in full gallop to communicate the intelligence to Napoleon. The Colbert and Exelmans divisions were immediately ordered to take horse to oppose the enemy. General Kaisarow, at the head of several thousand cavalry, charged the Colbert division, which scarcely amounted to 700 or 800, and flung them back on the Exelmans division, that, overborne by the shock, was obliged to yield. All together, pursuers and pursued, arrived *pêle-mêle* at Arcis. Ney was on the left at Grand-Torcy, with the infantry of the Young Guard. Between Grand-Torcy and Arcis there were at most three or four battalions, amongst which was one Polish, commanded by Skrzynecki, the same who has since, in 1830, so nobly and bravely defended the interests of expiring Poland. This battalion had only time to form in square to receive Napoleon, and protect him from the threatening masses of the enemy. The Poles, proud of the precious deposit, defended by

their bayonets, remained firm under a shower of shells and the repeated assaults of innumerable squadrons. But Napoleon did not long avail himself of the asylum he had found with the Poles. The first shock of the adverse cavalry being abated, Napoleon issued from the square, hurried towards Arcis, at the risk of being made prisoner, stopped, rallied his flying cavalry, and led them himself against the enemy. Our squadrons, into whom the presence of the Emperor infused new life, charged with the greatest vigour, and succeeded in restraining, without being able entirely to repulse, the superior numbers of the Bavarian and Austrian cavalry. During this time Ney, stationed in the Grand-Torcy, was preparing to make every effort to resist the army of Bohemia. The main object was to hold out till the Old Guard, whose columns were already visible on the other bank of the Aube, should have crossed that river and occupied Arcis. When the six thousand old soldiers composing this select troop should have arrived before Arcis, and joined Ney's ten thousand young soldiers, that were defending the Grand-Torcy, the French might be reassured. But these troops had not yet arrived.

Meanwhile, Ney sustained furious assaults at Torcy. Marshal de Wrède's corps had fallen into line, and his right, composed of Austrians, attacked Grand-Torcy, whilst he tried to throw his left, composed of Bavarians, between that village and the little city of Arcis. All the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian reserves, comprising the Guards, the Grenadiers, and the Cuirassiers, were engaged in this attack. We were opposed by more than forty thousand infantry, without reckoning hordes of cavalry.

Ney defended Grand-Torcy with his accustomed energy. His troops, stationed in the houses and behind the barricaded streets of the village, arrested, by a determined fire, the masses of Austrian infantry. Overpowered for a moment by numbers, he was driven from Grand-Torcy, but putting himself at the head of some battalions, and making a desperate charge with fixed bayonets, he re-entered the village and succeeded in keeping his position. Meanwhile, Napoleon, traversing incessantly the space between Arcis and Torcy, to encourage the troops by his presence, was, for a moment, in imminent danger of terminating his wondrous career. A bomb fell in front of a battalion of young soldiers, little accustomed to such a spectacle, and the men nearest to the flaming projectile drew back a step. Napoleon drove his horse straight to the bomb, to teach them contempt of danger. At this instant the bomb bursts, and he is wrapped in flames and smoke; the next moment, he issues from the fiery cloud in perfect safety—but his horse is wounded, and he throws himself on another, amid the enthusiastic cries of his young soldiers.

Thanks to these acts of heroic rashness, we kept our position. At length the Old Guard crosses the bridge of Arcis, under the conduct of the intrepid Friant. Napoleon in person drew them up before the town. The assistance was timely, for at this moment,

the Russian Guard, having fallen into line, came to the aid of Marshal de Wrède. A last attack, still more violent than the preceding, is attempted against Grand-Torcy. Ney displayed impenetrable firmness, and repulsed the assailants.

At the same time that this reinforcement of veteran infantry arrived so *a propos*, Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, who had left Paris to join the army, debouched by the bridge of Arcis, at the head of two thousand horse, with which he had preceded his infantry. General Sebastiani, now at the head of four thousand cavalry, deploys in the plain of Arcis, which ascends slightly towards the enemy's position. He is preparing to take revenge. His squadrons, charging fiercely, overthrow those of Kaisarow, drive them back on those of Frimont, and avenge the skirmish of the morning. But soon the Bavarian cavalry appears, together with the heavy Russian horse, and prudence counsels a retreat on Arcis. The day is now drawing to a close; Ney still keeps his position at Grand-Torcy, the Old Guard at Arcis, the cavalry placed between. The French have escaped the disaster which, had they displayed less energy, would certainly have befallen them. In fact, we had at first fought with 14,000 men against 40,000, then with 20,000 against 60,000, and lastly with 22,000 or 23,000 against 90,000, for on our right the corps of Giulay, Wurtemberg, and Rajeffski, had debouched from Nozay, and began to take part in the combat, when night separated the two armies.

At a distance on our right, an episode occurred which might have had disagreeable consequences, but for the rare valour of the cavalry of the Guard. We have said that the horse chasseurs and grenadiers had been left beyond the bridge of Méry, on the left of the Seine, with the booty captured on the previous evening, comprising the pontoon train. These troops having left Méry in the morning with this pontoon train, tried to join the main army by marching directly from Méry to Arcis, through Premier-Fait. They naturally fell into the midst of the cavalry corps of Rajeffsky, Giulay, and Wurtemberg, combined under the command of the Prince of Wurtemberg. Attacked by a force five or six times greater than theirs, they only escaped by displaying extraordinary valour, and fighting during several hours, sword in hand. Being at length joined by squadrons from the dépôt at Versailles that had advanced by Méry, they fell back on Méry itself, with a loss of not more than a hundred horsemen, and, above all, without having sacrificed their pontoon train. The next day they reached Plancy, crossed the Aube, and joined the main body by the right bank of this river, with the corps of Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard, that were *en marche* from Provins to Arcis.

Such was the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, the last that Napoleon fought in person during this campaign, and in which the soldiers as well as himself performed prodigies of valour. Napoleon believed himself victorious, and he believed it sincerely, for it was a miracle that 20,000 men had resisted forces that had successively increased from

40,000 to 90,000. He was proud of himself and his soldiers, and saw in this possibility of fighting forces so unequal, a guarantee of success to the end of the war. His confidence was now become so great that he was willing to encounter on the morrow all Prince Schwarzenberg's army. However, during the day, he could only be joined by Oudinot's corps, and adding to these what Lefebvre-Desnoëttes had brought, his forces would at most have numbered only 32,000 men. It would not therefore be prudent to brave the shock of 90,000 soldiers, especially with a river in his rear. He ultimately yielded to the dictates of reason and the advice of his marshals, who insisted that he should put the Aube between him and the enemy. After having kept his troops deployed before Arcis, whilst a second bridge was being constructed, he made them suddenly fall back through the streets of this little city, crossed the two bridges, and left Prince Schwarzenberg very much surprised and disappointed at seeing a prey escape that had almost seemed certain. The bridges of the Aube were broken down, and Marshal Oudinot took possession of the right bank with his corps, supported by a large body of artillery. The enemy, not wishing to allow the French army to escape undisturbed, determined to attempt the passage of the river, and remained during this attempt exposed to a destructive fire. Schwarzenberg lost unprofitably on this day—the 21st—more than a thousand men, for wherever he tried to cross the Aube, Oudinot's well-posted troops received him with a sustained fire of musketry and grape. It is not too much to say that these two days cost the army of Bohemia from 8,000 to 9,000 men, whilst our loss did not amount to more than 3,000, thanks to the smallness of our numbers and to the advantage of fighting under cover in a defended position.

Amidst these continual vicissitudes of war, Napoleon, finding his army ever heroic and devoted, though often discontented, still confiding in his genius, and with increased faith in the excellence of his tactics, he was far from despairing of his cause, though he did not deceive himself as to his political position. Though he would not acknowledge, even to himself, to how great a degree he had alienated the affections of the people, by his continual wars and his arbitrary government, still he was not blinded to the moral condition of France. Even on the field of Arcis, and amid the roar of battle, conversing with General Sebastiani, a Corsican like himself, and endowed with great political talents;—"Well General," asked the Emperor, "what is your opinion of what you see?" "I say," replied the General, "that your Majesty has, of course, other resources, of which we know nothing." "What you have before your eyes," answered Napoleon, "and nothing more." "But in that case, why does not your Majesty call upon the people to rise?" "Chimeras," replied Napoleon, "borrowed from recollections of Spain and the French Revolution! Call upon the people to rise in a country where the Revolution has destroyed the nobles and the priests, and where I have destroyed the Revolution!"

The General remained astounded, admiring this coolness and profundity of thought; and asking himself how genius so vast had not prevented the commission of errors so flagrant.

But the moment was now come to form a definite resolution. Between Arcis and Châlons, the Aube and the Marne are only separated by a distance of eleven or twelve leagues. Marmont and Mortier, who had been sent to keep Blücher in check, might delay, but could not arrest his progress. The armies of Bohemia and Silesia must soon be united, and then the French troops would be stifled in their grasp. Napoleon, not being able with the forces under his command, to beat either of the allied generals separately, unless fortune afforded him favours, which of late she had seldom granted, still less could he defeat them, if combined. To carry out his idea of marching on the garrisons, and so procuring a reinforcement of fifty thousand men and draw the enemy further from Paris, was now his only remaining resource, a resource that, hazardous for him, would have been fatal to another.

He determined to set out on the 21st March for Vitry-on-the-Marne. Taking the route of Summepins, he could traverse the distance between Arcis and Vitry in two days. From Vitry he could easily reach Bar-le-Duc, and without advancing a step further, he could be joined by the garrisons of Metz, Mayence, Luxembourg, Thionville, Verdun, and Strasbourg, to the number of more than 30,000 men. If Napoleon went as far as Metz—a journey he might accomplish in three days, he could, in manœuvring round that place, raise Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, and receive from the Low Countries 15,000 additional men. He would, in this case, find himself at Metz, at the head of 120,000 soldiers, in the midst of provinces in arms against the enemy; and if Marshal Suchet, who had replaced Augereau—collecting all the troops he could on his way—returned to Besançon with 40,000 men, the aspect of things would certainly undergo a change.

Napoleon sent to Paris an account of the plan he had adopted, and ordered that all the artillery, battalions of the Young Guard, and battalions drawn from the dépôts, that were not absolutely indispensable to the defence of the capital, should be sent to him. He begged the Parisians not to be disturbed, should the enemy again approach the city, as he said their appearance there could only be for two or three days, for the Allies would pursue him when they learned that he was about to cut off their lines of communication. Having renewed his orders to Marmont and Mortier, to join him at the Marne by Châlons, he set out for Vitry. He had formerly never quitted the Seine, without stationing considerable forces from Nogent to Montereau. It was not so this time, for he was obliged to execute *en masse* his projected diversion on the rear of the enemy; and it was by this movement alone he hoped to save Paris. 20,000 men, stationed between Nogent and Paris, would not have stopped Prince Schwarzenberg's progress, and their absence might frustrate the success of Napoleon's operations. Still,

believing it important to guard the bridges of the Seine, and thinking it possible to check the enemy at these points for some hours,—a delay which, under certain circumstances, was not to be despised—he left General Souham with a melange of National Guards and hastily-organized battalions, to defend Nogent, Bray and Montereau. General Alix, who, with forces of the same character, had so well defended Sens, where he still was, was placed under the orders of General Souham.

The journey from Arcis to Summepins was effected without difficulty. The French scarcely came in contact with some bands of Cossacks, that were hovering between the Aube and the Marne, and pillaging the country, desolated as it was. The corps of Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard, that had marched from Provins to Arcis, along the Aube, defended that river at the bridge of Arcis, and defiled unmolested in sight of the enemy.

Napoleon, on the night of the 21st, slept at Sommepins, with a part of the army; next day—the 22nd—he marched towards Vitry with a vanguard. Vitry had been put in a state of defence by the army of Silesia, and was then occupied by 5,000 or 6,000 Prussians and Russians protected by earthworks. Napoleon, not wishing to risk a terrible loss of life for a post that was of no great importance, sent to seek a ford between Vitry and Saint-Dizier. One was discovered at Frignicourt, where he crossed with his cavalry, and Ney's division of the Young Guard. He left a detachment to guard this ford, and passed the night at the Château du Plessis, near Orconte. He despatched the light infantry of General Piré to Saint Dizier, where they forced an entrance, and captured two Prussian battalions.

The next day—the 23rd—Napoleon thought it advisable to remain at Saint Dizier, and await there his remaining forces, for Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard were *en arriere*, and Marmont and Mortier had orders to join him by Châlons. It was also necessary to wait General Pacthod's division of the National Guards, that had behaved admirably with Oudinot and Macdonald, and had been left at Sézanne to escort a last convoy of troops and materials of war. Still, having some doubts as to the possibility of receiving this last transport, Napoleon ordered the War Minister to watch over its safety, and even bring it back to Paris, if he feared it might not reach Vitry through the opposing mass of enemies.

Without losing a moment, Napoleon directed his light cavalry on Bar-le-Duc, with directions to seize the bridge of Saint Mihiel, on the Meuse, and that of Pont-a-Mousson, on the Moselle; he sent fresh orders to all the garrisons to join him; he was preparing to spare them half the distance, by making one or two days' march to meet them—he would thus see his troops increase every hour. Independent of the Marshals Mortier and Marmont, independent of the Sézanne convoy, of which he had only received a part, and even deducting the losses at Arcis, and the troops left to guard the bridges of the Seine, he had about 55,000 men. He would have 70,000 when the two marshals joined, 80,000 when the Sézanne

dépôt arrived, and his troops would gradually amount to 100,000 and more, if the different garrisons succeeded in joining him. Though he fully appreciated the difficulty of his position, he was still confident in the success of his tactics, and on the 23rd March, in a letter to the War Minister, which breathed an imperturbable coolness, he gave an account of his march, of his motives for not attacking Vitry, and his project of approaching Metz, to draw from that and other garrisons a considerable reinforcement: the certainty of alarming the enemy by cutting off their lines of communication; the dejection of the greater part of the Allies, who had never obtained any serious advantage over the French troops, and who had recently experienced enormous losses at Arcis-sur-Aube, and almost regretted having advanced so far; his consequent hope of shortly bringing about new and important events; the utility of watching over the Sézanne transport, and even increasing it, if circumstances permitted; the possibility of recurring to the conscription of 1815, for in Champagne and Lorraine the peasantry was rising *en masse*, and the urgency of making prompt use of this resource; the importance of inducing Marmont and Mortier, who had fallen back on Château-Thierry, to advance and join the main body of the army; and, lastly, his confidence, spite of all the difficulties of his position, of soon saving France and himself in this terrible crisis. Nobody would have suspected in reading this letter, the last addressed to the War Minister, that Napoleon was on the verge of an awful catastrophe.

At this very time, M. de Caulaincourt arrived at the Emperor's head-quarters; he had just quitted the congress at Châtillon. This devoted servant of his king and his country, had, as we have seen, presented a counter-project, in order to satisfy the reiterated demands of the allied plenipotentiaries, and had endeavoured to render the reading of the document supportable to his auditors, deviating, at the same time, as little as possible from Napoleon's instructions. The plenipotentiaries of the allied powers, after listening in glacial silence to the French counter-project, and after receiving orders from their sovereigns, had read on the 18th March, a formal note, in which they declared that France having again proposed all the conditions, already declared unacceptable by Europe, the conferences were finally broken off, and that war would be prosecuted *à outrance*, until France would admit, purely and simply, the preliminaries of the 17th February. To this declaration M. de Metternich added a private letter, for M. de Caulaincourt, in which he begged him once more to think seriously before quitting the place appointed for holding the Congress—"For," he said, "the France of Louis XIV., augmented by the conquests of Louis XV., was of some value, and ought not to be longer staked at the dangerous game of battles." However great might be the temptation of the French plenipotentiary to follow this advice, he dared not outstep his instructions to the degree that would have retained the members of the congress at Châtillon. He left the plenipoten-

tiaries the next day—the 19th—and on the 20th, the different legations set out for the head-quarters of the belligerent armies.

M. de Caulaincourt found some difficulty in rejoining Napoleon, whom he found at Saint-Dizier. The return of the French plenipotentiary produced a painful impression on the French soldiers, for it annihilated every hope founded on negotiations, and left them no prospect but war unto death with the Allies. If the battles of Montmirail, of Champaubert, and Montereau, had raised the hopes of the soldiers to a level with those of Napoleon, the battles of Craonne, of Laon, of Arcis-sur-Aube, had quickly brought them down from this elevation, and the daring system of tactics that the Emperor was now attempting at a distance from Paris, a system of tactics which few were capable of appreciating, astonished and troubled minds already deeply disturbed. The noble and stern countenance of M. de Caulaincourt, more sad than usual, was little calculated to smooth the thoughtful brows he met at head-quarters. Napoleon received his minister in a friendly manner, like a man who felt no ill humour, because he experienced no emotion. The return of his legate, however, produced a certain impression on his mind, but it was only transient, and he soon overcame it. He was at table, supping with Berthier, when M. de Caulaincourt arrived. "You do well to return," he said, "for I will not deny that, had you accepted the ultimatum of the Allies, I would have disowned you. Better for you and me to avoid such a rupture. At bottom these people are not sincere. Had you yielded, they would have soon asked more. They spread a report that their enmity is against me, and not against France. All lies! Their enmity is against me because they know I alone can save France (which was then true, for he who had brought her to the brink of ruin could alone save her); but at bottom, it is against France and her glory their enmity is directed. England covets Belgium for the house of Orange; Prussia covets the Meuse for herself; Austria wishes to deprive us of Alsace and Lorraine, to barter them with Bavaria and the German princes. They want to destroy us, or at least to diminish our power, so as to reduce us to nothing. Well, my dear Caulaincourt, it is better to die than be minced up in that way. I am too old a soldier to fear death. They shall not say, now, that it is to satisfy my own ambition I fight, for it would be easy for me to save the throne; but I do not wish for a throne, purchased by the humiliation of France. Look at these brave peasants, how they already rise and kill the Cossacks on every side! They give us an example. Let us follow it. Would you believe that these contemptible members of the Council of Regency were willing to accept the infamous treaty proposed to you? Ah, I have ordered them to be silent, and to be quiet. These poor peasants are far better than the Parisians. My dear Caulaincourt, you shall soon see glorious deeds. I am about to march to the fortresses, and within a few days collect thirty or forty thousand men. The enemy evidently pursues me. In

no other way can we explain the appearance of the masses of cavalry that hover round us. My sudden appearance on Schwarzenberg's rear has made him fall back; and when he learns that I threaten his line of communication, he will not dare to advance on Paris. I shall soon have one hundred thousand men under my command; I shall pounce upon the nearest enemy, no matter whether Blucher or Schwarzenberg; I shall crush him, and the Burgundian peasantry will do the rest. The coalition, my dear Caulaincourt, is as near destruction as I am; and if I conquer, we shall tear these abominable treaties. If I miscalculate, then we shall die. We shall only do what our old companions in arms are doing every day, but we shall die after having saved our honour."

M. de Caulaincourt, who was as capable as anybody of comprehending this heroic language, remembered too many deliberate faults, too many ill-timed refusals, that honour had not counselled; his manner expressed discontent and cool disapprobation. Berthier, in whose presence this discourse occurred, was astounded. He, like Napoleon, was impressed by the encompassing presence of the enemy, and, like the Emperor, doubted that these troops could be merely a detachment; but, on the other hand, he asked himself how 200,000 allied troops, in whose favour victory had almost declared, could turn away from Paris, that great prey, that was almost within their grasp, to pursue a handful of men that had ventured to appear in their rear. He doubted, and under the circumstances doubt was agony; for, if the enemy were not in pursuit, they might within a few days reach Paris. This was the prevailing opinion. Restrained in presence of Napoleon, these opinions found vent elsewhere in unmeasured language. As to Napoleon himself, though his doubts were not allayed, he still repeated to M. de Caulaincourt, "You did well to return; I would have disowned you. You are come in time to witness great things."

All this energy, admirable, considered as a gift of God, but deplorable when we reflect that, ill-employed, it had conducted us to the brink of an abyss, this energy was not infectious, and the entire army expected every moment a terrible *denouement*. This *denouement* was indeed approaching; the fatal hour had at length arrived. Napoleon's military combinations were certainly profound; but if the efforts of genius could readjust his military affairs, no power of genius could retrieve his political position. Paris, filled with terror and disgusted with his *régime*, a *régime* glorious but sanguinary, methodical but despotic; Paris, at the first appearance of enemies who declared themselves liberators, might be lost to Napoleon, and become the theatre of a revolution! Should the Allies only suspect this sad truth, it would suffice to make them neglect all prudential considerations, and think of making this the scene, not of a military, but a political operation; and then Napoleon's plans would be frustrated, and his throne, which his powerful hand had two or three times within the last month sustained under terrible shocks, would

crumble into dust. We shall now see how near the Allies were to guess the terrible truth, that constituted all our weakness with regard to our invaders.

Prince Schwarzenberg had not very clearly understood the movement of the French army on Arcis; and it must be confessed that, to any one not in the secret, it would have presented some difficulty. His first and most natural supposition was, that Napoleon was going to give him battle, and the Austrian General determined to accept it at Arcis-sur-Aube, as Blucher had at Craonne and Laon. Expecting a sanguinary struggle of some days continuance, he was far from thinking it finished on the evening of the 21st. Seeing Napoleon withdraw on the 22nd, he endeavoured to guess what could be his design, crossed the Aube in his rear, and took up a position between Ramerupt and Dampierre, behind a wide brook called le Puits; his left was the Aube, his front covered by le Puits, his right in the direction of Vitry. In this position he awaited fresh attacks on the part of his adversary, whom he feared was contemplating some extraordinary movement.

But Napoleon, as we have just seen, had no idea of attacking his foe, and was indeed meditating an extraordinary movement in advancing from the Aube to the Marne, in the direction of Metz. The next day,—the 23rd—whilst Napoleon awaited at Saint-Dizier, the rear of his army that were to join him by the Frignicourt ford, Prince Schwarzenberg's light cavalry, who followed on his track, perceived the movement of the French army, and saw clearly that they were taking the direction of Vitry. Of Napoleon's intentions there could now be no doubt, for it was evident he purposed to cut off the Allies' lines of communication. What was to be done in this state of things? Would it be better to pursue Napoleon in the direction of Lorraine; or, join Blucher, who could not be very distant, and, with their combined troops, march on Paris, at the head of 200,000 men! The question was important, one of the most important that the heads of empires and commanders of armies were ever called on to resolve.

According to the strict rule of military tactics, the lines of communication ought not to be abandoned; on the contrary, they ought to be guarded with a care proportionate to the daring and formidable character of the enemy. The lines of communication being threatened by Napoleon, Schwarzenberg ought to pursue him, conjointly with Blucher, and determine the military question before advancing to Paris to receive the prize of victory. There were, undoubtedly, some advantages to be gained by marching directly on Paris, especially that of abridging the struggle; still, should the allies be arrested before the gates of the capital, by a resistance, not alone military, but popular, and should the Allies be detained some days outside Paris, fighting at the outskirts of the barricaded suburbs, they might be attacked in the rear by Napoleon, returning with an army of 100,000 men, and find themselves in a most perilous position.

These reasons were of great weight, and would have been decisive, had the situation been an ordinary one, and had the Allies been likely to encounter before the walls of Paris, a resistance, such as the importance of the place, and the patriotism and courage of the inhabitants might lead them to fear. But though they had received only one communication from Paris, that of which M. de Vitrolles was bearer, and though hitherto no manifestation had corroborated the truth of this communication, but that, on the contrary, the peasants were arming in the invaded provinces, they had discovered, by more than one symptom, that if M. de Vitrolles exaggerated in describing France as longing ardently for the Bourbons, he was perfectly right when he maintained that she was tired of war, of conscription, of imperial prefects, and that as soon as an opportunity of declaring her real sentiments offered, she would raise her voice against a government that, after having carried war to the very walls of the Kremlin, had now rolled back the destructive tide to the gates of Paris. There was a personage whose opinions commanded much more attention than those of M. de Vitrolles; this was Count Pozzo di Borgo, who had returned from London, and had acquired amongst the Allies an influence proportionate to his talents, and who never wearied of repeating to them that they ought to march on Paris. "The great object of the war," he said, "is the possession of Paris. As long as you think of fighting battles you run the chance of being beaten, because Napoleon will always fight better than you, and his army, even though discontented, but sustained by a sentiment of honour, will fight beside him to the last man. All-ruined as is his military power, it is still great, very great, and, aided by his genius, greater than yours. But his political power is at an end. The times have changed. A military despotism, hailed as a blessing, at the close of the Revolution, has been tested by its results, and is now universally condemned. If you give scope for a manifestation it will be prompt, general, irresistible, and Napoleon being at a distance, the Bourbons, whom France has forgotten, and in whose talents she has no confidence, will become suddenly popular, and from popular, necessary. It is by a political, not a military movement, that you ought to try and finish the war, and to achieve that as soon as an opening of any kind occurs between the belligerent armies, through which you can pass, hasten to take advantage of it; if you can lay a finger on Paris, even a single finger, the colossus is overthrown. You will have broken the sword you cannot wrest from him."

Such was the substance of the speeches unceasingly addressed by Count Pozzo to the Emperor Alexander, and he certainly had to do with a very impressionable person. Besides the very remarkable intelligence of Alexander, Count Pozzo had enlisted in his favour all the passions of this prince. To be revenged, not for the burning of Moscow, of which he had ceased to think, but for the personal humiliations that Napoleon had inflicted on him; to enter Paris, enter the capital of the civilized world, and there dethrone a despot and stretch forth a succouring hand to the French people; to re-

ceive for these deeds, universal applause ; this was the intoxicating dream in which he indulged. This dream so occupied his mind, that to realise it he was capable of acts of daring, alike foreign to his head and heart.

As to the rest, Count Pozzo di Borgo's opinions had gradually taken possession of the public mind. Owing their origin to the Prussians, amongst whom they had been engendered by hate, they afterwards found acceptance amongst the Russians, and finally amongst the Austrians. The latter very clearly understood that to strike Napoleon politically, was the surest and promptest manner of destroying him. The Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, though regretting in him, not a son-in-law, but a ruler more capable than any other of governing France, had felt, since the dissolution of the congress at Châtillon, that Austria should take a decisive part against Napoleon personally. They had long shrunk from the necessity of pushing things to an extremity, but having crossed the Rhine, and admitted the principle of the limits of 1790, which rendered the ancient Low-Countries monarchless, and for which Austria was to have Italy in exchange; knowing Napoleon too well to believe that he would ever submit to such a reduction of his territories, they had, through ambition, reached the same conclusion, to which the Prussians had been led by hatred and the Russians by vanity. To seek at Paris, the political solution of the question, which involved at the same time the military solution, seemed to them now a necessity. Prince Schwarzenberg, timid but steady, had adopted the same opinions as M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis, for, at this moment, Austria presented the extraordinary phenomenon of an Emperor, a Prime Minister, and a Generalissimo, identical in their sentiments, constituting, as it were, but one man, insensible alike to love and hate, and influenced solely by deep-laid calculations. Under these circumstances, Prince Schwarzenberg, seeing the road to Paris open, was inclined, for the first time, to advance, so that the resolution of marching on the capital was almost unanimously adopted, though several experienced officers opposed this rash proceeding, as contrary to the rules of war, which teach that the lines of communication should never be abandoned, nor victory risked by a too great eagerness to attain it. An event calculated to strengthen the opinion of the more daring, occurred during the day. Wintzingerode's cavalry, forming Blucher's vanguard, had fallen in near the Marne, with the cavalry of Count Pahlen, belonging to Prince Schwarzenberg. There were mutual congratulations and rejoicings at this junction, which, to say the truth, ought to have taken place sooner, for the battle of Laon, having been fought on the 9th and 10th March, it was strange that Blucher had not pursued Napoleon or the Marshals who had replaced him on the Aisne, and that on the 23rd, he was still groping between the Aisne and the Marne. But Blucher had acted like generals who possess more obstinacy of temper than firmness of mind. He had first tried to take Reims, then Soissons—had long

waited the arrival of some thousands of Bulow's corps, that had remained *en arriere*, and had finally decided to drive the Marshals, Mortier and Marmont, before him, and had reached the Marne by Châlons. However this may be, he brought with him one hundred thousand men, and the Allies had now two hundred thousand ready to march on Paris. The presence of such a force easily removed objections, founded on the rules of war, however skilfully propounded.

Whilst things were in this state, Prince Schwarzenberg was passing the night with the Emperor Alexander at the Château de Dampierre, when suddenly despatches were brought, that had been taken from a Paris courier, arrested by the allied light infantry. Prince Wolkonski, the head of Alexander's staff, was at the château, as well as Count Nesselrode, the head of his *chancellerie*. The latter was called, who having long resided at Paris, might be better able to seize the meaning of the intercepted despatches, which were submitted to his perusal. These were extremely important. They consisted of letters from the Empress and the Duke de Rovigo to the Emperor. Both expressed intense alarm about the internal state of Paris. Those of the Empress, breathing a sort of terror, were not, of course, of great significance, for they might be only an expression of feminine weakness. But the letters of the Duke de Rovigo would be estimated differently; for, minister of police and a soldier, long accustomed to difficulties, he could not be suspected of timidity; and he declared that Paris contained within its walls influential accomplices of the foreigners, and that at the appearance of an allied army, it was probable they would follow the example of the Bordelais. This revelation was, at such a moment, of immense importance; it threw new light on the political position of affairs, and put an end to any remaining doubts as to the course to be pursued. After this involuntary avowal on the part of the Emperor's government, of his wife, and his minister of police, there could no longer be a doubt that the imperial throne was tottering to its fall, and that to march on Paris was the most certain means of hastening its destruction. The Emperor Alexander and Prince Schwarzenberg were hastily awoke, and the intercepted despatches laid before them; these papers carried instant conviction to the minds of both. To march directly on Paris seemed the most suitable determination, one that ought to be put into execution at day-break. The three sovereigns were not on the spot. Alexander, the most active of the three, wishing to be everywhere, and particularly with the generals, was, at the actual time, with Prince Schwarzenberg. The most modest, the wisest, he who made least commotion, and who, not being a soldier, did not wish to embarrass the military chiefs by his presence, the Emperor Francis, had taken up his abode at Bar-sur-Aube, a considerable distance from head-quarters. The King of Prussia, who was a kind of medium between the two emperors, being more reserved than the one, more active than the other, was staying in the neighbourhood. It was agreed that he should be immediately sought,

and that in the morning the army should march towards the Marne, where Blucher was; that all the allied forces being combined, a consultation should be held, whose result the presence of the Prussians rendered certain; and that the army should take the route to Paris. Prince Schwarzenberg undertook to acquaint his master with the plan that had been adopted; and to beg of him, by letter, not to think of joining the invading army, lest he might, in the inter-crossings of the belligerent armies, fall into the hands of his son-in-law, which would be a serious complication in the actual state of things. There was a line of communication through Burgundy that might be called Austrian, as reinforcements had been sent to Count de Bubna from Troyes to Dijon. Prince Schwarzenberg advised the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich to go to Dijon; for, independent of the inconvenience of being made prisoner, it would not be suitable that the Emperor Francis should be present at the dethronement of his son-in-law, and especially of his daughter. These arrangements being made, they left Dampierre for Somme-pins on the morning of the 24th.

The journey was not long, the distance being scarcely three leagues. The Emperor Alexander, Prince Schwarzenberg, Wolkonski, the head of the staff, and Count Nesselrode, left the château of Dampierre together, and met at Somme-pins the King of Prussia, Blucher, and his staff. It is asserted that the fatal resolution that was to lead the armies of Europe within the walls of Paris, was taken on a little mound in the neighbourhood of Somme-pins, and that there the consultation was held, whose result was already certain, since to all the sentiments that had obtained in the château of Dampierre, the Prussian passions were now added. The council was almost unanimous. Replies swarmed in answer to the objections founded on military principles, which were the offspring of a servile subservience to the rules of war. Napoleon was about to cut off the Allies' lines of communication; but they were also about to cut off his. The mischief he would do in seizing their magazines, their hospitals, their rear-guards, their convoys of *matériel*, would be doubly, trebly repaid by capturing what they should find on the Nancy route, between Paris and the French army. He would take much; they would take more. And afterwards, whither would both parties go? Napoleon would go to Metz and Strasbourg, where his presence would decide nothing; the Allies would go to Paris, where they were certain of effecting a revolution, and snatching from Napoleon the power that rendered him so formidable. To pursue him would be to carry out his own views—for that was evidently what he desired, in executing this extraordinary and unexpected movement towards Lorraine. But it would be turning from the main object, and exposing themselves to a series of military chances; for Napoleon would be reinforced by the junction of his garrisons, and the Allies would recommence with exhausted armies against recently-recruited forces, the formidable game of battles at which, undoubtedly, Napoleon was the

stronger ; the war would be lengthened out, interminable complications would arise, and very probably, the Allies would end by falling into some snare that Napoleon would have the art to spread, and which they would not have the skill to avoid, and in which they would be finally ruined. To go to Paris and strike Napoleon a vital blow, was the shortest and surest way, though it appeared the most dangerous ; and, in any case, supposing they could not enter the capital of France, there was a line of retreat secured—that from Paris to Lille, the Belgic route—where the Allies would meet Bernadotte with 100,000 Dutch, English, Hanoverians, and Swedes.

There was no weighty argument to oppose to this mode of reasoning. Everybody yielded, and this frustrated Napoleon's calculations, by regarding only political considerations, whilst he, despising politics, to whose suggestions he seldom lent an ear, founded all his proceedings on military considerations. As usual, having reasoned on military premises, he was politically wrong, and thus continually deceiving himself, his destruction became inevitable.

It was immediately resolved that all the Allied *corps d'armée* should pause on the spot where they were, and, on the following morning, march for Paris. But some troops should be left in Napoleon's rear, either to harass or watch him, and obtain intelligence of his movements, in case, that changing his resolve, he should return on Paris. General Wintzingerode was ordered to keep close in his rear, with ten thousand horse, some thousand light infantry, and a large number of artillery. These troops would be sufficient to cause him, now and then, some annoyance, but would be especially useful in gaining intelligence of his resolves as soon as they were formed. The Allies, in advancing on Paris, were desirous of having an emissary who would precede them, and enter into relations with MM. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg, whom they regarded as the principal instruments of the revolution they contemplated. There was an emissary ready to their wishes—M. de Vitrolles—sent by the malcontent chiefs, and sending him back would only be replying to the overture they had made. But M. de Vitrolles was no longer to be had. Faithful, it must be confessed, to the promises made at Châtillon, the allied sovereigns had not wished to give M. de Vitrolles a hearing before the dissolution of the congress. Considering themselves free after that event, they had consented to receive and hear him, and expressed a wish to send him to Paris. But he, anxious to see the Bourbons, whom he loved, and who were about to become masters of France, preferred going to Lorraine, where, it was believed, the Count d'Artois had already arrived, than to return to Paris and run the risk of falling into the hands of the Duke de Rovigo. He persevered in requesting permission to seek the Count d'Artois. There were, certainly, many important arrangements to be made with this Prince, for it was imperative that the very day on which the Allies entered this formidable Paris—formidable whether they appeared as conquerors or as liberators—it was imperative, we say, that a Government

should be ready organized, under whose rule the French might immediately place themselves, and though the Allies felt no decided preference for the Bourbons, yet the return of these princes resulted so spontaneously from the nature of things, that it would be necessary to act in concert with them. The allied sovereigns therefore consented to the departure of M. de Vitrolles for Lorraine, and it was arranged that after having seen the Count d'Artois, he should return to head-quarters, outside the walls of Paris. He was commissioned to tell the Count d'Artois that in returning to France, he should lay aside many prejudices, forget many persons and circumstances, and be directed by the advice of MM. de Dalberg, de Talleyrand, and such persons.

M. de Vitrolles, having left before the events at Arcis-sur-Aube occurred, the Allies, on marching on Paris, had no means prepared of communicating with those inside the walls, but the gates of this capital, once opened by the instrumentality of cannon, it was presumed that political relations might be easily established. The next day, the 25th March, a day of mournful memory, the allied forces, henceforth combined, set out, Blucher's army on the right, Schwarzenberg's on the left, both advancing on Fère-Champenoise, the Paris route between the Marne and the Seine.

Advancing in this direction, the Allies could not fail to meet several corps, unfortunately scattered, who, in obedience to orders and their own inclinations, were *en route* to join Napoleon. Amongst these corps, the principal were those of Mortier and Marmont, that had been left as an army of observation in advance of Blucher, and the great convoy of reinforcement and *matériel* sent to Sézanne, to be put under general Pacthod's escort. We shall now relate what had befallen each up to the 25th March.

Napoleon, in quitting Reims, had left Mortier there to support Marmont, who was defending the bridge of the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, whilst General Charpentier, with some *débris*, defended at Soissons, the second bridge of the Aisne. When Blucher, having lost six or seven days in vain deliberations at Laon, determined to march to the Aisne, he found the bridge of Berry-au-Bac too well guarded to be carried by a direct attack. He sent a strong detachment, some leagues higher up, to Neuchâtel, where the passage was easy, whilst he made a feint of passing lower down, at Pontavert. As soon as the detachment that had crossed the Aisne at Neuchâtel reached the high grounds at Berry-au-Bac, Blucher advanced on the 18th to attack the bridge. But Marshal Marmont had mined it, and it was blown up with a terrible explosion before the eyes of the Prussians. Marmont then retired through Roucy on Fismes. This was an error and the source of great misfortunes.

The most natural movement for Marshal Marmont would have been to fall back on his reserve, that is to say, on Marshal Mortier, who was at Reims. It is true that Napoleon had given instructions both to cover Paris and to keep up a communication with him. But if Fismes was on the route to Paris, so was Reims, and by

repairing there, Marmont had the advantage of concentrating his forces and coming in direct communication with Napoleon. It would therefore have been better to go to Reims than to Fismes, for in marching towards Fismes there was an almost evident risk of being cut off from Napoleon, which was contrary to half his orders, and might induce, as we shall see, fatal consequences.

Marshal Marmont, probably influenced by the sight of the enemy's corps that had passed the Aisne at Neuchâtel, and who were advancing against his right, instinctively drew off to the left, and it was in consequence of this merely mechanical movement that he fell back on Fismes. Having arrived at this place, he felt himself isolated, and summoned Marshal Mortier to his aid. The latter, modest and wholly free from jealousy, knowing that Marmont had more talent than himself, and forgetting that he had not as much good sense, thought it his duty to defer to his colleague's opinion, and left Reims on the 19th; he joined Marmont at Fismes, which proves that the two marshals might in the first instance have repaired to Reims, without being on that account cut off from the Paris route. Their combined forces amounted to about fifteen thousand men.

They remained in position, on a hillock called Saint Martin, until the evening of the next day, the 20th; this proves that the enemy was not very troublesome, and it also proves how easy it would have been, during these first days, to manœuvre as they pleased between Paris and Napoleon. On the evening of the 20th, despatches arrived from Napoleon, written at Plancy, at the moment when he was leaving for Arcis. These despatches condemned the movement on Fismes, as separating the marshals from him, and ordered them to rejoin him by the route supposed to be the shortest and safest. To return to Reims was no longer possible, for the enemy had taken advantage of our retreat to occupy the place. From Fismes to Epernay, which would have been the most direct route to join Napoleon, there were no roads practicable for artillery. It would therefore have been necessary to come down to Château-Thierry, and cross the Marne there, then reascend between the Marne and the Seine, by the Montmirail route, thus losing two days, and exposing themselves to vexatious encounters. As there was no choice, the marshals set out on the evening of the 20th, and arrived on the 21st at Château-Thierry; they recrossed the Marne there, and the next day, the 22nd, advanced on Champaubert by two different routes, in order not to embarrass each other by following the same road. They arrived at their destination in the evening. On the 23rd, they went to Bergères, whence they began to get a glimpse of the enemy, and were obliged to proceed very cautiously. They learned that Napoleon had had a bloody affair at Arcis, that he had recrossed the Aube, and returned to the Marne in the neighbourhood of Vitry. To proceed in this direction, and endeavour to reach the Emperor, was the duty of the marshals, however great the risk. They consequently resolved to advance as far as Soude-Sainte-Croix, half a day's march from Vitry; if they found an opening through

the columns of the allied army, they intended to dash through blindly, in order to join Napoleon. If they did not succeed, and if the adverse army remained interposed in a compact mass between them and Napoleon, their intention was to follow their movements cautiously, and fall back and cover Paris, should the Allies advance on the capital. In fact, this was the only plan of conduct left them to follow, after committing the error of retiring to Fismes instead of Reims.

The next day, the 24th March, the two marshals repaired to Soudé-Sainte-Croix, but Marshal Mortier, wishing to know what was going on at Châlons, conceived the idea of crossing by Vatry, which would necessarily prolong his route. Marmont arrived in the evening at Soudé-Sainte-Croix, and finding that he alone had kept the appointment, felt very uneasy. A vast line of fires gradually sprang up before him, until the horizon glowed in the reflected blaze. Marmont selected three of his officers, who spoke German and Polish, and sent them to reconnoitre; one of these, a Pole, a brave and intelligent man, penetrated into the enemy's bivouacs, and learned all he wished to know; he soon returned to make his report to Marshal Marmont. According to this report, all the allied armies lay before them, amounting to nearly 200,000 men, and they were separated by this enormous mass from Napoleon, who had set out for Saint Dizier. It would be scarcely possible to reach the imperial army, opposed by such obstacles. Marmont sent an officer to Mortier, begging him to come up as quickly as possible, and recommending him to take a position in the rear, as a protection against the dangerous neighbours whose vicinity they had just discovered.

The following day, the 25th March, Mortier had an interview with Marmont. He had lost time in crossing by Vatry, and had received on the way the same intelligence that his colleague had learned. In consequence of this information, both thought it advisable to fall back on Fère-Champenoise; besides, the enemy's columns advancing towards them, rendered this movement unavoidable. Marmont prepared to retire to Sommesous, earnestly entreating his colleague to take the same direction.

Such had been the operations of the Marshals Marmont and Mortier, up to the morning of the 25th March, the very hour that the allied armies commenced their march on Paris. Two other corps, those of General Pacthod and General Compans, soon after found themselves in a position similar to that of the two marshals. General Pacthod had been left at Sézanne, with his division of the National Guards, to escort the reinforcements destined for the army. He had been successively joined by different battalions, some of the Line, others of the Young Guard, who had come from Paris under General Compans, and an immense quantity of artillery, the whole amounting to about 10,000 men. Napoleon had reckoned on these reinforcements, and had several times recommended them to the especial care of the War Minister; the minister bestowed little attention on them, and these battalions wandered about at random,

awaiting instructions that never arrived. General Pacthod having learned by different *reconnaisances* that he was near Marmont and Mortier, wrote to the latter, who did not know what advice to give, and Pacthod, receiving no answer, advanced from Sézanne to Fère-Champenoise, in the direction from the Aube to the Marne, by which movement he would cross the route of the two marshals, and could easily join them. On the very morning of the 25th, he crossed their line of march, and found himself near a place called Villeseneux. General Compans followed General Pacthod at a great distance.

This was the position of the different French corps, when on the morning of the 25th, the allied army, abandoning to Wintzingerode the pursuit of Napoleon, took the road to Paris. Blucher advanced to the right, protected by the Marne, Schwarzenberg to the left, protected by the Aube. Nearly 20,000 horse preceded the two columns. The infantry followed within half-an hour's march.

When Marshal Marmont saw the storm advancing in his direction, he immediately comprehended that the enemy had abandoned Napoleon, and were marching on Paris; he retraced his steps towards Sommesous, along the Fère-Champenoise route. The Marshal—an excellent tactician—retreated in good order, sheltering his cavalry, that was not very numerous, behind his infantry squares. He paused at every tenable position, covering the advancing enemy with grape, and then resumed his march, still protecting his artillery and cavalry, with his squares, whose solidity was not shaken for a moment.

At Sommesous a new vexation awaited him. Mortier, though hurrying, had not yet reached the rendezvous, and Marmont was obliged to wait his arrival, rather than run the risk of a separation. The combined forces of the two marshals would amount, at the utmost, to 15,000 men. What would become of them, if separated?

Marmont therefore waited resolutely the arrival of his colleague, but meanwhile he was exposed to many cavalry charges, and what was more vexatious, he was forced to lose most precious time, during which the enemy's columns had leisure to advance, and became more threatening. At length Mortier arrived, and the two marshals set out for Fère-Champenoise.

They had scarcely traversed some thousand metres when they were attacked by a terrific mass of cavalry, supported by infantry. The two marshals sheltered themselves in a position that permitted them to resist some time. Two ravines, not very distant from each other, and running parallel, the one towards Vassimont, the other towards Connantray, left between them an open space of small extent, and easily defended. The marshals took up a position between the two ravines, fortifying the space that separated them; their left supported by the ravine of Vassimont, their right by that of Connantray; they thus covered the Fère-Champenoise route. They held their position as well as they could, confronted by the enemy's cavalry and artillery. The French cavalry, posted in

the plain, defended themselves valiantly, but were at last driven back by Pahlen's horse, and obliged to take shelter behind our infantry.

During the proceedings the weather, which had been bad, became worse, and violent hail, beaten into the eyes of our artillerymen, obscured their vision; and now, the Russian horse, dashing on the Bordessoulle cuirassiers, who were on our left, a little in advance of Mortier, drove them back on our infantry. The Young Guard had hastily formed in squares, but their ammunition being rendered useless by the rain, they could not offer an effectual opposition to the enemy, and two of the squares of the Jamin brigade were broken. At the same moment an alarming spectacle presented itself to the eyes of our troops, who, spite of their youth, had hitherto unflinchingly maintained their ground. It was not that they were called on to dispute, during an hour or two, the space lying between the ravines of Vassimont and Connantray, they should afterwards fall back and defile through the village of Connantray that supported our right, and through which the Fère-Champenoise high road passed. Whilst the main body of the enemy's cavalry charged us in front, a portion of their cavalry having crossed the Connantray ravine on our right, came galloping on our rear in the direction of Fère-Champenoise. Threatened in the rear, and exposed in front to reiterated attacks, our soldiers wheeled round a little too quickly, and retired on Fère-Champenoise in considerable confusion. Marmont's corps crossed Connantray with no greater loss than a few pieces of cannon, but Mortier had some difficulty in extricating himself, and would have been overwhelmed had he not suddenly received unexpected aid.

Amongst the troops of the Generals Pacthod and Compans there were some cavalry regiments, hastily organized in the Versailles dépôt. One of these regiments having followed in General Pacthod's track, suddenly appeared between Vassimont and Connantray, charged the enemy's cavalry, disembarassed our infantry, and saved Marshal Mortier's corps. The latter escaped like Marmont, by the sacrifice of part of his artillery, that could not cross the Connantray ravine to reach Fère-Champenoise.

This skirmish, in which the bad weather, aiding an enemy ten times more numerous than we, had paralysed the resistance of our soldiers, cost us about three thousand men, and a considerable quantity of artillery. This was a severe loss, whether considered in itself, or relatively to the numerical weakness of the two marshals, and it was not the last they were destined to experience.

It was impossible to take up an abode at Fère-Champenoise; the marshals could only pass the night there. They were obliged to march towards Sézanne. But they were not sure of reaching the place, harassed as they were by hordes of enemies. Happily, in order to reach Sézanne, they skirted the heights over which passes the main road from Châlons to Montmirail, and where, a month before, the French troops had fought so gloriously. On the right was

one of the little hillocks belonging to this range; it jutted into the plain, forming a kind of promontory. On this spot the marshals were preparing to take up a position for the night, and shelter themselves from the incessant attacks of the enemy's cavalry. But as they were marching to their destination, a terrible cannonade was heard on their right and in their rear. The marshals became thoughtful, and Mortier remembered the brave and unfortunate Pauthod, who had asked him for advice that he was not able to give.

General Pauthod, in fact, endeavouring to join the marshals, had gone beyond Fère-Champenoise, and to overtake them, had advanced as far as Villeseneux. Having there learned their retrograde movement, he retraced his steps, pursued by Wassiltsikoff's cavalry, and directed his march towards Fère-Champenoise, at the very moment Mortier left. General Pauthod abandoned the hope of reaching the place, and resolved to fall back towards Pierre-Morains and Bannes, expecting to find shelter near the Saint-Gond marshes. He marched with three thousand National Guards, formed into five squares, and was forced to take refuge in a valley, surrounded on every side by the enemy's troops. These troops did not at first recognise each other, for some belonged to Blücher, others to Schwarzenberg, and they fired at each other. They soon perceived their error, and concentrated their fire on General Pauthod's unfortunate squares. The two last of these squares, that formed the rear-guard from Villeseneux, had made a heroic resistance, though composed of National Guards the greater part of whom had never seen service. Surrounded on every side, exposed to showers of grape, they held their ground, until beaten down by the artillery and their lines broken by the cavalry, they were cut down to the last man. The three remaining squares, driven towards the marsh of Saint-Gond, were at last forced into a single mass, and though still exposed to a heavy fire of grape, they refused to lay down their arms. Every fresh discharge of artillery produced frightful ravages amongst them.

The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, who had hastened to the spot, were touched by such heroism. Alexander sent one of his officers to summon them to surrender in his name; and those that remained surrendered to him. This prince could not help feeling some disquietude, in seeing the simple National Guards defend themselves with such energy; and he testified his astonishment and admiration of their conduct some days after. Noble and saddening episode of these wars, alike unwise and sanguinary!

This disastrous day of Fère-Champenois, which the Allies have decorated with the name of battle, and which was only the fortuitous encounter of 200,000 men with some straggling corps that fought in the proportion of one against ten, cost us about 6,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, without reckoning a great quantity of artillery. General Compans' corps, that had early taken the resolution of falling back, had marched on Coulommiers, and in perfect safety outstripped the enemy on the Meaux route.

The next day, the 26th March, the two marshals, whose united

forces amounted to nearly 12,000 men, advanced on Ferté-Gaucher, in order to place themselves on the Marne between Lagny and Meaux, and defend Paris; for the Marne, falling into the Seine at Charenton—that is to say, above Paris, protects the capital against an enemy coming from the north-east. They traversed Sézanne at an early hour, meeting only some Cossacks, whom they dispersed, and continued their way through Mœurs and Esternay. Marshal Marmont formed the head, Marshal Mortier the rear of the column.

In the afternoon, the advanced posts of our cavalry gave notice of the presence of the enemy at Ferté-Gaucher, which caused extreme surprise and a species of terror. General Compans having passed in this direction a few hours previously, and the enemy that pursued us being in the rear, it was difficult to understand how an adverse force should appear in front. Still the thing was very simple, though it did not appear so. Blucher, in advancing on Chalons to join the army of Bohemia, had left Bulow before Soissons, and sent Kleist and d'York in pursuit of the two marshals. Kleist and d'York followed them to Château-Thierry, and from Château-Thierry had thrown themselves directly on Ferté-Gaucher, to cut them off from Paris.

Mortier and Marmont held a consultation on the spot, and it was agreed that the former should force a passage at Ferté-Gaucher, whilst the latter should hold the enraged pursuing enemy in check, by defending Moutils *à outrance*. The Christiani division of the Old Guard vigorously attacked Ferté-Gaucher, but could not dislodge the enemy, who were strongly posted on the banks of the Grand-Morin. Marshal Marmont, on his side, defended himself valiantly in the defile of Moutils. The two marshals passed the day in this manner, their hearts oppressed with care, and not knowing how they should issue from this cut-throat trap, for they had the allied troops both in front and rear. Towards night, however, they conceived the design of turning to the left, and trying to reach Provins through Courtacon. The plan was executed successfully. Profiting of the darkness, they marched through the open country on the left, and reached Provins, after frightful sufferings, but without experiencing any greater loss than that of some wagons. Happily, the men and cannon were saved, and with the loss of a few carriages, the marshals extricated themselves from this fearful difficulty. But the line of march was now changed, and there remained no other way of reaching Paris, than by following the road along the right bank of the Seine, from Melun to Charenton. The enemy were now at liberty to advance to the Marne, and cross it where they would, having no other obstacle to fear than General Compans' feeble division that had retired to Meaux. It was therefore incumbent on the Marshals to hasten, that they might arrive in time before the walls of Paris and join General Compans, should he be so fortunate as to escape; in short, they wished to unite with the remaining patriotic citizens, and defend with them the capital of our country, against Europe, that was thirsting for vengeance.

The marshals, fully comprehending there was no other line of conduct left them to follow, allowed their troops some rest, of which they stood much in need, for they had been marching three days and nights; they set out on the evening of the 27th, for Paris, Marshal Marmont taking the Melun route, and Mortier that of Mormant, that they might not embarrass each other in pursuing the same road.

The next day—the 28th—they were equally far advanced on their respective routes; the one slept at Melun, the other at Mormant. On the 29th, they combined their forces and crossed the Marne, at the point where it falls into the Seine, that is to say, at the bridge of Charenton. The two marshals went to receive the orders of Joseph and the Regent for the defence of the capital.

General Compans, on his side, was joined *en route* by the retreating troops of General Vincent, that had occupied Château-Thierry, and those of General Charpentier, that had occupied Soissons, and who were falling back before the allied masses; with these he halted at Meaux, destroyed the bridges, sunk the fragments in the waves, and fell back, through Clay and Bondy, on Paris. The two armies of Bohemia and Silesia, having arrived at the Marne, it was necessary to make arrangements for appearing before Paris. This great capital, renowned through the entire world, is situate below the confluence of the Marne with the Seine, and it is the largest and most populous part of Paris that lies exposed to an enemy coming from the north-east. In the times of which we speak, this quarter had no other protection than the heights of Romainville, of Saint-Chaumont, and of Montmartre. The Allies would be obliged to cross the Marne *en masse* to force our last defences and avenge twenty years humiliation. They crossed the river above and below Meaux, and distributed their forces in the following manner in advancing on Paris :—

In the first place, the corps of Sacken and de Wrède were posted at Meaux, to cover the Allies' rear against a sudden attack, and this precaution was very natural, for they had left Napoleon at Saint Dizier. Blucher, with the corps of Kleist and d'York combined into one, with Woronzoff's corps (formerly Wintzingerode's), with Langeron's, the four comprising 90,000 men, was to move to the right, and take the Soissons route, in order to advance through Bourget on Saint Denis and Montmartre. Bulow's corps had orders to seize Soissons. Prince Schwarzenberg, with Rajeffsky's corps (formerly Wittgenstein's) and the reserves, amounting in all to about 50,000 men was to come by Meaux, Clay, and Bondy, on Pantin, la Villette, and the heights of Romainville. The Prince Royal of Wurtemberg, with his own corps and that of Giulay, amounting to about 30,000 men, was to come through Chelles, Nogent-sur-Marne, and Vincennes, on Montreuil and Charonne. The three columns had orders to appear before the walls of Paris, on the evening of the 29th, that they might be ready to commence an attack on the 30th. The allied armies were actually *en marche* to arrive on an

appointed day before the walls of that great capital, the object of their long cherished hatred and ambition.

It is unnecessary to say, for we can all divine, what were the feelings of the Parisians. It was now beyond all doubt that the allied armies had resolved to march on Paris. Napoleon, whether through necessity, or as the result of a plan of operations that his people did not understand, was at this moment at a distance from his capital, and totally unable to protect it. With the exception of some men, blinded by party feeling, the mass of the inhabitants was overwhelmed with grief, and would have hailed a deliverer, no matter whom. The desire to be delivered from Napoleon's government was as nothing compared to the fear of an assault, and the horrors that might ensue. The National Guards, drawn exclusively from the middle classes, and reduced to 12,000 men, had not 3,000 muskets; some were armed with pikes, which rendered them ridiculous. The people, though disliking the conscription, and the *droits réunis*, shuddered at the appearance of foreigners, and would have willingly taken arms, if the Government had any to give, and would place so much confidence in the citizens.

The populace wandered about idle, restless, discontented, in the faubourgs and on the boulevards. At the barriers crowds of peasants were seen driving their cattle before them, and bringing on carts whatever they could save of their humble furniture. The Government had not thought of exempting these poor people from the entrance duty, and some of them were forced to sell, much below the value, a portion of what they brought, to purchase the right of sheltering the remainder within the walls of the capital. These unhappy creatures, as soon as they entered Paris, crowded the boulevards and public squares, and after having made a kind of encampment with their carts and cattle, ran about here and there, asking the news, retailing it, exaggerating it, and groaning at the roar of cannon, that proclaimed the ravage of their desolated farms. Over this people, so diversified, so confused, so distracted, hovered in a sort of distraction the strangest government in the world. The Empress-Regent, intensely alarmed for herself and her son, fearing at the same time the soldiers of her father, and the people over whom she had come to reign, no longer receiving from Cambacérès, who was stupified, the advice she was accustomed to, wrongfully distrustful of Joseph, who was kind and affectionate to her, but whom she had been made to regard as jealous of the Emperor, and consequently not knowing where to seek advice or support, she had been thrown by the sound of the cannon into a state of extreme alarm. Joseph was not frightened by the roar of the cannon, but beholding the thrones of his family falling one after another, he began to fear for that of France. It is true that, spurred on by the Emperor, he for a moment busied himself with the organization of the troops, without at all understanding the business; but he had neither the knowledge, nor the activity, nor the authority necessary to utilize the elements of resistance still existing in Paris. The War Min-

ister, Clarke, Duke of Feltre, industrious, but void of capacity, weak-minded, and almost an infidel, opposing in every point the Duke of Rovigo, whom he detested, was scarcely fit to execute half the orders of the Emperor, which referred almost exclusively to the active army. The Duke of Rovigo, intelligent and brave, but execrated as the instrument of a nearly-extinct tyranny, had lost all influence. The other ministers, mere officials, did not step beyond the circle of their functions, and in the present circumstances participated in the general consternation. In short, M. de Talleyrand, the only man capable, not of creating resources, for he had never meddled in the administration, but of giving good advice as to the best mode of proceeding, smiled at the embarrassment of all these personages, sneered at them, and repaid with contempt their distrust of him. Such was the confused assemblage of princes and ministers who were at this moment charged with the safety of France. Now were seen on every side the deplorable consequences of a policy that provided only for foreign conquest: magnificent fortifications, arms, and soldiers at Dantzic, at Hambourg, at Flushing, at Palma-Nova, at Venice, at Alessandria—and at Paris—nothing—absolutely nothing! Not a redoubt, not a soldier, not a musket, not even a government, and the sole resource to direct the bravest people in the world was a weeping wife, and brothers, not without courage, but without authority, because the State had been concentrated in the person of one man; and because this man was absent, thought, will, and action seemed paralyzed throughout France.

When, on the 28th March, the approaching arrival of the two marshals became known, and there being no longer any doubt as to the approach of the enemy, Joseph, who was the depository of Napoleon's instructions, both written and verbal, as to what was to be done with the Empress and the King of Rome, in case of an attack on Paris, communicated these instructions to the Empress, to the Chancellor Cambacérès, and the Minister Clarke; it never entered into the minds of either to disobey, though both Joseph and Cambacérès saw some strong objections against the prescribed measure. As to the Empress, she was willing to leave or to remain, as her husband pleased. It was agreed that a council of regency should be immediately summoned, to discuss the question, and draw from the members a resolution conformable to Napoleon's intentions, positively and repeatedly expressed.

The Council assembled on the evening of the 28th March, the Empress presiding. It consisted of Joseph, of the great functionaries, Cambacérès, Lebrun, Talleyrand, the ministers and presidents of the Senate, of the legislative corps and the *Conseil d'Etat*.

No sooner was the Council assembled at the Tuileries, than, with the permission of the Regent, the War Minister addressed the Assembly, and laid bare the situation of affairs in mournful and studied phrase. He said their sole remaining resources were the diminished corps of the Marshals Mortier and Marmont, some troops, obtained with difficulty from the dépôts, a national guard of

12,000 men, of whom a part only had muskets, a populace willing to fight, but unarmed, some pallissades at the gates of the city, but no defensive works on the heights; in a word, 25,000 men, wholly unaided by art, and called on to oppose 200,000 veteran soldiers furnished with all the *matériel* of war. The minister accompanied this *exposé* with expressions of the most profound devotedness to the imperial family, and concluded by recommending the immediate departure of the Empress and the King of Rome for the Loire, where they would be beyond the reach of the enemy.

M. Boulay (de la Meurthe), who had listened impatiently to the War Minister, protested impetuously against such a proposition, and expatiated warmly on the self-evident disadvantages of such a project. He said it would be at the same time abandoning the capital and reducing the Parisians to despair, who looked on the daughter and grandson of the Emperor of Austria as a kind of *Ægis*; but should these seem only to consult their own safety, it would be inviting every one else to follow the example; that from that moment the defence of Paris would become impossible, that it would be tantamount to opening the gates to the enemy, and the departure of the government would create a void which a hostile party, supported by foreigners, would quickly fill, by proclaiming the Bourbons, as had happened at Bordeaux. M. Boulay (de la Meurthe), after having stated his opinions, proposed that Maria Louisa should imitate the example of her illustrious grandmother, Maria Theresa, that she should go to the Hôtel de Ville, with her son in her arms, and there make an appeal to the people of Paris, who, at need, could raise 100,000 soldiers to defend her.

This advice, to which there could be no objection, had there been a hundred thousand muskets to give the Parisians, and the government willing to trust them, was approved by the majority, especially by the Minister of Police, the Duke de Rovigo, and by the old Duke of Massa, who, notwithstanding his age and the impaired state of his health, opposed the departure of the Empress, with an eloquence that savoured of the vigour of youth. Even the sage and cool tempered Duke de Cadore grew warm, as he supported the proposition of staying at Paris and making a vigorous defence. Amid this general expression of opinion, that almost amounted to unanimity, Joseph, though appearing to side with those that opposed the proposition of leaving Paris, remained silent, and seemed as if paralysed by an invisible power. Prince Cambacérès, bowed beneath the weight of his vexations, was also silent. The Empress, powerfully agitated, was silent, but her supplicating looks implored advice from all present.

M. de Talleyrand, with the authority inseparable from his name, spoke in turn, and expressed an opinion truly surprising to those who were aware of his secret relations. With that calm, graceful, and at the same time disdainful gravity that characterized his manner of speaking, he gave the soundest political advice, such, in fact,

as he might have enunciated had he been exclusively devoted to the Bonapartes. He laid little stress on the enthusiasm that might be awakened by conducting the Empress and the King of Rome to the Hôtel de Ville, he was too discriminating to put much faith in such resources, but he laid great stress on the danger of evacuating Paris. To evacuate the capital, was, in his opinion, to abandon it to the attempts that an adverse party would not fail to make at the first appearance of the allied armies. This adverse party, as every one knew, was that of the Bourbons. The Allies, their great support, were drawing near. To abandon Paris, and remove Maria Louisa from the capital, would be to free the Allies from every difficulty they might encounter in effecting a revolution. Such was the general sense, though not the exact words, of the opinion expressed by M. de Talleyrand; and it was strange to hear a man who was to be the principal actor in the approaching revolution describe it so minutely beforehand.

People devoid of finesse, and who for that very reason suspect its existence in others, believed at this moment, and gave utterance to their opinion, that M. de Talleyrand had put forth this opinion in order that another might be adopted. This was a puerile error. M. de Talleyrand, called upon unexpectedly, had obeyed the dictates of his good sense, and gave the best possible advice. Moreover, the proposal of leaving annoyed him. To remain at Paris, after advising a departure, would put him in a serious difficulty; to leave would be to run the risk of all the vicissitudes that might befall the departing government, and remove to a distance from that which was approaching. In short, the advice to remain had an appearance of devotedness that might be useful, if Napoleon—whom the French would never believe utterly vanquished, until they heard of his death—should ultimately triumph. Having thus spoken conformably to the dictates of his understanding, and suitably to his particular circumstances, M. de Talleyrand was silent, and not a person present had the courage to offer an opinion after his. The question was put to the vote, and a considerable majority appeared in favour of those who disapproved the departure of the Empress and the King of Rome.

The result was scarcely announced when extraordinary anxiety was discoverable in the countenance of the Minister Clarke, and not less in the face of Prince Joseph, who, however, had visibly encouraged the opinion in favour of which the majority had decided. Then, as if under the influence of an imperative necessity, the War Minister rose, and pronounced a lengthy discourse, again recommending the departure of the Empress and the King of Rome. In support of his opinion he adduced reasons which, without being good, were the least bad that could be alleged. Paris was not everything, and ought not to be; and Paris once taken, it would be necessary to defend, *à outrance*, the rest of France, and dispute it obstinately with the enemy. It would be better to repair, with the Empress and the King of Rome, to the provinces that had not yet been in-

vaded, rally every patriotic Frenchman, and defend, to the last man, their native land and the Emperor's throne. But this prolonged struggle was not possible if, leaving the Empress and her son in the capital, they exposed them to the risk of falling into the hands of the allied sovereigns. This would be yielding up to the Emperor of Austria the precious pledge of his which they held; and if the people in any of the provinces were willing to raise the standard of resistance, they could not find any high personage round whom the devoted subjects of the empire could rally. Besides, the probability of seeing the enemy enter Paris was greater than was generally believed; for there was very little chance, with the resources they had, of resisting the 200,000 men that were marching on the capital.

The War Minister had taken all this trouble through a simple spirit of obedience. At bottom, he had no opinion on any subject. The arguments he brought forward he had drawn from historic recollections of cases of desperate resistance; these arguments, which were valid at Vienna under Maria Theresa, at Berlin under the great Frederic, but false at Paris, in the case of a vanquished soldier, did not convince anyone; for, without avowing it mentally, and without daring to express it openly, every one felt that with a government, itself the offspring of revolution, and that had ceased to be popular, and for which a substitute was ready prepared, to abandon the capital was to open the way for a revolution. Every one retained his opinion; and the sense of the assembly being again taken, it was found that the members were almost unanimous in declaring that Maria Louisa and the King of Rome ought to remain at Paris.

Then Joseph broke his prolonged silence, and the motive of his hitherto inexplicable conduct was revealed. He read two letters of the Emperor's—one dated from Troyes after the battle of la Rothière, the other from Reims after the battles of Craonne and Laon—in which Napoleon declared that on no account should his wife and son be allowed to fall into the hands of the Allies. We have already explained the feelings under which Napoleon wrote these two letters. Independent of the very sincere affection he bore his wife and son, he wished to keep in his hands a precious pledge; he also feared that Maria-Louisa might become the docile instrument of all that his enemies would contrive against him, especially by creating a regency that would exclude him from the throne. After the disquieting battle of la Rothière, this was his opinion, and he still held the same after the doubtful battles of Craonne and Laon. The two letters of the Emperor now produced were an overwhelming blow to the Council of Regency. Under the impulse of the moment, those whose opinions were negatived by the letters of the Emperor, exclaimed that it was very wrong to assemble a council when an order had been received from Napoleon, an absolute order, that did not admit of discussion. But reflection succeeding to the first emotion, they examined the letters, and disputed the use that was being made of them. The first had been written under circumstances very

different from the present, after the battle of la Rothière, when there appeared to be no chance of resisting the enemy. But since then, glorious triumphs mingled, it is true, with less agreeable events, had prolonged the war and rendered the result uncertain. The circumstances were, therefore, different, and Napoleon would not probably at the actual time give the same orders.

To this interpretation the second letter replied peremptorily. This letter was written at Reims the 16th March, the morrow of the successful battle of Reims, at the very time the Emperor was commencing his march towards the fortresses. The members were obliged to yield, and consent that the Empress should depart next day—the 29th. It was, however, resolved that Joseph and the ministers should remain in order to direct the defence of Paris, and not leave until it would be no longer possible to dispute this city with the enemy. The Chancellor Cambacérès, little suited to the tumult of arms, and being besides an adviser indispensable to the Empress, was to accompany her. The council broke up, and the members went their way confounded, and in a state of agitation unusual under this government, hitherto so obedient and peaceful. They broke out into recriminations, each imputing to the other the approaching ruin of the empire. Some of the more zealous members reproached the Duke of Rovigo with not having had recourse to the means that had saved France in '92—for example, with not having raised the people—to which he replied that he agreed with them; but in order to raise the people, he would have needed two things which he did not possess: in the first place, arms, and in the next permission to have recourse to such means. In descending the staircase of the Tuileries, M. de Talleyrand, who walked in the same fashion as he wrote, that is to say, slowly, said to the Duke of Rovigo, leaning on the cane on which he habitually supported himself—"Well, what an end to so glorious a reign! To finish his career like an adventurer, instead of terminating it peacefully on the greatest throne in the world, after having stamped the century with his name—what an end! The Emperor would be much to be pitied, had he not deserved his fate, by surrounding himself with such stupid!" The Duke of Rovigo, who had felt his own influence declining, and set no great value on those who had replaced him in the confidence of the Emperor, bowed his head and made no reply, he even appeared to approve the observations of M. de Talleyrand. The latter, with a look that solicited a little more confidence, added: "However, it will not suit every one to allow himself to be crushed under these ruins, and we ought to look to it." But, finding the Duke of Rovigo still silent, for though discontented, he was faithful, M. de Talleyrand finished the conversation with these simple words—"We shall see." He then stepped into his carriage, apprehensive that he had said too much.

After this meeting, whose consequences were so serious, Joseph, the Prince Cambacérès, and Clarke, in accompanying the Empress to her apartments, communicated to each other their opinions, and

acknowledged that the resolution to obey Napoleon presented serious difficulties. "But tell me," said Maria Louisa, "what I ought to do, and I will do it. You are very true counsellors, and you must teach me how to interpret the wishes of my husband." Prince Cambacérès, whose wisdom was now of little avail, and Joseph, who feared incurring any responsibility, dared not advise disobedience to the orders of Napoleon. However, they decided that before obeying, they would ascertain whether the danger was really so great as was believed, and whether the time was come for putting into execution, orders considered so dangerous. It was therefore resolved that Joseph and Clarke should the next morning make a military reconnaissance round Paris, and the Empress was not to leave until they should have pronounced a final opinion.

The next day—the 29th—the *Place du Carrousal* was filled with carriages belonging to the Court. These were loaded, besides the baggage of the Imperial family, with Napoleon's most valuable papers, the remains of his private treasure, that amounted to about eighteen millions, the greater part in gold, and lastly, the crown diamonds. A restless and discontented crowd had assembled, for Maria Louisa had appeared to many, a protection against the barbarity of foreigners. "These foreigners," said the multitude, "will not pillage, they will not burn, they will not destroy with bombs, the city that contains the daughter and grandson of the Emperor of Austria." The departure of Maria Louisa seemed a desertion, a kind of treason. Still the crowd remained inactive and mute. Some officers of the National Guard having succeeded in entering the palace—for in public calamities, etiquette yields to strong emotion—endeavoured to persuade Maria Louisa to remain, saying they were ready to defend her and her son to the last extremity. She replied, in tears, that she was only a woman, that she had no authority, that she was obliged to obey the Emperor; she thanked them for their offers of service, which she was neither able to refuse or accept. The unhappy woman (she was at that time really attached to the cause of her son and her husband) walked up and down through her apartments, weeping, expecting Joseph, who did not come, and not knowing what to say or what to do. At length, repeated messages having come from Clarke, announcing that the enemy's light cavalry already inundated the environs of the capital, she set off about midnight, overwhelmed with grief, bringing her son, who stamped with anger, demanding whither he was being carried. Whither he was being carried, unhappy child! To Vienna, where he was destined to die, without father, almost without mother, without country, and kept in ignorance of his glorious origin. Unhappy child, offspring of that strange destiny that united a soldier to the daughter of the Cæsars, and whose fate, next to the woes of France, is the most mournful history recorded in the annals of these extraordinary times.

The *cortège* of this terrified Court—sad example of human vicissitudes, calculated to scare the happy ones of the world—advanced

slowly towards Rambouillet, amid a discontented but silent crowd, who foresaw at this moment the future, as if it lay unveiled before them. Twelve hundred soldiers of the Old Guard escorted the fugitive court. This dreadful day of the 29th, the eve of one still more terrible, was devoted to making defensive preparations. Joseph had employed the morning, in company with several officers, in making a reconnaissance in the environs of Paris, which had delayed his replies to the Empress, and the result of his observations was, that with the actual disposable means, the capital could not be defended twenty-four hours. It is certain, that with the forces brought by the two marshals, with the dépôts then at Paris, there were scarcely more than 22,000 or 23,000 men to oppose nearly 200,000. The National Guard amounted to 12,000, whom a sense of duty and detestation of foreigners would have converted into devoted soldiers, but there were not more than 3,000 or 4,000 who had muskets. Amongst the populace sinewy limbs could be found, and in the common danger they would not be wanting in good-will, but there were no weapons to give them. As to the defensive works, we have already said they consisted of some ill-armed redoubts, and some *tambours* before the gates, constructed *en palissades*, and without moats. Napoleon, however, had sent orders, unhappily in general terms, such as it was possible to send from a distance, and amid the multiplied movements of an active army. Besides, as the question was of an irregular resistance, maintained by any means within reach, nothing could be foreseen, nor orders given beforehand. Napoleon's own presence was needed, with his strong will, his activity, his inventive genius, his indomitable energy, to turn to advantage the resources that Paris possessed; the excellent but irresolute Joseph, the incompetent and vacillating Duke de Feltre, were ill-fitted to supply his place in such circumstances. They were only impressed by the fact that they had 20,000 or 25,000 regular troops and that the enemy had 200,000. Certainly, the idea of a battle under such circumstances could only inspire despair; but nothing could be more stupid than the idea of giving battle outside the walls of Paris, for, the battle lost, and it was impossible it could be otherwise, everything was lost, the battle, Paris, the government, and France. Paris ought to be defended as General Bourmont had, a few days before, defended Nogent, as General Alix had defended Sens, as the Spaniards had defended their cities, as the Parisians themselves had too often defended Paris against their governments, with barricaded suburbs, with the populace drawn up behind the barricades, only reserving the regular army to fall on the points where the enemy might penetrate. For a resistance of this kind, there was no want of resources. The army, with the additions that might be made to the corps of the Marshals Marmont and Mortier, would amount to 24,000 or 25,000 men. There were 12,000 National Guards, to whom 5,000 or 6,000 muskets might be given, a number generally disposable out of the 30,000 or 40,000 under repair, and which

Clarke persevered in keeping for the active troops, which would have raised to 8,000 or 9,000 the number of the National Guards, regularly armed. The Parisians could at that time have furnished 50,000 or 60,000 volunteers, who could have found fowling-pieces, of which there was always a great number in the capital, which the zeal of the inhabitants would have induced them to present, and of which, in any case, the executive might have taken possession. Vincennes contained two hundred cannon of every calibre, and an immense supply of ammunition. With these the heights of Paris might be covered, and surely no one would have refused his horses for the service. By barricading the streets of the suburbs and the city; by placing the populace behind these barricades; by protecting, with artillery, certain select positions; by disposing the army on points where the enemy was most to be apprehended; or by throwing the regular forces from the heights on the flank of the invading columns as the configuration of the locality permitted, it was certainly possible to resist the entrance of the enemy into Paris at least for some days. The different localities, properly studied, would have offered resources that might have been turned to profit.

Everybody knows, either as an inhabitant or a visitor, the great capital, whose defence was now under discussion. An enemy advancing along the right bank of the Seine must of necessity encounter the half circle of heights that surrounds Paris from Vincennes to Passy, and which encloses the most populous and richest part of the city. From the confluence of the Marne and the Seine, near Charenton, to Passy and Auteuil, Paris is encircled by a chain of heights, sometimes extending *en plateau*, as at Romainville, sometimes saillant, as at Montmartre, and these offered a most valuable means of resistance, even before a patriot king had covered these positions with impregnable fortifications. To the south and east of this semi-circle (keeping still on the right bank of the Seine), are Vincennes, with its forest, its castle, and the encampments of Charonne, of Ménilmontant and Montreuil. Adverse forces on this side would be almost entirely cut off from all communication with any on the north-east, that is to say, in the plain of Saint-Denis, unless they had previously taken the precaution of seizing the plateau of Romainville. Should this precaution not be taken, a defensive force, well posted on the plateau of Romainville, could fall on the flank of an enemy coming by Vincennes, or on the flank of an invading column, crossing the plain of Saint-Denis with the design of attacking the barriers of Villette, Saint Denis, and Montmartre. This latter column, coming from the north-east across the plain of Saint-Denis, meets, of necessity, the hillock of Saint-Chaumont, the heights of Montmartre, of Étoile, and Passy, and should this column advance too far in the direction of Étoile, it would run the risk of being brought to a stand in the wood of Boulogne and thrown into the Seine, thanks to the retrograde sweep this river makes from Saint-Cloud to Saint-Denis.

The heights of Étoile, of Montmartre, of Saint-Chaumont, of

Romainville, being covered with strong redoubts and a great quantity of artillery, the city being barricaded and defended by the populace, part of the army being posted between the barriers most threatened by the enemy, but the bulk reserved to occupy the plateau of Romainville, a resistance, not invincible certainly, but prolonged for some days, might be opposed to the Allies, and give Napoleon time to manœuvre in their rear, and he had reckoned on this, not imagining that the defence of Paris would be limited to a single day, or in other words, to the number of hours that 25,000 men could sustain, in the open country, a combat against 200,000.

But the authorities at Paris had not thought of profiting of local advantages, nor of making use of the citizens; for Napoleon being absent, nobody was capable either of thinking or acting. Those to whom he had delegated his authority, scarcely possessed military courage—a quality in which Frenchmen are rarely deficient. Under Joseph, and under Clarke, who ought to have commanded, and who did not command, General Hutin was *chef de la Place* at Paris, and Marshal Moncey *chef* of the National Guards. Each of these busied himself, without holding communication with the other, with what specially concerned himself. General Hutin—a brave and patriotic man, but long accustomed to doze away his time at Paris, had immediately sent some pieces of cannon to the heights of Montmartre and the mound of St. Chaumont. Not being authorized to employ the horses of private persons, to transport the artillery from Vincennes, he had scarcely been able to drag to the heights some pieces of ordnance, fixed on badly finished *plates-formes*, ill supplied with munitions, or furnished with what did not suit the calibre of the guns. Marshal Moncey, always disposed to fulfil his duty, after having vainly demanded muskets for the National Guard, had at the last moment obtained the disposable 3,000, distributed them, and then drawn up the 6,000 National Guards he had succeeded in arming; some he placed behind the pallisades, erected at the barriers; the others he kept as a reserve, in order to send them to the points most threatened by the enemy.

As to the Marshals Marmont and Mortier, the Minister Clarke contented himself with prescribing a circuit outside Paris, as their field of operations, without examining whether it was advisable to fight a battle outside the walls of the capital. The right of this circuit he confided to Marmont, who would consequently have to defend the south and east of the heights—that is to say, the avenue of Vincennes, the barriers of Trône and Charonne, the plateau of Romainville, and a portion northward behind this plateau, as far as Prés Saint Gervais. He confided the left to Mortier, who was to defend the space between the canal of the Ourcq and the Seine—that is to say, the plain of Saint-Denis.

These two marshals, after all the combats they had sustained during their retreat, had not more than 12,000 men under their command. They were strengthened by General Compans, who had

escaped by a miracle, and who brought with him the Young Guard, recently organized at Paris, and the division Ledru des Essarts drawn from the dépôts. He had about 6,000 bayonets. He was placed under the orders of Marshal Marmont. This division was commanded by General Michel, and was placed under the orders of Marshal Mortier. Thanks to this last reinforcement, the active forces of the two marshals amounted to 22,000 men. In their rear, 6,000 National Guards, some hundred veteran soldiers, and some young men in the artillery service, increased the number of the defenders of the capital to 28,000 or 29,000; and these brave men, as we have just seen, had for their defence, some pieces of cannon planted on the heights of Montmartre, of Saint Chaumont, and Charonne, and some pallisades in front of the barriers.

The marshals, who arrived on the evening of the 29th, had only time to see the War Minister, and converse a few moments with him, whilst their troops were taking a little indispensable repose. The confusion was so great that, though a sufficient quantity of provisions had been provided, the soldiers could scarcely get anything to eat. They were supported solely by the kindness of the inhabitants. The two marshals allowed them some repose, preparatory to leading them to the spot where they were to fight.

The allied sovereigns were, on the evening of the 29th, at the château of Bondy, and approaching Paris by the north-east, they resolved to attack it by the right bank of the Seine; for no enemy, unless compelled by extraordinary circumstances, would have joined to the natural difficulties of the attack that of an operation executed beyond the Seine, with the obligation to repass this river in case of failure. Being obliged to operate on the right bank of the Seine, the allied generals combined their efforts in a manner conformable to the nature of the locality. They decided to make three simultaneous attacks—one on the east, to be executed by Barclay de Tolly, with Rajeffsky's corps and all the reserves, about 50,000 men—their especial object being to carry, by Rosny and Pantin, the plateau of Romainville; one to the south, to second the proceeding executed by the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg with his own corps and that of Giulay (nearly 30,000 men), and which was to abut through the wood of Vincennes, at the barriers of Charonne and the Trône; lastly, a third, to the north, in the plain of Saint-Denis, executed by Blucher at the head of 90,000 men, and especially directed against the heights of Montmartre, Clichy and Etoile. Of these three columns, the most advanced in its march was that of Barclay de Tolly. That of Blucher, having come by the Meaux route, and having reached the Chaussée de Soissons, was on the evening of the 29th, farther from the rendezvous than the two others. The Prince de Wurtemberg, who had skirted the Marne, and had crossed it at an advanced stage of his march, was also *en arrière*. It was agreed that all should enter into action as soon as possible.

On our side, the Marshals Marmont and Mortier, having arrived

at a very late hour in the evening, and having passed the night between Charenton, Vincennes, and Charonne, were to advance in a southerly direction to occupy the heights. Marmont, with his troops, scaled the escarpments of Charonne and Montreuil, with the intention of establishing themselves on the plateau of Romainville, and on the north of this plateau as far as Prés Saint-Gervais. Mortier had a still greater distance to traverse. Ascending by the exterior boulevard from Charonne to Belleville, having afterwards to descend on Pantin, La Villette, and La Chapelle, he was ultimately to reach the plain of St. Denis, establish his right wing on the canal of the Oureq, his left at Clignancourt, at the foot of the heights of Montmartre. He consequently required much more time to fall into line than Marmont. Happily he was to contend with Blucher, who was also *en retard*, so that he was certain of not being outstripped by the enemy.

Marmont, trusting too easily to the report of an officer, did not believe that the plateau of Romainville was occupied, and on this account had not hastened his march. When he arrived there, Rajeffsky's troops were already in possession. With 1,200 men of the Lagrange division, he threw himself on his vanguards, chased them from the plateau, and drove them back on Pantin and Noisy. At the same moment the Ledru des Essart's division took possession of the wood of Romainville, which covers the flank of the heights that border the plain of St. Denis. Marmont distributed his troops in the following manner. He had at his disposal one of the last divisions drawn from the Paris dépôts, under the Duke of Padua, his ancient divisions Lagrange and Ricard, the troops that General Compans had brought the evening before, and lastly, some cavalry under Generals Chastel and Bordessoulle. He left his cavalry between Charonne and Vincennes, with orders to defend the foot of the heights on the north side, and to cover the barrier of Trône. He placed the Duke of Padua on his right, on the extreme edge of the plateau of Romainville, in the tallest houses of Bagnolet and Montreuil, that are built *en amphitheatre* on the southern declivity, that their fruit trees may enjoy the full rays of the sun. He drew up on the centre of the plateau the Lagrange division, backed by the houses of Belleville, the Ricard division on the left in the wood of Romainville, and lastly, on the northern declivity, the Ledru des Essarts division of Compan's corps. He placed at the foot, in the plain, at Prés Saint-Gervais, the Boyer de Rebeval division. The Michel division, that awaited Mortier to serve under his orders, guarded in his absence *la Grand* and *la Petite Villette*.

The sound of musketry and the roar of cannon, awakened, at an early hour, the Parisians, who, to say the truth, had slept little during the night, and Joseph, accompanied by the War Minister, the minister of police, engineer and artillery officers, had established his head-quarters at the summit of Montmartre.

Barclay de Tolly, though convinced that when the Prince Royal

of Wurtemberg on the south, and Blucher on the north, would fall into line, the contest would soon turn to the advantage of the Allies, still did not wish to leave the defenders of Paris, the first success of the day. He consequently resolved to retake the plateau of Romainville, and to employ for that purpose a part of his reserve. This reserve was composed of infantry, cavalry, and grenadiers. General Paskewitch was, with a brigade of the 2nd division of Grenadiers, to scale the plateau on the Rosny side; he was also to attack it on the south, advancing by Montreuil with the 2nd brigade of this 2nd division, and with Count Pahlen's cavalry. The 1st division of Grenadiers was confided to Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, to attack Pantin and Prés Saint-Gervais, in the plain to the north.

This attack, conducted with vigour, was in the commencement successful. General Mezenzoff, who had been repulsed in the morning, now reinforced by the Grenadiers, remounted the plateau, spite of the Lagrange division, and succeeded in taking possession of it. On the right, the 2nd brigade of Grenadiers, after having turned the plateau by Montreuil and Bagnolet, forced the Duke of Padua's division, by outflanking them, to retrograde. We certainly lost ground, though the resistance of our soldiers was heroic, whether we consider the number or quality of the adverse troops, who were of the Allies' best.

However, though we lost ground, we kept the enemy in check. In fact, the Russian cuirassiers, led up on the plateau, tried to charge our infantry, but were covered with grape and stopped by our bayonets. In falling back from Romainville on Belleville, the Plateau growing narrower, our troops had the advantage of concentrating. On the right, we found a support in the houses of Bagnolet; on the left, in the wood of Romainville, and our soldiers, dispersing *en tirailleurs*, inflicted severe losses on the enemy. Our artillery profiting of the local advantages—for the plateau rises in retrograding towards Belleville—poured volumes of grape on the Russian grenadiers, and at each discharge overthrew entire lines. During this time, Ledru des Essart's young soldiers had reconquered, tree by tree, the wood of Romainville, and thus outflanked the Russian troops that occupied the wider portion of the plateau. At the very foot of the plateau, towards the north side, General Compans had remained master of Pantin, with the aid of the Boyer de Rebeval division; and kept Prés Saint-Gervais by the help of the Michel division. He had even driven beyond the two villages the Prince of Wurtemberg, who had attempted to take possession of them at the head of the first division of Grenadiers.

Marshal Mortier having at length taken up a position in the plain of Saint-Denis, had placed the Curial and Charpentier divisions of the Young Guard at La Villette, the Christiani division of the Old Guard at La Chapelle, and his cavalry at the foot of Montmartre itself.

It was ten in the morning, and if we had, independent of the

troops that covered the environs of Paris, a column of ten thousand veteran soldiers to take the offensive, we should have been able to give the Allies at this moment a severe check. But, far from being in a position to take the offensive, we had scarcely the means to defend our positions. In this state of things, Prince Schwarzenberg waiting his two wings that were *en retard*, and our two marshals being reduced to the defensive, both parties confined themselves to a cannonade and some sharpshooting, the superiority on our side being marked, owing to the zeal of our troops and the advantage of position.

At this hour Joseph was holding a council on the hillock of Montmartre, where he had fixed himself. Several officers, who had been sent to the marshals returned, with the assurance that they and their soldiers were determined to die to the last man, but added sad presentiments for the result of the contest, for they almost felt certain that the capital must be surrendered. This intelligence agitated Joseph deeply, who feared not the danger but the humiliation, and who dreaded above all things becoming the prisoner of the Allies. From the heights of Montmartre dark and voluminous masses, led on by Blücher, were seen to cross the plain of Saint-Denis, and officers coming from the neighbourhood of Vincennes asserted that they saw on the east and south a fresh army that was turning Paris, and trying to enter by the barriers of Charonne and Trône. All evidence, both visual and oral, concurred in announcing an imminent catastrophe. Joseph debated the subject with the ministers that had accompanied him, with the engineer and artillery officers, and all were of opinion that within a few hours Paris should be given up. In fact, the defence being reduced to a battle fought in the open plain, with odds of ten to one, of the result there could be no doubt, however brave our soldiers and generals might be. Confronted by such certainty, Joseph determined to withdraw. Having learned by reconnaissance that Cossacks were already seen advancing along the Revolte route and at the border of the *Bois de Bologne*, he hastily set off, ordering the ministers to follow, as had been agreed, when the last moment should have arrived. His sole instructions to the two marshals at parting were to continue the defence as long as possible, and then surrender on conditions that would guarantee the safety of Paris, and good treatment to the inhabitants.

During these proceedings the attack had made inevitable progress. On the north, that is to say, in the plain of Saint-Denis, Marshal Blücher had traversed the distance that separated him from our positions. General Langeron had driven our weak vanguards from Aubervilliers and Saint Denis, and sent his cavalry and light infantry by the road of La Revolte, as far as the edge of the Bois de Boulogne. The bulk of his infantry advanced towards the foot of Montmartre, whilst General d'York's corps, turning to the left (the left of the Allies) advanced on La Chatelle by the Saint Denis route, and the corps of Kleist and Woronzoff, turning still more to

the left, marched on La Villette. Prince Schwarzenberg, seeing Blücher in line, asked him to send a reinforcement to assist Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg to carry Pantin, Prés Saint-Gervais; in a word, all the villages situated at the foot of the Romainville plateau. The Kotzler Prussian division, the Prussian and Baden Guards, were then sent to the assistance of Rajeffsky's corps, and crossed the canal of the Ourcq, near the Rouvray Farm, to join in the first attack.

Whilst these movements were being executed to the north, the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg had, on the south, cleared the distance that separated him from the point of attack, and came to aid the Allies. After having crossed the bridge of Neuilly-sur-Marne, and left Giulay's corps to guard his rear, he had marched his forces in two columns, the one skirting the banks of the Marne, the other crossing by the shortest way the forest of Vincennes. The first column had carried the bridge of Saint-Maur, made a circuit of the forest, and attacked Charenton by the right bank. The National Guards of the neighbourhood who, with l'Ecole d'Alfort, defended the bridge of Charenton, finding themselves attacked in the rear, were forced, after a valiant resistance, to abandon the post, and march across the country to the left of the Seine. This adverse column having attained its object, which was to occupy all the bridges of the Marne, to hinder any auxiliary corps from coming to disturb the attack on Paris, began to *tirailleur*, with the National Guard before the Bercy barrier. The Prince of Wurtemberg's second column had crossed the bridge of Vincennes in a straight line, and assisted Count Pahlen, as well as the troops of Rajeffsky and Paskewitch, who were engaged in attacking Montreuil, Bagnolet, and Charonne.

All the allied forces being now in line, the action recommenced with increased violence. To the north, Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg's division, assisted by the Russian grenadiers and by the Prussian troops recently arrived, fell on Pantin and Prés Saint-Gervais, but was warmly received by the Boyer de Rebeval and Michel divisions of the Young Guard, commanded by General Compans. For a moment, the Allies succeeded in seizing the two villages, but our young soldiers, planting their backs against the foot of the heights, where they were supported by a well-posted artillery, recovered their spirits, and again entered the villages, where the carnage became fearful. The enemy did not succeed on this side, notwithstanding the vigour of their attack.

The defence was not less energetic on the plateau of Romainville, but was less successful. The troops of Generals Helfreich and Mezenzoff, supported by the grenadiers of Paskewitch, though at first repulsed, had ultimately succeeded in taking the position. Having seized Montreuil and Bagnolet, they had established themselves on the southern declivity of the plateau, and being well seconded by the troops of Count Pahlen and the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg, who were operating between Vincennes and Charonne,

they had taken possession of the nearest houses of Ménéilmontant. The Duke of Padua's division of reserve, which formed Marmont's right, being outflanked, had been obliged to fall back, and leave uncovered the Lagrange and Ricard divisions that occupied the centre. On Marmont's left the Ledru des Essarts division briskly pushed from tree to tree in the wood of Romainville, at length lost the wood altogether.

Finding himself thus pressed on both flanks, Marmont conceived the idea of directing his centre against the enemy that was advancing in a serried mass, their front protected by artillery and the wings supported by strong detachments of heavy cavalry. The marshal put himself at the head of four battalions formed *en colonne d'attaque*, and charged the Russian Grenadiers that marched in the front line. Twelve pieces of cannon loaded with grape were discharged against our soldiers, who sustained the fire with heroic firmness and continued to advance. But they were at the same moment attacked in front by the Russian Grenadiers, and in flank by the Chevaliers-Gardes, led on by Miloradowitch.

Overpowered by numbers, Marmont's four battalions were obliged to fall back, after a hand to hand fight, sustained with positive fury. The Marshal fell back with his troops on Belleville, and was near sinking under the mass of assailants, both horse and foot, when a brave officer, named Ghesseler, ambushed on the right, in a little wood called "Bruyères," of which at present the memory alone remains, dashed at the head of 200 men on the flank of the adverse column, and by making a diversion in favour of the Marshal, succeeded in facilitating his retreat on Belleville. At the same moment the wood of Romainville was definitely abandoned; and the plateau being evacuated on every side, the defence was carried back—at the centre, on Belleville; on the right, towards Ménéilmontant, which the Padua division had taken possession of; on the left, to the declivity of Beauregarde, where the Ledru des Essart division had found shelter. At the foot of the latter, the Boyer and Michel divisions struggled perseveringly. They had lost Pantin, but they defended Prés Saint-Gervais with intense obstinacy.

On every side the combat was furious; men fell by thousands, especially amongst the Allies, who received on all sides a plunging fire. In the plain of Saint-Denis, Kleist and Woronzoff had attacked la Vilette, defended by the Curial division; York attacked, before the eyes of Marshal Marmont, la Chapelle, defended by the Christiani division. In front of Clignancourt, Blucher's squadrons were engaged with General Belliard's cavalry, and seldom got the advantage.

Thus, from the plain of Saint-Denis to the barrier of Trône, the combat was prolonged with varying success. Our line had fallen back; but the Allies had already lost 10,000 men, whilst our loss amounted to only 6,000. Our worn-out soldiers were supported by the thought that Paris was in their rear, and 24,000 men struggled without extraordinary loss against 170,000. Once the arrival of

Napoleon was announced—it was the sudden appearance of General Dejean that had occasioned this false report—and the cry of *Vive l'Empereur!* propagated with electric rapidity, echoed from rank to rank. Our troops, reanimated by hope, rushed furiously on the enemy. On both sides the combat raged with a kind of madness—for the one party was striving by a single stroke to attain the great object of the war, and the other was endeavouring to snatch their country from ruin.

At this time an event occurred at Vincennes which must ever redound to the honour of the youth of France. In the advance of the Trône barrier, there was a battery served by veteran soldiers and by pupils of the Polytechnic school, which Marmont, exclusively occupied with what was passing on the Romainville plateau, had left almost without support. This battery having advanced too far on the avenue of Vincennes in order to play on Pahlen's cavalry, was turned by some squadrons that, passing by Saint-Mandé, made an attack in the rear. The brave pupils of the School, standing unflinchingly by their guns, resisted valiantly, and were fortunately aided by the National Guard, posted at the Trône barrier, and by a detachment of dragoons. The latter rushing on the guns, succeeded in retaking them. The battery was brought back to the heights of Charonne; and there, assisted by a crowd of the populace armed with fowling pieces, our brave youths continued to pour a destructive fire on the enemy.

Belleville was the key of the position; as long as this point, which crowned the chain of heights, was not carried, the mass of enemies fighting on the north, in front of la Villette, la Chapelle, and Montmartre, and those that fought on the south, between Vincennes and Charonne, could make no serious progress. The curved line of the Allies was, as it were, stopped near the centre at a fixed point, which was Belleville. Belleville, in fact, commanded the Romainville plateau itself. Numerous *clôtures*, joined to the advantage of the position, rendered resistance there more easy. Marmont, established on this spot with the *débris* of the Lagrange, Ricard, Padua, and Ledru des Essarts divisions, having besides at his command a large quantity of field artillery, kept his ground against numerous assailants, and sent word to Joseph, who had authorised the marshals to negotiate, that he did not yet feel himself obliged to surrender. The marshals' officer, who carried the message, found that Joseph had set off before he arrived, and he returned without having been able to fulfil his mission.

Meanwhile, the fatal hour was drawing nigh. Prince Schwarzenberg, not wishing to terminate the day without having carried the decisive point, ordered two attacking columns to advance, one towards the south, passing between Ménilmontant and the cemetery of Père la Chaise, was to take possession of the exterior boulevard, and so separate Belleville from the enceinte of Paris; the other column advancing to the north was ordered to seize, at any expense, Prés Saint-Gervais, la Petite-Villette, and the hillock of

Saint-Chaumont, and finish by joining the other column, coming from the south.

To conquer or perish was at this moment the fixed determination of the Allies, and it behoved them to overcome every obstacle without loss of time, for there was a possibility of Napoleon's arriving at any moment, and had he found the Allies repulsed from Paris, condign would have been their punishment for having dared to appear before the walls. About three in the afternoon the action re-commenced, furiously. Brigadier Paixhan's artillery, who proved on this day what can be done with well-posted heavy artillery, had placed eight guns of heavy calibre beyond Charonne, on the declivity of Ménilmontant, four on the north reverse of Belleville, and eight on the hillock of Saint-Chaumont. He took his place beside his cannon, charged with grape, accompanied by his gunners—some, veteran soldiers, others, youths from the schools, and waited until the enemy, who were masters of the plain, should essay to ascend the heights. In fact the Russian Grenadiers advanced, some to the south of the plateau, by Charonne, others marched straight to the plateau, in front of Belleville, and others approached the same point by the north, through Prés Saint-Gervais. Suddenly they are covered with grape; entire lines are overthrown. However, they sustain the fire steadily, and ascend on the south, the declivities of Ménilmontant, and passing by the exterior boulevard, attack Belleville in the rear; Belleville, where Marshal Marmont is desperately defending himself. The other division of Grenadiers who, with the Prussians and the Badeners, were attacking Pantin, Prés Saint-Gervais, and Petite-Villette and had snatched them from the Boyer and Michel divisions, now almost destroyed, ascended the hillock of Saint-Chaumont under the plunging fire of Brigadier-General Paixhan's batteries, carried the hillock, which, for want of troops, was not defended by infantry, and joined the column that arrived from the south, by Charonne and Ménilmontant. The enemy, having reached the exterior boulevard by the northern and southern declivities, succeeded in establishing themselves between Belleville and the barrier of that name, which they nearly carried.

On receiving intelligence of these events, Marshal Marmont, who had throughout kept his ground at Belleville, seeing himself cut off from the enceinte of Paris, assembled his remaining forces, and, supported by Generals Pelleport and Meynadier and Colonel Fabvier, rushes, sword in hand, on the Russian Grenadiers who begin to enter the high street, of the Temple Faubourg. He drives them back, closes the barrier against them, and resumes the defence at the *octroi* wall.

Mortier, on his side, struggled heroically in the plain of Saint-Denis, between la Villette and la Chapelle. La Villette, on his right, defended against Kleist and d'York, by the Curial and Charpentier divisions, was at length invaded by a host of enemies. At this spectacle Mortier, who occupied la Chapelle, with the Christiani

division of the Old Guard, takes a part of this division, and making a movement from left to right, entered Villette at the point of the bayonet, and succeeded in driving out the Prussian Guard, after a fearful carnage. But soon, fresh masses of the enemy, attacking Grande-Villette in the rear, by the canal of the Ourcq, and entering between la Villette and la Chapelle, Mortier is forced to abandon the plain and fall back on the barriers. At the same instant, Langeron advances towards the foot of Montmartre. Langeron, a Frenchman, leads the enemy against Paris! Advancing towards Montmartre, he expects to be enveloped in clouds of grape, but is surprised to find these heights silent; he ascends and seizes the few pieces of artillery that had been placed there, and which were feebly guarded by some of the sapper brigade. He marches afterwards to the Clichy barrier, which the National Guards, before Marshal Moncey's eyes, were bravely defending, and with a courage that proves what aids might have been obtained from the Parisian populace.

Such was the termination of two-and-twenty years of unprecedented triumphs, whose scenes of action had been successively Milan, Venice, Rome, Naples, Cairo, Madrid, Lisbon, Vienna, Dresden, Berlin, Warsaw, Moscow, and which now closed so disastrously before the walls of Paris.

No preparations having been made for a prolonged defence, by barricaded streets, and the population drawn up behind the barriers, with troops in reserve; the sole defence having consisted in a battle fought outside the walls of Paris with a handful of soldiers, against a formidable army, and that battle being inevitably lost, it was not to be supposed that the wall *d'octroi* could now stop the enemy's progress. It was better to spare Paris an unprofitable misfortune. Marmont, seeing no other resource, thought the time was come for using the powers conferred by Joseph on the two marshals commanding the army outside Paris, and had successively sent two officers to Prince Schwarzenberg to propose a suspension of arms. The battle raged with such fury that one of the delegates had not been able to cross to the enemy's quarters, and the other had been wounded. Marmont then sent a third.

At this moment General Dejean arrived all breathless, to announce that Napoleon, learning that the Allies had marched on the capital, had changed his course, and was advancing in all haste to Paris, that if the marshals could only hold out two days, they would see him appear at the head of considerable forces; that they ought, therefore, to resist at any cost, and when they could no longer resist, they should endeavour to cajole the enemy by parleying. In fact Napoleon, in this extremity, the Congress of Châtillon being dissolved, had written to his father-in-law for the purpose of resuming the negotiations, and authorised him to say so to Prince Schwarzenberg, in order to obtain some hours' suspension of arms. Marshal Mortier received General Dejean amid a hail of projectiles, and pointing out to him the *débris* of his divi-

sions, which still disputed the possession of la Villette and la Chapelle, he quickly convinced him of the impossibility of prolonging this species of resistance. It was evident there was nothing left to do but to apply to Prince Schwarzenberg, and the marshal accordingly wrote him a few words on a drum-head pierced with balls. He said that Napoleon resumed negotiations on bases that the Allies could not reject, and that, *en attendant*, it was desirable, for the sake of humanity, to stop the effusion of blood.

An officer, bearer of this letter, set off at full gallop, crossed the ranks of both armies, and succeeded in reaching Prince Schwarzenberg. The latter replied that he had received no intelligence of the resumption of negotiations, and could not, in the absence of such information, stop the battle, but he was willing to suspend the butchery on the immediate surrender of uaris. At the same moment, the third officer, sent by Marshal Marmont, having succeeded in obtaining an interview with the generalissimo, and having announced that the marshals, in order to save Paris, were ready to sign a capitulation, the parley assumed a more serious turn, and a meeting with the two marshals was appointed at La Villette. They repaired there, and found M. de Nesselrode, with several plenipotentiaries. Without losing a moment, the question of a suspension of hostilities was entered on. Divers pretensions were at first put forward by the representatives of the allied armies. They demanded that the troops who had defended Paris should lay down their arms. A movement of indignation was the sole reply vouchsafed by the two marshals. Then the adverse delegates reduced their demands to requiring the two marshals to retire into Brittany with those troops, in order that they might not exercise any influence on the sequel of the war. The marshals again answered in the negative, and demanded permission to retire where they pleased. These demands were acceded to, provided they evacuated the city that night. This condition was accepted, and it was agreed that some officers should meet in the evening to regulate the details of the evacuation of the capital.

Such was the celebrated capitulation of Paris, which cannot be reasonably condemned, for it was a matter of necessity on the part of the marshals. They had certainly done all that could be expected of them, since with 23, or 24,000 men they had, during an entire day, held their ground against 170,000, of whom 100,000 were actually engaged, and 6,000 of their troops were put *hors de combat*, they killed or wounded double that number of the enemy. Let us imagine what would have happened if Paris, holding out three or four days longer against the Allies, they had been surprised by Napoleon in their rear, at the head of 70,000 soldiers! And that it was not thus—whom shall we blame, if not in the first place Napoleon, who, having decided too late, to avow his real position, had not got the necessary defensive works executed under his own inspection round Paris! he who, scattering his resources from Alexandria to Dantzic, had not 50,000 muskets to give the Parisians; and after the Emperor, we must blame those who, delegated to represent him

in his absence, had displayed so little activity, intelligence, and energy, and had reduced the defence of the capital to a battle of 24,000 men against 170,000 !

In negotiating for their *corps d'armée*, the two marshals had not been able to make any stipulation relative to the city of Paris and the Government that resided within its walls, for they had neither the powers nor the mission to do so. Moreover, all the ministers had retired with Joseph. The Duke of Rovigo, faithful to what had been agreed on—for it was arranged that the ministers should follow the Empress-Regent when Paris should be no longer tenable—had set out, leaving the two prefects—one of whom directed the administration of the capital, and the other the police—the care of maintaining tranquillity in the city. There was consequently no longer a government; and the void, whose ill effects had been so frequently pointed out by those that opposed the departure of the Empress-Regent, was at length created.

The man destined soon to fill this void—M. de Talleyrand, whom by a secret instinct Napoleon had foreseen as the author of his fall, and whom the public, by an instinct as correct, looked upon as the necessary author of an approaching revolution,—M. de Talleyrand found himself at this moment in a state of extreme perplexity. In virtue of his rank as Grand Dignitary, he ought to follow the Regent; but by leaving, he rejected the great part that awaited his acceptance; and by not leaving, he exposed himself to be taken in an overt act of treason, which might involve serious consequences, if Napoleon, by a sudden stroke of good fortune—always possible in his case—should reappear as conqueror before the gates of the capital. To extricate himself from this embarrassment, he sought an interview with the Duke of Rovigo to obtain permission to remain at Paris, saying that, in the absence of the entire government, he would be able to render important services. The Duke of Rovigo, suspecting that these services would be rendered to some other than to Napoleon, refused the desired permission, which, in fact, he had not power to accord. M. de Talleyrand sought the prefects, but could not obtain what he desired; and not knowing how to cover with a specious pretext his prolonged stay at Paris, he took the resolution of stepping into his carriage, and affect at least a willingness to follow the Regent. Towards the close of the day, as the battle ceased to rage, he presented himself, without passport and with great travelling pomp, at the barrier leading to the Orleans route. The barrier was occupied by the National Guards, highly irritated against those who, during the past two days, had deserted the city. A kind of tumult was raised about M. de Talleyrand's carriage; some contemporaries regard this as a national outburst, others believe it to have been pre-arranged. His passport was demanded; he had none; a murmur was raised against this neglect of an essential formality; and then, with an affected deference to the opinion of the brave defenders of Paris, he retraced his steps and returned to his mansion. The greater part of those who

contributed to detain him, and who were not desirous of a revolution, little suspected they had detained the man who was about to effect one.

Not being fully satisfied as to the formality of his conduct, M. de Talleyrand repaired to the house of Marshal Marmont, who, the battle now over, had hastened to his dwelling, situate in the *Faubourg Poissonnière*. People of every class flocked thither, seeking, on some side, a government, and crowding round the man who, at this moment, seemed to represent one, since he was head of the only force existing in the capital. Marshal Mortier was subordinate to him on all important occasions. The two prefects, a portion of the municipal body, and several distinguished personages were present. Every one spoke of the late events with emotion, and according to his individual sentiments. Seeing the marshal, whose face was blackened with powder and his coat rent by balls, the assembly felicitated him on his courageous defence of Paris, and then proceeded to talk of the situation of affairs. There was a species of unanimity in condemning what they called the cowardly desertion of those that Napoleon had left in the capital to defend it, and against Napoleon himself, whose mad policy had brought the armies of Europe to the foot of Montmartre. The royalists—and there was a considerable number present—did not hesitate to say that the French ought to throw off an insupportable yoke, and boldly named the Bourbons. Two influential bankers, M. M. Peregaux and Lafitte, the one connected by the ties of blood, the other by those of friendship, with the Duke of Ragusa, attracted attention by the vivacity of their language. The second especially, whose secular success had just commenced, and whose versatile and brilliant talents had attracted general attention, spoke strongly, and went so far as to exclaim, on hearing the name of the Bourbons pronounced: “Well, be it so, give us the Bourbons, if you wish, but with a constitution that will guarantee us against a fearful despotism, and with peace, of which we have been so long deprived.” This unanimity of feeling against the imperial despotism, carried so far as to make the upper bourgeoisie consider the Bourbons, with whom they had never come in contact, very acceptable, produced an extraordinary impression on all present. It was suggested in the assembly that they ought not to think exclusively of the army, that the capital too, ought to engage their attention. Marshal Marmont replied that he was not empowered to treat for the capital; it was therefore thought proper that the prefects, with a deputation from the Municipal Council and the National Guard should be deputed to wait on the allied sovereigns, and demand from them that treatment to which Paris had a right from civilized princes, who, since the passage of the Rhine, had announced themselves as the liberators, and not the conquerors of France.

Whilst these discussions were at the height, M. de Talleyrand arrived. He had a private conversation with Marshal Marmont.

He wished at first to obtain something resembling an authorization of his stay at Paris, the which no person was less in a position to grant than the marshal; but he began to set less value on this permission when he saw what was passing around him. He instantly conceived the idea of making this visit facilitate a *denouement* which he now began to regard as inevitable, and which should, of necessity, be accomplished by him. No man was more open to flattery than Marshal Marmont, and none knew better than M. de Talleyrand how to administer the draught. The Marshal had, during this campaign, committed serious errors, but discoverable only by military men, whilst he had, at the same time, displayed heroic bravery. On this very day especially, the 30th March, he had acquired lasting claims on the gratitude of his country. His face, his hands, his dress bore testimony to what he had done. M. de Talleyrand praised his courage, his talents, and especially his understanding, very much superior, as he affirmed, to that of the other marshals. The Duke of Ragusa, as usual, became very much elated when told that he was endowed with high intelligence, in which his fellow-commanders were deficient, and it must be acknowledged, that in this respect, he possessed what they could lay no claim to. He listened, consequently, with a sentiment of profound satisfaction to what the arch tempter, who was preparing his ruin, told him. M. de Talleyrand took some trouble to point out the serious position of affairs, and the necessity of extricating France from the hands that had destroyed her; he gave the marshal to understand that under existing circumstances, a soldier who had defended Paris so gloriously, and who had still under his command the men at whose head he had fought, possessed the means of saving his country, which had now no master. M. de Talleyrand went no further, for he knew that no person is seduced at a first attempt. He took his departure, and left the unfortunate Marmont intoxicated with vanity; and now, amid the disasters of France he sketched for himself, in imagination, the most brilliant destiny, whilst the simple-minded and upright soldier, who had been his colleague, on this same 30th March, Mortier, whose face, too, was blackened with powder, devoured his grief in the loneliness to which his modesty and uprightness consigned him.

Night was already advanced; the officers, chosen by the marshals, were about arranging with Prince Schwarzenberg's representatives the details of the evacuation of Paris; the two prefects, with a deputation, selected from the members of the Municipal Council and officers of the National Guards, left the Hôtel de Ville for the Château of Bondy, where they intended to make an appeal to the better feelings of the victorious sovereigns.

At this very moment Napoleon arrived before the gates of Paris. We have already seen that, on the 23rd March, he stopped in the neighbourhood of Saint-Dizier, to give his troops some rest, and

collect the garrisons that were to reinforce his army. On the 24th and 25th he operated diverse movements between Saint-Dizier and Vassy, still flattering himself that he had drawn Prince Schwarzenberg after him, and in this belief he was confirmed by the reports of his lieutenants, who, still retaining the impression received on the day of Arcis-sur-Aube, fancied they saw on every side innumerable masses of the enemy. Napoleon had determined to ascertain the exact state of things, by profiting of the first opportunity to reconnoitre closely the numerous troop of cavalry that followed in his track. Meanwhile, M. de Caulaincourt, inconsolable that the negotiations had been broken off, insisted that an effort should be made to resumethem, which Napoleon seemed little inclined to do. A favourable circumstance had, however, occurred, and M. de Caulaincourt had done himself a sort of violence to turn it to profit. General Piré, reconnoitring with the light cavalry, had taken prisoners Baron de Wessenberg and M. de Vittrolles himself, who was returning from his mission to the Count d'Artois, and who, happily for him, was not recognised. M. de Caulaincourt, seconded by Berthier, had succeeded in obtaining the liberation of M. de Wessenberg, and sent him with a letter to Prince Metternich, in which M. de Caulaincourt declared that Napoleon was at length resigned to make great sacrifices, without, however, saying what they were. It was all that M. de Caulaincourt had been able to obtain from his master, though he would have wished to be more precise in these new overtures, in order that they might be better received. M. de Wessenberg, having been set free on condition of fulfilling the mission, undertook it, and, passing M. de Vittrolles for one of his servants, saved him from imminent danger.

An opportunity of making a close reconnaissance having offered on the 26th, Napoleon took care to profit by it. Whilst he was between Saint Dizier and Vassy, on the left of the Marne, filling the entire country between the Marne and the Aube with his troops, he perceived a vast number of cavalry on the right bank of the Marne, a little above Saint Dizier, in the direction of Vitry. At the sight of the enemy appearing in force, there was no time for hesitation; it was necessary to advance, in the first place, to give battle, and in the second place, to learn who the enemy might be. Notwithstanding the serious disadvantage of crossing a river in presence of troops drawn up in line of battle, the French marched straight to the Hœricourt ford, and crossed the Marne *en masse*, at that point, with the exception of Oudinot's corps, that was sent a little higher up, to cross at Saint Dizier. The enemy was embarrassed on discovering they had to do with the entire French army. Still, the enemy had ten thousand horse, and some thousand light infantry, that charged us at the moment we were crossing the Marne. They got the reception they deserved. The cavalry of the Guard, after a sharp contest with the enemy's squadrons, routed them completely. They were obliged to fall back, and Wintzingerode, for it was he, seeing that he had imprudently implicated

himself, determined to regain the Bar-sur-Aube route, notwithstanding the disadvantage of defiling within range of Saint Dizier, of which Oudinot had taken possession. We charged, à *outrance*, the retreating enemy, and whilst they were sharply attacked in the rear, they were at the same time taken in flank by our infantry, that debouched by Saint Dizier. Two battalions of infantry, having in vain attempted to form in square, the brave Letort rushed on them at the head of the Dragoons of the Guard, and cut them in pieces. The impetuosity of the charge was such, that the dragoons continued their course, without regarding the Russian infantry that they had broken and ridden past. The latter, who had feigned to yield, seeing the dragoons pass, tried to form again into line, and fired on them from the rear. Our horse, retracing their steps, cut them down without mercy. This pursuit lasted till night, and our troops returned to Saint Dizier, after having killed or made prisoners four thousand of Wintzingerode's rear-guard, that had been sent to follow and deceive us. We captured, besides, thirty pieces of cannon. This victory only cost us three or four hundred men. A brilliant trophy—the last, alas! of this heroic and fatal campaign.

The next day, the 27th, Napoleon having learned that the enemy still held Vitry, approached to take the place, but an old wall and a moat filled with water, were obstacles that presented some difficulty. Macdonald, whom our late misfortunes had irritated, made the remark to Napoleon with some bitterness, and an altercation on the subject ensued between them, when one of the enemy's bulletins, seized by our soldiers, was brought. This bulletin related, after the enemy's fashion, the fatal battle of Fère-Champenoise. This missive, though the date was incorrect, proved beyond all doubt that the Allies had marched on Paris. After the sad confirmation of this fact, obtained from some prisoners, Napoleon returned to Saint Dizier, deeply touched by this intelligence, and still more deeply affected by the impression produced on those about him. Spirits already restless, thinking of what might have happened since they left for Lorraine, no longer restrained themselves, when they heard that the Allies had marched on Paris; they burst out with a species of fury against the mad obstinacy of Napoleon, to whom, since the return of M. de Caulaincourt, they attributed the breaking off of the negotiations. They did not hesitate to say, that, having caused the destruction of part of the army in this campaign, he was now about to cause the destruction of the capital itself, and that whilst he was fighting uselessly in the rear of the Allies, they would perhaps avenge the burning of Moscow by setting Paris in flames. The commotion soon became so great, as to call for interference, and the following day, the 28th, Napoleon deliberated, in company with Berthier, Ney, and Caulaincourt, what was to be done. Could they only have known that Paris was beyond help, and that the best course was to persevere in a project, hazardous certainly, but which now offered the only remaining chance of safety—that of allowing the Allies, to effect a revolution in the capital,

and fall upon their rear with the 120,000 men that Napoleon could have assembled. But entertaining the hope that Paris was not utterly lost, it was natural to march thither as quickly as possible; and since Napoleon had not succeeded in turning the allied generals from the capital by his last movement, he might at least endeavour to surprise them at the moment when they should be engaged before the walls of the great city, and fall upon them like a thunder-crash.

Such were the sentiments of Ney and Berthier, and they warmly maintained their opinion. So strong was the general feeling, that to hasten to Paris was become a universal passion.

Napoleon, who was not led by emotion, thought differently. He had marched towards the fortresses to strengthen his army, and return at the head of 100,000 men, a force that, under his command, would make the Allies tremble. Paris being taken, or in danger of being taken, was not a sufficient reason for being turned from this great object; for no sooner would the Allies know of his being at the head of such a force, than they would hasten to quit Paris, or if they remained, pay dearly for the satisfaction of having appeared there for a moment. Napoleon attached little importance to the idea of a political revolution, because that, spite of his sagacity, he had never realized to himself the discredit into which his government had fallen. He saw things only from a military point of view; and under this aspect, he thought it more important to have 100,000 at his command, than to save Paris. However, unsupported in his opinion, accused of insane obstinacy, he was obliged to soothe the universal affliction, by giving up his own opinion and resolving to assist the capital. But if he were to go there at all, it would be necessary to march there immediately, as, in order to arrive in time, there was not a moment to lose. Napoleon took his resolution instantly, and set out that very hour, crossing straight from the Marne to the Aube, from the Aube to the Seine, in order to reach Paris by the left bank of the latter river, and so avoid encountering the allied armies.

Having left Saint-Dizier on the 28th, he passed the night with the army at Doulevant, and resumed his march on the 29th, crossed the Aube at Dolancourt, and slept at Troyes, leaving in the rear his army, that could not travel distances as rapidly as he. *En route*, he received a message from M. de Lavallette, informing him of the danger of the capital, the mass of enemies that threatened Paris from without, and the activity of plots that threatened it from within. On receiving this message, Napoleon hastened his march. On the morning of the 30th he reached Villeneuve-l'Archevêque, and there, ceasing to march in military fashion, wishing to encourage the Parisians by his presence, he travelled post, sometimes on horseback, sometimes in a miserable chariot, and thus, accompanied by M. de Caulaincourt and Berthier, he advanced towards Paris. He sent forward, as we have seen, General Dejean, to announce his arrival, and earnestly urge the mar-

shals to prolong their resistance. About midnight, having travelled at full speed the entire day, either on horseback or *en voiture*, he at length reached Fromenteau, all-impatient to know what was going on. A large number of cavalry was seen advancing, preceded by some officers. Without hesitation Napoleon called these officers. "Who goes there?" he asked. "General Belliard," replied the leader. It was, in fact, General Belliard, who, in compliance with the conditions of the capitulation of Paris, was going to Fontainebleau, to find a suitable position for the troops of the two marshals. Napoleon sprang from his carriage, seized General Belliard by the arm, led him to the roadside, and overwhelmed him so with questions that he had scarcely time to reply. "Where is the army?" said he, immediately. "Sire, the army is coming up." "Where is the enemy?" "At the gates of Paris." "And who occupies Paris?" "Nobody: it is evacuated." "What, evacuated? and my son—my wife—my government—where are they?" "On the Loire." "On the Loire! who counselled such a proceeding?" "But, sire, it was said to be in obedience to your orders." "My orders had no such meaning: but Joseph—Clarke—Marmont—Mortier, what has become of them? what have they done?" "Sire, we have not seen either Joseph or Clarke the entire day. As to Marmont and Mortier, they have behaved like honest men. The troops have acted admirably. Even the National Guards, wherever they were exposed to fire, vied with the soldiers. They bravely defended the heights of Belleville as well as the opposite declivity, looking towards Villette. They even defended Montmartre, where there were only a few pieces of cannon, and the enemy, believing the place to be better defended, sent a column along the Revolte route to turn Montmartre, thus running the risk of being driven into the Seine. Ah, sire! had we had a reserve of ten thousand men—had you been there, we would have thrown the Allies into the Seine, saved Paris, and avenged the honour of our country!" "Undoubtedly, had I been there; but I cannot be everywhere! And Clarke, and Joseph, where were they? And my two hundred Vincennes cannon, what has been done with them? And my brave Parisians, why were not they called into action?" "We do not know, sire. We were alone, and we did our best. The enemy lost at least twelve thousand men." "I ought to have expected it," cried Napoleon. "Joseph lost me Spain, and now he loses me France. I ought to have believed that poor Rovigo, who told me that Clarke was a coward, a traitor, and, moreover, a stupid. But let us have done with complaints, we must repair the evil. Caulaincourt—my carriage."

Having finished these words, Napoleon began to walk in the direction of Paris, ordering every body to follow him, as if he could thus gain time. But Belliard and the others endeavoured to dissuade him. "It is too late," said Belliard, "to go to Paris; the army has been obliged to leave, the enemy will soon arrive, if they are not already there." "But," replied Napoleon, "I shall lead on

the army again, and drive the enemy out of Paris; my brave Parisians will hear my voice, and they will all rise and drive the barbarians beyond their walls." "Ah, sire, it is too late; the infantry is even now following me—besides, we have signed a capitulation that forbids our return." "A capitulation; and who has been so cowardly as to sign one?" "Honest men, sire, who had no alternative."

During this colloquy, Napoleon is still advancing, refusing to listen to any remonstrance, and calling for his carriage, which Caulaincourt does not bring, when an infantry officer is seen advancing. It was Curial. Napoleon calls him, and then learns that the infantry is on the spot—that is to say, three or four leagues distant from Paris, and that the time for returning to the capital is past. Conquered by facts, by the explanations he receives, Napoleon pauses at the two fountains that rise on the Juvisy route, sits beside the waters, covers his face with his hands, and remains some time plunged in profound reflection.

All present are silent; they look at each other; they wait anxiously the result of the Emperor's meditations. At length he rises, and asks to be shown some place where he can find a few moments' shelter. He had travelled without cessation thirty leagues *en voiture*, and thirty on horseback; he was worn out with fatigue, but he seemed unconscious of exhaustion. He asked for a table and lights; he wanted to look at his maps, and give orders. A messenger is despatched to the neighbouring post-master, a light is brought, and the Emperor's face becomes visible. His features exhibit some traces of his late emotion, but no disturbance of mind—the prevailing expression is invincible energy.

The maps are spread; he examines them; he reflects, and then says—"If I had the army here all would be set right! Alexander is going to show himself to the Parisians. He is not badly inclined; he has no desire to burn Paris; he only wishes to show himself in this great city. To-morrow he will hold a review; he will have one portion of his troops on the right of the Seine, another on the left. Some will be in Paris, some outside, and in that position, if I had my army, I would crush them all. The people would join me. They would fling every available missile on the heads of the Allies. The peasants of Burgundy would finish the work. Not one of them should return to the Rhine. The greatness of France would be restored. If I had the army! But my troops will not arrive for three or four days. Ah! why did not Paris hold out some hours longer?" And as he uttered these words Napoleon walked up and down the small room, which was scarcely large enough to hold him and the few witnesses of this strange scene. In order to calm him M. de Caulaincourt said: "But, Sire, the army will come, and in four days your Majesty can do what you would do to-day." Napoleon who, up to this moment, seemed neither to hear or understand what was said to him, suddenly raised his head and walked straight up to M. de Caulaincourt, and he, who had never appeared

to admit the possibility of a revolution, exclaimed: "Ah! Caulaincourt, you do not know men. Three days; two days; you do not know what may be done in that short time. You know not all the intrigues that will be plotted against me. You know not how many there are who will abandon me. I could name them for you if you wish. Listen; the people say that I have ordered the Empress and my son to leave Paris. It is true; but I cannot explain everything. The Empress is a child. They would make use of her against me, and God knows what acts they would force her to commit. But let us forget these trifles. Three days, four days; 'tis very long. However, the army will arrive, and if I am properly seconded France may be saved." Napoleon relapsed into silence, sank into thought; he took a few rapid steps, then, in a tone of inspiration he exclaimed: "Caulaincourt, I have our enemies trapped. God will deliver them up to me. I shall annihilate them in Paris, but I must gain time. You must help me to gain it." Then, intimating that he wished to be alone he remained with M. de Caulaincourt, to whom he explained his plan, which was as follows:—M. de Caulaincourt was to go to Paris to visit Alexander, by whom he would be well received. He should appeal to the recollections of this Prince, seek to awaken his old sentiments, point out the dangers that threatened him in this great capital, especially when Napoleon, approaching with 60,000 men, would be joined by the 20,000 that were leaving Paris, all burning for revenge, and wishing at any time to redeem the honor of our arms. These ideas must have already presented themselves to the imagination of Alexander, but would doubtless produce still more effect when placed before his eyes by another. If in this disposition of mind an immediate offer of peace were made to him on conditions nearly the same as those of Châtillon he would not compromise his triumph, he would lend a willing ear, he would send M. de Caulaincourt to the French head-quarters. M. de Caulaincourt would go and return. Three or four days would soon pass, and then, added Napoleon, I should have the army, and all would be set right. "But, sire," replied M. de Caulaincourt, "would not that be an opportunity of negotiating seriously and submitting to events, if not to men, and to accept the Châtillon bases or at least their principles?" "No," replied Napoleon, "it is sufficient to have hesitated an instant. No, no; the sword must decide everything. Cease to humiliate me. The dignity of France can still be saved. The chances are great, if you only gain me three or four days." Firm as M. de Caulaincourt was, he could with difficulty resist the torrent of this energy, whose impetuosity so many misfortunes had not abated. He asked that Prince Berthier should accompany him, as he knew the resources that the Emperor had still at his disposal, and was himself known and esteemed by the sovereigns, and would be listened to with attention. Napoleon did not allow M. de Caulaincourt to finish. In the first place he wanted Berthier, who alone knew how the army was distributed through the confused

theatre of war ; but this was not his strongest reason. "Berthier is excellent," said Napoleon, "he has great qualities, he loves me, I love him, but he is weak. You have no idea of what those intriguers who are going to set to work are capable of doing. Go without him ; you are the only one whose temperament would enable you to visit unhurt the focus of those intrigues."

After this animated conversation it was decided that Napoleon should fix himself at Fontainebleau, where he should concentrate the army and collect his remaining resources, and that whilst he was preparing everything for a last and formidable struggle, M. de Caulaincourt should endeavour, if not to stop, at least to retard the political enterprises which the Allies, together with the malcontents, were about to attempt in Paris—that three or four days would thus be gained, and by that time the longed-for moment would have arrived when Napoleon should appear at the gates of the capital ; perhaps, indeed, to be defeated, but even so to involve the coalition in his ruin. M. de Caulaincourt accepted the mission with his usual fidelity, not indeed with the intention of deceiving the allied sovereigns, for he would not wish to deceive any one, not even the enemies of his country, but in the hope of renewing relations between an intractable master and victorious Europe. He left for Paris, whilst Napoleon set out for Fontainebleau, after having ordered the troops which arrived to take up a position on the river Essonne, and establish themselves firmly there. It was behind this line that Napoleon wished to concentrate his forces. He was so animated that one might have believed him on the eve of one of his greatest victories, rather than on the morrow of one of his greatest disasters. His ardent imagination had already conceived a design which could, he thought, change the destinies of all. He was bringing with him 50,000 men, who would be joined by 15,000 or 18,000 that were leaving Paris. With what he could collect from the banks of the Seine and the Yonne he would not have less than 70,000 combatants, whom he wished to concentrate between Fontainebleau and Paris, along the Essonne, his right on the Seine, his left in the direction of Orleans, where were his wife and son. The enemy would be dispersed in Paris, divided on the two banks of the Seine, and with 20,000 soldiers, whose hearts were inflamed with honor and patriotism, and Napoleon did not despair of striking terrible blows ; blows that would resound through ages to come. Who could tell ; perhaps in one bloody day he would restore the greatness of France. These ideas succeeded each other with the rapidity of lightning in his mind, and after sending M. de Caulaincourt to Paris he gave his orders to General Belliard, desiring him to go to the river Essonne, and to summon the two marshals thither and fix them on the banks of the Seine, on the Orleans route ; he told him that on the next day he would furnish them with artillery to replace what they had lost in the glorious and fatal battle of Paris. Having made these arrangements he quitted M. de Caulaincourt and Belliard, and set out for Fontainebleau with Berthier to await and collect his army there.

Whilst Napoleon proceeded thither, M. de Caulaincourt took the road to Paris, and repaired to the Hôtel de Ville, seeking the municipal authorities—the sole power that still subsisted in our deserted capital. But they had already repaired to Bondy, to make an appeal to the allied sovereigns in favour of the Parisians. The greater part of the night had passed. The Emperor Alexander had received the two prefects, and the deputation that accompanied them, in his most gracious manner. This monarch, at length master of Paris, was at the height of his wishes. His pride once satisfied, all his good qualities came into play. His most decided inclination was the desire to please, and there were none whose approbation he more desired than that of those French who had conquered him so often, and whom he in his turn had conquered, and whose applause he passionately ambitioned. His most cherished dream was to astonish this generous people by the extent of his generosity, a noble weakness, if it were one.

He therefore received the two prefects and the Parisian deputation with the greatest courtesy, repeated to them what he had so often said before, that he did not war against France, but against the mad ambition of a single man; that he did not mean to impose either a government or a humiliating peace on France; but to deliver her from a despotism from which she had not suffered less than all Europe. He guaranteed the best treatment to the capital, provided the Parisians remained quiet, and he showed himself as friendly towards his guests as they desired to be towards him. He consented, without any difficulty, to confide the care of Paris to the National Guard, and not to billet his soldiers on the inhabitants. He only asked for provisions, which they had, and which they promised him.

As soon as the general conversation was finished, he addressed himself individually to each member of the deputation, and again affirmed, that whilst he brought the most honourable peace to France, he would also leave her full liberty in the choice of her government. He was particularly anxious to know what had become of M. de Talleyrand, what this great man was doing, and where he then was. M. de Nesselrode, who was present at this conversation, requested M. de Laborde, one of the deputation with whom he was acquainted, to repair immediately to M. de Talleyrand to detain him at Paris, if he had not left, and to assure him that the allied sovereigns held him in the highest esteem.

Whilst the prefects were with Alexander the officers of the two armies had arranged the conditions for the evacuation of Paris. It was agreed that at about seven in the morning the soldiers of Marshals Marmont and Mortier should deliver the barriers to the soldiers of the allied armies, after which the sovereigns would make their entrance into Paris.

Meantime M. de Caulaincourt, not having found the Parisian authorities at the Hôtel de Ville, had repaired to the Château de Bondy, met the deputation returning, and after great difficulty succeeded in gaining admittance to Alexander. Alexander received

him with the same cordiality as formerly, embraced him in the most affectionate manner, and explained why he had not received him at Prague; then coming to the great events of the day he said that, free from all resentment, and only desirous of peace, he came to seek it at Paris, since he had not been able to find it at Châtillon; that he wished it to be honorable for France, but also secure for Europe, and for that reason neither he nor his allies would any longer consent to negotiate with Napoleon; that it would not be difficult to find a person with whom they could treat, as they heard on all sides that France was as weary of Napoleon as Europe itself, and that she desired nothing better than to be rid of his despotism; that besides, the Allies had no idea of doing violence to this glorious France, but, on the contrary, meant to treat her with all respect, to leave her the choice of her own sovereign, and to conclude a peace with that sovereign as soon as France should have chosen him; that when they had entered Paris they would consult the most eminent persons to whom they would apply in every difference of opinion, and that what should be decided on by the most respectable persons of the country should be adopted by the Allies and consecrated by the adhesion of Europe.

Dismayed by language so firm, and at the same time so calm and mild, M. de Caulaincourt sought to combat the opinions expressed by Alexander. He tried to make him feel the danger the Allies would run if they, the representatives of social order and monarchy in Europe, in favouring revolutionary principles, should dethrone a prince so long recognised and flattered by all the powers, who had been accepted by them as an ally, and by one as a son-in-law; he dwelt on the danger of being influenced by the malcontents, who only consulted their own passions, and being thus deceived as to the true sentiments of France, who, while she condemned the continual wars of Napoleon, was still grateful for the glory and internal order she had enjoyed under his reign, and felt little inclination to exchange his powerful and glorious hand, for the weak and forgotten one of the Bourbons; in a word, the danger of driving Napoleon and the army to despair, and exposing to new and fearful risks an unhoped-for triumph, a triumph that might be confirmed that very instant, and rendered definite by an equitable and moderate peace.

These reasons appeared to have little weight with Alexander. He said that the Allies, having no party interests nor private views, they would not be guided by the malcontents, but by sensible men; that the allied sovereigns had not, and could not, have any desire to overturn thrones; that they were aware of the danger of reducing Napoleon to despair, but were resolved, after having come so far, and especially as they were now so united, to pursue the struggle to the utmost, that they might not be obliged to recommence it under less favourable circumstances; that, of course, they expected, that as long as Napoleon wielded a sword, he would make extraordinary exertions, but that, even should they be driven

back from Paris, they would return again and again, until they should have obtained an assured peace, a peace that could not be expected from a man who had ravaged Europe from Cadiz to Moscow.

Nevertheless, although Alexander affected not to fear any final act of desperation on the part of Napoleon, it was evident that he was interiorly disturbed by the apprehension, and that it would be an argument of great weight in the negotiations that were to follow. As to those resolutions which appeared so irrevocable on the part of the Allies, M. de Caulaincourt asked the Czar whether the Emperor of Austria had no regard for family ties, and if he had brought his soldiers so far that he might have the honor of dethroning his daughter; that if that were the case, he could no longer reproach the French people with putting an archduchess to death when he was come himself to dethrone another. "The Emperor of Austria," replied Alexander, "has felt much difficulty in coming to a determination, but since you refused the armistice of Lusigny, which he had devised to bring about an accommodation, he is as firmly convinced as we, that it would be impossible to treat with his son-in-law, and that a treaty of peace, to be durable, must be signed by some other than he.

To this declaration Alexander joined fresh assurances of friendship for M. de Caulaincourt, asked him to come to see him again in the course of the day, promising to receive him at any hour, but at the same time made him promise to observe a diplomatic silence in Paris; he then left him, for the hour of triumph approached, and his vanity rendered him impatient. His desire was not to burn Paris but to enter there in triumph.

On Thursday, March 31, 1814—day of sorrow not to be forgotten—the allied sovereigns set out between ten and eleven in the morning to make their triumphal entry into Paris. The Emperor Alexander had assumed, and was allowed by the other sovereigns to play the chief part. The King of Prussia yielded it to him most willingly, too happy in the success of the allied arms, a success of which his distrust of fate made him doubt until the last moment. The Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, separated from the headquarters of the Allies by the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, had retired to Dijon, and were still ignorant of the taking of Paris. Prince Schwarzenberg possessed sufficient authority and knowledge of their intentions to represent them during these important transactions. Lord Castlereagh, minister of a government where everything must be explained to the nation, was gone to lay before Parliament the motives of the treaty of Chaumont. There was therefore nobody to dispute with the Czar a position which he soon assumed openly as well as filled in reality.

Alexander, having round his arm a white scarf, which he had worn as a distinctive mark on the field of battle, crossed the Faubourg Saint Martin, on horseback, accompanied by the King of Prussia on his right, and Prince Schwarzenberg on his left, followed by a

brilliant staff, and escorted by 50,000 chosen soldiers, marching in perfect order. A proclamation of the two prefects, announcing the benevolent intentions of the allied monarchs, had warned the Parisians of the solemn and sad event which was about to cast a gloom over their city. It would be difficult to describe the feelings of the Parisians under the influence of contradictory emotions. The people of Paris, always so sensitive of the honour of the French arms, irritated at not receiving the muskets they had demanded, and suspecting treason where there was only weakness, bore with an ill-concealed aversion the presence of the foreign soldiers; the *bourgeoisie*, more enlightened though not less patriotic, appreciating the causes and consequences of events, were divided between horror of the invasion, and satisfaction at seeing an end to despotism and war. The ancient French nobility, forgetting the glory of their country, which was once so dear to them, in their hatred of the revolution, were so intoxicated with joy at the fall of Napoleon, that it prevented them from feeling, in its full extent, the disaster that had befallen their native land. Some of them, anxious to effect in Paris a change like that produced in Bordeaux, traversed the Faubourg Saint Germain, the Place de la Concorde, and the Boulevards, waving a white flag, and crying, "Vive le Roi," a cry that found no echo, but often provoked evident disapprobation. Calmly and sadly the National Guards performed their duty, ready to maintain order, which indeed nobody seemed inclined to disturb.

Such was the aspect of Paris. As the allied sovereigns pursued their route through a dense and silent crowd, across the Faubourg Saint Martin to the Boulevard, they encountered at first only mournful and sometimes threatening countenances. Beyond that, not an insult, not an acclamation signalized their slow and solemn march. As they arrived at the Boulevard, and approached the principal quarters of the capital, the countenances began to change with the sentiments of the people; some exclamations were heard, that seemed to indicate that the generous intentions of Alexander were appreciated; he replied with evident sensibility. His repeated salutations to the people, and the order observed by his soldiers, soon produced more friendly manifestations. At last, the group of royalists appeared, who since morning had been traversing Paris with a white banner, and enthusiastic cries of "Long live Louis the Eighteenth! long live Alexander! long live William!" burst on the ears of the sovereigns, and caused them evident satisfaction. To the violent cries of this group, were soon joined those of some elegantly dressed women, who waved their white handkerchiefs, and saluted the foreign monarchs with the passionate vivacity of their sex; sad spectacle, that we must deplore, but cannot wonder at, for it is the same that in every age and every country a divided people presents. Party triumphs stifle every feeling of patriotic sorrow that the woes of country ought to awaken.

These last manifestations reassured the allied monarchs, whom

the cold ill will testified by the populace in the Faubourg Saint Martin and the Boulevard Saint Denis had alarmed at first, not indeed for their personal safety, but for the success of their designs. They proceeded without pause to the Champs Elysées to review their soldiers. This great military spectacle filled up the hours of the day, which were passed by their ministers in attending to more serious and pressing cares. It was of urgent necessity to address this city of Paris, so much dreaded even when conquered; to tell the people that the Allies were come neither to conquer, nor to oppress, nor to humble France, that they brought peace, which an intractable chief would not accept; and as to the form of their government, they were free to choose whatever they pleased. But in order to arrange this harangue, and to know to whom it should be addressed, it was necessary to concert with some persons of repute, therefore, during the review in the Champs Elysées, M. de Nesselrode had gone to one whom public opinion seemed unanimously to point out—in a word, to M. de Talleyrand. He found him in his celebrated hotel in the Rue Saint Florentin, awaiting the steps which might be so easily foreseen, and asked him, in the name of the allied monarchs, what government they ought to give to France, assuring him, at the same time, that they had more confidence in his judgment than in that of any other man in the Empire. M. de Talleyrand, who had long known and appreciated this skilful diplomatist now deputed to wait on him, received him most warmly, and said that it was indeed true that the Imperial government had lost all favour in the minds of the people, that the *régime* of perpetual warfare inspired as much horror in 1814, as the guillotine had in 1800; and that nothing would be easier than to bring about a revolution, provided the Allies treated France with the regard due to so great a country, and proved to her, by deeds as well as by words, that they desired rather to be liberators than conquerors—on such generous terms, it was easy to come to an understanding. M. de Nesselrode repeated the assurances which he had been commissioned to lavish, and the two diplomatists were commencing to discuss the grave subjects connected with the affair, when a singular message was brought to M. de Nesselrode from the Emperor Alexander.

Through a refinement of modesty, Alexander did not wish to take up his residence in the Tuilleries, but in the Elysée, and during the review a note was given him, saying that the Elysée was undermined. This note he sent to M. de Nesselrode, in order that he might enquire if there were any truth in the information. M. de Nesselrode communicated this message to M. de Talleyrand, who smiled at the childishness of the warning, but, at the same time, courteously offered to place his mansion at the Emperor Alexander's disposal, where he would have no danger to fear, and which had been long conducted in a princely style. M. de Nesselrode eagerly seized the offer, as an opportunity of testifying a high esteem for a person of whom the Allies had great need, whilst it would, at the

same time, augment M. de Talleyrand's influence, and facilitate, in many ways, the work in hand.

The Duke de Dalberg, the Abbé de Pradt, Baron Louis, and a number of other persons who had been for a long time either the confidants or the visitors of M. de Talleyrand, were assembled at his house to talk over the wonderful events which were about to be accomplished. There his court was prepared to receive the Emperor Alexander, when, having reviewed his troops, he should betake himself to the hotel in the Rue Saint Florentin. The Emperor Alexander, alighting from his horse on the Place de la Concorde, repaired on foot to the house of the great imperial dignitary, to whom he presented his hand with that courtesy which seduced those who did not know how much *finesse* was concealed beneath the charm of his manner. He then traversed the apartments which were already filled with an eager crowd, where the new royalists, whose numbers visibly increased, were presented to him, and having lavished the most flattering attention on everybody, he retired with M. de Talleyrand to consult concerning the resolutions which were to be adopted. The King of Prussia and Prince Schwarzenberg were immediately summoned to his conference, to which M. de Talleyrand asked permission to introduce his true and only accomplice, the Duke de Dalberg, who, more enterprising than he, had ventured to send an emissary to the allied camp. No sooner were these eminent persons met than they commenced to discuss the business for which they had assembled—that of giving a government to France.

Alexander, who had already acquired the habit, strengthened by daily practice, of opening and closing the deliberations, commenced by repeating what he had said to everybody—that his allies were not come to France to effect a revolution, but to seek peace; that they would have concluded it at Châtillon if Napoleon had agreed, but that, having met with nothing but refusals at Châtillon, and being obliged to come and seek peace within the very walls of Paris, they were willing to conclude it with those who sincerely desired it; that it was not their part to name who should represent France under these circumstances, or to decide as to its form of government; that they did not mean to prescribe any person; that they would not even have taken it upon them to exclude Napoleon himself, if he had not prevented his admission by peremptorily refusing the conditions on which the safety of Europe depended; but Napoleon, being now excluded, they were prepared to admit any person whom the French nation would seem to desire, the Regent Maria Louisa, Prince Bernadotte, the Republic itself, or the Bourbons. They were ready to admit whomsoever the French people might desire; but, both for the interest of Europe and of France herself, the French ought to choose a government strong enough to make themselves respected, particularly when succeeding the powerful hand of Napoleon, as it would be well to avoid a repetition of the work they were now about to accomplish.

Alexander did not deny that though the allied monarchs felt a natural preference for the Bourbons, they feared that those princes being now strangers in France and unacquainted with the people, might be unequal to governing the country; neither did they hope to form a solid government with a woman and child, such as Maria Louisa and the King of Rome, and this was the decided opinion of the Emperor of Austria; that for his part, when considering what would be the best government to give to France, he had sometimes thought of Prince Bernadotte, but that, not being supported in this opinion, he would not insist on it, and that in this state of indecision it would be easy to bend the opinion of the sovereigns to the desires of France, who alone had a right to be consulted here; that the Allies had but one interest and made but one claim, which was to secure a certain peace, and by offering one that was honourable, such as was due to a nation covered with glory, a nation against whom the Allies felt no resentment for their own injuries, knowing well that she had been as much oppressed as the rest of Europe by the detested yoke that had just been broken.

It was M. de Talleyrand alone who was expected to reply to this speech, so mild, flattering, and insinuating. These questions were particularly addressed to him, as the most esteemed of those to whom they could be propounded. Generally speaking, M. de Talleyrand was not anxious to express his opinion, and willingly gave precedence to more eager speakers; but he was capable of deciding promptly when necessary. M. de Talleyrand possessed, in the highest degree, the faculty of discerning the exact state of affairs; he knew well what suited each person, and possessed the art of clothing his opinions in a piquant or sententious guise, which gave them all the value of a *bon mot*, or of an aphorism. He saw clearly that as Napoleon owed his throne to his military victories, that it was by such victories alone he could retain it; that to him defeat was equivalent to dethronement; he saw that a republic could not be proposed to a generation that had witnessed the horrors of 1793, and that as monarchy was the only suitable government, the Bourbon was the only acceptable dynasty, for it would not be possible to create at will, and by artificial means, the conditions that qualify a family for the throne. Genius, or chance, born of revolution, might, for a moment, raise a man to the highest position, and of this there was a living proof; but this phenomenon, once passed away, the people would quickly resume opinions consecrated by time and long-formed national habits.

Safe from imperial vengeance, M. de Talleyrand slowly and clearly pronounced the truth upon this subject, and declared that Napoleon was no longer suitable to France. France, to which, indeed, he had rendered great services, though unfortunately at a very high price, saw in him, as did all Europe, the personification of war, whilst she was desirous of peace. Napoleon was consequently the very antithesis of what the present generation desired. It could not be expected that he would sign a treaty of peace. In

fact any peace, even on the most honourable terms—such as France might accept and Europe, in her wisdom, grant—would be certain to fall short of Napoleon's pretensions; nor could he subscribe it without demeaning himself, and, consequently, with the intention of breaking it. They must now abandon all idea of Napoleon, since he was incompatible with peace, for which the whole world called, and it would be seen, in leaving free scope to public opinion, still repressed, that this was the universal belief. And if Napoleon himself was not fit, neither were his wife and son. Who could seriously believe that he would not be the moving spring of a government carried on in the names of Maria Louisa and the king of Rome, and really rule in their name? Nobody. It would still be Napoleon, with all his disadvantages, added to those of dissimulation. It was consequently necessary to renounce such a combination, and since the august prince, who had given his daughter to Napoleon, was willing to make a sacrifice for Europe, that sacrifice ought to be accepted in thanking the Emperor of Austria for having so well comprehended the difficulties of the position. As to the proposition of choosing Prince Bernadotte, who was become heir to the throne of Sweden, it required still less consideration. France, after being governed by a soldier of genius, would never brook the rule of a mediocre soldier, one, too, who was covered with the blood of her sons. There, then, only remained the Bourbons. Certainly France, that had once known them well, knew little of them now, and even entertained certain prepossessions against them. But she would renew her acquaintance, and receive them willingly, if they brought back, not the prejudices which had been already the ruin of their house, but the healthy ideas of the age. M. de Talleyrand added that it would be necessary to bind them by wise laws, and reconcile them with the army by placing about them the most distinguished military men; that with tact, precaution, and assiduity, all this might be accomplished; in fact it should be made possible, for it was necessary; that after so much national commotion, the most crying public want was the re-establishment of the social edifice on a steady basis, which only seemed possible when the throne of France should be restored to its old possessors. Summing up his opinion in a few words, M. de Talleyrand said, "The republic is an impossibility; the regency and Bernadotte are an intrigue; the Bourbons alone are a principle."

Such language was sure to please the allied sovereigns, and would have found still warmer applauses amongst them, if the Emperor Francis, the true representative of old Europe, if Lord Castlereagh, the head of the tory party, had been present. However, the rare good sense of King William made him desire that all that had just been said should be true. Alexander, without desiring it so much, was still willing to admit it, provided that the restoration of the Bourbons might be a means of pacifying France, without humbling her—of pleasing, after having conquered her. M. de Talleyrand, who had expressed his opinion clearly and firmly,

but without vehemence, wishing to give it the support of an eloquence more lively and warmer than his, proposed to the Allies and their ministers, assembled in his drawing-room, to introduce some Frenchmen who, by their position, intelligence, or official rank, deserved to be heard. He called in the Abbé de Pradt, Archbishop of Mechlin, who had lately been ambassador at Warsaw; Baron Louis, a skilful financier, and employed by Napoleon on several important occasions, and General Dessoles, formerly head of Moreau's staff and one of the most esteemed men in the army.

The interview then lost its character of a *tête-à-tête*. The conversation became animated, and sometimes confused from its very animation. The Abbé de Pradt with his petulant language, Baron Louis with his firmness, and General Dessoles with his solid reason affirmed, each in his own manner, that there was an end to Napoleon's rule, that nobody any longer desired a madman who was ready to sacrifice France and Europe to his sanguinary chimeras, that his wife and son would be only he, under another name, that Bernadotte would be considered an insult, and that as a monarchy was desired the Bourbons alone could be thought of; that it was true they were not thought of yet, but nobody had had time to think, but that if their names were once openly spoken everybody would see that they were the only suitable princes, and that by providing against their prejudices by good laws, they would have all the advantages, without the inconveniences that their name afforded.

Nobody was more influenced than Alexander by the conclusiveness of this advice. "Since this is your unanimous opinion," said he, "it is not for us to oppose it." Then looking at his allies, who signified their approbation by an inclination of the head, especially Prince Schwarzenberg, who had visibly approved what had been said against the regency of Maria Louisa, he declared himself ready to accept the Bourbons; "For," said he, "it is not the representatives of the old European monarchies that could object to the restoration of this ancient family." This principle once admitted, it was next to be considered how the deposition of Napoleon was to be assured, and what government should be instituted to reconcile Europe to France, and France to herself. M. de Talleyrand and those who composed his extempore council were of opinion that they ought to make use of the Senate, whom they expected to find ready to overthrow a ruler they had so long flattered, and hated while they flattered. But in order to inspire this body with sufficient courage to come to a decision, it was necessary that Napoleon should appear irrevocably condemned. Without this certainty the same timidity which had kept the senators silent before Napoleon would still keep them silent in presence of his shadow. To remove this difficulty the first and simplest way was to declare that the allied sovereigns—assembled at Paris and prepared to grant the most honorable peace to France—had determined not to treat with Napoleon, with whom they believed it impossible to conclude a sincere and durable peace. Although this was a very serious

engagement to enter into, they could and they did not hesitate, as it were the only means to induce a burst of public opinion with regard to Napoleon. The declaration was therefore adopted. However, for those who desired the immediate restoration of the Bourbons, it was not sufficient to say that the Allies would not treat with Napoleon. It would be necessary to add nor with any member of his family, for, if any chance were left for his son, timid persons would hold back, and it was those whom it was important to influence at this moment. This necessary addition was made on the proposition of Abbé de Pradt, and the following declaration, signed by Alexander in the name of his allies, was immediately placarded on the walls of Paris.

"The armies of the Allied Powers occupy the capital of France. The Allied Sovereigns are willing to promote the wishes of the French nation.

"They declare—

"That if the conditions of peace necessarily involved the strongest guarantees when it was a question of restraining the ambition of Bonaparte, they need be less stringent, when France herself by again adopting the rule of a moderate government, will give the best pledge of peace.

"Wherefore the Allies proclaim—

"That they will not treat with Napoleon, nor with any member of his family.

"That they respect the integrity of ancient France, such as it existed under her 'legitimate kings; that they even do more, because they still maintain the principle that for the welfare of Europe, France ought to be great and powerful.'

"The Allied Sovereigns will recognize and guarantee whatever constitution the French nation will choose. They therefore invite the Senate to appoint a Provisional Government to discharge the functions of the executive, and prepare a suitable constitution for the French people.

"The intentions that I here express are shared with me by all the Allied Powers.

"ALEXANDER.

"COUNT DE NESSELRODE, Secretary of State.

"Three o'clock, p.m. Paris, March 31, 1814."

It was decided that M. de Talleyrand and his co-operators, authorised by this declaration, should consult with the members of the Senate, and prevail on them to appoint a Provisional Government; they would afterwards consider the mode of formally and definitely pronouncing the deposition of Napoleon.

After this first act the sovereigns separated. Alexander remained at M. de Talleyrand's; the King of Prussia went to the hotel of Prince Eugene, which has since become the Prussian Embassy. Orders were given that the allied troops should not be billeted on the inhabitants, but that, furnished with provisions, they should

bivouac in the principal places of the capital, especially in the Champs-Élysées. General Sacken was appointed Governor of Paris. The editors of the different journals were either changed or required to speak according to the spirit of the new revolution. The telegraph, such as it then was, announced the great events which had been transacted in the capital, together with the reiterated assurances of the generous intentions of the Allies. Royalists, old and new, who during the day had besieged the Hôtel Talleyrand, dispersed through the capital, in order to propagate the hope, and almost the certainty, of the restoration of the Bourbons. Those who during the morning had borne a white banner through the streets of Paris, having assembled tumultuously, proposed to address the foreign sovereigns, and demand the immediate proclamation of the Bourbons. They considered the declaration, that the Allies would not treat with Napoleon, was indeed something gained, but yet not sufficient; they should also proclaim that they would treat with none but the Bourbons, the only legitimate sovereigns of France. After a warm and disorderly deliberation, they separated, having agreed, on this one point, that a deputation should be sent to Alexander, to announce to him the formal wishes of the Royalists. Effectively this deputation sought Alexander, first at the Elysée, then at the hotel in the Rue Saint-Florentin, but was not received by that prince, but by M. de Nesselrode, who, confining himself within the bounds of a suitable reserve, said that Europe, through her representatives at Paris, meant to be guided altogether by the wishes of France; and if these wishes were, as everything seemed to indicate, favourable to the Bourbons, the allied sovereigns would be happy to assist in their restoration, and to contribute to it by their full consent.

Thus was the first act of the revolution accomplished. The sovereigns had entered Paris, had been favourably received by the disarmed populace, whom they were anxious to flatter; they had consulted some persons of importance, and by their advice had declared they would no longer treat with Napoleon, but were ready to treat advantageously with any government agreeable to the French nation. This was sufficient to induce public opinion, weary of the rule of a soldier, who never desired repose for himself, and would never allow it to others, to declare in favour of the only dynasty which now presented itself to the public mind, except, indeed, that which had been raised up by victory, and which victory had just overthrown. A moment's hesitation was necessarily caused by an event so sudden, and after twenty years' absence of the Bourbons; but hours were now about to accomplish what in other times might not have been brought about in months and years.

The same evening and the following morning all those restless spirits who fling themselves into the torrent of revolutions—some to seek gain, others for the sake of the excitement—came and went without ceasing from M. de Talleyrand's to those persons

especially the senators, whose assistance was necessary. No great resistance was to be dreaded on any side, for every one considered Napoleon's defeat equivalent to his dethronement. It is true that the people of Paris felt some regret for the brilliant warrior who had long dazzled their imaginations, and who but a few days before had still appeared as the defender of their walls; but for all France, with the exception of the inhabitants of a few large towns, and of the peasantry whose huts had been ravaged, peace, the natural consequence of Napoleon's fall, was a great relief. Besides, there was a general desire for change amongst those who more directly guided events. The old revolutionists, without reflecting, that it was the Bourbons that would succeed Napoleon, rejoiced at the prospect of being revenged on the author of the 18 Brumaire. Sensible persons saw in present events only the predicted consequence of unlimited power, and of the mad rashness which they had so often deplored. Men, entirely occupied by their own interests, and anxious to court fortune, not seeing her beside Napoleon, turned their attention elsewhere. Amid feelings so unanimous, it was not to be feared that the Senate would blush for, or persevere in, its long submission. In general persons feel indignant against those by whom a long obedience has been imposed, and far from being a shackle to modesty, the sense of imposed subjection serves as a pretext for ingratitude.

Of this the faithful and unfortunate Duke de Vicence was fully convinced, during this day (31st March) and the following night, for after leaving Alexander he had called on the many persons, who under different titles had served the imperial government, and who could be of assistance in this extremity. He believed that by claiming their promised faith, or at least their gratitude—for every one of these men owed his fortune to Napoleon—he would succeed in strengthening the fidelity of those who began to waver, and that if the allied sovereigns, who were so desirous not to offend public opinion, should find it still, though ever so little, in favour of Napoleon, they would stop, and, instead of a revolution, content themselves with making peace, a work for which M. De Caulaincourt was now prepared. He had secretly determined to violate his instructions, even should his acts be disowned at Fontainebleau, and sign the Châtillon bases at Paris. But his unceasing visits during four-and-twenty hours had brought him only surprise, indignation, and profound contempt for men whom he did not know sufficiently to expect what he now experienced. Upright, straightforward, and intellectual, M. de Caulaincourt did not possess that profound knowledge of men which forbids anger by excluding surprise. He passed two days in astonishment and anger. His first visit was to the hotel in the Rue Saint Florentin, but here he felt no surprise, for, knowing as he did M. de Talleyrand's just causes of complaint, he considered his conduct quite natural. He only hoped to be able to induce him to choose another course. "It is too late," said the great actor in the scene of the day, "all that can be now done for

Napoleon is to secure him a distant retreat. He is a madman, who has lost everything, and deservedly lost, and who should no longer be taken into consideration. Think of yourself, and look to your own interests. Your own honorable reputation and the friendship of the Emperor Alexander will assure you a position under any government. Consider your own interests, and forget a master who is weary of your sincerity." M. de Caulaincourt, who expected such language from M. de Talleyrand, passing over what concerned himself, and exercising the privilege of an old friend, endeavoured to awaken the favor with which M. de Talleyrand was believed to regard the regency of Maria Louisa, under which he might be the first personage in the state. "It is too late," repeated the Prince de Bénévento, "I wished to save Maria Louisa and her son by keeping them in Paris, but a letter from that man whose destiny is to destroy everybody, obliged them to leave for Blois, and caused the void that we are now seeking to fill up. Cease your regrets; all is at an end for Napoleon and his friends. Think of your children, and let us save France by the only means we can now employ." M. de Caulaincourt, seeing that M. de Talleyrand was irrevocably engaged to the cause of the Bourbons, lost all hope of influencing him. As M. de Caulaincourt left the cabinet of M. de Talleyrand, he passed a group composed of officials of the Empire, amongst whom the Abbé de Pradt, as was his wont, was speaking without the least reserve. M. de Caulaincourt, who recalled to mind the long flatteries of the Bishop of Mechlin, could not restrain his anger, and walking directly towards him, left him no resource but the staircase of the Hôtel Saint Florentin. The others surrounded M. de Caulaincourt and tried to calm him, assuring him that his honorable fidelity misled him, and that he ought now to open his eyes to the truth. "But why not open them before?" cried M. de Caulaincourt, addressing himself to these men, who had been once such warm partisans of the Empire, "Why not open them before? If you had supported me six months ago we should have stopped on the brink of the abyss the man that you now call a fool, a madman, and an intractable tyrant." To this they only replied by turning away their heads, and saying that all was at an end for Napoleon. Still in despair, M. de Caulaincourt hastened to visit several of the senators, but he found few doors that were not closed at his name, once so honored and so well received. Some were from home, others pretended to be; some, however, taken by surprise, received him. Amongst these a few appeared embarrassed, surprised, and sought to conceal with profound sighs their evident determination to do anything that should be asked of them. Others, more daring, declared in a loud voice that it was time to think of France, that had been too long forgotten, too long sacrificed to a man who had seriously compromised the country, and who would cause its destruction if it were not torn from his grasp. "Sacrificed by whom?" said M. de Caulaincourt with passion, "if not by those who now see for the first time that the hero, the god of yesterday, is only

a madman and a despot, who must be hurled from the throne for the safety of France." But these reflections of the honest Duke de Vicence, however just, could not alter anything, and he saw clearly that Napoleon's cause was lost, and that the utmost that could be done would be, perhaps, to save the son in abandoning the father, but there was scarcely time even for that, so fearfully rapid was the succession of events. Besides, although indignant at what he saw, he felt that what he heard was the truth, though it ill became the lips that pronounced it, and, as though he were the culprit against whom these just reproaches were directed from every side, he withdrew silent and dejected. Despairing of the Senate, he determined to appeal to Alexander and Prince Schwarzenberg, that he might save something from this great wreck.

The success denied to M. de Caulaincourt with the senators was easily obtained by M. de Talleyrand; some affecting indignation, others sighing, but all trying to find favour with the man who held the future in his hands, seemed prepared to yield a full consent to whatever might be proposed to them. More character was shown by those who, disciples of M. de Sieyès, had formed an inactive but severe opposition in the Senate. These were ready to undertake everything against Napoleon, and their dignity was uncompromised, for they had never flattered him, but they were not as ready as their colleagues to accept whatever conditions might be imposed. They asked whether they were to be led, like prisoners of war, to the feet of the Bourbons; and if, in recalling this family, there was to be no guarantee for the principles of the French revolution, and the restoration of that liberty which had been so long immolated to the author of the 18th Brumaire. They were assured that the Bishop of Autun, independent of his clearheadedness, had a particular interest in taking precautions against the Bourbons, and that as soon as Napoleon should be set aside by the votes of the Senate, he would immediately occupy himself in framing a constitution suited to the wants and lights of the age.

This being understood M. de Talleyrand, as Grand Dignitary and Vice President of the Senate, took the resolution of convoking this body for the 1st of April, the day following the entrance of the allied armies, in order to supply the want of a governing authority. Although many doors were knocked at and many senators visited, the number of those who had quitted the capital with Maria Louisa, or those whose offices kept them near Napoleon, and above all the number of the intimidated was so great, that of 440 scarcely 70 could be assembled. At three o'clock they took their seats and waited with resignation to hear what should be proposed to them. M. de Talleyrand told them, in an ill-written speech, the production of the Abbé de Pradt, that they were called on to aid a forsaken people (an expression expressly chosen, that the resolution about to be taken might be based on the departure of the regent), and to provide for that indispensable want of every society—a government; that they were consequently invited to form a Provisional Government

which might assume the rejected reins of authority. All listened in profound silence to this discourse, which was pronounced with M. de Talleyrand's usual *nonchalance*, and none made an objection; but the members of the liberal opposition demanded immediately that the Provisional Government should not alone take upon it the administration of the State, but that it should also frame a constitution, which would consecrate the principles of the French revolution; and one suborned to allure his colleagues, hastened to add that the Senate and the Legislative Body should occupy the place of the great political bodies in the future constitution. These propositions were reciprocally accorded, and it was decided that the government which they were about to appoint, after having assumed the power, should immediately proceed to frame a constitution.

This being decided, they were next to compose this so-called Provisional Government. It is unnecessary to mention that those who were to be chosen, and their number, had been already decided at M. de Talleyrand's. As three would not suffice for the many wants of the time, five were chosen, and those from amongst the most submissive friends of M. de Talleyrand, and who, at the same time, would be useful from their connections with the different parties. Therefore four other persons were joined with M. de Talleyrand, the appointed head of the new government. The first was the Duke de Dalberg, a man little known in France, but the oldest, the most active, and the most skilful operator in the deep intrigue which now saw the light; he was, besides, intimately connected with the foreign princes and ministers, who were the necessary support of the new revolution. This man being chosen for the foreign diplomacy, another was to be selected for the army. The choice fell upon the old Beurnonville, an officer in the early times of the revolution, a man of moderate abilities, good-natured and yielding, who, a short while since, was mourning over the misfortunes of Napoleon, with M. de Lavelette, and was now inveighing against his faults in the Hôtel Talleyrand. He was intimately connected with the greater number of the military malcontents. It was necessary to meet, as far as possible, the opinions of the different parties, without, however, going beyond the society of M. de Talleyrand, where all were essentially moderate. M. de Jancourt was selected; an honest man, an old constituent, mild, enlightened, liberal; one who had belonged to the minority of the nobility, and happily represented those who desired to unite the Bourbons and liberty. But that royalty, the ruling influence of the moment, might not be forgotten, the Abbé de Montesquiou was appointed. He had been one of the presidents of the *Assemblée Constituante*, and, under the Empire, had been the secret correspondent of Louis XVIII, a churchman, and a man of the world, who no longer officiated as a priest, frequented society, and who, while he retained more than one political prejudice, affected to have no religious prepossession; well informed, witty, independent, but haughty and irritable, chosen now as an accessory, but des-

tinued to become soon the principal person, because, besides to the advantage of representing a power that was hourly gaining importance, he joined that of having the most decided opinions of any member of the new government.

As we have said, these men had been previously fixed on at M. de Talleyrand's. The Senate, divided into groups, told each other who had been selected, and confirmed the choice by their votes, without dreaming of rejecting a single name of those that had been presented to them. These resolutions being adopted, M. de Talleyrand, leaving the Senate to put them into official form, returned to his hotel, where he found the numerous courtiers of his new grandeur, who were convinced that he would bring back the Bourbons, and govern them on their return.

The men thus chosen could constitute a nominal government, reflecting the various opinions of the day, but not an effective government, capable of administering public affairs. For this a ministry should be appointed. No sooner had M. de Talleyrand returned from the Luxembourg than he assembled his colleagues, and turned his attention to the choice of ministers. Two were of vital importance—the Ministers of War and Finance, for money must be got, and the army detached from Napoleon. Baron Louis was chosen Minister of Finance, a choice for which France had eternal cause of thanksgiving, a man of earnest and vigorous mind, who understood better than anyone of his time, the power of credit, that power which could alone close the wounds of war, and replace the creative genius of Napoleon. In appointing General Dupont (the unfortunate victim of Bayhen), Minister of War, they yielded too much to the feelings of the time, and made an appointment which had all the character of a reaction. Of late attention had been directed to the brilliant victories of General Dupont; in 1805 and 1806, his misfortunes had been pitied, and whilst Napoleon was blamed in secret and flattered in public, it was said privately that General Dupont was the victim chosen to deceive public opinion, as to the faults of the Spanish war. They erred in thinking that this choice, which was an accusation against Napoleon, and reparation to the army, would please the latter, whilst, on the contrary, it only irritated the military. M. de Talleyrand, one of General Dupont's judges, summoned him from his prison at Dreux. M. de Beugnot, another who held office under the Empire, was appointed Minister of the Home Department; a man of great intelligence, who had distinguished himself lately by piquant epigrams against the Empire. The Legal Department was confided to M. Henrion de Pansey, a liberal and respectable magistrate; the Naval to a disgraced Councillor of State, the estimable and hard-working M. Malouet; Foreign Affairs to M. de Laforest, a learned diplomatist, unconnected with any party, and possessing the usual moderation of his profession. The Civil Department, under the form of general direction, was confided to an employé of this department, M. Anglis, a secret friend of the Bourbons; and

the Post Office to M. de Bourrienne, an enemy of Napoleon, and formerly his secretary, who had been removed from the Cabinet for reasons unconnected with politics.

To these appointments, some of which were excellent and others indifferent or unsatisfactory, one most fortunate addition was made. The National Guard, very well constituted, had behaved honorably and firmly, and deserved to be treated with consideration. It received a worthy commander, General Dessoles, formerly head of Moreau's staff, a man of decided character, of clear and cultivated intellect, who had formerly been a republican, but was now a partisan of constitutional monarchy, and united in his person a civil and military character as became the chief of a troop called "The Citizen Militia."

These persons, like the government which appointed them, received only provisional titles. They were called "Commissioners delegated for the administration of justice, war, of the interior, &c." They were ordered to repair immediately to their posts, and take possession of their different offices as quickly and as completely as possible. Here was now a government to refer to, with which the sovereigns could treat, and which they were about to employ to tear from Napoleon whatever civil or military power he still possessed in France.

Instituting this provisional government was declaring that Napoleon had ceased to exist, and this was an important step. They would not have ventured to take it without the support of 200,000 foreign bayonets in Paris. This, however, was not sufficient for the few but zealous royalists that were at work in the capital, and who, if they were deficient in numbers, had with them all the weight of present circumstances. They would have the Bourbons proclaimed at once; they beset M. de Talleyrand and M. de Montesquiou to induce them to take a decided step, and declare without delay that Louis XVIII. was the only legitimate sovereign of France, and that his reign commenced at the death of the unfortunate Louis XVII. Such expeditious work did not suit either the calculations of M. de Talleyrand, who did not desire the unconditional return of the Bourbons, nor his temperament, which never allowed him to hurry, nor his prudence, which saw the necessity for many intermediate steps. To these impatient spirits he opposed his customary weapons—*non-chalance* and disdain; he considered himself justified in saying, what was true for some time at least—that he alone was to regulate public affairs.

Defeated on this side, the ardent Royalists betook themselves to the Municipal Council of Paris and the staff of the National Guard. Both counted in their numbers, large landed proprietors, rich merchants, and distinguished members of the liberal professions. It was to be expected that they would find partisans of royalty amongst them. Such were found in the Municipal Council, and M. Bellart, an advocate of talent, whose intellect was more brilliant than profound, drew up an address to the Parisians, in which he

enumerated in virulent language what party spirit then designated the crimes of Napoleon, but what history, with greater justice, will call his errors, errors of which some were very culpable and almost all irreparable. At the end of this long enumeration M. de Bellart proposed the deposition of Napoleon, adding resolutely that France could only be saved by throwing herself into the arms of the legitimate dynasty, and that the members of the Municipal Council, regardless of all danger, considered it a duty to proclaim this truth to their fellow citizens. This address was unanimously adopted. This deliberation was held in the presence of the prefect, M. de Chabrol, who owed his sudden elevation to Napoleon, having been transferred at once from the prefecture of Montenotte to that of the Seine. He could have opposed this address, but he thought he fulfilled his duty by declaring that his convictions were conformable to the proposed address, but that his gratitude prevented him from signing it. This address, signed by all the members of the council that were present, was posted on the walls of Paris on the evening of the 1st April, at the very time that the Senate was framing the Provisional Government. The Royalists hastened the same hour to the Hôtel Saint Florentin to get permission from the Provisional Government to insert the address in the *Moniteur*. M. de Talleyrand was displeased at this impatience, which, in his opinion, would spoil everything. His colleagues, with the exception of M. de Montesquieu, were of the same opinion, and contented themselves with allowing it to be posted in the streets of the capital, but refused its insertion in the *Moniteur*.

The Royalists were not so successful with the staff of the National Guard. General Dessoles, the lately-appointed chief, had unhesitatingly taken the side of the Bourbons, wishing, however, and that they should be restrained by a wise constitution, and joined in the efforts made to deck the National Guard again with the white cockade. But they were stopped by the resistance met with, particularly from M. Allent, head of the staff, a man known and esteemed during thirty years, as the most enlightened member of the *Conseil d'Etat*.

There existed a great deal of patriotism in the Guard, united with much intelligence, prudence, love of order, and, above all, great disapproval of the faults of Napoleon. The men of the Guard blushed to see the enemy in the bosom of the capital; some of them had fought at the barriers, and so would all, had they been provided with arms, and, if the Regent had not abandoned them, they would have rivalled the populace in defending Paris. Without blaming those, who sought to replace an impracticable and insupportable government, they saw with repugnance that this work was half accomplished by foreigners, and it needed much precaution in leading them, step by step, to the deposition of Napoleon and the recall of the Bourbons. After a few trials the Royalists perceived they should go to work slowly, and that there was danger of wounding honest, sincere, and still warm feelings.

This was a lesson to the impatient, and fresh strength to

sensible persons like M. de Talleyrand, who did not wish to move too fast. One of the most ardent, and at this moment one of the most useful members of the Royalist party had just arrived in Paris. We mean M de Vitrolles, sent, as has been seen, to the camp of the allied sovereigns, and admitted to an audience after the rupture of the congress at Châtillon, and then sent to Lorraine to give some good advice to the Count d'Artois, and prepare him for the part for which Providence seemed to destine him. He was not perhaps the best person to counsel prudence to the prince, but he was a man of intelligence, and long acquainted with MM. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg, and was convinced that it would be impossible to succeed except united with them, and equally impossible to govern without them. This was the truth as far as concerned persons, if not with reference to things; but the one would lead to the other. When M. de Vitrolles arrived at Nancy he had great difficulty in finding the prince, who was still obliged to conceal himself, and whom he filled with joy when he told him of the late resolutions of the Allies, and the reasons there were for hoping for an approaching change in the affairs of France. The account of the battle of the 30th March had changed this hope into certainty. The prince, whom joy had rendered more willing to hear and to grant anything, made no objection to what was proposed. It appeared to him quite natural to treat the army well, and to surround himself with men who had become illustrious and remained powerful. "Besides," he frequently repeated, "I was very intimate with the Bishop of Autun. We passed some of the happiest years of our youth together, and I am sure he preserves the same feelings of friendship for me that I do for him." In fact, when the Count d'Artois was young and fond of pleasure he had often met M. de Talleyrand thinking and acting the same things in his sacerdotal habit, as the Count d'Artois did in the dress of a man of fashion. It is true the Count d'Artois had repented, and that M. de Talleyrand had not, but still the memories of the past formed between them a bond that was rather agreeable than otherwise. M. de Vitrolles assured the prince that M. de Talleyrand reciprocated his sentiments, but at the same time advised him not to call him "Bishop of Autun," and endeavoured to impress upon his memory that, having renounced holy orders and married, he was become Prince of Bénéveto, Grand Dignitary of the Empire, and President of the Senate. Profiting of the warning, the Count of Artois corrected himself, called M. de Talleyrand Prince Bénéveto, but the next moment called him bishop again, again corrected himself, and made the same mistake repeatedly, and in these insignificant things gave a proof already of that luckless memory which had forgotten nothing, but could receive no new impression, and which was destined on two future occasions to cause his fall and that of his august race.*

* I do not admire caricatures in history, and I do not wish to make one here; but I relate this anecdote because I consider it characteristic, and because it is to be found in the interesting, witty, and undoubtedly sincere memoirs of M. de Vitrolles.

For the present the only point on which it was necessary to decide was, that they should employ those Imperialists who consented to hand over the Empire to the Bourbons; and on this point M. de Vitrolles and the Count d'Artois naturally agreed. But the prince wished to enter Paris immediately, and that his title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom should be recognized there, as emanating solely from his brother, Louis XVIII., who had not quitted Hartwell, a residence in the neighbourhood of London. In this M. de Vitrolles agreed with the prince, and he set out again for Paris, to negotiate this immediate return, and the unrestricted title of Lieutenant-General. He had been exposed on the road, as we have seen, to the strangest accidents; he had been taken prisoner with M. de Wessenberg, set free with him, and arrived at Paris, where he fell suddenly into the midst of the circle at the Hôtel Saint Florentin, at the moment when they were thinking very little about the Count d'Artois. M. de Talleyrand and his friends were endeavouring to free themselves successively from the bonds which still bound men and things to the empire. These bonds, although relaxed and almost broken, needed still to be definitely broken, and this required a little time. The Senate, having instituted a Provisional Government, was preparing to pronounce the deposition of Napoleon, but did not mean to accept the Bourbons without the guarantee of a constitution. M. de Talleyrand, who shared this opinion, had twenty-four hours before promised all the senators that it should be as they wished; and besides, the Emperor Alexander, who at that time sincerely admired liberal opinions, declared, with the sincerity that distinguished his first impressions, that Europe should receive liberty as well as peace, and that the good work should commence with France. There was consequently something else to be done during those three or four days than to receive the Count d'Artois with open arms. Napoleon was to be cast off by declaring his deposition, the form of the new government was to be determined, and a constitution drawn up which was to be made a condition of the new reign.

The astonishment of the Count d'Artois' messenger was extreme. M. de Vitrolles was naturally of an impetuous temper, anxious to take part in the most important affairs, even such as were beyond his position; he was, besides, vain of the dangers through which he had passed, and proud of his newly-acquired importance. Gifted with remarkable intelligence, he saw clearly that the Bourbons could not rule as formerly; but the presumption of imposing upon them conditions of any kind, written or implied, filled him with surprise and indignation (sentiments that were shared in by all the Royalists of the time), and he would willingly have given utterance to some very unseasonable observations, if his impetuosity had not been restrained by the vastness of what was passing before his eyes. However, he saw that, before the prince could be received on any conditions, it was necessary that Napoleon should be dethroned,

which was not yet done ; and that it was also necessary to introduce this idea by degrees to that great body, the Senate, which, though not much esteemed by the public, still contained within it the remains of the French Revolution, and was armed with its great principles, and that all this was to be done in the presence of an army commanded by Napoleon in person. Contemplating these difficulties, M. de Vitrolles became gradually calmer, but he still continued to urge them, repeating constantly that the Count d'Artois was impatient to come, and anxious to testify his gratitude to MM. de Talleyrand and Dalberg, and that they could not decently keep him waiting long.

To this M. de Talleyrand opposed that benumbing influence with which he met all unwelcome importunities, as with mocking indifference he said slowly, first looking round with absent gaze, that it would be well to reflect that a good deal remained to be done before he could have the happiness of embracing the Count d'Artois, but the matter would be looked to as soon as possible. M. de Vitrolles heard from M. de Dalberg, words still better calculated to cool him, if his ardour had not been so great. No person was more decidedly opposed to Napoleon than M. de Dalberg, but, at the same time, none could be more determined against the unconditional return of the Bourbons. He was a sincere liberal, and was never restrained by any consideration from expressing his opinions. "We must move quickly !" he said to M. de Vitrolles. "We must move steadily. Nothing is fixed here. It is with the greatest difficulty that we can succeed in having Napoleon's deposition definitely pronounced. Napoleon still intimidates everybody. We can only make use of the Senate, which, conquered by events, will yield ; but it will require, and justly require, conditions. Besides, the Emperor of Russia, who rules everything here, is of the same opinion as the Senate. It is not from inclination that this prince accepts the Bourbons, and he considers that it is only with great precaution that France should be again delivered into their hands. You must learn to wait, and not pluck the fruit before it is ripe."

Indeed, no time had been lost. On the 31st of March, the foreign sovereigns had arrived, and decided that they would not treat any longer with Napoleon or any member of his family ; on the 1st of April, a Provisional Government had been formed, and the address of the municipal body, in favour of the Bourbons placarded through Paris. It was now only the morning of the 2nd of April, so that not a moment had been lost. But the hour was come to pass the decisive and essential act, the deposition of Napoleon. Appointing a Provisional Government was indeed declaring that Napoleon's government was no longer recognized, but it was necessary to declare it in a formal manner, and as the Senate had taken the first step, it could not refuse to take the second. However, if some senators wished to make themselves conspicuous by speaking and acting in the spirit of the day, the majority was

stunned, silent, inactive, and although ready to pronounce the deposition of Napoleon, asked by looks, if not by words, that the formula should be drawn up by others, and that they should only be asked to sign it. But there were some members in the Senate, who felt less embarrassment, and were more inclined to come forward—these were the members of the old opposition, who generally assembled at Passy, where, under the inspiration of M. de Sieyès, they expressed their disapprobation—alas! only too well deserved, of all the acts of the Emperor. After twelve years of oppression, their hearts were full and yearned to give vent to their sentiments. M. de Talleyrand, who had himself of late freely criticised the Emperor's government, without, however, holding any connection with the opposition at Passy, considered it better to allow a free course to the sentiments of these gentlemen, and let them propose and draw up the act that declared the deposition of Napoleon. This task was committed to M. Lambrechts, an honest, simple, and hard-working man, who only thought of making himself useful, without considering whether he was serving the designs of men more crafty than he. The evening of the 2nd of April was spent in preparing the act of deposition, whilst those who drew it up, were promised that attention would immediately be directed to the Constitution—the formal and recognised condition of the return of the new dynasty.

The day on which this act was to be accomplished, M. de Talleyrand presented the Senate to the Emperor Alexander. This monarch, whose sole aim was to please the Parisians, had already walked on foot amongst them, regarding them with flattering smiles, and attracting their salutations by his personal beauty and gracious affability, scattering on every side well-timed phrases, and telling everybody he met, how much he loved and admired the French, that he did not in the least blame them for the misfortunes of Russia, neither would he avenge himself on them, but on the contrary, do them all the good in his power; that he did not consider himself their conqueror, but their liberator, and that if he had overcome their resistance, he knew well, it was because they thought and felt as he, and abhorred the yoke which had just been broken. These ideas repeated in a thousand refined, delicate, and graceful forms, had produced their effect, and the national pride feeling soothed in presence of a conqueror so anxious to please the vanquished, yielded to his caresses, and returned them, and it is a fact, that Alexander was become the most popular man in Paris. He alone, looked upon, thought of, or sought by those Parisians, dispensers of glory in modern times, was intoxicated with his success, and disposed to repay it by serving France in every way compatible with Russian ambition.

The Senate was presented to him on the evening of the 2nd of April. He received the members with the most perfect courtesy, repeated to them, that he had not taken arms against France, but against a single man, that he had admired how the French had

fought even in a cause they disliked, that he was too happy to see the end of this horrible struggle, and that as a proof of the satisfaction he felt, and the hope he experienced, that this struggle would not recommence, he had ordered that all the French prisoners throughout his dominions should be set free. The senators, charmed by everything that seemed an excuse for their submission, thanked Alexander most warmly for this magnanimous act, and promised on their side, to do all that lay in their power to terminate the misfortunes of France and the world.

On this same day, the Senate definitely pronounced the deposition of Napoleon. This document, embodied in two essential articles, declared, that the hereditary sovereignty established in the persons of Napoleon and his descendants, was abolished, and that all Frenchmen were absolved the oath they had sworn to him. The proposition once made, its unanimous adoption was a necessary consequence. It passed without any opposition in a sad and solemn silence, like a decree already recorded elsewhere by a Power higher than the Senate, higher than this earth. No party was satisfied, but the old oppositionists, who did not conceal their sentiments. To them therefore, was committed the task of explaining the causes that originated this decisive act. M. de Lambrechts accepted this commission, and speaking as if he were the organ of the Senate, he proposed the following reasons:—"That Napoleon had violated every law, in virtue of which he had been called upon to reign; that he had oppressed public and private liberty; arbitrarily imprisoned the citizens; imposed silence on the press; levied men and taxes, regardless of legal forms; shed the blood of the French in foolish and unnecessary wars; covered Europe with corpses; strewed the roads with wounded Frenchmen; in short, had carried his audacity so far, as to disregard the right of the national representatives of the nation to vote the taxes by increasing contributions in the past January, without the consent of the legislative body, and not even respecting *la chose jugée*, when he annulled the year before, the decision of the jury at Antwerp. That consequently, Napoleon had forfeited the throne, and his descendants in his person.

M. de Lambrechts seemed to have forgotten that if personal freedom, and the liberty of the press had been sacrificed, it was the duty of the Senate to prevent it, since that body was charged with the examination of all extraordinary acts relating to persons or writings; that if continually renewed conscriptions favoured the carrying on of universal wars, the Senate alone was to blame, for from 1804 to 1814, the conscriptions had been voted without opposition; that if in the levying of men and taxes the usual forms had been violated, it was also the fault of the Senate, for the power of voting troops and money had been transferred from the Legislative body to the Senate, with the consent of the latter, and in violation of the Imperial Constitution; that, in short, if legal decisions had not been respected, the Senate was also to blame, since it had consented to annul the decision of the jury at Antwerp. Honest M. de Lam-

brechts, we say, seemed to have so thoroughly forgotten these facts, present to the memory of every one else, that the Senators felt almost as much at their ease, as if in presence of a public as forgetful as themselves. As to the rest, M. de Lambrecht's statement received the same silent consent as the act of deposition itself, and so anxious were the Royalists to proclaim the result, that in order to save time, they had already placarded copies of the act of deposition through Paris, leaving the old oppositionists the task of explaining the motives on which they acted.

From this moment the essential act was accomplished, and the Senate in passing the act of deposition, had freed the French from their oath to Napoleon and his family. However, it was not sufficient to break the legal bonds that bound France to the Imperial dynasty; Napoleon should be deprived of the power of recovering the sceptre, which had been wrested from his grasp; and although protected by two hundred thousand men, the authors of the revolution that was being accomplished, were visited from time to time, with a sense of terror, especially when they thought of him who was at Fontainebleau, of what he was doing, and what he could do. He had still the army that had fought under his command, reinforced by all he had collected *en route*, and by those who had fought beneath the walls of Paris; he had still the army which was excellent, though ill commanded by Augereau, the incomparable armies of the Marshals Soult and Suchet, which, it is true, were at a distance, but could easily be united to his troops, by going to meet them or bringing them to him; he still had the Italian army! what might he not undertake with such means, exasperated as he was, and his military talents in full activity, as the events of the last two months had only too well proved? And at this moment, could he not with the troops actually under his command, make a descent upon Paris, and though he should not conquer, he might, at least, signalize his end by some tragic catastrophe, some brilliant vengeance, that would worthily crown his formidable career. The very idea of such possibilities was appalling, and, indeed, very little confidence was felt by the crowds of Royalists, old or new, that swarmed the Hôtel Talleyrand: they hawked the gossip of the day, they commented, they affirmed or denied the reports from Fontainebleau and its neighbourhood.

The only means to avert the danger was to excite some such feeling in the army as had been produced in the Senate. It was not, certainly, the civil servants of the empire that alone were weary of the rule of Napoleon; the same feeling was shared in more or less by very many of the military. Those unfortunate men who, often with wounded limbs and without the slightest prospect of an end to their sufferings, had followed Napoleon from Milan to Rome, from Rome to the Pyramids, from the Pyramids to Vienna, from Vienna to Madrid, from Madrid to Berlin, from Berlin to Moscow, those few survivors of two million warriors were weary and exhausted, though certainly after another fashion than the Senate, that was

tired of the fatigue of others. As long as glory and munificent gifts had been the reward of the unceasing dangers that threatened their lives they had uncomplainingly followed their successful captain. But now that the structure of rewards, which, like the colossal edifice of the empire, had extended from Rome to Lubeck, had crumbled to the earth, and where glory was no longer the brilliant renown that follows victory, but the virtuous and bitter fame that attends heroically-supported defeats, it would not be impossible by skilful intrigues to convert murmurs into complaints, and complaints into military sedition. Besides, there were very good reasons that could be adduced to military men, whom their own sufferings had already half persuaded, to induce them to have an exacting master. They would not be asked to abandon Napoleon for foreigners or for the Bourbons, which might inspire some with honest scruples, or others with repugnance, but to leave him that they may rally round the provisional government which had risen from the misfortunes entailed by Napoleon on France; and after all, this government was neither foreigners nor Bourbons, though the former were its support and the latter its aim, but an assemblage of the most influential men of the imperial *régime*, who, in the midst of Paris—that was deserted by the wife and brother of Napoleon, left unprotected by an erroneous manœuvre on his part, and invaded by the enemy—had concerted how to save the country, how to reconcile it with Europe, and to put an end to this disastrous and henceforth useless struggle. As long as Napoleon represented and protected France it was their duty to stand by him faithfully, whatever his faults may be, but now, when after a fatal complication of mistakes and reverses, he was conquered and could no longer do anything for France, except, perhaps, ruin her by continuing a calamitous war, was it not right to withdraw from a man who, although he still personified the glory of our arms, no longer represented the welfare of the nation, and to rally round a government which, without being prejudiced in favor of any institution or any dynasty, appealed to all good citizens to aid them in serving their country in this terrible crisis, leaving them free to consider afterwards (as their title “Provisional” testified) under what laws and what royal family they would place free and ransomed France.

Such rational ideas were sure to be well received by all sensible men, and still more willingly by those who, like the principal military officers, were disgusted, weary and anxious for their own interests, and the greater part of whom were suffering under private as well as public wrongs, for Napoleon had notoriously to find fault with more than one of his lieutenants during the last campaign, and he did so with all the abruptness of an impetuous and tyrannical temper. However, it must be told to their honor that none had shrunk before the enemy, and that those most tired of Napoleon’s rule and most discontented had often been the bravest. But all things have an end, even devotedness itself, especially when men no longer see any legitimate cause for it, and consider themselves

sacrificed to the passions of senseless masters. Now, Napoleon could not appear in any other light to men, who were persuaded that it had always been in his power to make peace, and that he had refused to do so. He now experienced what all who do not habitually speak truth must experience—that truth itself is not believed from them. Napoleon had been blameable in not concluding peace at Prague, imprudent in not accepting it at Frankfort; but it was to his honor to refuse it at Châtillon; and at Fontainebleau, it was heroism to desire to prolong the war that he might rescue Paris from the hands of the enemy. But he did not get credit for this, and the sorrow, the dignified sorrow, of M. de Caulaincourt was almost become a calumny of Napoleon. The regret that M. de Caulaincourt expressed because peace had been so often rejected, led persons to imagine that lately, especially at Châtillon, it might have been accepted with honor, and it had been insanely refused. Napoleon was henceforth considered a furious madman, from whom they should at once, and at any cost, rescue both France and themselves.

Sometimes a violent feeling, resulting from physical fatigue, showed itself in the inferior ranks of the army; but a sunny day, a good meal, an hour's repose, or the sight of Napoleon, was sufficient to dispel it. It was amongst the commanding officers that the most dangerous species of weariness—moral fatigue—was exhibited, and this feeling increased in proportion to the rank, that is to say, to the penetration of those who felt it; strong in the generals, it was extreme in the marshals.

Amongst these was one man—no other than Marshal Marmont, who, perhaps, would have been least suspected, but whom M. de Talleyrand, with his facility in detecting the weak side of humanity, had pointed out as the man who would soonest yield to the good or bad reasons which could be employed to detach his most intimate lieutenants from Napoleon. This officer, whom Napoleon had created marshal and duke, more through affection for an old fellow-student than admiration for his talents, did not think himself appreciated under the imperial *régime*, or put in his true position, for it is undeniable that, though Napoleon felt a personal friendship for Marmont, and admiration for his courage, he thought little of his intellectual capacity. This presumptuous and unformed mind, partly candid, partly cunning, believing himself completely master of subjects of which he had only a superficial knowledge, desiring to assume the principal part, whilst at the very utmost he was fit for the second: not possessing sufficient superiority to direct, nor sufficient modesty to obey, was disagreeable to Napoleon, who preferred the simple and solid understanding of several of his marshals, who, if their intelligence was not very extensive, were at least punctual and energetic in obedience. He had consequently placed many men, whom Marmont believed his inferiors, in a position far superior to his. Besides this, Marmont had committed a serious fault at Craonne, and, instead of being displeased with himself, was angry

with Napoleon, though he had reproached him much less than his fault deserved. The wounds inflicted on his vanity were quite evident to M. de Talleyrand in the conversation he had with Marmont on the evening of the 30th of March, and he consequently pointed out this marshal as the term to which all the seductions of the Royalists ought to tend. Discontented vanity is in every crisis the object round which intrigue can twine with the greatest possibility of success. Besides, at this moment, Marmont held a position which, as much as his natural disposition, would attract those who sought to seduce him. He had just distinguished himself in the defence of Paris; and though half the honour by right belonged to Mortier, he had no hesitation in attributing it all to himself. He was stationed with his division on the Essonne, and protected Fontainebleau; and if he could be induced to join the Provisional Government, it would decide the question which the genius and indomitable spirit of Napoleon still rendered doubtful. The emissary chosen on this occasion, and who was perfectly well suited to the office, was M. de Montessuy, who had formerly been aide-de-camp to Marmont, and who had abandoned a military for a financial career, in which he had achieved an honourable success. M. de Montessuy shared in the healthy sentiments of the higher classes of the citizens respecting the war and the Imperial dynasty. He possessed, besides, that influence over Marmont which aides-de-camp sometimes acquire over their generals, and which arises from a knowledge of their weaknesses, and a capability of turning them to profit. M. de Montessuy was sent to Essonne, furnished with letters for Marmont and the other chief officers from the principal members of the new Government. To this was added another project, which promised to be no less efficacious. Since that Napoleon had retired to Fontainebleau, and had appeared to concentrate his forces there, a portion of the allied army had been stationed on the left bank of the Seine. The allied reserves were assembled in Paris and the environs, together with Bulow's division, which had been employed at the blockade of Châlons, and a large portion of the troops of the coalition was stationed between Juvisy, Choisy-le-Roi, Longjumeau, and Montlhéry; Prince Schwarzenberg had fixed his head-quarters not far from the Essonne, that he might be ready to profit by the first symptoms of weakness in Marmont. Marmont was not the sole object of these intrigues; a military relative was sent to influence Marshal Oudinot, Beurnonville wrote to his friend Marshal Macdonald, and a number of emissaries, principally military men, were sent to Fontainebleau, and who were expected to be well received by the wavering and the unfaithful, as well as by all who were anxious to hear how things were going on at Paris.

The one theme of all these verbal or written communications was, that men belonged to their country and not to an individual, to whom they might still be faithful, if, after compromising France, he was able to save her, but all that Napoleon could do would be

to shed blood unnecessarily, of which too much had been already poured forth; that Europe was resolved not to treat with him, whilst she was ready to grant the most honourable conditions to any other government than his; it was therefore necessary without delay to join the Provisional Government, with which Europe was now disposed to treat; that in joining this government they would give it strength, authority, in a word, the capability of making itself respected both by the Allies and the Bourbons, against whom, whilst they recalled them, they wished to take all necessary legal precautions. To these sensible and honourable reasons were added others, less elevated, though by no means objectionable, such as that the Bourbons would receive with open arms all officers who would join them, and especially those that would declare themselves first.

Independent of these intrigues, the principal authors of the new revolution took care that M. de Caulaincourt should leave Paris, because, being admitted to the same familiarity by Alexander as when at Petersburg, he represented the conqueror of Austerlitz and Friedland, his presence was as offensive to them as the Congress of Châtillon had been. In fact, whilst there was any appearance of negotiations being carried on with the deposed Emperor, nothing seemed secure, and the Royalists gave the Czar to understand that it was neither wise nor generous to induce them to compromise themselves farther, if there were any probability of treating with Napoleon. Alexander saw this very clearly, and though from the natural goodness of his heart it would have pained him to tell the full truth to M. de Caulaincourt, he ultimately discouraged him, in order to force him to leave Paris, without being necessitated to give an order to that effect. M. de Caulaincourt repeatedly told Alexander that he was the dupe of intriguers, of partizans, who deceived him as to the true sentiments of France, and that, wishing to complete his triumph, he perhaps exposed himself to some catastrophe that would involve Paris and the allied army in one common ruin. Alexander said he believed neither intrigues nor partizans, but trusted to his own eyes; that nobody desired Napoleon, that France was no less weary of him than Europe herself, that his friends must submit to necessity, and give up all hope of seeing him reign; that the Allies knew well what he was capable of; but they were prepared, and in a short time their preparations would be still more complete; that the friends of Napoleon could only render him one service, which was to induce him to resign, as that was the only measure that could ameliorate his fate. In speaking thus of an ameliorated fate for Napoleon, Alexander, always anxious to conciliate M. de Caulaincourt, hinted to him that the question under consideration was a comfortable retreat for Napoleon, and a throne for his son, under the regency of Maria Louisa. M. de Caulaincourt, although little inclined to idealize, began to conceive hopes, and he now said within himself, that the throne hinted at would be, perhaps, that of France, accorded to the King of Rome,

under the guardianship of his mother. Before returning to Fontainebleau, he made a last effort with Prince Schwarzenberg, whom, as the representative of Napoleon's father-in-law, and the negotiator of Maria Louisa's marriage, ought to be kindly disposed to the Napoleon dynasty, if not to Napoleon himself. But M. de Caulaincourt found Prince Schwarzenberg still more discouraging than Alexander, and far less reserved in the expression of his sentiments. Wearied by the presence and the importunities of M. de Caulaincourt, he said it was better to tell him frankly that the Allies would have nothing more to do with Napoleon or his family; that the Emperor of Austria had struggled for him to the last moment, and had proposed the armistice of Lusigny, with the view of giving him an opportunity of coming to an accommodation, but that instead of corresponding to his paternal intentions, Napoleon had sent his father-in-law a letter, which was most insulting to that monarch, as it seemed to imply that he was capable of deceiving his Allies, and that that letter would have been dangerous for Europe had Austria been capable of yielding to his views; that from the date of that letter the deeply-insulted Emperor Francis had adopted the resolution of no longer treating with Napoleon, in consequence of which the hazardous enterprise of marching to Paris was resolved on, and which, having succeeded, notwithstanding all the attendant dangers, the Allies were determined to profit of their success; they would have nothing further to do with Napoleon on any terms, and, finding public opinion in France coincide with theirs, he did not see why they should stop short in a path that alone was safe, for no repose could be expected but in getting rid of a man who, during eighteen years had convulsed the world; that as for his wife and son, it was a mere chimera to think of confiding an empire to them, which neither the one nor the other was capable of governing; that in fact Austria would not assume such a responsibility; that it would be either the government of Napoleon continued under a fictitious name, or the weakest, the most impotent of governments, that would neither give rest to France nor security to Europe; it was therefore better to come to a determination, and M. de Caulaincourt, instead of vainly soliciting persons who received him with a deference, induced by politeness, but with a deafness imposed by duty, would do better, with politeness, to tell the truth to Napoleon, and by inducing him to accept his fate, terminate a painful and protracted agony, alike disagreeable to himself, to France, and to Europe.

Irritated by such unmeasured words, M. de Caulaincourt, who liked to speak the undisguised truth, asked Prince Schwarzenberg whether it was not surprising that he, the minister of Napoleon's father-in-law, should be the most decided against him of all the representatives of Europe; that he, once the humble solicitor of Maria Louisa's marriage, should be now the haughtiest despiser of that union, and of the moral obligations that resulted from it, and that he, the zealous and well-recompensed lieutenant of the Em-

peror of the French during the Russian campaign, should now view his military enterprises with so much severity, and, in short, that, with such recent opportunities of refreshing his memory, he should have forgotten what were the French army and its chief. "Perhaps you suppose," said M. de Caulaincourt, proudly, "that because I, the constant apostle of peace, am here as a suppliant of that same peace, which I desired as earnestly after the battles of Wagram and of Dresden as I do at present,—perhaps you fancy that my sentiments are those of the master I serve; you mistake;—his genius is as indomitable as ever. He is, moreover, exasperated. His soldiers share his sentiments, and if the Austrians were able, with an enemy in their capital, to fight the battle of Essling and Wagram, the French will not do less to wrest their country from the hands of foreigners, and, indeed, there is not much vanity in believing that the French are as good as the Austrians, and Napoleon as valiant a leader as the Archduke Charles."

The bluntness of this address checked Prince Schwarzenberg somewhat, and he replied that he had never forgotten what he personally owed to Napoleon, but that he owed still more to his own sovereign; that he had indeed desired and even solicited the marriage of Maria Louisa; that he was not ignorant of the obligations incurred by that contract, but he considered it a tie, not a chain; that, in consideration of this connection, Austria had done all in her power to open Napoleon's eyes, and to lead him to moderate measures, but without effect; that all things must come to an end, even family considerations—that as to desperate acts, such might naturally be expected, from a man of genius commanding the French army, but the Allies were prepared for that, and they, too, would fight with desperation; that if the French fought to tear their country from the hands of foreigners, the allied sovereigns would combat to wrest their independence from a pitiless tyrant; they had been slaves, but would be so no longer; that if they were forced to quit Paris, it would only be to return; and that the Allies would not display less devotedness in fighting for their independence, than the French in defending the integrity of their soil.

It is very evident that if Austria, either from motives of friendship or prudence, had wished to favour Napoleon in 1813, and was satisfied in offering him peace at Prague, to restrain his absolute dominion over Europe; that if at Frankfort, she, from the same motives, had offered him France, together with the Rhine and the Alps; and if, in fine, to avoid the risks of the march upon Paris, she had offered at Châtillon to leave him France as it was in 1790, it was evident that now, when all dangers had been surmounted, and all considerations satisfied, the Emperor of Austria would prefer to get rid of an insupportable son-in-law, and, above all, share the fruits of the common victory, of which indeed his share would be large beyond his hopes, for in depriving France of the Low Countries and the Rhenish provinces, and renouncing all claim to

them herself, Austria would receive in exchange the line of the Inn, the Tyrol, and Italy. The doubtful and, in many ways, very embarrassing pleasure of seeing an archduchess Regent of France, would not compensate for the risk of seeing this terrible son-in-law repossess himself of the sceptre, and Austria would therefore prefer indemnifying this archduchess at her own expense in Italy, than leave her at Paris, which would be virtually keeping the place for Napoleon. This very natural calculation did not prove that Francis II. was a bad father, but it proved that he preferred the interests of his people to that of his daughter, and no one can say that in doing so he neglected his first duty.

This explains the little support that Napoleon's cause met with from Prince Schwarzenberg, who followed only too plainly a policy which M. de Metternich, had he been at Paris, would have pursued with more precaution, but not with less constancy. Although M. de Caulaincourt, from what he had seen during the last three days, was convinced there was not the least chance of gaining a single friend for Napoleon, even among the most eminent servants of the Empire, or among the representatives of the Allies, he still wished for an interview with the Emperor Alexander, to know whether if Napoleon were sacrificed, there would be any chance for his dynasty. Alexander received him with his usual cordiality, but repeated almost the same words he had used before, telling him that he ought to go to Fontainebleau, and advise a last and great sacrifice. "Go," he said to him, "for I am constantly asked to give an order for your departure, for it is said that your presence intimidates many persons, and makes them fear that we shall take the part of Napoleon. In the end, I shall be obliged to order you to go, for neither my allies nor I wish to favour such suppositions. Believe me, I feel no resentment. Napoleon is now overtaken by misfortune, and I forget the injuries he has inflicted on Russia. Both France and Europe need repose, but with him on the throne they could never hope to obtain it. On this point we are irrevocably decided. Let him ask what he will for himself, there is no retreat that we are not willing to grant him; if he will accept the friendship I offer, and come to my dominions, he shall receive there, not alone a magnificent, but a cordial hospitality. We shall thus both give a great example to the world; I in offering, he in accepting this asylum—but there is no other base of negotiation than his abdication. Go, and return as quickly as possible, with powers to treat on the sole conditions that we can accept."

M. de Caulaincourt tried to discover whether Napoleon could secure the throne to his son by his own abdication. Alexander refused to give a decided answer, but said that nothing was irrevocably fixed with regard to the Bourbons, though everything looked favorable for them. He himself appeared to feel very coolly towards them, and again pressed M. de Caulaincourt to turn his attention as quickly as possible to the personal fate of Napoleon. M. de Caulaincourt, wishing to discover the views of the Allies, asked if

in case Napoleon were deprived of France would they give him Tuscany as an indemnity. "Tuscany," exclaimed Alexander, "although, indeed, it is very little in comparison with France, could you expect that the allied powers would have Napoleon on the continent, or that Austria would suffer him in Italy? It is impossible." "Perhaps Parma, or Lucca," replied M. de Caulaincourt. "No, no, nothing on the continent," said the Emperor, "an island; let me see—Corsica perhaps." "But Corsica belongs to France," replied M. de Caulaincourt, "and Napoleon would not consent to accept that which had been wrested from himself." "Well, the island of Elba," added Alexander; "but go and induce your master to submit to a necessary resignation, and we shall consider the matter. Everything afterwards that is honorable and possible shall be done. I do not forget what is due to so great and so unfortunate a man."

At these words M. de Caulaincourt took his leave, convinced that without a military miracle there was absolutely no hope for Napoleon, and scarcely any for his son, and he felt it his duty to announce this sad truth to his master. He left on the evening of the 2nd of April, when the deposition was about to be pronounced, and with the conviction that it would be in a few hours. It was midnight when he arrived at Fontainebleau.

Whilst M. de Caulaincourt was seeking to strengthen the wavering friends of the empire in Paris, and to arrest the extreme resolution of the Allies, Napoleon was not losing his time at Fontainebleau. Complaints were no more suited to the loftiness of his character than self-deception to the greatness of his mind. If he sometimes abandoned himself to illusions, it was as a self-excuse or self-encouragement in the execution of some rash design, without being at the same time the dupe of the illusions. In misfortune he did not hesitate to look truth in the face, and met her aspect undismayed. Although at a distance from Paris he almost divined what was passing there; he saw that the Allies would seek to draw as much advantage as possible from their triumph, that the Senate would abandon him, and that arms alone would be his resource in this double danger. When he returned to Fontainebleau he called for his maps and the lists of his troops; he saw at a glance, the brilliant but terrible chance that fortune still offered him, and determined that it should not escape.

The Allies having lost twelve thousand men either by death or wounds, and having summoned Bulow's corps to Paris, now counted about one hundred and eighty thousand combatants. Napoleon had not less than seventy thousand, counting the corps of Marshals Mortier and Marmont, together with some troops from the banks of the Yonne and Seine. The disproportion was enormous, but the ardour of the army—we mean of the inferior ranks—the genius of Napoleon, and many local circumstances, might compensate for this numerical inferiority, and everything indicated a mighty catastrophe either for the capital or the coalition. If we consider

what would have been gained, had he succeeded, France restored to greatness by a single blow,—we mean by this not an insane but desirable greatness—the boundary of the Rhine, and not of the Elbe—we do not hesitate to say that the possible gain justified the risk, though even all the splendour of Paris had been destroyed in one bloody day. The Rhine frontier would compensate for what might be destroyed in the capital, we should withdraw our admiration from men who accompanied Napoleon to Moscow, if they now refused to follow him to Paris.

However this may be, Napoleon conceived a plan of whose success he had not the least doubt, and which to posterity must appear at least probable. Since Napoleon had fixed his centre of operation at Fontainebleau, the allied forces had been divided into three bodies, one of eight thousand men on the left of the Seine, between the Essonne and Paris, another within the walls of Paris itself, and the third outside on the right of the Seine. This disposition of the foreign troops, Napoleon considered as fatal to themselves, provided he could profit of it. His plan was to cross the Essonne suddenly with his army, and driving back Prince Schwarzenberg's eighty thousand men on the suburbs of Paris, call upon the citizens to join him, and profiting of the probable confusion of the Allies, thus unexpectedly attacked, he could destroy them, either by entering Paris along with them, or immediately crossing, by the bridges of which he was master, to the right bank of the Seine, and cut off their line of retreat. Indeed, it is possible, that with seventy thousand men under his command, he would overthrow the eighty thousand immediately opposed to him, and that those driven back upon Paris, would enter the town in confusion, where the slightest assistance from the Parisians would change this disorder into flight, and Napoleon, either following close on their heels or passing to the right bank of the Seine, where he could cut off their line of retreat, would place the Allies in a position from which they would have great difficulty in freeing themselves, even were they—which they were not—headed by the greatest of captains. It is also very probable, that after such an event, and aided by the peasants of Burgundy, Champagne, and Lorraine, who would not fail to attack the conquered allies, since they did not hesitate to attack them when conquerors, that Napoleon would soon have forced back the coalition upon the Rhine. If he was mistaken, it would be better, in our opinion, to have erred with him that day, than to have erred with him at Wilna in 1812, or at Dresden in 1813. Besides, he did not consider the risk to Paris; he estimated his capital as the Russians did Moscow, and he considered that too high a price could not be paid, to exterminate an enemy that had penetrated to the very heart of France.

Imperturbable in the midst of the most exciting circumstances, and always passing directly from the conception of his plans to the execution, he immediately issued his orders. He placed Marshals

Marmont and Mortier along the river Essonne, Marmont at Essonne itself, and Mortier at Mennecey. He had strengthened Marmont's corps with the Souham division, comprising at least six thousand men. He replaced Marmont and Mortier's artillery, part of which had been left outside the walls of Paris; he also furnished them with sixty pieces of cannon fully supplied. He commanded them to surround Corbeil with earth works, that they might take possession of the bridge independently of that of Melun, of which he was master; he would thus be able to manœuvre according to circumstances on both sides of the river; they were to collect at Corbeil all the supplies of grain abundantly distributed along that side of the river, and to manufacture at the powder-mills at Essonne as much powder as possible. He had stationed his cavalry *en échelon* in the direction of Arpajon, in order to be in communication with Orleans, whither he had summoned his wife and son, together with his brothers and ministers. He had ordered the Young Guard to advance between Chailly and Ponthierry, to keep the position for Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard, who were soon to arrive with their corps. Lastly, he sent forward the troops that, under General Alix, had so well defended the Yonne, and thus made his arrangements to have the army concentrated behind the Essonne on the 4th, the earliest possible date, considering the distance from Saint-Dizier to Fontainebleau. He every day reviewed the troops that joined, and without explaining himself fully, gave them hopes of a brilliant revenge for the defeat they had suffered before the walls of the capital. At sight of Napoleon, the Guards uttered wild cries, horse and foot, brandishing their sabres or their guns, mingling with their usual cry of "Long live the Emperor" the more significant one of "To Paris, to Paris!" The other divisions of the army, consisting of younger men more sensible of fatigue, arrived sometimes weary and dispirited. But they could not resist the presence of Napoleon, nor the view of his countenance, at once thoughtful and inspired, and after a little repose, these caught the contagion of sentiments, whose focus was in the Imperial Guards. On the other hand, the principal officers were seized with astonishment, Napoleon's presence embarrassed them, and even irritated without animating them. They dared not deny, that a last and fatal battle was a duty due to their country, if it could thus be saved, but they exclaimed against the idea of that battle being fought in Paris, if it were there he intended to fight, which, indeed, they did not know, but which they reported to be the case, to render the project the more odious. Their aides-de-camp and flatterers asserted the same thing. But it was very different with the officers immediately attached to the troops, who only spoke of avenging the honour of their arms, and instilled the same feeling into their men. Thus, the moment that Napoleon appeared, violent transports burst forth on every side, and all manifested a common sentiment, not indeed of devotion to his person,

but of exasperation against the enemy, and those traitors, who, they said, had betrayed the capital.

There are days, sad days ! when it is difficult to see clearly what is our duty, when even hearts the most sincere are perplexed ; this was the case now, and an honest man might in all sincerity hold one opinion at Paris, and a different one at Fontainebleau. We can easily understand, how in Paris, one could, without feeling any esteem for the Senate, adhere to its decisions, and prefer peace and liberty under the old dynasty, to a perpetual war under a violent and arbitrary government, whilst at Fontainebleau, on the contrary, to brave soldiers not obliged to choose between two different systems of policy, but called on to expel foreigners from their native land, the mere hope of crushing the coalition, were it even amidst the ruins of Paris, might be the cause of boundless enthusiasm. Indeed, although truth is independent of local position, and that what is truth in one place, is not falsehood elsewhere, still it seems to us, that a good deal depends on the point from which we view it, and that duty assumes different aspects according to circumstances. In Paris, good citizens were called on to choose between the Charter and the Bourbons ; in Fontainebleau, soldiers, in the mere hope of expelling an enemy from their land, were bound to expose their lives once more, and it would be more patriotic to die now before Essonne, than formerly at Austerlitz or Jena, for they would now unquestionably die for their country, and sacrifice themselves, not to exalt success, but to aid misfortune.

We repeat that the public mind must necessarily be deeply agitated amidst such great events, and this M. de Caulaincourt found to be the case, when, on the night of the 4th of April, he appeared at Napoleon's door, where the unoccupied staff that guarded it besieged him with questions, and implored him to tell the truth to the Emperor. This noble-minded man needed no persuasion on that point. He related, in a simple and straightforward manner, without reserve, all that he had seen and heard during his stay at Paris ; he did not conceal from Napoleon the furious passions that were excited against him, nor the extreme resolutions of the sovereigns with regard to him ; but though he had never hesitated to advise, he dared not do so now, so great would be the difficulty of forming an opinion, and so useless and cruel would it be even to insinuate the slightest counsel. Napoleon received M. de Caulaincourt very mildly, and with visible signs of gratitude, and appeared neither disturbed nor astonished at what he heard. He had already learned from different persons some of the facts related by M. de Caulaincourt, and he had divined the rest. He was aware of the appointment of the Provisional Government, and the passing of the Act of Deposition, but not of the adduced motives ; he was also aware of the efforts made to overturn his statue. "It is well done," said he to M. de Caulaincourt, "and is only what I deserve. I did not desire statues, for I know that it is only those erected by posterity

that are safe; to conserve those erected during life, one must be always successful. Denon wished to flatter, I had the weakness to yield, and you see what I have gained. But let us talk of something more important. Nothing in your recital surprises me; Talleyrand wishes to revenge himself on me, and the Bourbons will avenge me on him. But those men of the revolution that fill the Senate, and amongst whom there is more than one regicide, are very imprudent to throw themselves into the arms of foreigners, who will hand them over to the Bourbons; but they are frightened, and seek their safety where they may. As to the allied sovereigns, they only wish to humble France; however, they do not act well towards me. I could have dethroned the Emperor Francis and King William, and could have excited the Russian peasants against Alexander, and I did not do it; I acted towards them like a king, and they behave to me like Jacobins—this is giving a bad example. Alexander is the least hostile amongst them; he has had his revenge, and, moreover, is good-hearted, though cunning. The Austrians are what I have ever found them, humble in adversity, and insolent and heartless in prosperity; the Emperor almost forced me to take his daughter, and now he acts as though that daughter were not his. Schwarzenberg is the advocate of emigration, and Metternich of the English; my father-in-law lets them have their way, we shall see whether he will allow them to follow out their views; the Empress hopes he will not. As for the English and Prussians, what they want is to annihilate France. All is not finished yet. The Allies wish to put me aside, because they feel that I alone can restore our fallen fortunes. Believe me, I do not value a throne; born a soldier, I can become a citizen again. You know my tastes; what is it I need? A little bread should I live; six feet of earth if I die. It is true that I have loved, and still love glory. . . . But my fame is beyond the reach of man. . . . If I seek to rule a few days longer, it is that I may restore the honour of our arms, and wrest France from her implacable enemies. You have done well in not signing any document, for I could not subscribe to the conditions that would have been imposed on you. The Bourbons may accept such conditions with honour, the France they are offered is only what they have made her themselves; I could not do so. We are soldiers, Caulaincourt, and what is death in such a cause as ours? Besides, do not fancy that our fate is definitely decided; if I had my army, I should have already made an attack, and all would be over in two hours, for the enemy is in a position of imminent danger. What glory, should we succeed in driving them forth! what glory for the Parisians to expel the Cossacks from their capital, and hand them over to the peasants of Burgundy and Lorraine, who would finish them! But it is only a short delay. After to-morrow I shall have the corps of Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard, and if they follow me, I shall soon change the aspect of affairs. The chief men of the army are weary of this work, but the mass will march; my *old moustaches of the Guard* will give the

example, and not a single man will refuse to follow them. In a few days, my dear Caulaincourt, all may be changed, and then what satisfaction—what glory!”

After pronouncing these words, with calmness mingled with a warmth of feeling that sought vent in words, Napoleon dismissed M. de Caulaincourt to repose, and soon fell into a profound sleep himself.

He passed the following day—the 3rd April—in reviewing his troops and making preparations, and his countenance, sometimes shaded by thought, sometimes lighted with animation, and the flame of genius sparkling in his eyes, he seemed filled with some mighty project that he was anxious to put into execution. In this all-important moment the soldiers could not resist the effect of his presence, and though weary and exhausted, they cried in almost frenzied accents, “Long live the Emperor!” In the rage excited by the tales of the Old Guards, who related, with the credulity common to camps, that Paris had been lost by treason, they felt no other desire than to tear their capital from the hands of traitors. As we mentioned before, these sentiments, common to the soldiers and officers immediately in command, were not shared by the staff. The emissaries, who had come from Paris, mingling among these latter, asserted that Napoleon had been legally deposed, and that those who continued to obey him only obeyed a rebel, and became, by the fact, rebels themselves; that it was now time to abandon a man who had ruined France, and who would ruin them also if they did not abandon him, and rally round the paternal government of the Bourbons, that awaited them with open arms; that, indeed, with this government alone was peace to be hoped for, as Europe was resolved to destroy Napoleon and his adherents. They also said that by quitting, what was henceforth a rebellious camp, they would preserve their rank, pensions, and dignity, and still enjoy, beneath the shade of a protecting throne, the glory they had acquired, and which none could deny them; whilst, pursuing an opposite course, they would be surrounded by 400,000 enemies, and cut off to a single man. It was not difficult to make reasons valid in the weary and anxious minds of the commanding officers, and excite them to an extraordinary outburst, not alone against the political errors of Napoleon, which were only too real and disastrous, but also against his pretended military errors. According to them he was only an adventurer who had had a run of good luck, which he abused until he exhausted it. 1813 had been but a succession of blunders: it was the same in 1814, and quite lately he committed a fresh mistake in seeking an enemy at Dizier, who ought to have been sought at Paris. And now, made more desperate by misfortunes, he wanted to fight a last battle, and sacrifice the poor remains of his army. Let there be a last battle, they said, if it will restore the honour of our arms and save France. But Napoleon, in his rage against the Parisians, has resolved to fight this battle in the very heart of Paris, with the intention, ap-

parently, of killing as many Parisians as Austrians, Prussians, or Russians. Napoleon's enemies industriously spread the report that this battle was to be fought in Paris itself, in order to attach the greater odium to this last great effort, and in admitting that the risk ought to be incurred if there were any chance of thereby saving France, they demanded, with a terror sometimes feigned, sometimes sincere, whether it was not the act of a madman or a barbarian, to seek to convert Paris into a battle field, and thus give the allied sovereigns a legitimate reason for turning the capital of France into a new Moscow.

Such discourses excited the members of the different staffs to the highest degree, and whilst a truly patriotic fury animated the Guard, and from them passed to the inferior ranks of the army, a very different feeling took possession of the different staffs and commanding officers. This double current of contradictory opinions, only increased during the course of the 3rd day of April, influenced also by information coming from Paris or the outposts.

On the following morning—the 4th April—Napoleon seemed, at last, to have decided to act. He explained his plans to M. de Caulaincourt. The troops under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard, were expected to arrive that day, and by granting them a day's rest, he expected to be able the next day, the 5th, or at furthest on the 6th, to let them fall into line, and attack the enemy with 70,000 men. He had no doubt of his success. Early in the morning he gave orders that the Guards should leave, and station themselves behind Marmont and Mortier on the Essonne, in order to support the movement, and at the same time to leave room for the troops that were to arrive. Having reviewed the corps that were to leave, he assembled the officers and sub-officers in a circle round him, and in sonorous voice addressed them in the following energetic words :—

“Soldiers, the enemy, in stealing three marches on us, have rendered themselves masters of Paris. They must be expelled. Frenchmen, unworthy of the name—emigrants, whom we had the weakness to pardon formerly—have made common cause with the foreigners, and mounted the white cockade. Cowards! they shall receive the reward of this additional crime. . . . Let us swear to conquer or die, to avenge the insult offered to our country and our arms.”

“We swear it!” cried those old officers, all on fire with devotion to their standard, and then dispersed to communicate the ardour that consumed them to their men. The troops defiled, uttering wild acclamations.

When this scene was ended, Napoleon mounted the staircase of the palace, followed by a crowd of officers, some still under the influence of the enthusiasm which had just been aroused, but others with very different sentiments. They immediately formed groups around the Marshals, and unanimously asserted that the resolution was evidently taken to risk their existence and the fate of France in

a last scene of madness, and they must prevent such folly by protesting against it. This was the unanimous opinion, but each wished to avoid being the first to speak. The aides-de-camp surrounded the generals, the generals surrounded the marshals, and exciting each other mutually, they demanded that their chiefs should refuse to obey. Marshal Macdonald was only just arrived, for he had not quitted his division. As he was alighting from his horse, still covered with mud, he was presented with a letter from Beurnonville, bearing the following erroneous address, "For Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Ragusa." This letter was sent to Marmont, as Duke of Ragusa, and he having read it, perceived from the contents that it was meant for Marshal Macdonald, and forwarded it to him. This letter conjured Macdonald, in the name of friendship, in the name of his family, to whom he was tenderly attached, and who ran the risk of perishing amidst the flames of the capital, to abandon a tyrant, who was no longer anything but a rebel, and join the legitimate government of the Bourbons, who were about to re-enter France, bearing peace in one hand and liberty in the other. Macdonald had preserved in his heart the sentiments of the army of the Rhine; he was irritated by what he had seen and suffered during the two last campaigns, and he was passionately attached to his children. He had just heard from them—they were still in Paris: he was overpowered with sorrow. The officers surrounded him; they said he ought to join his colleagues, and contribute to put an end to this hateful and frantic reign. He consented, and only asked time to change his dress for one more suitable. They had by this time arrived at the door of Napoleon's cabinet, and they resolved not to leave the antechamber, but watch over the marshals and defend them, if, after the scene that was about to take place, Napoleon should put them under arrest. There were some officers in this kind of mutiny who were even mad enough to cry that they ought to get rid of Napoleon.* In a word, it was a repetition of one of those military revolts of which the Roman Empire had given such odious examples, and it must be admitted that a reign so deplorably warlike met with a worthy end in the midst of a military sedition.

The marshals entered. They were Lefebvre, Oudinot, and Ney. Macdonald was to join them. They found Napoleon surrounded by Major and General Berthier, the Dukes of Bassano and Vicence, and several other eminent persons. Napoleon had taken off his hat and sword, and was walking about his cabinet, speaking with more than ordinary vehemence. The marshals were dejected, embarrassed, and afraid to speak. Napoleon, divining the cause of their silence, and wishing to make them break it, asked them if they had any news from Paris, to which they replied that they had, and very disagreeable news. He asked what was their opinion:

* I have received these sad details from eye-witnesses, respectable men, whom I could name, and who may be ranked amongst the most honourable men of their time.

"All that has happened," said they, "has been very sad, very deplorable; but what was saddest of all was, that there was no probable end to this cruel state of affairs." "The end," replied Napoleon, "depends on us. You see those brave soldiers, who have neither rank nor pensions to save, and who only think of marching forward, of dying, that they may tear France from the hands of strangers. We must follow them. The Allies are divided on both banks of the Seine, of which we have the principal bridges, and dispersed in an immense city. Vigorously attacked in this position they are lost. The Parisians are burning for revenge; they will not allow the foreigner to depart without pursuing them, and then the peasants will complete their destruction. Without doubt they may return; but Eugene has returned from Italy with 36,000 men, Augereau has 30,000, Suchet 20,000, Soult 40,000. I can summon to our aid the greater part of these forces. I have 70,000 men here, and with this mass I shall throw into the Rhine all that shall have left Paris and wish to return there. We shall save France—we shall avenge our honour—and then I will accept a moderate peace. What does it need to accomplish all this? One last effort, that will allow you to enjoy in repose the benefits of twenty-five years of labour."

These reasons, though very striking, did not seem to please the listeners. They objected to Napoleon, that though it might be legitimate to risk a last battle, provided it might be of use, and not the cause of irremediable catastrophe, still it would be frightful to fight it in the centre of Paris, and to turn the capital into another Moscow. To this, Napoleon replied, that it was a calumny to say he wished to avenge himself on the Parisians, that he did not mean to turn Paris into a battle field, but he would attack the enemy wheresoever Providence gave him an opportunity, and that in the actual position of the Allies, they would necessarily be destroyed. Then addressing himself to Lefebvre, Oudinot, and Ney, he asked them, if they desired to live under the Bourbons? To this they replied by loud exclamations. Lefebvre, with the violence of an old Jacobin, declared he would not, and in this he was sincere. Ney expressed himself with incredible vehemence; he said that his children could never enjoy comfort or safety under the Bourbons, and that the only desirable sovereign for them, was the King of Rome. "And do you believe," replied Napoleon, "that in abdicating, I shall secure to you and your children, the advantage of living under my son?" Do you not see, that the proposal of a regency during the minority of the King of Rome is only a cunning falsehood, invented for the purpose of separating you from me, and by that means destroying us both. The government of my wife and son would not stand one hour, and then you would have an anarchy, that, in perhaps a fortnight, would end with the Bourbons. Besides," he said, "there are family secrets that I cannot divulge A government directed by my wife is impossible." Napoleon alluded to the reasons that had induced him to order his wife to leave Paris, the chief of which was, the weakness of Maria

Louisa's character, with which he was well acquainted. When Napoleon spoke to the marshals of living under the Bourbons, they burst forth into violent exclamations of abhorrence, but when he mentioned his abdication and its possible consequences, they did not speak, but their silence showed that it was what they desired. Napoleon understood them, but did not let it appear. At this moment, Macdonald, disturbed and anxious, entered, holding Beurnonville's letter in his hand. "What news do you bring?" said Napoleon. "Very bad," replied the Marshal. "I am told that there are two hundred thousand of the enemy in Paris, and that we are going to fight them there. It is a frightful idea. . . . Is it not time to put an end to all this?" "The question is not," said Napoleon, "whether we shall fight in Paris, but whether we shall not profit of the mistakes of our enemies." Then a discussion commenced, and the Emperor asked Macdonald what was the letter about that he held. Macdonald replied, "Sire, I keep nothing secret from you, you can read it." "Nor I from you," said Napoleon, "let it be read aloud." M. de Bassano took the letter and read it with that embarrassment and pain, which a subject, who is still respectful and attached to his master, must feel under such circumstances. Napoleon listened with a disdainful calmness, and when it was ended, without blaming the frankness of Macdonald, he said, that Beurnonville and such men were only intriguers, who, with the assistance of foreigners, were trying to bring about a counter-revolution, that they would end by ruining France, and weakening her for ever; that the Bourbons far from pacifying France, would only throw her into confusion, whilst with a little perseverance, the present state of affairs could be changed in two hours. "Yes," replied Macdonald, whose heart was grieved by the thought of a battle in Paris, "yes, that might be, but at the expense of reducing our capital to ashes, and fighting probably over the corpses of our children." The Marshal also declared, without venturing to say that he would not obey, that the soldiers were not to be depended on. Ney seemed to confirm this assertion. Having thus reached the limit that separates respect from revolt, the marshals sought to cast the blame of disobedience upon the soldiers, whilst they themselves were alone in fault. Napoleon saw this, and said proudly: "If your soldiers will not obey you, they will obey me, I need but speak a word to lead them where I will." Then, in a tone of haughtiness that forbade reply, he added, "Retire gentlemen, I shall consider, and let you know my determination."

They left the room quite astonished at their own daring, little as it had been, and in admiration of their courage, made themselves appear more guilty than they really were, by declaring to their aides-de-camp, that they had cast aside all fear and boldly told the truth.*

* It has been spoken, written, and repeated in every variety of form, that the scene that took place in Napoleon's cabinet, on the morning of the 4th of April, had been one of violence carried so far as threats—so far, in fact, as to force him to abdicate. I have

They retired, awaiting the result of this very extraordinary scene, for when Napoleon was in full possession of his power, they had never ventured to address an observation to him, when perhaps, a single word would have arrested his descent into the abyss.

On that day, Napoleon had but to step outside his cabinet, and appeal from the marshals to the colonels and soldiers, and he would have found enthusiastic servants ready to follow him where he would, and ready also to avenge him on ungrateful men, overloaded with his benefits. But to expect that he would at that moment turn from the door of his palace an entire staff, composed of generals and marshals, who during twenty years had lavished their blood for him, and form another of colonels and brigadiers, and so commence a formidable military operation, would be asking too much even from the most determined and energetic character.

When Napoleon found himself alone with Berthier, Caulaincourt, and Bassano, he gave free course to his suppressed indignation.

"Did you see them?" he said, "did you see how excited they were when I mentioned the restoration of the Bourbons, and how silent when I spoke of my abdication? That is what they want, for they have been persuaded that, by setting me aside, they could enjoy the riches I have lavished on them, under the government of my son. Shortsighted creatures, they do not perceive that there is no choice but between me and the Bourbons; they cannot see that my wife and son are only a shadow, that would fade away in a few days or months."

He then complained of their daring to read such a letter to him as Beurnonville's, and expatiated on the weakness and ingratitude of men. M. de Caulaincourt tried to calm him, saying that Marshal Macdonald was a noble-minded man, and had only shown the letter in compliance with the Emperor's wish; that this repugnance to fighting in Paris, which was only a pretext with some, was with others a deep and honest feeling; he then added that the project of abdicating in favour of his son was very generally received, and that it was, in fact, the only base on which they could still negotiate.

Napoleon soon recovered that equanimity with which great minds rise superior to circumstances, and acknowledged that the popular idea of the hour was his abdicating in favour of the King of Rome, which perhaps afforded some satisfaction to anxious

before me at this moment, the manuscript memoirs of two most respectable witnesses of this scene, I have collected information from several credible ocular witnesses, and I am convinced, that the reports spread on this subject are all misrepresentations. In fact, the aim and result of this interview were to wrest a conditional abdication from Napoleon, but as to the mode of execution, it did not exceed what I relate. The exaggerated versions, whose veracity I dispute, drew their origin, their sad origin, in the boasting of some military men, who wishing to make themselves of importance, a few days later, represented themselves as more culpable than they really were, and which they regretted the following year. It was their boastings, still further exaggerated by the propagators of false reports, that gave rise to such misrepresentations, and I am convinced that the truth is contained in what I relate.

minds, and that he was quite ready to yield to public opinion, if it were only to prove the folly of such a plan.

"I am satisfied," he said to M. de Caulaincourt, "that you should return to Paris, and offer to negotiate on this basis—and even that you take with you the marshals most enamoured of this project; you will rid me of them, which will be no small advantage, for I have men to fill their places—and whilst you occupy the Allies with this new proposition, I shall advance and finish all, sword in hand. You must hasten your departure, for, twenty-four hours hence, you will not be able to pass the outposts."

Napoleon seized at once the proposition of his abdication, as an opportunity of gaining two or three days more, of setting the vigilance of the enemy to sleep, of satisfying the marshals, and of ridding himself of some of them, who were become particularly troublesome. He added, however, that if the regency of his wife during the minority of his son, were accepted on conditions that were both honourable, and likely to support the new order of things, it was very possible he would consent. Notwithstanding that he spoke thus, there was very little chance that a negotiation should succeed, which he intended to interrupt so soon with the roar of his cannon.

Having so suddenly given this new aspect to affairs, the next thing was to choose the men who should accompany M. de Caulaincourt to Paris. M. de Caulaincourt wished to have Berthier with him, that he might add weight to military considerations, and Bassano, as he could best represent the feelings of Napoleon, but the Emperor would not listen to the proposal. He could not part with Berthier, who transmitted his orders to the army, and he said, that although Bassano was not in any way accountable for the late wars, that still he was responsible for them in the eyes of the public and of the allied sovereigns. He would only consent to M. de Caulaincourt's being accompanied by two or three of the marshals. He mentioned Ney first of all. "He is the bravest of men," said he, "but at this moment I have men that will fight as well as he, and you will rid me of him. But you must watch him, he is a mere child—if he fall into the hands of Alexander or Talleyrand, he is lost, and you will not be able to do anything with him. Take Marmont, also, he is devoted to me, and will assert my son's rights." Then reflecting for a moment, he said, "No, you cannot take Marmont, he is too much needed on the Essonne." Macdonald was then proposed, who would have more influence than Marmont, as he had never been considered a flatterer, and, besides being a perfectly honest man, he would defend the interests confided to him with as much zeal as if they were his own. Napoleon consented to this arrangement, and drew up himself the act of his conditional abdication, with the tact and haughtiness of language that ever distinguished the emanations of his pen. The marshals were then summoned to his presence:

"I have reflected," he said, "on our position; and on the senti-

ments with which it has inspired you, and I am resolved to test the sincerity of the allied sovereigns. They say that I am the only obstacle to the peace and happiness of the world. Well, then, to remove this prejudice, I am willing to sacrifice myself, and resign the throne, but on condition that it shall be transferred to my son, who shall be placed under the Regency of the Empress, during his minority. Does this arrangement suit you?"

At these words, which freed the marshals from all embarrassment, for it would suit them much better to live under the government of a woman and child of their own party, than under that of the Bourbons, who were strangers to them, they seized the hands of Napoleon, clasped them with the deepest emotion, and declared that at no period of his life had he shown himself so truly great.

When they had made an end of these demonstrations, which were by no means agreeable to Napoleon, though he did not show the annoyance he felt, he said to them, "Now that I have yielded to your wishes, it is your duty to defend the rights of my son, which, indeed, are your own; and to do so, not alone with your swords, but by your moral influence." He then said that he had appointed two of them to accompany the Duke of Vicence to Paris, and there negotiate the establishment of Maria Louisa's regency. He mentioned Ney and Marmont, saying how he had at first thought of Marmont, and why he had changed his mind. Ney was greatly flattered by being chosen, and Macdonald also, who felt it the more, as he had never been one of Napoleon's personal friends. "Marshal," said the Emperor to the latter, "you know that I have entertained prejudices against you, but that is past; I have full confidence in your honour, and am convinced that you will be the firmest defender of my son's interests."

Saying these words, he extended his hand, which Macdonald pressed warmly between his, and promised to justify the confidence the Emperor reposed in him on this occasion, and this promise he nobly fulfilled. Though Napoleon renounced the idea of sending Marmont to Paris, he left his plenipotentiaries free to take him with them as they passed through Essonne, if they thought he could be useful, in which case he would appoint some one to take his place. When these explanations were over, Napoleon read the following Act, which he had just drawn up.

"The allied powers having declared that the Emperor Napoleon was the only obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares he is ready to descend from the throne, to quit France, or even life, for the welfare of his country, inseparable from the rights of his son, from those of the regency of the Empress, and the laws of the empire. Given at our palace of Fontainebleau, 4th April, 1814."

This act being received with universal approbation, Napoleon took a pen to sign it, but before affixing his signature, conscious of the importance of what he was about to do, notwithstanding the secret projects that he cherished, he felt a poignant regret, not for the throne, but for the chances that might be lost, and still think-

ing of the imprudent disposition of the enemy's forces, he cried, "And yet—yet we could beat them if we would." After this exclamation, which made all present droop their heads, he signed the document, handed it to M. de Caulaincourt, and dismissed his three ambassadors, still feeling more inclined to fight than to negotiate, and resolved, provided he did not lose the means that were in his hands, to interrupt, by the roar of cannon, this new negotiation that was about to be opened at Paris.

The marshals, accompanied by M. de Caulaincourt, immediately quitted Fontainebleau, in order to repair to the allied sovereigns, and by Napoleon's orders they were to pass through Essonne, and stop at Prince Schwarzenberg's head-quarters, to ask permission to pass the outposts. They arrived at Essonne about five in the evening, and immediately called on Marmont to acquaint him with their mission, and that he was authorised to accompany them. To their great surprise they found him cold, embarrassed, and disinclined to join them. Alas! the unfortunate man had yielded to the snares that had been weaving around him for the last four days!

His old aide-de-camp, M. de Montessuy, who had been sent to him, had arrived the previous evening, and given him letters from the Provisional Government, whose reasoning he supported with his private exhortations. It was not difficult for this envoy to speak warmly on the subject, for in common with all the more influential commercial men of Paris, he was firmly convinced that it was time to withdraw from an arbitrary government, which was so disastrously warlike, and which had thrown France into an abyss, from which it could not rescue her. The agent of the Provisional Government, knowing all the avenues to the heart with which he had to deal, had provided himself with a variety of arguments to accomplish his purpose. Having first dilated on the patriotism of Marmont, he next attacked his vanity and ambition. He did not forget to say that, in the last campaign, Marmont had covered himself with glory, that the eyes of France, of Europe, were fixed on him; that he alone, of all the marshals, had sufficient political knowledge to understand what present circumstances demanded; that those circumstances imperatively commanded to separate from Napoleon, and join and strengthen the Provisional Government authorised to conclude peace, to recall the Bourbons, and recalling, impose on them the restriction of a wise constitution. That by assisting in this excellent work, he would play the same part in the military, that Talleyrand played in the political, world; that under the Bourbons he had only to choose his place, for that no reward could be too great for the services he would have rendered, and he would thus unite the double advantage of serving his country, and of being magnificently rewarded.

There was, of course, a great deal of truth in all that was said to the unfortunate Marmont, and the man who said it was perfectly sincere. It is quite true that for simple citizens free from all personal engagements, and ignorant of the position of military

affairs, not knowing whether it was still possible to defeat the Allies, and to wrest conquered France from their hands, the best thing was to join the Bourbons, and, united with them, obtain a more equitable peace, and a less despotic government. But such considerations should not have had any weight with an officer laden with the gift of Napoleon, and still less with a soldier charged with such a trust as guarding the Essonne with 20,000 men, a trust not alone important to Napoleon but to France; for so long as there existed anywhere an imposing body of soldiery, it was not alone the fall of Napoleon, but that of France, that might be ameliorated by negotiation: a trust, in short, which, like that of every soldier, should be sacred until he was relieved from it.

No doubt, a soldier does not cease to be a citizen because he is a soldier, nor lose the right of interfering in the political interests of his country, because he sheds his blood for her. Marmont might have gone to Napoleon at Fontainebleau, forced an entrance into his palace, and into his heart, appealed to him in the name of France, implored him not to injure her further, but to yield the country to the Bourbons, who were more capable than he of reconciling it with Europe and restoring its liberty; he could have said all these things, if he believed them; and if he were not listened to, he could resign his sword, and with it, his post, to Napoleon, and then betake himself to the Provisional Government, taking with him a thing of great value, and of which he could dispose without ingratitude,—his example. Gratitude may check personal interest, but cannot shackle duty. To deliver, surreptitiously, the possession on the Essonne to the enemy without the preliminaries we have mentioned, was, simply, treason.

And yet Marmont had not the soul of a traitor, far from it; but he was weak, vain, and ambitious, and, unfortunately, such failings are sufficient, under circumstances of great importance, to lead to acts that posterity stamps with reprobation. Marmont heard, with pleasure, the praises bestowed upon his military and political talents, the personal importance that he might acquire, and the services he could render, and, yielding to the deceitful bait of perhaps holding a position in the state equal to M. de Talleyrand's, he consented to treat with Prince Schwarzenberg, who for that purpose had come to Petit-Bourg. The following conditions were decided on, after many discussions. Marmont, with his *corps d'armée*, was, on the following day, to leave the Essonne, and advance along the Normandy route, where he was to place himself at the disposal of the Provisional Government, and as he could not conceal from himself the consequences of such an act—for he not only deprived Napoleon of a third of his army, but of the important post of the Essonne—he stipulated that, should Napoleon, in consequence of his desertion, fall into the hands of the allied sovereigns, they would respect his life, liberty, and past grandeur, and procure him a retreat at once suitable and safe. This single proviso, dictated by an honorable repentance, condemns the conduct of Mar-

mont, in proving the importance which he himself attached to his treason.

These conditions, reduced to writing, were sent to Prince Schwarzenberg. But it was not sufficient to be seduced himself, it was necessary that Marmont should gain over the generals under him, for, without their concurrence, it would be difficult to complete the stipulated arrangements. It was not a difficult task to win them, for they knew nothing, or almost nothing, of the general position of the army; nor did they know whether it was possible or not, by a last battle, to wrest France from the hands of the coalition; they only thought, what every one thought then, that Napoleon, having already caused the destruction of the greater part of his army, was now, in his obstinacy, about to expose the remainder to be slaughtered. Marmont, profiting of this state of opinion, told them how Napoleon, after committing fault upon fault, and permitting the Allies to enter Paris, was now mad enough to think of attacking 200,000 men with his 50,000, and thus risk the utter annihilation of the remnant of his army, and, by fighting in the capital itself, prepare them a tomb amidst the ruins of Paris and of France. There was, doubtless, a great deal of truth in what he said, and what could the generals reply to the images he conjured up? They said that it would not be right to follow Napoleon in this last extravagant adventure; that it was their duty to put an end to the misfortunes of France themselves. They promised, therefore, to follow Marmont to Versailles as soon as he should give the order. In their opinion this determination, which by the sequel has proved to be a defection, was but a necessary and legitimate separation from a madman.

Such was the entanglement in which the marshals found Marmont when they arrived at Essonne. At first he would not enter into any explanation, and only made weak excuses when they pressed him to accompany them to Paris. But as his mind was as incapable of concealing treason as inventing it, he finished by telling Macdonald and Caulaincourt all that had passed, at the same time palliating his own conduct as much as possible, by relating all the motives that had influenced him, and which, if the truth must be told, were much the same as the marshals had used to induce Napoleon to abdicate. Macdonald blamed him very much for what he had done, and took great pains to impress on him, that the best way to repair his fault would be to revoke his engagement with Prince Schwarzenberg, justifying his conduct on Napoleon's conditional abdication, a sacrifice that made it a point of honor to defend the rights of his son; and after this he should go to Paris to plead the cause of the King of Rome before the allied sovereigns. Marmont, without attempting to controvert this reasoning, appeared, however, unwilling to adopt a line of conduct that would be in direct contradiction to his former act. He was strangely perplexed. At one moment he felt inclined to go to Fontainebleau, tell Napoleon all that he had done, and implore his forgiveness; but either from

shame or fear, this better feeling passed away, and he determined to adopt Macdonald's advice, to retract his engagement with Prince Schwarzenberg, and then go with the others to Paris, to support the King of Rome's cause, taking care to suspend, until his return, all movement in his *corps d'armée*.

Accordingly he summoned his generals, told them of the new state of things, of Napoleon's conditional abdication, and the negotiations that were about to commence in consequence, and arranged with them that nothing was to be done until they should receive fresh orders from him. He then rejoined M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals, and permission to pass the outposts having arrived, he followed them to Petit-Bourg. He would not enter at the same time as they, under pretext of having a private interview with Prince Schwarzenberg, before taking part in the general conferences. When M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals had been admitted into the château, they had some very lively altercations, first with Prince Schwarzenberg, who sustained, with imperturbable calmness, the cool policy of the Austrian Cabinet, and afterwards, with the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg, who spoke in the harshest manner both of Napoleon and France. This prince had served formerly under Marshal Ney, who had never shewn him much favour, and who now told him, with great haughtiness, that if any Court in Europe had lost the right of blaming the ambition of France, it was most certainly that of Wurtemberg. They were engaged in these disagreeable recriminations when the permission to enter Paris, demanded by Napoleon's representatives, arrived.

They left immediately, and outside the château met Marmont, who was waiting for them, indebted, as he said, to Prince Schwarzenberg's honor for the revocation of his promise. But, notwithstanding this assertion on his part, there is every reason to believe that the prince only gave him a temporary release from his engagement, merely during negotiations, whose success he felt to be impossible, and on condition of fulfilling his promise, should the negotiations fail. The fact that the Allies immediately announced the convention signed by Marshal Marmont proves that this was the case.

M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals arrived at the Hôtel Talleyrand between one and two in the morning. Great was the excitement amongst the crowd of interested or curious persons, who day and night surrounded the doors of the Provisional Government, when it was known that these men were come to offer that Napoleon should abdicate in favour of the King of Rome and Maria Louisa, and that they were about to support this negotiation with all the authority of the army. Terrific was the idea of Napoleon acting under the names of his wife and son, and dealing forth vengeance on those who had abandoned him. The number of the Royalists had increased greatly since the publication of the deposition, on the evening of the 2nd April, some gradually feeling emboldened to express openly sentiments they had always cherished in their

hearts; while others became converts to royalty, when they perceived it to be the road to success. The number of the compromised and the anxious had consequently been considerably augmented, and so great was the alarm excited, that M. de Talleyrand—the most deeply compromised of all—asked himself whether it were not better to pause in a course where he had taken so many steps that might be deemed irrevocable.

In fact, worried by M. de Vitrolles, who insisted, as we have said, on the immediate and unconditional admission of the Count d'Artois into Paris, M. de Talleyrand was considering these questions, and actually about to give a letter for the prince to M. de Vitrolles, when the marshals were announced.

Alarmed at this unexpected arrival, he withheld the letter, and requested M. de Vitrolles to wait until every doubt should be removed, to which the latter consented, as he did not wish to rejoin the prince until he should be able to bring him certain and definite information.

The first interview M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals had with the members of the Provisional Government was short and cold, and might have become stormy, but that the question under discussion was to be decided elsewhere.

The night was far advanced, and the King of Prussia had retired to the mansion in which he had taken up his residence; but the Emperor Alexander, being in the Hôtel Talleyrand, received the envoys of Napoleon at once. Talleyrand, fearing the mobility of this prince, and the influence that the new arrivals might have on him, endeavoured to fix more firmly in his mind the ideas that he had already instilled into it, representing to him that Napoleon, the personification of war, could no longer be thought of, that Maria Louisa was only Napoleon under another name; that it would be ridiculous to think of Bernadotte, and that, all things considered, the Bourbons alone were admissible; and besides that, during the last five days, every public proceeding had been influenced by this opinion; and that common sense as well as honour required that they should not abandon men who had compromised themselves on the faith of the allied sovereigns, in whose honour and power they were justified in believing. Not satisfied with these precautions, M. de Talleyrand placed near Alexander, as a kind of guardian, M. de Dessoles, a man, as we have said before, of great firmness of mind, who favoured the Bourbons from conviction, and not from interest, and who was capable of asserting his opinion against every possible contradiction. Though he did not possess the same right as Marshals Ney and Macdonald to speak in the name of the army, he had some claim to reply to those who, in representing its opinions, did not confine themselves to the exact truth.

Alexander received M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals with that courtesy that was natural to him, and which he never more willingly exercised than towards the military men of France. Having complimented them on the prowess they had shown during

the last campaign, and the heroic devotion with which they had fulfilled their military duties, he added that these duties being now accomplished, it was time to choose between the welfare of their country and that of an individual, and retracing, as he often did, the origin of the present war, as far back as 1812, he asserted that it was Napoleon alone who had provoked it. He said that, in 1809, 1810, and 1811, Russia had patiently borne all the expenses of the alliance, and, in conformity with Napoleon's political plans against England, had almost totally deprived her subjects of the advantages of commerce, when Napoleon, as inconstant as he was despotic, invented a new commercial legislation, and proposed imposing it on his allies; and that when he (Alexander) had made him the most reasonable and friendly representations on this subject, and was about to yield to these demands, notwithstanding their injustice, Napoleon suddenly invaded his dominions, and forced him to take up arms in his defence; that, aided by the severity of the climate, and the courage of his army, he had repelled the invader, and would have stopped short on the Vistula, but that oppressed Europe had implored his assistance; that after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen the allied sovereigns wished to come to terms with Napoleon, offering to allow him to retain his immense conquests, and only seeking to lighten the yoke that pressed upon them, but he distinctly refused; that again on the Rhine they stopped, and offered him that beautiful river as a frontier, but he did not reply; that at Châtillon they had offered him France, such as it was in the days of Louis XIV. and XV., but that he had again refused, and they were obliged to come to seek in Paris that peace which they could not find elsewhere; that having entered Paris, they had no idea of humbling France or imposing a government on her; that they were seeking in all sincerity to discover who France really desired, who, in assuring her happiness, would secure the peace of Europe; that they had not entered into any compact with the Bourbons, and that if they were inclined to favour them, it was more from necessity than choice; and that so great was their deference for the opinion of the French nation, they were quite ready to adopt the government that the deputies of the army who were now present should propose, provided that government was consistent with the tranquillity of Europe. Then, redoubling his flatteries to them, Alexander added—

“And, gentlemen, arrange the matter between yourselves,—adopt what constitution you please, choose the chief that will best suit this constitution, and should it be from amongst yourselves, who possess so many claims, both from your services and your glory, that this new sovereign will be chosen, we most willingly consent, and shall recognize him with pleasure, provided he neither threatens our peace or independence.”

Marshal Ney, whose natural impetuosity always impelled him to take the lead, hastened to reply to the courteous address of the Czar, and entering rather too much into his views, said, that they

had suffered more than any one else from the incessant wars of which Europe complained, that they had been the first victims of this despotic ruler, as was testified by the bodies of their companions in arms strewn all over the continent, and none could desire his removal from the throne more warmly than they. There may have been much truth, but certainly very little tact in this reply, which was ill calculated to influence the Allies, whose plans could only be modified by exaggerating the devotion of the army to Napoleon. It produced an evident impression on Alexander, which the companions of the too impetuous marshal perceived to their great regret. Then continuing his discourse, and replying to Alexander's flattering hint of choosing a candidate from amongst themselves, a hint which, had it been serious, could only have referred to Bernadotte, he insinuated that amongst military men only one had attained a position that could entitle him to rule, and that he, forsaken by Fortune, had, by his abdication, renounced his claim; after him, no soldier could entertain such pretensions, that the only one who could or would perhaps dare to think of it, would be, covered as he was with French blood, abhorrent to the nation; that, therefore, Napoleon's son, under the regency of his mother, was the only form of government that could be offered to France and the army.

This proposal once made, Ney and Macdonald successively defended the cause of the King of Rome, with a vehemence and eloquence peculiarly military. They exclaimed against the recall of the Bourbons, and proceeded to demonstrate the difficulty of getting them accepted by this young France, that was not acquainted with them, and the great difficulty of making them accept this France, which they did not understand, and the probable consequence of seeing arise between the throne and the people, an opposition of sentiments that would lead to painful consequences, and destroy those hopes of peace which Europe founded on the restoration of the ancient dynasty. They then sought to impress on Alexander the necessity of leaving new generations under a government of the same nature as themselves, and composed of men who had administered public affairs during the last twenty years, men who detested, as much as Europe herself, the system of continual warfare, of which they had borne all the burden, and besides, would have at their head a princess whom the Allies could not distrust, since she was the daughter of one of themselves. Then speaking for the army in particular, the marshals said that something was due to men who, during twenty years, had been pouring out their blood for France, and were still ready to shed the last drop again if necessary; men who alone, at this moment, were able to check the desperation of Napoleon, and to whom it was at least due to place them under the authority of the son of their General, to whom they had devoted their lives, and who, during twenty years had led them to victory, and not under the government of princes who would detest while they flattered them.

Considerations expressed with so much warmth, did not fail to produce a visible effect on Alexander. He sought by opposing the opinions of the marshals, rather to induce them to give expression to what they thought, than to contradict them; he cited the recent acts of the Senate, pointed out all that had been done towards the restoration of the ancient dynasty, and observed, the most esteemed men of the Revolution and the Empire had unhesitatingly declared in favour of the Restoration.

The mere mention of the Senate roused the anger of Ney. "That despicable Senate," he cried, "that might have spared us so many afflictions, by opposing some resistance to Napoleon's passion for conquest; that despicable Senate, always ready to obey the wishes of the man they now call a tyrant—by what right do they raise their voice at this moment? These men were mute when they ought to have spoken, and how dare they presume to speak now, when they ought to observe silence? Most of these gentlemen of the Senate enjoyed their emoluments, whilst we were bedewing Europe with our blood. It is not they that have a right to complain of the Imperial sway, but we soldiers, who have borne all its rigours; but if in defiance of all justice they pretend to claim authority now, bring them face to face with us, and you will see, sire, whether they will dare to speak in our presence."

Alexander was so much influenced by this discourse, that he was about to consent to a conference between the marshals and some of the principal senators, when General Dessoles, seeing what ground had been already lost, interfered with vehemence, and indeed with a certain rudeness. He was interrupted several times, and the debate became confused and violent, when Dessoles, seeing himself alone and unsupported, appealed to the honour of Alexander, saying that too much had been already done towards the recall of the Bourbons to recede now; and that a number of honest men, relying on the good faith of the allied sovereigns, had already compromised themselves, whom it would be dishonourable to desert.

This argument, true, though somewhat egotistical, and which had been already adduced by M. de Talleyrand, was ill suited to the noble character of General Dessoles, who was entirely guided by disinterested convictions. It was, besides, not a little offensive to Alexander, who replied with pride that no person should ever have to regret confidence placed in him or his allies, but that here they must be guided by higher considerations than the interests of individuals, when the welfare, not alone of France, but of all Europe, was at stake. Then putting an end to an interview that had lasted nearly all night, he graciously dismissed the marshals, remarking that he alone of the allied sovereigns was present, and appointing them an interview for the next day, when he would inform them of the decision of the Allies.

Although so much had been already done towards the restoration of the Bourbons, there was still some hope for Maria Louisa and

the King of Rome, but the marshals, overrating the chances in their favour, left the Hôtel Talleyrand with greater confidence of ultimate success than they had reason to entertain. Alexander had heard them with so much politeness, had treated them with so much attention, nay, respect, that, still excited by the discussion they had had, they left him in the highest spirits, and finding in the antechamber numbers of persons who had formerly crowded the antechambers of Napoleon, they could not restrain their anger, though they were in a short time to exhibit in their own persons a spectacle which now shocked them so much in others. They immediately renewed their discussion with the members of the Provisional Government, and, in truth, in far less measured terms than with Alexander. General Beurnonville was about to address Macdonald, when the marshal repelled him, saying, "Begone! your conduct has obliterated a friendship of twenty years' duration." Afterwards, meeting General Dupont, Macdonald said to him, "It is very possible, General, that you have been treated with injustice and even cruelty, but you have very badly chosen both the time and manner of avenging yourself." Marshal Ney was equally unreserved in the expression of his sentiments, and some disagreeable scenes might have taken place, had not M. de Talleyrand reminded them that it would be disrespectful to the Emperor of Russia to continue such discussions in his apartments, and then invited them to come down to that part of the mansion occupied by him, where they would be in the apartments of the Provisional Government. "We don't acknowledge your Provisional Government, and have nothing to say to it," replied Macdonald, and left the house abruptly with his colleagues.

Napoleon's negotiators went immediately to Marshal Ney's house to pass the rest of the night, and await the reply of the allied sovereigns, which they were to receive in the course of the morning.

Whilst this important question, with all its chances of success or defeat, was under discussion in the hôtel Rue Saint Florentin, it was very quickly decided elsewhere, not by reasons true or false, but by treachery, the worst of all arguments. Napoleon, as we have seen, attached very little importance to the negotiations undertaken by the marshals, and was solely occupied with his project of crossing the Essonne, with the 70,000 men he still had, and of either overwhelming the allies, or perishing with them amidst the ruins of Paris. He sent for Marmont, who commanded the division on the Essonne, in order to give him his last instructions; and foreseeing that Marmont might have accompanied the marshals to Paris, he ordered that, in his absence, the general left in command should immediately repair to Fontainebleau.

This commission was confided to Colonel Gourgaud. This officer, brave and devoted, but who did not always transmit the Emperor's orders in the spirit in which they were given, appeared

surprised not to find Marmont at his post, and asked in an almost menacing tone, for the officer left in command. From his manner one would suppose that he was the representative of an irritated master, who was aware of what had taken place between Marmont and Prince Schwarzenberg at Petit-Bourg. But it was nothing of the kind. Napoleon and Gourgaud were wholly ignorant of the matter, and the latter, speaking with the harshness habitual to the members of the imperial staff, decided without intending it an event of the last importance. Napoleon now experienced in a most painful manner, that there are times, when fate, that once seemed to turn our very mistakes to our advantage, suddenly changing her plan, punishes us even for the faults of others.

It was old General Souham that was in command during the absence of Marmont. Colonel Gourgaud spoke to him in the same haughty tone, as well as to the Generals Compans, Bordessoulle, and Meynadier; and to add to this unfortunate complication, a written order arrived at the same moment, directed to General Souham, commanding him to repair immediately to Fontainebleau. This was the usual practice in the Imperial staff, that a verbal order from the Emperor should be followed by a written one; but old Souham, struck by Colonel Gourgaud's manner, and made suspicious by a consciousness of guilt, forgot this, and immediately conceived the most alarming apprehensions. He thought that Napoleon had discovered everything—not alone the secret convention between Marmont and Prince Schwarzenberg, but also its approval by the Generals of Division of the Sixth Corps, and he believed they were summoned to Fontainebleau to be arrested, or perhaps shot. General Souham was a general of the revolution, an excellent soldier, an old friend of Moreau's, entertaining for Napoleon the same concealed hatred as the other generals of the Rhine army, and complaining, like Vandamme, and with as good reason, of not having been created marshal. He was still a republican in his heart, and sufficiently accustomed to revolutionary proceedings to believe Napoleon capable of the most violent measures. He immediately assembled his colleagues, Generals Compans, Bordessoulle, and Meynadier, and said it was quite evident that Napoleon knew what had occurred, and that they were now summoned to his presence to be shot, a finale for which, he assured them, he had not the least desire. The other generals declared that they were no more ambitious of such an end than he; and after some objections that were silenced by repeating that Napoleon knew all, they consented to Souham's proposal, which was, not to await the return of Marshal Marmont, but conclude themselves the treaty entered into with Prince Schwarzenberg, and crossing the Essonne, place themselves under the orders of the Provisional Government. So impressed was Souham with the idea of the Emperor's desire to secure his person, that he stationed a cavalry picket on the road to Fontainebleau,

with orders to arrest the first officer of Napoleon's staff that should appear, in case Napoleon, in his anxiety to be obeyed, should despatch another messenger.

Colonel Fabvier, of Marmont's staff, was sincerely afflicted by these headlong resolutions, and endeavoured to calm Souham, by showing him that he exaggerated the danger of his situation, and that, besides, the precautions he had just taken, of guarding the Fontainebleau route, ought to tranquillize him; and, in addition to this, he need only cross to the other side of the Essonne to be ready to escape at the first signal of danger, but that by commanding the troops to pass the river, he would merit, and perhaps incur, the punishment that he dreaded now without cause. But nothing could calm his excitement; and, persisting in his error, he replied to the excellent reasons of Colonel Fabvier, with the vulgar adage to the soldiery, "*It is better to kill the devil than be killed by him.*" He consequently persisted in his error.

Under the influence of this fatal delusion, the Generals of Division of the Sixth Corps informed Prince Schwarzenberg, or those who represented him, of the movement they were about to make, and fearing strong opposition from the troops, they ordered that all the regimental officers, from the colonels to the sub-lieutenants, should march with their men to their posts, lest the officers assembling together, should communicate their suspicions to each other, and, divining the plans of their superiors, should rise against them.

These precautions being taken, the sixth corps, conducted by its generals, crossed the Essonne at four o'clock on the morning of the 5th of April, whilst the marshals were in conference in the Rue Saint Florentin. The troops advanced in silence towards the outposts of the enemy. The soldiers obeyed, ignorant of the crime they were unconsciously committing; some supposing the movement was a consequence of the abdication, of which they had heard the evening before, whilst others thought it was a concerted movement to surprise the enemy. However, when they perceived that the allied troops remained peaceably on the road side, and allowed them to pass without firing, they began to conceive some suspicions, which were soon changed into murmurs. Some officers, accomplices in the treason, tried to pacify them by various pretexts, and induce them to continue their march. But the murmurs increased at every step, and everything seemed to announce an outbreak when they should arrive at Versailles. Thus the sixth corps passed over to the enemy, with the exception of the division commanded by General Lucotte, who suspected that something was wrong, and refused to obey the order to march. The line of the Essonne was thus left unprotected, and the sixth corps, so necessary for the execution of his projects, was totally lost to Napoleon.

The brave Colonel Fabvier, not being able to prevent this terri-

ble resolve, had no other resource than to endeavour to anticipate its effects by hastening to visit Marshal Marmont at Paris. But, unfurnished with credentials, he found great difficulty in passing the enemy's out-posts, and only succeeded by dint of solicitations and false pretences. He arrived at length at the Talleyrand Hotel, but not meeting there the chief he sought, he hastened to Marshal Ney's, where he found the three marshals together, and informed Marmont of what we have just related.

On receiving this terrible information, Marmont experienced violent emotion. "I am lost!" he exclaimed, "dishonoured for ever." Unfortunate man, he was not sufficiently convinced of the truth of what he said, or he would have made a last effort to escape all share in the responsibility of this defection. But he contented himself with lamenting, complaining, and asking consolation from his colleagues (very little disposed to offer him any), instead of going in person to Versailles, and bringing back the troops to their posts, at any risk. Whilst he was consuming the time in useless bewailings, a messenger from the Emperor of Russia announced to Napoleon's representatives that they were waited for at *Rue Saint-Florentin*. They set off, followed by Marmont, who still continued his useless lamentations, without proceeding to act; the marshals had lost all hope, since learning the late intelligence that had confounded them.

Whilst this scene was taking place on the Versailles route, the authors of the restoration of the Bourbons had been very busy. The Emperor Alexander had appeared so moved by the language of the marshals, and the Allies themselves, though naturally inclined to favour the Bourbons, had appeared so sensible to the advantages of immediately finishing the war by coming to terms with Napoleon, that the Royalists, assembled at M. de Talleyrand's, became terribly alarmed. They repeated to the Emperor Alexander all they had so often told him during the past five days: they despatched General Beurnonville to the King of Prussia, to repeat the same things to him; there was no occasion to try fresh persuasions with Prince Schwarzenberg, but they begged him not to waver. In a word, they neglected no means to prevent a change of fortune in Napoleon's favour, a change that depended solely on the versatile will of Alexander. As to the rest, these efforts were nearly superfluous, for there was no occasion for using any argument with the allied powers to show them that the Bourbons were much better than Napoleon, acting under the shelter of his wife's regency; but the Allies dreaded to drive Napoleon to despair, and this was the only motive that could make them hesitate. However, after having assembled at the Hôtel Saint-Florentin, and after having deliberated, the representatives of the coalition determined to persevere; in the first place because they had already gone very far in pronouncing the deposition of Napoleon and his heirs, and secondly, because the Bourbons were much more satisfactory for them than

a regency, which would leave Napoleon the temptation and the means of resuming the sceptre, and with the sceptre the sword, and lastly, because the work of throwing off the common oppressor was so far advanced, that it was better to finish, even at the risk of another effusion of blood, than to abandon the nearly-completed task. The representatives of the allied powers, therefore, commissioned Alexander to declare that they still persisted in what they had originally resolved, and this they did without infusing into his mind an energy which they did not themselves possess, or without inspiring him with a zeal for the Bourbons, in which they were deficient.

Alexander, surrounded by the King of Prussia and the allied ministers, received the marshals, presented by M. de Caulaincourt, with the same affability as on the previous evening. He expressed once more the sentiments, repeated to satiety during the last few days, that the allied sovereigns had come to Paris to seek peace, and not by any means to humble France, or impose a government on her; then he repeated, in a formal and determined manner, the reasons already quoted against maintaining Napoleon on the throne of France, but he mentioned in a manner much less positive the reasons that might be alleged against the regency of Maria Louisa. He spoke on the latter part of the subject in a manner somewhat vague, and which left an opening to the renewal of the discussion. The question was, in fact, again opened; the marshals repeated, with extreme vehemence, what they had already said against the recall of the Bourbons, and almost assumed a threatening attitude in speaking of the forces that Napoleon still commanded, and of the devotedness he would find them testify in defending the rights of the King of Rome. Alexander, visibly perplexed, looked now at the speakers, then at his allies, as if he were thinking of a solution different to that he had been commissioned to announce,* when an aide-de-camp suddenly enters, and addressing the Emperor in a low voice, says something in Russian. M. de Caulaincourt, who has a slight knowledge of this language, thinks, from what he overhears, that the Czar is informed of the defection of the 6th corps, of which Alexander was evidently ignorant, as his surprise testified. "The entire corps," said the Emperor, inclining his ear, for he was a little deaf, "Yes, the entire corps," replied the aide-de-camp.

Alexander returned to the negotiators, but with an absent air, and scarcely appearing to hear what was said. He afterwards withdrew for a moment to converse with his allies. Whilst the three negotiators were alone (Marmont had not dared to accompany them this time), M. de Caulaincourt told the two marshals that all was lost, for he had not the slightest doubt that the intelligence just brought to the Emperor Alexander, was the defection

* I speak on the written authority of men the most worthy of belief, and the least hostile to Marshal Marmont and the Bourbons.

of the 6th corps, and this information would entirely change the dispositions of the Czar. Alexander soon returned; but now firm in his attitude, decided in his language, he declared that both Napoleon and Maria Louisa should be given up, and that the Bourbons alone suited France as well as Europe, and as to the rest, the army, in whose name they spoke, was at least divided, for he had just learned that an entire corps had passed over to the Provisional Government, that the entire army would, undoubtedly, follow this good example, and would, by so doing, render France a service at least equal to those her soldiers had already rendered; that her glory and her interests would be carefully respected; that the princes now called to the throne would look to the army as their support and their guide; that, as to what concerned Napoleon, he had only to trust to the honour of the allied sovereigns, and that both he and his family would be treated in a manner conformable to their past greatness. Having spoken thus, Alexander conversed with the marshals in succession; he treated Macdonald with the esteem that was his due; he flattered Ney in a way to turn the head, unfortunately weak, of this hero; he detained M. de Caulaincourt some minutes. Then, in a short conversation, he signified to the latter that the late vacillations of the Allies had been terminated by the occurrence of the past night on the Essonne, for from that moment the Allies saw clearly that Napoleon could make no further efforts, and that he must submit to his fate. The Emperor Alexander renewed the assurance he had already given, of the most generous treatment for Napoleon; he did not deny that he had, perhaps, gone too far in offering the island of Elba, but he added that he would keep his word, and promised formally to obtain a principality in Italy for Maria Louisa and the King of Rome. He then dismissed M. de Caulaincourt, pressing him to return soon, furnished with powers from his master to conclude this negotiation, for Napoleon's cause was every hour losing what that of the Bourbons was gaining, and the indemnifications that the Allies were disposed to make would diminish in the same proportion.

M. de Caulaincourt, left alone with Macdonald, who had not quitted him, prepared to return to Fontainebleau. Ney, surrounded by the members and ministers of the Provisional Government, was overwhelmed with attentions, capable of shaking a firmer head than his. Marshal Marmont had gone to M. de Talleyrand's, where he was exposed to fresh seductions. He arrived there, confounded with what had taken place on the Essonne, and expecting to find in the looks of the bystanders a judgment that he feared would be severe, especially when he remembered what the marshals, his colleagues, had said in the morning; but instead of expressions condemnatory or even equivocal, he met on all sides the most flattering approval, and the most expressive pressures of the hand. He was told, that after having heroically done his duty in the last campaign, he had put

the *acme* to his noble conduct in saving France by the determination he had taken ; that there was no price too high for such a service, and that the Bourbons would be eager to acquit the debt, however great the amount. The unfortunate Marmont was at first about to protest against the suppositious merits that were attributed to him, but, assailed by felicitations, he had not strength of mind sufficient to repulse such honours, so many brilliant hopes, and without suspecting, without wishing it, in accepting these compliments he accepted the reprobation which is for ever inseparably attached to his memory.

In times of revolution, vicissitudes of fortune are sudden and unforeseen. Whilst the frequenters of the Talleyrand mansion, delighted to learn the defection of the sixth corps, and the definite resolutions of the Allies, were overloading Marmont with compliments, and thus endeavouring to associate him with their joys and their hopes, a piece of intelligence suddenly damped their exultation. A report was spread that a military sedition had burst out at Versailles amongst the soldiers of the sixth corps ; that these soldiers declared themselves deceived by their generals, whom they threatened to shoot ; and, in short, there was no saying what might be the consequences of this accident. Had the Royalists preserved a coolness, which indeed is seldom exhibited under such circumstances, they ought to have known that a corps of 15,000 men, separated from the main body of the French army, and completely surrounded by the allied troops, would be annihilated or disarmed, had they attempted to undo what they had done. But people do not reason so logically during the tumult of revolution. It was feared that this corps, repenting in a burst of heroic despair, might rekindle the passions of the troops still remaining at Fontainebleau, as well as the warlike ardour of Napoleon, which would excite the Parisians, who, though apparently so tranquil, were impatient of the presence of strangers, and so effect a complete change in the aspect of affairs. The Royalists were exceedingly alarmed.

There was only one man who could hinder the fortunate event of the past night becoming so suddenly disastrous ; this man was Marshal Marmont. This marshal ought naturally to have great influence over the troops of the sixth corps, and be more capable than any other person of keeping them in the way in which they had entered. The Royalists surrounded the marshal, and begged him to finish the work he had begun. They told him for the hundredth time, that the re-establishment of Napoleon, in opposition to all Europe, was impossible ; that the European Powers, even if conquered before the walls of Paris, would not consider themselves defeated, but would renew the war with fresh vigour ; that France would be consequently exposed to a frightful prolongation of evils ; that peace, with the frontiers of 1790—that the Bourbons, with legal guarantees—would be preferable to such risks ; that, moreover, he, Marmont, having taken one decided step, having brought

away his *corps d'armée*, it was now impossible for him to retrace his steps, his conduct would be inexplicable, and being already compromised with Napoleon, he would then be irrevocably compromised with the Bourbons.

Marmont did not wish to be compromised with everybody, and, besides, after having had the weakness to accept unmerited congratulations, he wished to acquire incontestable titles to royal favour, he therefore resolved to set off for Versailles, and win back the mutinous troops of the sixth corps. On arriving, he found the soldiers in open insurrection assembled outside the town, and refusing to return to their ranks, notwithstanding the efforts of General Bordessoulle, whom they bitterly reproached for what they had been induced to do. The unexpected arrival of Marshal Marmont caused the soldiers evident satisfaction. As he was absent at the moment when the defection took place, they supposed it was accomplished without his concurrence, and seeing him now arrive, they were persuaded he had come to extricate them from the consequences of the false step they had made. Besides, Marmont had won their sympathies by his brilliant bravery in the last campaign. He presented himself before them, appealed to their recollections, retraced the perilous circumstances in which he had commanded them, and where he was always foremost in the fight. Having thus awakened their acclamations, and proved his claim to their confidence, he said, that having always led them in the path of honour, he would continue to guide them in the same way still, when the road would be clear before them, but disturbed as their spirits now were, they could only be the instruments of disorder, destined to be conquered by the first enemy they should meet; he therefore implored them to return to their duty, and take their places again under their chiefs, promising, when they should have again become a real army, he would return amongst them, and remain with them until France should have passed through the present fearful crisis.

Marmont said no more, and the soldiers attributed his reserve to the vicinity of the enemy, by whom they were surrounded on all sides; they became calm, fell into rank, and appeared inclined to await patiently the part their marshal should appoint them to take. As to the rest, a few moments' submission was sufficient to prove that there was nothing more to be feared from their mutiny. The Allies were naturally anxious to place between the sixth corps and Fontainebleau an impassable barrier.

Marmont returned immediately to Paris, to announce the successful result of his short mission, to receive the flatteries of the Rue Saint Florentin mansion, that had destroyed him, and of which he was no longer independent. He was again surrounded by Royalists, overloaded with flatteries greater than he had yet received, and promises of eternal gratitude, which on the part of peoples and kings is not always assured even to services the purest and most honourable.

Thus was this defection, commonly called Marshal Marmont's treason, accomplished. If the act of this marshal had consisted in preferring the Bourbons to Napoleon, peace to war, the hope of liberty to despotism, nothing could have been more simple, more legitimate, more avowable; but, setting aside all the duties of gratitude, we cannot forget that Marmont possessed at that time the personal confidence of Napoleon, that he was under arms, and occupied on the Essonne a post of great importance; to abandon this position at such a moment, with his entire *corps d'armée*, in consequence of a secret convention with Prince Schwarzenberg, was not acting like a citizen, free to choose between one government and another, it was playing the part of a soldier who deserts to the enemy. Marmont has since asserted that this deplorable act had but one part, and it is true that after having himself planned and accomplished the commencement, his generals, misled by a false terror, resumed the interrupted act, and completed it on their own responsibility, but Marmont, appropriating the termination to himself by his conduct at Versailles, assumed the entire responsibility, and, loaded with this heavy burden, his memory will descend to posterity.

The commotion at Fontainebleau was quite as great, but of a different nature. The three plenipotentiaries returned thither towards the evening of the 5th, to deliver the definite reply of the allied sovereigns. Marshal Ney, overloaded with caresses by the Provisional Government, had undertaken to obtain and bring back Napoleon's abdication *pure et simple*. He had set off without his two colleagues, either through a wish to be alone, or through eagerness to keep his promise. He found Napoleon aware of the defection of the sixth corps, and appreciating better than any one the military and political consequences of the act, but as to the rest, calm, exhibiting a haughtiness inversely proportionate to his fortunes, and by no means disposed to reveal his feelings, except to the two or three who exclusively possessed his confidence. Napoleon thanked Marshal Ney politely for having fulfilled his mission, but exhibited no inclination to make him his confidant, or take him into his counsels, for Napoleon divined from the marshal's eagerness to arrive first that he was anxious to contribute to the *dénouement*, and perhaps arrogate the merit to himself. The Emperor listened, almost without reply, to all the marshal said; and, indeed, the latter expatiated at considerable length, on the irrevocable determination of the allied sovereigns, on the impossibility of inducing them to change, on the kind of fascination with which the Parisians spoke of peace, and the Bourbons on the dismemberment of the army, and the impossibility of inducing the military to make fresh efforts, and *à propos* of the blood shed by these soldiers, he spoke of existing misfortunes with truth, but without consideration for the feelings of the Emperor, for his warrior soul was

more strong than tender. However, Ney did not for a moment forget the respect due to a master, under whose rule both he and his companions in arms had acquired the habit of profound submission.* Napoleon, after having listened coolly and patiently to the marshal, told him he would think over the matter and let him know, next day, his determination. After this interview, Marshal Ney, eager to fulfil his promise, wrote a letter to the Prince of Bénévento, in which, relating his return to Fontainebleau, after the failure of the morning negotiations, "a failure," he wrote, "which was owing to an *unexpected event*," (the event of the Essonne), he added, "that the Emperor Napoleon, *convinced of the critical position in which he had placed France, and recognizing the impossibility of saving her himself, he appeared decided to give in his abdication, pure et simple.*" After this assertion, which was, at best, premature, the marshal said he hoped to be the bearer of the authentic and formal act of abdication. The letter was dated Fontainebleau, half-past eleven in the evening.

M. de Caulaincourt and Marshal Macdonald arrived immediately after Marshal Ney. They found Napoleon already sound asleep, and after waking him, they related as minutely as Marshal Ney, but in different terms, all that had taken place at Paris, since the previous evening, that is to say, their negotiations, at first successful, at least in appearance, but followed by a complete failure,

* It is as difficult to know what passed in this interview as in the preceding, of which we have spoken. Marshal Ney has left no written record, and Napoleon, in his St. Helena Memoirs, through a feeling of respect for the misfortunes and bravery of the marshal, has observed a profound silence on the subject. But it is easy to perceive by some of his expressions, that he was deeply sensible of the attitude assumed by the marshal during the last days of the empire. The marshal was wrong to boast, on his return to Paris, of having forced Napoleon to abdicate. That he did so, to General Dupont, the War Minister, is patent, for the latter has recorded the circumstance in his memoirs. Everything proves that on this occasion the marshal accuses himself without grounds, and that had he confined himself, in the scene at Fontainebleau, to a want of consideration for fallen greatness, without indulging in violence of language, which would have been scarcely possible. What induces us to adopt this opinion is, that M. de Caulaincourt, on arriving towards midnight, that is to say, some minutes after Ney's departure, found Napoleon perfectly calm, not exhibiting, either in gesture or language any trace of the emotion which would naturally have remained after a violent scene, nor had he come to any determination. M. de Caulaincourt in a written record, says positively, that in comparing what he had seen at Fontainebleau, with what he heard a few days later, touching Marshal Ney's conduct, he could not understand the reports that had been circulated, nor could he help thinking that Ney had been guilty of self-calumny. M. de Caulaincourt was certainly not pleased with either Marshal Ney's language or conduct at *l'Hotel Saint-Florentin*, but he could not believe in the scenes of violence reported at Paris, and which many historians have since quoted. As to Marshal Macdonald, though in his manuscript memoirs he manifests his discontent at Marshal Ney's conduct, yet he relates the scenes in which he took part in a manner that entirely excludes the idea of Napoleon being subjected to violence. We cite these two eminent persons, the only ocular witnesses who have written the scenes of Fontainebleau in 1814, and the most credible amongst all who might have written them, the persons most likely to tell things exactly as they were. We flatter ourselves that we have in this instance, as in every other, recorded the truth as closely as it could be ascertained, and we do not hesitate to assert that every recital that oversteps the limits within which we have confined ourselves, are, either utterly false or strangely exaggerated.

after the defection of the 6th corps. They did not conceal from Napoleon, that their intimate conviction, however painful it might be to declare it, was that there was no other course left for him than to abdicate unconditionally, if he did not wish to render his personal position still worse, and deprive his wife, his son, and his brothers of every chance of a suitable appanage, and entail on France new and irremediable misfortunes. This advice, repeated so soon again, though now, in the most respectful terms, annoyed Napoleon. He replied with a kind of impatience that he had still too many resources to accept such a proposition. "And Eugene," he cried, "Augereau, Suchet, Soult, and the fifty thousand men I have here—do you think these are nothing? As to the rest, we shall see. Farewell till to-morrow." Then, intimating that it was late, he recommended his negotiators to take some repose, showing at the same time, how highly he appreciated their generous and delicate-minded mode of action.

Hardly had he dismissed them, than he recalled M. de Caulaincourt, whom he did not esteem more highly than Marshal MacDonald, but in whom he was accustomed to confide. Every trace of ill-humour had disappeared. Napoleon told M. de Caulaincourt how much he was pleased with the conduct of Marshal MacDonald, who, though so long antagonistic to him, acted in this trying moment like a devoted friend, he took an indulgent view of Marshal Ney's mobility, and speaking of the conduct of his lieutenants with a slightly-disdainful gentleness, said, to M. de Caulaincourt:—"Ah! Caulaincourt, men, men! My marshals would blush to act as Marmont has done, for they express the strongest indignation at his conduct, but they are very sorry that he has so far outstripped them on the road to fortune. They would be very glad, without dishonouring themselves to do as he has done, to acquire the same rights to the favor of the Bourbons." He afterwards spoke of Marmont with vexation, but without bitterness. "I treated him," he said, "as if he were my own child. I have often had to defend him against his colleagues, who did not appreciate his intellectual advantages, and who, judging him only by what he appears on the field of battle, made no account of his military talents. I created him marshal and duke through personal affection and regard for the recollections of childhood, and, I may well say, that I reckoned on his fidelity. He is, perhaps, the only man whose desertion I was not prepared for; but vanity, weakness of mind, and ambition have misled him. The unhappy man does not know what awaits him; his name will be for ever dishonoured. Believe me, I have no longer a thought about myself—my career is finished, or, very nearly so. Besides, what desire could I now have to reign over hearts that have grown weary of me, and are eager to offer their allegiance to another? I think only of France, which it is frightful to leave in this state—clipped, crippled, after having had frontiers so vast! Oh, Caulaincourt, that

is the most poignant of the many humiliations heaped on my head! Oh! if these dolts had not abandoned me, I would have rebuilt the fabric of her greatness; for, be assured, the Allies, maintaining their actual position, having Paris behind them and me in front, would have been destroyed. Had they left Paris to escape the danger, they should never have entered it again. The very fact of their leaving the city, at my approach, would be in itself a signal defeat. That unfortunate Marmont has frustrated this glorious result. Ah, Caulaincourt, what joy it would have been to restore the greatness of France in a few hours! Now, what is to be done? I would have about 150,000 men, with those I have here, and the troops Eugene, Augereau, Suchet, and Soult could bring; but I would be obliged to retire behind the Loire, entice the enemy to follow, and thus extend indefinitely the ravages to which France has been too long exposed, and try the fidelity of many, who, perhaps, would not bear the test better than Marmont,—and I should make all these efforts to prolong a reign, which, I clearly see, is drawing to a close. I do not feel sufficient energy to make such efforts. Undoubtedly, in prolonging the war, we should find means of improving our position. I am informed, on all sides, that the peasants of Lorraine, Champagne, and Burgundy, cut down isolated parties of the enemy. Within a short time the people will conceive a horror of the enemy; the Parisians will tire of Alexander's magnanimity. This prince is gracious in his manner,—he pleases women; but so much graciousness in a conqueror soon becomes revolting to the national pride of the conquered. Moreover, the Bourbons are coming, and who can foresee the consequences. To-day they reconcile France with Europe; but to-morrow in what state will she be in relation to herself? They represent external peace, but internal war. You will see what they will have done with the country in a year. They will not keep Talleyrand six months. There would be many chances of success in a prolonged struggle,—chances both political and military,—but at the price of fearful calamities. Besides, at this moment, something more is needed than myself. My name, my statue, my sword, all cause alarm. I must yield. I am going to recall the marshals, and you will see their delight, when I extricate them from their difficulties, and authorize them to do as Marmont has done, without compromising their honour."

This entire detachment from things, this indulgence towards individuals, resulted from the greatness of his mind, and was commensurate with the vastness of his errors. If his hard-working lieutenants were at length fatigued, it was because he had urged them to the verge of human capability, and was not able to estimate the exact measure of ordinary men or things. It was not they only who were fatigued, for so was the world at large, and their defection was a result of the nature of things. But after the commission of great faults, it becomes a mighty genius to acknowledge them, and

this sentiment inspires an ennobling sense of justice and that loftiness of language that gives dignity to misfortune.

Napoleon spoke afterwards of the fate that awaited himself. He accepted the isle of Elba, and in everything that concerned himself personally was very easy to please. "You know," he said to M. de Caulaincourt, "that I do not want anything. I had saved 150 millions out of my civil list which belongs to me, as justly as the savings a clerk makes out of his salary, belong to him. I have given everything to the army and I do not regret it. Let my family have a proper maintenance and I shall be content. As to my son, he will be an archduke, which will, perhaps, be better for him than the throne of France. Did he ascend that, would he be able to keep it? But I would wish Tuscany for him and his mother. They would be thus placed in the neighbourhood of the isle of Elba, and I should have the means of seeing them."

M. de Caulaincourt replied that the King of Rome would never obtain such a dotation, and that, thanks to Alexander, he would at most get Parma. "What," exclaimed Napoleon, "in exchange for the empire of France, not even Tuscany!" He submitted to the repeated affirmations of M. de Caulaincourt. After his son, he spoke of the Empress Josephine, of Prince Eugene, of Queen Hortense, and insisted that a proper provision should be made for them. "But," he said, to M. de Caulaincourt, "these things will be easily arranged; the Allies would not be so mean as to dispute them. But the army, but France, it is about them especially I ought to think. Since I give up the throne, and that I do more, that I sheathe my sword, having still so many opportunities of using it, have I not a right to demand some compensation? Would not the Allies extend the French frontiers, since this increase of strength to France would not be vested in my hands, but in those of the Bourbons? Could we not stipulate for the army, the maintenance of its privileges, such as grades, titles, dotations? Could we not, which would be so gratifying to the soldiers, conserve for them those three colours, which they have carried with so much glory to every part of the civilized world? Since we yield without fighting, when it would be so easy for us to shed more blood, is something not due to us, especially as I, the sole object of the enemy's hate and fear, would not profit by the concession?

And expatiating on this theme, which lay so near his heart, Napoleon wished to make some stipulations for France and the army. M. de Caulaincourt tried to disabuse his mind on these subjects, pointing out to him that he would no longer be allowed to treat of these great and important interests; that the great principle being accepted, that of his deposition, the privilege of representing France and negotiating for her was transferred to the Provisional Government, and that what he said on the subject would not be listened to. "But," added Napoleon, "what strength

has this Provisional Government, except what it receives from me, except what I give it by remaining here at Fontainebleau, with the *débris* of the army? When I shall have yielded, and the army with me, it will be powerless, it will command still less consideration than at present, and will be obliged to surrender at discretion."

Such was, in fact, the situation of affairs, it could not be better described; but he who deplored the public woe was himself the author of these calamities, and ought to submit like the rest of the world. M. de Caulaincourt did all in his power to make the Emperor comprehend this, and persisted in bringing him back to what alone could henceforth concern him, that is to say, his personal interest and that of his family. The former master of the world, becoming impatient, exclaimed, "You wish, then, to bring me down to a discussion of these miserable pecuniary interests! It is unworthy of me. Do you arrange my family affairs, Caulaincourt. As to me, I do not want anything; let me have the pension of a retired officer, it will be enough!"

After these conversations, which occupied the night and morning of the 6th of April; after drawing up the definite act of abdication, on which he bestowed considerable care, Napoleon recalled the marshals, to acquaint them with his ultimate resolves. Being admitted to his presence, and not knowing to what determination he had come, they renewed their complaints; they repeated that the army was exhausted, that there was no more blood left to spill, so much had been already shed. The marshals were so eager to obtain a sanction to their offering their services to the new government, that, had they met opposition, they might in the end have forgotten, for the first time, the respect due to Napoleon. But after having, through a kind of mischievous enjoyment, left them some moments in doubt, Napoleon said to them, "Gentlemen, make your mind easy, neither you nor the army will be called on to shed more blood; I consent to abdicate unconditionally. I would have wished, for your sakes as well as for the sake of my family, to secure the succession of the throne for my son. I believe such an event would have been still more profitable to you than to me, for you would have lived under a government, consonant to your origin, to your opinions, and to your interests. This was possible, but a disgraceful desertion has deprived you of a position that I hoped to secure you; but for the defection of the sixth corps, we might have done that, and more, we might have restored the fortunes of France. The event has been otherwise. I submit to my fate, do you submit to yours; resign yourselves to live under the Bourbons, and serve them faithfully. You have wished for repose, you shall have it; but, alas!—God grant that my presentiments deceive me—we are not a generation made for repose; the peace that you so much desire will cut down more of you on your beds of down, than war would have done in our bivouacs." After pronouncing these words, in a sad and impressive

manner, Napoleon read the act of his abdication, couched in these terms :—

“The Allied Powers, having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon was the only obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he renounces, for himself and his heirs, the thrones of France and Italy, because there is no sacrifice, even that of life which he is not ready to make for the interests of France.”

After hearing this document read, Napoleon's lieutenants rushed forward, seized his hands, and thanked him for the sacrifice he had made, and repeated what they had already said, touching his conditional abdication, that, in descending after such a fashion from the throne, he showed himself greater than ever. He allowed their secret joy to find vent in these last flatteries, and permitted them to speak on, for he did not wish to demean either them or himself by contemptible recriminations. Besides, who had made them what they were? He alone, by the despotism that had destroyed their individuality, by the interminable wars that had exhausted their strength; he had therefore no right to complain, and he acted nobly in recognizing the inevitable consequences of his errors, and submitting without an outburst of feeling, alike disagreeable to all parties.

It was then agreed that M. de Caulaincourt, accompanied as before by the Marshals Macdonald and Ney, should go to Paris, and lay before Alexander the definite act of abdication, an act of which he was to be the sole depository, and which he was to exchange for the treaty that was to secure the imperial family a suitable provision. Napoleon insisted once more that no efforts should be made, if such were needed, to ensure success, excepting for what concerned his son and his relatives. He dismissed the marshals, and affectionately pressed the hand of M. de Caulaincourt, who enjoyed the largest share of his confidence.

No sooner was this intelligence circulated at Fontainebleau, than a deep sadness was visible on the faces of the old soldiers. Amongst the officers of high rank, on the contrary, a feeling of immense relief was the prevailing sentiment. They could now, without qualms of conscience, quit the old master for the new. The greater number of the marshals were already considering the best mode of sending in their adhesion to the Provisional Government. They would willingly have confided the task to M. de Caulaincourt, if his immeasurable superiority had not prohibited the idea of his accepting such a confidence. But their anxiety had nearly reached its term, and within twenty-four hours acts of adhesion were to be seen in abundance, with signatures capable of putting the most scrupulous at their ease.

M. de Caulaincourt and the two Marshals set out immediately for Paris, where they arrived at a late hour on the 6th. At mid-

night they were admitted to the Emperor of Russia, who awaited their coming with extreme impatience, an impatience shared by the Provisional Government and its numerous adherents. Though the defection of the 6th corps had greatly diminished the fears that Napoleon still inspired, and though the assurances given by Marshal Ney and the greater number of the military personages with whom the Royalists were in correspondence, left little doubt as to the speedy adhesion of the army, they were still terrified in thinking of what might be attempted by the infernal spirit, as they called him, that had retired to Fontainebleau, and whom they honoured by the fear they felt, even whilst seeking to dishonour him by an accumulation of unheard-of insults. There was a kind of general joy when Marshal Ney said to the most eager among the frequenters of the Hôtel Saint-Florentin, that they might make their minds easy, for the act of unconditional abdication had arrived. When Napoleon's envoys appeared before the Emperor Alexander, this prince who, on former occasions, always shook hands with M. de Caulaincourt first, now ran to Marshal Ney, to thank him for what he had done, and tell him that of all the services he had rendered to his country, the last would not be esteemed the least valuable. The Russian monarch alluded to the letter of the previous evening, in which Marshal Ney boasted of having forced Napoleon to abdicate, and promised to be the bearer of the formal act. M. de Caulaincourt and Marshal Macdonald, ignorant of the existence of this letter, and not having seen anything that could induce them to consider Marshal Ney as the author of Napoleon's last resolves, were very much surprised, and testified their astonishment to Marshal Ney, who became embarrassed. Alexander did not delay to express to the two other negotiators the thanks he had at first, exclusively, addressed to Marshal Ney, and having learned on what conditions they would deliver the important document of which they were the depositories, he made no objection. As to the Isle of Elba, however, he declared he would keep his word, because he considered himself pledged by what he had said to M. de Caulaincourt; but his allies considered the concession imprudent, and blamed it openly; but he was determined it should be so, as he had promised; that touching the King of Rome and Maria Louisa, a principality in Italy was the least they could get, and the Emperor of Austria was about to recover so much territory in that country, that he certainly would not higgler with his own daughter; that as to Napoleon's brothers, his first wife, and his adopted children, Prince Eugene and Queen Hortense, they should obtain a suitable provision, for which he would become personally responsible; that his minister, M. de Nesselrode, would, if necessary, advocate the interests of the Bonaparte family; that they could refer to this minister for the details, but might, in case of any difficulty arising, apply to himself (Alexander). In dismissing the negotiators, the Emperor of Russia detained M. de

Caulaincourt, and explained himself more frankly with this noble-minded man, whom he always treated as a friend, and acknowledged to him that the intelligence he had just received of the insurrection of the French peasants, without alarming, disturbed him, for these peasants had massacred a numerous Russian detachment in the Vosges. He afterwards dwelt, with deep commiseration, on the desertions that were so numerous amongst Napoleon's followers, and recommended that no time should be lost in arranging his personal concerns, for two feelings, he said, were at that time being rapidly developed—the baseness of those who had served under the Empire, and the extravagant exultation of the Royalist party. He spoke of the Bourbons and their friends with extraordinary frankness, exhibiting, at the same time, surprise, disgust, and ill-humour at what he witnessed on every side, and said, that after having had so much trouble in escaping from the warlike follies of Napoleon, the Allies would have considerable difficulty in protecting themselves from the reactionary follies of the Royalists. Alexander dismissed M. de Caulaincourt, promising his friendship for himself and his support in aiding Napoleon.

Even after the deposition was pronounced by the Senate, Napoleon at Fontainebleau still inspired a degree of fear that held the Royalists in check, and prevented them giving full vent to their feelings. The defection of the 6th corps, which rendered Napoleon completely powerless, had considerably tranquillized them; but on learning his unconditional abdication, that is to say, the sheathing by his own act, of his terrible sword, they no longer felt any measure in the expression of their sentiments. That they should be, after so many sufferings, so much bloodshed and so many disasters, public and private, delighted to see again the princes under whom they had been young, rich, powerful and happy, was quite natural and legitimate. That to their joy they should add all the fury of triumphant hate, was, alas! perfectly natural, though sadly derogatory to the dignity of France. Never was there witnessed in any country, a greater outburst of long-restrained rage, than was now displayed, and it must be confessed that the partizans of the ancient dynasty, especially known as Royalists, were not the sole execrators of the deposed Emperor. Fathers and mothers of families who had hitherto cursed in secret a war that devoured their children, now feeling themselves free to give vent to their sentiments, called Napoleon the most atrocious names. Nero had not been more execrated in ancient nor Robespierre in modern times. He was now generally called, “The Corsican Ogre.” He was represented as a monster occupied in destroying whole generations, to glut a devouring passion for war. A document secretly prepared by M. de Chateaubriand, during the last hours of the empire, and published under the protection of foreign bayonets, was the correct expression of this overflow of unparalleled hate. In this production, it would seem that passion had stirred up the dregs

of the bad taste, too frequently discernible in the writer's style : M. de Chateaubriand attributed to Napoleon every vice, every meanness, every crime. The production was read with incredible avidity at Paris, and from Paris it passed into the provinces, always excepting those into which the enemy had penetrated. Strange contrast ! the provinces that had suffered most from Napoleon's errors, were less adverse to him than the others, for the former pertinaciously regarded him as the defender of their native land. Everywhere else, the public anger went on increasing, like an angry man who becomes still more angry as he continues to scold, so the public mind appeared to become intoxicated by its own fury. The murder of the Duke of Enghien, that had been so long consigned to silence, the perfidious meeting at Bayonne, where the Spanish princes had been deceived, were made subject-matter of the darkest narratives, as if the truth, which was bad enough, needed the heightening of calumny. The return from Egypt, the retreat from Russia, were talked of as cowardly desertions of the betrayed French army. Napoleon, it was said, had only made one campaign that was really brilliant. There were, in his long military career, only a few successful events, obtained by force of arms. The art of war, degraded in his hands, had become a mere butchery. His government, hitherto so admired, was now talked of as a horrible fiscal system, designed to extract the last crown from the pocket of his last subject. The immortal campaign of 1814 was only a succession of desperate acts inspired by despair. An order given by the artillery, in the battle of 30th March, without Napoleon's sanction, who was then 80 leagues from Paris, ordering the destruction of the munitions at Grenelle that they might not fall into the enemy's hands, was regarded as a design to blow up the capital. An officer, willing to flatter the dominant passions of the day, declared that he had refused to execute this fearful order. The monster, it was said, had wished to destroy Paris, like a corsair who wishes to blow up his vessel, only with this difference that he was not on board. As to the rest, it was added that he was not a Frenchman, which ought to be a matter of congratulation for the honour of France. He had changed his name from *Buonaparte* to *Bonaparte*, but he ought to be called Buonaparte. Even the name, Napoleon, did not belong to him. Napoleon was an imaginary saint : it was *Nicholas* that ought to be joined to his family name. This monster, it was said, this enemy of mankind, was an infidel. Whilst that at his chapel or Nôtre Dame, he attended mass, in private with Monge, Volney and others, he professed atheism. He was hard-hearted, coarse, beat his generals, insulted women, and in his military capacity no better than a coward. "And France," his enemies exclaimed, "France had submitted to this man." Such an aberration of intellect could only be explained by the political blindness that succeeds revolutions ! This outpouring of words was accompanied by acts of the same character. Napoleon's statue, to which a rope had been uselessly fastened for the purpose of pulling it down, the day

the Allies entered Paris, was assailed some days after, with the aid of machinery and taken down from the Austerlitz column and placed in a government store, and public hate gazing on the monument had the satisfaction of seeing the summit bare.

Such was the fierce explosion of anger to which, by a terrible reaction in sublunary things, Napoleon was exposed; he who during twenty years had been so servilely flattered, he whose deeds had excited the admiration of the astonished world. But he was too great not to remain unmoved by such indignities, whilst he was at the same time conscious that his own acts had produced this revulsion of public feeling. And the flatteries lavished at the same time on the allied sovereigns made the picture of humanity still more pitiable. Alexander, undoubtedly, by his own conduct and the example he gave his allies, deserved the thanks of the French people. But if ingratitude cannot be sanctioned under any circumstances, gratitude ought to be measured in expression when addressed to the conquerors of our native land. Yet it was not so, and the Royalists went so far as to say that the allied sovereigns, who had suffered so much from the French, displayed great magnanimity in taking so gentle a vengeance. The flames of Moscow were every day recalled, not by Russian, but by French, writers. They were not content with praising Marshal Blucher and General Sacken, brave men, whose praise was natural and well-deserved from Prussian and Russian lips; but these writers sought out a French emigrant, General Langeron, who served in the army of the Czar, and related with complacency how he had distinguished himself in the attack on Montmartre, and with what well-merited rewards he had been loaded by the Russian monarch. Thus, amongst the many changes of our great and terrible revolution, patriotism, like liberty, was doomed to reverses; and, just as liberty, the idol of every heart in 1789 became in 1793 the object of universal execration, in like manner patriotism had now fallen into such disrepute, that the act of bearing arms against the natal soil, an act condemned in every age, now met laudation. Weary days of reaction, when the public mind, losing its primary notions of right and wrong, rejects what it had adored and adores what it had rejected, and esteems the most shameful contradiction a happy reversion to truth.

It naturally followed that if Napoleon were a monster from whose grasp France ought to be torn, the Bourbons were accomplished princes, to whom it ought to be restored as soon as possible, as their legitimate property. France had not quite forgotten them; for twenty years were not sufficient to consign to oblivion an illustrious family that had reigned with glory during centuries; but the present generation was entirely ignorant how and in what degree they were related to the unfortunate king who died on the scaffold, and the not less unfortunate child that died in custody of a cobbler. The populace asked each other if these were the sons, brothers, or

cousins of those unfortunate princes, for, with the exception of a few aged persons, the populace knew nothing of the matter. Flattery, quick to turn from him who was now called the deposed tyrant, to those who were designated saving angels, attributed to the latter every virtue, and they certainly possessed some that deserved to be extolled in language more refined and classical than that in which their praises were sung. It was told that Louis XVI. had left a brother, Louis Stanislaus Xavier, now destined to succeed him, under the name of Louis XVIII.; that he was a savant, a literary man, and a philosopher; that he had left another brother, the Count d'Artois, a model of French goodness and elegance; and nephews, the Dukes of Angoulême and Berry, types of ancient chivalrous honour. Under these princes, gentle and just, having preserved the virtues that a fearful revolution had almost driven from earth, France, beloved and respected by Europe, would find repose and bequeath it to the world. She would find peace, which she had never met amid the orgies of demagogry, and which would be now presented to her by princes, formed during twenty years in the English school. There was, incontestably, some truth in this flattery, and all might have turned to an enduring good, had not party spirit perverted these many promising elements of prosperity and peace.

Be this as it may, independent of their merit, the Bourbons had in their favour the law of necessity. In fact, the republic, still all stained with the blood shed in 1793, not being presentable to terrified France, royalty alone was mentionable; and of the two forms then existing, that of genius and that of tradition, the former was rendered unacceptable by its own wild extravagances, and what remained but the latter, with memories hallowed by time and renovated by misfortune? It was therefore very natural that, some days having been employed in recalling the Bourbons to the public mind, the people rallied round them with an hourly increasing enthusiasm.

Two things were needed to be done expeditiously; to draw up a constitution that would impose conditions on the Bourbons in recalling them, and meanwhile receive the Count d'Artois at Paris. The Count d'Artois had remained concealed at Nancy, as we have seen, awaiting the return of M. de Vitrolles, who had come to make arrangements with the Provisional Government, and who did not wish to return to the prince, until the question of Maria Louisa's regency was settled. This regency having been irrevocably rejected, and the recall of the Bourbons being the only imaginable solution of the political difficulty, it became necessary to send M. de Vitrolles to Nancy to see the prince. M. de Talleyrand and the members of the Provisional Government, spite of M. de Vitrolles' importunities, instructed him to tell the Count d'Artois that he would be received at the gates of Paris with all the honours due to his rank; that he

would be conducted to Nôtre Dame to hear a *Te Deum* chanted, and from Nôtre Dame to the Tuilleries; that he should enter the city dressed in the uniform of the National Guards; that it was even desirable that he should wear the tricolor cockade, for this would be a sure means of gaining the affections of the army; that such was the opinion of those enlightened men, whose concurrence was indispensably necessary for carrying out his views; that the power attributed to him would be that of the representative of Louis XVIII., of whose letters patent he was the bearer; that these letters would be submitted to the Senate, who, basing their conduct on them, would bestow on the prince the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, implying, of course, an adhesion to the conditions of the new constitution.

M. de Vitrolles, under the inspiration of the sentiments that animated the old royalist party, exclaimed loudly against the tricolor cockade, white being in his opinion the colour of the ancient dynasty, and the emblem of the Bourbons' inalienable right; he was also indignant at the pretension of the Senate to invest the Count d'Artois with royal power; and, above all, at the idea of imposing a constitution on the legitimate sovereign. M. de Talleyrand, not wishing to enter into a discussion, and trusting that time would settle all things, said rather carelessly to M. de Vitrolles, that it was better to set off without delay, and find the prince; that at the moment of his entrance the difficulty of the cockade could be settled; that, touching the constitution, it was indispensable that one should be framed, but it would be rendered as little irksome as possible, and the framers would especially endeavour to avoid the appearance of imposing a law. M. de Talleyrand repeated to M. de Vitrolles, in a word, that it was better to set off, and not impede, by puerile objections, the progress of events. He commissioned him, at the same time, to carry to the prince the assurance of his absolute personal devotedness.

In order to convince M. de Vitrolles that he could not do better than depart, with these conditions, an audience with the Emperor Alexander was procured him. During this audience, M. de Vitrolles having attempted with the arrogance of the victorious party, to plead for the ancient colours and unconditional liberty for the King of France, the Emperor Alexander, laying aside his habitual gentleness, told him, the allied sovereigns had not crossed the Rhine with four hundred thousand men to make France the slave of emigration; that without pretending to impose a government on France, they would be guided by the opinion of the actual and sole acknowledged and admissible authority—the Senate—that having used this body to dethrone Napoleon, they would not repay the service with ingratitude, by dethroning the Senate; that moreover the authority of the Senate was in their eyes the only safe, the only enlightened authority existing in France, and that it

was this body alone that could imprint on any public act, a character at once legal and national ; that besides, the power that had burst open the gates of Paris, was still within its walls, that this power represented all Europe, so it was better to submit and not force the Allies to regret that they had pledged themselves so deeply in favour of the Bourbons.

M. de Vitrolles would have been tempted to contradict, for he now regarded as detestable the foreign influence that he had himself gone to Troyes to solicit, but which he found intolerable when made the vehicle of good advice. However, there was no reply to be made, and M. de Vitrolles set out, the bearer of conditions imposed by the Provisional Government, resolving with his friends, to curtail them as much as possible in the execution.

The most urgent business was to draw up the constitution. It was necessary to use despatch, in the first place, to render Napoleon's deposition definite, by appointing the Bourbons his successors, secondly, to bind the Bourbons themselves in their recall, by imposing on them the principles of 1789. This two-fold idea, of recalling the Bourbons and restricting them by wise laws, had been propagated by M. de Talleyrand, and had gradually taken possession of the public mind. According to the original project, it was the Provisional Government that was to draw up the plan of a constitution. To accomplish the task, M. de Talleyrand had wished to obtain the assistance of the most enlightened and influential members of the Senate, and for that purpose had assembled them at his house. At the very first words uttered on this important subject, the most contradictory ideas were enunciated, those ideas that were dominant in 1791, and entailed so much public confusion. In fact, the political education of France, successively interrupted by the Reign of Terror and the Empire, had been, so to speak, suspended, and the prevailing ideas now were those of the *Assemblée Constituante*, moderated, certainly, by existing circumstances. M. de Talleyrand, who hated disputation, resolved to let the senators do as they pleased, recommending them three things : to be expeditious, to restrict the Bourbons in recalling them, and to make the restriction efficacious, he advised that the Senate should be interwoven in the new constitution under the title of "Upper Chamber of the Restored Monarchy." He thus sought to please the Senate, of which he had need, and render that body an obstacle to emigration. After giving this advice, M. de Talleyrand abandoned the work, and there only remained of the members of the Provisional Government, the Abbé Montesquiou, a haughty and persevering debater, constantly demanding what conditions were to be imposed on the Bourbons, of whom he was the secret and devoted agent.

The discussions between the Abbé Montesquiou and the Senators commissioned to draw up the constitution were very animated. The points of dispute were the following. The Senate wished, in

the first place, that Louis XVIII, the brother of the unfortunate Louis XVI, and his heir, since the death of the august orphan, who was imprisoned in the temple—should be recalled by the *free-will of the people*, and invested with the insignia of royalty, after having sworn to observe the new constitution. The nation applied to this prince, unquestionably because of his royal origin, whose hereditary value they recognized, but the people sought him *freely*, and accepted him *on condition*, and in virtue of the right the nation had to choose a ruler. The Senate wished to conciliate both claims, that of the ancient royalty, and that of the nation, by acknowledging both claims, and binding them by a reciprocal contract. This point, after a warm discussion, being decided, next came the question of the form of government, upon which, happily, there was no dispute, even amongst those the most opposed upon other matters. Thus an inviolable king was immediately admitted who was to be the sole depository of the executive power, exercising it through responsible ministers, sharing the legislative power with two chambers, the one aristocratic, the other democratic. There were some differences of opinion as to the details of carrying out this system. Those persons who were deeply imbued with the prejudices of the *constituante* wished that the two chambers should enjoy the privilege of taking the initiative in framing the laws, the right being secured to the king of affixing his sanction, a right which no person thought of contesting. The French had not, at that epoch, learned by experience that, under this form of government, the most important point for the chambers is to obtain, by constitutional means, ministers of their own choice. These ministers, once appointed, pass laws the most agreeable to the majority, for, otherwise, ministers, constrained to pass and execute laws that do not emanate from themselves, would be either the most awkward or the most insincere of legislative administrators. For want of experience, or, to speak more correctly, under the influence of a too recent and sad experience, these debates spoke of depriving the king of the prerogative of making peace and war, forgetting that all these prerogatives which they claimed for the chambers are, more properly, combined into one, that of deposing or appointing ministers who, being elected by the majority, would make, as the majority pleased, either peace or war. Another subject that excited lengthened discussions was the formation of the two chambers. The second, called the “lower house,” by the English, who are too proud not to attach importance to things, not to words, provoked no discussion. Instead of having the members appointed by the Senate, from the candidates presented by the electoral bodies, as was done under the Empire, it was agreed that the Second Chamber should be directly chosen by the electoral colleges, investing the actual administration with the duty of organizing these colleges. The most serious debate arose on the subject of the upper chamber. M. de Talleyrand and his *collaborateurs* were

desirous that, under the restored monarchy of the Bourbons, the chief power should be invested in the Senate, which was composed of the most illustrious men of the Revolution and the Empire. It would certainly have been a most desirable measure, for the members of the Senate were so long accustomed to submit, that they would not have been importunate to royalty and, at the same time, too deeply imbued with the sentiments of the French Revolution, not to oppose an invincible obstacle to emigration. In this manner M. de Talleyrand encouraged the senators to fix themselves solidly in the new constitution by declaring themselves hereditary peers. In this the Emperor Alexander fully agreed with him, for this generous-minded and enthusiastic prince, being accompanied by his former tutor, M. de Laharpe, and brought by him into contact with the most liberal of the senators, entered fully into their ideas, and shrank from placing France under the yoke of emigration, after having freed her from the yoke of the Empire; he wished to make use of the Senate alone, either in dethroning Napoleon, or binding the Bourbons by constitutional laws in recalling them.

Encouraged in these tendencies by sincere conviction, by their own interests, and by the approval of high personages, the senators were determined not to stop at half measures. They wished that the entire Senate should constitute the Upper Chamber under the Bourbons, and in order that this chamber should not be inundated by numerous promotions of emigrant peers, they wished to limit the members of the chamber to the actual number of the senators, and only grant the King the prerogative of filling up the vacancies, a very limited prerogative where the principle of a hereditary peerage was admitted. To these political advantages, the senators intended to add some of a pecuniary nature, by converting into real property the funds out of which their salaries were paid, the entire to be equally divided between the actual senators. As to the rest, not wishing to seem exclusively occupied with themselves, the senators wished the existing legislative corps should compose the Lower Chamber under the monarchy, until a new election should take place.

There were many points on which not one dissentient voice was heard; the vote for supplies and taxation by the chambers, equality of justice for all ranks, permanency of the magisterial office, individual liberty, religious liberty, liberty of the press, under a certain limited censorship, eligibility of all Frenchmen to public employments, the continuance of ranks and pensions in the army, the conservation of the Legion of Honour, a recognition of the new nobility, and re-establishment of the old, an inviolable respect for the public debt, an irrevocable sanction of sales of what was called "national property," and lastly, an act of oblivion, including all persons, who by word or deed had taken a part in public affairs since 1789; from this moment, all parties were agreed, with the exception of some slight details as to the form of the monarchy de-

signated as *constitutional*, and which consisted of an inviolable hereditary king, represented by responsible ministers, with two chambers, representing different social classes, and furnished with means of bending the ministers to their will; a monarchy which is neither English nor French nor German, but of all times and countries, for it is the only possible monarchical form that remains, after an absolute monarchy is rejected.

Generally speaking, the mass of the Royalists, intoxicated with joy at the idea of again beholding the Bourbons, thought little of constitutional questions. Provided they could obtain a king such as they knew in former times, they were satisfied. In fact, they would have preferred to see the king absolute as in former times, than surrounded by revolutionary trammels, but they were satisfied to have their king on any terms, as with him they felt confident of recovering the happiness they enjoyed in olden times. However, some persons, either more thoughtful or more subtle, having systematized their prejudices, wished that the king should return *free*, and declared they would not receive him if he were shackled by conditions. Of the latter, the Abbé Montesquiou was one of the most zealous. In his opinion, and the opinion of the rest of his party, the king was sole sovereign, and the pretended sovereignty of the people was only a revolutionary impertinence. Undoubtedly the king, whose eyes were not closed against the light, might, from time to time, say every century or half century, perceive that abuses existed, and reform them, but of his own free authority, by granting reformatory measures, which might even go so far as to modify the forms of government, but never abrogate the principle of an absolute royal authority. Such were the only concessions that these high class royalists would make; but to impose conditions on the royal authority, an authority of divine origin, emanating from God, not from men, binding the king by an oath, and only restoring the crown on such conditions to its legitimate possessor would be, in their opinion, so many acts of rebellion and insurrection.

M. de Talleyrand, having little time and less inclination to occupy himself with questions of this kind, besides confiding to the Senate the care of restraining the Bourbons, he left M. de Montesquiou to dispute with the senators, commissioned to draw up the new constitution. This abbé, though a philosopher and a politician, could not restrain his anger when the principle of national sovereignty was enunciated in his presence. However, he was not so besotted as to advocate openly the opposite principle, or suppose it would ever obtain the ascendant, for it would be easier to turn back our planet in its orbit, than induce old revolutionists to recognise the king as sole sovereign and the nation as subject, with no other right than that of being well treated by him, in the same way as the lower animals have a right not to be overworked by man. But, whilst getting angry and exclaiming against this and against that, M. de Montesquiou dared not attack the

main difficulty and contest the principle of a contract existing between the monarch and the people. But he took advantage of the opportunity afforded by the Senate, who had given themselves so conspicuous a place in the future constitution; on this subject he was violent, and almost insulting. "And what are you," he said to the senators, "to assume such authority, both with regard to the nation and the king? And first, with regard to the nation, what title have you but what is derived from a constitution that you have just overturned, or a confidence of which the nation has as yet given no evidence, and which possibly it does not feel in you? As to the king, he does not know you; he is my sovereign and yours; he returns by the instrumentality of providential decrees, of which neither you nor I am the author, and will not submit to any condition imposed by you. To limit the number of peers! To give the king only the prerogative of filling the vacancies! But this is violating the principles of constitutional monarchy, such as they are understood in England, the country where they are best known; it would be making the peerage an omnipotent oligarchy, against which the king would be powerless for two reasons: because he could not dissolve the Upper as he could the Lower Chamber, nor could he create peers, the number being already limited. The peerage will be, in fact, an absolute monarch, and you would yourselves constitute this peerage. You would recall the king only to make him serve as a veil to your own power."

It must be acknowledged that on this last point, the Abbé Montesquieu was right, because limiting the number of peers was, in fact, to render the peerage absolute. But he was offensive, even impertinent, and seemed to tell the senators that they might retain their pensions and some of them their seats, but that was all that could be done, for a body of revolutionists who no longer possessed the popular favour, who would never obtain the royal confidence, and who had thrown away their sole support, in breaking Napoleon's power.

The senators might have replied that they represented neither the king nor the nation, who at the actual time had no representatives, but that with all their faults and weaknesses, they represented something very important--the French Revolution; that they were the faithful depositories of its principles; that this constituted an immense moral force, to which they united an actual force equally incontestible; that of being the only authority recognised, especially by the all-powerful foreigners then at Paris; that they held the crown in their hands, and would bestow it *conditionally*, but those who pretended to the crown, were expected to refuse it, if the conditions did not suit them.

Unfortunately amongst the senators, who were so tenacious of their opinions, though the energy of their character was broken down, there was not one capable of speaking energetically.

Instead of replying, they contented themselves with acting. Looking on M. de Montesquieu as an insolent spirit, the precursor of others still worse, they lost no time drawing up in writing the plan of the constitution as they had conceived it; in this they were encouraged by the secret approbation of M. de Talleyrand and the undisguised approval of the Emperor Alexander. We may as well add that these altercations reached their highest point on the 5th April, the very day that the marshals were pleading at Paris for the regency of Maria Louisa, and the representatives of royalty were in the greatest alarm. It would be evidently, an incalculable advantage to obtain, at such a moment, a proclamation of the Bourbons by the Senate, no matter on what conditions. "Let us put an end to it," said M. de Talleyrand to M. de Montesquieu, "let us obtain from the only recognised authority, the exclusion of the Bonapartes, and the recall of the Bourbons, and we shall afterwards endeavour, either to throw off what is disagreeable or submit to it." "Put an end to it," he said, also to the senators, "proclaim the Bourbons, for Bonaparte will make you pay dearly for your acts of the 1st and 2nd of April. Proclaim the Bourbons and impose on them what conditions you please. If these conditions do not suit them, they will refuse the crown, but you need not fear that. They will accept the crown on any conditions, and we shall be delivered from the power of the madman at Fontainebleau." These counsels, which rather palliated than removed the difficulty, pointed out however a means of extrication from the existing embarrassment. The Senate followed M. de Talleyrand's advice, and the next day—the 6th—whilst the marshals were returning to Fontainebleau to demand the Emperor's unconditional abdication, the Senate voted the acceptance of the constitution, based on the conditions we have quoted.

The Senate declared in the act of constitution that they *recalled to the throne of their own free-will*, under the title of KING OF THE FRENCH, Louis Stanislas Xavier, brother of Louis XVI, and conferred upon him the hereditary royalty, with which the prince was not to be invested until he should have sworn to observe faithfully the new constitution. There were now established an inviolable King, responsible ministers, two Chambers, one hereditary, the other elective; the hereditary Chamber was composed of the Senate, whose number was limited to two hundred members, this left the King fifty nominations; the existing legislative corps, composed the elective Chamber, until new elections; their dotations were secured to the members of the Senate, and their salaries to those of the legislative corps; the executive power was invested exclusively in the King, including the prerogative of making peace and war; the legislative power was to be exercised conjointly by the King and the two Chambers; there was to be a permanent magistracy; religious liberty, individual liberty, and the liberty of the

press were to be recognized principles; the Legion of Honor was to be maintained, the two *noblesse*, the privileges enjoyed by the army, the public debt was to be respected, and what was called national sales, and lastly an act of oblivion for all acts and votes prior to, &c., &c.

These conditions, drawn up in terms simple, clear and sufficiently general to allow many after alterations, were voted on the evening of the 6th. On the 7th, the constitution was printed, and on the 8th published in the different quarters of the capital. It must be acknowledged that it did not produce a favourable impression. The Senate ought to have been strongly supported in the present instance, for it was that body alone who could transfer the crown from Napoleon to the Bourbons, that body only who in the transfer had any title to represent the nation, and obtain favourable conditions for her, but, the Senate, that for so many reasons ought to have been supported, was neither esteemed nor loved by anybody. The Bonapartists reproached the Senate with having lifted a parricidal hand against their founder; the friends of liberty, scarcely awakened from a long sleep, saw in the Senate only the servile instrument of an insupportable despotism; lastly, the systematic Royalists, considering that body as the representative of the Revolution and the Empire, were indignant that the senators, degraded as they were, should dare to dictate conditions to the legitimate King; and such conditions! conditions borrowed from a detested revolution. This was in the eyes of the Royalists, an act of rebellion, of impudence, and unheard-of effrontery. To oppose the Senate, they had recourse to the simplest means—those adopted by M. de Montesquieu; they attacked the Senate in its weak point, and exclaimed, as did the entire public, against the solicitude displayed by the Senate in guarding their own interests, by securing the perpetuity of their own incomes. The press took up the cry, not in the form of newspapers but of pamphlets, which were the fashion of the day, and endless reprobation and bitter pleasantries were poured out against the *conservative* senators who, of all they had undertaken to conserve, had only succeeded in taking care of their own incomes. Convicted avarice is one of those vices against which it is most easy to excite public laughter, for men generally condemn most loudly in others, the failings to which they are most subject themselves. Consequently, a universal, and contemptuous laugh was raised against the Senate. The public fell into the snare, and did not perceive that in mocking the Senate, they became themselves the partizans of emigration, whose evil consequences were at this time much more to be feared than the acts of the Senate. This was a misfortune, which temperate and enlightened men—always so rare in times of revolution—could alone appreciate. But the mass of the public, joining their voice to that of the Royalists, seemed to say to the senators: “Begone with the master that you knew neither how to restrain nor defend!”

The Royalists, who were not very expert in the trade of politics, for they had been long out of practice, endeavoured to play off the legislative corps against the senate, but without much success. The legislative corps, prorogued by Napoleon, on account of its recent manifestation, had not been legally convoked. But the question of legality presents little difficulty at a time when sovereigns are being dethroned, and the members of the legislative council assembled in full force, to play their part in the new revolution. Finding the first place already taken by the senate, who, of their own authority, had pronounced the deposition of Napoleon, and the recall of the Bourbons, and whom the foreign sovereigns recognized as the sole existing authority, the members of the legislative corps were obliged to play a secondary part, and follow the others; they were evidently jealous. Though they had not formerly shown more firmness than the Senate, and possessed still less intelligence, they enjoyed a certain amount of popularity in consideration of their mode of acting in the previous December, and the Royalists divining their jealousy, began to flatter for the purpose of making use of them. However, these intrigues could be of very little consequence. The legislative corps obliged to utter a few words of assent to the important resolutions that had just been adopted, might indeed hold a language somewhat different to that of the Senate, but was incapable of putting forth antagonistic resolutions, and the Bourbons were, consequently, to return, bound by the constitution of the 6th of April, or by one nearly similar; this was the important point.

M. de Caulaincourt, who had been especially charged to advocate the interests of Napoleon and his family, saw with grief the influx of adhesions that poured into Paris since the fact of the unconditional abdication had become known. Marshals Victor, Oudinot, Lefebvre, and a crowd of generals, had hastened to send in their allegiance to the Provisional Government. The Ministers of the Empire assembled round Maria Louisa at Blois, had, for the most part, done the same, and at their head was Prince High Chancellor Cambacérès. It was only the field-officers who were at a distance, Marshals Soult, Suchet, Augereau, Davout, and General Maison, commanding respectively the armies of Spain, Catalonia, Lyon, Westphalia, and Flanders, who did not speak out, for they had not had time. But the Provisional Government had despatched emissaries to summon them officially, and beg them earnestly to support the new order of things, pointing out, at the same time, the uselessness and danger of resistance; and, with the exception of Marshal Davout, the obstinacy of whose temper was well known, favourable replies were expressed from all of these, and it must be said that such expectations were well grounded, for Napoleon having once abdicated, what interest, public or private, could be alleged in favour of a prolonged resistance.

Each passing day, in giving fresh strength to the new government, rendered Napoleon weaker, and his representatives more

dependant on the negotiators with whom they had to treat. Alexander had, with a high sense of honour, warned M. de Caulaincourt of this, and advised him to hasten; "for," he said, "the most I shall be able to do, in exerting all my authority, will be to secure the fulfilment of what I have promised." In fact, Alexander's weakness in placing Napoleon so near the European continent, by granting him the island of Elba, was loudly condemned in the allied camp, and in the *salons* of the Provisional Government. There was one person in particular, the Duke d'Otranto, who, having had a mission to Murat during the last campaign, was in despair at being absent from Paris whilst a revolution was being effected, and thus allowing M. de Talleyrand to play the most conspicuous part. Less suited than the latter to negotiate with the European cabinets, he was much fitter to conduct intrigues with the different bodies of the State; and had he been at Paris, he would have acquired an influence almost equal to that of M. de Talleyrand. But, fated to play only the second part, he went, came, blamed, approved, advised, and exclaimed against the idea of according the isle of Elba to Napoleon, for whom he entertained as much hatred as fear. He called Alexander's generous imprudence folly, and by dint of talking he had excited a strong opposition against the conditions promised to the deposed Emperor. On the other hand, Austria was unwilling to grant a principality in Italy to Maria Louisa; it was even doubtful whether she would consent to accord Parma and Plaisance, but she absolutely refused Tuscany. In fact, even the Provisional Government entertained objections. This government did not wish to concede to Napoleon the honour of stipulating certain advantages for the army, such as the conservation of the tricolor cockade and the legion of honour, asserting that he had no longer any interest in such things; the Provisional Government also contested the pecuniary conditions, less on account of the expense to the Treasury than because these concessions implied a recognition of the imperial reign. But Alexander had declared his opinion decidedly, and even with a kind of anger, and gave his allies to understand that they were under sufficient obligations to him not to force him to break his word. He therefore wished for an immediate decision. But M. de Metternich had remained at Dijon with the Emperor of Austria, not caring to appear at Paris, whilst Maria Louisa was being dethroned; and Lord Castlereagh, not wishing to become responsible to the two English Houses for the recall of the Bourbons, which, however, he ardently desired, had delayed coming to Paris. The arrival of these two ministers was announced for the 10th, and it was impossible to conclude without them.

A slight incident was very near interrupting the negotiations, and giving events an entirely new course. If some of Napoleon's adherents exhibited hourly evidences of moral fear, the greater number became more warm at sight of the general weakness. The latter forgot that a few days before they too had participated in the

general feeling of weariness, and had cursed a hundred times the exorbitant ambition which had caused their blood to flow so often on the battle-field; they were now entirely impressed by the sight of the great man deserted and left almost alone at Fontainebleau. Some certainly thought bitterly of their career suddenly broken off, but all were heartily disgusted at Marmont's defection and the ingratitude that stained his conduct; they cried out against treason, and were ready to fall upon their chiefs, whom they accused of being the cause of the Emperor's forced abdication. In fact, a report was circulated that the marshals had used violence to oblige Napoleon to renounce the throne. To a suppositious fact were added false details, and many hot-headed partizans were not far from proceeding to actual violence, in retaliation for imaginary wrongs, which they took pleasure in recounting. When Napoleon appeared in the court of the Fontainebleau palace, many officers brandished their swords, and offered to sacrifice their lives for him. Deeply touched by such demonstrations, and calculating the forces that still remained to his lieutenants, Soult, Suchet, Augereau, Eugene, Maison, and Davout, he could not repress some feelings of regret, nor prevent their manifestation. Sympathising with this sentiment, young, generous, but thoughtless men, who experienced for him an increased enthusiasm, had, on the nights of the 7th and 8th, exhibited more than usual emotion. The old Chasseurs and Grenadiers of the Guard, who had remained at Fontainebleau, distinguished themselves especially on this occasion, they traversed the streets of the little town, crying out, "Long live the Emperor! down with the traitors!" They threatened to massacre those whom they qualified as traitors, and wildly demanded to be led on to Paris. However, after yielding a moment, Napoleon seeing in his cooler reason, that no great advantage could be drawn from such a movement, sent his most faithful servants to calm a fruitless ebullition of feeling. This burst of emotion was the last effort of a flame that was about to expire.

One of the officers who did not take part in these imprudent regrets and feared the consequences, had had the cowardice to inform the Allies, adding the falsehood that Napoleon had escaped from Fontainebleau, intending to put himself at the head of the armies of Italy, Catalonia, and Spain.* When this intelligence reached the head-quarters of the sovereigns, great alarm was excited. After the desertion of the sixth corps, which was involuntary on the part of the soldiers, individual desertions became frequent in the army, and there did not now remain to Napoleon more than 40,000 men. The idea of these 40,000, led on by him, and possibly sustained by the Parisians, caused an indescribable terror to the 200,000 allied troops that were at Paris, and who were about to be joined by 200,000 more; they knew no rest whilst they entertained a doubt on the subject. Alexander, with his character-

* M. de Caulaincourt, who knew the author of this treason, did not wish to entail on him the contempt of posterity, and forbore to record his name in his Memoirs.

istic mobility, passing suddenly from extreme confidence to extreme distrust, thought he had been deceived by Napoleon's representatives, and even forgetting M. de Caulaincourt's stainless honour, suspected that fidelity to his master had stifled his sincerity, and that he and the two marshals had come to Paris to hide a great military manœuvre. This suspicion might have had some foundation, when they first came to Paris a few days before, and had not pledged their word, but at the actual time it was an illusion, conjured up by fear. Alexander sent for the three plenipotentiaries, expressed his discontent, and even went so far as to say, that, had he followed his first impulse, and the advice of his allies, he would have had them arrested. M. de Caulaincourt haughtily rejected the suspicions cast upon him; he said that after the generous frankness the Russian monarch had displayed in treating with them, they would have scorned to become accomplices even in a *ruse de guerre*—he asserted that the allied sovereigns had been shamefully misled, and offered to become a prisoner, until the truth should be ascertained. Alexander did not accept this offer, and to prove that his suspicions had not been lightly conceived, he told M. de Caulaincourt the name of the informer. The latter was indignant, and it was instantly agreed that officers should be sent to Fontainebleau, to make enquiries. Some hours after, these officers returned with an exact report of what had passed. According to their report, the affair had consisted of a kind of military sedition, that had died out of itself, Napoleon not wishing to profit by it.

Here was an additional reason for hastening the *dénouement*. But this was not the sole cause, for every moment, reports were spread of the arrival of the Count d'Artois, and should this prince once enter Paris, received, as he would undoubtedly be, with the loud acclamations that ever welcome new arrivals, it might become impossible to obtain anything for Napoleon. Alexander had indeed promised not to admit the Count d'Artois into Paris before the conventions relative to the imperial family should be signed, and this was an additional reason for despatch. Matters were accordingly expedited. In the first place, it was thought unwise to live under a tacit armistice, which might, at any moment, be broken, without criminating any one. A formal armistice was therefore drawn up for all the armies, and particularly for that encamped round Fontainebleau. Touching the latter, it was agreed, that it should be separated from the allied troops by the Seine, from Fontainebleau to Essonne; from this place, the river of the same name should form a line of demarcation as far as the cantonments extended. This armistice signed, the arrangements for Napoleon and his family were proceeded with.

The cession of the isle of Elba, though more than once contested at the instigation of M. Fouché and the Austrian ministers, was not questioned, thanks to the decided opinion pronounced by Alexander. It was agreed that Napoleon should be sole sovereign of this island, and retain during his life, the title by which he was

known to the world—that of Emperor. It was also agreed that he should be accompanied by seven or eight hundred men of the Old Guard, who should serve both as an escort of honour, and a means of defence. The next question under consideration was a provision for Maria Louisa and her son. M. de Metternich had arrived the 10th April, and refused Tuscany, saying that Alexander's willingness to give up that province, was only being generous at the expense of others. Parma and Plaisance were assigned to the mother and son. Next came the pecuniary arrangements. Napoleon was to have an annual income of two millions, and a like sum was to be divided between his brothers and sisters. These sums were to be partly obtained from the French treasury and partly from the immense revenues of the countries yielded by France. On these conditions, Napoleon pledged himself to give up the entire treasury extraordinary as well as the crown diamonds. Out of this treasury extraordinary, he was allowed to distribute two millions in ready money to officers whose services he wished to recompense. A principality was promised to Prince Eugene, when the territorial question should be definitely settled. Lastly, the Empress Josephine was to receive her pension, which was reduced to a million.

It was only after protracted debates that these arrangements were adopted. The Provisional Government opposed them, not on account of the extent of the pecuniary sacrifices involved, but on account of the implied recognition of the imperial reign. Alexander wished that Napoleon's representatives should meet M. de Talleyrand and the allied ministers in a general assembly. The discussion was warm, and Marshal Macdonald, whom the petty details of this discussion rendered indignant, energetically supported the cause of the imperial family. At length the insolence and pride of M. de Caulaincourt, which surpassed even the habitual haughtiness of M. de Talleyrand, put an end to the debate, and the general conditions were agreed on. It was the 10th April, and the approaching arrival of the Count d'Artois was announced.

On the 11th, there was a general assembly of the ministers of the different Powers, of the members of the Provisional Government, and of Napoleon's representatives. The treaty was signed by the ministers of the allied monarchs, in separate copies, and M. de Talleyrand, in the name of the royal government, without adhering to the treaty himself, guaranteed the execution of the conditions that concerned France. M. de Caulaincourt then, for the first time, produced the act of abdication, and presented it to M. de Talleyrand, by whom it was received with undisguised joy.

Such was the end of the greatest power that had reigned in Europe since the days of Charlemagne, and the conqueror who had signed the treaties of Campo-Formio, of Lunéville, of Vienna, of Tilsit, of Bayonne, and of Presbourg was obliged to accept, through the medium of his noble-minded representative, not the treaty of Châtillon, which he was perfectly right to refuse, but the

treaty of the 11th April, which accorded to him the isle of Elba, with a pension for himself and his family; terrible example of the chastisement that Fortune reserves for those who allow themselves to be intoxicated by her favors!

These signatures being exchanged, M. de Talleyrand, with a mixture of dignity and courtesy, said to the three envoys of Napoleon, that their duty towards their unhappy master being amply fulfilled, the government now reckoned on their adhesion and attached importance to it, on account of their personal merit and high reputation. To this speech M. de Caulaincourt replied, that his duty to Napoleon would not be fully discharged until all the subscribed conditions should have been fulfilled. Marshal Ney replied that he had already given in his adhesion to the Bourbon government, and was ready to repeat the act. "I," said Marshal Macdonald, "shall follow the example of M. de Caulaincourt." After these explanations the meeting broke up, and M. de Caulaincourt, accompanied by Marshal Macdonald, set off immediately for Fontainebleau.

Shortly before the treaty of the 11th April was signed, Napoleon demanded from M. de Caulaincourt that he should send back the act of abdication. Though he was in no way deceived as to the sentiments of Austria, and understood perfectly well, that Francis II., though loving his daughter would prefer the interests of his empire to hers, he had still flattered himself that if Maria Louisa had an interview with her father, she would obtain something, perhaps Tuscany, to which he attached especial importance as being in the neighbourhood of the isle of Elba. He therefore advised her, in the secret correspondence kept up between them, to apply to the Emperor Francis. Maria Louisa, following this advice, sent several emissaries to Dijon, and received from her father protestations of tenderness of a nature to inspire hope. At the same time, erroneous information received by Napoleon, made him believe that Francis II., disapproved the haste with which the regency of Maria Louisa had been condemned for the benefit of the Bourbons. It was in consequence of this erroneous information that Napoleon had recalled his act of abdication, but without insisting on it, for he soon discovered the shallowness of the information he had received. M. de Caulaincourt had flatly refused to break off the negotiations. Napoleon, appreciating his motives of action, received M. de Caulaincourt and Marshal Macdonald with much cordiality and many expressions of gratitude. He took the treaty from their hands, read it, and approved of it, with the exception of the refusal of Tuscany, which he regretted. He thanked his two negotiators warmly, especially Marshal Macdonald, from whom he could not have expected such friendly conduct. He afterwards dismissed both, as if desirous of taking some repose, and wished to defer, until the morrow, the renewal of the conversation.

Scarcely had the negotiators left, than the Emperor, according to his wont, recalled M. de Caulaincourt, anxious to pour forth his

feelings in the confidence of friendship. He was calm, more gentle than ordinary, and there was something solemn in his tone and gesture. During the late extraordinary events, M. de Caulaincourt had profoundly admired the mental strength with which Napoleon had restrained his emotions, and raised himself, so to speak, on the wings of his genius, above sublunary things; but he seemed at the present moment to rise higher than ever, and spoke of passing events with extraordinary disinterestedness. He again thanked M. de Caulaincourt, and, this time, personally, for his conduct, which had inspired him with the deepest sense of gratitude, but not the slightest surprise. He repeated that the treaty had amply provided for his family, and afforded more than enough for him, who really wanted nothing, but at the same time, he expressed his regret about Tuscany. "It is a fine principality," he said, "and would have suited my son. On this throne, where mental power is hereditary, my son might have been happy, happier, perhaps, than on the throne of France, continually exposed to revolutionary storms, and where my race has only one claim—victory. Besides, this throne would have been necessary to my wife. I know her; she is good-hearted, but weak-minded and frivolous. "My dear Caulaincourt," he added, "Cæsar might again return to the rank of a citizen, but his empress could scarcely surrender the rank of Cæsar's wife. Maria Louisa would have found at Florence something of the splendour with which she was surrounded at Paris. She would only have had to cross the Piombino canal to pay me a visit; my prison would have been, as it were, enlocked in her states; under these circumstances, I could have hoped to see her, I might even have been able to visit her, and when the European Powers would have been convinced that I had renounced the world, and, like a new Sancho, *I only thought of the welfare of my island*, they would have sanctioned these little trips; I should have enjoyed a happiness of which I knew little, amid all the splendour of my glory. But now that my wife would be obliged to come from Parma, and traverse so many foreign states to come to me—God only knows. But let us quit this subject. You have done all you could, and I thank you; Austria is utterly heartless."

The Emperor again pressed M. de Caulaincourt's hand, and spoke of his entire life with extraordinary impartiality and incomparable greatness of mind.

He acknowledged that he had deceived himself, that enamoured of France, of the rank she held in the world, and of the higher rank she might attain, he had wished to raise with her and for her, a sovereign empire, upon which all the other empires of Europe would have been dependant, and he acknowledged that after having almost realized this glorious dream, he had not had the good sense to pause at the limit traced by the nature of things. He afterwards spoke of his generals, recalled Massena to memory and declared, that of all his lieutenants, he had performed the highest deeds; he did not speak of the campaign in

Portugal, only too well justified alas! by our misfortune in the Peninsula, but he repeated what he had already said more than once, that there was one thing wanted to the noble defence of Genoa in 1800, and that was twenty-four hours longer resistance. He spoke of Suchet, of his profound wisdom in war and administration, said something of Marshal Soult and his ambition, did not utter a word about Davout, of whom he had lost sight for the past two years, and who at that very moment was performing at Hambourg prodigies of valour, of which France knew nothing; he afterwards spoke of Berthier, of his good sense, his honesty, and his rare talents as head of the staff. "I loved him," he said, "and he has just caused me great pain of mind. I begged him to pass some time with me in the isle of Elba, and he did not seem willing to consent. And yet I would not have retained him long. Do you suppose that I would wish to prolong indefinitely an idle and useless life? This proof of devotedness might not have cost him much, but his heart is broken, he is a father, he thinks of his children; he fancies he might be able to keep the principality of Neuchâtel," he is mistaken, but his error is excusable. I love Berthier, I shall never cease to love him. Ah, Caulaincourt, without being indulgent, it is impossible to judge men correctly, and above all, to govern them!" Then Napoleon spoke of his other generals; he named Gérard and Clausel as the hope of the French army, and made some reflections, not bitter, but sad, on the eagerness exhibited by certain officers to abandon him. "Why do they not act frankly?" he said. "I see their desire, their embarrassment, I try to put them at their ease, I tell them they have nothing more to do, but to enter the service of the Bourbons, and instead of profitting of the offered opportunity, they make me empty protestations of fidelity, and afterwards send their adhesion underhand to Paris, and frame a pretext for leaving me. I detest dissimulation. It is very natural that old soldiers covered with wounds, should seek to preserve under the new government, the reward of the services they have rendered to France! Why deny their motives of action? But men never see clearly what they ought to do, and what is due to them; they seldom speak or act consistently. My brave Drouot is very different. He is not satisfied, I see it clearly, but it is not through personal feeling, but on account of our poor France. He is not pleased with me, but he will, however, remain with me, less through personal affection for me, than through respect for himself. Drouot! Drouot! he is virtue itself!"

Napoleon spoke afterwards of his ministers. He appeared to feel that not one of them had come from Blois to bid him farewell. He spoke of the Duke de Feltre as he had always thought of him, which was not very flattering. He spoke highly of the honesty, knowledge, and attention to business displayed by the Duke de Gaete and Count Molliën. He afterwards expatiated on the character of Admiral Decrès. Though he had no personal

affection for this minister, he seemed to attach an importance to him proportionate to his abilities. "He is hard-hearted, pitiless in his remarks," said Napoleon; "he takes pleasure in making himself detested, but he is of a high order of mind. The misfortunes that befel the navy are not attributable to him, but to circumstances. He prepared, with very little expense, a magnificent fleet. Caulaincourt, I had one hundred and twenty ships-of-the-line. England, whilst walking over the waters, did not sleep. She has done me much harm, undoubtedly; but I have left a poisoned arrow in her side. It is I who augmented that national debt that will press on future generations, and will become an unceasingly oppressive, if not overwhelming, burden to her." Napoleon also spoke of M. de Bassano, M. de Talleyrand, and the Duke of Otranto. "Bassano is falsely accused," he said; "but in all ages a victim has been sacrificed to public opinion. My most serious resolves have been imputed to him. You know—you, who have seen all, know how it really is. He is an honest man, well-informed, industrious, devoted, and of inviolable fidelity. He has not Talleyrand's *esprit*, but he is far better. Talleyrand, whatever may be said to the contrary, has not opposed me a whit more than Bassano in the acts with which I am reproached. He has just found a part suited to him, and has invested himself with it. As to the rest, it is to be wished that the Bourbons would govern in his spirit. He will be a valuable adviser for them, but they are no more capable of keeping him six months than he is of remaining six months with them. Fouché is a wretch. He will go about busying himself, and will embroil everything. He hates me intensely, and fears me as much. That is why he would wish to see me at the extremity of the ocean."

This conversation was interminable, and M. de Caulaincourt admired Napoleon's judgment: impartial, but generally indulgent, in which there appeared scarcely a trace of human passion. At this moment Count Orloff was announced; he brought the ratification of the treaty of the 11th April, which the Emperor Alexander had had the courtesy to forward immediately. Napoleon appeared annoyed at this, and did not wish to part with M. de Caulaincourt, nor was he very anxious to place his signature to such an act. He continued the conversation, and after having spoken of others, he spoke of himself, of his position, and said with an accent of profound grief, "Undoubtedly I suffer, but amid my many causes of grief, there is one which exceeds all the rest; it is the idea of finishing my career by signing a treaty, in which I have not been able to stipulate one general interest, not even one moral interest, such as the preservation of our colours, or the maintenance of the Legion of Honour; to sign a treaty by which I receive money. Ah, Caulaincourt, but for my son, my wife, my sisters, my brothers, Josephine, Eugene, Hortense, I would tear the treaty in a thousand pieces! Ah, if my generals, who so long displayed such great courage, had only been courageous two hours longer, I

would have changed our destinies. If even this contemptible Senate, which, apart from me, has no power to negotiate, had not taken my place, if I had been allowed to stipulate conditions for France, with the force I still retained, with the fear I still inspired, I would have turned our defeat to a very different purpose. I would have obtained something for France, and afterwards sunk into oblivion myself. But to leave France so little, after having received her so great ! What misery !”

And Napoleon seemed overwhelmed by the weight of his reflection. In contemplating the faults of others he beheld his own, for, in fact, if his generals had at last refused to follow him, it was because he had exhausted them ; if the Senate had not allowed him to act, it was because they felt the necessity of snatching the power from his hands, in order to terminate a fearful crisis. He perceived all these truths, without giving them utterance ; and, in judging, he punished himself, for it is so that Providence chastises the man of genius—deputing to him the task of self-condemnation, of self-torture, by the clearness with which he views the past and future. Then, with still greater grief, Napoleon added, “ And these humiliations are not the last. I am about to traverse these southern provinces where men’s passions are so violent. Let the Bourbons get me assassinated ; I can pardon that ; but I shall be, perhaps, abandoned to the insults of this abominable populace of the south. To die on the field of battle is nothing, but amid filth and by such hands !”

Napoleon seemed at this moment to foresee with horror, not death, which he was accustomed to brave, but degrading punishment. Observing that the conversation had lasted very long, he apologised for having detained M. de Caulaincourt, and dismissed him with the most affectionate expressions, saying he should send, did he need him again. M. de Caulaincourt left, profoundly impressed by what he had heard, and seeing, as he thought, in these long recapitulations, and in the Emperor’s decisive judgment on himself and others, an adieu to worldly pomp, but not to life. He was mistaken. Napoleon himself believed that he was bidding farewell to life, when he poured forth his feelings in that manner. He had, in fact, taken the strange resolution, one wholly unworthy of him, of committing suicide. Persons of an active temperament rarely conceive a disgust of life, they make too much occupation for themselves to wish to renounce existence. Napoleon, who was one of the most active of the human race, had therefore no suicidal tendencies ; he, on the contrary, despised self-destruction, as a reckless renunciation of the chances the future may present, chances that are as numerous as unexpected for him who knows how to bear up under the temporary burden of evil days. Nevertheless, in adversity, even when most courageously supported, there are moments of dejection, when the mind and the heart bow beneath the weight of misfortune.

Napoleon experienced on this day one of those moments of

insurmountable depression. The treaty relative to his family being signed, the honour of the sovereigns pledged for its fulfilment, he believed that his son, his wife and relations were provided for, and he thought he had fulfilled his last duties. It seemed to him that for honest people, his death would impress on the engagement he had signed, a sacred character, and that ceasing to fear, they would also cease to hate him. Therefore, believing his career at an end, and feeling it impossible to realize the idea of existence in a small Mediterranean island, where he would only breathe the hot air of Italy, not even reckoning on the sweet ties of home affections—for in this moment of sinister clairvoyance he foresaw that he would be deprived of his son, of his wife; humiliated at being obliged to sign a treaty, exclusively personal, and, in point of fact, pecuniary; wearied of hearing every day the murmurs of public maledictions, beholding with horror, the prospect of being abandoned to the insults of a despicable populace, he for a moment detested life, and resolved to have recourse to poison which he had long kept in his possession to be used in extremity. In Russia, on the morning of the sanguinary battle of Malo-Jaroslavetz, after the sudden irruption of the Cossacks, which had involved him in personal danger, he foresaw the possibility of becoming a prisoner to the Russians, and requested Doctor Yvan to supply him a strong draught of opium, as a means of escaping the intolerable torture of adorning the conqueror's car. Doctor Yvan, understanding the necessity of such a precaution, prepared the required dose, and took the precaution of enclosing it in a little bag, so that the Emperor could always carry it about with him. On his return to France, Napoleon did not wish to destroy it, and had placed the poison amongst his travelling equipments, where it still remained.

At the close of the day, occupied by these overwhelming reflections, seeing his family provided for, and, as he believed, doing them no injury by his death, he selected this night of the 11th April, to escape the labour of life, which he could no longer support, after having drawn it so heavily upon him; taking from his travelling apparatus the formidable dose, he diluted it with a little water, swallowed it and then lay back in his bed, where he believed he was about to take his last sleep.

Awaiting thus the effects of the poison, he wished to bid a last adieu to M. de Caulaincourt, and above all, express his last wishes with regard to his wife and son. He had M. de Caulaincourt called about three in the morning, and apologizing for disturbing his sleep, said he had some important instructions to add to those he had already given. His features were scarcely distinguishable in the fading light; his voice was weak and changed in tone. Without mentioning what he had done, he took from under his pillow a letter and a portfolio, and presenting them to M. de Caulaincourt, he said: "This portfolio and this letter are intended for my wife and son, and I pray you to deliver them with your own hand. My wife and son will both stand in need of your prudent and honest

advice, for their position will soon be perilous, and I beg you not to abandon them. This case, pointing to his travelling case, is to be given to Eugene. Tell Josephine I thought of her before quitting the world. Keep this cameo in remembrance of me. You are an honest man, you have always told me the truth. Embrace me." At these last words, which could leave no doubt as to the resolution adopted by Napoleon, M. de Caulaincourt, though not easily moved, seized the hands of his master, and bathed them with tears. He suddenly perceived a glass near the Emperor, in which there were still some traces of the deadly draught. He questioned the Emperor, whose sole reply was to beg him to restrain his feelings, not to quit him, but allow him to finish his agony in peace. M. de Caulaincourt endeavoured to escape and call for assistance. Napoleon first entreated, then commanded him to do nothing of the kind: he did not desire any commotion, he did not wish that a stranger eye should gaze upon his death-stamped features.

M. de Caulaincourt seemed paralyzed, and remained standing near the bed, where that wondrous life was about to be terminated, when Napoleon's face became suddenly convulsed. He was suffering intensely, but endeavoured to resist the pain. Violent spasms soon came on, indicative of approaching discharges of the stomach. After resisting for some time this natural movement, Napoleon was obliged to yield. A part of the dose he had taken was thrown up in a silver basin held by M. de Caulaincourt. The latter profited of this opportunity to withdraw for a moment and call assistance. Doctor Yvan came quickly. In his presence everything was explained. Napoleon begged a last service from the physician, it was to renew the dose of opium, as he feared that which remained in his stomach might not be sufficient to effect his object. Doctor Yvan appeared horrified at the proposal. He had in Russia supplied his master with poison, to furnish him with the means of escaping from a fearful position, but he bitterly regretted having done so, and now, when Napoleon insisted on the renewal of the dose, he fled from the chamber and did not return. At this moment General Bertram and M. de Bassano arrived. Napoleon begged they would not divulge this sad episode of his life, which he still hoped would be the last. In fact, there was every reason to believe so; for he seemed very much sunken and almost exhausted. He fell into a lethargy which lasted several hours.

His faithful servants stood round, motionless and dismayed. From time to time the Emperor experienced dreadful pains of the stomach, and said several times: "How difficult death is here, and how easy on the field of battle! Ah, why did I not die at Arcis-sur-Aube!"

Night closed without bringing fresh misfortunes. Napoleon began to believe that he had not reached the term of his life, and the devoted friends that surrounded him hoped so too; they were happy that he had escaped death, though believing that life could possess little attraction for him now. During these proceedings,

Marshal Macdonald was announced. He was desirous, before quitting Fontainebleau, to pay his respects to the deposed Emperor, "I would willingly receive this worthy man," said Napoleon, "but he must wait a little. I would not wish him to see me in my present condition." Count Orloff awaited the ratifications, for which he had come. It was the morning of the 12th; at this hour, the Count d'Artois was about to enter Paris, and many persons were eager to quit Fontainebleau. Napoleon wished to recover a little, before admitting any one into his presence.

After a lethargy of considerable length, M. de Caulaincourt and one of the three personages initiated in the secret of the poisoning, took Napoleon in their arms and placed him near an open window. The air sensibly revived him. "Fate has decided it," he said to M. de Caulaincourt, "I must live and await what Providence has appointed me." He then consented to receive Marshal Macdonald. The latter was introduced without being informed of the carefully-guarded secret. He found Napoleon lying on a *chaise-longue* and was horrified at the state of exhaustion in which he was. He respectfully expressed his concern.* Napoleon affected to attribute his illness to an affection of the stomach, to which he was subject, and which already announced the malady of which he died. He affectionately pressed the marshal's hand: "You are," he said, "an honest man, whose generous conduct towards me I appreciate, and I would I could testify my gratitude towards you otherwise than by words. But honours are no longer at my disposal; money I have not; and, besides, it would not be worthy of your acceptance. But I can offer you a token of remembrance, which will, I hope, be acceptable." He then asked for a sword that was lying near his pillow, and, presenting it to the marshal, said, "This is the sword of Mourad Bey; it was one of the trophies of the battle of Aboukir; I have often worn it. You will keep it in remembrance of our late transactions, and you will transmit it to your children." The marshal accepted this generous gift with profound emotion; he embraced the Emperor with intense feeling. They separated never to meet again, though neither had finished his career. The marshal set off immediately for Paris. Berthier had also left, promising to return, but in a manner that had not convinced his old master. "You will see that he will not come back," said Napoleon, sadly, but without bitterness.

During this interval, M. de Caulaincourt had at length found time to remit to Count Orloff the ratification of the 11th of April, with the imperial signature attached. He returned to Napoleon, who had just received an extremely affectionate letter from Maria Louisa. This letter gave him the most gratifying intelligence of his son, and expressed boundless devotedness on the part of the Empress, who declared her determination of joining him as soon as possible. This letter produced an extraordinary effect on Napo-

* This is the marshal's own recital in his still manuscript memoirs.

leon. It, in some sort, recalled him to life. It was as though a new existence had been presented to his powerful imagination. "Providence has decreed it," he said to M. de Caulaincourt, "I will live,—who can penetrate the future? Besides, my wife, my son will be all-sufficient for me. I shall see them, I hope I shall see them often. When the allied powers will be convinced that I have no thought of quitting my retreat, they will allow me to see my family, perhaps to visit them, and then I shall write the history of what we have done. Caulaincourt," he cried, "I shall immortalise your names." He afterwards added, "Even that is a reason for living."

Then, with extraordinary mobility of feeling, filled with sudden affection for this new existence, whose image was presented to his imagination, he busied himself in the details of his establishment at the isle of Elba, and wished that M. de Caulaincourt should go in person, either to Maria Louisa or the sovereigns, to arrange the mode in which his wife should join him. He had not thought of keeping any money for himself; the military chest had been exhausted in paying the soldiers. Some millions remained in the possession of Maria Louisa. Napoleon intended to leave her this sum, that she might not be forced to ask pecuniary aid from any one, and especially from her father. But when the necessity of drawing on this last remaining fund was proved to Napoleon, he consented to participate in these millions. He deputed M. de Caulaincourt to visit the Empress, and again advise her to ask an interview with the Emperor Francis, who, perhaps, touched by her presence, would accord her Tuscany. She was afterwards to join her husband by Orleans on the Bourbonnais route. Napoleon reiterated his injunctions to M. de Caulaincourt not to press Maria Louisa to join him, but allow her sentiments on this subject to rise spontaneously from her heart, "for," he repeated several times, "I understand women well, and particularly Maria Louisa." To offer her a prison instead of the court of France, such as I made it, would be a terrible trial. If she came, looking sad and dejected, I should be miserable. I prefer solitude to the sight of sadness or despondency. If my wife's feelings impel her to come to me, I shall receive her with open arms; if not, let her remain at Parma, or Florence, where she will ultimately reign. I shall only ask her to let me have my son."

After giving utterance to these scruples, Napoleon applied himself to the details of his journey. It was agreed that he should be accompanied to the isle of Elba by the commissioners of the allied powers, and he appeared to set especial importance on the presence of the English commissioner. "The English," he said, "are a free people, and respect themselves." Having arranged all these details, he took leave of M. de Caulaincourt, repeating his assurance of absolute confidence and eternal gratitude. M. de Caulaincourt set out to fulfil his mission to Maria Louisa and the sovereigns.

Whilst this mournful scene took place at Fontainebleau, a very different one was being enacted at Paris; for, amid the unceasing vicissitudes of this life, joy, in her perpetual rounds, sometimes lights up, suddenly, faces long shaded by woe, withdrawing her radiance from features on which she had long shone, and which now lapse into midnight gloom. In fact, the Count d'Artois, who was then making his solemn entry into Paris, was surrounded by excited, eager, welcoming crowds.

M. de Vitrolles joined the Prince on the 7th. He found him at Nancy, assisting at a *Te Deum*, sung to celebrate what was called the deliverance of France. The Count d'Artois was seized with a very natural emotion, when he learned that he was about to enter Paris, from which he had fled in 1790, and absent from which he had lived proscribed about a quarter of a century. He was surrounded by some faithful friends. M. M. François d'Escars, Jules de Polignac, Roger de Damas, de Bruges, L'Abbé de Latil, all of whom sympathized in his joy, and prepared to accompany him to the capital. The Prince left Count Roger de Damas at Nancy, where, under the title of Governor, he was to assume the administration of Lorraine, and, after having provided a uniform of the National Guard, he set out, that he might be in the neighbourhood of Paris, on the day appointed for his entry.

The provinces through which the Prince and his suite journeyed, were horribly devastated. Putrid bodies of men and horses filled the air with pestilence; farm-houses were reduced to ashes; bridges were barricaded or cut down; the population had taken flight or were hidden, and some ran to the road-side, on hearing the noise of wheels different from those of cannon. They were entranced with joy on hearing intelligence of peace, and astonished when they learned the return of the Bourbons. The people evinced no pleasure on hearing the name of these princes, for in the eastern provinces, Napoleon was still regarded by the inhabitants as the defender of their native land, though his policy had drawn foreigners thither. When the royal suite arrived at Châlons, the place was empty. At Meaux, the bishop, the prefect, the public functionaries, and the principal inhabitants quitted the city that they might not be present at the arrival of the Prince. However, when the Count d'Artois succeeded in making himself seen or heard, he never failed to make an agreeable impression. Possessing little learning, but endowed with a remarkable facility of expression, perfect gracefulness of demeanour and a noble face, to which an aquiline nose and hanging lip gave the distinctive characteristics of his family; a marked expression of goodness and a great desire to please, rendered him universally attractive. At Châlons and Meaux, he eventually dissipated the coldness of those with whom he succeeded in obtaining an interview, and left them much better disposed than he had found them.

As he drew near Paris, M. de Vitrolles received a letter from

M. de Talleyrand, informing him of what had taken place, that is to say, the adoption and publication of the Constitution of the Senate, the obligation imposed on the King of swearing to this Constitution before being invested with the royal power, and the consequent obligation on the part of the Count d'Artois to take some pledge before being recognized as lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and, lastly, the universal desire of sensible people and, especially of the allied sovereigns, to see the tricolor cockade assumed by the Bourbon princes. No sooner had M. de Vitrolles received this letter, than he ran to the Count d'Artois, exclaiming loudly against what he called indifference, the frivolity of M. de Talleyrand, who, he said, was not able to resist any request, and for want of firmness in his view, promised sometimes to one, sometimes to another, and did not keep his word with any. The Count d'Artois was at this moment so elated with joy, that it would be difficult to mingle a feeling of sadness with his exultation. Both he and his friends entertained an instinctive repugnance to the tricolor cockade, but the constitutional subtleties troubled them less, and the Count d'Artois, astonished at the indignation of M. de Vitrolles, asked him whether what he heard was really sufficiently bad to make him take fire as he did, and above all to make such an outcry. The Prince undertook personally to calm M. de Vitrolles, and it was agreed that the latter should go secretly to Paris, to remove or elude the principal difficulties. Meanwhile the Prince continued his journey and passed the night at the Château de Livry.

M. de Vitrolles having, on the evening of the 11th, reached M. de Talleyrand's, *Rue Saint-Florentin*, he found everything as he had left it—that is to say, in extreme confusion. In the court, there were Cossacks stretched on straw; on the first floor, the Emperor Alexander, surrounded by his staff; on the *entre-sol*, the provisional governor; in one apartment, the members of the government—in another, some copyists; and M. de Talleyrand, sometimes in one chamber, sometimes in another, receiving petitioners with a bland smile, and advisers with a shake of the head that involved no pledge, being as little conclusive as possible, leaving things to time, which certainly does much, but does not do everything. M. de Vitrolles, always very active, but less yielding in proportion as his prince drew nearer Paris, flew into a violent passion against the tricolor cockade and against the oath required of King Louis XVIII., before being invested with royal power. He seemed to say that the crown would be refused on such conditions. The colorless and ironical countenance of M. de Talleyrand presented a great stumbling-block to headlong talkers; he smiled at the threats uttered by M. de Vitrolles, and then proceeded to explanations.

Touching the cockade, a singular accident, whether fortuitous or concerted, had occurred, which had very much simplified the difficulty. Scarcely had the Constitution been proclaimed, when many

Royalists, intoxicated with joy, hastened to the provinces, announcing the return of the Bourbons, and wearing the white cockade in their hats, as if this emblem was to be henceforth universally adopted. Two or three of these went to Rouen, where Marshal Jourdan commanded a military division. This Marshal, whose aversion to the Empire, and whose liberal and monarchical opinions disposed him to look favourably on the return of the Bourbons, if restricted by good laws, had shown himself willing to subscribe to the acts of the Senate; he was, moreover, told that the white cockade had been adopted at Paris, and Marshal Jourdan, attaching importance only to the essential act—the recall of the Bourbons, with a Liberal Constitution—made an address to his troops, announcing to them the new revolution, inviting them to give in their adhesion and assume the white cockade. He gave them the example by displaying one himself. Having only to do with scattered detachments and thinly-supplied depôts, the Marshal met no resistance. The white cockade had been accepted by the troops, and the information was circulated in Paris as a conclusive fact; so that the people of Rouen assumed the white cockade, believing they were following the example of the Parisians, and the Parisians did the same, fancying they were sanctioned by the example of the inhabitants of Rouen. Thus, the question being looked on as decided, an order was issued on the 9th, commanding the Parisian National Guard to assume the white cockade, though that body had at first abhorred the idea. On this point the difficulty was nearly surmounted—at least, as far as the Parisian Guard was concerned; and, as the Count d'Artois was to wear the uniform of this guard, which was tricolor, it was hoped that a kind of compromise had been effected between the two cockades. It was, therefore, arranged that the Count d'Artois should enter the city, wearing the white cockade in his hat, and dressed in the tricolor uniform of the National Guard.

As to the Constitution, the arrangement was more difficult. M. de Talleyrand, de Jaucourt, and de Dalberg, members of the Provisional Government, discussed the question with M. de Vitrolles, and did not know in what way to resolve the difficulty. During these proceedings, some of the many frequenters of the house, having called at M. de Talleyrand's, they were admitted to the consultation, where the great difficulty was to make the Count d'Artois Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, without violating the decision of the Senate, and without pledging him to an engagement opposed to his wishes, and which he was not authorised to take, not having had time to consult Louis XVIII. An expedient presented itself, this was, that M. de Talleyrand should give in his resignation as President of the Provisional Government, and transfer this presidency to the Count d'Artois. But even in this case the intervention of the Senate would be needed, and to obtain it some connection should be formed with that body. Wearied by the recurrence of so many difficulties, M. de Talleyrand said to M.

de Vitrolles, "Enter Paris first, and we shall consider the rest afterwards." Thus, according to his custom, he allowed things to take their own course, when he was not able to arrange them himself.

M. de Vitrolles returned on the evening of the 11th to the Castle of Livry, after having arranged that on the next day, the 12th April, the Count d'Artois should make his entry into Paris. M. de Talleyrand had then at his command M. Ouvrard, who had just issued from the imperial prisons, and who had been always renowned for his luxurious habits. This gentleman M. de Talleyrand deputed to make arrangements for the reception of the Prince at Livry. The Cavalry National Guard, with six hundred infantry of the same corps, were sent to Livry to serve as an escort of honour to the Prince. The latter, radiant with joy, received them with a cordiality that touched them deeply; and, as if he wished to correct the effect of the white cockade displayed in his hat, he told them he had procured at Nancy a uniform similar to theirs, and that he would next day enter Paris dressed like them, and his heart imbued with corresponding sentiments. Cheers replied to these gracious words, and for a moment the representatives of ancient and modern opinions seemed to agree.

On the following day, the 12th, a considerable influx of people had concentrated from early morning on the route and in the streets leading to the Bondy Barriere. Men, born Royalists, and those that the Revolution had made such—and these were not a few—were foremost to assist at the spectacle which they never could have anticipated; for, after the scaffold of Louis XVI., and the victories of Napoleon, who would have ever believed that Paris would open its gates to receive the Bourbons in triumph? And yet, with a little reflection, it might have been predicted, for we may naturally reckon on abrupt and violent reactionary movements when the rational and legitimate object of revolutions is overstepped. But who reflects, especially amongst the masses? At this period, so many persons had lost their fathers, their brothers, and their children on the scaffold or the field of battle, so many persons had seen their families dispersed and their property devastated, that their emotion was profound at the bare idea of again beholding a prince, who was for them a living representative of a time when they were young and believed themselves happy. Under such circumstances, the prince's defects were easily forgotten. In the expectation of beholding the prince, thousands of faces exhibited strong emotion, and many were bathed in tears. The prudent bourgeoisie of Paris—always the best representative of public feeling—had been long attached to Napoleon, who had procured them rest, combined with glory, and they had become detached from him solely on account of his faults; but they now clearly perceived, that Napoleon once overthrown, the Bourbons became his necessary and desirable successors, that the respect which surrounded their title to the throne, that the peace of whose

continuance they were a pledge, that the liberty which could be so well combined with their hereditary authority, the bourgeoisie, we say, perceived that all these accompaniments were the pledges of a peaceful and enduring happiness for France. The bourgeoisie, therefore, were animated by the best sentiments towards the Bourbons, and ready to throw themselves into their arms, if they exhibited somewhat of good will and good sense. The pleasing personal appearance of the Count d'Artois was well calculated to ripen these dispositions, and convert them into a universal burst of enthusiasm.

About eleven in the forenoon, the Count d'Artois, surrounded by a vast cavalcade, composed of persons of every class, but especially of the ancient nobility, took his way towards the Bondy Barriere. Every moment new comers, high functionaries, French and foreign officers, joined the cortège, and when they became recognised, the ranks opened, that they might reach the prince. The Royalists, by whom he was surrounded, were highly elated. If, amongst the persons who arrived, there were any of the old nobility whose fidelity had for a moment wavered, loud cries of *Vive le roi* burst out at their approach, and proved that forgetfulness was not a royalist quality, even with regard to one another. M. de Montmorency, who had joined the Empire, when everybody in France did so, and now held the rank of assistant-major-general in the National Guard, arrived with his *chef*, General Dessoles, and was assailed with affected cries of *Vive le roi*, as if it were needful to teach a Montmorency affection for the Bourbons. As the cortège approached the barrier, a group of horsemen was seen in full uniform, and wearing the tricolor panache; this group consisted of the Marshals Ney, Marmont, Moncey, Kellerman, Sérurier, who had not laid aside the colors which were still those of the army. Shouts were again raised, but without violence, for an infallible instinct taught even the most impassioned friends of the prince, that in the presence of these formidable men, it was better to restrain their feelings. Marshal Ney headed the group. His strongly-marked features, violently contracted, revealed a feeling of discomfort, but without the slightest admixture of fear, for no person had dared to fail in respect towards him. At the cry of the "marshals," the ranks of the royal cortège instantly opened, and a passage was formed. The Count d'Artois, quickening his horse's pace, advanced towards the marshals and pressed the hand of each. "Gentlemen," he said, "you are very welcome; you, who have spread in every quarter, the glory of France. Believe me, my brother and I have not been the last to applaud your high deeds." Marshal Ney, being placed near the prince, at whose reception he was much gratified, was soon more at his ease. The Provisional Government, headed by the president, waited at the barrier to conduct the prince to the gates of the capital, M. de Talleyrand pronounced some courteous phrases, respectful and sententious, to which the prince replied by highly appropriate expressions, inspired

by the circumstances of the moment. The cortège then wended its way towards Nôtre-Dame, passing through the finest streets of Paris. In the suburbs the spectacle was not very cheerful, but it was otherwise on the Boulevards. The citizens, filled with hope of peace and rest, powerfully touched by the thousand memories that came thronging to their minds, and fascinated by the graceful demeanour of the prince, gave him a most cordial reception. The emotion increased as the cavalcade drew near the cathedral. At the gate, the prince was received by the Chapter. Care had been taken to remove Cardinal Maury, Archbishop of Paris, *non-institué*, by overloading him with insults during eight days in the Parisian journals. Thus the intrepid defender of the royal cause in the Constituante Assembly was so severely visited for some acts of weakness towards the Empire, that he was not included in the act of oblivion promised to all. The prince, being conducted to the royal *fauteuil* beneath the daïs, became, even in the church, the object of noisy demonstrations. All the grand functionaries of the State, all the staffs were assembled in the basilisk, the Senate alone was absent. The senators, at length resuming the dignity, which they ought never to have laid aside, did not wish to take part in any ceremony that might imply, on their part, a recognition of the authority of the Bourbons, until the latter should have pledged themselves to maintain the constitution. Fresh exclamations broke forth when the clergy pronounced the solemn words, "*Domine, salvum fac regem Ludovicum*," and the Count d'Artois, who had not heard these words pronounced since his royal brother had lost his head on the scaffold, could not restrain his tears.

The ceremony being terminated, the Count d'Artois was conducted to the Tuileries, amid crowds still uttering enthusiastic acclamations. Arrived at the palace of his fathers, the emotion of the prince became so strong that he could no longer support himself; his attendants, with tears in their eyes, hastened to his aid, and the air re-echoed with cries of *Vive le roi*. Having reached the first floor of the palace, he thanked those who had accompanied him, particularly the marshals, who were now to retire. The latter, on quitting the Tuileries, and leaving the prince, surrounded by the high personages of the emigration, already felt that they would be strangers at this court, to whose re-establishment they had so largely contributed, and a look of defiance and regret impressed on their faces, gave expression to the sentiments of their hearts! *

The impression produced in the capital by the proceedings of the day was intense. The prince had, no doubt, contributed to this, by the gracefulness of his demeanour, by his unaffected emotions, and the appropriateness of his language; but the effect was principally owing to the great memories of the past, so powerfully awakened on the occasion. It seemed as if the Nation and the Old Royal dynasty spoke to each other in these terms, "We have sought

* This is M. de Vitrolles' own recital.

our happiness apart from each other, and our paths have lain through blood and ruins; let us be happy, and let us be friends by making mutual concessions." The two parties did not, indeed, express these sentiments so clearly; but though not exactly defined, they were profoundly felt; and if the same memories, which at this moment so deeply stirred and attracted to mutual good feeling the minds of all, did not soon become a source of discord, France might enjoy, under the race of her ancient kings, a peaceful liberty. But what profound good sense would have been needed on all sides to produce such an effect. However, it was legitimate to hope for such a result, and it was believed that the great victim at Fountainebleau, immolated through his own fault, for the public welfare, would be sufficient to secure it.

The Tuileries remained open next day, and whoever appeared with a name, no matter whether his rank entitled him to the presentation or not, if he could only say that in such or such circumstances he had seen the princes, and had suffered with them or for them, he was graciously received, and his hand affectionately pressed by the Count d'Artois. Each word, uttered by the prince, circulated instantly through Paris, and flattery, prompt to aid sentiment, compared his gracious and affable demeanour with the abrupt and harsh deportment of the deposed usurper. On every side were heard and read perpetual comparisons between the gloomy, distrustful, and often cruel tyranny of the upstart soldier, and the paternal authority, so gentle and confiding, of the ancient legitimate princes. A thousand *jeux d'esprit*, more or less just, were made on this theme. "We have had enough of glory," said M. de Talleyrand to the Count d'Artois, "pray, let us now have honour." Genius had fallen into as much discredit as glory. These two words, "genius" and "glory," so ceaselessly repeated during the last fifteen years, had given place to others in the vocabulary of flatterers, and nothing was now heard of but "right," "legitimacy," and the wisdom of early times. But so it is, each epoche has its fashionable jargon, which becomes a characteristic of the time, but to which we must not attribute more importance than it deserves.

The Bourbons being now installed in the Tuileries, nothing more remained to be done, but to remove from France, into the retreat destined for him, the conquered lion, imprisoned at Fontainebleau. M. de Caulaincourt had been deputed to arrange with the foreign sovereigns the details of Napoleon's journey through France, about which some difficulties existed, on account of the southern provinces, through which he would be obliged to pass. It had been agreed that each of the great belligerent powers, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England should send a commissioner as representative to Napoleon, to insure respect for his person and the execution of the treaty of the 11th April. On introducing M. de Shouvaloff as his commissioner, Alexander said to him, in presence of M. de Caulaincourt, "Your head shall answer to me for that of Napoleon, for our honour is at stake, and our first duty is to see that he is treated

with proper respect, and arrives in perfect safety at the isle of Elba." The Russian Monarch had, at the same time, sent one of his officers to Maria Louisa, that she might not be incommoded either by his Cossacks, nor by the more enthusiastic of the Royalists, who were, naturally, more numerous on the banks of the Loire than elsewhere.

Maria Louisa, whom we had left on the Blois route, after the battle of Paris, had travelled by short stages, sunk in despair, fearing for her husband's life, her son's crown, and for her own future fate, and, through weakness of understanding, not able to proportion these fears to the real extent of the danger. She had successively received intelligence of the taking of Paris, Napoleon's return towards the capital, his abdication, and lastly, the appropriation of the duchy of Parma to her and her son. She had suffered severely during her late vicissitudes, and though not endowed with the strength of mind that prompts to high resolves, she was gentle and kind; she was sincerely attached to Napoleon and felt a true maternal tenderness for the King of Rome. The fine duchy of Parma, where she was to reign independently, was without doubt, a certain indemnification for what she was losing; however, she scarcely reflected on that for the moment, and the sight of her husband, fallen from the greatest of thrones into a sort of prison, touched her weak, but not callous mind. Had she followed her own impulses and the advice of Madame de Luçay, she would have hastened at once to Fontainebleau, thrown herself into Napoleon's arms, and never left him. But the desire to see her father, a desire that Napoleon had encouraged in order to obtain Tuscany, made her hesitate. Moreover, an incident, insignificant in itself, had produced a painful impression on her mind and strongly indisposed her against the Bonapartes. Her brothers-in-law, seeing the enemy approach from the Loire, had advised her to retire beyond, which she was averse to do, and so noisy a scene ensued, that the servants hearing the outcry hastened to her assistance. She did not forget this annoyance, and when officers from Alexander and the Emperor Francis came to take her under their protection, she willingly went with them, not suspecting that with her son, she was about to become a pledge that the coalition would never yield. It was afterwards arranged that she should go to Rambouillet, to receive the visit of her father before her departure. The protection of Russia and Austria could not save her from a species of insult, only too general in times of political catastrophe. In leaving Paris, she had brought with her the remainder of Napoleon's personal treasure, consisting of eighteen millions in gold, silver, and plate. Added to this treasure were the crown diamonds. The eighteen millions were the last remains of what Napoleon had saved out of his civil list and the plate was his personal property. Out of these eighteen millions, some millions had been sent him to Fontainebleau, either to pay the army or defray the expenses at head-quarters, and in virtue of a formal order from Napoleon himself, Maria Louisa had put about two

millions into her travelling carriages for her own use. About two millions were placed in the waggons of the fugitive court. The Provisional Government being in want of money, conceived the idea of sending emissaries in pursuit of Maria Louisa to seize this treasure, under pretext that it was money taken from the public treasury. It was nothing of the kind, but in such cases, truth and justice have little weight.

According to another custom, common in similar crises, an enemy was chosen as agent, and he, too, selected from the lower ranks of the administration. This was M. Dudon, who had been expelled from the *Conseil d'Etat* by order of Napoleon. This agent having reached Orleans, seized the ten millions placed in the treasury waggons, Napoleon's personal plate, and a part of Maria Louisa's diamonds, notwithstanding her expostulations, and the efforts of the foreign commissioners to spare her such an insult. These imperial spoils were carried to Paris, where the new government was much in need of funds.

From Orleans, Maria Louisa went to Rambouillet, to await the arrival of her father. The Emperor of Austria had entered Paris on the 15th April, and had been received with great pomp by his allies and very coolly by the Parisians, who did not admire the conduct of the father of the Empress. He afterwards went to Rambouillet to see his daughter. He overwhelmed her with demonstrations of tenderness, and endeavoured to persuade her that all her misfortunes were attributable to her husband; that Austria had made every effort to bring about an honourable peace at Prague, at Frankfort, and lastly at Châtillon; that Napoleon had never been willing to subscribe to the conditions; that he was undoubtedly a man of genius, but wholly devoid of reason—one who had forced the European Powers to proceed to extremities; that as for him (the Emperor of Austria), he could not have acted otherwise than he had done; that his duty as a Sovereign had overlaid his tenderness as a father; but his paternal feelings had not been inactive, for he had procured his daughter a noble principality in Italy; that she should be sovereign there, and could devote herself to her son, and prepare for him a happy and peaceful future; that the most favoured branches of the imperial house were rarely treated so well; that when the present storm should have passed away, if she wished to visit her husband, and even to live with him, she would be free to do so, but at the actual moment, the wisest thing would be to remain at Vienna, until she should have recovered the effects of the many painful scenes through which she had lately passed; that she would be surrounded by the attentions of her family until she should be ready to go either to Parma or the isle of Elba—but that for the present it would be painful and inconvenient to attempt to join Napoleon, as she would be obliged to traverse France as a prisoner; that to her husband she would be rather an embarrassment than a comfort; that the life, the safety of the conquered and disarmed Emperor, were a deposit confided to the honour of the

allied monarchs ; that on this subject she might make her mind easy, and take the advice of passing the first moments of this separation in the endearments of the family circle, and amid the memories of her childhood.

Maria Louisa, finding a solace for her weakness in these proposals, which were certainly made in the most affectionate manner, yielded to the wishes of her father, and consented to go to Vienna, whilst Napoleon took his way to the isle of Elba. She begged M. de Caulaincourt to assure Napoleon of her affection, of her constancy, and of her wish to join him as soon as possible, and bring her son, of whom she promised to take, and of whom she certainly did take, the greatest care.

As to the brothers, sisters, and mother of Napoleon, they had all scattered after Maria Louisa's departure, and sought to reach, as quickly as possible, the frontiers of Switzerland and Italy, in order to escape the insults with which they were threatened. As to the different ministers and agents of the Imperial Government who had accompanied the Regent to Blois, they too scattered, the greater number to go to Paris and give in their adhesion to the acts of the Senate.

Such was the fate of all who belonged to Napoleon in those days. Meanwhile he was at Fontainebleau, perfectly resigned to the rigour of his fate, anxious to see the preparations for his voyage finished—in short, he was anxious to be in the place where he was about to enjoy some kind of rest, though what its nature or duration might be he could not foresee. He each day saw solitude increasing around him. He thought it very natural that people should quit him, for these officers, who had always obeyed his commands, except on the last day, were naturally anxious to rally round the Bourbons, in order to preserve the rank which was the just reward of the labours of their life. He only wished they had been a little more frank, and to encourage, he addressed them in the following noble language:—"Serve the Bourbons," he said to them, "serve them faithfully ; no other course remains to you. If they act wisely, France, under their rule, may be happy and respected. I resisted M. de Caulaincourt's earnest entreaties to make me accept the peace of Châtillon. I was right. For me these conditions were humiliating ; they are not so for the Bourbons. They find France as they left her, and may accept her ancient limits without compromising their dignity. Such as she is, France will still be powerful ; and though geographically diminished, she will be still as morally great as before, by her courage, her arts, and her intellectual influence over the rest of the world. If her territorial extent is diminished, her glory is not. The memory of our victories will remain to her as a monument of imperishable greatness, and which will always have immense weight in the councils of Europe. Serve France under the princes who bring back at this moment fortune, so fickle in times of revolution. Serve France under them as you

have done under me. Do not make the task too difficult for them, and leave me, but give me a place in your memory."

Such was the substance of his daily conversations in the continually-increasing solitude of Fontainebleau. We have seen how Ney and Macdonald had left him. Oudinot, Lefebvre and Moncey quitted him, each after his own fashion. Berthier had also retired, but, in some sort, by an order from his master. Napoleon had confided to him the command of the army, in order that he might transfer it to the Provisional Government, and that during this transmission he might confirm the grades bestowed as the reward of the blood shed in the last campaign. Berthier had promised to return; Napoleon expected him; but seeing hours and days pass, but no Berthier, he began to despair of seeing him, and suffered without complaining. Instead of the arrival of Berthier, each succeeding day witnessed the departure of some officer of high rank. One left Fontainebleau on account of his health, another for family reasons or for business—all promised to return soon, but not one kept his word. Napoleon feigned to enter into the motives of each, pressed affectionately the hands of all at parting, for he knew that he was receiving their last adieus, and listened, without believing, when they promised to return quickly. Gradually the palace of Fontainebleau had become empty. In the deserted courts the noise of carriage wheels was still sometimes heard, but after a little attention, the ear discovered that these were departing vehicles. Napoleon seemed, amid these scenes, as if assisting at his own funeral. Who has not often seen, at the commencement of winter, a powerful oak throwing wide its leafless branches, whilst at its feet lie the withered *débris* of its former rich vegetation? All around, through the cold air, reigns a profound silence, and sometimes the rustle of a falling leaf is heard. The tree, motionless and proud, retains only a few yellowed leaves, and they, too, are about to fall, like the others; but it does not rear less proudly above the surrounding plain its lofty, but despoiled head. And it was so Napoleon saw fall off, one by one, those who had accompanied him through the innumerable vicissitudes of his life. There were some who held on a day, two days at most, and who fell off on the third. All, ultimately, reached the same point. But there were a few whom nothing had been able to shake. Drouot, with disapprobation in his heart, sadness on his brow, and respect on his lips, had remained with his unfortunate master. Marshal Bertram had followed this generous example. The Dukes of Vicence and Bassano had also remained. The Duke de Vicence was not more of a courtier than formerly, whilst the Duke of Bassano seemed to have become a greater flatterer than ever, and thus gave an honourable excuse for his long submission, by proving that it was the result of a sincere and absolute admiration for Napoleon, alike independent of time and circumstances. Napoleon, touched by his devotedness, said, more than once, "Bassano, people say that it is you who prevented my making peace! What do you

say to that? This accusation ought to make you smile, like all those that are lavished on me at present." And Napoleon repeatedly pressed Bassano's hand, acknowledging thus, in the most noble manner, that it was himself alone who was culpable.

This protracted agony was to come to a close. The commissioners of the different Powers arrived, and Napoleon received them with perfect courtesy, excepting the Prussian commissioner, who recalled two painful remembrances; his former faults with regard to Prussia, and the odious conduct of the Prussian army in our ravaged provinces. Napoleon received the Prussian commissioner politely but coldly. Everything being ready for the 18th, Napoleon, having received a more detailed account of what had taken place at Rambouillet, saw at a glance that this interview from which he had expected some advantage, less for himself than for Maria Louisa and the King of Rome, would only end in depriving him of their presence, and that these beloved objects, regarded not as members of his family, but as part of the pomp of his throne, would be taken from him with the throne itself. He was so exasperated at the idea that for a moment he was tempted to break the treaty of the 11th April and to plunge into new adventures. But, soon recovering his self-command, he became resigned and determined to set off. The orders for the Governor of Elba not being sufficiently explicit, M. de Caulaincourt again went to Paris, in order to get them more precisely detailed. At length, on the morning of the 20th, every thing being ready, Napoleon determined to quit Fontainebleau. The battalion of the Guard appointed to accompany him to the isle of Elba was already *en route*. The Guard was encamped at Fontainebleau, Napoleon wished to bid them farewell. He had them drawn up around him in a circle in the castle yard, then, in presence of his old soldiers, all profoundly touched, he pronounced the following words: "Soldiers, you, my old companions in arms, who have always accompanied me in the road to honour, we must at length separate. I might have remained longer among you, but to do so, I should have prolonged a bitter struggle, adding, perhaps, civil to foreign war, and I could not bear the idea of longer convulsing France. Enjoy the repose you have so justly earned and be happy. As for me, do not pity me. I have a mission and it is to fulfil that that I consent to live, and this mission is to relate to posterity the great deeds we have performed together. I would wish to clasp you all in my arms, but allow me to embrace the flag which represents you."

Then, drawing towards him Général Petit, who carried the standard, and who was an accomplished model of modest heroism, he pressed the standard and the general to his bosom, amid the cheers and tears of all present. He then sprang into his carriage with moistened eyes, having touched the hearts even of the commissioners, sent to accompany him.

His journey at first proceeded slowly. General Drouot went

first in a carriage. Napoleon followed in his, accompanied by General Bertrand; the commissioners of the Powers came next. During the first stages, the cavalry of the guard accompanied the cortège. Further on, the detachments having retired, the cortège proceeded without escort. In the early part of the journey, and even in the midst of the Bourbonnais, Napoleon was received with acclamations by the people, who, though detesting the conscription and the *droits réunis*, saw in him the unhappy hero and the valiant defender of his native land. Whilst the crowd surrounded his carriage crying: *Vive l'Empereur*, they pressed round that of the commissioners, exclaiming *à bas les étrangers*. Napoleon several times apologized to the foreign commissioners for manifestations of feeling that it was not in his power to prevent, but which proved however that he was not so unpopular throughout France as certain persons had asserted. In general, he conversed freely and gently with the functionaries he met on the route, received their adieus, and offered his, with perfect calmness.

The journey soon became painful. In the environs of Moulins the cries of *Vive l'Empereur* ceased, *Vive le roi! Vivent les Bourbons* were heard. Between Moulins and Lyon, the people only exhibited curiosity, without adding any more significant demonstration. Napoleon had always had many partizans at Lyon, on account of what he had done for their city and manufacturers; still there was a portion of the population who professed entirely opposite sentiments. In order to avoid all open manifestations, the cortège passed through Lyon by night. Some cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were heard, and these were the last that saluted Napoleon's ears. Passing through Valence, Napoleon met Marshal Augereau who had just published an infamous proclamation, drawn up, it is said, by the Duke of Otranto, and concluding with these words—"Soldiers, you are released from your oaths; you are released by the nation, in whom the sovereign power resides; you are released, if more were needed, by the abdication of a man, who after having immolated millions of victims to his insatiable ambition, *has not known how to die like a soldier.*" Poor Augereau was still further from knowing how to die like a soldier; he had not exposed himself to death on the Saône and Rhone, where he had contributed by his weakness and incapacity to ruin the affairs of France. Napoleon, who knew nothing of Augereau's proclamation, but who was well acquainted with his unfortunate campaign, did not make him any reproach; he received him with indulgent familiarity, and even embraced him at parting. Advancing towards the south, the cries of *Vive le roi*, became more frequent, and to these were added—*à bas le tyran! A mort le tyran!* At Orange, especially, the cries were reiterated with violence. At Avignon, the excited population, wildly demanded that "the Corsican" should be delivered to them, that they might tear him in pieces and throw him into the Rhône. Whilst the populace treated thus the man of genius, guilty indeed, but covered with glory, who had so long represented in his own person, the prosperity and the great-

ness of France, they shouted—*Vivent les Allies!* around the carriage of the commissioners. Still the popular favour shown to foreigners was at the moment fortunate, as but for this popularity, Napoleon with his throat cut, might have anticipated in the waters of the Rhone, the unfortunate Marshal Brune. All the efforts of the commissioners, magistrates, and the police, were needed to prevent the commission of a horrible crime. Information was received that a vast multitude was assembled at Orgon, and that violence might be expected. These excited populations, exasperated by the conscription, the *droits réunis*, and by the long suspension of trade, were Royalists in 1814, as they had been Terrorists in 1793, and only wanted an opportunity to exhibit the same sanguinary spirit again. The commissioners, upon whom lay so heavy a responsibility, saw no other means of escaping the danger than by inducing Napoleon to assume a disguise. He accordingly put on a foreign uniform, and passed for one of the officers composing the cortège. This humiliation, the most painful he had undergone, had been, we may remember, present to his mind, when he swallowed the poison prepared by Dr. Yvan; but however painful it might be to assume the disguise, it was indispensably necessary. When the cortège reached the little town of Orgon, the people, armed with a gibbet, appeared calling for the tyrant, and threw themselves on the imperial carriage, intending to open it by force. General Bertrand alone was inside, and his life might have been sacrificed to the fury excited against his master, but that M. de Schouvaloff springing from his carriage and addressing the multitude in French, which, like all Russians, he spoke remarkably well, endeavoured to awaken in the minds of the exasperated crowd, the sentiments that a conquered man and a prisoner ought to inspire. As to the rest, his Russian uniform was of more service to M. de Schouvaloff than his eloquent speech, and he succeeded in calming the most excited of the mob. At the succeeding stages, the demonstration of violence gradually diminished, and they entirely ceased as the cortège approached the sea.

During these severe trials Napoleon remained motionless and silent, affecting a sovereign contempt for what was going on; but he could not be insensible to the reiterated cries of public hate, and he once actually melted into tears. He recovered himself quickly, and endeavoured to reassume a haughty impassability, but he could not help discerning, amid the baseness of these demonstrations, that slow but infallible justice, which would be disgusting to contemplate if we only considered it in the vile instruments it employs, but which, if we raise our eyes to the source, appears as profound as terribly avenging. There remains to the great minds who have provoked this avenging power only one honour, one consolation—that is to acknowledge, to comprehend, and resign themselves to its decrees. After having shed, not through wickedness of heart, but through excess of ambition, more blood than any Asiatic conqueror had ever poured forth, Napoleon felt, without saying it, that he de-

served the violent execrations of the multitude. Alas ! this many-headed multitude has often trailed in bloody mire sages and virtuous heroes, who had only merited applause ; and it must be confessed that if the popular outcry was never more insulting than on the present occasion, it had often been more unjust.

This punishment was terrible, but happily short. Napoleon found at the Gulf of Saint Raphaël an English frigate, "The Undaunted," which Colonel Campbell, the English commissioner, had ordered to be prepared. He embarked on the 28th April for the isle of Elba, and cast anchor on the 3rd May in the road of Porto-Ferrajo. On the morrow, the 4th, he disembarked amid the joyous shouts of a population, proud of having for their sovereign this monarch, who had fallen from the highest throne of the universe, bringing with him, as they said, immense treasures, and about to inundate the Isle with benefits. Thus, to indemnify him for the homage of the universe, he received the acclamations of some thousand islanders, who were either fishermen or miners. Empty and cruel comedy of human life ! Napoleon, lord of the great empire that had extended from Rome to Lubeck, Napoleon was now the enthusiastically-received monarch of the Isle of Elba.

CONCLUSION.

IN beholding this wondrous reign finish so disastrously, reflections crowd upon the mind suggested by the greatness, the variety and strange character of the events ! Let us pause on these reflections before closing our recital : they may tend to our instruction, and to that of future generations.

The republican government in 1795 had ceased to be sanguinary, without, however, renouncing the spirit of persecution, and had imposed peace on Spain, Prussia, and Northern Germany, and remained engaged in war with Austria and England, a war kept up, so to speak, through habit, by means of admirable soldiers, and excellent, but disunited generals, when there suddenly appeared in the army of the Alps a young artillery officer, of small stature, shy but haughty expression of face, striking but eccentric turn of mind, alternately taciturn or lavishly loquacious, one moment disgraced under the Republic, and then banished into the *bureaux* of the Directory, where he attracted attention by his just and profound opinions on every phase of the war, which procured him the command of Paris on the 13th Vendémiaire, and soon after the command of the troops in Italy. Reappearing suddenly amongst the army as Commander-in-Chief, he immediately impressed an extraordinary momentum on events, crossed the Alps, whose feet only had been touched by any previous general, invaded Lombardy, turned the

tide of war in that direction, conquered in succession the different armies of Austria, tired out her patience, forced her to acknowledge our conquests, and obliged her to subscribe to the immense losses she had sustained. He thus gave peace to the Continent, and his astonishing deeds he expressed in language entirely new by its originality and grandeur, a language that may be called military eloquence. That this extraordinary young man should appear like a meteor on this disturbed and bloody horizon, without attracting every eye and chaining every heart, would have been impossible. Even had France been ice-cold, which she never was, she would have been captivated. She was bewitched, and the entire world with her.

Of all the powers, to whom the Revolution had thrown down the gauntlet, one only remained to be conquered. This was England. Sitting aloof, upon her own element, inaccessible to us as we to her, it might have been believed that she never could become either victor or vanquished. The Directory, looking for occupation for the conqueror of Italy, and believing him to be not only the greatest captain of the century, but the most fruitful in resources, commissioned him to surmount the physical difficulties that separate us from our eternal rival. Young Bonaparte being appointed general of the Ocean Army, did not find the preparations made to cross the Straits of Dover sufficient for the purpose, and led on by his powerful imagination, he determined to attack England in the East. It was he that suggested the expedition to Egypt, crossed the Mediterranean, before Nelson's eyes, with five hundred sail, took Malta *en passant*, disembarked at the foot of Pompey's Pillar, conquered the Mamelukes at the Pyramids, the Janissaries at Aboukir, and, having become master of Egypt, abandoned himself during some months to wonder-picturing dreams, which embraced at the same time both the East and the West. Learning suddenly that, thanks to its anarchical nature, the Directory had been engaged in a fresh war, which, through incapacity, was badly managed, General Bonaparte abandoned Egypt, crossed the sea a second time, and by his sudden appearance, surprised and delighted France, that was plunged in desolation. He had not been more prompt to covet the supreme power than France was to offer it; for, seeing his mode of directing war, administering conquered provinces, in a word, his manner of managing everything, France had recognized in him a great political as well as a great military chief. Having become First Consul, he signed, within two years, a continental peace at Luneville, a naval peace at Amiens, tranquillized La Vendée, reconciled the Church to the French Revolution, re-established religion, gave peace to France and to Europe, and allowed the wearied world to breathe after twelve years of blood-spilling strife. In recompense for so many prodigies, he was invested in 1802 with supreme power for life, and he continued to win universal admiration by his efforts to reconstitute France and Europe.

Who could prevent such a man remaining in quiet, and peace-

fully enjoying the happiness he had procured others and himself? Some penetrating minds, seeing his devouring activity, experienced a kind of involuntary terror; but the generation of that time gave themselves up to him, with blind confidence; and, indeed, it would be difficult, in listening to this young man, to doubt his profound wisdom. There was not a single event of the terrible French Revolution that had not deeply penetrated his mind, and added largely to his knowledge of human nature. He spoke of regicide, and the effusion of human blood, with horror. He considered party spirit a wild and detestable manifestation, and wished to put an end to it, by tranquillizing Vendée, and recalling the emigrants. He condemned the assumption of the French Revolution, that wished to have exclusive control in religious matters, without setting any value on the Pontifical authority; it was alike tyrannical for individual consciences, and dangerous for the State. Napoleon, after having arranged with the Pope, again opened the churches, and attended mass, in presence of the angry revolutionists. He had a horror of disordered finances, paper money, bankruptcy, and treated with contempt these flatterers of the populace who had abolished indirect taxation. Besides, in eloquent diatribes against Mr. Pitt, inserted in the *Moniteur*, he decried war, which was his profession, his glory, his power, and said he would be very glad if Mr. Pitt and his adherents were sent to bivouac on blood-stained battle-fields, or to cruize day and night amid ocean tempests, and learn what war really was. Lastly, what bitter raillery did he not pour forth against the inventors of a universal Republic, who wished to submit all Europe to a single power, and, moreover, wished to model this government on an imaginary type, drawn from their own brain! Who could teach anything to this young man, so well instructed by the events of the French Revolution? Alas! he was so wise, so thoughtful, when called upon to judge the passions of others, but when it became necessary to resist his own, what was he?

Now, the young Consul possessed everything his heart could desire, and satisfied every hope the world had formed of him. His power was limitless, in virtue not only of the laws, but of the adhesion of the nation. He was invested with supreme power for life, which ought to be sufficient for a man who was a husband, but not a father; he had also the privilege of choosing his successor, a privilege that allowed him to consult at the same time the interest of the public and gratify his personal affections. As to France, she had, thanks to the revolution and to him, a position, which she had never held before, and which she was never again to hold, even when she commanded from Cadiz to Lubeck. Her frontiers were the Alps, the Rhine, the Scheldt; in fact, all that she could wish for the maintenance of her safety and her power, for acquisitions beyond these limits, were contrary to the indications of nature and the principles of sound policy. France had emancipated Italy to the Adige, taking care to indemnify in Germany

the Austrian princes who formerly had *apanages* in Italy. Acknowledging the necessity of the papal authority in matters of faith and its high utility in politics, France had restored the Pope, who was indebted to her for the safety and respect he enjoyed, and from her he expected the restoration of all his states. France wisely despised the powerless anger of the Neapolitan Bourbons. She had arranged the affairs of Switzerland with admirable wisdom. Recognising both the great and little cantons, the aristocratic and democratic cantons, because all existed, obliging them to live in peace and on terms of equality, abolishing the subjection of classes, and territorial subjection, in a word, putting in execution in the Alps, the principles of 1789, without outraging nature, whose laws are always invincible, she gave, in the act of mediation, the model of all the future constitutions of Switzerland. But it was in Germany especially that the profound wisdom of the Consular policy was most eminently displayed. There were German princes, stripped of their states by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France; there were Austrian princes stripped of their patrimony by the emancipation of Italy. The first Consul never thought of leaving either without compensation, or allowing Germany to remain unorganized. The French revolution had already established in France the principle of secularisation by the alienation of ecclesiastical property, and extending the principle to Germany, getting it recognized there, furnished ample means of indemnifying the deposed princes. With what remained of the states of the archbishops of Treves, of Mayence, of Cologne, and, with those of some other ecclesiastical princes, the First Consul collected wherewith to indemnify all the royal families that had suffered loss, and maintain in Germany a sage equilibrium. After having judiciously combined the indemnities and influences in the Confederation, after having secured suitable pensions to the deposed ecclesiastical princes, he maturely arranged his plan, and not having at that time adopted the principle of writing treaties with his sword alone, he associated in his work, Prussia, who was induced to assist through motives of interest, Russia, through self-love, and Austria, influenced by the example of the two other powers. By these means he succeeded in procuring the adoption of the *revez* of 1803, a master-piece of practical and profound policy. This *revez*, in fact, without involving us too deeply in German affairs, re-established in Germany, order, peace and content, and placed in our hands the balance of the Germanic interests. It also prepared for us the only alliance at that time desirable and possible, that of Prussia. France was at that moment so powerful, so dreaded, that with the alliance of one continental state she was certain of the submission of the others, and the continent, once submissive, England would be obliged to devour in silence her vexation at seeing her rival so great. Such an alliance France could at that time only form with Prussia. Austria having lost the

Low Countries, Suabia, almost the entire of Italy, and the ecclesiastical principalities, which constituted her clientèle in Germany, was in Europe the great victim of the French Revolution, and this was an inevitable calamity. A sound policy pointed out that it would be better to humour her, even indemnify her for her losses, if possible, but at the same time showed that it would be impossible to convert her either into a friend or an ally. Russia's alliance was to be purchased only at the expense of fearful concessions in the East. With her, it was necessary to keep up courtesy without intimacy, and avoid as much as possible all actual business. Prussia alone remained, with whom, it was easy to come to an understanding. This Power, gorged with church property, was ardently desirous of more, and was become, what in France was called *un acquereur de biens nationaux*. By treating Austria with respect, by showing her favour, and never pushing her to extremities, France was sure of her support. Her prudent and honest monarch was delighted with the policy of the First Consul and sought his friendship. A union with Prussia consequently assured us the submission of the entire continent and the resignation of haughty England. The First Consul had forced the latter, in subscribing to the peace of Amiens, to acknowledge our conquests, and that, which she most disliked, the conquest of Antwerp. With regard to England only one difficulty remained to be overcome, it was by humouring to induce her to pardon us all the glory we had acquired in a few years, and this was possible, for the English admired the First Consul with all the vivacity of British enthusiasm, which at least equals that of the Parisians. A word of flattery from his lips, emanating from the height of his genius, which was elevated as the most exalted throne in the world, would be sure to touch to the quick the heart of haughty Albion. It was possible that this flattery might not always be repaid with flattery; on the pinnacle of glory, to which he had attained, some English orators, or some emigrant journalists might insult him, but he could well afford to despise their insolence, and leave to the world, to the English nation itself, the task of avenging him.

There remained still another Power, formerly of considerable importance, but, at the period of which we speak, lamentably fallen, we mean Spain, still under the sceptre of the Bourbons, but fallen into such a state of disintegration, and in this state so prostrate at the feet of the First Consul, that one word sent from Paris to poor Charles IV., or the wretched Godoy, was sufficient to govern her. And, allowing this work of disintegration to advance, it was evident that Spain would soon be obliged to ask from the First Consul, not only a system of policy, which she had already done, but a government, perhaps a king.

What, then, had he to wish more for himself, or for France, he, the happy mortal, who had become her head? Nothing but to

persevere in this policy, which was that of force rendered supportable by moderation. No man ever enjoyed so many diverse species of glory as the conqueror of Rivoli, of the Pyramids, of Marengo—the author of the Concordat, of the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, of the act of Swiss Mediation, of the *reces* of the Diet of 1803, of the civil code, and of the recall of the emigrants. If one merit were wanted to complete the *fascès* of his merits, it was, perhaps, that he had not given liberty to France. But at that period the apprehension of political liberty, far from being a pretext for degrading servility, was an insurmountable principle. To the generation of 1800, liberty was only another name for the scaffold, for schism, for the Vendean war, for bankruptcy, for confiscation. The only species of liberty at that time suited to France was the moderation of a great man. But, alas! the moderation of a great man, endowed with unlimited power, even were he at the same time endowed with every gift of genius, is it not of all revolutionary chimeras, the most chimerical?

But mis-placed liberty produces as great evils as her total absence. This man, at that time so admirable, was, by the very fact of possessing absolute power, on the brink of an abyss. In fact, within a few months after the peace of Amiens had been signed, and when the first emotions of joy had subsided amongst the English, there arose before their eyes, like a mighty but importunately dazzling light, the greatness of France, unfortunately but little shaded in the person of the First Consul. Some flattering attentions offered to Mr. Fox, when he visited Paris, did not in the least detract from the attitude taken by the First Consul, as master, not only of the affairs of France, but of Europe. His language, sparkling with genius and redolent of ambition, offended the pride of the English; his devouring activity disturbed their peace. He sent an army to St. Domingo, which was certainly very allowable, but he publicly sent Colonel Sebastiani into Turkey, Colonel Savary into Egypt, and General Decaen into India, charged with missions of observation, which it would be very difficult to construe into scientific missions. These movements were more than sufficient to excite British suspicions. At this period, many emigrants, who persevered in remaining in England, notwithstanding the glory and clemency of the First Consul, put forth against him and his family many publications, which, a year before, would have been universally condemned in England, but for which an imprudent jealousy now procured a favourable reception, which the spirit of the laws did not interdict. These were certainly effusions that only deserved contempt, for what pinnacle could be higher than that on which the First Consul was placed, and from which he could look down on the insults of calumny? Alas, he descended from this glorious eminence to listen to pamphleteers, and abandoned himself to bursts of passion as violent as unworthy of him. To insult him, the philosopher, the conqueror,

what an unpardonable crime! As if in all times, and in every country, free or otherwise, genius, virtue, and beneficence, have not been insulted! No, torrents of blood should flow because pamphleteers, who every day insulted their own government, had insulted a stranger, certainly a great man, but after all, only a man, and, moreover, the head of a rival nation!

From that moment the gauntlet was thrown down between the warrior who represented, in his own person, the French Revolution, and the English people, whose jealousy had not been sufficiently soothed. Only a few days and Malta would have been evacuated, but, by a singular fatality, it happened that at this moment, when all the British passions were excited, the First Consul exercising in Switzerland his dictatorial beneficence, sent an army to Berne. A weak-minded minister, pandering to British passions, found in this act a pretext for suspending the evacuation of Malta. If the First Consul had had patience, if he had insisted firmly, but gently, the frivolity of the motive would not have long opposed a hindrance to the solemnly-promised evacuation of the great Mediterranean fortress. But the First Consul, influenced not alone by a feeling of wounded pride, but of resentment for outraged justice, demanded the execution of treaties, "for," he said, "no power shall, with impunity, fail in a promise made to France or to me." Everybody remembers the sadly-heroic scene with Lord Whitworth and the rupture of the peace of Amiens. The First Consul vowed from that moment to perish, or to punish England. Fatal vow! The emigrants, we mean those that were irreconcilable, did not limit themselves to writing, they conspired. The First Consul, discovering with his penetrating glance, plots that the police were unable to detect, pounced upon the conspirators, and, believing that he discovered princes amongst them, and not being able to seize those whom he considered the real criminals, he went into the heart of Germany, caring little for the rights of nations, to arrest the descendant of the Condés. He ordered him to be shot without pity, and he, the severe reprover of the 20th January, equalled, as far as he could, the crime of regicide, and seemed to experience a kind of satisfaction in committing the crime in the face of Europe, in contempt and defiance of public opinion. The prudent Consul had become suddenly a madman, labouring under two species of mania: the anger of the offended man, who only breathes vengeance, and the anger of the conqueror, voluntarily braving enemies that he is certain to conquer. Afterwards, in order to brave his enemies more effectually, and satisfy his ambition at the same time as his anger, he placed the imperial crown on his head. Europe, at once offended and alarmed, saw France and her ruler in a new light. At the sound of the fusillade of Vincennes, Prussia, who had formed a solemn alliance with France, drew back, became silent, and renounced an intimacy that had ceased to be honourable. Austria, more calculating, made no display of feeling, but profitted of the opportunity to keep no

measure in the execution of the *revez* of 1803. The young Emperor of Russia, Alexander, honest, and full of honor, alone dared, as guarantee of the Germanic constitution, to demand an explanation of the violation of the Baden territory. Napoleon replied by an insulting allusion to the death of Pius I. The Czar held his peace, wounded to the heart, and determined to avenge the insult. Thus Prussia, chilled in friendship—Austria encouraged in her excesses—Russia insulted—all became auxiliary, from different motives, to the commencement of our struggle with England.

The Boulogne expedition was prepared. Napoleon might have slowly organized his navy, and directed remote expeditions against the English colonies, leaving the continent, which was ill-disposed, but intimidated, in peace; he might then have waited until his expeditions should have caused some sensible injury to England; until our corsaires should have harassed her commerce, and she should be wearied of a war in which we could do little against her, but in which she could do nothing against us, our traffic being at that time exclusively continental.

But this powerful genius, the greatest conqueror of physical difficulties that perhaps ever existed, wished to fight England hand to hand, and in this he was right; for, could any one pass the Straits of Dover with a powerful army, he was most certainly the man. To the genius of profound political combinations, he joined the fulminating genius of war; to these he added, in an especial manner, the prestige that fascinates soldiers and disconcerts the enemy; and he could, having accomplished the miracle of crossing the strait, effect a second miracle, that of terminating the war at a single blow. His preparations, though never put into execution, will be for military men and legislators enduring monuments of his capabilities of resource. But see the value of innate disposition! This man, who had the greatest of all difficulties to conquer, that of crossing the sea with an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, and who, consequently, needed that the Continent should be perfectly tranquil—this daring man, having gone to Milan to assume the Italian crown, declared, on his own authority, that Genoa should be reunited to the Empire. The European Coalition was again immediately formed. Russia, deeply hurt by the insults she had received from the First Consul, and also offended by the naval pretensions of England, thought to act as mediatrix, and could not help demanding the evacuation of Malta. But when the annexation of Genoa was made known, she discontinued her demands, and joining with England and Austria, she gave her armies the order to march, hoping to be joined on her route by the Prussians, who had been restrained until now by the prudence and moderation of their King. Thus he, who had been the sage peacemaker in 1803, was now become the incitor of a general war, merely because he had not been able to subdue his passions.

But he, like Alexander or Cæsar, was a man of genius, and genius is forgiven much and long by Fortune. The threats of the Con-

continent did not interrupt the preparations for his great expedition; it failed in consequence of the Admiral's fault, and fortunately—for had he embarked at the same time that the Austrian army was passing the Inn, it is very possible that whilst he was opening for himself a road to London, the Austrians would have advanced towards Paris. However that may have been, when his expedition was necessarily deferred, he advanced like a lion that springs from one enemy to another, and in a few days, hastening from Boulogne to Ulm, from Ulm to Austerlitz, he overwhelmed Austria and Russia, and then saw Prussia, that was about joining the rest of Europe, fall at his feet, and implore mercy from the conqueror of the Coalition.

Henceforth the war with England was changed into a continental war, which, indeed, would not have been a disadvantage, had the political affairs been as well directed as the military. In taking up arms for England, the continental powers provided us the battle-field we needed—a battle-field that gave us Austerlitz and Ulm, instead of Trafalgar. There was, consequently, no reason to complain. But when they had been well beaten and convinced of the folly of their efforts, they should have been treated in a manner that would have deprived them of all desire to recommence the strife. Austria ought to have been punished, but not driven to despair—nay, she ought even to have been consoled, as a means of compensating her for her great losses, could an indemnification be found. Russia ought to have been left in her confusion, and the powerlessness resulting from distance, without making or asking concessions; and, lastly, Prussia ought neither to be punished for her faults nor ridiculed for her unsuccessful mediation—it would have been better to make her feel the danger of yielding to the passions of coteries, and she ought to have been definitely attached by giving her some of the *optima spoliæ* of victory. Then our victorious arms could be turned against England, deprived of her allies, terrified at her isolation, assailed by our corsairs, and threatened by a formidable invasion, reason declares, and facts prove, that she would not have waited until her conquered allies had signed their treaties, to propose to treat herself. It would have been an extension of the peace of Amiens.

After Ulm and Austerlitz Napoleon was in a position to realize in Europe the wise and profound policy of separating the continent from England, and thus forcing the latter to make peace. Austria, accustomed to warfare during five years, three at least of which were against us, seeing foreign armies advance in two months as far as Vienna and Brunn, losing whole armies in one day, reduced to laying down her arms like Mack, was no longer inclined to resist us, provided she was not driven to the last degree of despair. The young Emperor of Russia, who, at the head of Souvarof's soldiers, had hoped to act a very important part, and had been reduced to play a very humiliating one, had fallen into extreme dejection. Prussia, that with two hundred thousand soldiers of the great Frederick, had gone to dictate the law at Vienna, finding us in a

position to give laws to the entire world, presented an alarmed and almost ridiculous appearance. How easy, how becoming, how wise it would have been to be generous to such enemies !

We have already said why it would have been impossible to make a friend of Austria, but though she could not be made an ally of France at that time, it was not wise to add unnecessarily to her causes of vexation, and change them into implacable hatred. As a compensation for the loss of the Low Countries, of Suabia, the Milanese, and the *clientèle* of the Ecclesiastical States, she might have been given the Venetian States. It was harsh to deprive her of them. However, they were taken from Austria, because warfare cannot be an inexpensive game to those with whom it originates ; and indeed the freedom of Italy could not with decency be alleged as a motive, when we ourselves had taken Piedmont, and converted Lombardy into an apanage for the Bonaparte family. But to deprive Austria of every seaport, as Napoleon did then, in taking from her Venice, Trieste, and Illyria, and shut her up in her continental possessions, was treating her with a rigour that was without real advantage for us, and only calculated to drive her to despair. But not stopping there, but depriving her besides of the Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and the remains of Suabia, in order to enrich Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, unimportant and unfaithful allies, who only aided that they might betray us, this was only rendering her implacable. To treat people in this way is like attempting their death, and if we do not kill them, we prepare for ourselves enemies, who at the first opportunity will stab us in the back, and their conduct cannot excite wonder.

Depriving Austria of the Venetian States was, we repeat, harsh, and yet it was the almost inevitable result of the third coalition. It would have been good policy to compensate her for this inevitable rigour. It would have been easy, according to the fashion in which the world was treated then, to send her towards the East, and give her the Danubian provinces. Had this been done, the fate of Europe would have been changed, and Austria placed upon the Danube, her true position, would have gained more than she had lost, would have always protected Constantinople, and would have been for ever at enmity with Russia. This would have been, without doubt, a very dictatorial proceeding ; but as these provinces were afterwards given to Russia, it would most assuredly have been better to have gratified Austria at this moment. Russia might have taken it ill, but that would have been her punishment for interfering in this war. As to the Turks, incapable of comprehending the service that had been done them, they would not have interfered, and Austria would certainly have accepted the Danubian provinces, for her only thought was to obtain compensation, no matter how, which indeed she carried so far as to demand Hanover for the dispossessed Archdukes—Hanover, the patrimony of her ally, England.

Far from thinking of compensation, Napoleon only thought of stripping her, of turning her into ridicule, and making her a victim

even longer than was necessary. He took away, then, without compensation, and independently of the Venetian States, Illyria, the Tyrol, Volarlberg, and the remains of Suabia. In general, punishment is inflicted to destroy the will to offend, but here, far from removing the desire, it was excited to passion in the breast of Austria. Towards Prussia, Napoleon entertained but one sentiment—to make her the subject of jest. In truth, she supplied the materials ! The Czar, through the influence of a thoughtless nobility and a beautiful and imprudent queen, had induced the King of Prussia to declare war, and his ambassador, M. de Haugwitz, coming to Vienna on the eve of the battle of Austerlitz to dictate the law, and receiving it on his knees on the morrow, was, indeed, one of those comic spectacles that the world sometimes presents. But if it is ever permitted to laugh at the ridiculous in human events, it is when we are spectators, not directors of the scene. Napoleon had all the caprices of power : he would do as he pleased, and amuse himself besides ; that was too much, a hundred times too much !

Austria asking Hanover for her archdukes, inspired Napoleon with an idea, which he thought most piquant, that of presenting the spoils of England to her allies. But instead of giving Hanover to Austria, he gave it to Prussia. This may have been more conformable to geographical unity, but it was contrary to sound policy. Far from laughing at Prussia he ought, on the contrary, to have pitied her false position. She had always desired to obtain possession of Hanover, but being induced through the error of her Court to join in the excitement of Europe against France, it was placing her in a cruel position to force her to accept Hanover at this moment, and only excited in her already anxious mind a conflict between avidity and honor. Without doubt, it is something, it is even a great deal, to satisfy men's interests ; but it is nothing, if, at the same time, we humiliate them ; for, happily, there is as much pride as avidity in the human heart. To humble Prussia in enriching her, was not making her an ally,—it was making her ungrateful, and her ingratitude would be proportionate to her honesty.

Napoleon offered Hanover to Prussia, with the sword at her throat. "Hanover or war," he seemed to say to M. d'Haugwitz—who indeed did not hesitate, and chose Hanover. Napoleon did not stop there, but made her pay for this unwelcome gift, by sacrificing the Marquisate of Anspach, and the Duchy of Berg, so that he lessened the value of his gift without lessening the shame of its acceptance. This was a serious mistake, for it was making war with England interminable. In fact, it was impossible that old George III. would ever consent to give up the patrimony of his family, and the English kings had, at that time, an influence in the monarchical republic of England that they no longer possess. M. de Haugwitz, who had left Potsdam for Schœnbrunn, amidst the applauses of the court, in order to give the law to France, and declare war for the advantage of England, now returned to Berlin,

after receiving the law from France, and laden with the richest of British spoils. What must have been the excitement of an honest king, of a proud nation, and of a vain and impassioned court !

Thus Napoleon, instead of deriving from his incomparable victory at Austerlitz a continental and maritime peace, a double peace which he might easily have secured by discouraging and alienating the allies of England, had oppressed some, humbled others, and left a desperate war as the only resource to all. He had even created an invincible obstacle to peace by giving Hanover to Prussia.

All the arrangements at Vienna in 1806 were mistakes, and Napoleon did not even confine himself to these serious errors. When he returned to Paris, he abandoned himself to an intoxication of ambition, unparalleled in modern times. He planned then an immense empire, supported by vassal kingdoms, which should rule Europe, and which should be designated by a name consecrated by the Romans and Charlemagne, "THE EMPIRE OF THE WEST." Napoleon had already prepared two vassal kingdoms, in the Cisalpine Republic converted into a kingdom of Italy, and in the kingdom of Naples, which had been taken from the Bourbons, and given to his brother Joseph. To these he added Holland, which had been changed from a republic to a monarchy and given to his brother Louis. But this was not all. The Empire of the West to be complete, should embrace Germany. Napoleon had made allies there ; the princes of Bavaria, of Wurtemberg, and of Baden. He had abandoned to them the spoils of Austria, of Prussia, and of the unsecularised ecclesiastical princes, gave them up the *noblesse immédiate*, made them kings, and asked in marriage for his brothers, adopted children, and lieutenants, princesses of these houses, and his alliance was eagerly accepted. Germany had not yet recovered from the confusion caused by the system of secularisation, and was still in an extraordinary state of disorder in consequence of the many questions that yet remained to be decided. The sovereign princes who remained electors or had become kings, pillaged the property of the nobility and of the church, and did not pay the pensions of the deposed ecclesiastical princes, and all the oppressed, in their despair, invoked, not conquered Austria or ridiculed Prussia, but he who was the master of fate—Napoleon. This universal appeal to him excited the idea of a new Germanic Confederation, which should be called "The Confederation of the Rhine," and should be placed under the protection of Napoleon. It was composed of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, Nassau, and all the princes of the south of Germany. Thus, the Emperor of the West, Mediator of Switzerland, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Suzerain of the kingdoms of Naples, Italy, and Holland needed only to join Spain to his vassal states, to be more powerful than Charlemagne. Such were the projects that the fumes of pride had excited in the vast brain of Napoleon.

In such a state of disintegration, Francis II. not being able

to retain the title of Emperor of Germany, resigned it, and was thenceforth called Emperor of Austria. This was the most humiliating degradation after his territorial losses. Prussia being also expelled from the old Germanic Confederation drew around her the princes of the north of Germany, and thus became the head of a little third-rate Germany. She asked permission to form this Confederacy, which was coldly granted with the secret determination to discourage those who may be tempted to join her. This was injury upon injury, both for Austria, that should have been punished without being driven to despair, and for Prussia, that should have been won by helping her interests and protecting her honour. In fact, it was the most delusive of all policies to interfere to such a degree in German affairs. In the middle ages, Germany, not being able to arrive at unity, had stood still at the federative state. These states, whilst they preserved their independence, had entered into a Confederation to defend themselves against their powerful neighbours, and of course against France, the most powerful of all. This was met by France by a policy as natural as it was lawful. Profiting of the jealousy of the Germans, she supported the petty princes against the great, and Prussia against Austria. But, abandoning traditional and legitimate policy, and creating a Germanic Confederation, which would not be German, but French, which would burden us with the affairs of the Germans, and expose us to all their hatred, which would give us allies to-day, who would be traitors to-morrow, was the madness of ambition and nothing else. In every country in which a traditional policy exists, this policy has an appointed aim, towards which it always proceeds with greater or less speed according to the circumstances of the times. To proceed a step on this path is only to advance in the natural order of things. To advance more than one step is imprudent, but endeavouring to reach the goal at once, we are sure to miss, by over-passing it. By the *revez* of 1803, Napoleon had approached as near as possible to the object of our traditional policy in Germany. By the Confederation of the Rhine he unfortunately overstepped it. His interference was to international law, what that of the Jacobins had been to social rights. They wished to remodel society, he wanted to remodel Europe. The guillotine had been their instrument; cannon was his. His remedy was infinitely less odious, and was, besides, surrounded by the prestige of glory. It was not a whit wiser.

Such were the fruits of the great victory of Austerlitz. Spite of these errors the fact of the victory still remained dazzling, overwhelming. Russia utterly broken down, England terrified by her isolation, wished for peace, and nothing would be easier than to conclude one with these two powers. In letting these opportunities pass, Napoleon put the acmé to his errors.

Touching the mouths of the Cattaro, which the Austrians had perfidiously given up to the Russians, instead of giving them to us, the Czar sent M. d'Oubril to Paris. As Austria and Prussia had

negotiated directly with France, the Czar refused to interfere in their concerns. Russia had constituted herself the patron of two royal families—Savoy and the Neapolitan Bourbons. She was desirous of obtaining Sardinia for the one, and Sicily for the other. On these conditions she was ready to sanction all Napoleon had done. England had passed from the hands of Pitt to those of Fox. It was a most favourable moment to conclude the maritime peace. Fox had sent Lords Yarmouth and Lauderdale to Paris. England wished to keep Malta and the Cape; and on condition of obtaining this concession, she would allow us to overturn Europe as we had done, but she, too, wished that Sicily should be given to the Neapolitan Bourbons, and Sardinia to the house of Savoy. Thus the continent of Europe would belong to the Bonaparte family, to which it had already furnished apanages, and the two large Italian islands would be given as indemnity to the two ancient deposed families. On such terms, the great Empire of the West, such as it had been constituted, would have been accepted both by Russia and England. A treaty may be well commenced on such a basis, but pride and a want of foresight (a rare fault in Napoleon), prevented so important a result.

Napoleon wished to treat separately with England and Russia, that he might the more effectively dictate to them. They yielded to his wish, in a certain degree, through their desire for peace. M. d'Oubril negotiated on the one side, Lords Yarmouth and Lauderdale on the other, but with a secret understanding. By terrifying M. d'Oubril, Napoleon induced him to sign a separate treaty, by which, instead of Sicily the Bourbons of Naples should have the Balearic Isles, for which Spain would receive a compensation. England was alarmed at this, and now or never was the time to conclude a peace with her, when she was terrified at her isolation. Napoleon thought it more clever to await the ratification of the Russian treaty, flattering himself that he could then do as he pleased with England. Meantime, Mr. Fox died. England succeeded in preventing the ratification of the Russian treaty, and thus the opportunity of peace was lost. An over-refined policy is legitimate, but on condition that it succeeds. When it fails, it only gains for those who were deceived, the reputation of foxes taken in a snare.

However, peace was not yet absolutely impossible. At this moment the fermentation which Napoleon had caused in Prussia had attained its height. Divided between Hanover and honour, Prussia was terribly agitated, and violently excited against him who had reduced her to this alternative. In addition, two pieces of intelligence following quick on each other, drove her to despair. On the one side she thought she could perceive that France secretly discouraged the princes of the north of Germany from entering into a confederacy with her, which, indeed, was true to a certain degree, but which the Elector of Hesse exaggerated even to calumny; on the other hand, she learned that Napoleon was willing to restore Hanover to the royal family of England in order to obtain a naval

peace. He had not said so, but had allowed it to be understood, and, indeed, it was his intention to make a new arrangement with Prussia; to restore her Anspach and Berg, and take back Hanover declaring that it was on such terms alone that the peace of the world could be secured. But he did wrong in differing this frank avowal. Prussia considered that she was trifled with, turned into ridicule, and rated as a third-rate power, and in consequence her agitation turned into rage. Napoleon let her speak and act as she would, thinking it beneath his dignity to give an explanation, which, perhaps, might have been quite satisfactory; but, as she drew her sword, he drew his. He was weary of hearing constantly of the soldiers of the great Frederick, whom he had not yet conquered,—and the Prussian war was the consequence. England and Russia naturally took part in the war, and that universal peace which Napoleon might have obtained by land and sea, together with the recognition of his imperial title and his immense empire, was now deferred until some new miracle should arise.

Napoleon's genius and the valour of his army had now reached the culminating point. In another month there was no longer either a Prussian monarchy or a Prussian army, and at the sight of the North Sea the soldiers exclaimed* spontaneously "Long live the Emperor of the West." Their enthusiasm had divined his ambition. This caused him the greatest joy; but, however, he did not betray the secret desire he felt for so glorious a title. The Russians had advanced to the assistance of the Prussians. Napoleon hastened to meet them, drove them beyond the Vistula, and meeting Poland on his way, conceived the idea of restoring her former greatness, without considering whether it might not be as difficult to resuscitate a State as an individual. He was excited against the Russians and only thought how he could most annoy them, or do them an injury. He fought bloody battles at Czarnow, and Pultusk, and at Eylau, where he had his first experience of the northern climate, and of the despair of peoples, before which he was afterwards to yield. He performed prodigies of valour and skill, during a winter passed upon the ice. When spring at length arrived, he fought and won the battle of Friedland, the greatest perhaps that was ever fought, both from the promptitude displayed, the profound skill of the combinations, and the importance of the results.

Alexander fell at his feet, as Francis II. and Frederick William had done before, and now the greatest conqueror of modern times paused, for he already felt an insecurity in his position. Alone at the extremity of the continent, surrounded by conquered states, and yet feeling the necessity of having some ally, Napoleon determined to seek the aid of his young conquered enemy. In fact, the Austrian alliance, which at this time was almost impossible,

* Our readers will undoubtedly remember, that at the capitulation of Prenzlau, Lannes' soldiers uttered this same cry, when they came in sight of the North Sea, Lannes wrote it to Napoleon, who made no remark.

became still more so in consequence of the severities that had followed on the battle of Austerlitz; the Prussian alliance had been allowed to slip away, and there now remained only the Russian. Napoleon, inconstant because he had no fixed principles, passed abruptly from one scheme of policy to another, carrying with him his young competitor, a prince fickle by nature. He then conceived the idea of two great empires, that should rule the world; one in the West, which was to be his, and one in the East, which was to be Alexander's, but his was to be the dominant power. He had an interview with the Czar on the raft at Tilsit, where he praised, flattered, and delighted him, and formed on the celebrated raft, an alliance with Russia. However, explanations would have been necessary, and as the alliance was to depend on mutual concessions, the extent of these concessions ought to be determined on. Napoleon was in a hurry, Alexander was charmed, they embraced and promised everything, but did not enter into any explanations. Alexander showed the desire he felt to take possession of Finland, to which Napoleon consented, for he had many reasons to be displeased with Sweden. Besides, Alexander showed all the desire of a young man with regard to the East. At the mention of Constantinople, Napoleon started, but restrained himself and allowed his new ally to indulge all the dreams his imagination might suggest. It was on such a basis that the union of two empires was to rest. The treaty was signed at Tilsit. Napoleon deprived Prussia of half her possessions, and only left her the other half at the entreaty of Alexander. Of a part of the Prussian states, and some sacrifices required from Alexander, Napoleon composed the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which was given to the King of Saxony. This was a disturbing phantom for the Poles, and alarming to her co-spoliators. With the remainder of the Prussian spoils and the Electorate of Hesse, Napoleon composed the kingdom of Westphalia, destined for his brother Jerome. Saxony, increased by the Grand Duchy and the new kingdom of Westphalia, was to form part of the Confederation of the Rhine, which would thus extend as far as the Vistula. It would be impossible to bring together a greater number of contradictions. A Germany under a French Emperor and containing the French kingdom of Westphalia, the French Duchy of Berg (which had been conferred on Murat), Saxony, enlarged without desiring it, and Poland, half restored; not including half-ruined Prussia, nor Austria rendered miserable by the territory promised to Russia on the Danube; two Emperors at the extremities of this un-German Germany, the one of Russia, the other of France, promising each other the most inviolable friendship, provided that each allowed the other to do what he pleased, and taking very good care not to enter into any explanation lest they should not agree; the one dreaming of going to Constantinople, where his ally was determined not to let him enter, and the other having commenced the formation of a Poland, that his ally would not allow him to finish; and beyond the chaos, was England, hovering around these two allied empires with

one hundred ships and two hundred frigates, implacable England, that was determined to hasten the destruction of this monstrous edifice. Such was the system conceived at Tilsit on the morrow of the immortal victory of Friedland. What a political result from so great a military triumph!

Most assuredly, had Napoleon been capable of stopping and reflecting, in the midst of the torrent that bore him along, he might after Friedland, still better than after Austerlitz, return at once to the excellent policy of the Consulate, and find it completed, consolidated, having but one inconvenience, that of being too extended. The continent, which had been vanquished at Austerlitz, might be considered as conquered definitely, and without appeal at Friedland. The army of the great Frederick, which had been always cited to pique the pride of the conqueror of Marengo and Austerlitz, existed no longer. Distance, that protected Russia, as the strait of Dover protected England, had been surmounted. There was no longer any imaginable resistance on the continent. From the height of his universal rule Napoleon might raise up Prussia as though she had never been conquered, and restore her all her possessions except Hanover, which had been sacrificed to a naval peace. At that price he would have won the hearts of the Prussians, even the Queen's and Blücher's, and would have found in Prussia a firm ally, for by the lesson received at Jena, and the generous act which would have followed, there was no suggestion, English, Russian, or Austrian, that could have penetrated her ears or her heart. Reasoning on this hypothesis, Napoleon would have had nothing to ask from Alexander, except that as a punishment for his defeat the Danubian provinces should pass into the hands of Austria, The latter, compensated, would have been half appeased. In short, had he exercised a still higher degree of wisdom, Napoleon would have reconstituted Germany, in confederating her around Austria and Russia, skilfully balancing the one against the other; and even in neglecting this act of wisdom, he might, in preserving the ridiculous Confederation of the Rhine, cease to make new victims amongst the German princes; he might, for example, have pardoned the Elector of Hesse, and permitted Prussia to confederate Northern Germany around her. On these conditions Napoleon would have been truly master of the continent, and England, definitely isolated, would have demanded peace at any price. But we must admit, this is but a dream! There can be no resting place amid such a torrent. Napoleon, carried away by his passions and the course of events, overturning one state after another, forming and rejecting alliances, went to the banks of the Niemen to pick up the Russian alliance from the mud of Poland, and returned intoxicated with pride, ambition, and glory, and leaving behind him in despair Austria, Prussia, and Germany, whom he hoped to awe by an alliance with that Russia for whom he was preparing a Poland, and to whom he would not give Constantinople, nor even Bucharest nor Jassy! Should we be asked how a man endowed with so great a genius,

both military and political, could be guilty of such great errors, we ask in return how, though bringing into play such great talents and such generous sentiments, the French Revolution could have caused the sanguinary follies of 1793? And we reply, that it was because reason was put in abeyance, and passion allowed to assume the ascendant. But there is less excuse for Napoleon, for an individual ought to be more easily restrained than a multitude. Unfortunately experience proves that a man, carried away by pride, ambition, and the desire of conquest, is no more capable of restraint than the multitude itself.

At the return from Tilsit the preconcerted comedy was played. Russia, Prussia and Austria, under compulsion joined with France, and declared to England, that if she did not listen to the voice of her ancient allies, and still refused peace, they would unite against her in a general and destructive war,—a war especially directed against her commerce, by which they would close the ports of the continent against her. And certainly England would have yielded had such a declaration been made in the name of Prussia, restored by the generosity of Napoleon; of Austria, consoled by his policy; and of Russia, wearied by repeated defeats in carrying on war for the advantage of another. But England only laughed at a declaration torn from some by force, from others by an ephemeral union, and proudly defied the threats of this pretended European coalition. However, the continental blockade commenced. England had laid the continent under an interdict; Napoleon in his turn, did the same to the sea in closing all European ports, both to England and to those who would submit to her maritime laws. Of all the designs he had imagined during the campaign, this was the most important and the most efficacious. Had this interdict been maintained for some years, England might probably be induced to yield. Unfortunately the continental blockade only added to the exasperation of the countries that were obliged to submit to the demands of our policy, and Napoleon was preparing an immense compensation for England in abandoning to her the Spanish colonies.

His design on Spain was one of the causes that expedited Napoleon's proceedings at Tilsit. The throne of Philip V. had descended to the Bourbons. It was natural that in the impulse of his ambition, Napoleon should appropriate it to himself. Next to France, it was the fairest throne that could be appropriated by the Bonapartes, and the necessary completion of the Empire of the West. When this great Empire, already suzerain of Naples, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and Holland, should have obtained the command of Spain, it would have nothing further to seek than the obedience of the peoples to this gigantic edifice. But it was not easy to find a pretext for such an annexation. Amongst the meannesses that at that time dishonored the royal family of Spain, its obedience to Napoleon may be considered as one. The good Charles IV. felt an unbounded admiration and devotion for the hero of the age. The nation itself, delighted that the First Consul had become Emperor, seemed only to ask his councils as their guide. How could war be

declared against such persons? Besides, the Spanish people were ardent, proud, young-spirited, and capable of immense resistance, which could not easily be overcome. Beneath the apparent weakness of the Spanish court, great difficulties were conceded. Perhaps by waiting, a solution of the difficulty might be found in the corruption of the court of Aranjuez. An honest king, but weak and imbecile in the extreme, such as are only found towards the extinction of a race, a shameless queen, a barefaced favourite dishonoring his master, a bad son, who wished to profit of these disorders to hasten his own succession, and an indignant people ready for any change that would deliver them from such an odious spectacle, offered favourable chances to an ambitious and all-powerful neighbour. It was possible that the Spanish court would sink beneath its own corruption and ask Napoleon for a king. He had already been asked for a wife for Ferdinand, and thus offered an indirect means of attaching Spain to the great Empire. But Napoleon cared for nothing indirect or remote. He wished to obtain possession of the crown of Spain fully, and immediately devised a series of plots, all tending to a universal revolt.

He had already invaded Portugal under pretence of closing it against England, and the Braganza family had fled to Brazil. This was a ray of light for him. He thought by assembling troops on the road to Lisbon, and directed towards Madrid, that the Bourbons would be terrified and fly, and that he could arrest them at Cadiz. Thanks to these machinations, the Spanish Court was about to fly, and the plot was on the point of succeeding, when the people, in indignation, hurried to Aranjuez, prevented the departure, nearly strangled Godoy, and proclaimed Ferdinand VII. king, who accepted the crown, snatched from his father. Napoleon, finding in this unnatural act a new excuse to replace that of which the people had deprived him, invited father and son to Bayonne, and there incited them against each other. The father raised his cane to strike his son, in Napoleon's presence, who uttered cries of indignation, and declared he had been treated with disrespect, made the father abdicate, because of his incapacity, and the son on account of his unworthiness, and then, in presence of Europe, disgusted at this spectacle, and of Spain, confounded and indignant, he dared to place the crown of Philip V. on the head of his brother Joseph, and transferred that of Naples to the weak and ambitious head of poor Murat. Thus commenced the fatal Spanish war, which, during six years, destroyed the finest armies of France, and prepared an impregnable battle-field for the English.

This last fault, once committed, its consequences immediately followed. Napoleon believed that eighty thousand conscripts, with a few officers from the dépôts, would be sufficient to bring the Spaniards to reason. But in such a climate, in presence of a popular insurrection, which could only be conquered by well-directed masses, and overcome by obstinate and daily battles, it was not conscripts that should have been employed. Baylen was the first punishment of a serious military error, and of a grave poli-

tical crime. This first act—resistance to the great empire—stirred all Europe, and awoke hope in hearts consumed by hate. Napoleon, struck by the excitement manifested from Seville to Königsberg, summoned his ally, Alexander, to a consultation at Erfurt, and was then obliged to lay aside the vagueness of his magnificent promises. He finished by granting the Danubian provinces. This was too much, a thousand times too much, for it was placing the Russians at the very gates of Constantinople. Alexander, who had expected Constantinople, feigned to be content, because he wished to complete the conquest of Finland, and he thought it better to accept the banks of the Danube, whilst awaiting something better. Napoleon and he embraced at parting, promising to become brothers-in-law, and half disenchanted with their mendacious alliance. Tranquillized by the interview at Erfurt, Napoleon led his best armies into Spain, those before which the continent had yielded. This was the moment awaited by Austria and all the discontented in Germany.

Then occurred a new European rising, that of 1809. Napoleon, after having driven before him, but not conquered, the Spaniards, who constantly fled, was about to overwhelm the English army under Moore, which could not fly as fast as the Spaniards, when the crossing of the Inn by the Austrians suddenly recalled him to the north. He left Valladolid at full speed, promising that in three months Austria should cease to exist, fled like lightning to Paris, from Paris to Ratisbon, and then with an army composed of one-third of the old soldiers that had remained on the Danube, and two-thirds of recruits raised in haste, he wrought miracles at Ratisbon, and again entered Vienna as a conqueror, and thus restrained all the insurrections that were ready to break forth in Germany.

However, from the obstinacy with which the victory was disputed first at Essling, and afterwards at Wagram, together with the excitement of all Germany and Europe, Napoleon felt some gleams of the truth penetrate his mind. He saw that the world needed repose, and that if he did not accord it, he would expose himself to a universal revolt of the nations. He then formed some resolutions, which were the result of this short-lived wisdom. He determined to withdraw his troops from Germany (at least from those territories that did not belong to him) in order to diminish the general anger; he determined to finish by arranging the affairs of Spain, and thus deprive England of a pretext for continuing the war; he endeavoured to make this latter power submit, by the absolute prohibition of commerce, and in this view he systematized the continental blockade. Lastly, he resolved to marry again, as if having heirs could ensure the inheritance of the crown, or as though the Imperial happiness constituted the happiness of the people.

However, if these resolutions formed under a wise inspiration, had been seriously carried out, it is possible that the gigantic order of things, which Napoleon wished to establish, might have acquired

consistence, and, perhaps, duration, at least in all that was not absolutely opposed to the interests of the people concerned. If he had, in reality, evacuated Germany, and employed in Spain forces proportioned to the difficulty of the undertaking, and persevered, without violence, in the continental blockade, he might, in all probability have obtained a maritime peace, which would have put an end to the principal sufferings of the continental nations, and suppressed a serious cause of disunion with the nations subjected to the continental blockade, and if he had crowned all by a marriage, that had been really an alliance, he might have consolidated an exaggerated state of things, and perpetuated all that was not actually impossible. But his temperament, and acquired habits soon led Napoleon to results diametrically opposite to these fleeting pacific inclinations. Thus, whilst evacuating some parts of Germany, he assembled masses of troops from Bremen to Hamburg, from Hamburg to Dantzic, under pretence of a continental blockade. He did still better; to simplify proceedings, he united to the Empire, Holland, Bremen, Hamburg, Lubeck, and the Duchy of Oldenburg, which belonged to the imperial family of Russia. At the same time he united Rome and Tuscany to the Empire. The Pope resisted, he had him arrested, carried first to Savona, and then to Fontainebleau, where he kept him in respectful bondage. From Saville to Dantzic he caused several seizures of merchandize to be made, which, however, without adding anything to the efficacy of the blockade, added intensely to the irritation the people felt against the system. Whilst he was so rigorous in the observance of the blockade, especially with those who had no interest in it, he committed the strangest infractions himself, in granting the French licenses to trade with England, which gave the appearance of intolerance to the whole system, for it would seem as though France would not submit to a regimen that had been invented for her sole benefit. As to Spain, where it was of so much importance to put an end to the war, Napoleon, deceiving himself as to the real difficulties, was wrong in not sending larger forces there, or in not going there himself, for his presence would, at least, have encouraged existing forces to a decisive result. The war in Spain was continued indefinitely at the expense of the French army, which was exhausted, and to the great glory of the English, who alone seemed to keep the great empire in check. Then, Napoleon's marriage, which might have been a signal of peace, a hope of repose for weary Europe, instead of procuring a solid alliance, caused, on the contrary, the rupture of the union with Russia, on which all the imperial policy had been based since the day of Tilsit. It was a Russian princess that Napoleon was to have married, according to the promises made at Erfurt. But when Alexander allied himself with us, he acted singly for his court and nation, neither as pliant nor as cunning as he, did not perceive, that if he were inconsistent, this inconsistency won him Finland and Bessarabia; but to dispose of his sister's hand, it was

necessary to remove his mother's prejudices, and this occasioned some delay. But Napoleon would brook no delay, and abruptly breaking off the negotiation, though it had been only just commenced, and without taking the trouble of freeing himself from his engagements, married an Austrian princess. Austria hastened to offer this connection, less from a desire to form an alliance with France, than through a wish to break the bonds that united her to Russia, and Napoleon accepted it, because he had been kept waiting for the Russian princess, and because the Austrian princess was of more noble birth, and because it was an alliance such as the Bourbons had formerly contracted. From this moment, the alliance with Russia was broken, an alliance which was indeed false, mendacious, but specious, and consequently useful. Napoleon was alone in the world with his pride and his army, an admirable army, but scattered from Cadiz to Kowno.

His pacific views, after the battle of Wagram, produced but this result, that Holland, the Hanseatic towns, the Duchy of Oldenburg, Tuscany, and Rome were united to the Empire; the Pope was imprisoned; the continental blockade was made intolerable by its rigour and inexplicable infractions; the war in Spain was indefinitely prolonged; the Russian alliance was broken off, and no alliance, but a marriage for vanity, contracted with Austria.

Such was the position of Napoleon in 1811, after twelve years of absolute power, either as First Consul or Emperor. This needed a solution. Weary of seeking it in the Peninsula, since Massena had been stopped before the lines of Torres-Vedras, Napoleon determined to seek it elsewhere. Austria and Prussia were, apparently, profoundly submissive; their hearts were pained, but their gestures were humble; each word they uttered was one of deference, and when some too-deeply oppressed interest was to be defended, their language assumed the form of a prayer. Russia, a little less humble, was the only one that dared dispute with the master of the continent, but, indeed, only in the gentlest terms. It was obvious that she still counted on her geographical position, though it was evident she had been made to feel at Friedland, that even at the distance of the Seine from the Niemen, Napoleon's blows could be severely felt. She complained, but with moderation, that her kinsman, the Duke of Oldenburg, had been deprived of his territories. She demanded that she should be reassured by a secret convention as to the future destiny of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which was nothing, but might become Poland. Then she resisted the continental blockade. She said that each nation should be allowed to make such commercial laws for itself as would be judged best suited to its interests; she had promised to close the Russian rivers against British commerce, and she had kept her word; that, indeed, some English vessels had entered under the American flag, but they had been very few, and could not be prevented without exciting a revolt amongst the people. All this, we must remember, was said with infinite moderation, and supported with the most solid reasoning.

Russia said nothing of the insult to the Russian princess, but she showed by her manner that she felt it deeply.

These objections made Napoleon indignant. To resist him even noiselessly and unknown to the world, was, in his opinion, to give the signal of revolt. If any one, no matter where, offered opposition to his arbitrary will, he considered that he was defied. In him, calculation was always united to the anger of pride. The Spanish war seeming difficult to terminate, and, above all, likely to be protracted; no effect being yet produced by the continental blockade, and the Boulogne expedition having been long since abandoned, Napoleon determined to bring the present state of affairs to a conclusion on the banks of the Dwina and Dnieper. He pictured to himself that when from Cadiz to Moscow there would be no longer a shadow of resistance, and when Russia would be reduced to the same position as Austria or Prussia, he should have resolved the European question, that overwearied England would yield, and that the French empire extending from Rome to Amsterdam, from Amsterdam to Lubeck, would be firmly established, having as vassals the kingdom of Spain, Naples, Italy and Westphalia! Thus, it was the rage of pride, joined to the expectation of finishing in the north what did not seem likely to terminate in the south, that furnished the true causes of the Russian war.

This fatal undertaking was commenced with formidable resources, and began at Dresden with the unheard-of spectacle which Napoleon and the sovereigns of the continent presented for a whole month, of power on one side and dependance on the other. The monarchs, humbler and more mortified than ever, presented themselves before their master with humility writ upon their brows but hatred in their hearts. Although Napoleon, far from having lost any of his qualities as a great captain, had, on the contrary, gained all that experience could add to great genius; still the art of war had deteriorated somewhat, from the very vastness of his aims, and the precipitation of his enterprises. In every art, indeed, to do too much, is to do ill. The conceptions were undoubtedly more vast, but the execution less perfect. And especially in the Russian war, the luxury which had been introduced amongst our generals, the precautions that were taken against an unknown and dreaded climate, had loaded the army with baggage that would be inconvenient even for short distances, but overwhelming for great. Besides this, the desire to increase the number of soldiers, and the habit of finishing all by a skilful disposition of masses, had introduced a kind of negligence as to the quality of the troops. The corps of Marshal Davout alone remained a model, and two hundred thousand men such as his would have gained the cause that was lost by the six hundred thousand that were marched beyond the Niemen. But—singular example of the progress of meanness under despotic rule!—a somewhat spiteful feeling was engendered against Marshal Davout, because of the strict and severe discipline in which he kept his troops amid the general laxity. Thus that art which had almost attained

theoretic perfection in Napoleon's conceptions, had become somewhat corrupted in practice. The campaign of 1812 represented an expedition in the style of Xerxes. Scarcely eight days had elapsed after the passage of the Niemen, when two hundred thousand men abandoned their standards, and presented the deplorable and contagious example of a breaking up of the army. Perhaps if Napoleon had paused, serried his ranks, and consolidated his base of operation, he might have been able to inflict a mortal blow on the Russian Colossus. But in presence of observant Europe, filled with silent but profound hatred, and ardently desiring our ruin, one of those prodigies with which Napoleon was wont to astonish her was needed, such as Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland. Napoleon went in pursuit of this prodigy even to the banks of the Moskowa, and there indeed he found a prodigy, on the 7th of September, 1812, but it was a prodigy of carnage, and nothing definite—the definite he must seek in Moscow itself, where indeed he found something wondrous; he beheld a fearful patriotic sacrifice, the conflagration of Moscow, and then remained a whole month uncertain, and hesitating at the extremity of the civilized world. Never, indeed, did he show more firmness, or more talent in combination, than in the twenty and odd days passed and lost in Moscow. But the exhausted powers of his lieutenants were not equal to the means by which he meant to free himself from the abyss into which he had sprung. It was necessary to return. The army, which contained in its ranks too many foreigners and too many young men, acted upon by the climate and the distance, at the same time that it was labouring beneath its baggage, fell into dissolution in the midst of the frozen immensity of Russia. At the commencement of the retreat Napoleon sunk for some days into a state of stupefaction, which suggested an idea of weakness of mind, but these were only a few days spent in contemplation, in realizing this prodigious change of fortune. At Berezina his natural disposition shone forth again, and never sank more, not even at Waterloo. Those who blame the military genius of Napoleon at this epoch, are guilty of an error of judgment. It is not his military genius that should be blamed, but his frenzied will, that, impatient of every obstacle, wished to extend its influence from men to nature, where it found that resistance that man no longer offered, and it was beneath the unfettered violence of the elements he sank. It was not the soldier that erred and was punished by the effects of his own fault, but the despot, that acted after the fashion of the despots of Asia. In another age, and with less intelligence than he possessed, Napoleon might, perhaps, like Xerxes, have whipped the sea, because it disobeyed him. However, there was one thing that bore some resemblance to such extravagance, for, during several months the French journalists of that time poured forth unheard-of maledictions on the climate of Russia, the sole cause, they said, of our misfortunes. The external form of things changes, but human folly is ever the same.

Napoleon deserting his army, as his detractors say, or as the im-

partial historian will say, quitting his soldiers without compunction, in order to go and prepare another army, crossed Germany secretly, Germany more stunned than he, and needing some reflection to enable her to believe in his change of fortune. He had time to escape and resieze the reins of the Empire at Paris. Though France was confounded, she hastened to supply him with every thing necessary to avenge our arms, feeling at the same time no indulgence for his errors. He employed these last resources with a military genius tried and improved by misfortune. Germany lightened of her bonds held forth her hands to Russia, and Austria was alone wanting to the union against us in Europe. The safety or ruin of France depended on the manner in which this power would be treated. Austria assumed a position that was at once honourable and diplomatic, which we had no right to expect from her, and which was due alone to the minister who had negotiated Maria Louisa's marriage, who skilfully sought to bring about the transition from alliance to war. Austria, frankly and boldly, interposed as arbiter, between the enslaved nations of Europe, who wished that all the oppressed should unite against their common oppressor, and France who called upon her by the ties of blood. She certainly asked very little, she only required that French Germany, qualified by the title of Confederation of the Rhine, should be given up, that the indispensable ports, Lubeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, should be restored to Germany, that Trieste should be given back to herself, and that the false Poland, called the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, should be abandoned. On these terms she would leave Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples, in the quality of vassal kingdoms, Holland, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Roman States, as departments of France, but no mention was made of Spain. She thus yielded to us, twice as much as Napoleon's son could keep. Not believing that Austria would seriously dare to constitute herself arbitress between him and Europe, and hoping that since the war had come nearer to the Rhine, he could sustain it with vigour, Napoleon hastened, whilst the negotiations were going on, to gain the two battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, where, without cavalry and with infantry composed of children, he conquered the best troops of Europe, then treating Austria as an inferior, and taking no heed of her advice, or even of her solicitations, convinced that he could restore his grandeur without her or in spite of her, he broke the armistice of Dresden, and recommenced that fatal strife with all Europe, which he opened by the victory of Dresden, one of the most brilliant conquests of his reign; he commenced a struggle which might, perhaps, have ended successfully for him, had he confined himself to defend the line of the Elbe from Koenigstein to Magdebourg. But in the rash hope of recovering all his ancient glory at a single blow, he wished to extend his left wing as far as Berlin, and his right to the neighbourhood of Breslau, in order to intercept any supplies that might be sent from Prague to

Berlin; but whilst he was himself victorious on the Elbe, he was conquered in the persons of his lieutenants, both on the Breslau and Berlin routes; he was then obliged to concentrate his forces; but too late; he lost the line of the Elbe, which he sought to reconquer at Leipzig, where, in one of the greatest military encounters recorded in history, he fought for three consecutive days without abandoning the field of battle. But, forced to retreat, he was assailed by a fearful accident—the explosion of the bridge of Leipzig—an accident fortuitous in appearance, but, in reality, the inevitable result of the gigantic scale on which Napoleon conducted all his plans. There he lost a portion of his army, and this deplorable accident caused a second retreat from the Saale to the Rhine, which, though shorter than that from Russia, was almost as disastrous. The army which France had furnished to repair the disaster of 1812 was almost annihilated on the Rhine by typhus fever.

Once on the Rhine, Austria persisting in her prudent policy, offered peace to Napoleon on the conditions of the treaty of Luneville—that is, France reduced to her natural limits. He did not refuse; but he expressed his acceptance with an ambiguity which partook both of pride and the fear of weakening his pretensions, by showing too much eagerness to treat: a new fault, which was, indeed, the almost inevitable consequence of his previous errors. But Europe, that had trembled at the very idea of invading France, finding the nearer she approached it, how much Napoleon had alienated the hearts of the people, profitted of the ambiguity of his language, and, withdrawing her offers, marched directly on Paris. Napoleon, who thought himself invincible on this side of the Rhine, and believed he had sufficient time to assemble the necessary troops, found he had only the miserable remains of Leipzig to oppose all Europe—that is to say, sixty or seventy thousand men—some exhausted, and some mere children, against three hundred thousand trained soldiers. Now, again, he was offered peace, but with the France of 1790. From the first time he was right in opposition to his counsellors, and displaying the noble pride of a citizen, instead of the insensate haughtiness of an Asiatic conqueror, fully comprehending that the France of 1790 would suit the Bourbons better than him, he refused the conditions of Châtillon, and with the wreck of his army, struggled to the last hour with indomitable energy.

It may, indeed, be said, that history does not offer two such spectacles as he presented during the February and March of 1814. His lieutenants, assailed on every frontier, retired in disorder, and betook themselves in consternation to Châlons. Thither he betakes himself alone, with no other reinforcement than his presence, encourages them, gives them new life, reanimates his soldiers, and then hurries forward to anticipate the invasion at Brienne and Rothière; fights with four, sometimes with five to one against him; astonishes his adversaries by the force of his attacks, and succeeds in arresting their progress; thus, profitting of the few days'

respite that had been gained at the point of the sword to provide the Marne, Aube, the Seine, and the Yonne with indispensable troops, and to preserve a sufficient force at the centre to be ready to hasten to any threatened point, he waited, like a tiger on the spring, for the chance that, in the profoundness of his genius, he had foreseen, namely, that the enemy would divide their forces between the rivers that flow towards Paris. This foresight having been justified by events, he hastened to encounter Blucher separated from Schwarzenberg, and overpowered him in four days; then returning to Schwarzenberg, he put him to flight, drew him from the gates of Paris to Troyes, and then, for the last time, he was offered peace—that is, the crown—but he refused the offer because it did not include the natural limits of the country. He then attacks Blucher anew, shuts him up between the Marne and the Aisne, and is on the point of annihilating him and restoring his own fallen fortunes, when Soissons flings open its gates! Nowise troubled by this sudden change of fortune, he fought with indomitable tenacity at Craonne and Laon, and is on the point of winning back the victory, when an error of Marmont destroys the possibility. He then retires half conquered, but not discomfited—does not yet despair, though the manœuvre of hurrying from Blucher to Schwarzenberg was no longer possible, because it had become too evident to the enemy—because Blucher had not been overcome—in a word, because they were too near each other! Always inexhaustible in resources, he determined to fall back on the fortresses and rally the garrisons, and take up a position with a hundred thousand men on the enemy's rear. Before executing this daring march, he made an attack on Schwarzenberg's flank at Arcis-sur-Aube, in order to draw the Austrian General towards him; hastens then to Nancy, when the enemy, marching on Paris, succeeded in forcing the gates. Napoleon returns in haste, finds the enemy dispersed on both banks of the Seine, and is preparing to crush them, when his lieutenants wrest the sword from his hand, punishing him too late for the bad use he had made of it; and he, the successful warrior, terminates his career, after displaying all the resources of his character and his genius in a desperate war, in which he added to all the brilliancy, daring, and fertility of resource exhibited on his former campaigns, one quality that he had still to display—and which he then displayed even to a miracle—unchangeable constancy in misfortune!

Such was Napoleon's career from the commencement to the close. We have recapitulated it in a few pages, to present it better as a whole; let us now compress it into a still smaller space, that we may draw from it the profound lessons it contains.

In the midst of France exhausted of her blood, and disgusted by the scenes she had witnessed for the last ten years, General Bonaparte seized the Dictatorship on the eighteenth Brumaire, and, in doing so, whatever may be said, he committed neither fault nor crime. The Dictatorship was not then an invention of servility,

but a social necessity. In order that liberty should be possible, it is necessary that the Government, the opposing parties in the State, and even individuals, should listen to all opinions with unalterable patience. This is scarcely to be expected, even when men, having nothing serious to reproach each other with, betake themselves to calumny. But to imagine that the men of those times could discuss public affairs in a peaceful spirit is an illusion, when we remember that they could justly accuse each other of murder, rapine, and of leaguering with the external enemy. It is not for seizing the Dictatorship that we ought to blame General Bonaparte, but for the use he made of his power from 1800 to 1814.

When, amid the frightful disasters of a long revolution, his genius, as rational as it was great, applied itself to repair the faults of others, he left nothing to be desired. He found the French inflamed one against another; he pacified Vendée; he recalled the emigrants, and even restored them part of their possessions. He found schism established and disturbing the consciences of all, and as he could not remove the evil by his sword, he respectfully addressed himself to the spiritual head of the Catholic universe, whom he himself had replaced upon his throne, induced him by the influence of his reasoning to recognize the legitimate results of the French Revolution, obtained, from him especially, the approbation of the sale of ecclesiastical property, the deposition of the ancient, and the institution of a new and orthodox clergy, and the pardon of those priests who had taken the oath, or had broken their vows. After a negotiation that continued nearly a year, he drew up that masterpiece of skill and patience, the Concordat—regulating all the relations between Church and State, and which, of all our institutes, is the only one that still endures. The Revolution had commenced to frame civil laws under the influence of the wildest passions; Napoleon took up the work and completed it, under the inspiration of good sense and of the experience of ages. He re-established the necessary taxes, which had been abolished by the demagogue flatterers of the multitude; he established an infallible system of finance, and instituted an active, efficient, and honest administration. Externally proud, resolute, but reserved, he knew how to unite force with persuasion. In Switzerland he effected a pacification, like to that of Vendée, by means of the Act of Mediation, which, though under another name, continues the definite constitution of that country. He reconstituted Germany, which had been thrown into confusion by the war, by compensating the dispossessed princes with the property of the church, and by establishing a just equilibrium between the confederate princes. Thus holding, with firm and equitable hand, the balance of German interests, which he allowed to incline slightly towards Prussia, without at the same time offending Austria, he prepared the Prussian alliance, the only one that was then possible, and at the same time equal to our wants. Having thus effected all the good that was practicable or possible, both at home and abroad, admired by the world, adored

by France, nothing more remained for him than to rest in this unsullied glory, and allow the wearied world to rest with him.

Vain dream ! this man, who had so truly estimated, and so wisely suppressed the passions of others, could not restrain himself when his own were wounded. The emigrants, who had taken refuge in London, insulted him ; England did not prevent them, because, by the constitution of her laws, she could not, and moreover, she listened to them because it flattered her jealousy. What wonder that it was so ; what cause could it be of surprise, much less of anger ! But this hero, this sage, whom the world admired, could no longer control himself. He demanded vengeance, and because he did not receive such as his anger demanded, he insulted the ambassador of Great Britain. When he needed but to wait a few days, and the English would have evacuated Malta, he broke the peace of Amiens, and thus left Malta for ever to Britain. The emigrants, who had insulted him, conspired against his life, having some princes as accomplices or confidants. Not being able to punish either the one or the other, he seized, on neutral ground, a prince who possibly knew nothing of these plots, but who certainly took no part in them, and had him ruthlessly shot. Europe exclaimed against this violation of neutral territory : he insulted Europe. Alas ! in his excited mind passion had conquered reason, and every change of this powerful intellect, becoming a cause of revolution in the entire world, the firm and sustained policy of the Consulate gave place to the wild and reckless government of the Empire. This was the first great fault of the First Consul, and the most important, for it was the source of every other.

At war with Great Britain, the First Consul wished to fight her hand to hand, and cross the straits of Dover. But to pass the sea in safety, it would be necessary to tranquillize the continent, and he took Genoa. Then the continent rose, and the maritime war was exchanged for a continental one, which was not to be regretted, for it gave him an opportunity of fighting England in the persons of her allies, and decide the question by land instead of by sea. Having crushed Austria at Ulm and at Austerlitz, he sent Russia home conquered and ashamed ; and Prussia, that came to dictate to him, he covered with ridicule. This was the time to resume the exercise of his reason, and consolidate and extend the peace of Amiens and Luneville. Had he made Austria suffer only inevitable losses, compensating her even when necessary ; had he by his consideration for her feelings or by gifts that caused her no shame, consoled Prussia for the embarrassment of her position ; had he asked nothing of Russia, but, that she should stand aloof in a quarrel in which she had no concern, Napoleon would have isolated England, and compelled her to treat on whatever conditions he pleased, and he would thus have resumed the consular policy, at the same time that his imperial title would have been universally recognized, and he would have obtained some useless though brilliant acquisitions. Unfortunately, instead of considering his triumphs

at Ulm and Austerlitz, as what they were, and what they ought to be, a means of conquering England by land, he only looked upon them as an opportunity of obtaining universal empire. This was his second great fault, and the one that was destined to involve him permanently in the practices of a madly-acquisitive policy. He then proceeded in quick succession to take Naples for his brother Joseph, Lombardy for his adopted son, Eugene, Holland for his brother Louis, all three destined to become vassal sovereigns of the great empire of the west; he overturned that Germany that he had reconstituted, and which was one of his greatest works, and created a French Germany under the title of the Confederation of the Rhine, a Germany from which Austria and Prussia were excluded; he placed the crown of the Cæsars on his head, and humbled Prussia by the gift of Hanover! and, still, he was so powerful at this time, that these excesses did not render peace impossible, so ardently was it desired, even at any price. Russia had sent M. d'Oubril as ambassador to Napoleon, and England sent Lord Lauderdale, and their only demand, after all his extravagant enterprises, was that Sicily should be given to the Bourbons, and Sardinia to the House of Savoy. Napoleon wishing to treat separately with each, that he might the better bend them to his purpose, lost the opportunity of making peace with both, a peace that would have been the consecration of all his daring acts; he refused a simple explanation to Prussia on the subject of the restitution of Hanover to George III., and consequently found himself in the centre of a universal war. But he had the best soldiers in the world, and was himself the greatest commander of modern times, perhaps of any time. In a few months he had annihilated the Prussian army at Jena, and completed the destruction of the Russian troops at Friedland. From this day forth, envy could no longer wound his pride, it could no longer pique him with the army of the great Frederick, an army that he had overpowered in a single day, nor could distance any longer render Russia invincible. Now was the time, even more opportune than after Austerlitz, when he ought to have resumed a wise policy and made use of his power on the continent to deprive England for ever of her allies. He might, for example, have gratified Austria by the cession of the Danubian provinces, and have made this gift Russia's sole punishment. He might have raised up prostrate Prussia, by restoring to her all that she had lost by her imprudence, and have overwhelmed her with joy, surprise, and gratitude; and, certainly, when he had consoled Austria, attached Prussia for ever to France, and twice punished Russia for imprudent interference, isolated England would have surrendered to our arms; and the gigantic empire, already sketched by Napoleon, might have been securely founded. But the same cause that had made him abandon the moderate policy of 1803, and prevented his resuming it after Austerlitz, still subsisted; and, intoxicated with pride, seeking to systematize his faults, that he might

excuse them to himself, excluding from his consideration, as if they did not exist, greater number of the states of Europe, he would only recognize two great empires, that of the East and that of the West, each resting on the other, and, gaining strength from this mutual support, and thus enabling him to revel in the exercise of unlicensed power over the enslaved world. This was the third of Napoleon's great faults; for this Russian alliance, which henceforth formed the sole basis of his policy, must either be false, or a crime against Europe—false, if he wished to exercise unlimited power himself, and not allow the same to Russia, a crime against Europe, if he opened the route to Constantinople to his ally. Alas! hurried along by the torrent of conquest, his progress was so rapid, and he gave himself so little time to reflect, that he never decided how far he would allow Russia to proceed towards Constantinople, or what should be done with the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, that ought to become Poland or nothing! What he hoped was, that with the assistance of Russia he could decide the Spanish question; that became his ruling thought. Spain, possessed by the Bourbons, was all that was wanting to his vast empire, and he was anxious to make it one of the vassal kingdoms of the West. Spain, submissive and ashamed of her condition, asking him for a system of policy, a government, and a wife, might perhaps be induced to ask him for a king, if he had waited. But he had become as incapable of patience as of moderation, and sought to make the Bourbons fly from Aranjuez, that he might stop them at Cadiz. As the Spanish people had opposed this flight, he induced them to come to Bayonne, where, exciting the father and son against each other, he took advantage of their dissension to declare the one incompetent and the other unworthy, and finished this sombre comedy by an usurpation that disgusted Europe, excited Spain to revolt, and turned it into a new Vendée, in the midst of which a high-spirited people like the Spaniards, and an obstinate nation like the English, waged an endless war against us. This was the fourth fault of the imperial reign, and certainly the greatest, since the abandonment of the moderate policy of 1803, for it caused the ruin of the French army, the sole support of the Bonaparte dynasty, since Napoleon had made his reign a reign of physical force.

Baylen—fatal name—was the first punishment of the crime committed at Bayonne. When a revolted peasantry rose up against our soldiers and forced them to capitulate, dejected Europe resumed her courage, and in 1809 Austria, impatient of the yoke, gave the signal for a general revolt. Napoleon's best soldiers being in Spain, he advanced with conscripts to meet Austria, and, accomplishing wonders at Ratisbon, he exposed himself to great danger at Essling, by his too great precipitation, performed new wonders at Wagram, and thus put an end to the first European revolt, for which Austria had given the signal too early.

However, the ground had become unsteady beneath his tread, and some gleams of reason penetrated to his excited brain. He

felt the necessity of appeasing Europe, and formed the determination to evacuate Germany, to carry on the continental blockade with perseverance, to finish the Spanish war, and by this twofold means to reduce England to peace. He would then rest, and allow the world to rest, and marry that he might have an heir to this universal monarchy.

With these pacific views, Napoleon, in the course of fifteen months, united Holland, Bremen, Hamburg, Lubeck, Oldenburg, Tuscany, and Rome, to the Empire, had the Pope imprisoned, forbid the merchants of the continent to hold any communication with the English, at the same time that he granted licenses to Frenchmen to go to London and return; he married an Austrian archduchess, without deigning to break off formally his negotiation for the hand of Alexander's sister because he had been kept waiting; and thus terminated that mendacious Russian alliance, which had gained Finland and Bessarabia for Russia, and furnished us the opportunity of ruining our fortunes in Spain.

Nevertheless, the continent, although full of hatred, submitted under the influence of the battle of Wagram. Russia alone ventured to offer some objections touching the territory of Oldenburg, which had been taken from a prince of his family, and to the manner in which the continental blockade was put in operation, and to the successive augmentation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, until it had almost become Poland. Then Napoleon, finding the Spanish war and the continental blockade too tedious, wished to enter Russia, thinking that when he should have punished, at that distance, a power that had dared to raise its voice in objection, he would have terminated his fearful struggle with the civilised world. This was the fifth great fault, and it would be difficult to say in what degree it surpassed or fell behind its predecessors in folly; for one would be embarrassed to decide which was the greatest error, to have broken the peace of Amiens unseasonably, or to have sought universal monarchy after Austerlitz; to have, after Friedland, founded his policy on the inexplicable Russian alliance, to have gone to war with Spain, or to have marched to Moscow. However that may be, followed by six hundred thousand soldiers, he now commenced a struggle both against man and nature. But nature can defend herself better than man, and she did it now by alternately opposing to the conqueror of the Alps, distance, heat, cold, and famine. However, she might herself have been conquered by time! But Napoleon had not time. The world secretly leagued against him, left him none, and he would have needed to complete his conquest in one campaign. He was overwhelmed by the most tragic catastrophe that time shall ever bring forth.

Desolated France generously furnished him with the means of repairing his own glory and ours, and he was about to do so, after Lutzen and Bautzen, even in a higher degree than was desirable, when the insensate hope of recovering all his

losses at a single blow, made him commit his sixth and last great fault, for it consummated his ruin; this was refusing the conditions of Prague, and extending his line of operations from Dresden to Berlin, whilst, if he had concentrated his forces on the Elbe he might have rendered his position impregnable. Forced to abandon Germany, he received a last offer, that of the Rhine frontier, to which he had the folly to return an ambiguous reply, through fear of shewing too great a desire to negotiate, and whilst he lost a month in explanations, Europe profiting of this month, to inquire into the state of France, withdrew her offer and crossed the Rhine. Napoleon, then employing the same talents, the same force of character, to resist those humiliating conditions, that he had before employed to his own ruin, finished, as he had commenced his reign, like a great man,—a reign that was vitiated in mid-career by an ambition, after the fashion of Asiatic conquerors,—a wonderful reign, of which it may be said, that nothing could be more perfect than its commencement, nothing more extravagant than its mid-course, and nothing more heroic than its termination.

Thus this great and doom-bringing man, after having attained perfection during the Consulate, abandons, at the first offence offered to his pride, the firm and moderate policy of 1803, is about to attack England, but is turned from it by the continent that he has himself provoked, but which he cruelly punishes; it now only needed an effort of generosity and wisdom, and he might have returned to the practice of a sound policy, first at Austerlitz, again at Friedland; but, all-powerful in his influence over others, and infinitely weak in his empire over himself, he dashes into the vague region of chimeras, and frames, in his airy dreams, a vast empire of the west, that is to embrace civilized Europe, from Poland to Spain; to effect the realisation of this dream he flatters the Russian visionary views, but receives, at Essling and Wagram, a first notice of the feeling of exasperated Europe; he thinks to profit of it, and might, perhaps, with moderation and patience have consolidated his chimerical empire, but, as incapable of exercising patience as moderation, he wishes to hasten events, marches into Russia, and only hastens his ruin; still he might, after Lutzen and Bautzen have conserved his power, in a higher degree than was even desirable, but he refused the offer of peace at Prague, a chance which fortune never again presented him, and he fell to rise no more. Such, in a few words, is the history of Napoleon's reign.

If, in order to understand aright this extraordinary spectacle, we draw back a step, as in presence of an object too vast to be judged at a near view, if we recur to the times of the French Revolution, then everything is explained, and we see that this reign is one of the phases of this immense revolution, a phase tragic and wondrous as the others, and we recognise it by this essential characteristic of the imperial reign—excess. From 1789 to 1800, we behold the first outburst of the French Revolution; from 1800 to 1814

we see its reaction on itself, a reaction of which the Empire is the condensed expression, and in both the wild whirl of passion is the essential characteristic. The French Revolution dashes into the arena of social reform, with a heart full of generous sentiments, with a mind overflowing with great and fruitful ideas, she encounters obstacles, is astonished, becomes angry—as if the chariot of humanity in rolling over the earth is never to feel the friction—she flies into a rage, becomes intoxicated and furious with passion, pours human blood in torrents on the scaffold, disgusts the world, is herself disgusted at her own excesses, and the offspring of this feeling is a man mighty as the Revolution, imbued with the same desire of effecting good, wishing it ardently, wishing to effect it instantly, by any means, and the consequence is that the projected good disappears from view, convicting him of a thousand self-contradictions, and inflicting on him many severe lessons. Ah, when it is needed to admonish the French Revolution, how admirably Napoleon does so! He condemns regicide, civil war, schism, the captivity of the Pope, a universal republic, the fury of war; he recalls the emigrants, reinstates the Pope at Rome, concludes the Concordat, and grants Europe the peace of Lunéville and Amiens. But the world presents a succession of obstacles, in whatever direction we march, either forwards or backwards. At the first error committed by his adversaries, like the true son of his mother—the Revolution—intemperate as she, refusing to brook either resistance or delay, the prudent Consul flies into a rage, commits regicide at Vincennes, revives schism, detains the Pope prisoner at Fontainebleau, relapses into war, now general and prolonged, substitutes for the universal republic a universal monarchy, and—phenomenon of unheard-of passion—like the Revolution, whose continuator, representative or son he may be called, left behind him immense calamities, high principles, and dazzling glory. The calamities and glory belong to France, the principles to the world at large.

If, after the astonishment, admiration, and terror, we experience in contemplating this spectacle, we wish to draw from it a profound, a never-to-be-forgotten lesson, we must be convinced in the secrecy of our own hearts, whether we contemplate the operation of revolutions, even the most glorious and the most praiseworthy, or whether we weigh the conduct of the most highly-gifted amongst men, we must be convinced that self-restraint is man's first duty. "Commonplace moral," we hear re-echoed on every side. Yes, commonplace, we admit, but ever new, if we only consider how succeeding generations profit of it. It is a lesson that must be continually repeated, and is in itself the concentration of all public and private wisdom. In fact, nations and individuals, especially great nations and high-minded individuals, are never wanting in heroic impulses. What they do fail in is forbearance, cool reason, and self-control. For men, private or public, ordinary or extraordinary, for nations, above all, during revolution, which are often only

an unpremeditated impulse towards good, self-restraint is the great secret by which we can retain our honesty, or become useful or happy; in a word, it is the great secret of success. If we cannot restrain, that is, if we cannot govern ourselves, we injure the cause, whose triumph, in the excess of our affection, we had endeavoured to secure, by violence or precipitation! Let us always keep three great examples before our eyes—the Convention destroyed liberty, Napoleon destroyed the greatness of France, and the house of Bourbon destroyed the cause of legitimacy—that is to say, they destroyed the cause, whose success they had each a special mission to serve! But we go too far, when we say destroyed, for great principles can never be destroyed in this world. They are only compromised.

After having pronounced judgment on Napoleon's reign, it becomes our duty to pronounce judgment on the man himself, as soldier, politician, administrator, legislator, thinker, and writer, and assign him a place in that glorious family that reckons amongst its members Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Frederick the Great. But, to pronounce a correct judgment, it is necessary that the great man's career should be finished. The end of his career was not attained at the isle of Elba. Providence reserved two further trials for Napoleon. He was destined to stand again, face to face, with the powers of Europe, busy dividing our spoils amongst themselves, and disturbed in the division by his return from the isle of Elba. He was in a special manner destined to stand face to face with reviving liberty. This is the spectacle presented by 1815, during the period called "the hundred days," a mournful and tragic spectacle, whose details we purpose to retrace. After which, we shall judge the man as a whole. And after having judged the man impartially, our task will be finished, and we shall leave to posterity the task of pronouncing judgment on our judgment, if, indeed, posterity will deign to take the trouble of correcting or confirming our opinion.

END OF BOOK LIII.

AND

VOLUME XVII.

NOTE ON THE MARRIAGE OF PRINCE JEROME BONAPARTE.

(See Vol viii.)

M. Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte, French citizen, residing in the United States at Baltimore, required the editors on the 7th May, 1859, to insert in the present volume, the following note, which they believe they ought to insert, not being judges of a question of state policy, which the legal authorities can alone decide.

"On the 24th December, 1803, M. Jerome Bonaparte, at that time an officer in the navy of the French republic, married Miss Elizabeth Paterson, daughter of a respectable citizen of the United States: this marriage was celebrated at Baltimore by the Bishop of Baltimore, according to the rites of the holy Catholic Church, and the act of celebration was inserted the same day in the register of marriages at the cathedral of the city of Baltimore.

"M. Jerome Bonaparte, then aged nineteen, had attained the age required by the laws of France, to render a marriage valid (Art. 144 of the Civil Code).

"This marriage was not contracted under any of the conditions which would render it null by the 184th article of the same code.

"The father of M. Jerome Bonaparte was dead: his mother, Madame Lætitia Bonaparte, was still living, but her consent was not necessary to the validity of the marriage, neither by the American nor Canon law. According to the French law, the invalidity resulting from the absence of the paternal and maternal consent was not absolute; this invalidity not having been appealed against during the first year that the marriage was known to his mother. (Art. 183 of the Civil Code.)

"Madame Lætitia never judicially demanded that her son's marriage should be annulled: on the contrary, in her later correspondence, Madame Lætitia called M. Jerome-Napoleon Bonaparte, the issue of this marriage, *her dear son*, and especially in a letter of the 10th November, 1829, she congratulated him on his marriage, and concluded with the words, '*your very affectionate mother.*'

"The princes Joseph and Louis Bonaparte have always in like manner spoken of and written to him as their nephew.

"In 1803, Napoleon Bonaparte shared the dignity of Consul of the Republic, with two other French citizens: he was not invested with any of the rights attributed to the heads of royal houses, with regard to the members of their families, who cannot marry without their consent. The First Consul had no legal authority to recognize or refuse to recognize the validity of his brother's marriage.

"On the 24th May, 1805, the Emperor Napoleon wrote to Pope Pius VII. in these terms: '*I wish for a bull from your Holiness to annul this marriage. Your Holiness will please to do this without publicity: I shall not have the marriage annulled in the civil courts until I hear your Holiness is willing to declare it void.*'

“ The Holy Father replied to the Emperor in a very detailed brief, dated 27th June, 1805, in which we find the following : ‘ In order to preserve an inviolable secrecy, we have done ourself the honour of satisfying your Majesty’s solicitations with the greatest exactness : for this reason we have reserved to ourself exclusively the task of examining the proofs, touching the marriage in question.

“ ‘ *We regret that we cannot find any cause that would authorize us to declare the marriage invalid.*

“ ‘ Did we usurp an authority that did not belong to us, we should render ourself guilty before the tribunal of God and in face of the entire Church *of a most abominable abuse* of our sacred ministry. Your Majesty, in your justice, would not wish that we should pronounce a judgment contrary to *the testimony of our conscience* and the invariable principles of the Church.’

“ It does not in any way touch the validity of the marriage contracted in 1803 by the citizen Jerome Bonaparte, that this marriage became at a later period, opposed in the highest degree to the political designs of the Emperor of the French.”

HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY
M. A. THIERS,
MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY AND OF THE INSTITUTE,
&c., &c., &c.

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C O N T E N T S .

BOOK LIV.

	PAGE
RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS . . .	1

BOOK LV.

GOVERNMENT OF LOUIS XVIII. . .	121
--------------------------------	-----

BOOK LVI.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA . . .	247
--------------------------	-----


BOOK LIV.

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS.

LAST operations of the French, who remained scattered in different parts of Europe—Campaign of General Maison in Flanders, and defence of Antwerp by General Carnot—Surrender of Antwerp, and conditions of this surrender—The French troops begin to desert—Firmness of General Maison under a misfortune that threatens to leave France without an army—Long and memorable resistance of Marshal Davout at Hambourg—Conditions on which he surrenders, after having saved a numerous army and abundant war materials—Noble conduct of Prince Eugene in Italy—The French army led back from Italy by General Grenier—Events in the Pyrenees—The news from Paris having arrived too late to stop hostilities, the English and French fight for the last time—Sanguinary battle of Toulouse—Armistice on all the frontiers—Position of the Count d'Artois after his entrance into Paris—Debate as to the title under which he should provisionally govern the kingdom—The senate objects to recognise his rank of lieutenant-general, excepting on condition of a solemn pledge with respect to the constitution—Irritation of the Count d'Artois and his friends—The Duke d'Otranto devises a mode of proceeding which is adopted—The Senate repairs to the Tuileries, and invests the Count d'Artois with the lieutenant-generalship, at the conclusion of a declaration in which the Prince, becoming responsible for Louis XVIII., promises the adoption of the principal bases of the Senatorial Constitution—First acts of the Count d'Artois' administration—The provisional government becomes the prince's council—Constitution of the ministry—Despatch of envoys extraordinary into different parts of France—Sufferings of the occupied provinces, and contemplated alleviations—New quarters assigned to the French armies—The conscription of 1815 suspended—Financial measures of M. Louis—His firm resolution to pay all the debts of the state, to keep up the taxes, and especially the *droits réunis*—Rapidly with which public credit begins to be re-established under the combined influence of this minister and peace—Transient changes effected in our commercial tariffs—Sufferings of the occupied provinces continue to increase—A négociation is hastily commenced to obtain the evacuation of the territory by the combined armies—The evacuation of the French provinces cannot be spoken of, without exciting a similar demand with regard to the foreign provinces occupied by our troops—It being impossible to refuse this reciprocity, it is agreed by the convention of the 23rd April, to evacuate Hambourg, Antwerp, Flushing, Berg-op-Zoom, Mons, Luxembourg, Mayence, and, in a word, the most important fortresses in Europe—The imprudence of this convention is not at first perceived, which

becomes soon a subject of bitter reproach—Rapid change which has taken place in the public mind since the entry of the Count d'Artois—The mass of the population, familiarised with the idea of the return of the Bourbons, soon submit to them unreservedly, but the transports of the royalist party irritate the revolutionists and the Bonapartists, and provoke sharp recriminations from both parties. The Count d'Artois commits certain acts of imprudence, which make his most enlightened friends anxious for the return of the king—Various messages despatched to Louis XVIII., and description he receives of the state of France—In consequence of being told that his adhesion to the constitution of the senate is not indispensable, he defers his decision, and advances slowly towards France—His sojourn at London—Enthusiasm that his presence excites among the English—Imprudent address, in which he declares that, next to God, he is most indebted to England—Disembarkation of Louis XVIII. at Calais—His journey through the northern departments, and his arrival at Compiègne—Warm attentions, of which he is the object, especially on the part of the marshals, to whom he gives the most flattering reception—Impatience testified to know his character—Character of Louis XVIII., and of the Count d'Artois, and remarkable difference between the two brothers—Interview of M. de Talleyrand with the king—Solicitude of the latter to avoid all pledges—Visit of the Emperor Alexander to Compiègne, and uselessness of his efforts to win attention for his advice—Louis XVIII. is not adverse to the idea of a constitution, even of a liberal one, but he wishes to give it himself, in order to maintain the principle of his authority—It is arranged that before entering Paris he shall pause at St. Ouen, and make a general declaration, confirmatory of that of the Count d'Artois, and framed in conformity with the bases of the senatorial constitution—Sojourn at St. Ouen, and declaration of St. Ouen, dated 2nd May, 1814—Entrance of Louis XVIII. into Paris, 3rd May—The Parisians give him the most cordial reception—Louis XVIII. seizes on the supreme power, and frames the royal council—First meeting of this council, in which all the public questions are slightly touched—General views concerning the army, the navy, the finances—M. Louis persists in his two principles, respect for the public debts, and support of the necessary taxes—Royal proclamation relative to the *droits réunis*—Adjournment of the question of conscription—Louis XVIII. shows a determination to re-establish the ancient military household, and even to increase it considerably—No member of the council dares resist this imprudent resolution—Fresh efforts to terminate the sufferings in the occupied provinces—It is now evident that the convention of the 23rd April, whilst depriving us of valuable pledges, has not advanced the departure of the allied armies by a single day—The allied sovereigns promise to give fresh orders to their armies, and Louis XVIII. issues a proclamation, commanding the local authorities to disobey the requisitions of the foreign generals—Anxiety to conclude peace—M. de Talleyrand receives a mission to negotiate—Fresh error resulting from precipitation, similar to that committed in signing the convention of the 23rd April—It would be better that the fate of France should be regulated at Vienna at the same time as that of the other powers, because there would be a diversity of opinions, and the French interests might find support—M. de Metternich believes on the contrary, that it is for the interest of the allied powers to treat immediately with France, and defer the solution of the European questions until the assembly of the general congress at Vienna—The royal government does not comprehend the profundity of these views, and impatient to claim the merit of making peace, is anxious to conclude it immediately—Adoption of the frontiers of 1790 laid down as an irrevocable principle—This frontier adopted with some additions—The Isle of France made an exception in the restitution of our colonies—Noble opposition of the king to every species of compensation for the expenses of the war—He succeeds, thanks to the firmness displayed by him and the government on this occasion—Preservation of the museums—Treaty of Paris of the 30th May, 1814—Whilst peace is being negotiated, the constitution is also discussed—The king does not wish to confide this task to the royal council, and undertakes it himself with MM. Montesquieu, Dambray, Ferrand, and Beugnot. His liberal views, attributable to his residence in England, but all subordinate to one condition, which is that the new constitu-

sion shall emanate exclusively from the royal authority—Various questions debated—Pliancy of the king on every point, when his favourite principle is conceded—The sketch of the constitution laid before two commissions, one chosen by the senate, the other by the legislative corps—The new constitution is called the “constitutional charter”—The foreign sovereigns, not wishing to leave Paris before the promises made at St. Ouen are fulfilled, the 4th June is fixed for the royal audience, when the charter is to be proclaimed—Royal audience of the 4th of June—Favourable results of this audience—Proclamation of the charter—Departure of the foreign sovereigns—Definite establishment of the Bourbon government.



HISTORY
OF
THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE
UNDER
NAPOLEON.

BOOK LIV.

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS.

THE departure of Napoleon for the isle of Elba had delivered the Bourbons from the presence of a formidable enemy, who, though conquered, still alarmed the victorious powers. But although the monster—as the imperial government was called—was decapitated, the trunk remained, and its scattered fragments still agitated Europe by their convulsive throes. Various detachments of troops that had not yet received intelligence of what had occurred at Paris, or who refused to believe these accounts, were dispersed through Flanders, Holland, Westphalia, Italy, Dauphine, Languedoc, and Spain. The first care of the provisional government had been to despatch agents to inform these troops of the entrance of the allies into Paris, the abdication of Napoleon, and the re-establishment of the Bourbons on the throne of France. The replies were expected with a certain amount of anxiety, for the provisional

government would not have wished to command the siege of such places as Strasbourg, Mayence, Lille, Antwerp, Flushing, the Texel, Hambourg, Magdebourg, Wurzbourg, Palma-Nova, Venice, Mantua, Alessandria, Genoa, Lerida, Tortosa, &c., &c., nor would the allies like to be obliged to undertake such enterprises. Nor was it without considerable difficulty that the voice of reason could find its way to the hearts of the old soldiers that guarded these remote posts, and at whose head Napoleon had placed energetic commanders, devoted to his interest and that of France. Their last acts are worthy of a place in history, and clearly illustrate the position in which Napoleon left affairs, and in which the Bourbons found them. We shall give a rapid glance over these events.

The illustrious Carnot defended Antwerp, whilst the brave and talented General Maison occupied by his activity and courage the whole extent of country lying between Antwerp, Lille, and Valenciennes. It must not be forgotten how Carnot, who of his own will had stood aloof from the Empire and the Emperor, had, as soon as he saw our frontiers invaded, discerned, more by the impulses of his heart than the reasonings of his head, the danger that threatened the cause of the revolution and France, and wrote to Napoleon to offer him, as he said, his *sexagenary arm*, not as an aid, but as an example. Napoleon received, as it deserved, this patriotic offer, and confided to Carnot the task most suited to him, that of defending Antwerp—Antwerp the most magnificent creation of the empire, the depôt of our maritime riches, the bulwark of our Scheldt frontier. Carnot had established order in the fortress, inspired the garrison with a sentiment of the most absolute devotedness, and shown the enemy the impossibility of obtaining, otherwise than by a regular and protracted siege, this object of England's intense hatred. The besiegers might indeed avail themselves of the barbarous alternative of bombardment. Carnot, in concert with Admiral Missiessy, had made preparations for such an event. The *escadre* was covered with earth and dung, the magazines and the most exposed works were protected with blinds, and then, with heroic impassability, the besieged supported during several days a continuous shower of bombs and howitzers, taking care to extinguish instantly the flames that from time to time sprung up in different places. The besiegers, after having exhausted their ammunition, saw themselves reduced to a simple blockade, and Carnot having well victualled the garrison, proved unquestionably that his patience was as indomitable as his courage.

The active troops shut up in Antwerp in consequence of the movement of the invading armies, were a great loss to General Maison, who had only 6,000 men for the occupation

of Flanders. Amongst the troops shut up in Antwerp, there was a division of the Young Guard, consisting of 4,000 foot and some hundred horse, which would have been a great assistance in defending the frontier. Consequently, Carnot and Maison exerted themselves, the one to find the means of sending off these guards and the other to secure their safe passage through a host of enemies.

General Maison after having hastily thrown some dépôt battalions and some provisions into the fortresses of Berg-op-Zoom, Ostend, Dunkirk, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Condé and Lille, hastened with from five to six thousand men from one of these fortresses to the other, relieving sometimes this, sometimes that, destroying from time to time vast detachments of the enemy, and by a series of ambuscades giving occupation to the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who with between forty and fifty thousand men had not succeeded in expelling us from the labyrinth of our fortresses.* Whilst General Maison thus executed actual prodigies of daring and activity, several of our commanders won for themselves unfading laurels by resisting formidable attacks with a handful of men. General Bizanet, obliged to defend with 2,700 men the fortress of Berg-op-Zoom, which would have required a garrison of 12,000, was not able to prevent Graham's soldiers, who were favoured by a popular movement, from ascending the *escalade* and entering the city as victors. But undisturbed by this disaster, General Bizanet rushed upon the English columns, overthrew them one after the other, killed 1,500 and captured 2,500 men. The Prince of Saxe-Weimar, having made a similar attempt on Maubeuge, which was defended by Colonel Schouller, of the artillery, at the head of 1,000 national guards and custom house-officers, had seen his artillery dismounted, his soldiers repulsed, and his enterprize defeated in the most humiliating manner.

General Maison, who was seeking a means by which the Roguet division might safely join him, profited of the opportunity afforded by the failure of the attempt against Maubeuge, and advanced towards Antwerp amidst hosts of the enemy. Uniting the two infantry divisions, Barrois and Salignac, that were 6,000 strong, and the cavalry division of Castex consisting of 1,100 horse, he left Lille under pretext of going to aid Maubeuge, overthrew the detachments that occupied Courtray, feigned to pursue them in the direction of Oudenarde and

* Napoleon, who had only learned the commencement of the campaign in Belgium, and who had only heard of the retreat from Brussels upon Lille, had often in his correspondence complained of General Maison. He would have spoken in a different tone, had he had time to appreciate fully this campaign, which at that period excited the admiration of the military world.

Brussels, when suddenly turning towards Ghent, which he captured, he took up a position before this city, awaiting the arrival of General Roguet, to whom he had sent intelligence of his approach. Carnot having received timely information, sent out of Antwerp the Roguet division, which joined General Maison at Ghent, increasing his numbers by nearly 5,000 men.

General Maison, now at the head of 12,000 men, saw numerous columns of the enemy abandon the blockade of the fortresses, to march against him; he especially noted the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who was preparing to cut off his retreat with an army of 30,000 men. General Maison did not lose an instant, he marched straight through Thielmann's corps, of whom he killed or captured 1,200, and after an expedition of six continuous days, entered victoriously into Lille, at the head of a little army, all imbued with the spirit of their commander, and ready again to achieve such deeds as they had lately performed. It was whilst affairs were in this position that General Maison received intelligence of what had occurred at Paris, despatched officially by the provisional government. This general, an ancient aide-de-camp of Bernadotte, and an old soldier of the Rhenish army, was not strongly attached to Napoleon; but untainted by the spirit of intrigue, though endowed with great activity of mind and character, he was incapable of becoming the associate of plotters. Thus, though surrounded by Bernadotte's agents, he repulsed them, threatening to have them shot, if they renewed their propositions. But destiny having pronounced its decrees, he submitted, and informed his soldiers of the events that had occurred in France, whose consequences would be henceforth irresistible, and proposed to them to give in their adhesion. His generals unanimously adopted his opinion, but in the lower ranks of the army a general cry arose against the traitors, who, they said, had betrayed the capital. The soldiers could not be persuaded that Paris had succumbed to natural causes, or the mere events of war, and the report of a great treason, which was vaguely spread, tended to increase their unwise distrust. They were persuaded that France and Napoleon had been victims to the blackest treason. The old soldiers, through indignation, and the new, through want of discipline, mutinied, saying, it was better to abandon standards dishonoured by treason. The imprudent expression—"no more conscriptions," no more *droits réunis*, uttered by the Count d'Artois, had echoed to the remotest provinces. "Let us come away, let us return home," was the language heard from the lips of all the soldiers. In fact, hundreds quitted their standards within a few hours. General Maison understood perfectly well, that whatever

might be the government, an army would be always needed. He assembled his soldiers, who at first appeared to feel his energetic representations, but who soon began again to desert in numbers. He then assembled his officers and appealed to their patriotism. These yielded to his remonstrances, and in their turn appealing to the sub-officers and the veteran soldiers, succeeded in making an impression. In this way, a nucleus of faithful men was formed, and with their aid General Maison pointing his artillery at the principal gates of Lille, declared that he would pour a shower of grape on the first who attempted to desert. This vigorous demonstration awed the mutineers, and they returned to their duty. The Flemish army had lost about two thousand out of twelve thousand men, but the remainder were staunch and could be relied on.

General Maison's conduct on this occasion was called for by circumstances, for desertion was becoming contagious. Profiting of the anger of the veteran soldiers against those whom they called traitors, and endeavouring to increase in order to take advantage of it, the conscripts deserted in masses, saying they were no longer bound to the service, and in the end they enticed their veteran comrades, who began to feel longings after their native villages. In the great army that Napoleon had left at Fontainebleau, desertion had spread to a disastrous extent, and there was even danger that none but foreign soldiers might remain, which would be a deplorable condition in which to treat for peace. Many of the immediate partizans of the Count d'Artois looked upon the dispersion of the Imperial troops as a fortunate event, but the marshals pointed out the threatened danger of the extinction of a public force. Marmont, the principal author of this dispersion, wishing to make his zeal for the interests of the army serve as an excuse for his conduct, was one of the most active in representing the state of things to the government, and finally the Count d'Artois was induced to make a significant manifestation. He accordingly wrote a letter to General Maison, which was instantly published, thanking him for his noble conduct, and informing him that his services should be made known to Louis XVIII., and would be a claim on the esteem and confidence of his sovereign.

Whilst the Flemish army thus rallied round the new government, Carnot, whatever his dislike to the Bourbons, could not act otherwise than as a good citizen. He felt that he must submit to the law of necessity and accept the Bourbons, as their government was the sole remaining alternative. But the Bourbons being accepted and recognised, there still remained duties towards France, and though the gates of Antwerp had been opened to the envoys of the ancient

dynasty, that was no reason that the place should be delivered to the enemy. Bernadotte had informed Carnot of the events that had taken place at Paris, and endeavoured to induce him to give up Antwerp to the allies, but Carnot replied that these circumstances had not yet been sufficiently proved to induce the faithful commander of a besieged city to regard them as certain, and that, moreover, supposing them true, he would surrender the keys of the fortress confided to him only to the envoys of the King of France. Some days having elapsed, and all doubt having disappeared, Carnot informed the garrison of what had passed, made them assume the white cockade, and kept his gates still closed, waiting the orders of Louis XVIII.

Whilst the French generals established on the Scheld and Rhine pursued a line of conduct alike prudent and patriotic, an illustrious warrior distinguished himself in Westphalia, by persevering firmness in his endeavours to preserve intact the trust confided to him. We have not forgotten how Marshal Davout was besieged in Hambourg at the head of the *corps d'armée* that he commanded. Commissioned to subdue the rebellious provinces in the north of Germany, and to defend the line of the Elbe, he had not put into execution against any body the severities prescribed by Napoleon, but had contented himself with converting these penalties into *contributions de guerre*, and had sent to the main army lying before Dresden supplies in provisions and money, which had sufficed for its maintenance, and after the disastrous battle of Leipsic, not finding himself joined, either by the garrison of Dresden or by any other, he had taken up his position in Hambourg, determined to defend himself there against all the armies of Europe, and to save this important position, which would be a valuable object of compensation in the future negotiations of peace, an important bond with Denmark, and the dépôt of an immense war material, collected by France.

Shut up in Hambourg from the month of September, 1813, and, from the month of November cut off from all communication with France, Marshal Davout had remained immovable, determined to hold out as long as he should have soldiers, ammunition, and provisions. Towards the end of November, a communication, scarcely official, being couched partly in ordinary letters, and partly in cipher, commanded him to go to the assistance of Holland if he could, if not, to remain at Hambourg, to protect that place and engage the enemy as much as possible. All the roads leading to Holland and France being intercepted, he adopted the latter alternative.

The marshal had under his command nearly 40,000 men, who had become under his instructions excellent soldiers, but of

this number, seven or eight thousand were incapacitated by sickness. He had laid in large supplies of provisions and ammunition, and had by Napoleon's command, drawn round Hambourg, Harbourg, and the islands of the Elbe, a vast line of defence, consisting of earthworks, palisades, and hastily repaired bastions; thus defended, less than a hundred thousand men, aided by skilful engineers, could not have dislodged him. Never shrinking from danger when it appeared, but never going to seek it, he had deferred until the place should be invested, the destruction of any buildings that might interfere with the defence; he warned the inhabitants of the terrible struggle that was approaching, advised them to lay in provisions, and declared to them that every person unprovided with the means of subsistence, should be remorselessly expelled from Hambourg. The enemy having at length appeared, he got the houses that were condemned to be pulled down valued, and out of eighty thousand inhabitants, expelled twenty thousand, who had not laid in provisions. It is true that the poor people thus expelled need only pass the gates, when they would find themselves in Altona, a neutral city belonging to the Danes, but half hamburgian, where they would be sure of abundant assistance. The Marshal then commenced defensive operations, and in various combats killed between seven and eight thousand of Benningsen's soldiers; a circumstance that put a period to these attacks. He passed the entire winter of 1813-14 in this manner, receiving no direct intelligence from the French Government, but many reports through the enemy, some false, others true and depressing, but Marshal Davout, regardless alike of both, determined to persevere in his resistance until all the armies of Europe should advance to overwhelm him.

Always severe, but upright and honest, he was determined to pay for the provisions he took, for the works he commanded, and the property he was compelled to destroy: the expenses thus incurred he defrayed from the *contributions de guerre*, to which Hambourg had been condemned for the rebellion of 1813. Being at the head of an active force, he might, like so many other commanders of besieged places, have refused to make compensation for the injury he caused in seizing provisions, pulling down houses, or raising levies of men. A few individuals would, under such circumstances, be obliged to support all the evils attendant on war. But it was repugnant to Marshal Davout's principles to lay upon some the burden that ought to be borne by all, and a fine having been levied the preceding year, he thought it more just to employ this money in indemnifying those whose property and services he employed for the public benefit. The Hamburgers had

refused, since the French reverses, to pay the imposed fine, and Marshal Davout now assembled the merchants, and informed them that he wanted funds to pay the services he required from the inhabitants, and if they did not furnish what he required, he would seize the specie in the Bank, upon which the bills for the payment of the *contribution de guerre* had been drawn. This declaration not having produced the desired effect, he kept his word, took the specie out of the Bank, and employed in the public service the thirteen millions of which he thus obtained possession, without converting a single centime to an obscure or equivocal use. He continued to hold his position with indomitable tenacity amidst the bullets of the enemy and the calumnies of the Hamburgers, who were loud in their vociferations against what they called the crimes of the French, forgetting the acts of the English in Portugal, where they burned the harvests, the trees, the houses, and forced the Portuguese under pain of death to burn them themselves.

In this formidable position of affairs, Marshal Davout attacked by the Russian and German armies, held out eight entire months, without receiving either commands from his sovereign or intelligence of his country. About the commencement of April, General Benningsen communicated to him through the instrumentality of the Danes, what had occurred at Paris, and summoned him to open the gates. The Marshal replied by quoting the decree relative to besieged places which forbids belief in reports circulated by the enemy, and added, that his sovereign might have experienced reverses, but that reverses did not absolve a man of honor from his duty. General Benningsen then commanded a fresh attack, which was executed in the name of the Bourbons, and under the white flag. The Marshal fired on the white as on the Russian standard, and repulsed the assailants after having experienced considerable loss. General Benningsen thus defeated, had again recourse to negotiations, still through the instrumentality of the Danes, our ancient allies. The Marshal did not refuse to listen, and offered to send General Delcambre to France, to learn authentic intelligence, promising to look on these accounts as true and act accordingly, if they proceeded from a French source. General Benningsen consented to this arrangement, on condition that one of the principal fortifications of Hambourg should be delivered to him. This the Marshal refused. At length an envoy, a member of his own family, having arrived, bearing official communications from the provisional government, he, on the 28th April, assembled his army, which still amounted to 30,000 men, well armed, well dressed, and loyally disposed, and announced to them the restoration of the Bourbons. He made them assume the white cockade,

and declared amidst universal applause, that he would never yield the fortress until he should receive an order from Louis XVIII. Marshal Davout by this memorable defence preserved for our negotiators, a valuable object of compensation, saved for France 30,000 men, an immense war *matériel* and the honour of the national standard. Calumnies circulated by interested persons through Europe, and especially through France, cannot dim the lustre of such services. Under any circumstances, it is the duty of the historian to record such events with impartial justice.

In Italy, Prince Eugene had valiantly opposed Marshal Bellegarde, and perseveringly refused propositions made by the allies through the King of Bavaria, his father-in-law. Napoleon, as we have seen, after having ordered him to bring back the army to France—an order which, had it been executed in time, might have changed the fate of the war—had unfortunately, after the successes of Montmirail, Champaubert, and Montereau, commanded him to remain in Italy, where the prince successfully maintained his position, until Murat attacked him in the rear. He then despatched the Maucune division to oppose the Neapolitans at the passage of the Po. The brave Maucune had, in fact, routed them whenever they appeared, either alone or supported by the Austrians, and still continued to keep them in check, when positive intelligence of the occurrences at Paris reached Milan. Prince Eugene immediately consented to negotiate with Marshal Bellegarde, and on the 16th of April signed an armistice on the following bases:—The French troops scattered through Italy were to return to France with the honours of war, bringing away their *matériel*. The Italian army under Prince Eugene was to remain on the Po, and continue to guard the fortresses until the allied powers should have decided the fate of Italy.

The armistice being signed, the noble-minded prince, who, owing to the extraordinary events of the times, had become a foreign prince without ceasing to be a French soldier, took a touching leave of the army from which he was about to be separated for ever, and received in return the most expressive testimonies of affection and regret. The French army then advanced towards the Alps under the orders of General Grenier, and were joined on the way by the garrisons that were evacuating the Italian fortresses; they experienced a patriotic sadness in leaving this country, where they had shed so much blood, acquired so much glory, and made so short-lived an impression.

At Genoa some thousand conscripts, under the orders of General Frezia, had disputed the possession of the place with

the English, and the Genoese themselves had foolishly hoped to recover their independence by rising against us. Obligated to yield, they too abandoned Italy, retreating along the foot of the Maritime Alps. In Dauphiné, Marshal Augereau, who had not been able to defend either Franche-Comté, or Lyons, nor his own dignity, had fallen back on the Isere, whilst General Marchand, after having made a much better defence at Geneva and Chambéry, had retired to Grenoble. Intelligence of the capitulation of Paris, which had quickly reached this part of France, had caused a cessation of hostilities in virtue of a local armistice. But it was very different at the foot of the Pyrenees on account of the distance, and the forces engaged, and even after the roar of cannon had ceased elsewhere, a sanguinary battle marked in this region the last days of the war.

Marshal Suchet, as we have seen, had deprived himself of the best part of his army for the benefit of Augereau, who had not profitted of the advantage. With an army reduced to a few thousand men, he took up a position before Figuières, endeavouring to recover his Catalonian garrisons in exchange for Ferdinand VII., whom he offered to give up. Not having been able to induce the Spaniards to listen to his propositions, he had in the end set Ferdinand at liberty, by the express order of Napoleon, and had been obliged to trust for the faithful execution of the treaty of Valençay to the rather unreliable word of the new King of Spain, and the generosity of the Spaniards, whose feelings towards us were those of intense hatred. The Marshal afterwards returned to France, determined to join Marshal Soult, if circumstances afforded him time and means.

Marshal Soult, after the battle of Orthez—which, had he displayed a little more tenacity, might have been a victory—had retired to Toulouse, flattering himself that he could draw Lord Wellington thither, and so cover Bordeaux by a simple manœuvre. But Lord Wellington had no intention of pursuing an adversary, whom he was certain to overtake when he pleased; he therefore seized Bordeaux, opened that city to the Bourbons, and then set out in pursuit of Marshal Soult, returning for that purpose along the left bank of the Garonne.

The English general had 60,000 men, amongst whom were many Spaniards and Portuguese, animated by victory, and who, under the influence of example and success, were nearly as good as the English troops, though not resembling them in any particular. Marshal Soult's soldiers did not amount to more than 36,000, but all were tried men, and at this moment filled with truly patriotic ardour. Unfortunately, the

Marshal, depressed by recent events, had no longer confidence either in himself or his fortunes; he had fallen back on Toulouse, where he had scientifically fortified the position.

It was important in every sense, both military and political, to keep this city, which, like Bordeaux and Marseilles, exercised great moral influence in the south. It is situate, with the exception of the Saint Cyprien suburb, on the right bank of the Garonne, and in order to attack the city, the English General would have been obliged to cross before our eyes a deep and rapid river. Cautious in all his movements, with soldiers incompetent to make long marches, and burdened with an immense convoy of provisions, Lord Wellington would not have been able by the quickest manœuvres, to elude the vigilance of an adversary determined to prevent his crossing the Garonne. But Marshal Soult, placing his entire confidence in the position he had chosen round Toulouse, did not think of disputing the passage of the river that separated him from the English General, and left him free to traverse the banks above and below Toulouse to seek a position for throwing a bridge across. Lord Wellington carried his researches beyond the confluence of the Ariege and the Garonne, he even entered Cinte-Gabelle, whether that he hoped to find at this height an easier passage, or that he hoped by threatening the communications of Marshal Soult with Marshal Suchet, to induce the French to abandon their position. However this may be, Lord Wellington, thinking the risk too great at this distance, redescended the course of the Garonne, and resolved to cross below Toulouse, that is to say, at Granada.

On the 4th April, the day of Napoleon's first abdication, the English General succeeded, notwithstanding the rapidity of the current, in throwing a bridge of boats across near Granada, and transported to the right bank Marshal Beresford's corps. Scarcely had this corps crossed the Garonne, when a sudden and violent swelling of the river, common to the season of the year, endangered and nearly carried away the bridge. Fifteen thousand English, constituting the best part of the enemy's army, were thus thrown into our power, and these once destroyed, the entire English army would have been exposed to ruin. The cavalry of General Soult—brother to the Marshal—witnessed this happy accident; General Count d' Erlon was also aware of it, and both communicated to the General-in-Chief this unexpected favour from fortune that had been so adverse during the past two years. The Marshal, depressed by his reverses, and seeing safety only in the strongly defended position of Toulouse, dared not go in quest of the English, whom he could have overtaken in twenty-four hours, and precipitated into the Garonne. The English remained

four days in this perilous position, but the waters having abated, Lord Wellington repaired the bridge, and transported all his forces to the right bank. On the 9th he appeared before Toulouse and resolved to attack the French on the following day, taking care that his bridge of boats kept pace with his progress along the Garonne, so that he might be assured of a means of retreat in case of need.

The position taken up by Marshal Soult possessed great advantages. The Garonne, which in the beginning of its course, descends perpendicularly from the Pyrenees, turns suddenly to the right on reaching Toulouse, and there making a bend flows afterwards nearly parallel with the mountains, to the sea. Though the enemy having passed the Garonne, threatened the right much more than the left bank, Marshal Soult had naturally thought of defending Toulouse on both banks. On the left bank, that is to say in the inner angle formed by the Garonne, and occupied by the suburb of Saint-Cyprien, he had thrown up earth-works and planted a strong range of palisades, both extremities of which reached the banks of the river. Behind this line of works, the embattled wall of the suburb flanked with towers and bristling with artillery, formed a second and almost impregnable obstacle. And supposing that the St. Cyprien suburb were forced, the French need only cross the stone bridge which connected the suburb with the city, and then blowing up the bridge, the enemy would find themselves confined to the left bank, after having lost numbers of men in a fruitless attack. One efficient division would have been sufficient to defend us on this side and frustrate all the efforts of the British army.

It was not therefore probable that the principal attack would be made on the left bank, where there was only a suburb to conquer; it was much more likely that the attack would be made on the right bank, where the prey offered was the city itself. But the approach on this side was not easier than on the other. The great southern canal which surrounded Toulouse, joining the Garonne below the city, offered the first line of defence, which might be warmly disputed, an additional means of prolonging the resistance being afforded by the wall of circumvallation. The banks of the canal had been carefully fortified; the bridges had been protected by works, and mined. In this manner, the entire north of Toulouse was defended by the canal. On the east and south the position was still stronger, because beyond the canal there was a line of heights, reaching from Pujade to Calvinet, and everywhere bristling with redoubts and artillery. It was here that Marshal Soult placed the main body of his forces, and it was impossible that the

enemy could think of attacking any part of the city until they should have driven the French army from the heights. The enemy would have been obliged to make a descent towards the south, leaving themselves exposed during this movement to an attack from the French, and crossing the canal that lay on the right and rear, attack the city by the Saint-Michel suburb. But the marshal had taken precautions in this direction, and protected this suburb with works and artillery.

Marshal Soult had established the Maransin division—a detachment of General Reille's corps—on the left bank, in the St. Cyprien suburb. It was sufficient, as we have seen, for the defence of this quarter. The main body of his army was drawn up on the right bank. The Darricau division—belonging to Drouet d'Erlon's corps, stationed behind the canal, at the Matabiau bridge, defended the north of the city. The Darmagnac division of the same corps occupied the interval between the canal and the heights. The Harispe and Villatte divisions of the Clausel corps occupied the heights also. Lastly, behind the heights and as a reserve, the Taupin division, forming the remainder of General Reille's corps, was placed.

Lord Wellington resolved to commence operations on the morning of the 10th of April. He ordered General Hill, with the Murray, Stewart, and Morillo divisions, to attack the French on the left bank of the Garonne, in front of the St. Cyprien suburb; this was more than a sufficient force for an operation which could only be secondary to the main action. The remainder of the English army was transported to the right bank. General Picton, at the head of the Scotch division, was ordered to force the canal on the north of the city, whilst Alton's light division was to second this attack by one the Spaniards were to attempt against the heights of Pujade. Lastly, Marshal Beresford, with the Clinton and Cole divisions, was to skirt the foot of the heights, advancing from the north towards the south, and endeavour to carry the Calvinet position, and then advance in a southerly direction in front of the St. Michel suburb. He had under his command a considerable portion of the British cavalry.

On the morning of the 10th, General Hill on the left bank attacked the Maransin division, in front of the St. Cyprien suburb, but cautiously, as the decisive effort was not to be made on that side. He met a determined resistance, and perceived that it would be a serious matter to persevere in his attempt. On the right bank, the real theatre of the warfare, General Picton attacked the canal courageously.

The brave Darricau, the veteran colonel of the 32nd, who had distinguished himself at Diernstein, at Hall, and lately in Spain, defended the banks of the canal with his division. Skilfully disposing his soldiers behind this line of defence, and animating them by his example, he repulsed all the efforts of the English during several hours, and covered the line of the canal with dead or wounded Scots. During this time, General Freyre tried to carry, by the aid of his Spaniards, the heights of Pujade, which are connected with that portion of the canal defended by General Darricau. The Spaniards, received with a brisk fire of artillery and musketry, advanced boldly to the foot of the entrenchments. But, arrived at this point, they were attacked on their left flank by General Harispe, and on their right flank by General Darmagnac; they were unable to hold their ground against this combined assault, and numbers were killed. They would have been completely destroyed but for Alton's light division that hastened to their relief.

On the south, the English had lost nearly 3,000 men, and the fruit of their efforts was everywhere the same. They were repulsed both on the left and the right bank, along the canal, as well as before the heights of Pujade.

At this moment, Marshal Beresford afforded the French general a happy opportunity of terminating the conflict by a decisive success. The Marshal, advancing from the north to the south along the heights that covered the east of our position, operated in front of us, a dangerous but necessary flank movement, for it was indispensably necessary that he should come down to the south side in order to approach Toulouse. The danger of this movement was so much the greater, for if at this moment the enemy had advanced upon him *en masse*, he would have been precipitated into the muddy bed of a little river called the Ers, which flows parallel to the heights. Fortune smiled upon us a second time within eight days, but this was her last favour. Generals Clausel, Harispe, and Taupin, assembling round the Commander-in-Chief, urged him to profit of the opportunity, and to pour the mass of his forces on the flank of the rash Beresford, who, feeling the danger of his position, was hurrying the accomplishment of his movement. Marshal Soult, remembering the faults already committed with regard to the English, when the French quitted strong positions for the purpose of attacking them, and fearing to commit a like error on this occasion, hesitated more than two hours, and only made up his mind to arrest Beresford's march when the troops of the latter no longer exposed their flank to his fire, but were marching abreast towards the Calvinet point, the extreme right of our

position. The Taupin division, despatched too late, abandoned uselessly a village where they might have long defended themselves, and attacking the enemy with impetuosity, were received by the English with their accustomed vigour: they unfortunately lost their General at the most critical moment. The division was left some moments without a leader, and without orders, and the English profited of their embarrassment to seize the redoubts of Calvinet. The French endeavoured in vain to recover them. General Harispewaswounded severely, and Marshal Beresford then crossing the line of the heights, on our extreme right, appeared before the south side of the city. The retreat was effected with some little disorder, which put Toulouse for a moment in danger. Fortunately a grenadier captain of the 118th, named Larouzière, assembling his company behind the *remblai* of the canal surprised the English by a close fire, arrested their progress, and gave the Darmagnac division time to rally. The enemy could carry their attempt no further. Although along the rest of the line, we had repulsed the enemy as valiantly as in the morning, the position being turned on the south was no longer tenable.

The entire French army ought now to have fallen back on the walls of Toulouse, determined to fight there to the last. It would have been difficult in this position to force the 32,000 men that Marshal Soult still commanded. But the situation was completely isolated, and such a movement would besides leave the city of Toulouse exposed to the most imminent danger. On the other hand, by falling back on Carcassonne, Marshal Soult was certain of being joined by Marshal Suchet, and both united would present to the prudent Wellington, a mass of forces against which he would scarcely attempt anything. Marshal Soult therefore took the wise resolution of traversing Toulouse, and falling back on Villefranche. He had killed or wounded about 5,000 English, and had himself lost 3,500 men. As usual, the Spanish army had been unfortunate but heroic.

At length, intelligence of the late events at Paris was received. The provisional government by a little more activity might have spared the lives of 8,000 brave men, uselessly sacrificed for the solution of a question that had been solved elsewhere. It was only on the 8th April that the provisional government thought of sending an emissary to the two armies that were battling at the foot of the Pyrenees, and yet they ought to have been the first objects of attention, as they were most likely to renew the sanguinary conflict. M. de Talleyrand had chosen for this mission M. de St. Simon, who had set out accompanied by an English officer in order to secure a passage through the enemy's army. The escort of this officer,

though it facilitated M. de St. Simon's passage through the English army, rendered him suspected in the eyes of the French, who fancied they saw traitors on every side. Delayed first at Orleans, next at Montauban by the French, and lastly at Toulouse by the English, M. de St. Simon did not reach the camp of Marshal Soult until the 14th. The Marshal had chosen an impregnable position at Villefranche; he there waited the arrival of troops from the Catalonian army, and flattered himself that he should be soon revenged of the English. The arrival of M. de St. Simon was therefore a cause of extreme vexation, for besides the disastrous intelligence of which he was bearer, he checked the Marshal at the very moment when victory was not impossible. The presence of M. de St. Simon produced moreover an intense emotion among the troops, who were still more exasperated than the veterans of the other armies. Influenced by all these motives, Marshal Soult endeavoured to persuade himself that the accounts from Paris were not true. He even fancied that these communications might be a snare of the enemy and was about to put M. de St. Simon under arrest. But the latter effected his escape and repaired to Marshal Suchet's camp. This Marshal immediately gave credence to M. de St. Simon, and showed himself disposed to obey the orders of the provisional government, but on condition of awaiting a definite confirmation of the received accounts. The confirmation soon arrived, and an armistice exclusively local, such as had been concluded in other places, suspended hostilities between the French marshals and the adverse forces that had invaded the Pyrenean frontier.

Whilst that in the most remote regions our armies still defended the Empire, of whose fall they were ignorant, on our frontiers, and even at the gates of Paris, brave men fought for their country to the last gasp. Count Marmier, though he had never been a soldier, had enrolled and equipped, at his own expense, a legion of *mobile* national guards, and took up a position in Huningue, where he had heroically defended the place during five months. On his side, the brave Daumesnil, so celebrated as "the wooden leg," had shut himself up in Vincennes, determined that the enemy should not get possession of the immense *matériel* lodged there. Threatened with the rigours of war, he replied by declaring he would blow the place up, if his adversaries persisted in their threat; they consequently desisted. Like all the other commanders he had only yielded on receiving evidence of the revolution that had taken place at Paris and the regular government established there. So terminated the opposition that our soldiers, dispersed in so many different places, had not ceased to offer to combined Europe from Antwerp to Hamburgh, from Ham-

burgh to Milan, from Milan to Toulouse, and from Toulouse to Vincennes. Henceforth, the new government delivered from the presence of Napoleon, was also freed from the resistance of his lieutenants, all of whom were now ready to acknowledge the Bourbons.

But if the resistance of the armies had ceased, that of the passions was about to commence, and to this, prudence was the only efficacious force that could be opposed. Could this prudence be expected from the princes of the house of Bourbon and their friends, all returning to their country after twenty-five years of proscription and misfortune? Such was the important question that arose on the fall of the Empire.

The Count d'Artois, established during two or three days in Paris—he had entered on the 12th April—was, so to speak, carried away by a whirl that would have disturbed a stronger head than his. Having taken up his abode in the Tuileries, he could scarcely contain his joy at finding himself in such a residence; he wished that the world at large should share in the satisfaction he felt, and endeavoured to persuade the partisans of the Empire that nothing should be changed, whilst, on the contrary, he told the emigrants who returned with him after twenty-five years of suffering, that they should have full satisfaction, provided they waited with patience. But he soon perceived that soft words were not sufficient to remove the difficulties of his position. He wanted aides-de-camp, and the choice required deliberation. The friends who had accompanied the prince from foreign lands, or those who having remained in France, had been the first to greet him, expected that if high political posts had been given to those who served under the Empire, they at least ought to fill the places immediately near the persons of the restored princes. But where could aides-de-camp be chosen but from amongst the military, and where were military men to be found but in the imperial armies? The question was a difficult one; and M. de Vitrolles, who understood the true state of things, advised the Count d'Artois to choose some of his aides-de-camp from among the distinguished officers of the Empire. The prince followed this advice, and appointed MM. de Nansouty and de Lauriston, than whom none better could be selected, for they were respected in the army and were connected with the ancient nobility. These appointments excited loud murmurs amongst the personal friends of the prince, brought many reproaches on M. de Vitrolles, and were a complete revelation of the sentiments that animated the partisans of the ancient and modern régime towards each other in flocking round the Bourbons. The Count d'Artois, entirely engrossed by congratulations, visits, and interviews with the sovereigns, paid but little attention to this

incident, and continued to testify his delight by lavishing pressures of the hand and promises. However, it was necessary to take into consideration an important affair, which mere pliancy of temper could not decide, and that was the title with which the prince should be invested, in order to direct the government. The title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, exercising the royal authority in absence of the king, seemed the most natural to adopt. But how could he dare to assume this title in presence of the senate? at this moment the sole recognised authority, but who held themselves apart, since they had deposed Napoleon, not wishing to take part in any of the late proceedings, showing by their attitude as well as by the language of several individual members, that they would neither invest the Count d'Artois nor the king himself with regal power without a solemn pledge to maintain the constitution. Scarcely could M. d'Artois or his friends be made to understand this difficulty, so natural did it appear to them that, at the bare presence of the legitimate sovereign, or his representative, every other authority ought to disappear, and so ignorant were they that, beside the royal power, any authority could exist emanating from the people or responsible to them. M. de Vitrolles, who acted as the royalist intermediary with the provisional government, being informed of the difficulty, knowing that it ought not to be treated lightly, laid the case before the prince, who confided to him the care of solving the question as best he could, by coming to terms with those to whom the more serious state affairs were entrusted.

Although the people at large still continued to ridicule the senate, they nevertheless looked upon that body as the only existing authority, and had they supposed that the Bourbons, in order to return to France as absolute princes, refused to receive the investiture of their authority from the senators, the nation would have risen in favor of the latter: the army would have followed the example, and the allied sovereigns, would have joined the public and the army, bound as they were by their plighted word, by the dictates of good sense, and by conscientious conviction; the Emperor Alexander, in particular, warmly approved the determination of recalling the ancient dynasty only on condition of supporting a liberal constitution. It would therefore have been folly to dispute the authority of the senate; but the senators, on the other hand, were considerably embarrassed; public opinion once convinced of the propriety and necessity of recalling the Bourbons, had turned in their favor with a kind of enthusiasm. This excitement, the offspring of reason and natural sensibility amongst the masses, and the result of ambition and sometimes of meanness of character in individuals, continued to

increase. The personal qualities of the Count d'Artois contributed very much to this feeling, and the senate ran the risk of being deserted in a few days. It was, therefore, prudent in both parties to effect a compromise. But, as usual, before attempting to negotiate, each asserted extreme opinions; and it was not M. de Talleyrand who was likely to effect a reconciliation so necessary to both parties, for he habitually, partly through indolence, and partly because he was tired of discussion, shunned disputation. He allowed them to go on disputing, quietly waiting the moment when both parties being worn out, the difficulty should be solved in some way.

There was a personage whose arrival at Paris we have already mentioned—the Duke d'Otranto—who sought rather than shunned trouble; who was fond of commotion and intrigue; who wished to put himself forward, and bitterly regretted having by his absence lost the opportunity of being the principal actor in the late changes. Since his return he had given evidence of his presence by exclaiming against the treaty of the 11th April; and he beheld with intense joy, in the question now agitated, a stage ready prepared, where his turbulent and daring activity might be exhibited. It was his opinion that the senate ought to endeavour to bind the Bourbons, and being a regicide, this was a precaution more needful to him than to others, but he perceived the embarrassment of the senate and wished to extricate them, and at the same time do the Bourbons a service which would give him a claim to their favor in future. He was, besides, better suited than M. de Talleyrand, to surmount the present difficulty, because he was more fertile in expedients, because he feared less to take a prominent part, and besides he was better suited to carry on intrigues with the senators. Intruding himself everywhere, he had become as conversant in the affairs of the provisional government as one of the members, and M. de Talleyrand wishing to humour that he might afterwards make use of him, had offered no opposition.

The provisional government had transferred its sittings from the rue Saint-Florentin to the Tuileries, after the Count d'Artois had taken up his abode there, but their doors were not more firmly closed than before; they were still open to busybodies, who came to intermeddle or to obtrude their advice, nor were they closed against mere loungers. The provisional government was at this moment busy discussing, with a select number of senators, the important question of the day—the title to be conferred on the Count d'Artois, and M. de Vitrolles, on the prince's part, asserted the rights of legitimate royalty, when M. de Fouché, with a mixture of vulgarity, effrontery and good sense, rising suddenly, gave M. de Vitrolles clearly to un-

derstand, that he did not comprehend the question under discussion; that it was necessary that the Count d'Artois should receive the title of Lieutenant-General, but that he should receive it from the senate, who would confer the title on the prince when he would be willing to pledge himself to support the senatorial constitution. M. de Vitrolles objected the want of powers on the part of the prince, who had not time to receive authority sanctioning his acceptance of the Constitution. M. Fouché treated this objection lightly. He said that the difficulty that embarrassed M. de Vitrolles was not of a serious character, that of course the Count d'Artois knew the feelings and opinions of his brother Louis XVIII, that he might therefore become surety for him, and declare that aware of his intentions, he was certain that the king would accept the Constitution, if not in all its details, at least in its principal bases. M. de Fouché did not stop there, he instantly sketched a document, leaving it optional to modify the terms more or less, but which embodied a positive moral pledge with regard to the Constitution, without removing the difficulty of the want of the royal sanction. According to this plan, the senate should repair to the Tuileries, where the Count d'Artois would read the prepared declaration, and this being done, the senate should invest the prince with the lieutenant-generalship. "But," said M. de Vitrolles, "who can assure us that the senate will accept this arrangement?" "I can," replied M. Fouché, with his usual effrontery. M. de Vitrolles, who had never seen M. Fouché before, seemed to ask all present by his looks, who the person was with whom he was discussing, and who answered so confidently for himself and others. Having learned the name he ceased to be surprised at the presumption of his interlocutor, and felt no doubt of the promised result, without appearing alarmed at the idea of his prince being laid under obligations by a regicide. The proposed expedient was agreed on, and each departed to prepare the minds of the parties interested. M. de Talleyrand allowed M. Fouché to do as he pleased, like all indolent persons who allow themselves to be deprived of their privileges by the active-minded.

M. de Vitrolles having returned to the Count d'Artois, communicated to him and his friends the arrangement devised by M. Fouché. The prince was not then the person most annoyed. Intoxicated by success and the applause with which he was everywhere greeted, he was inclined to look upon the proposed difficulties, as unimportant subtilities that time would dissipate, and he was ready to consent to everything, provided that the title of Lieutenant-General was immediately conferred on him. But his friends, whose prejudices were less dissipated

by personal flattery, were disgusted at not seeing the legitimate authority acknowledged, and, as it were, adored, the moment it became visible, but on the contrary they saw it cheapened, by a power that arrogated a superior authority, under pretext of representing the nation. These pretensions of the senate irritated the royalists, and they were determined to put them down at any price. As they had triumphed in the case of the tricolour cockades, they flattered themselves that they should triumph as easily over what they called *revolutionary principles*. M. de Vitrolles after having poured his grievances into the sympathising hearts of his friends, did not however wish to urge them to acts of imprudence of whose folly he was conscious, and he saw clearly that it would be necessary to come to some conclusion. But what was to be done under the circumstances? It was impossible to remain at Paris without legal authority; to assume it in presence of the senate and in spite of that body, was equally impossible, unless that the senate could be annihilated, by its dissolution being pronounced, and the chamber where the senators held their sittings closed. But how could such a resolve be put into execution? There were not more than eight or ten of these ultra royalists in Paris, they did not know any person, not an official of the administration to whom they could give an order. They had no organized force at their command, for Marmont's soldiers, who alone had abandoned Napoleon, belonged to the provisional government, the national guard had assumed the white cockade with visible repugnance, and the soldiers of the allies were at the disposal of the too liberal-minded Alexander. To attempt, in this destitute state, to upset the senate and the provisional government would have been an act of madness, the projectors would expose themselves to a prodigious amount of ridicule, and probably to a disavowal of their acts by Louis XVIII.; perhaps even that public opinion might suddenly change in favour of the regency of Maria Louisa, if this counter revolutionary attempt assumed a serious aspect.

The Count d'Artois, disposed to take everything in good part, said that he could not without orders from his brother, indeed without his formal approval, expose to perilous chances the cause of royalty, that had just so miraculously triumphed. He thought it better to accept the investiture from the hands of the senate on the best terms that could be obtained, take possession of the royal authority as soon as possible, and exercise it to the best of his judgment until the arrival of Louis XVIII., who, once seated on his throne, could do as he thought fit. The Count d'Artois' self-created advisers, seeing him inclined to submit, dared not offer further resistance, they therefore adopted the part of submission, modifying at the same time

the declaration suggested by M. Fouché, making the pledges taken by the prince as light as possible, and mentioning only the principal bases of the future constitution. This task being finished, M. de Vitrolles returned to M. Fouché, who showed little concern about the changes of form provided the principles remained. He went immediately to prepare the senate for the proposed arrangement.

Whilst the ultra royalists were thus employed, the Emperor Alexander having learned the difficulties, opposed by the Count d'Artois' advisers to the conditions of the senate, commissioned M. de Nesselrode to visit M. de Vitrolles, and communicate to him the intentions of the allied sovereigns. On the morning of the 14th, while the senate was preparing to assemble, M. de Nesselrode had a clear and conclusive conversation with M. de Vitrolles. The Russian minister, whose language in general was simple and moderate, but decisive, declared to M. de Vitrolles, in the name of his master and the allied sovereigns, that it was the senate who had done everything; that it was the senate who had deposed Napoleon, and recalled the Bourbons; that but for the existence of this body, the allies would not have found a legitimate authority with whom to treat, and that reviled though the senate may be, it contained the most enlightened and experienced men the country possessed; that it was not by the aid of emigrants, who did not understand either the state of France or Europe, nor the spirit of the times, that so formidable a nation as France could be ruled; that it was therefore necessary to submit to the conditions offered by the senate, which, after all, were not unreasonable. M. de Nesselrode added that there existed at this moment only two military forces—the army of Napoleon, and the two hundred thousand bayonets of the allied sovereigns; that Napoleon's army was in the interest of the King of Rome, and that the two hundred thousand bayonets of the allies should never serve to enact an 18th Brumaire against the senate, but would rather be employed to prevent it: that this was a fixed resolution which he was not commissioned to discuss, but to announce.

M. de Vitrolles again retired indignant against the foreign influence which, however, he had himself gone to seek at Troyes, and laid before the prince the communications with which he was charged. There was a unanimous outcry against *that fool Alexander*, as the ultra royalists called the Emperor of Russia, and they waited with a forced resignation the determination of the senate.

This body assembled on the same day, and heard the propositions of M. Fouché, supported by all M. de Talleyrand's influence. It was not by sound reasons,

adduced in public sittings, that the senate was influenced, but by words whispered in the ear of individual members by active and crafty agents. And amongst these none was more conspicuous than M. Fouché. He told the senators that it was absolutely necessary to get out of this difficulty, and invest the Count d'Artois with the lieutenant-generalship, still maintaining the conditions already stipulated, that is to say, the senatorial constitution and the oath of the king to maintain this constitution.

Influenced by the opinions of MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand, the senate passed in full sitting the following resolution, which did honor to the firmness of the senate, and gave no opportunity for ridicule:—

“In conformity with the proposition of the provisional government, and the report of a special commission of seven members,—

“The senate resigns the provisional government of France to S. A. R. Mgr, the Count d'Artois, with the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, until Louis Stanislaus Xavier, called to the throne of the French, shall have accepted the constitutional charter.

“The senate further declares that the resolution passed this day shall be presented in the evening to S. A. R. Mgr, the Count d'Artois, by the entire body of the senate.

“Resolved at Paris 14th April.”

On his return to the Tuileries, M. de Talleyrand met M. de Vitrolles, and said, throwing carelessly on a table a copy of the resolutions adopted by the senate, that the royalists must be satisfied with that, for the senate would come in the evening to receive the declaration of the prince, and to read him their decree. M. de Vitrolles returning to the prince, found him now less accommodating than on the previous evening. The haughty precision of the terms in which the provisional and conditional power was conferred on him, filled him with anger. He flung away the document offered to him, exclaiming that the gentlemen senators might do as they pleased; that he did not know them; that he would not receive them; and that he would be lieutenant-general of the kingdom in virtue of his own right, and not in virtue of their decree.

Thus the prince, who on the previous day had been more rational than his friends, was much less so now; each in turn had become intractable. But necessity, before which the friends of the Count d'Artois had bent, was equally powerful with him. The prince and his friends were not stronger on the 14th than they had been on the 13th April; they had no power over the army, for that obeyed Napoleon, nor over the national guard, which obeyed the senate, nor over the foreign

soldiers who were under the command of the Emperor Alexander. They had thought of making use of the legislative corps, a body more popular than the senate, but possessed of less authority, and for this purpose had endeavoured to learn the sentiments of the most influential members of the legislative corps, but the replies were timid and disheartening. Besides, there were so few of the members then in Paris, that it would be impossible to assemble that body. In short, the day was advancing, the senate would soon arrive, so that there was not time to get up an outcry. The declaration required of the prince was read over, the pledges demanded of him were made as light as possible, but allowing the fundamental principles to remain, and these principles were, the recall of the king on condition of giving guarantees, which have since received the title of the *Constitutional Charter*, that is to say, on condition of recognizing the French Revolution in all its most legitimate and respectable phases.

The senate arrived at eight in the evening at the Tuileries, and at their head the president, M. de Talleyrand.

This personage, so well calculated to figure in scenes where it was needed to temper firmness with the most refined politeness, approached the prince, and leaning as usual on a cane, with his head inclined to one side, read a discourse, at once haughty and adroit, in which he explained without excusing the conduct of the senate, for it did not need excuse.

"The senate," he said, "has promoted the return of your august house to the throne of France. Taught by the present and the past, the senate desires, with the nation, to fix the royal authority for ever, on the enduring basis of a just division of power and the security of public liberty; the only guarantees for the happiness and interest of all.

"The senate persuaded that the principles of the new constitution have penetrated your heart, confer on you by the decree that I have the honour of presenting, the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, until the arrival of the King, your august brother. Our respectful confidence cannot offer a higher testimony of regard to the spirit of chivalrous honour transmitted to you by your ancestors.

"My lord, the senate, in these moments of public joy, being obliged, in the discharge of its duties, to preserve a greater calmness of manner, is not the less penetrated with the popular sentiments. Your Royal Highness can read the sentiments of our hearts, even through the reserve of our language."

M. de Talleyrand added to these firm and respectful words protestations of devotedness, then common in every mouth, but which in his case were the least commonplace and mean that could be selected.

The prince replied in the words already agreed on. "Gentlemen," he said, "I have read the constitutional act that recalls to the throne of France the king, my august brother. I have not received from him authority to accept the constitution, but I know his sentiments and his principles, and I do not apprehend a disavowal when I declare, in his name, that he will admit the bases of this act."

After this explicit engagement, the declaration enumerated the bases, that is to say, the division of power, the participation of the executive between the king and the chambers, the responsibility of ministers, the right of the nation to levy taxes, the liberty of the press, individual liberty, freedom of religious worship, permanency of judges, inviolability of the public debt, and of the sales, called "national;" maintenance of the legion of honour, of ranks and pensions in the army, and an oblivion for the votes and acts anterior to, &c., &c.

"I hope," added the prince, "that the enumeration of these conditions will satisfy you, and that it comprises all the guarantees that can secure the liberty and tranquillity of France."

These remarks having produced an effect, the prince, emboldened by success, spoke in the most happily-chosen phrases, first to the senate collectively, then to different senators with whom he conversed familiarly. One of them could not help exclaiming; "Yes, it is indeed the blood of Henry IV. that flows in your veins." "His blood flows indeed in my veins," rejoined the prince; "I would wish to possess his talents, but in default of his talents, I possess his heart and his love for France."

These expressions excited warm approbation, and the senate and the prince appeared to be two powers, thoroughly reconciled. After the senate came the members of the legislative corps, anxious to give in their adhesion to the act that was consummated before their eyes. The prince addressed them in words that indicated a certain preference, for he complimented them on having resisted tyranny, a compliment which he could not address to the senate. This little piece of flattery, highly gratifying to the legislative corps, but scarcely perceived by the senate, disappeared amid the general content.

The prince had achieved a complete success, and he was perfectly happy. The idea of appearing before a great body composed of the most important personages in France, had inspired him with a certain amount of timidity. He was enchanted at having got so well out of the business, and with his usual volatility, appeared to have forgotten his recent anger. "Upon my word," he said, to his intimate friends, "the pledge is taken: we must abide by it honestly, and, if

after some years, things do not go on well, we shall see what can be done towards a new arrangement.*

From this moment, the prince might consider himself as legally invested with the royal authority, and he had passed triumphantly through one of the most trying phases of his position. But he now suddenly remembered that during the last fortnight, carried away by the whirl of events, he had always acted according to his own opinions, or the advice of his friends, without thinking of Louis XVIII. He certainly was not guilty of negligence or usurpation, for he had not had one hour free to devote to obedience to the king, and in every circumstance he had only yielded to necessity. But he feared his brother, who was witty, jealous, and sarcastic. Perceiving, that in all which he had done since the affair of Nancy, he had not once thought of consulting his brother, who, in his eyes was a king by divine right, he was terrified. "But my brother," he said, "we have not thought of him, we have not communicated to him anything we have done. What will he say?" M. de Vitrolles, rather surprised at this innocent and unfounded remorse, replied, that in the first place he had seized the crown, which was a signal service, for which Louis XVIII. must hold himself indebted; that besides, there had not been time to send intelligence to London, that the sincerity of his conduct was evident in all his acts, that at the utmost the time had only now arrived to send an envoy to London, and that Louis XVIII. would see clearly that this was the first moment the prince had had at his disposal. Somewhat recovered from his alarm, the Count d'Artois selected the Count de Bruges as his envoy to England, to explain to Louis XVIII. what had been done, to show him the reasons for this mode of acting, and to receive his royal orders concerning what was yet to be done, and commands for the preparations of his journey into France.

The Count d'Artois, being invested with royal authority, it was necessary to put a term to the existence of the provisional government, without however estranging the men who composed it, or losing the benefit of their influence. Setting aside all claims of gratitude, it would have been a great imprudence to break with them so soon and so abruptly. The means of satisfying every requirement was clearly pointed out: which was to resolve the provisional government into a council for the Count d'Artois, because this prince, even had he been better acquainted with men and things than he was, could not dispense with a council. The provisional government was therefore changed into a privy council, deliberating with

* This is the account given by M. de Vitrolles, the devoted friend of the prince.

the prince on all state affairs. The ministers, unexceptional in every respect, and some worthy of governing France, during the brightest epochs of her history, became privy councillors, *en attendant* the return of Louis XVIII., who would confirm them in office.

Meanwhile, the council of the prince, composed exclusively of the provisional government, was defective in more than one respect. There was no representative of the army, for the hoary Beurnonville could not be looked upon as such; formerly indeed a good officer, he had since fallen into such complete oblivion, that the glorious phalanxes that had traversed Europe during twenty years could not think themselves represented by him. Two persons were at first thought of, Marshal Suchet, because of his talents as a warrior and statesman, and Marshal Marmont, because of the signal service he had rendered to the royal cause. But M. de Talleyrand did not wish to be associated with a person so influential as Marshal Suchet, and nobody had either the courage or inclination to enter into close relationship with Marshal Marmont. This unfortunate man, who had hoped to secure to himself the first rank, by transferring his services to the provisional government, had become odious to his ancient comrades and insupportable to his new friends. Military men ascribing more influence to the defection of the 6th corps than it really had had on the result of the war, took pleasure in thinking, and still more in saying, that treason alone had conquered them, and at the moment when they abandoned Napoleon for the Bourbons, they took especial care to establish a decided distinction between *betraying* and *giving in adhesion*. Thus the more they yielded, the more severe were they on Marmont, who was become the traitor *par excellence*.

This unhappy man perceiving the abyss into which he had fallen without anticipating it, exclaimed against the injustice of fate. The more he suffered internally, the more he exerted himself externally, going hither and thither sometimes for the purpose of acquiring additional importance, sometimes to render to the army services for which he was thanked by the military; and it was this that had inspired him with so much ardour in defending the tricolour cockade and instituting measures against desertion. But without succeeding in clearing himself in the eyes of his ancient comrades, he had rendered himself singularly disagreeable to those he had served, by the commotion he excited, by the excessive pretensions he put forth, and by the reproach of ingratitude, always ready on his lips, when what he wished was not done. His vanity, his fickleness, his very courage added to the disagreeables of his presence, and he was become a heavy burden to those whose

triumph he had secured ; a terrible example to those who during political revolutions are tempted to deviate from the line of plain and obvious duty, arising naturally from their position. To elect him member of the supreme council was really impossible, and it was only suggested in order that it might be said that it was impracticable. Marshals Moncey and Oudinot were selected ; honest men, who had been amongst the first to give in their adhesion, but who were incompetent to exercise a political influence. These new colleagues suited M. de Talleyrand, for they could not excite his suspicions. Another of different stamp was elected—General Dessoles,—who did not put forth any great pretensions. It was long known that the head of Moreau's staff was a distinguished man. This opinion was changed into conviction on the part of those who passed a few days in his society. He gave evidence of a refined, cultivated, and enlarged mind, an upright character, and an adherence to the honest convictions of the times, that is to say, a sincere belief that henceforth, peace and legitimate liberty could be found only under the Bourbons. Moreover, General Dessoles had been able in a few days to win the good opinion of the national guards, who, drawn from the middle classes of Paris, holding rational and temperate opinions, would become for the new government a powerful support between the imperial army, already a prey to regret, and the allied army that was under foreign control. General Dessoles was, therefore, as representative of the national guard, and on his own account, appointed a member of the royal council.

There was a personage who, after having served as intermediary between the ruling powers of the day, and even incurred actual dangers for the royal cause, had no idea of being set aside as a henceforth useless instrument—this personage was M. de Vitrolles. Having become the special agent, and almost the personal friend of the Count d'Artois, he hoped to play under the Bourbons the same part that M. de Bassano had played under the Empire. This was a strange mistake, for the part of M. de Bassano, which was only to receive the wishes of an absolute master, and transmit them to clerk ministers, ceased with Napoleon's reign. Nevertheless, M. de Vitrolles assumed spontaneously the functions of Secretary to the royal council, took notes of the proceedings, which displeased M. de Talleyrand very much, for he wisely believed that it is the definite resolutions of a privy council that ought to be recorded, and not the thousand fugitive and often contradictory opinions, which even men of the strongest intellect put forth before arriving at definite resolutions. M. de Vitrolles undertook the office of recording the delibera-

tions of the royal council, though he was often recommended not certainly to withdraw, but to abstain from writing.

Still all the claimants for office that hovered round the new government were not satisfied. There was the Abbé de Pradt, who imagined that he was as useful as he was petulant, and of whom nobody would have thought of making a minister, nor wished to make a colleague, and who on this account was placed in dignified isolation, by being appointed Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour. And there was another person, who had long been intimate with Napoleon, who had been his schoolfellow, and who having lost his confidence some years before, repaid by a rabid hatred the disgrace he had incurred: this was M. de Bourrienne, who had on the first change of government been appointed to the office of Postmaster-General. He was allowed to keep the appointment, because he had it, and there would have been a difficulty in finding him another. Amongst all these appointments, very few were bestowed on the emigrants, who having returned to France either at a late or more remote period, regarded the reign of the Bourbons, not only as a triumph achieved by them, but as their patrimony. Some had already returned from England or the provinces, and thronged round the Count d'Artois, who not being able to give them places in the government of the country, formed them into a private government, and made of them, so to speak, his personal *clientèle*. We have mentioned MM. de Montceil and de la Maisonfort, who had returned, the one from Franche-Comté, the other from England, men of talent and learning, who must not be confounded with the herd that seek to turn every revolution to their personal advantage. The Count d'Artois installed them at the Tuileries, for the purpose of having near him a kind of secret council, that should possess his entire confidence. Had the Count d'Artois admitted only such men to his confidence—though antagonistic influences are always dangerous in government—the quality of the choice might have partly corrected the evil. But whilst his brother Louis XVIII, through prudence, idleness, or contempt had uniformly kept at a distance those royalists who came from Vendée or Paris to England, bringing groundless information, and raising false hopes, the Count d'Artois, who was of a restless disposition and compliant temper, was always surrounded by these men, and he was now beset by them as constantly as circumstances permitted. In fact the Tuileries were now filled with men, who reminded the prince that they had done this or that, that they had been charged with such or such mission, which according to their account had been most difficult of execution, and they now offered to perform services of any kind whatsoever. Some proposed to go

into the departments, and depose the refractory prefects or sub-prefects of the Empire, or to pursue the members of the Bonaparte family, and tear from them the riches, which, it was said, they had carried off. Others went so far as to volunteer to rid France of the tyrant, who, though dethroned, would never allow France to enjoy peace, if he were allowed to live. The Count d'Artois, not listening attentively, above all, not examining minutely these propositions, gave a gracious reception to all these busy-bodies, shook hands with all, did not question any of their pretended services, did not say to any one that he did not remember to have seen him before; he received the offers of all, and in return, lavished on them promises with a warmth of manner and words, the result alike of his amiability and frivolity. His only care was to send every body away content, and he treated exactly in the same manner, those high-minded royalists, who, faithful to their principles, had never stained their honour by a single misdeed, and men who, during the civil war, had covered themselves with crime. To all, without exception, he said that they must have patience, that each should receive the recompense due to his services, provided he would only wait; that for the present, the government had been obliged to give places to *Bonaparte's people*, who had certainly rendered services that deserved to be rewarded, but that the turn of the pure royalists would come, and that they should not have in vain suffered, loved, and waited during five and twenty years.

Incapable of knowingly doing what was wrong, but very capable of allowing it to be done, the Count d'Artois had become almost immediately on his arrival in Paris the centre of two governments, the one regularly appointed, composed of the ancient functionaries of the Empire, who had invested him with the authority he held; the other irregular, and what might be called clandestine, had not its existence been generally known, composed of royalists, that had been oppressed during the revolution, and their existence ignored under the Empire, some of whom had passed with unblemished reputation through the ordeal of the civil war, and others stained with all the vices engendered by that period. The Count d'Artois passed from one party to the other, presenting a fair face to each, thinking to conciliate both, and thus strengthen his cause; a double part, in the effort to sustain which, the strongest-minded and wisest man might have failed.

Meanwhile, the state of France was deplorable, and called loudly for a remedy. Desolation and terror reigned in Franch-Comté, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, Burgundy, and Flanders. The allied troops, particularly the Prussians, committed atrocities of which the French armies, though they had often

committed deplorable excesses in conquered countries, had never rendered themselves guilty, at least in the same degree. The allied sovereigns resident in Paris, commanded in all sincerity the observance of discipline and humanity, but the officers believing that they might disobey these orders, or that, at least, their disobedience would remain unknown or unpunished, neither abstained from any excess themselves, nor imposed any restraint on their soldiers. They seized every thing of which they had need, and allowed still more to be destroyed. In Champagne especially, where the fury of war had been greatest, the villages were reduced to ashes, the inhabitants had taken flight, traffic had ceased, the bridges were cut down, the roads broken up, and the air rendered infectious by exhalations arising from the unburied dead. The enraged peasantry murdered without pity the foreign soldiers that fell into their power. The imperial functionaries had been replaced by persons who had volunteered their services, or who had been found in the locality, and who were employed to levy on the country whatever the enemy needed, a species of extortion preferable however to pillage. To this disheartening spectacle was added another of a nature to excite intense uneasiness. The French armies, especially those that had seen most service, were in close proximity to the allied armies. Their first emotion was one of satisfaction at seeing a horribly destructive war terminated, but this feeling soon gave place to regret, and this regret was quickly converted into anger against the *traitors*, to whom they imputed the disasters that had befallen our arms. In the excitement of their feelings they were ready to fall again upon the enemy, an event that might have occurred but for desertion, which had become, as we have said, a general contagion. Consequently, the high-ways were covered with soldiers, deserting in troops with arms, baggage, and horses, so that France was threatened with one of two misfortunes, either to be deprived of soldiers, or to retain those who were too faithful, and ready, spontaneously, to recommence the war.

In the provinces, to which the invaders had not penetrated, the authorities, anxious, restless, and uneasy, fearing alike to abandon Napoleon too soon, or to join the Bourbons too late, held an equivocal line of conduct, and were not competent to restrain the excited inhabitants. In the midland departments, generally so peaceable, these inconveniences were not strongly felt, the worst disposition manifested being the public ridicule with which the vacillating conduct of the magistracy was assailed. But in Vendée, in the South, and in every place where the royalists and revolutionists found themselves in juxtaposition, the weakness of the authorities became a posi-

tive danger. At length, taxation became as obnoxious as conscription. Following the example of the Count d'Artois, the Dukes of Angoulême and Berry had appeared, the one in Gascony, the other in Normandy, amid cries of "Down with the conscription, down with the *droits réunis*."

The people were desirous that the second of these promises should be instantly realized, and from Marseilles to Bordeaux all refused to pay the indirect taxes. To complete this sad picture, it must be added that the English, faithful to their habit of introducing their merchandize in the rear of their armies, had crowded the seaports on the coast of the English channel, of the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, with sugars, coffees, cotton goods and iron, offered at extremely low prices, which threatened to ruin our merchants and manufacturers, for the former had in their warehouses, only colonial goods that had paid a duty of 50 per cent., and the others could only offer for sale goods manufactured from a high-priced raw material. It was therefore possible that a commercial catastrophe might be added to all the calamities of a frightful war.

Lastly, there was only one disposable million of francs in the Treasury. In the invaded provinces, the public money had been carried off by the enemy, and in the provinces where the foreign troops had not penetrated, the taxes had ceased to be collected.

When we regard attentively the difficulties with which a government just emerged from a revolution is beset, we are impressed with a feeling of alarm, for it seems impossible that such a government can be firmly established without the aid of prodigious genius. But genius is never necessary in the commencement of such a work, because a kind of general goodwill seconded governments in their beginnings, and it is only according to the wisdom they display later, when the moments of greatest difficulty seem to be passed, that we should judge them.

Commissioners extraordinary were sent into the provinces for the purpose of making known what were, at that time, called the *acts of the senate*; they were to procure the public acceptance of these acts, and get them put into execution; they were to set at liberty the priests or royalists who were detained in prison, to put an end to the vexations caused by conscription, to examine carefully the local authorities, the prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, to demand their adhesion to the Bourbon cause, and in case of refusal to deprive them of their official rank. The motive in selecting these commissioners was most conciliatory, and they received the most prudent instructions. They were chosen from amongst *Bonaparte's people*—it is so these men were called who had

studied in Napoleon's school, and who had had the worldly wisdom to abandon him before committing themselves—and the grand seigneurs of the ancient nobility, men who were moderate-minded and benevolent, as people generally are in the first flush of triumph.

In a selection so diversified, we find Marshal Kellerman, who was sent to the 3rd military division (Metz); the Count Dejean to the 11th (Bordeaux); the Duke de Plaisance, nephew to the treasurer Lebrun, to the 14th (Caen); M. Otto, an ancient diplomatist, to the 21st (Bourges); General Marescot, companion of the unfortunate General Dupont, to the 20th (Perigueux); Count Jules de Polignac, to the 10th (Toulouse); Count Roger de Damas to the 4th (Nancy); Count Auguste de Juigné, nephew of the former archbishop of Paris to the 7th (Grenoble); Count Bruno de Boisgelin to the 8th (Toulon); Chevalier de la Salle, son of the former governor of Alsace to the 5th (Strasbourg); the Count Alexis de Noailles, to the 19th (Lyon), &c.

These persons, whose antecedents were so opposite, set off immediately to announce in the departments, the good news of the return of the Bourbons, the approaching peace, and the recognition of constitutional liberty; they were to use every effort to enlist the sympathies of the people in these changes.

One of the first acts of the government was to disperse in different localities the army that Napoleon had concentrated round Fontainebleau, and to change the commanders of whom doubts were entertained. The Imperial Guards, that by being concentrated had become so formidable, were dispersed through those departments least likely to be influenced by their spirit. The Old Guard was allowed to remain at Fontainebleau, but the Young Guard was sent to Orleans. The cavalry of the guard was quartered at Bourges, Saumur and Angers; the artillery at Vendôme. The 6th corps, which, under the influence of Marmont and his generals of division, had separated from the imperial cause, was stationed at Rouen and in the environs. The 7th corps, that of Oudinot, chiefly composed of the troops brought from Spain, was sent off to Evreux, with the Count de Valmy's cavalry. The 11th, or Macdonald's corps, was sent with Milhaud's cavalry to Chartres. The 2nd corps, commanded by General Gérard, was sent to Nevers with the St. Germain cavalry. Those that remained of the Poles were assembled at St. Denis, to be placed at the disposal of the Emperor of Russia. In like manner the Croats were assembled at Dijon, to be delivered to the Prince de Schwarzenberg, and the Belgians were brought to St. Germain to be given up to the Prince of Orange. Quartered in this manner, there was no further cause to fear collisions between the French and foreign

troops. General Maison, who had distinguished himself in the Belgian campaign, where he had maintained the strictest discipline, was left at the head of the troops in Flanders. Marshal Davout was reputed an obstinate partizan of the Empire. His resistance at Hambourg had exasperated the allied sovereigns; his name made all the enemies of France in Germany tremble; he had not hesitated to fire upon the white flag, when it appeared beside the Russian, and these were acts which, without involving the imputation of intolerance, rendered him unacceptable to the government. General Gérard was sent to Hambourg to take his command. General Grenier was allowed to bring back the army from Italy without having received any particular orders as to its disposition, and Augereau was to command during the peace the troops in Dauphiné, that he had commanded so badly during the war, but which, judging at least by his late proclamation, he did not seem inclined to give up to Napoleon. Lastly, with regard to the Marshals Soult and Suchet, the decision of the government was influenced by the report they had lately received. According to these reports, Marshal Suchet had shown himself calm and temperate; Marshal Soult, refractory, hostile and inordinately attached to the Empire. The latter was ordered to give up his command to Marshal Suchet, who thus became chief of the veteran armies of Arragon and of Castille.

These pressing matters having been arranged, it was equally urgent to come to some resolution touching the army. The question to be debated was the conscription, a necessary but at that time universally detested institution. The government, notwithstanding the imprudent promises of the Princes, came to the wiseresolution of passing no law on the subject at that time, but adjourned the debate, under pretext of respectfully reserving for the consideration of the absent monarch, every deeply important question. But as it was necessary to take some notice of the prevailing desertion, it was decided that the conscripts of 1815, enlisted in 1814, according to the Emperor's custom of anticipating the conscriptions by a year—might remain in their homes, if they had not yet joined, or return home if they had already quitted their parishes. This was only in some sort legalizing a proceeding already generally adopted. The government wisely considered that the soldiers, who were returning in vast numbers from Italy, Spain, Germany, Russia and England, where they had been either prisoners of war, or had garrisoned the fortresses that had been surrendered, would supply the army with excellent soldiers and in greater numbers, in fact, than they could afford to pay.

Money payments had become one of the principal difficulties of the new government. Napoleon during the latter part

of his reign had supported the Treasury by loans, furnished from the savings he had made out of the civil list after the *domaine extraordinaire* was exhausted. Out of about 150 millions which he had saved from his different civil lists, he possessed, as we have seen, about eighteen millions in January 1814, of which ten millions with the Emperor's private plate, had been forcibly taken from Maria Louisa at Orleans. The perpetrators of this act of rapine, regarding this booty as a recovered portion of the public property, wished to bring the waggons containing the ten millions to the Tuileries, and deviously present them to the Count d'Artois; and, in fact, the prize had been conducted intact to the Prince's portal.

When Baron Louis, the Minister of Finance, learned this, he was irritated beyond expression. He was, as we have said, a man of impetuous temper, but great intellect, imbued with the soundest principles of finance, understanding perfectly well the resources afforded by an unblemished public credit, and he alone was capable under existing circumstances of attempting the proof, and succeeding in the attempt. To the depth and vastness of his views he united a love of order that amounted to passion. He had warmly espoused the cause of the Bourbons, not because he approved the principles of the emigration, but through a sincere desire of establishing constitutional liberty, which he believed could only be obtained under the Bourbons. Notwithstanding his devotedness to the new government, when he learned that the ten millions which he needed so much had been transported to the Tuileries, he was highly exasperated, both on account of the loss and the irregularity of the proceeding. He immediately assembled the principal members of the ministry and of the Prince's council, informed them of what had occurred, and declared that if the ten millions were not instantly sent to the Treasury, he would send in his resignation. The members endeavoured to calm him; they advised him to go to the Prince, and explain with moderation and politeness, the rules established since 1789, concerning the disposal of the public money, and they promised him that he should receive full satisfaction.

Baron Louis, somewhat tranquillized, sought the Count d'Artois, whom he surprised but did not displease, by the vigour of his language. He found no difficulty in persuading him to restore money that he had never intended to appropriate to his own use, and which at worst he only would have applied to the benefit of his distressed friends, had he not been told it was the property of the state, and absolutely needed for the discharge of the public debts. The ten millions were restored with the exception of about 500,000 francs, which were employed to defray the expenses of the Prince's household.

This supply was a most timely relief, and being in specie, was of still greater utility. No person has perhaps ever understood more thoroughly than M. Louis that the secret of maintaining an unblemished credit, is by punctually fulfilling our engagements. It is a common error amongst political parties of all times, to care little about the engagements contracted by their predecessors, and royalists were not wanted at the period of which we speak, who were disposed to treat lightly the debts incurred during the time of the empire and the revolution. But M. Louis declared firmly that though resolved to economise every penny of the public money, he would never defraud the state creditors of their due, and that consequently former debts, on whatever account incurred, should be faithfully paid. He added, what gave his declaration greater weight, that he was determined to maintain the existing taxes, spite of the clamours of parties or the cries of the populace. A few thoughtless words uttered by the princes, immediately on their return to France, were not, in his opinion, a reason for deviating from the principles of sound finance. The indirect taxes and the conscription were necessary, for every government stands in need of men and money, and government ought therefore to have the courage to maintain these two institutions.

The presence of the Count d'Artois, who of all the princes had been the most lavish in promises, put no restraint on the courageous minister, and he asserted that if the government did not immediately declare in favour of the maintenance of all the ordinary and extraordinary taxes already voted for 1814, it would be impossible to carry on the public business, and that for his part he would not undertake it. He was satisfied on this point by being told that when the king arrived, a strict and minute enquiry should be made into existing taxes. M. Louis therefore continued provisionally the *droits réunis*, with the exception of some changes of form, made in compliance with popular feeling. Thus the tax, known as "*detail*" had always been odious to the lower classes, because it was collected at the public house. M. Louis still maintaining the tax, permitted that in towns where there was an *octroi*, the *detail* should be converted into an increase on the entrance duties. He also permitted some simplification in the tax *de mouvement*, which was collected when spirituous liquors were removed from one place to another. Excepting these slight concessions, M. Louis remained immovable on the subject of taxation, and brought over the entire council to his opinion. M. de Talleyrand and his colleagues smiled at the earnestness of the Minister of Finance, but even in smiling they gave the Count d'Artois an example of re-

specting and yielding to that passion so rare, a passion for the public good. The Count d'Artois, at once ignorant and compliant, and moreover unmindful of his promises, allowed the minister and his council to do as they pleased, being well inclined to listen to men who were reputed to know what he and his companions in misfortune were absolutely ignorant of.

Self-interest inspires a quick and delicate tact that early discovers those that are deserving of confidence. The French public soon perceived that they had to do with a Minister of Finance, who was willing to pay, without exception, all the legitimate public debts, and that in order to do so he did not fear to maintain the necessary taxes, caring little about being unpopular, provided he could establish the credit of the state. This credit was created as if by magic, thanks to the prospects of an assured peace, and thanks to a minister, whose principles were so lofty and so firmly expressed. Commercial men, the chief organs of public confidence, manifested an extreme eagerness to aid M. Louis, and the latter was immediately able to carry into effect, a measure which before would have been impossible; he intended to issue bills at short date, that is to say, exchequer bills.

Custom has consecrated in modern states two kinds of public debt—the funded debt, where the stock is not terminable, or terminable at a very remote period, and the floating debt, where bills are of short date, and the interest varies according to the state of the public credit. Thus in England and France there are interminable annuities, and exchequer or treasury bonds. The discredit resulting from bankruptcy had been so great after the time of the Directory, that, during the Empire, Napoleon had never been able to issue a treasury bond, and was even obliged to cloak the principal involved, by never mentioning the treasury. On this account he had recourse to bills of the receivers general; M. Mollien having afterwards wisely created the *caisse de service*, the receivers generals' bills were converted into *caisse de service* bills. These were in reality exchequer bills, only the government dared not to call them so. In 1814, the *caisse de service* was so involved in debt, that the managers dared not issue another bill in addition to those in circulation. M. Louis did not hesitate to create a new floating debt, by issuing exchequer bills for ten millions at short date, and at an interest proportioned to existing circumstances. These bills, thanks to the confidence inspired by the minister, were readily accepted. The government had received from Orleans ten millions in specie; the taxes were levied, and though not paid in some provinces, they still furnished sup-

plies, and the government was able during the first month to distribute amongst the heads of the different departments, fifty million francs in ready money, which put all the public departments into full operation. Business received a favourable impulse, which contributed to revive the credit on which the state was henceforth to subsist. Whilst M. Louis began in this way to establish the public credit, he showed equal firmness in maintaining order, which had been the chief merit of the imperial system of finance, and he continued the custom of presenting to the council every month a synopsis of the expenses of the coming month, that proper measures might be taken to find the supplies.

The finances, which were the great difficulty of the new government, began to assume a favourable aspect, thanks to the skilful and active-minded minister, who had taken the burden upon himself. It was necessary in this department of the administration to provide against the serious difficulty resulting from the extraordinary position of the national commerce, to which we have already alluded. Though Napoleon had, through want of patience, failed in conquering England by the system of continental blockade, he had, at least, laid the foundation of our manufactures. The spinning and weaving of cotton and wool, the mode of preparing iron, and its application to different uses, had made extraordinary progress. The extraction of sugar from vegetables of European growth, and the dyeing of stuffs by chemical agency, had made a not less astonishing advance. Our manufactures were presentable in every market, at a disadvantage, certainly, as to price, but equal, and often superior in quality, to British produce. But Napoleon wishing to destroy the commerce as well as the industry of Great Britain, was not satisfied with forbidding the importation of English manufactured goods, he also prohibited the raw material carried under the British flag, such as raw cotton, indigo, dyeing wood, sugar, coffee, &c. In 1810, instead of the prohibition, he substituted the famous tariff of fifty per cent., which all these articles were obliged to pay. Nevertheless, our manufactures had been able to support this tax, being protected from English competition by these high prohibitory duties. It is easy to conceive, without comment, how great must have been, under such circumstances, the perturbation caused by the sudden influx of British manufactures. And sugars, coffees, cotton goods, &c., so ardently longed for by the inhabitants of the continent, and scattered abundantly throughout Germany since 1813, were poured into France, in 1814, in the train of the allied armies. These goods had passed the Rhine, the Scheldt, the Meuse, and followed the allied soldiers step by step, or

else they had been landed on the coast, for our ports had, even before receiving orders from Paris, admitted the British flag. The consequence was, that our cotton goods had to contend with the English, which, to their economical mode of fabrication, united the advantage of not having had to pay fifty per cent. on the raw material; and the English coffee, which cost 28 sous at London, and in our ports stood at 38, had to compete with the French coffee, which, having had to pay a duty of 44 sous, was absolutely unsaleable, as the purchaser would have had to pay more than four francs. It was the same with sugar, and all colonial produce. Had peace been established without a foreign invasion, the most natural mode would have been to suppress these duties gradually, leaving time to sell off the goods that had been taxed so highly. But a military and commercial invasion having taken place at the same moment, we were obliged to submit to the consequences of both, but not to prolong the evil, by keeping up a tariff that became unsuitable to the commercial condition of the country. For example, raw cotton ought to be admitted duty free, in order that our manufacturers might be less burdened in competing with British productions. It would also be necessary to make a considerable reduction in the duty on sugar, coffee, and colonial produce in general, to enable the French vendor to sell at the same rate as the English. Thus, coffee, which in London cost 28 sous per pound, might very well bear a duty of six sous, which would raise the cost to 34 sous, and permit the retailer to sell at 38 sous, the current price at Paris since the arrival of the allies. Without these precautions our markets would be exclusively supplied by smugglers, who sold at the lowest price the goods that had found an entrance into France in the train of the enemy.

These considerations clearly set forth, served as a preamble to regulations which provisionally modified the duties. By these regulations the minister suppressed the duty on cotton and several raw materials, reduced about seven-eighths the duties on sugar and coffee, and promised to re-establish the custom houses as soon as the allied armies should have evacuated the territory, and promised to put in force at the same time a new scale of duties, which would sufficiently protect our manufacturers against the foreign, without making them pay too high a price for the raw material, or putting on colonial produce, such as cotton, sugar, coffee, &c., heavier taxes than were indispensably needed by the exchequer.

These measures, though undoubtedly very prudent, did not entirely tranquillize the manufacturing towns, where an apprehension prevailed that, under the reign of princes just returned from England, British trade would be favoured. The

new regulations, however, lessened the existing pressure, soothed public uneasiness, and gave reason to hope that a better system would be established as soon as circumstances would permit the application of a definite system of legislation to commerce and industry.

To these measures of general interest were added others, exclusively applicable to the provinces ravaged by the war. Commissioners were sent to rebuild the bridges that had been destroyed, to repair the roads that had been broken up, to bury the dead, to reorganise the postal service, and, in a word, to establish order as far as possible. On every side the people, who had been afflicted by the misfortunes of the country, but who now began to be consoled by the prospect of peace, and to have confidence in the Bourbons, complied with the demands made on them, and even afforded manual aid in execution of the orders that came from Paris. However, if the government succeeded in triumphing over the principal difficulties in the unoccupied provinces, it was quite different in those where the enemy still remained. In the latter the foreign troops presented a serious obstacle. They arrogated to themselves the rights of absolute authority, and committed excesses of all kinds. They did not limit their crimes to despoiling chateaux, to pillaging cottages, and outraging women; they seized the property of the state, and endeavoured to sell for their private advantage the woods, as well as the stores of salt, and the metals contained in our arsenals. It was a scene of universal spoliation, both private and public, which, besides ruining the country, exasperated the inhabitants, and rendered them ill-disposed towards the new government, unjustly reputed allies and accomplices of the foreigners.

A universal cry was raised, demanding the departure of the allied armies. Their generals had declared, on passing the Rhine, that they had come, not to humiliate France, but to set her free. Napoleon being conquered, disarmed, and departed, and the Bourbons universally recognised, why should the allied armies remain longer in France?

This reasoning, which was perfectly just, was rendered more impressive by the sufferings of the people, and had become the dominant feeling; consequently, an unanimous appeal was made to the ministers, and by the ministers presented to the Prince to whom the royal authority had been delegated, demanding the immediate evacuation of the French territory by the foreigners. This appeal, so natural, so general, so becoming, was, however, imprudent. In fact, how could we speak to the allied sovereigns of evacuating our territory, without provoking a similar demand on their part with regard to the foreign places we still occupied? These places were

fortresses, such as Hambourg, Magdebourg, the Texel, Flushing, Berg-op-Zoom, Antwerp, Mons, Luxembourg, Mayence, Lerida, Tarragona, Figuières, and Girona, filled with a large war *matériel*, and some of the harbours containing magnificent fleets. Was it possible to ask the Austrians, the Russians, the Prussians, the English, to quit Champagne, Lorraine, Alsace, Languedoc, without expecting them in return to ask us to give up these first-class fortresses, which it was intended we should ultimately lose? The consequence of such a step would be the serious inconvenience of giving up pledges which, in the negotiation of a future peace, would be of the highest importance. Undoubtedly, the conditions of this peace could not vary much, for the principles of the frontiers of 1790 were so generally admitted, that it was only the victorious sword of Napoleon which could effect a change. But in consenting to abandon the Rhenish provinces and Belgium, that is to say, the Rhine and the Scheldt, there remained between these rivers and the limits of 1790 an extensive and solid frontier which might have been claimed by France, as we shall see presently; a frontier that might have been obtained by negotiating with firmness and patience, in the name of the Bourbons, in virtue of the good will they inspired, and the desire the allies felt to render them popular. One means of securing success would certainly have been the possession of such pledges as we were about to surrender, for it is easy to imagine how great would have been the embarrassment of the allied sovereigns, had they been obliged to recover by force Hambourg, Magdebourg, Antwerp, Mayence, &c., &c. But was it possible, we repeat, to demand the evacuation of France without instantly provoking a similar demand with regard to the territories we occupied beyond the limits of our ancient frontiers? Evidently not, and no negotiator could have obtained a hearing, who would have advanced the one demand, without admitting the other.

We certainly might have consented to the evacuation of the more remote fortresses, such as Hambourg, Magdebourg, the Texel, and Flushing, in the north, Lerida, Tarragona, and Figuières, in the south, and endeavoured to retain Antwerp, Mayence, Luxembourg, and Mons, as lying nearer. But the allied powers would have seen in this proposition an intention to contest the frontiers of 1790, and the offer of a partial evacuation would have been as unacceptable as an absolute refusal to give up any of the fortresses.

A wiser mode of acting would have been to wait patiently for two months longer, asking the Emperor Alexander and his allies to give positive orders to their soldiers to treat our unhappy provinces less cruelly. If the French, amid their

sufferings had been capable of reflection they would not have failed to perceive that even had the foreign armies signed an act of evacuation on the spot, they could not have left before two months on account of their claims on some of the magazines, and that before the expiration of two months, as the event proved, peace might be signed. The King, it is true, was absent, but his absence, which was no impediment to yielding the principal European fortresses, could have been no obstacle to commence at least discussing the bases of peace. But grief does not reason, and the unanimous and ardent desire of the nation forced the government to commence negotiations for an evacuation which should necessarily be reciprocal. Let us in justice add that the places which there was a question of giving up, Hambourg, Magdebourg, the Texel, Lerida, Tarragona, and others, were evidences of a madly ambitious policy, which had fallen into general disrepute, and traces of which no one cared to preserve.

M. de Talleyrand, who naturally enough had been commissioned to conduct the negotiations, was listened to by the representatives of the allied powers with profound attention and a feigned benevolence for France, which they said they had hastened to deliver from foreign occupation. In reality, the allies were extremely anxious to obtain possession of the fortresses that we held. Prussia was undoubtedly certain of sooner or later getting possession of Magdebourg and Hambourg; England of having Antwerp; and Austria, Mayence; but ardent desires are accompanied by an impatience that can only be satisfied by immediate possession. The allies promised to evacuate France without delay, on condition that our garrisons would evacuate the places we have named. It was therefore no longer possible to retain Antwerp, Mayence, Luxembourg, by restoring Hambourg, Magdebourg, &c., yet the allied monarchs had promised to treat France under the Bourbons better than under the Bonapartes. Their ministers did not deny this, and still holding firmly by the principle of the frontier of 1790, they spoke of a territorial extension beyond these frontiers, which might be represented by a million souls. Finding it impossible to do better M. de Talleyrand was obliged to be content with this promise. There now remained the serious consideration, of what was to be done with the *matériel* contained in the fortresses we were about to give up. There was in these fortresses, besides the field artillery, a vast war *matériel* of every kind, which might have been, if not saved, at least disputed. But no attention was paid to this, both parties were so anxious to come to a conclusion. It was stipulated that our troops should leave with arms and baggage, and three field pieces to every thousand men. It was

certainly only a loss in money of thirty or perhaps forty million francs, by no means comparable to the loss of territory, but still it was a loss. But our magnificent fleets lying in certain harbours were not forgotten, and this part of the *matériel* was reserved as an object of future consideration, when negotiations for a definite peace should be commenced.

It was consequently agreed that the foreign troops should evacuate the French territory (that of 1790) in proportion as we withdrew our troops from the remote fortresses we occupied, leaving those of the Rhine within ten days, those of Piedmont and Italy in fifteen, and the Spanish fortresses within twenty days. The most distant should be evacuated by the 1st June. It was arranged besides, that prisoners of every nation, no matter in what place they might be found, should be immediately set at liberty.

This convention being signed by M. de Talleyrand, was the same day submitted to the Count d'Artois and his council. It is a singular fact, and one that proves the strength of an absorbing idea, that no observation was made on this convention, because it fulfilled a universal wish, that of removing foreigners from the soil of France.* The unfortunate Prince, upon whom this act afterwards induced an unmerited unpopularity, was incapable of foreseeing the consequences of what he did, and sincerely believed that he was delivering France from the presence of foreign soldiers; he therefore joyfully signed the deed. It was instantly published, and on the first day excited no more remark than it had done at the royal council. But the voice of criticism was soon heard, and thanks to a sudden change in public opinion, became as bitter as universal.

In fact, a very great change had taken place in the public mind since the deposition of Napoleon, that is to say within a month. The absolute submission and the almost perfect silence that prevailed during the Empire, had been suddenly replaced by an extraordinary frankness of sentiment and language. Whilst the idea of the return of the Bourbons, which at first appeared strange and rather surprising, began to be received by the mass of the public and regarded as a prudent measure, and that the Bourbons themselves were gaining a certain amount of popularity on account of their misfortunes and their virtues, a sharp and bitter quarrel suddenly sprung up between parties newly called into existence. The press had recovered a certain liberty enjoyed by sufferance but not by right, for the imperial regulations concerning publications

* M. de Vitrolles, an eye-witness, and who noted down events as they occurred, says that not a single remark was made in the royal council.

were still in force. The new government had contented themselves with restoring to the proprietors of public journals the property of which they had been deprived by Napoleon, and required of them in return, the appointment of a principal editor who should be accountable for the acts of each journal. The liberty of the press had sprung up under the equivocal form which made it dependant on a censorship. As usual, the press had become the expression of the passion of the day, and this passion was detestation of the empire, of its incessant wars and arbitrary government. There consequently prevailed a fearful excitement against Napoleon, against his family, against his ministers, and against everything that belonged to him. And public opinion, soon running farther back, passed from the empire to the revolution, which became an object of no less anger than Napoleon himself. Though the Count d'Artois, on entering Paris, had spoken of an act of oblivion, though the senate had made such an express condition of the recall of the Bourbons, this act of oblivion, so much easier to promise than put into execution, had not been put into practice by any one. The cruel death of the Duke d'Enghien was commented on, and still more violently was the iniquitous death of the unfortunate Louis XVI. condemned. In this regard, so strong was popular feeling, that Napoleon for awhile gave place to the regicides, upon whom a torrent of abuse was poured. Undoubtedly, the existing generation should have lost all memory, and every sense of justice and humanity, not to be penetrated with the profoundest pity, in recalling to memory the punishment inflicted by fanatics on one of our best kings; and yet, with regard to the tranquillity of France and the development of its destinies, this cry of the public conscience was a very great imprudence. The clergy, more thoughtless, if possible, than the royalists, and less justifiable in such demonstrations, entertained strong antipathies, of which Cardinal Maury was the principal object. Priests, of whom very few had dared to defend the cause of the church during the revolution, and of whom not one had refused ecclesiastical favours under the empire, could not pardon Cardinal Maury, the most eloquent and courageous defender of his order, for having accepted the diocese of Paris. They had commenced by overwhelming him with insults, then declared the diocese vacant, nominated vicars capitulary, and used every possible means to induce the cardinal archbishop to abandon his diocese. Thus violently persecuted, he quitted Paris, and ceded the place to his embittered enemies.

When parties are sought for in this manner they are easily found. In fact, a few days had sufficed to revive and gather

together all the men whom the royalists attacked in this manner. At the first return of the Bourbons, these men, divided and confounded, had held their peace. The revolutionists, avenged by the fall of the empire, had experienced a moment of joy. The civil and military functionaries, eager to secure their own safety, had at first thought only of giving in their adhesion to the Bourbons, and had given it, execrating at the same time the senate that had dethroned Napoleon, and applauding the raileries uttered by the royalists against that body. But after a few days' reflection, the revolutionists and the civil and military functionaries felt their fate was cast in common, and that if the senate had struck them in striking Napoleon, it had also defended them in stipulating constitutional guarantees. They consequently began to take part with the senate. In reading in the journals of the triumphant party—the only ones that enjoyed the freedom of the press—furious declamations against all that had taken place since 1790, in seeing gather round the princes, and round the special commissioners, the men of former times, they felt that under the new order of things they could not fail to be in peril, or at least in disfavour. The military men, especially (we mean the officers), quitting the ranks, like the soldiers, had come in numbers to Paris. They crowded the streets and public places, where they participated in the general agitation, and sought to know what was to be their fate. The War Minister, General Dupont, had issued an order, commanding them to return to their regiments—the only place, said this order, where they would learn the fate reserved for them. Amid the general confusion, scarcely one of these officers had obeyed. They still crowded the capital, where the presence of foreign soldiers irritated them deeply, and provoked on their part the most dangerous expressions of feeling. They took especial pleasure in declaiming against the *traitors* who, they said, had betrayed Napoleon and France.

The convention of the 23rd April, whose conditions, as we have already explained, were inevitable, was at first received as a natural, and even as a very desirable event, because it stipulated the evacuation of France by the foreign troops; but ill-disposed people soon began to put forth different opinions. Though the surrender of Hambourg, Magdebourg, Lerida, did not really touch the solid greatness of France, yet these names recalled undying memories, and besides, when to these remote fortresses were added Mayence, Luxembourg, Wesel, Flushing, and Antwerp, which we were accustomed to look on as French possessions, in seeing all these fortresses given up with the single stroke of the pen, without

any guarantee for indemnification, military men were touched with sincere grief. The public even, the rational, disinterested public, spite of the joy infused by peace, spite of their well-founded dislike to distant conquests, could not help feeling a profound sadness, in seeing so many important fortresses abandoned, and though they did not cry out treason, as did the military men, yet they felt that they were under the iron hand of foreigners, who, whilst flattering France in order to render her more manageable, left her only so much of her greatness as they could not deprive her of.

Still the dominant sentiment was a lively and universal satisfaction at the prospect of peace, and, if a bitter censure were heard, it was from the lips of men whose existence was imperilled by the change of government, or who were disturbed in their retreat by outbursts of royalist feeling. As to the Count d'Artois, he did all in his power to satisfy everybody, and especially to win the good graces of the army. He invited the marshals, generals, and colonels, who were staying at Paris, to dinner; he used every exertion to please them, but they felt sensibly that at the Tuileries they were only passing acquaintances, not intimate friends. The abiding guests in this palace, which had been occupied, and was still destined to be occupied by so many generations, of various origins, of different modes of thinking and of different sentiments—the abiding guests, we say, at the Tuileries were the royalists, who began to flock to Paris in great numbers from the provinces, or from those lands whither they had emigrated. Less caressed, less flattered than the heads of the army, but evidently more loved, they alone enjoyed a real intimacy. They came at all hours, and when the Count d'Artois could not receive them himself, he deputed his most confidential friends to do so. These received, as we have already said, their protestations of affection, and offers of service; and, moreover, the reports made by these royalists were received with attention; they were formed into a kind of police, who, merely officious in the commencement, would one day pretend to play a higher part.

We have already spoken of these daring men, whom the Count d'Artois had had the weakness to admit to his confidence, and to whom he had the imprudence to confide important missions, or allow them to assume such. Some of these men had taken upon themselves to pursue the Princess Catherine, wife of Prince Jerome Napoleon. This princess, daughter to the King of Wurtemberg, and universally respected on account of her personal qualities, was arrested near Fossard, when on her way to Germany. She was robbed of every thing. The men who arrested her said they were com-

missioned by government to restore to the treasury property belonging to the state, and, under this pretext, the baggage taken from the princess was brought to the Tuileries apparently intact. Scarcely was this act consummated, when the Emperor of Russia having learned what had occurred, became indignant, and sent his minister to complain, and demand reparation for the insult offered to a respectable princess, protected by the treaty of the 11th April, and, moreover, his own near relative. The first act of reparation was to restore the princess's trunks, which were all found empty. The diamonds belonging to the princess, which were valued at 1,500,000 francs, had disappeared. The men who had arrested the princess denied the robbery, and threatened, if anything further were said about it, to compromise the provisional government, by declaring what their real mission was. Of this mission they made no secret; it was to assassinate Napoleon.

The affair was certainly of a doubtful character, but amid the existing chaos it was evident that many imprudent expressions had been allowed to find utterance; and if things went on in this manner, disagreeable incidents might become more frequent. The Count d'Artois had been now twenty days at Paris, and the arrival of Louis XVIII. was already anxiously desired, in order that he might assume the reins of government. This was the wish of the prince's most enlightened friends; it was the wish of the prince himself, who, though anxious to meddle in everything, was alarmed at seeing his responsibility every day increasing. It was one day the question of taxation on which he was called on to decide; another day, the commercial interests of the country formed the subject of debate, or perhaps the extent of the French territory; and all this in the absence of a brother, of whom the Count d'Artois stood much in fear, who was king, and very jealous of his authority. The Count d'Artois had been joined by his two sons. The Duke d'Angoulême, a modest and courageous prince, not very intellectual, but steady and prudent, had landed a month before at Bordeaux. The Duke de Berry, who had entered France by Brittany and Normandy, possessed considerable talent; his sentiments were generous, but he was hot-headed. These two young princes were received at the gates of Paris with great pomp, and many demonstrations of joy. They brought in their train a fresh contingent of devoted royalists, and these arrivals were not a pledge of greater unity and prudence in the government.

The presence of the king was therefore justly wished for, because much was hoped from his prudence, and because many

were anxious for the speedy solution of questions that were left in suspense until the king's arrival. How would this monarch receive the conditions that the senate wished to impose on him. What value would he attach to the engagements, contracted in his name by the Count d'Artois? These were doubts which it was important to solve, and waiting the solution, each had endeavoured to induce Louis XVIII. to regard his particular views and interests with favour. The Count d'Artois had sent to inform his brother that the engagement into which he had entered was of a very general character, that consequently the king was absolutely free with regard to the substance of the senatorial constitution, and still freer with respect to the required oath; that no positive engagement was contracted, and that with regard to the general bases of the constitution, there was a reservation in favour of the royal pleasure, which left a great latitude. It was evident that the Count d'Artois, to excuse his having assumed too much authority, sought to make the pledges he had given the senate appear as light as possible. M. de Talleyrand had at first sent M. de Liancourt to Louis XVIII, and he had neither been well received nor his reports listened to, as we shall soon see; others of less note were afterwards sent, whilst M. de Talleyrand, instead of speaking of things as they really were, adopted a tone of complaisance, and wishing to impress the new king with the idea that his authority had not been infringed, he sent him word that with some flattery to the marshals, and a general declaration in conformity with the prevailing opinions of the day, which should be published immediately on his entrance into France, all existing necessities would be satisfied. M. de Montesquiou, though still adhering to his peculiar view of matters, had been more truthful and more firm. He had in writing to Louis XVIII. displayed much irritation against the senate, and against the pretensions put forth by this body, to impose conditions on the king, but he had not sought to depreciate either the gravity of the engagements contracted, nor the power the senate still possessed. He said that France was not so deeply imbued with a royalist spirit, as some persons took pleasure in believing; that many regretted the days of the Empire; that others, strongly attached to revolutionary principles, had not made up their minds to abandon them; that the army especially was in general hostile to the legitimate dynasty; that these different classes of malcontents, having physical force on their side, were ready to take part with the senate, and so render that body formidable; it would therefore be better to make a compromise with the senate, however disagreeable such a proceeding might be; that the jealousy of the legislative corps might be turned to some advantage, but that this body was weak and incompe-

tent; that the senate still possessed the chief power; that it would be better to select from the senatorial constitution whatever was least objectionable, and from these materials, frame an act purporting to emanate from the royal authority alone; that besides, the finances were in a perilous state, and would probably necessitate a considerable loan, and that without the intervention of the great bodies of the state, lenders could not be found. Though these opinions were not in every respect correct, they represented more exactly the real state of things than the accounts forwarded by the Count d'Artois and M. de Talleyrand. On the whole, the intelligence sent by all caused considerable surprise at Hartwell.

Louis XVIII., who, after the death of Louis XVII., the unfortunate son of Louis XVI., had become legitimate king, according to the principles of hereditary monarchy, had resided for several years at Hartwell, in England, where his love of study and natural tranquillity of disposition had induced him to fix his abode. He had, so to speak, lulled himself to sleep in the peaceful uniformity of his exile, when the terrible events of 1812 suddenly awakened in his heart hopes that were almost extinguished. He then thought proper to make certain declarations, less vague than the preceding, promising to reform ancient abuses, to forget the past, and respect the alienation of the *biens nationaux*, conditions which at that time comprised the entire programme of the most liberal-minded emigrants. These declarations, scattered through Europe, had never been heard of in France. When Louis XVIII. learned the acts of the senate, he experienced a delight quite as strong as what the Count d'Artois had felt, though less demonstrative; and, in the first moments of his joy, he thought no more than his brother had done at Nancy, of disputing the conditions on which he was to be recalled to the throne. Consequently, M. de Blacas, who had become his confidant and the executor of all his wishes, received orders to prepare his act of adhesion to the senatorial constitution. Nor did Louis XVIII. think he purchased too dearly his return to France, by accepting a form of government which, since his abode at Hartwell, he had himself seen in operation to the great advantage of England, and without any other inconvenience than disagreements, which sometimes became serious for the ministers.

It was in these dispositions that Louis XVIII. was found by the emissaries of the Count d'Artois, of M. de Talleyrand, and M. de Montesquiou. Very yielding, as we have seen, with regard to things, he was much less accommodating when persons were in question, for old prejudices yield more easily to the former than the latter. Things have no living features, but persons, on the contrary, have, which revive painful

impressions, and implacable rancours. The worthy M. de Liancourt, hateful to the ancient noblesse because of the good sense he had displayed in the earlier period of the revolution, was so coldly received at Hartwell, when sent there by M. de Talleyrand, that he took his immediate departure, not being of a humour to bow his high birth, his cultivated mind, and honourable life, before emigrants of any rank. The reception given to the other messengers of M. de Talleyrand was very different, and still more so to those of the Count d'Artois and M. de Montesquiou. As soon as Louis XVIII. learned that these gentlemen had preserved intact the essential principle of legitimate royalty, such as the ultra-royalists understood it, and that he could still retain, not only the colours of the house of Bourbon, but was not even obliged to submit to any condition, nor take an oath, and that it would be sufficient to make a general declaration of principles to satisfy the exigencies of his position, he laid aside his act of adhesion, and prepared to assume an absolutely royal attitude. He had been advised, on leaving England, to make his progress slowly, in order to receive *en route* the homages of the inhabitants, and to make a stay in one of the ancient royal castles, that of Compeigne, for example, which had been splendidly fitted up by Napoleon. There, he could hear and see everybody, and become acquainted with men and things before entering Paris, and assuming engagements which would be now personal and obligatory. This advice he promised to follow, and decided that, after visiting at London the Prince Regent of England, the host to whom he was indebted for such noble hospitality, he would repair by Calais to Compeigne, to receive there the first homage of his subjects.

It was on the 20th of April that Louis XVIII. made his entrance into London. We may easily divine, without need of expatiating on the subject, what were the sentiments of the English people on seeing the house of Bourbon again in possession of the throne of France. Whilst that every power in Europe had in succession recognised him who was called the usurper, and refused shelter to the Bourbons, England alone had never acknowledged Napoleon as emperor; she had received the proscribed princes, and had thrown over them the protection of her inviolable hospitality. In truth, though her ministers denied it in parliament, she had always sought the restoration of the Bourbons, as the most certain means of avenging herself of Napoleon and the French revolution.

Though England had more than once been desirous of peace, though she had been more than once ready to conclude it, and had only been prevented by the obstinacy of Napoleon

with regard to Spain, she now forgot these moments of weakness, and thought only of the last triumph of the coalition, of which she attributed all the merit to herself. According to English reports, it was not Prussian, Austrian, or Russian generals with whom Napoleon had to do in the terrible campaigns of 1813 and 1814; it was to Lord Wellington the definite success was due; and yet it must be avowed that it was Marshal Soult, and not Napoleon, whom Wellington encountered. But nothing could efface these notions from the minds of the English, who were absolutely intoxicated with joy and pride. It is undeniable that the English had had a considerable share in bringing about the general result, but it is also true that they had received the largest share of profit. They also believed, and to a greater extent than they were warranted, that the Bourbon princes, now accustomed to the English habits, and imbued with the English spirit, would be the firmest supporters of British policy. Influenced by these feelings, the English resolved to give Louis XVIII. a magnificent reception. During the three days this prince passed at London, all the English wore the white cockade, and he was received with acclamations as joyous as could have been expected in his own capital. Louis XVIII. entered the palace of the Prince Regent, leaning on the arm of this prince, and having on his left hand the Duke of York; he was thus conducted to the chair of state, in quality of king and guest. No sooner was he seated than he listened with proud self-possession to the speech of the Prince Regent, who congratulated him on his restoration to the throne of France; and he congratulated him on it as an event, not alone fortunate for France, but for England, for Europe, for the entire world; an event which every man in England felt as a personal advantage. Louis XVIII. replied to this discourse by thanking the prince for the proofs he received of his friendship, and for his generous hospitality, and added those sadly memorable words—*that it was to his prudent advice, to his noble efforts, to the indefatigable perseverance of his nation, that he should always attribute, under Providence, the restoration of his family to the throne of France.*

These words, so completely in unison with the pretensions put forth by the English, and even with their hopes, were listened to with transport. Instantly circulated with the promptitude of British publicity, they produced an extraordinary effect. In uttering these words had Louis XVIII. thought only of his hosts, to whom he wished to testify his well-founded gratitude in terms the most calculated to gratify them? Or, had he thought of the senate who pretended to

recall him to the throne conditionally, or of the continental sovereigns who supported the senate, and who, basing their pretensions on the services they had rendered to the house of Bourbon, thought themselves justified in giving the king advice and expecting him to follow it? Did he mean to say to both parties that he had reason to be grateful only to God and to England? It is difficult to say; but it is possible that he was at the time influenced solely by a feeling of courtesy towards the nation to whom he believed himself more indebted than to any other. Whatever may have been the motive that dictated these words, the effect, as often happens, was destined to be greater than the cause.

Féted at London during three days, and greeted wherever he appeared with enthusiastic applause, Louis XVIII., before leaving, invested the Prince Regent with the *cordons bleu*, the highest distinction in the power of a French monarch to bestow, and which implied the restoration of the order of the Saint-Esprit. He left London on the 23rd April, and arrived the same day at Dover, accompanied by the Prince Regent, the greater number of the English princes, and the most distinguished members of the aristocracy. The next day,—the 24th,—he embarked and set sail for Calais, escorted by a fleet of eight ships of the line, several frigates, and a number of smaller vessels. The inhabitants of Dover and the environs headed by the Prince Regent, all wearing the white cockade and waving white handkerchiefs, saluted the French monarch with loud cheers, and did not leave the shore whilst his ship remained in sight. The Duke of Clarence accompanied Louis XVIII. to the coast of France, and took leave of him, amid the roar of the cannon of both nations, a sound that had not wakened the echoes of that locality since the time of the camp at Boulogne. What a contrast! what changes! Alas! in our fitful century, two or three years have often sufficed to bring about changes the most contradictory and the most surprising.

On arriving at Calais, the king was received by a considerable number of persons, who, so to speak, prostrated themselves before him. The people, once habituated to the idea of the restoration of the Bourbons, vied with each other in testifying their delight by the noisiest demonstrations. Besides, the inhabitants of a provincial town when visited by their sovereign, are always delighted with the honour, and profoundly touched at a spectacle, novel to them, they experience transports of affection, sincere certainly, but not so durable as they believe, and as may be desirable. But it was not with joy, but with tears, that Louis XVIII. was received, for the recollection of the past was dominant on this occasion, and in

thinking of the long and bloody tragedy that commenced in 1789, and terminated in 1814, the French might well shed unfeigned tears. Flattery, as usual, adding something to emotion—we may divine the demonstrations of which Louis XVIII. was the object. After having devoted a day to the people of Calais and the environs, he passed the night of the 26th at Boulogne, the 27th at Abbeville, the 28th at Amiens, imbibing slowly the incense burned before his legitimate authority, and finally, on the 29th, made his entrance into Compiègne, where he was awaited by the most illustrious persons of France and of Europe.

The impatience to see the king and become acquainted with his disposition were extreme, for in this case, curiosity was heightened by the stimulant of self-interest. With what kind of master would these new subjects have to do, some of whom were the originators of the Revolution and the Empire, others of the emigration? With what kind of ally would these continental monarchs have to do, who had just reinstated the house of Bourbon on the throne, and already heard their services disputed? Such were the questions which each asked himself. To judge by the attitude Louis XVIII. assumed, and the sentiments he first expressed in public, one would be tempted to believe him the haughtiest, the vainest, and least prudent of the emigrants. In fact, his words to the Prince Regent had already deeply disturbed those who had taken a part in the last revolution, and had produced a feeling of discomfort amongst the military men, who detested England more than any of the other powers, and lastly, disobliterated the allied sovereigns themselves, who were not inclined to admit that England had done everything, and had been nearly equal to Providence in the late events. Yet it would have been acting with injustice towards Louis XVIII. to have judged him by these first manifestations.

The first impression that Louis XVIII. made on those already acquainted with the Count d'Artois, was that there was a great difference between the two brothers. The Count d'Artois was graceful and elegant in his deportment, whilst the Count de Provence, now become Louis XVIII., was embarrassed in his manner and awkward in his gait. Corpulent to a degree, which was burdensome at sixty (he was about this age in 1814), he was moreover gouty and walked with difficulty, leaning on a cane. He wore a blue coat with a general's epaulettes, a small English hat, and gaiters of red velvet, completely enveloping his infirm legs. But above this cumbrous and awkward body, there rose a handsome and intelligent head, somewhat too large, differing in one particular from the general cast of the Bourbons, that the nose was not

very aquiline, with a bright and commanding eye that might have become a man of genius and of lofty character. The manners of the Count d'Artois were characterized by affability and a complaisance that suited itself to everybody's humour, whilst Louis XVIII. was calm and haughty. The two princes were as different in disposition as in person. The Count d'Artois, profiting of his personal advantages, had formerly sought and enjoyed the pleasures of the world, and led a frivolous life at the court of Marie Antoinette, but when the day of adversity came, he repented, became a pious Christian, and of his former life retained only his amiability of manner.

Louis XVIII., on the contrary, destitute of the physical advantages of his brother, sought an indemnification in study, to which he applied assiduously, endeavouring to become solidly instructed, but he only succeeded in acquiring superficial information. He associated with the literary men of his time, that is to say, with those of the second class, for a prince of the blood would have compromised himself too deeply, had he sought the society of literary men of the highest class, such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau. Louis XVIII. favoured the philosophy of the French school, and even its revolutionary principles, but when the hour of adversity came, without repenting, like the Count d'Artois, he still preserved in his philosophy opinions that could not be deemed religious, and retained in politics sound principles. When his brother involved himself in the exaggerations and intrigues of the emigration, he avoided the former through a natural moderation of character, and the latter through aversion to excitement, and he shunned both to mark a distinction between him and his younger brother, whose conduct he did not approve, and for whom he entertained little affection. Not devoid of kindness of heart, though possessing a somewhat malicious wit, often sarcastic, and a little egotistical, seeking above all things that repose which his infirmities rendered necessary, attaching much less importance to the exercise, than to the recognition of the principle of his authority, of which he was prouder than any monarch in the world; ever ready to delegate his power to whomsoever submissively acknowledged its existence; detesting business, and avoiding it to enjoy his favourite authors—the Latin—whom he quoted often and appropriately; in fact, a crowned wit, admirably well calculated, both by the qualities he possessed, and those in which he was deficient, to play the part of a constitutional king, a part which the English monarchs have, happily for themselves and their country, acquired the habit of performing. Louis XVIII. was ensured by his defects, as much as by his good qualities, from committing those faults into

which his brother was likely to fall. Such was this prince, such the portrait of him which the impartial historian ought, in our opinion, to present to future generations.

We should not, however, present a correct portrait of Louis XVIII., if we did not speak of a personage who at that time was reputed to exercise great influence over his mind. This personage was M. de Blacas. Men afflicted with physical infirmities, whether princes or private individuals, stand more in need of confidants than do other persons. This necessity is increased, if, like Louis XVIII., such men are widowers without children, and if, in addition, they are occupants of a throne, they possess facilities for forming this circle of assiduous, obsequious, submissive friends who are sometimes called favourites, and to whom, either justly or unjustly, all the errors of the reign are attributed. Louis XVIII. had long reposed his confidence in M. d'Avaray, and he having died, his place was filled by M. de Blacas. Member of a noble family of Provence, he had been one of the first emigrants, and sympathised in all the sentiments of the French emigration with frigid obstinacy rather than fervent enthusiasm. He was a proud and virtuous man, tall of stature, unbending in person and disposition, and possessing as much good sense as was compatible with strong party spirit. As to the rest, he was more anxious to rule in the prince's household than in the state, and possessed, like his master, a refined taste for the arts, in which he found refuge from the pressure of business. M. de Blacas might have become in the hands of a skilful premier, who knew how to bend the court to the designs of the government, a valuable instrument, for he might have been made the means of enunciating, at the foot of the throne, the truth, which he loved when he was able to discern it. However this may be, the courtiers of the various *régimes*, after having saluted and flattered Louis XVIII., flocked round M. de Blacas, to present him their stupid and vulgar adoration.

When Louis XVIII., accompanied by his niece the Duchess d'Angoulême, whom he called his daughter, and the two Condés, the father and grandfather of the Duke d'Enghien—he affected in this way to surround himself with the great victims of the revolution—approached Compiègne, the crowd of courtiers, those who were not capable of being anything else, and those who might have been something much better, the marshals for example—hastened to meet him with unexampled eagerness, and had they dared, had the prince permitted it, they would have thrown themselves at his feet. The marshals had confided to Berthier, on account of his age, his position, and his talents, the task of speaking for them, and he, broken

down by recent events, his mind filled with anxiety for the future career of his children, had undertaken this part, though he was fully conscious how little it became him. Without uttering a word derogatory to the great man whose glory he had shared, he gave utterance to the same commonplaces which at that time fell from every mouth.

"The marshals, as representatives of the army, hastened," he said, "to greet a father whom France during so long a time had the misfortune to disown, but to whom, taught by experience and misfortune, she now returned with transports of joy, certain of finding under his rule, the repose, prosperity, and even the glory she had enjoyed under the sceptre of Henry IV. and Louis XIV. The heads of the army were anxious to offer to this father their hearts and their swords, which having never belonged to any other than to France, were especially due to the legitimate sovereign of restored and regenerated France."

If these are not the exact words, they are at least the sentiments contained in the harangue pronounced by Berthier, and deserve a place here, as a sample of all the public speeches of the time.

The king being fully aware that of all the persons concerned in the late revolution, the marshals were those whom it was most necessary and easiest to flatter, mollified by the most perfect gracefulness, the haughtiness for which he was indebted to his natural disposition and his social rank, he shook hands with them, and said that in his exile he had admired their exploits, that these exploits had afforded much consolation to his paternal heart amid the woes of France, that it was a pleasure that the marshals should be the first he met on returning to the patrimony of his ancestors, that he confided in them, that he brought them peace, a precious blessing, due to his family, but that should this peace ever be disturbed, old and infirm as he was, he would march at their head, under the ancient banner of French honour. Then suiting the action to the word, Louis XVIII. took two marshals by the arm and moved through the spacious apartments of Compiègne, saluting affectionately the crowds that pressed eagerly round him, but showing a marked preference for the marshals, and making to each some appropriate remark. To the old republican Lefebvre, he spoke of the gout, and conversed with the unfortunate Marmont about the wound he had received at Salamanca; he introduced the marshals in succession to his niece and to his cousins, and made them stay to dinner; during the repast, toasted the army in English liquor, and did not leave until he had charmed them by the mingled gracefulness and dignity of his manners, totally unlike either

the amiability of the Count d'Artois or the abruptness of Napoleon, whose manners, though irresistibly attractive, were harsh.

Close observers remarked with concern the foreign habits of the royal family, of which they seemed unconscious themselves: they remarked the wholly English costume of the Duchess d'Angoulême, as well as the coldness of manner, which the respect inspired by her misfortunes easily rendered excusable: but close observers are rare, especially under such circumstances. But the majority were delighted, and it must be confessed that existing circumstances were calculated to excite the imagination strongly, for here were presented two conditions rarely united, antiquity the most venerable, joined to novelty the most imposing. Under the rule of this ancient family, the men of the old *régime* recovered their position, and the modern men believed themselves secured in that which they had acquired. If, on the arrival of the Count d'Artois, comparisons were made, disadvantageous to the empire, it was still worse at Compiègne! The crowds assembled at the château declared that now they saw what kingly majesty was, of which they had not before had the slightest idea. And yet the greater number of these men had had the honour of approaching genius in its grandest and most striking phases. We must confess that these men would have been in the right had they said, that between a prince, born to the throne and uniting to the lustre of his origin, talent, knowledge, and a noble cast of feature; between this tranquil authority undisturbed by self-mistrust, and the haughty, fitful, abstracted, often harsh and abrupt rule of genius, there was a very great difference. But very few amongst them possessed so refined a taste, as to discern these distinctions, and it was strange to hear Marmont, Ney, Kellerman, Oudinot, Moncey, and Berthier speaking of the *majesty* of King Louis XVIII., and assuring each new-comer, that they had never seen anything similar. Such is the unceasing comedy of human life, which men never weary of playing, even though they have already played it a hundred times, and over which we shall pass rapidly, for it would be useless to hold the mirror again before their eyes, as we should never succeed in correcting that spirit of idolatry, which bows before the powers that be. But Compiègne was to be the scene of something more serious than official receptions; Louis XVIII. was to receive there those high personages that held in their hands the springs that moved the machinery of the state.

The king had, during his protracted journey from Calais to Compiègne, sent M. de Blacas to Paris, to learn from the Count d'Artois, and the most reliable royalists, all that was

most important for him to know. The Count d'Artois had hastened to fling himself into his brother's arms, and had received a welcome more affectionate than usual from Louis XVIII., whose heart was softened by joy. Besides, the news he brought was satisfactory. The Bourbons were momentarily becoming stronger, and the senate weaker, for from the day that this body had, by the Duke d'Otranto's advice, made a compromise by accepting a vague and general promise, legitimate royalty had not ceased to gain ground. However, it was impossible to contest fundamental principles; and though the ultra-royalists had a horror of everything bearing the name of constitution, still a constitution could not be refused. France, at every change of government, had acquired such a habit of drawing up in writing the conditions of her new position, that now, too, recourse must be had to the pen; and there was no choice but to grant a government like that of England, with two chambers debating and voting on public affairs, a free press, the impartial administration of justice, the confirmation of the sale of national property, the maintenance of the legion of honour, and of the new nobility. The Count d'Artois, M. de Montesquieu, and, indeed, all who had assisted in the work for the last month, were obliged to admit this. But those points to which Louis XVIII. attached most importance had been gained. He was not even obliged to accept the senatorial constitution, he was dispensed with taking the oath, and, in fact, with doing anything that had the appearance of accepting a constitution. He could give this constitution himself—give it as emanating spontaneously from his own royal authority—a proceeding which consecrated the principle of legitimate royalty, such as the ultra-royalists understood it. Besides, he need only choose some members of the senate, those that displeased him least, and complete the number from the ancient nobility. He could retain the legislative corps, which had given more satisfaction than the senate, and thus compose a government more to his taste. In short, in order to make more evident the difference between this truly royal mode of proceeding and that which the senate had at first required, the king was to enter Paris without giving a constitution, merely making a simple declaration in general terms, almost the same as that made by the Count d'Artois, an arrangement that would leave time to consider maturely the conditions of the new constitution.

These points coincided exactly with the views of Louis XVIII. He had no objection to this kind of government, which consists of two chambers, that torment the ministers, and leave the king in peace, for he had seen this system work

very well in England. But his authority, which, with the blood that flowed in his veins, had descended to him from Louis XIV., Henry IV., Saint Louis, and Hugh Capet—this authority had been recognised, and this was for him the principal point. To grant, what were called written guarantees, couched in whatever style might be desired, provided that he was supposed to have written them himself; to receive oaths, but not to take any, was a mode of proceeding that soothed his regal pride, and gratified his feelings. He would afterwards allow the country to be governed one way or another, provided that certain limits were not overstepped, and that he should be allowed to have such men as he pleased about his person. His brother, having provided for all these conditions, was welcome, and for the first time, in the king's opinion, his conduct was faultless.

Firmly fixed in these points by the information he had received from the Count d'Artois, M. de Blacas, and M. de Montesquieu, he knew how to treat everybody, and he spoke with some, listened to others, was gracious with all, without promising anything, but allowing everything to be expected from his unfettered wisdom, whilst he was firmly resolved not to accept from any one an advice which had the appearance of a condition.

The most important person, and he whose first interview with the King would be of great consequence, was M. de Talleyrand, who had been for some time, the principal actor on the political stage. Both Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand had studied their parts well, for they were fond of acting, an art in which both excelled. M. de Talleyrand's part was the more difficult, not because he was the less talented of the two performers, but because of his position. For men who act exclusively upon principle, success is not an absolute necessity, but for men who trust solely to their talents it is an indispensable condition. Up to this time, between those who had refused all connection with the revolution, and those who had made a compromise with it, the advantage had appeared to be entirely on the side of the latter, for they seemed to understand in what the strength of the time lay, and joined the revolution, in order to guide it, whilst the others, blind and obstinate, had only hurried their king and friends to the scaffold. Suddenly the aspect of things changed, and those who had obstinately refused to listen to any accommodation, seemed to have judged correctly, and if the long revolution had now assumed its last phase—and the existing phase always seemed destined to be the last—it was they who would be pronounced to have acted wisely and correctly. Between Louis XVIII. returning from exile, and M. de Talleyrand,

who having alternately served the Republic and the Empire, had now, at the end of twenty years, returned to the feet of legitimacy, the advantage of position was entirely with the former. M. de Talleyrand could, indeed, boast of having contributed to the late change of affairs, but such services are soon forgotten. Besides, these services, in the opinion of the ultra royalists, were only an acknowledgment of his fault, a tardy return to true principles, and for the moment, Louis XVIII. was the conqueror, M. de Talleyrand the conquered, although he had himself contributed to his defeat. However, M. de Talleyrand assumed an attitude quite as haughty as that of his royal interlocutor. He also possessed exquisite tact, and a perfect knowledge of affairs, and the art of disposing of them with a word, and, above all, the art of flattering without demeaning himself, and of never playing a subordinate part, even in the presence of kings and princes. Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand could, therefore, meet without disadvantage on either side, and each had prepared himself thoroughly for an interview, of which both felt the importance.

Louis XVIII. received M. de Talleyrand with extreme courtesy, thanked him for his services, like a prince who felt he owed everything to his own claims, showed him that those who returned from exile were not, after all, those who had displayed least judgment or penetration, but he passed quickly from this subject to that of the existing state of affairs. In point of fact, the King and his future prime minister coincided, for both agreed in essentials. On one side, the question was a written constitution; on the other, the giving it spontaneously. There was no further need of discussion; each eagerly assented to the points proposed by the other. To concede these two Chambers, which could not be refused, and gratify military men, whom it would be sufficient to flatter, for they neither desired to govern, nor knew how. Such was M. de Talleyrand's project, and the only one to which the King offered no objection. Louis XVIII., on his side, gave M. de Talleyrand to understand, that a man such as he, well skilled in the art of diplomacy, and still reflecting the *éclat* of the great empire, a *prestige* which Louis felt without acknowledging, should always be his representative before Europe. This was sufficient for M. de Talleyrand. The King and the minister then separated, after an interview which royal politeness had made sufficiently long—the King really satisfied, M. de Talleyrand affecting to be so. It may be supposed the latter was not fully content, for he did not tell any one what reasons he had to be so, and he preserved, which was unusual with him, a profound silence on the incidents of the

interview, which proved, at least, the unimportant nature of the conversation. He contented himself with saying, to those who questioned him, that the king was a man of intelligence, of very great intelligence, of a cast of mind, indeed, of which no specimens had appeared since the end of the eighteenth century.

Meanwhile, a more important visit was announced, that of the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor Alexander played, with sincerity and success, the part of the generous conqueror at Paris, and interested himself in our future destiny with a warmth and goodwill that well deserved the gratitude of the French, if it were not painful to be indebted even for one's happiness to a stranger. The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria thought little of such things. The King of Prussia troubled himself little with what might happen to France, provided he could return to Berlin with solid assurances of peace, and large sums towards the expenses of the war; and the Emperor of Austria thought as little of the fate of France, provided he returned to Vienna with the certainty of getting Italy and the Tyrol. Let the Bourbons get out of the affair as well as they could; that was their business, and that of the French. Nothing more was asked of them, than that they would not again cross the Alps or the Rhine. As for Napoleon, it would be more agreeable had he been at the Azores or Saint Helena, than at Elba; but there he was, and no more interest was taken in him, at least for the present. Alexander thought otherwise. Liberal, and in little danger of being taken at his word on the subject of liberty by his subjects, yet sincere in his sentiments, he thought it more consistent with his own greatness to leave the French free, and also more prudent to leave them content. In the habit of frequenting the society of men who advocated liberal institutions, and very intimate with M. de Lafayette, who, at the first hope of a free government, had left his retreat at Lagrange, he became confirmed in his generous inclinations, bound himself by his words, and had, in some sort, taken upon himself the task of defending the ideas and interests of the senate, to whom he took a pleasure in acknowledging his obligations, for it was to this body the allied monarchs owed the deposition of Napoleon. Discontented, not with the Count d'Artois, but with the emigrants who had hurried from England and the provinces to Paris, Alexander had sent Count Pozzo di Borgo to Compeigne, to talk reason to Louis XVIII. But, though very adroit, Count Pozzo could not succeed in entering into any satisfactory explanation with this king, so heavy in body and so agile in mind, and who warded off all serious re-

monstrance with a half natural, half affected thoughtlessness. Alexander, therefore, determined to go himself to Compeigne, a bold step, for neither the King of Prussia nor the Emperor of Austria had gone there; but it was a step that the age and vivacity of the young Emperor might explain, and which could not fail to flatter Louis XVIII. extremely. Alexander wished to make him understand, that he must not only grant a constitution, but have about his person the men of the empire and revolution, give up the idea of dating his reign from the death of Louis XVII., comply in many points with the prevailing ideas of the times, and, above all, consider the army. Louis XVIII., having been apprised of this visit, determined to receive the Emperor, and to act towards him, as he did towards all who pretended to give him advice, with dignity and general professions of goodwill.

No sooner was Alexander announced, than crowds of courtiers fell back, leaving face to face the head of the European coalition, and the head of the old French dynasty. Flattered by this visit, and wishing to appear penetrated with gratitude, Louis XVIII. opened his arms to the young Emperor and received him as a father, but as a father, whose age and rank placed him above all the sovereigns of his time. Whilst he thanked him for the assistance he had given his family, he affected to refer the great events that had taken place, to superior and Providential causes, and especially to the influence of the great principle of which he was the representative. He seemed to have nothing to learn; when the Czar spoke to him of the new position of France, he listened with politeness, but as a man to whom a young prince could not teach anything, he disputed nothing, admitted nothing, expressed decided resolutions on every subject, conformable to his authority, which was not derived from any one, and to his wisdom, which needed no counsel; he allowed his resolutions to be understood without entering into particulars, and, in a word, was almost as incomprehensible to the sovereign as he had been to the ambassador. The embarrassment of the Emperor Alexander was completed by the arrival of a deputation of the legislative corps at Compeigne, to compliment the King, whilst the senate resuming its reserve and silence towards Louis XVIII. had neglected to appear. A body that pretended to represent the nation, and that had acquired popularity by its recent resistance to Napoleon, thus hastening to meet the monarch, and prostrate itself before his legitimate authority before he had made any promise, necessarily deprived the senate's silence of its influence, and gave Alexander the appearance of an importunate adviser. This prince gave up the idea of remonstrating warmly and returned unsuccessful

though overwhelmed with politeness ; he had spoken but few words, and had obtained still fewer from his august interlocutor ; he was not more contented than M. de Talleyrand, though he acknowledged it more frankly. Having two hundred thousand soldiers at his command, and being, unfortunately, master of France, it was more to his credit than discredit to acknowledge that he had been politely dismissed. After spending three or four days at Compeigne, in reposing himself and acquiring some notion of men and things, Louis XVIII. determined to repair to Saint Ouen, at the gates of Paris, where he would make a last and short stay before entering Paris itself. He decided with his brother and the members of the Provisional Government, that by publishing a general declaration, announcing the guaranteed constitutional principles they would satisfy the senate, who would visit the King, and thus the affair would be finished, three weeks before those men, who wished to procure France solid liberty under the ancient dynasty, would have been able, by the assistance of Alexander, to deny admittance to Louis XVIII., until he promised all that was demanded. But the excitement had become so great within a few days that it could not be allayed, and had the attempt been made, it would seem as if the assistance of foreigners had been sought in order to stop a national movement. France, indeed, having first hesitated whether she would recal the Bourbons, then saw that they were her only resource, and the necessity once admitted, the sensibility of some, and the sordidness of others, had given an impulse to the public mind, unexampled since the taking of the Bastille and the return of General Bonaparte from Egypt. The senate, which had grown weak by continual concessions, was losing ground every day ; but if the senate was conquered in what regarded its own interests, it was not vanquished in the principles which it had undertaken to support. The senate had demanded a constitution, and a constitution was about to be granted with the essential clauses. But the senate did not succeed in making the constitution the result of a combined act of the nation and the King, which would have given the constitution a strength and inviolability that might have secured its duration ; and in this respect the Bourbons lost their cause when they believed they had secured its triumph, for they established the ascendancy of this principle of *octroi royal*, of which the results at a future day were a *coup d'état* and their own downfall.

It was decided that they should confine themselves to a simple, general declaration, and all the Count d'Artois' assistants were set to work—M. de Vitrolles, his chief instrument, as well as M.M. de la Maisonfort and Terrier de

Montciel—who formed a second council in the *entresol* of the Tuileries. The King, who disdained such literature, did not interfere, but depended on M. de Blacas to superintend and revise their work. The question for these many editors was to know what part should be accorded to the senate, what amount of gratitude should be shown to that body, and how far, whilst carrying out their own wishes, they might seem to comply with the desires of the senate. It was agreed that these questions should be definitely arranged at Saint Ouen. The King was overjoyed at the idea of returning to his capital, and abandoned himself to the pleasure of inhaling once more that royal incense, which had not been burned before him for so many years, and of which he now received an inordinate measure. He set out for Saint Ouen, where he arrived on the first of May. At this, the last station of his route, the influx of visitors overflowed again, and filled the royal dwelling. The senate had not yet appeared in the presence of Louis XVIII. But it was necessary to put an end to the separation between the King and that constituent body which had recalled the Bourbons, from whose hands the Count d'Artois had received the Lieutenant Generalship, and which, though detested and even despised, nobody dared dissolve or annul, for the senate was supported by the high officers of the state, by the army, and the allied sovereigns. But as it had been decided that there should be a constitution, that this constitution should emanate from the royal authority, and that the senate should compose in great part, the upper chamber, there was no reason why the senate should hold back any longer. The senators therefore consented to visit the King, and M. de Talleyrand presented them to Louis XVIII. at St. Ouen, as he had presented them to the Count d'Artois at the Tuileries. M. de Talleyrand's discourse, carefully drawn up, expressed the current ideas of the day. It was no longer the senate, he said, but the entire nation, enlightened by experience, that came to meet the King and recal him to the throne of his ancestors. The senate sharing the sentiments of the nation, came at the same time to salute the monarch. He, on his side, guided by his wisdom, was about to grant institutions conformable to the wants of modern reason. A constitutional charter would unite the interests of all parties with those of the throne, and strengthen the royal will by the adhesion of the nation's will. The King knew better than any one, that such institutions, long and happily tried in a neighbouring nation, offered a support and not an obstacle to those monarchs who based their authority on the law of the land, and were fathers to their people.

To this discourse the King made a gracious reply, which

contained a full assent to the sentiments expressed by the president of the senate. Strange to say, the members of the legislative corps, whose conduct in these circumstances dictated by a puerile jealousy, was far from honourable, and very injurious to the public cause, wished to present themselves a second time before the King, though they had already paid him their respects at Compeigne. They repeated the commonplaces of the day, and after them, the principal bodies of the state would needs recommence defiling and haranguing. The 2nd May was appointed for receptions, and but little time remained for serious business. The declaration that was to precede the King's entry into Paris, and which was, in reality, the condition of this entry, was not even drawn up on the evening of the second, or to speak more correctly, it was overdone, for there were five or six drafts, one drawn up by M. de Vitrolles, another by M. de la Maisonfort, besides several others. The King weary, and caring little about the terms in which he should be made say what had been agreed on several days before, ordered M. de Blacas to see to the definite arrangement of this declaration that was to be published the following day. M. de Blacas assembled the different compilers, passed a part of the night of the 2-3rd May with them, gave audience to some advisers, each of whom brought a phrase or an idea, took care to dismiss the greater number of them, and then, having softened down those sentences which seemed to express too much gratitude to the senate, or too much dependance on that body, he decided on the form of the declaration. M. de Vitrolles, who was the principal compiler, having asked if it should not be submitted to the King, M. de Blacas replied that it was not necessary to disturb the monarch, who had much need of repose on the eve of such a day as the approaching, and the original of the celebrated declaration of St. Ouen was dated 2nd May, sent to the King's printer, and in the morning a large number of copies was issued.

The following is the preamble to this declaration :—

"Recalled by the love of our people to the throne of our fathers, enlightened by the misfortunes of the nation that we are destined to govern, our first thought is to invoke that mutual confidence so necessary to our repose, and to the happiness of our people.

"Having read attentively the plan of the constitution proposed by the senate at its meeting of the sixth of last April, we find the fundamental principles of this constitution excellent, but many of the articles bear the impress of the haste with which they were drawn up, and

cannot, in their present form, become fundamental laws of the state.

"Being resolved to adopt a liberal constitution, desirous that it should be the result of mature deliberation, wishing that it should be wisely compiled, and not wishing to accept one that would require revision, we summon for the tenth of the month of June of the present year, the senate and legislative corps, before whom we pledge ourselves to lay the result of our labours, assisted by a commission selected from these two bodies, and to lay down as bases of this constitution the following guarantees."

After this preamble, the guarantees which had never varied, were enumerated. Two chambers voting on all affairs of state; responsible ministers bound to appear before these chambers; personal liberty; liberty of the press; liberty of conscience; taxation by vote; the eligibility of Frenchmen of every rank to civil and military employments; the permanency of judges, the confirmation of the national sales; the support of the Legion of Honour, &c. With the exception of the fundamental question of its origin, which made the constitutional charter a concession and not a contract, the promise to give it such as was desired was formal; and besides, it was made to the senate, which heightened the importance and authority of this body, and assured the adoption of the most desired resolutions, with one exception, which, we repeat, the Bourbons ought to have been less inclined to reject than any other, for well would it have been for them had they been bound beyond the possibility of retracting.

Under the auspices of this declaration, Louis XVIII. prepared to make his entry into Paris the 3rd May. He left St. Ouen at eleven in the morning, escorted by an immense crowd that came to meet him. He was in a caleche drawn by eight horses, the Duchess d'Angoulême at his side, and the two Princes de Condé on the opposite seat; the Count d'Artois on the right of his carriage; the Duke of Berry on the left, both on horseback. Behind the King's carriage came the Marshals, next followed the cavalry of the National Guard, commanded by Count Charles de Damas. Whilst this great cortege was passing, every eye was turned on the infantry of the Imperial Guard, of which some companies had guarded the King at Compeigne, had followed him to St. Ouen, and now escorted him to Paris. The public contemplated with extreme curiosity those manly faces, tanned by twenty-five years warfare, assisting respectfully at a ceremony opposed to their inclinations, neither joyous nor excited like their marshals, but haughty though submissive to the desires of France, whose

destinies were now being changed. Amidst the ardent and unanimous cries of "Vive le Roi," there was frequently heard "Vive la Garde," an expressive cry that proved the sympathy of all present for these noble relics of our heroic wars. Even the more rational of the royalists admired their attitude, at once proud and resigned.*

Louis XVIII. was received with enthusiasm. Those deep-seated emotions, the offspring of memory, which the Bourbons possessed the gift of awakening, were perhaps stronger, when the Count d'Artois made his entrance into Paris, because the people then felt those emotions for the first time. But reflection told all minds, that nothing better could be done than to recal the Bourbons, and that with them alone could peace and a moderate government be expected. This was also become the opinion of the middle classes, dispassionate and disinterested judges of the questions of Government. They had a particularly good opinion of the King who had gained an undisputed reputation for wisdom, by his prudent conduct during the emigration; the middle-classes were very well disposed, and possessing great influence with the populace, who are naturally imitative, they caused Louis XVIII. to be loudly applauded, by applauding him themselves. The King's figure was concealed by the carriage, and his noble countenance rendered more gracious by content, was alone visible, and gave pleasure to all beholders. The desire of peace being universal, no one regretted that the King now called to the throne, was unable to manage a horse, and the public imagination dwelt with pleasure on the oft-sketched image of an aged father returning to the bosom of his family. The Duchess d' Angoulême, whose usually severe countenance was several times this day bathed with tears, and the Princes of Condé, whose misfortunes were present to every mind, excited general interest. This carriage, which contained the entire Bourbon family, was accompanied by the most respectful acclamations, until it arrived at Nôtre Dame. After the religious ceremony the carriage turned towards the Tuileries by the Pont Neuf, where a statue in plaster of Henry IV. had been raised, and at this spot all present hastened to the assistance of the Duchess d' Angoulême, who fainted at the sight of this palace which her parents had left to go to the Temple and from the Temple to the scaffold. At this affecting scene every heart was moved. Brought back in this fashion to the palace of their fathers, this august family might with good reason believe

*Many writers and M. de Chateaubriand in particular, who in general troubles himself very little about the truth, have spoken of the deportment of the guards in exaggerated terms. According to the most creditable witnesses they behaved exactly as we have endeavoured to describe, coldly but submissively.

themselves definitely established within its walls. And that it should be so, only one thing was necessary—that in entering the Tuileries the Bourbons had participated in the advanced intelligence of the age and the enlightenment of the country over which they were come to reign! It was to be desired both for them and for France. But at this very moment, these unfortunate emigrants gave a new proof of the difficulty of reconciling them with this France, of which they had seen little during twenty years, and studied still less. The grenadiers of the Imperial Guard, who had attended the King both at Compeigne and St. Ouen, and who had no other thought than to fulfil their duty to him, were placed as sentinels round the Tuileries. When the courtiers, both men and women, learned to whom their safety, and above all, that of the royal family was confided, they were seized with terror. They had recourse to M. Dupont, the Minister of War, and asked him if he had lost his reason, when he dared to trust the precious existence of the King to such hands? The General, accustomed to the fidelity of the French soldiers under arms, scarcely understood what they meant. He was at first tempted to laugh at such fears, but they recalled him to what they called the importance of the affair, and that very evening, without any consideration for these brave soldiers, who though their hearts were full of Napoleon would still have defended Louis XVIII. against all comers, he was forced to dismiss them, and insultingly send them to their barracks. And these were the hearts that were to be united, that were to be fused in love for the same dynasty.*

Next day, the different bodies of the state recommenced their visits to the Royal Family, always repeating the same speeches; then the allied troops defiled before Louis XVIII. seated on the balcony of his palace, and surrounded by the principal sovereigns of Europe, who courteously yielded the first place to him, wishing thereby to prove to France how much they esteemed both her King and herself.

Some time having been devoted to ceremonies and congratulations, the moment was now come to commence the laborious work of reconciling the past and present, of giving some compensation to the classes injured by a long proscription, without, however, offending the nation, that would not consent to be sacrificed to any private interest; seeking truth and justice through a space of twenty-five years filled with bloody quarrels, and from these to construct a system of government; a very difficult task, and almost impossible, unless a clear and firm

* I only repeat in this place, in other words, the very sentiments which General Dupont expresses in his manuscript memoirs.

May, 1814.]

CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE.

intellect should be found in the King, or one of the princes of his family, or in some minister capable of obtaining a decisive ascendancy over the court and government! Could this phenomenon be found? This was the question, and a very obscure one.

Under the short rule of the Count d'Artois, the government had only had a provisional character, and the ministers had merely borne the title of commissioners of the different ministerial departments. It was now necessary to form a definite ministry. Louis XVIII. taking things as he found them, continued the separation, which had existed under the Count d'Artois, between the Royal Council aiding the Prince with its advice, and the ministers executing his wishes, some ministers being permanent members of this council, and others only summoned to it for the special affairs of their departments. It was a strange combination, and very little suited to the government that was about to be given to France.

In order that a free state, formed upon the principle of deliberative assemblies should possess that unity of will, without which promptitude and vigour of action would be impossible, and that clearness of perception which can only result from the co-operation of many minds, it is necessary that the ministers trusted with the governing power under the crown and the chambers, should be the sole councillors of the crown, that they should concoct the resolutions of government, get them sanctioned by the king and the chambers, and then have them executed on their own responsibility, both collective and individual. It would also be necessary, before bringing the great powers of the state to this desirable state of unity, that the ministers themselves should be united by the influence of one amongst them, superior to the others in intelligence, temper, and position. It is under such conditions alone, that all the intelligence of a country can be united for the common good, which is the privilege of free states, and, at the same time, preserve that unity of action which seems to be the privilege of absolute governments, but which enjoy this advantage only in appearance, for such governments are frequently the most unstable. Between the crown and the deliberative bodies, there must, therefore, be no other intermediaries than the ministers alone, who are at once the authors, demonstrators, and executors, on their own responsibility, of the different acts that constitute the administrative authority. All additional machinery is useless and consequently hurtful. But, in 1814, experience had not yet taught us anything on these important subjects, and even in England people acted more from instinct than reflection.

Free government was a science existing in England practically, but theoretically nowhere.

The King simply accepted the legacy of circumstances—that is, the superior royal council, which was only, as we have seen, the old provisional government transformed into the council of the Lieutenant General, and under it the ministers, some being members of the council and some not. He confined himself to making definite appointments to each department by continuing in office the actual possessors of portfolios, or by changing them as circumstances arose. The following were his selection.

No one would wish to remove M. Louis from the finance department, where, in a few days, he had gained universal confidence. He was named minister of this department. General Dupont, who was well acquainted with the army, and did all in his power to satisfy the feelings of the military, but unfortunately possessed of less firmness than intelligence, and who had with difficulty preserved his presence of mind, in the midst of conflicting pretensions, but who had not yet lost the prestige of his long disgrace, was confirmed in the post of Minister of War. M. de Malouet, an honest, laborious man, retained his office as Marine Minister. M.M. de Talleyrand, and de Montesquiou were summoned to the ministry, however, without losing their places in the council. Although M. de Laforest was Minister of Foreign Affairs, it was M. de Talleyrand alone who had directed the negotiation of the armistice, and he was the only person that could arrange the conditions of a definite peace. He became titular minister of foreign affairs, whilst next to the princes of the blood, he was the most important member of the superior royal council, which from custom was now called the “upper council.”

Although M. de Montesquiou was a clergyman, he did not wish to be either cardinal or ambassador to the Holy See; he wished to be minister in France, and chief minister. He willingly resigned the foreign policy, which, on account of the peace, he believed would be, for a long time, very unimportant, and which also belonged of right to M. de Talleyrand, and reserved himself for the home policy which was about to become very active, very difficult, and very stormy. He possessed more than one advantage for this department. He exercised a certain authority over his own party, and could be as arrogant to his colleagues as to others; he was accustomed to public life, and spoke with ease. But he was irritable, and did not possess sufficient vigour either of mind or character, and was quite unequal to the burden he was about to assume—a burden, which would have been, indeed, too

heavy for anybody. But the royalist party had not, at this time, a better candidate to offer to the king, so that the choice of the minister for the home department, was, under the circumstances, the best that could be made. M. Beugnot, who had temporarily administered the home department, was compensated with the command of the police under the title of "director general," an office almost equivalent to a place in the ministry.

M. Henrion de Pansey, notwithstanding the excellence of his character, lost his appointment of chancellor. It was desirable, that a man who had belonged to the ancient parliaments, should be at the head of the magistracy, and a magistrate was chosen who possessed the learning, and somewhat of the studied eloquence of d'Aguesseau, and who, endowed at the same time with a mild temper and honourable principles, entertained all the opinions of the old royalists. This magistrate was M. Dambray. Lastly, it would be impolitic to exclude from the official members of the government, a person who possessed so much influence at court as M. de Blacas, and the ministers, desirous of associating him with themselves, offered him the control of the royal household. M. de Blacas had just been appointed Grand Master of the Bedchamber, the only important office that was vacant at court, for all the others had been given to their old possessors. Vain of this distinguished favour, he thought it would be a degradation to enter the ministry. It was only by great efforts that he could be induced to yield. Great efforts were made, and he was prevailed on to accept a portfolio, which leaving him near the King's person, without imposing on him any portion of the burden of public affairs, yet united him in the collective responsibility of the ministry.

The Count d'Artois had admitted M. de Vitrolles into the council with the title of secretary of state. A secretary of state, placed between the sovereign and his ministers, in order to transmit to them the orders of a master who never took council but of himself, ought to have passed away with Napoleon. In the new order of things this post should have fallen to the lot of M. de Blacas, and would have been an impossibility even for him. In fact, the ministers had determined to communicate directly with the King, and had already refused to accept the intervention of M. de Vitrolles with the Count d'Artois, which, indeed, was only natural, since they were the responsible authors of their own acts. But one function, therefore, remained to the new secretary of state, that of keeping a registry of the meetings of the council. The members of the council would not on

any account sanction this registry. M. de Montesquiou and M. de Talleyrand said, with justice, that a registry would restrain the freedom of debate, for the certainty of having all they said noted down, whether correctly or not, would prevent the most sincere and the most courageous members of the government from speaking with perfect frankness. Therefore, there being no longer any intermediary between the ministers and the King, and, not being allowed to keep a register, the secretary of state had no duties to perform. His colleagues did what they could to exclude M. de Vitrolles from the royal council, and to compensate him by a post at court. But he was obstinate, and, being supported by the princes, remained in the council, where his only employment was to take notes of the adopted resolutions, and to correspond with the *Moniteur* or the *Telegraph*. So he remained, little liked by his colleagues, liking them still less, at open enmity with M. de Montesquiou, who was not sparing of arrogance towards a person whose rank he despised, whose merit he did not recognise, and whose services he denied.*

To these personages was added, with the title of minister of state in charge of the post-office, M. Ferrand, a well-informed old man, and a not very skilful writer, endowed with all the obstinacy and the vehemence of the ultra-royalists. He was in the administration of the post-office what M. Beugnot was in the police—a director-general, with almost ministerial rank.

Such was the cabinet of Louis XVIII., if an assemblage of ministers can be called a cabinet, in which M. de Talleyrand, the most important by his position, was allowed to occupy himself only with foreign affairs, where M. de Montesquiou, the next in importance, was obliged to give his entire attention to affairs connected with the Chambers; and M. de Blacas, the third in rank, was allowed to interfere solely in business brought immediately under the King's notice—a cabinet, in which each minister acted almost isolated, not being united by a prime minister, for no such person existed; nor by the superior royal council, which had no leader; for a literary king, indolent and solely occupied with classic reading, could not be considered as a head. There was reason to fear that this ministerial chaos, unguided by any governing power, would be led by the passions of the times, which were very irrational, very exacting, and very unsettled.

On the second day after his entry into Paris the King assembled the royal council, to which, on this occasion, all

* M. de Vitrolles kept, nevertheless, some sort of register of the meetings of the council, very short, but very interesting, and which is still preserved in the archives of the state, and is perhaps one of the most curious documents we possess concerning the government of the first Restoration.

the ministers were summoned, besides the princes, who were amongst its habitual members. The King addressed the council in an opening speech, which was studied, polite, and affectionate. He spoke in a clear voice, with effect, though haughtily, touching rather superficially on every subject, wishing that, on the first day, a word at least should be said about everything. He enumerated the different objects that were to be provided for; the army, which should be re-organised, and attached to the present dynasty; the navy, which should be remodelled, and proportioned to our financial resources; the old military establishment of the King, which was to be again set on foot; the finances, which should be the measure of what could be done for the army and navy; the taxes, which must be maintained and collected in spite of imprudent promises; the sufferings of the occupied provinces, to which a speedy end must be put; the negotiations, which it was important should end in a definite but not humiliating peace; and, lastly, the constitution, which was promised for the 10th of June at the latest.

The task with regard to the army was most difficult. It was in the first place necessary to decide on the principle of recruiting, and come to a rational resolution, considering the pledge the princes had made to abolish conscription. Besides, notwithstanding the number of desertions, the difficulty was not in the want of men, but, on the contrary, in their too great number, and in the sentiments they expressed. A hundred and fifty thousand men were about to return from England, Russia, Germany, and Spain, and about as many prisoners, all old soldiers. There would be, consequently, four hundred thousand men, at least, and more than forty thousand officers, for all of whom provision should be made. The minister of finance declared, that when the state debts should be paid, he would not have more than two hundred millions of francs to devote to the army—that is to say, that he had scarcely sufficient to pay half the claims that would be made on him. As to the navy, Napoleon's hundred vessels must be given up, for if this number was too great when the empire extended from Lubeck to Trieste, and when France had double the number of sailors, it would be ridiculous when France would be reduced to the frontiers of 1790.

Some words were exchanged on these serious subjects. The minister of war was requested to produce a plan of organisation, which would, as far as possible, satisfy all interests, by conforming to the temporary financial distress. The minister of marine was authorised to prepare large reductions, for a long peace with England was reckoned on, and it was not

desirable to offend this power by an expensive and useless display of naval force. The King, who was very sensitive to externals, desired that the names of several vessels, which recalled revolutionary memories, should be changed, whilst those of Austerlitz and Friedland, for example, which only spoke of victory, should be retained. Lastly, he questioned the minister of finance, who did not hesitate to explain again his irrevocable intentions. At first he wished to lay it down as a principle, that all the state debts should be paid, even those that were called "Buonaparte's debts," and which, unfortunately, had been contracted to support unwise wars. Whether the money were well or ill employed, these debts had been contracted on the credit of France, and it would have been as scandalous as impossible to deny them. Without this scrupulous exactness in fulfilling the engagements of the treasury there would be no public credit, and without credit, whatever system may be adopted, the taxes being insufficient for several years, it would not be possible to satisfy the most pressing wants of the state. But with credit it would be possible, provided that the proper means were adopted to obtain it. But as credit would not suffice for everything, it would be necessary also to require the exact payment of the taxes. The city of Bordeaux, in calling itself the "*City of the Twelfth of March*," signified an intention not to pay the *droits réunis*; and the other cities of the south, encouraged by this example, adopted the like resolution. If the King, now that he was at the head of the government, did not address the southern populations with great firmness, all help from the taxes, and consequently all public credit, would disappear. So spoke the minister.

The Count d'Artois reminded him that a promise had been given to abolish the *droits réunis*. "You made another promise," replied M. Louis, "that the public debts should be paid, and this promise is much more important than the other."

The King, always glad of an opportunity to make his nephews, and still more his brother, appear to be in the wrong, fully agreed with M. Louis; he declared, that without depriving the people, who had been led away by thoughtless promises, of all hope of amelioration, he intended to address a proclamation to them, recalling them to their duty, and reminding them that taxation, like law, was to be the same for all, and that good intentions, however excellent they may be, would not suffice to pay the expenses of the state. It was decided that this proclamation should be immediately drawn up, signed by the King, and published.

The ministers of finance, of war, and of the navy, having

spoken together for a few moments, it was evident that economy should be the inflexible law of the new government, for without economy it would be impossible to meet the various demands of the different government departments, and above all, to satisfy the army, whose good will it was all-important to gain. This was no time to think of expense or luxury, or of any project not demanded by absolute necessity. And still Louis XVIII. spoke in the simplest and most decided manner of the ancient military household of the King, as of an institution definitely re-established. "Already," he said, "the ancient officers of the body guards have resumed their titles." These were MM. d'Havr , de Grammont, de Poix, and de Luxembourg. But this was not enough; he also wished to increase the number of companies, in order to appoint two new officers chosen from the Imperial Army. And he was desirous of re-establishing the red companies. His determination was fixed, for it was, in his opinion, for want of a sufficient military household that royalty, and France with her, had suffered so many misfortunes in 1789.

To understand how imprudent it was to re-establish this ancient military household, it must be explained that under the name of *red companies*, it was meant to assemble two or three thousand gentlemen, some very old, and others mere boys, not deficient in courage, if an occasion called for it, but wholly unfit for effective military service; they were all to have magnificent uniforms, and a rank not lower than that of captain. Besides these, there were to be assembled, under the name of body-guards, three thousand young men who should have the rank of cornets, and to whom were to be added artillery and infantry, to the number of four thousand, which would make altogether about ten thousand men, costing as much as forty or fifty thousand, at a moment when it would be, perhaps, necessary to disband two hundred thousand soldiers, and thirty thousand veteran officers, covered with wounds, and doomed to sink into misery. The King's household, thus constituted, could not cost less than twenty million francs; and should the civil list pay a part, it would be a great imprudence to divert such a sum from the war budget, and give the army, little disposed as it was to interpret favorably the diminution it was about to undergo, an opportunity of comparing its misery with the opulence of the King's household troops. Louis XVIII. distinctly declared that the Imperial Guard should meet the highest consideration, but how were all these things to be conciliated? how were all these expenses to be met?

We may see from this, that the Bourbon princes returned with resolutions ready-formed on the most important sub-

jects. They wished in the present instance to furnish employment to poor gentlemen (the only specious excuse for the proceeding), and they actually believed that six thousand gentlemen, well armed, could have checked the French Revolution, an opinion, indeed, which they were not singular in professing. This august family was destined soon to experience what resistance could be made against a revolution with even the bravest gentlemen! No member of the council dared to raise an objection to a resolution apparently irrevocable. Even the Minister of Finance was silent. He gave what money he could, employing all his energy to avoid giving more; and as to how it should be employed, he left that to the consideration of the Minister of War, who was more interested in the question than he. The latter would take good care not to quarrel with the French nobility, who were willing in this fashion to resume the profession of arms. M. de Talleyrand and M. de Montesquiou possessed sufficient power to render them fearless of the nobility, but the former wished to win their good opinion, and the latter agreed with him on this occasion, so that no opposition was offered to a measure destined to be fatal to the Bourbon dynasty. As a proof of his solicitude for the army, and of the attention with which its interests would be guarded, the King announced that he would form a superior Council of War, composed of the princes, of several marshals, and of some of the most distinguished lieutenants-general of each service. He added that he would himself preside.

The sufferings of the occupied provinces were then spoken of. It was already evident that the Convention of the 23rd April was a deception. The foreign troops that were to have retired in proportion as we evacuated the fortresses, had not even moved. The heads of the armies intended to sell for their own advantage the *materiel* deposited in the magazines and arsenals of which they had taken possession. They even carried their pretensions so far as to lay claim to the salt magazines, and attempted to cut down the woods for their private benefit, and, in the disputes resulting from these pretensions, sought a fresh motive for delaying their departure. The sacrifices that had been made in evacuating so many distant posts of the highest importance, met with no compensation, and the immediate relief that had been hoped from the Convention of the 23rd of April, was found to be an illusion.

The King expressed himself very warmly on this subject, and the Duke de Berry, who was always excitable, said that France should not be devastated in this manner on unfounded pretexts, Napoleon having already gone to Elba, and all the

commanders of the French army having submitted to the new order of things. M. de Talleyrand was ordered to speak on this subject with the sovereigns and their ministers, and to express himself in the most decided manner. He was also desired to introduce the important subject of peace; and as to the constitution, the King, as we have already remarked, said nothing, or almost nothing. But it was of the first importance to fulfil the pledges made to the senate and the legislative corps, that were summoned to meet on the 10th of June. The allied sovereigns, on their part, showed a desire to leave France, recalled to their dominions by their own affairs, and also desirous to obtain their share of the spoils of the great empire. They were consequently anxious for the speedy conclusion of the peace; and they often insinuated—Alexander more than the others—that they should not consider their obligations towards France fulfilled, and particularly towards those who had rid them of Napoleon, until the question of the constitution should be decided. Influenced by these different reasons, Louis XVIII. declared his intention of anticipating the day appointed for the convocation of the senate and the legislative corps; consequently the 31st May was substituted for the 10th June—a change which necessitated greater expedition in drawing up a sketch of the new constitution.

During this preliminary examination of the great affairs of state, Louis XVIII. appeared to his councillors to be dignified, affable, and, perhaps, a little superficial to those who, like M. de Talleyrand, M. Louis, and General Dessoles, were capable of seeing beyond the surface. However, the members of the council were satisfied, and, according to custom, affected to be still more so than they really were.

Every subject entered upon was of importance. M. de Talleyrand, having learned from the Minister of the Interior the horrible exactions practised in our provinces, introduced the subject to the allied monarchs and their ministers. To produce the treaty of the 23rd April was sufficient to prove them in the wrong; for it had been decided that from the date of this convention all exactions should cease, that the allied troops should commence their retreat, and that the territories through which they marched should alone be obliged to furnish them provisions during their passage. Although the articles of the convention might in the execution give rise to abuses, still the exactions that had been made were exorbitant, and so odious, that no excuse could be offered for them. Alexander appeared to be sincerely indignant at what he heard, and declared that he had given orders, and that he would now renew them. The King of Prussia, being niggardly and desirous of small profits for his army, was

really embarrassed, but promised to issue fresh instructions. Prince Schwarzenberg's language was satisfactory, but his sincerity doubtful. M. de Talleyrand said to the allied ministers that since all admitted the injustice of what was going on, no one could take it amiss if the King, in a proclamation addressed to his subjects, should advise them to resist the exactions daily committed, both by levies in kind and by the sale of property belonging to the state. The ministers did not dare to object, for that would be to acknowledge themselves the accomplices of their subordinates, and a proclamation was drawn up upon the spot, conformable to the truths that had been admitted, and sent to the Royal Council. There was at the same time laid before the council the proclamation concerning the collection of the *droits réunis*—an affair always of great difficulty, as we have said, in the Southern provinces.

The proclamation intended for the occupied provinces, cited the convention of the 23rd April, of which the intention had been to allow France to enjoy an anticipated peace. In the proclamation the inhabitants of these provinces were called upon to fulfil faithfully the conditions of this convention, and consequently to treat the allied armies well, and supply them during their retreat with whatever they might need.

But the proclamation reminded the people of the promises made to France, not to make any further war levies, to respect public and private property, and enjoined them to refuse compliance with every illegal demand, and forbade them to purchase articles offered for sale by the foreign armies, such as wood, salt, or furniture, declaring beforehand that all such sales were illegal and void. The precaution was a good one, for, taking wood as an example, as its cutting down and removal would require several months, the declaration of the nullity of the sale would prevent purchasers from presenting themselves, seeing that they would be certain not to obtain what they should have paid for. It is sad to think that such measures were necessary to prevent the French from assisting in the spoliation of the land; but since the mournful necessity existed, we repeat, that the precaution was well devised. Besides, it was couched in firm and dignified language, which was not at all calculated to offend the allied sovereigns, however severe upon their generals.

The proclamation was adopted and published immediately. The motion concerning the *droits réunis* was less unanimously supported, and met with much opposition from the princes. In treating this subject, the promises made by the Count d'Artois and his sons always presented a difficulty. This prince returned to the charge, reminded the ministers of the promises made

to the people, and alleged the excellent dispositions of the refractory provinces. But these remarks had no effect on M. Louis, who said that, in financial matters, the best disposed were those who paid the taxes punctually, and that it was an indispensable necessity that all should submit to the laws, otherwise he should be obliged to retire, and leave his place to those who would undertake to govern in the midst of such anarchy. The King, annoyed at constantly hearing of the promises made by his brother and nephews, and weary of a royalism that manifested itself by refusing to pay the taxes, said that the Vendéans were as much royalists as the Bordelais, and that notwithstanding they paid the public dues. Had the King been better informed, he would have known that the Vendéans behaved no better, with regard to the duty on salt, than the Bordelais with regard to that on wines. However, the argument was good with respect to others, if not to the Vendéans, and the Minister of Finance, supported by the King and his colleagues, carried the proclamation in dispute; it was published with that intended for the invaded provinces.

In this proclamation, the King, addressing himself to the wine-growing provinces, said that, like Henry IV. and Louis XII., he wished to be called the father of his people, and to be able to suppress all burdensome imposts; but that the present taxes, which had been much ameliorated, were indispensable, until some means should be devised to replace or suppress them; that a sacred duty was to be fulfilled towards the creditors of the State, and towards the army, which could not be done if the finances became disorganised; besides, it was necessary to give an example of respect for the laws, if they did not wish to fall into a frightful state of anarchy; he hoped that his subjects in the southern province, who every day bestowed on him lavish expressions of their affection, would now give an effective proof of it, by submitting to a necessity, whose duration he would endeavour to abridge; that he would rather warn than correct, but that if, having admonished, his voice were not attended to, he should be obliged to punish, and he would do so, to prevent the disorganisation of the finances, the destruction of the laws, and the ruin of the State.

These two proclamations were, indeed, only words, but it was useful that they should be heard, especially from the lips of the head of the house of Bourbon. The foreign generals would be less audacious in their exactions, and compelled to greater precaution now that their acts were disclaimed by their sovereigns, and by the Bourbons their allies, besides being exposed to meet with greater opposition from the people. As to the refractory provinces, the affectionate language of the monarch was certainly not capable of converting them, but

the resolution, so decidedly expressed concerning the execution of the laws, would give the authorities a moral force which, up to this moment they had not possessed, and would also hasten the time when the taxes might be again collected.

The next objects to be considered were the peace and the constitution, in order to place France in a proper and definite position, externally with regard to Europe and internally with respect to herself.

M. de Talleyrand was naturally the principal agent of the Government in the important negotiation concerning the peace, and the task was not an easy one, even for him. A great deal had been said on this subject, in the conversation of each day, but no positive decision had been come to. But there were two description of questions to be decided, those which concerned France in particular, and those which concerned all Europe. Thus, although the principal belligerent powers were decided as to what they wished for, and tacitly determined to let each satisfy itself; although England, as was well known, had resolved to claim Belgium, in order to join it to Holland and thus create an important monarchy, which would remove us from the mouths of large rivers; although Austria, independently of Italy, also desired a portion of the banks of the Rhine to give Bavaria in exchange for the Tyrol; although Russia and Prussia desired to have Poland and Saxony to share amongst themselves; and that these motives decided all four to deprive us of the Rhine frontier, in order that these different arrangements might be practicable, still, even in permitting each other to effect these different spoliations, there still remained so many subordinate questions to be determined, both as to the extent of the partitions, and the combinations to be adopted, in order to establish in some sort a European equilibrium, so that the lesser states should not be sacrificed to the greater, that the decision was not easy, and there was no certainty of obtaining it but after long and painful efforts. It was seen at a glance, that without supposing sittings so protracted as those of the congress of Westphalia (which had continued several years) it would require some months to conciliate all these interests, and the allied sovereigns did not wish to pass these months in Paris. There was another reason why these numerous questions should not be debated in Paris, and this was that France should not be afforded an opportunity of taking part in the discussion. However desirous the allies might be of agreeing, they were almost certain of not doing so, and consequently of quarrelling more than once before arriving at a definite resolution, and they did not wish to give France the immense advantage of being present at the disputes. Besides being a moral triumph, it would offer her an

opportunity of recovering with ease a strong position, by uniting herself to one party against the other, and so making powerful alliances. Although the other powers pretended that France should be better treated than she was at Châtillon, in point of fact, they cared little about how she was treated, and under the Bourbons as well as under Napoleon it was determined to reduce her to her ancient limits, and, as far as possible, exclude her from the great European arrangements. There was less to irritate under the Bourbons, but there was also less of the fear that Napoleon inspired, and the one almost compensated for the other. M. de Metternich had since his arrival again taken the chief part in the negotiations, and thanks to his profound and redoubtable sagacity, he said that it was necessary, first to arrange relations with us, and that there would be afterwards less difficulty in arranging the relations of the European states amongst themselves.

This subtle thought soon penetrated the minds of the allied sovereigns, and they decided to conclude their arrangements with France at Paris, and reserve for a congress, which should be held in one of the great capitals of the continent, the general arrangements which should constitute the new balance of power in Europe. Austria was treated at this period with great deference because she had secured the general safety by joining the coalition spite of her natural repugnance and the ties of blood, and it was decided that the future congress should be held at Vienna.

The foregoing arrangements being communicated to the French negotiators met with no opposition from them. At first view they appeared simple and free from guile, for it was of the first importance to put an end to the war, and consequently to treat first with France, against whom arms had been taken up. No opposition could be offered to the project of submitting the numerous questions to which the new order of things would give rise in Europe, to a future assembly to be held in a central capital after the different monarchs should have had time to return to their dominions, and arrange their most pressing affairs, and thus be more at liberty to give the necessary attention to those definite arrangements which interested the entire world. It would have been difficult to make any objection to so specious a plan, and one so apparently well founded. In fact nothing was objected, for on our part we were anxious to enjoy the honour of having concluded a peace, which would furnish so happy a contrast between the government of the Bourbons and that of Napoleon.

These resolutions were consequently adopted, and it was arranged that all things concerning France should be first and immediately decided. The frontier question was the first, and

beyond all comparison the most important. We had often been told that France would be treated very differently under the Bourbons to what she was under the Bonapartes. More was done than saying this—it had been written, and a number of proclamations had been filled with this promise. Afterwards, in the conversations to which the conventions of the 23rd April had given occasion, there had been mention, but in a very vague manner, and without any definite engagement, of adding a million subjects in addition to our territorial possessions of 1790. As to the principle of the frontiers of 1790 it had never been altered either directly or indirectly, and no negotiator in the world, except it had been Napoleon himself flushed with victory, could have obtained a concession on this point. In fact, on this depended the creation of the kingdom of the Low Countries, so anxiously desired by England, the restitution of the Tyrol and Italy for Austria, the acquisition of Poland for Russia, and of Saxony for Prussia, since it would have been impossible to accomplish these projects without depriving us of the left bank of the Rhine. It would therefore have been unreasonable to try to change this resolution. It would be uselessly exerting a tenacity of disposition which could be better employed elsewhere. Consequently good care was taken not to dispute a point so decided, and every effort was directed to the manner of defining the frontier of 1790, of which we had been solemnly promised an improvement.

M. de Talleyrand had received certain instructions in full royal council. He had been recommended most particularly to try and obtain the million subjects on the north side of France, and not on the south-east—that is in Savoy. The house of Savoy, which was about being restored at the same time as the house of Bourbon, was united to Louis XVIII. by the bonds of blood and friendship, and it would be repugnant to his feelings to share in its spoils. Let us add that our ancient frontier needed much more to be strengthened to the north than to the south. M. de Talleyrand was also desired to require the entire restoration of our colonies, and not to consent to any contribution for the expenses of the war.

The idea of obtaining the promised augmentation to the north instead of the south, although inspired by family reason, was very wise. It would be possible, indeed, without exceeding the limit marked by a million souls, to improve our frontier considerably, and render it almost as strong as that of the Rhine, though neither so extensive in territory or so formidable to our neighbours. And by extending it a little further, and letting it pass through the following points—Nieuport, Ypres, Courtray, Tournay, Ath, Mons, Namur, Dinant, Givet, Neuchâteau, Arlon, Luxembourg, Sarrelouis, Kaisers-Lautern, and Spire—

we should have gained a frontier not only more extensive, but more solid, since to the noble enclosure of fortresses that we already possessed, we should have joined that of the Belgian fortifications. To the celebrated fortress of Luxembourg we should have added the important position of Kaiserslautern in the Vosges, and the fortress of Landau on the Rhine. This would have been a certain compensation for the Rhine frontier, and an immense amelioration with regard to our territorial position in 1790. To obtain such a frontier, it would have been worth while to fight more than one battle.

The two negotiators who assisted M. de Talleyrand in these details—M. de Laforest and M. d'Osmond—had with much intelligence traced this new line upon the map. They proposed it in the first meeting of the negotiators, at which M. de Talleyrand was not present, as he reserved himself for an interview in which he would bring his personal influence to bear upon the monarchs and the allied ministers. MM. Laforest and d'Osmond supported their case by means of an ably written document. In this document they recounted how it had been publicly and repeatedly promised that France should be left great and strong; that it had been formally said that she should be granted an increase of a million inhabitants; and, they asserted, that unless the allied monarchs desired to destroy all equilibrium, they ought not—considering the manner in which all the other European powers had aggrandized themselves since the division of Poland—condemn France to remain as she had been at the end of the last century.

Hardly had the foreign commissioners heard this memoir read, and cast their eyes upon the map, than they exclaimed against our pretensions, and appeared as much surprised as if the thing had been quite unexpected, and what they could not have foreseen. They had only heard, they said, of the frontiers of 1790; they did not know whether there had ever been mention *de vive voix* of any augmentation whatever; as for them, they now heard of it for the first time, and could find no trace of it in their instructions. The English commissioner alone, entering a little deeper into the subject, showed that the execution of this project would dismember Belgium, which would be contrary to the promises made to the Belgians, that their territories should not be parcelled out, and given to different masters. Our negotiators replied that if under the rule of Napoleon the Belgians did not feel much desire to belong to France, on account of the conscription and the *droits réunis*, it would be quite different under the Bourbons; that the feeling of the Belgians was totally changed; and that those who should be left to France would never think of objecting,—and

that the only objection would be from those who should be given up to Holland—an assertion whose truth was strictly proved, since the Belgians had had the English and German troops amongst them, and had reflected on what would be their fate under a Protestant power. Our adversaries did not reply, and did not advance the only reason which could have had any value, namely, that France would by this means gain the Belgian fortresses in addition to her own, and that the future kingdom of the Low Countries would be without a frontier. Their only defence was an exhibition of profound astonishment, and a declaration that our pretensions were so novel, so unforeseen, that it was impossible to discuss them, nobody being prepared for the subject. It was evidently necessary that the meeting should separate, and each member consult his respective chief.

The French Commissioners told M. de Talleyrand of the effect produced by their first proposition, and he immediately determined to confer with those persons, monarchs or ministers, who decided sovereignty on European affairs. Promises had indeed been made him at the time of the convention of the 23rd April when there was a question of evacuating the most important fortresses, but vague promises which, if contested, would give no ground for exclaiming against a breach of faith, the mere mention of which would seem an offence. Besides deriving all his strength against emigration from the favour of the foreign monarchs, M. de Talleyrand was not sufficiently at his ease, to speak to them with that decided energy which would have commanded attention.

M. de Talleyrand had several interviews with Lord Castlereagh, M. de Nesselrode, and M. de Metternich, the three persons who could alone exert any influence in this dispute. Lord Castlereagh represented the power to which Louis XVIII. had expressed the most gratitude and from which some return might be expected. But there was none. M. de Talleyrand found the English minister plain-spoken and friendly, but obstinate as the English ever are when their interests are at stake. England wished to found the monarchy of the Low Countries on a firm basis, and this object she hoped to attain by incorporating the entire of Belgium with Holland, and she certainly would not contribute to weaken the former by depriving her of her fortresses. England never forgot the continental blockade, and was most solicitous to cut us off from the sea-board. Besides, without avowing her motive, she wished by this means to compensate Holland for the colonies of which she was preparing to deprive her, especially for the Cape of Good Hope. Lord Castlereagh was consequently immoveable though polite, and spoke in such a manner as not

to leave the least hope. An appeal to M. de Nesselrode and M. de Metternich was equally unsuccessful, though neither the one nor the other had the least interest in the affair, for neither Russia nor Austria desired to curtail our possessions in the Low Countries. But M. de Talleyrand saw that M. de Nesselrode took but little interest in the subject, and was an exact reflection of his master's sentiments. The haughtiness of Louis XVIII., and the little desire he showed on different occasions to gratify Russia, above all, the spirit that seemed to animate the Bourbons, were extremely disagreeable to Alexander; for example, whilst Louis XVIII. had been so very eager to offer the *Cordon bleu* to the Prince Regent of England, he had not even thought of offering it to the Emperor of Russia, who was, however, the principal cause of Napoleon's downfall and of the restoration of the Bourbons. Alexander entertained a warm affection for M. de Caulaincourt, but when he sought, certainly without this noble-minded gentleman's solicitation, to obtain him some share of the royal favour, Louis scarcely listened to the request. There had been some question of uniting the Duke de Berry to the Archduchess Anne, who was to have been married to Napoleon, but the restored family did not appear very anxious for the union, though it was spoken of from time to time. Alexander had consequently become cool, and said frankly to his allies, that he was not certain, whether the restoration of the Bourbons was the best service they could have rendered to France and to Europe.

It was evident that no support could be expected from the Russians, and none was obtained. We might have had more hope from the Austrians. If, at the new French court, it was commonly said, that with all his talent Alexander had not common sense, and that he was too lavish of his advice; on the other hand, great praise was bestowed on the wisdom and reserve of the Emperor of Austria, who was neither a liberal, nor eager to offer advice to those who did not ask it, and moreover he warmly approved of giving as little liberty as possible to the French. It thus happened, that for some time Louis XVIII. had been on better terms with Napoleon's father-in-law, than with any other of the allied monarchs. M. de Metternich was mild, friendly, and well-disposed towards the Bourbons, whom, he said, ought not to be rendered unpopular. Still, he appeared very much embarrassed. Austria had renewed her union with England, her old and constant friend, and this union had become closer since Russia had acquired such a preponderance. She agreed with her on every point, and expected an unreserved assistance from her in the affairs of Italy. Now, England having formally announced her intention of restricting us to the frontiers of

1790, Austria could not hold a different opinion. M. de Metternich did not deny that his master had no personal reason for refusing us an extension of territory in the direction of Belgium or the Rhenish provinces, but neither did he deny that England's wishes would guide Austria on this point. He did not absolutely deny the promised increase of a million souls, but he said it was only a form of speech, that the million might not have meant more than five hundred thousand, and that in those must be counted Avignon and Montbéliard, which had been added to the territory of 1790; that certainly something might be added towards the North, but, above all, that the augmentation should extend in the direction of Savoy, and that when five hundred thousand souls should have been gained here and there, there was no reason why they should not be reckoned a million; the *amour-propre* of the allies was concerned in the affair, and they would never contradict the French government, if, in order to make the Bourbons popular, it should be publicly announced that a million inhabitants had been added to the frontiers of 1790.

It was evident that none would support us, for Prussia would either remain neuter or take part against us. She was preparing to introduce the question of money, a point on which she was particularly sensitive, and she did not wish to lose the goodwill of any of her allies by disobliging them. It was evident that nothing was to be hoped from our conquerors, at least for the present.

Nothing now remained but to refer the subject to the King's council, explain the position of affairs, and await further orders. For some time past, a universal, and it must be admitted an unjust outcry had been raised against the convention of the 23rd April, by which we had abandoned the greater number of the great European fortresses. In truth, we had made a mistake, and in desiring to put an end to the evils of war, we had not shortened the sufferings of the occupied provinces by a single day. But the intention was good, and moreover universally approved; but that was forgotten now as well by the impartial, as by the prejudiced and discontented portion of the public. But what is still stranger, these sentiments had penetrated even into the Royal Council itself, and when M. de Talleyrand had explained the species of insincerity of which he had to complain, almost everybody blamed the convention of the 23rd of April, which had deprived us of our pledges, as if all had not at that time unanimously concurred in the wisdom of the measure. The Duke de Berry, with his accustomed impetuosity, exclaimed—forgetting that he was blaming his own father—that it was the consequence of the fault committed, in so hastily signing the unfortunate

armistice. The King looked maliciously at his brother and nephew, and seemed to approve what had been said by the latter. The Duke d'Artois, deeply affected, said that it was easy to talk of the convention then, but that at the time it was signed, the government had done as well as it could, and that those who blamed would not probably have done better in the same circumstances. This prince might have added, that, at that time, the idea of hastening the evacuation of the country was the dominant thought of every mind, that a single objection had not been made, either in the council or elsewhere on the day the convention was signed. He contented himself with exhibiting a profound grief, the grief of a good man, who receives, without returning an injury, and it became an established opinion that the cause of France had been sacrificed by signing the convention too precipitately and without compensation. M. de Talleyrand, who was the author of the deed, replied to the attack by cold and disdainful silence.

However, those who blamed the convention of the 23rd of April were about to commit a like fault, that is, a fault of precipitation. Since nothing of what had been promised could be obtained, there remained but one possible resource, which was to appeal to the congress that in a few months should decide the great European questions at Vienna. The armistice was sufficient for the present because it traced a temporary frontier, that of 1790; it stipulated that all parties should retire without hostilities to these frontiers; it restored us three hundred thousand men who could be held in readiness, and if the powers were in haste to decide those questions that concerned us, they could have no reason to allege for coming to a conclusion about our affairs, and at the same time come to no resolve on what touched themselves. We, on the other hand, could advance an unanswerable reason, which was, that the sacrifices required from France would assume a different aspect according to the use that should be made of the territories abandoned by her; and that, viewed in this light, the whole matter was resolved into a question of the balance of power, and that consequently, France, before accepting the position prepared for her, ought to learn what was intended for others. No reply could be made to such an argument, and France would have an immense advantage in appearing at Vienna with her fate still undecided, for in the midst of the divisions which would inevitably arise amongst her oppressors, she might find allies who would help her to obtain better conditions than those she had been offered. Of course this same reason ought to induce the other Powers to desire an immediate settlement for all that concerned France, but it was a reason that could not be easily avowed, and a little firm-

ness might have induced an adjournment of all the pending questions to Vienna. In any case France need not have signed, and it would have been impossible to compel her.

One man alone, in the royal council, saw the course that ought to be pursued, and that man was General Dessoles. "Why," he said, "conclude to-day? We shall not possess less influence at Vienna, because of appearing there without having our fate irrevocably decided: the other Powers will certainly not be able to decide about the portion each will wish to have; they will have need of us, and we will consequently find allies. There are therefore some chances of our receiving better treatment, and there is no possibility of our receiving worse." This observation, so pregnant with wisdom, was not comprehended by any present, because that minds filled by a dominant prejudice, refuse admittance to the simplest ideas. To conclude and publish a peace, to allow the country to enjoy its fruits, and assume to themselves the honour of the deed, was the passion of the moment, as the passion of the previous moment had been to obtain the evacuation of France. And yet, if there were any means of repairing the fault of over precipitation committed on the 23d of April, it would be by a wise tardiness at the actual juncture, and the courage to defer for six months the conclusion so eagerly urged at the present moment. M. de Talleyrand was ordered to yield to necessity, and to change the line of demarcation drawn up by our commissioners. The line in advance of the Belgian fortresses once abandoned, the frontier question lost all its importance. There now only remained to consider some amendments, which would give our frontier a more regular outline, and obtain us an increase of some hundred thousand inhabitants, together with two or three third-class fortresses, but none equal in value to Mons, Namur, or Luxembourg.

After several days' discussion, these unimportant rectifications were accorded us, nor were they to be despised. In 1790 our frontier line formed a sweep between Maubeuge and Givet, leaving Givet at the angle. The line now traced from Maubeuge to Givet, being made slightly convex, effaced the sweep, and gave us two additional fortresses—Phillippeville and Mariembourg. Leaving Luxembourg without the line, it was continued to Sarre, in such a manner as to preserve us Sarrelouis. In a word, without reaching the important point of Kaisers-Lautern, a medium course was taken between the line that we demanded and that of 1790, following the course of the Queich, by which we obtained an addition of some importance; for Landau, instead of being isolated, as formerly, in the midst of the German territory, was completely united to ours.

These augmentations, together with Montbéliard and Avignon, which the allied monarchs did not wish to give either to the Germanic empire or to Rome, did not give us half the promised million souls, of which we were only allowed to speak on condition of resigning our claim. The deficiency was sought to the east and south—that is in Switzerland and Savoy. We got some part of the country of Gex, around Geneva; then tracing a line that divided Savoy in two, we obtained Chambéry and Annecy. This frontier was of much less value than that demanded by our commissioners, and which we might have claimed in compensation for what we had lost; but such as it was, it was a little better than that of 1790, to which we have since been condemned in punishment of the events of 1815. These difficulties being got rid of—thanks to our compliance—others might arise on the subject of the general European arrangements, from which an effort had been made to exclude us by the treaty of Châtillon—a proceeding for which no excuse existed since the re-establishment of the Bourbons. Undoubtedly, the desire to exclude us was still the same; but those who entertained it, dared not avow the wish. Some general expressions were invented, which formed very vague guarantees as to the future balance of power in Europe. They were as follows:—

“The German states shall be independent, and united by a federal union.

“Holland shall be placed under the sovereignty of the house of Orange, and receive an increase of territory. It shall never pass under the rule of a foreign prince.

“Independent Switzerland shall continue to govern herself.

“Italy, except those portions restored to Austria, shall be composed of sovereign states.”

But touching these European arrangements, announced in so summary a manner, there was one point not immediately made public—and that was the proportions in which the territories taken from France should be distributed amongst the principal co-sharers. We had the mournful honour of receiving this confidence, but in secret articles, intended rather to shackle our actions than to give weight to our influence. These articles were as follows:—

“Holland shall receive the countries ceded by France, between the sea, the French frontier of 1790, and the Meuse.”

“The countries yielded by France on the left bank of the Rhine, shall serve as compensation for the German states.”

“The Austrian possessions in Italy shall be limited by the Po, the Tessino, and the Lago Maggiore.”

“The King of Sardinia shall be indemnified for the portion

of Savoy ceded to France, by the possession of the ancient republic of Genoa."

Thus, by these articles, all Belgium was to be given to Holland; Bavaria was to receive a part of the ancient ecclesiastical Electorates, in exchange for the Tyrol, which was to be restored to Austria; Austria, besides her ancient possessions, was to have all the territory of the Venetian republic; lastly, the kingdom of Sardinia was to absorb Genoa; and thus the number of independent states would be considerably diminished. Not a word was said of Saxony or Poland, for that was a subject on which nobody dared to touch, so much avidity was anticipated on one side, and so much resistance on the other.

It only remained to decide about the colonies. There, it seemed, we should be compensated for our sacrifice on the continent, and that if we did not obtain an increase, we should not at least suffer any diminution. The restitution of our colonies ought, so to speak, to follow as a matter of course. But we had not yet reached the term of our sacrifices, and as M. de Laforest, one of our negotiators, said, "Wormwood was poured forth for us drop by drop."

Martinique and Guadaloupe were first mentioned, the latter was to be taken from Sweden and restored to us—Bourbon in the Indian seas was also mentioned, and these were spoken of with confidence, and as possessions of whose restoration there could be no doubt. But nothing was said of the isle of France, that Malta of the Indian ocean. What was to be done with it we were not told. At last an explanation was given. That power which had taken the Cape of Good Hope from her ally, Holland, which by a positive breach of faith had deprived Europe of Malta, declared that she must have the isle of France, because it was the route to India. We were allowed to keep the Isle of Bourbon, however, because it lay quite open; but the Isle of France, the great fortress of these seas, England was to have that. What could we oppose to such pretensions, when we had not a single ally, when the only one that we might have gained, the Emperor of Russia, had been offended by us and annoyed both in important and trifling matters. Our only resource would have been to break off the treaty, and at Vienna appeal with indignation to assembled Europe, against these repeated refusals to do us justice; to appeal to Europe that would be then enlightened by a careful inquiry into all these questions, and still more by the shameless display of such unlicensed ambition. Unfortunately, such a proceeding was not even thought of.

These new exactions were made known to the Royal Council, and the consternation there was general. It was then seen what it was to be dependant on foreigners, or

on their generosity. The English had also announced their intention of depriving us of some of the Antilles, such as Sainte Lucy and Tabago, which were of little consequence in comparison with the Isle of France. Louis XVIII., who did not foresee the value that the Isle of Bourbon would acquire by the development of commerce, said with apparent justice—"What could we do with Bourbon without the Isle of France? It is like giving us a fortress without the citadel that commands it. Let them take, if they will, Bourbon with the Isle of France, and leave us what we possess of the Antilles." These reflections contained some justice, but to whom were they to be addressed? who could be made to listen? Nothing remained but to yield, or obey, to the inspirations of despair.

We had recourse to private communications with Lord Castlereagh, who decided on all maritime affairs, and indeed on almost all continental questions. M. de Talleyrand found him calm and even gentle, but obstinate and immovable as a rock. He gained nothing. M. de Vitrolles endowed with less self-command, had a stormy interview with this minister, and obtained nothing but an almost cynical avowal of Britain's ambition. "Every position on the route to India," said Lord Castlereagh, "ought to belong to us, and shall belong to us." M. de Vitrolles recalled the fine-sounding declarations that had been made at the passage of the Rhine, and still more recently at the gates of Paris, declarations that promised to respect France and her dignity, and only deprive her of what she had taken from others, and which in her hands had become dangerous to the public security. Lord Castlereagh seemed to think that the Powers had fulfilled their promises, when they did not treat France as Poland had formerly been treated.

Again we were obliged to submit, for there was no means of resisting those unbridled ambitions all leagued against us. Only one reflection could suggest itself in contemplating such deeds, a reflection of which our oppressors took little heed, and it was, that by acting thus they rendered Napoleon much less guilty in the eyes of the world, and the Bourbons less popular in those of France.

There remained but one question to be decided—an important question, too; and most humiliating should it be decided against us—this was the question of the expenses of the war. Only one of the belligerent powers—Prussia—had pretensions on this point, which left us some chance of escaping oppressive exactions. During the last twenty years our armies had visited all the European powers, and inflicted on them all the evils attendant on the presence of an enemy, but, it must

be allowed, that Prussia suffered more than any other. She expected to be compensated, not only for the contributions which Napoleon had imposed upon her, but for the effects of our presence on her territories during the campaign of 1812. She consequently demanded, besides the restitution of the deeds representing the unpaid expenses, and which amounted to one hundred and forty million francs deposited in the *domaine extraordinaire*, an indemnity of one hundred and thirty-two millions, exclusive of the share she claimed in the sale of our arsenals and magazines. Prussia had, undeniably suffered a great deal during our long wars, but if we call to mind, that she took the initiative in the aggressions of 1792, merely for the sake of interfering in our home concerns, that in 1806 she abandoned herself to the wildest passion against France, and that quite recently during the invasion, the conduct of her soldiers had been most odious ; it must be admitted that the wrongs between her and France had been mutual. We were therefore less disposed to yield to her demands than to those of any other power. Her King, honest but avaricious, held as firmly to the demands for money that he had made, as Austria for the Italian, as England for the maritime provinces. We were presented with Prussia's bill, and requested to look over it, and if we did not receive a summary demand for payment, we heard language that very much resembled it.

M. de Talleyrand peremptorily repelled these demands, and declared that he neither could nor would not subscribe to them. He referred the matter immediately to the Royal Council. None would suffer it, and that sensation of despair was at last felt, to which the ministers had been more than once on the point of yielding. The King expressed an indignation that was shared in by everybody, and said that he would spend three hundred millions in making war on Prussia, rather than spend one hundred in satisfying her demands. He added, that he knew how desirous France was of peace, and how much this desire had influenced the reception given to him and his family ; but he knew that she would not brook the excess of degradation, now sought to be inflicted on her, and would not take it ill of him if he resisted strangers who thus abused the facility with which they had been received, and that for his part, far from thinking himself ungrateful towards the Cabinets of Europe, he believed them to be ungrateful towards him, for the Bourbons had been as useful in effecting their entrance into France, as they had been to the Bourbons in procuring their restoration to the throne. He therefore declared that he decidedly refused the new burden that the allied sovereigns wished to impose upon his subjects.

The entire council applauded this resolution, and again deplored the unfortunate convention of the 23rd April. The Duke de Berry exclaimed that with the garrisons and the returned prisoners, the King would have 300,000 men ; that he ought to put himself at their head and fall upon the allies who had but 200,000, and that this act of patriotic despair would for ever secure to the Bourbons the affections of the French people. M. de Talleyrand did not say no, but contented himself with remarking that the 300,000 men, with whom it was proposed to attack the allies, were owed to the much abused convention of the 23rd April.

M. de Talleyrand, whilst decidedly refusing the demands of Prussia, still felt that the project of 300,000 French attacking 200,000 foreigners was a serious matter, for the General, who knew how to lead the French to victory, was in the isle of Elba, so he determined to try whether the voice of reason would not be listened to. He had an interview with Lord Castlereagh, the Emperor of Russia, and M. de Metternich. He told them that the King and the Princes were determined to let the treaty of peace be wrecked on this question, whatever might be the consequences ; that besides, it was compromising for a miserable pecuniary consideration, not alone the great work of the restoration of peace, but also the restoration of order in Europe, for there was not a sovereign in Europe who was not deeply interested in the security of Louis XVIII. on his throne ; that to humiliate the Bourbons in this manner, to render them unpopular would be to act against the aim the allies had proposed to themselves ; and to sacrifice such important interests to the avarice of Prussia was neither wise, dignified, nor honourable. Lord Castlereagh, who was always reasonable when the Low Countries, the Cape of Good Hope, or the Mauritius was not in question, and M. de Metternich who was always ready to judge the conduct of Prussia without any flattering illusions, agreed with M. de Talleyrand. The Emperor Alexander, whose delicacy blushed at the avarice of his friend Frederick William, was of the same opinion, and all three forced Prussia to yield. The spirit of economy was in this prince a virtue that had degenerated into a vice, and he was capable of acting most unwisely, to gratify a passion that was originally the offspring of wisdom.

The contribution to Prussia was thus avoided. There still remained the common contribution founded on the right of conquest applied to the arsenals, the magazines, and other property of the state. According to the convention of the 23rd April, the foreign armies ought on the very day of the signing of this convention to have given up the administration of the occupied provinces, nor ought they to have levied

further contributions, nor longer retained any of our public property. But they pretended that for military effects, for captured magazines, for contributions levied but unpaid, and for wood ordered to be cut down in the state forests, there was due to them a sum which they did not blush to estimate at 182 millions. Of this sum, Prussia claimed the largest part; England asked nothing, for if this latter power had been severe, where territory was concerned, she was remarkably easy in money matters. For example, the Duke of Wellington's troops observed perfect discipline, in the south, and showed a scrupulous respect for all property both public and private. It was evident that in treating with England, we had to do with a great nation, ambitious but not avaricious.

The King's council showed equal firmness concerning this other ill-cloaked contribution of war. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Nesselrode supported M. de Talleyrand; two French commissioners, General Dulauloy and Baron Marchand charged with this arrangement, defended the French interests with great firmness, and it was finally agreed that we should pay a sum of 25 millions, which, according to the laws of war, was very nearly due.

The division of the naval armaments found in the ports yielded by France was deferred to the definite negotiation of peace. It is certain that all this *matériel*, consisting of twenty-five ships of the line afloat, and twenty on the stocks, besides a considerable number of smaller vessels, and a large quantity of stores dispersed in the ports of Hambourg, Bremen, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Flushing, Ostend, Genoa, Leghorn, Corfu, and Venice; it is certain, we say, that all this *matériel* had been procured with French money, that the labour and materials needed for the ships had been paid for, which was an advantage and not a burden, since the people had been employed, and a market opened for the products of the locality. The only exception was the Dutch fleet, built before the union with the Empire, and which should in justice be restored to the Low Countries. It was therefore stipulated, that this fleet should be restored unconditionally, but that of the forty-six ships and other vessels of inferior rank, dispersed in the above mentioned ports, two thirds should belong to France, and one third to the different maritime localities where they lay. This decision was not quite just, but the loss was not much to be regretted, as France had in her own ports a larger naval force than she could employ.

The last question remained to be decided, that of our museums. The subject had never been mentioned, and the

omission was intentional. The sovereigns were accustomed to visit them daily, to admire them in the state in which Napoleon had left them, that is to say, containing the riches of civilized Europe, and they had almost considered it a duty to respect collections where they had been received with so much warmth, and for which they had expressed so much admiration. Besides, this was a question that principally concerned southern Italy and Spain, for both of which powers but little interest was felt by the allied monarchs, but the pride of France was at stake, and that must not be wounded. We were thus left the masterpieces conquered by our armies, left them as one may say by preterition, by neglecting to speak of them. But in private conversations, much stress was laid on the important concession thus made us, and it had, indeed, a considerable moral influence.

This labour, called the treaty of Paris, was terminated on the 30th May, and consisted of several deeds, identical but separate, signed by England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, who became security for all Europe. Sweden was joined to these signatures, on account of Guadeloupe, which she had for a short while possessed, and Portugal because of the portion of Guiana that was restored to us. The peace with Spain was to be arranged separately, as this power had no representative at Paris, owing to the position of Ferdinand VII., who had not yet made his entry into Madrid. Besides, the peace with Spain, thanks to the Pyrenees, could be more easily concluded than any other.

However much the excellent frontier was to be regretted, that we might have had in the direction of the Low Countries in compensation for that of the Rhine, and which might have been obtained, either by not having so precipitately signed the armistice of the 23rd of April, or by referring the definite conclusion of peace to the congress at Vienna, still this treaty, called the treaty of Paris, was not so disadvantageous as had been apprehended. We were exempted from paying the expenses of the war; we preserved the immense riches in works of art acquired at the cost of our blood; we had gained in addition to our possessions of 1790, Philippeville and Marienbourg near the Low Countries, Landau in the direction of the Rhine, and one half of Savoy in the direction of the Alps. The Isle of France was the only serious loss, and could not fail to affect our commerce. The treaty of Paris could only be considered unfortunate in comparison with those of Campo-Formio, and Luneville, which, without menacing the peace of Europe, seemed to have definitely assured our geographical frontier; and in reflecting that but for the faults of the Empire, these acquisitions might have been permanent, the sorrow of France ought to be universal and profound. We shall see presently

what effect the treaty of the 30th May produced on the public mind.

It was proposed to publish the conditions of the peace at the same time as the constitution, the framing of which had not been suspended during the negotiations. The allied monarchs, who were desirous of returning to their own dominions, wished to see all the affairs of France concluded at once, and insisted that Louis XVIII. should fulfil the engagements of St. Ouen, for which they considered themselves in a certain degree responsible, especially towards those who had surrendered to the allies in the hope of being protected from the passions of the emigrants. The drawing up of the constitution was consequently continued with great activity and in a spirit of liberality, truly meritorious on the part of Louis XVIII., especially when one considers the opinions of the royalist party at that period.

The royalists were not more deficient in talent than others, but they had not studied things in their essence, and did not possess the information that springs from such studies. It was only in the very lowest ranks of the revolutionary party that one could find such narrow and such obstinate prejudices. In the old military nobility there existed a blind hatred of everything that had arisen in France during the last thirty years, and the conviction that the old regime ought to be re-established by force. The parliamentary nobility better informed but not more enlightened, could only understand a constitution, such as that of the ancient parliaments, which sometimes contradicted but never checked the King. Amongst the most distinguished royalists, those whom misfortune and inaction had rendered studious, the love of the past and the hatred of the present, had been systematized and formed into singular theories under the influence of M. de Bonald, an excellent but paradoxical writer, who possessed the rather rare merit of developing false ideas in a healthy style. These theories, the inevitable and merited reaction consequent on the excesses of the French Revolution, consisted especially in a profound contempt for written constitutions, which were pronounced to be one of the most impertinent vanities of the modern mode of thinking. It is true, that when we consider the fate of the numerous constitutions, which had been put forth in writing during the previous seventy years, we cannot help concurring in the opinion expressed by the royalists. However, these feelings carried beyond a certain degree possessed their own share of vanity and impertinence. For example, M. de Bonald's disciples asserted that constitutions ought not to be written, that being the offspring of time and not of man, they, like the great works of nature, ought to grow gradually, some-

times taking the form of written laws, but being more frequently the result of custom, traditions, and habits, and that all these combined circumstances, constituting the idiosyncracies of a nation, formed its true constitution, the only one that would not pass away like a dream. Starting from this principle they asserted that the ancient France had had a constitution, which had endured for centuries, whilst the constitutions devised since 1789 had succeeded each other like the waves of an enraged sea. The embarrassment of these gentlemen was great when asked to define this constitution, which consisted of an absolute monarch sometimes contradicted by the parliament, from whose expostulations he escaped by having recourse to the *lots de justice* or the Bastille; assembling the States General once in a century and obliged to dismiss them immediately after, and so little capable of profiting of these institutions when involved in either political or financial difficulties, that it was in consequence of seeking to bring them into operation that the deplorable disorders of 1789 had come to pass. And in fact, what had this so much boasted constitution produced, when set to work in 1787 by the convocation of the notables, and in 1789 by the assembly of the States general? the French Revolution.

It was certainly a strange idea to eulogize a constitution which had produced such results. Great would have been the confusion of its admirers, had a proposal been made to re-establish this constitution. Where were the nobility, the clergy, the parliament, the *Tiers état*, the nation of 1789? Instead of a wealthy *noblesse* enjoying many privileges, and holding all the high military employments, there was left only a scattered, half-ruined nobility, that had no other means of becoming rich than by the consequences of the French revolution; strangers to the army by whom they were not loved and whom they did not love (we speak of 1814), and possessing, in a word, no influence; instead of a clergy, proprietors of landed property, noble, eloquent, talented, and at that time of such distinguished merit that the clergy furnished France her ablest statesmen and greatest ministers; instead of such men there was now a clergy, poor, restricted to the discharge of professional duties, taken from every class of society, and entirely dependant upon the government; instead of an opulent hereditary magistracy who enjoyed the administrative functions, as the nobility did the military by privilege, and who were competent to the discharge of these functions; instead of these we had a magistrate exclusively selected from amongst the citizens of moderate fortune, and appointed like the other functionaries by the executive power, upright but incapable of offering other resistance than a rigorous observance of the civil laws; and in short, underlying all this was a people entirely transformed, that had attained a sort of absolute

unity, no longer admitting distinctions of class, or recognizing privileges, having all the same ideas, the same habits, the same ambition: such was France in 1814 and the systematic royalists would have been sadly embarrassed if, taken at their word, they had been charged to reconstruct the old constitution. They would be as embarrassed as an architect who having full liberty to build upon what plan he pleased, should be condemned to employ materials that were nowhere to be found.

All these theories were in reality only satires on the French revolution, often indeed just, and even eloquent, when they were directed against its excesses, but vain as the wailing or regret for that which is no more, when they tended to the re-establishment of a past that no power on earth could call back from annihilation.

Amongst these adversaries of written constitutions, even those who were most deficient in practical sense, when they were asked to decide and commence the work declared, as every body did, for a limited enlightened monarchy restrained and strongly influenced by the Chambers; in short what is called an English Monarchy, because the English were the first who established this form of government. These royalists only desired to gather from the vast rubbish of the old edifice, a certain number of ancient materials more or less recognisable, and make them figure in the new building. Thus they wished, that the ancient nobility and clergy should be restored and formed into a Chamber of Peers, and that the Lower Chamber should consist of those who formerly constituted the *Tiers état*, divided into classes according to their trades. Thus far and no further went the pretensions of those, who were compelled to emerge from their perpetual lamentation over the past. But this would have been to impose upon themselves the task of recovering and recombining the destroyed elements, which would have presented a ridiculous contrast with modern society, and shattered that great national unity in which consists the strength of modern France; and it would have been a profitless insult to the existing spirit of equality, for the advantage of a system that could produce no beneficial result, for the Chambers thus constituted would have put forward as strong pretensions as the others and would have as certainly struggled with the monarch for ascendancy—a struggle that would have terminated as fatally under such conditions as it had done under others, did the monarch conduct himself in the same manner. In fact what these royalists desired would be a kind of modern edifice bearing on its front some ornaments of the middle ages, which would have no real influence on the construction, arrangement, or destiny of the monument.

There was, therefore, nothing serious in these theories, which were only the prejudices of the past, systematized too late, by some eminent and melancholy minds. It must be admitted, however, that the King and his nephews, obliged to be more practical than their party, and fortunately having just returned from England and not from one of the continental states, did not share in these false doctrines, or if they did, acted as though they did not. Without fully acknowledging, and above all, without admiring the empire of public opinion, they were determined not to come in contact with its strongest points. Now, there were two points, which no power on earth could induce public opinion to yield—first, civil equality, which consists in every man enjoying in the eyes of the law the same rights, and being liable to the discharge of the same duties, in paying the same taxes, performing the same military service, being judged according to the same laws, by the same judges, being eligible to the same public employments whatever the birth, religion, or fortune of the individual; secondly, constitutional royalty, that is, limited monarchy, restricted more or less by two chambers. The first of these opinions was the work of the eighteenth century, the second, the result of Napoleon's despotism; both were invincible.

Nothing now remained to be considered but questions of form or style. As to the form, the Bourbons, as we have seen, had brought with them into France an almost insurmountable prejudice. Pretending that they were recalled to the throne not by an act of the senate, but in virtue of their own right, they wished to *grant* and not *receive* a constitution, and on this point, the public, foreseeing as little as the dynasty the danger of this absolute principle, which involved the power of modifying this *granted* constitution, was prepared to admit a pretention that only seemed a subtlety of theory, or an affair of self-love. Provided that the essential principles of the constitution were granted, the public cared little whether the constitution proceeded from the King or the senate, whether it came from above or below. Once arrived at this point, all things must go on smoothly.

The King had confided the task of drawing up a sketch of the constitution to MM. de Montesquieu and Ferrand, certain that the only principle to which he was firmly attached, monarchical supremacy, would not be in danger in the hands of those old royalists. As to the other points, he felt more confidence in his deputies than in himself, for he cared little about the matter: with these gentlemen he associated M. Beugnot, who possessed an easy and facile style, and knew how to choose expressions calculated to conciliate conflicting opinions. He recommended M. de Beugnot to observe the most absolute

secrecy towards M. de Talleyrand. Although more inclined than Kings in general to allow his ministers to govern, still Louis XVIII. was not desirous of the presence of a minister who wished to interfere in every thing. He wished M. de Talleyrand to confine himself to foreign affairs, M. de Montesquieu to occupy himself with the home department, and M. de Blacas to devote his attention to affairs of the court; he hoped thus to diminish by dividing the power of his ministers. Neither did he wish that in case of difficulty, M. de Talleyrand should call the Emperor Alexander to his assistance, and influenced by all these reasons he did not wish him to have any part in the formation of the constitution.

The sketch of the constitution being made was submitted to Louis XVIII, who without making any or scarcely any alteration referred it, conformably to the declaration of Saint-Ouen, to two committees, one appointed by the Senate and one by the Legislative Corps. The committee appointed by the Senate was composed of M. M. Barthélemy, Serrurier, (the Marshal) Barbé-Marbois, de Fontanes, Germain Garnier, de Pastoret, de Semonville, Boissy d'Anglas, and Vimar. The committee appointed by the Legislative Corps was composed of M. M. Lainé, Felix Faulcon, Chabaud-Latour, Bois-Savary, Duhamel, Duchesne de Gillevoisin, Faget de Baure, Clausel de Coussergues, Blanquart de Bailleul. No objection could be made to these persons, who corresponded to the moderate and liberal ideas of the time. The King recommended as much unity as possible in their labours, and reserved to himself the decision of all contested points, more for the honour of his prerogative, than for the value of the things themselves.

The Chancellor laid the subject before the two committees assembled at the Chancery, read the plan, and then commenced the discussion of the different articles.

In drawing up this plan, great care had been taken to use expressions which would show that the new constitution emanated from royalty alone, from royalty understanding the wants of the time, and acting under the impulse of its own wisdom, as it had already done in emancipating the *communes*, in instituting the parliaments, in reforming the civil legislation. Consequently no mention was made of the return of the Bourbons to the throne, the causes of this return, the nature of the monarchical principle or its hereditary descent from male to male in order of primogeniture, all of which subjects were spoken of in the constitution of the senate. M. Boissy d'Anglas remarked this circumstance, and regretted it as an omission injurious to the interests of royalty. He was told immediately, and without hesitation, that these omissions were intentional, that the right of the Bourbons to the throne

needed no enunciation, that it existed anterior to every other right, and that even when absent and physically replaced by usurpation in France, they still had not ceased to reign there; neither did the principle and manner of inheritance require to be mentioned, for they were co-existent with the ancient constitution of the French monarchy; that the question at issue was merely the modification of certain parts of this constitution, and granting the French people some rights not formerly recognised; that, therefore, it was only necessary to announce the new enactments, without occupying themselves with those which, amidst all the vicissitudes of time, had not ceased virtually to exist.

M. de Fontanes, anxious to efface the memory of the services he had rendered Napoleon by his compliance with the wishes of the Bourbons, hastened to support this doctrine, saying, that the origin of power ought to be allowed to remain wrapt in shadows, in order to preserve its venerable antiquity; endeavouring to approach too near the source, would be to destroy the reverence it inspired. As if a *prestige* once destroyed, could be restored at will, or by convention. These remarks elicited no reply, and silence was certainly the most prudent part. Assuredly the committees ought, had it been possible, even for the sake of the dynasty itself, to have insisted on these omissions being supplied, in order to deprive the Bourbons of the means of one day breaking the contract that bound them to the nation. But how could the future, which no one penetrated at that time, be unveiled for them; that future hidden alike from the restored dynasty, and those who sought to limit its rule.

The examination of the different articles of the constitution was then proceeded with. The first referred to what was called the public rights of the French, consisting of equality in the eyes of the law, of the equitable divisions of public employments, individual liberty, liberty of conscience, liberty of the press, respect for all kinds of property, equality in the form of military service, and finally a complete oblivion for all acts and opinions since 1789. On the greater number of these points, there was no difference of opinion. However, there was a discussion about some, and even in some cases a change of form. After admitting an equal protection to every form of worship, it was added that the Catholic religion was the religion of the state. MM. Boissy d'Anglas and Chabaud-Latour desired that the meaning of these words should be defined, and asked what they meant, if, for example, they did not give some advantage of position to the Catholic religion, and whether the other forms of worship would not be placed in a sort of dependance by this advan-

tage. They were told that France was Catholic and must not fear to avow her religion. It was then purely and simply an act of deference to the Catholic faith, a sort of apology to that creed for the equality granted to the other forms of worship. No objection was made, for nothing would have been gained by discussion. There was scarce any discussion on the question of individual liberty and the liberty of the press. As to the liberty of the press, all were of opinion that it ought to be granted, only restraining the excesses into which the press was only too much inclined to run. At this period, for want of experience, nobody thought of the distinction, which was afterwards established between newspapers and books, nor did any one think of submitting either to a preliminary examination—that is, to a censorship.

The respect promised to property, no matter whence derived, was the most important question of the day. It concerned, as may be divined, the property called *national*, which was no other than the confiscated property of the emigrants or that taken from the church, and which had been sold at different periods of the Revolution for larger or smaller sums according to the state of the times, and so passed into the possession of millions of Frenchmen. The anxiety of the possessors was natural, when they beheld the emigrants, proud of their triumph, confident in their strength, and very much irritated against the detainers of their property, which had in many cases been purchased at a merely nominal price, sometimes for a handful of worthless assignats, and not unfrequently obtained by dishonourable means. But the tranquillity of the kingdom depended on maintaining the validity of these sales, and neither the King nor the Princes entertained a doubt on the subject. Their desire to see the emigrants in possession of their property was not inferior to that of the emigrants themselves, but the certainty of an immediate political convulsion restrained them, and the King had consented to this clear and positive announcement, "*All property is inviolable, not excepting that called national, the law recognising no difference.*"

This mode of expression was perfectly satisfactory, and better could not be desired. But it was too significant for some members of the committee, who, on this occasion, revealed the secret designs of the royalist party, and, especially, the *ruse* by which this party wished to escape from the necessity that weighed upon the Bourbons, and which was the chief condition of their return. M. de Fontanes, pursuing the expatiatory system on which he had entered, exclaimed warmly against the proposed enactment. According to him, custom had established a marked difference between patri-

monial property and that called national; and if this difference existed essentially how could the law dare assert that none ought to be made? Until this time even the laws of the Revolution had confined themselves to proclaiming the inviolability of national property, but they had never carried their zeal so far as to seek to give it a moral value which it did not possess. What folly, then, to choose the very day on which the Bourbons returned to France to render still worse the condition of these unfortunate persons who had been stripped of their property?

It was easy to reply that these unfortunate persons—not all, indeed, but a great many—had fought against their country, and that, therefore, they could not inspire an unreserved interest; and that the return of the Bourbons naturally exciting their hopes, it was necessary to choose the moment of that return for strengthening the guarantees given to the purchasers of national property. However, the authors of this project were silent, as if to show that they yielded to the necessity of the times, whilst cursing it in their hearts. But M. Lainé rent the veil. He had warmly espoused the cause of liberty twenty years before, and, like many others, had been violently repulsed by the excesses of the Revolution, so far as almost to adopt the sentiments of the emigrants themselves. “Let us speak frankly,” said he; “let us admit that we must humour the holders of national property,—but even whilst humouring them, we are desirous that the property they possess should return to its ancient owners. Morality, justice, and the true monarchical spirit, dictate these wishes. Now, this cannot be effected without compromises between the old and new proprietors. Such compromises are being made in many quarters, and they are the effects of public opinion on the new proprietors. Why, then, seek to lessen the moral force that is inducing them to make restitution?”

This was simply announcing a wish to intimidate new proprietors into yielding the property they held to its ancient owners, for some trifling sum. Amongst the actual holders of such property there were certainly some who had purchased for almost nothing; but many had paid ready money, and at a rate approaching the full value. Besides, thousands of sales had already transferred a great part of this property into new hands, and almost on terms equal to its full value. The project, therefore, of restoring this property to its ancient proprietors was morally unjust as well as politically unwise.

Those who had drawn up the plan of the constitution, persisted in remaining silent, when M. Beugnot, Minister of State, Commissioner of Police, and compiler of the article under discussion, spoke in its defence. He knew, by the reports which

he daily received, in what degree the indiscreet hopes of the emigrants had become serious threats for the holders of national property; and he gave such a description of the present state of affairs, as seriously alarmed the two assembled committees. However, he could not have carried his point, if he had not used a subterfuge. The series of general guarantees contained the article which said,—“The state can exact the sacrifice of a property for the public benefit, if such be legally proved, but with a previous indemnity.” He placed this article immediately after the one in dispute, and he presented it, thus placed, as though it would hereafter give an opening for an indemnity that the State itself would pay to the ancient proprietors. This subterfuge, which was only a pretext for some, though a reason for others, terminated the discussion, and the proposed form was adopted.

To this series of general claims and duties had been joined the article relative to the military duty, to which every citizen was bound. The expedient already employed for the abolition of the conscription was adopted, in announcing a law intended to define, at a later period, the mode of recruiting, which would naturally bring back the old form without its abuses, which resulted less from the nature of the institution than from the character of the government called upon to employ it.

The general claims being once decided, the next subject to be considered was the form the royal government was to assume. Upon this subject there was not a single dissentient voice, excepting when extreme measures were proposed. An inviolable king, entrusted with the entire executive power, was universally admitted, and who was represented by ministers responsible to two Chambers of different origin. Whilst the emigrants cherished the most extravagant ideas, the men of the revolution—emigrants of another kind—did not entertain juster notions; and still fervent adorers of the constitution of 1791 desired but a single Chamber. There was not a man in either of the committees, or amongst enlightened persons, who entertained these opinions. There was, therefore, no discussion on this point. The fourteenth article, which gave the King the right of regulating the execution of the laws, was taken in its natural and simple sense; and although these words were added—“For the safety of the state”—it did not imply that the King should use the regulative power, in order to place himself above the executive, and be able to overturn the constitution when he pleased. Nobody had any other idea than to accord to the royal power the initiative in all measures of defence at home and abroad—a privilege which necessarily belonged to the King—and to

unite the regulative power with the executive, which is not less indispensable, the laws, however perfect they may be, leaving a number of details to be regulated, which must, of necessity, be abandoned to the authority charged with their execution. The dictatorship was not perfidiously concealed in the fourteenth article, because, we repeat, it was drawn up in all simplicity and good faith.

There was one question, that of initiative legislation, to which at that time much more importance was attached than there would be now-a-days, because experience had not yet shown that the true initiative for a country is to be able to appoint to the ministry the men of its own choice. Ministers appointed in this way introduce those laws of which a country has most need. At the period of which we speak the initiative was highly prized, the royalists wishing to secure the privilege for the King, the liberals for the two Chambers. To deprive the Chambers utterly of the initiative, as was proposed, and reduce their power simply to the privilege of adopting or rejecting the measures proposed by the King, appeared even to the authors of the projected constitution, a rigorous proceeding. To get rid of this embarrassment that everybody, even the royal commissioners themselves seemed to feel, a compromise was proposed. This consisted of giving the Chambers the power of addressing the King and requesting him to present the sketch of the proposed laws, with the certainly wise precaution of requiring that the request should not be transmitted to the crown until it had received the assent of both chambers. It was the initiative itself under a very respectful form, which neither diminished its value nor its authority.

The right of amending the laws submitted to the consideration of the Chambers was thus in some degree ameliorated, but this right could only be exercised after being discussed in the *bureaux* and after the consent of the ministers or royal commissioners was obtained. In all cases, it was the privilege of the King to ratify the law. These precautions against the right of amendment were superfluous, for discussing laws without the power of modifying them is but a useless expenditure of time. To leave the Chambers no choice between absolute adoption or rejection, was reducing them to extremities, and destroying that spirit of debate which ought to be the actuating spirit of a free country. Besides, the definite sanction being vested in the crown guaranteed the royal prerogative in its full extent.

The changes made in the plan of the constitution by the two committees were, as a matter of course, to be submitted to Louis XVIII, and could only be inserted in the series of

articles after receiving his consent. The four royal commissioners presented these amendments to the King, and he admitted them without difficulty, saying, that he wished the plan should be as far as possible unanimously approved by the two committees.

Instead of a senate, it was resolved that the upper chamber should be a Chamber of Peers to correspond better with the old French monarchy, it being understood that the King should select from the senate, not all the members, but those who by their services, their reputation or position, could appear without objection in the new order of things, and that even those members who were not elected should still preserve their salaries. It was decided that the princes should be peers by right of birth. At the suggestion of M. de Semonville who, from a desire to please, plainly meant the Duke of Orleans, it was decreed that the princes could not take their seats without the King's express permission. As this precaution was contained in the original plan, it was necessary to refer it to Louis XVIII., who simply approved it, without making any sarcastic remark on the Prince against whom the measure was directed.

The second Chamber was called, the Chamber of Deputies. It was to be composed for the present, and until remodelled, of the entire legislative corps, which, as we have seen, had won the royal approbation, because the legislative corps was jealous of the senate, and because it had shown more zeal for the Bourbons. It was decided, that the deputies should be chosen from the communal of the different wards by electors qualified to vote by the payment of taxes to the amount of 300 francs; the qualification of the candidates consisting in the payment of taxes to the amount of 1,000 francs. Many questions arose on this point. In the first place, should there be a property qualification for the electors and the candidates, and what was to be the amount of the qualification? Nobody hesitated as to the electors. There were doubts about the property tax. M. Felix Faulcon, a worthy man, and much respected, who had for twenty-five years occupied a seat in our assemblies, objected to the property qualification for candidates, and cited himself as an example of the difficulties that would arise from such a condition, for he did not pay the required amount of taxes. His observations were rejected, but with all the deference due to his character, and it was replied that in giving liberty to a country, guarantees should be sought amongst the holders of property, and in their hands should be placed this novel and capacious liberty, of which the perilous trial was now about to be made. These reasons prevailed. There now remained to be considered the nature of the qualification.

The expression *Contribution foncière* or "land tax" was thought too restricted, and it was proposed to add *mobilière* or "personal," because the tax implied by the latter term had a good deal of analogy with the other. After some discussion the words "assessed taxes" were substituted for "land tax," without any suspicion that by this means the order of things was changed, by introducing amongst the electors the class *patentables*, who are taxed, not for the property they possess, but for the profession they exercise. The question of whether the debates of the Chambers should be published was not discussed.

With respect to the manner of forming the second Chamber, M. de Montesquiou acting on his own authority, wished that the power possessed by the senate under Napoleon should be vested in the King, namely, the power of choosing the members of the legislative corps from a list prepared by the electoral colleges. In order to prove that such an assembly would not be more subservient than another, he cited the assembly of notables, which in 1787 rejected all the propositions of the King. He did not find one to support his opinion. M. de Montesquiou's proposal involved the serious inconvenience of depriving the most popular of the Chambers—that which was supposed to represent the country—of the appearance of independence, which is of as much importance as independence itself,—and the example he had cited proved that in the days of the revolution the King's appointment had been no guarantee, whilst that in ordinary times it possessed all the imputed disadvantages, and caused it to be said that France was again about to be put under the Imperial Constitution. This idea, originated by M. de Montesquiou, was not carried into effect.

The initiative in financial measures was granted to the Lower Chamber without opposition, and to the Upper Chamber the judicial power in certain special cases, when, for example, ministers were arraigned. The Chamber of Peers left to the King's nomination was to be, as a general rule, hereditary, excepting in cases where the King conferred a peerage for life. Not a voice was raised against hereditary rank, which was regarded by all as a guarantee for independence of conduct and stability in the form of government.

It was then stipulated that the King should summon the Chambers every year, that he could dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, but under the condition of summoning fresh members in three months, and it was moreover decreed that every petition presented to either Chamber, should be in writing. These points being decided, the next consideration was the

judicial order based on those principles of independance which have not varied in France since 1789 ; and lastly, the guarantees, transitory in their nature, which related to the maintenance of the public debt, the Legion of Honour, the military grades and pensions, the two nobilities, &c., &c.

There was scarcely a discussion on these subjects, and touching those points, in which it was agreed that some alteration should be made, and which were consequently submitted to the King, his Majesty showed an extreme desire to please, as he considered the monarchical principle quite safe, since he gave and did not receive a constitution. He even consented that it should be made a condition, that the kings at their consecration should swear to observe the constitution faithfully, which was not a contract with the nation, as we have since seen, but with God, and of which he who took the oath, and his confessor, were to be the judges. Whilst these questions were being decided one after the other in the commissions, the King scarcely spoke of them in the royal council, merely saying the work was advancing, and that he was satisfied with the spirit in which it was performed. Only on two or three points, such as the conscription and the initiative legislation, did he submit the difficulty to the council, but in a few words, as a subject that concerned him personally and exclusively.

Four days longer than the time first appointed, that is, until the 4th June, were accorded for the promulgation of the constitution, and M. Beugnot asked four more, which would extend the time to the 8th, to put the articles in order, to give a last polish to the work, to prepare the preamble, and above all to arrange some general principles which would serve as a basis to the electoral law, a subject not yet touched on. M. Beugnot would have obtained the desired delay, but that the allied monarchs, anxious to depart since the peace had been concluded (an event that occurred on the 30th May), desired that all should be finished on the 4th June at the latest. The allied monarchs, it was evident, considered themselves bound in honour to see this constitution promulgated, without which the men who had trusted in them would be without guarantee, the emigrants would be under no restraint, and France, that is to say Europe, would remain exposed to fresh storms. M. de Metternich said that urgent affairs summoned the allied sovereigns to their own kingdoms, and that their troops were gaining nothing by remaining in France, their officers were ruining themselves there, and that they could not remain any longer. The King's Council appeared both surprised and offended at this demand. "Let them go," hastily and impetuously cried the Duke de Berry,

"we do not need their assistance to give a constitution to France; and when they are gone, the concessions that the King is about to make to the country will assume a higher and more independent character." This Prince showed an especial desire to get rid of the Emperor of Russia, who was the most exacting of the allied sovereigns. But the foreign ministers declared, that, having kept as few troops as possible in the capital, the last should not be withdrawn until the very day fixed for the royal session, and the fulfilment of the promises made at Saint Ouen put beyond all doubt. The council was obliged to yield, and the royal session was fixed for the 4th June. What remained to be done seemed of little importance to the King.

The articles relating to the election of deputies might be referred to the electoral law; the revision of the articles and the drawing up of the preamble were details that could be finished in one night; and orders were given to M. Beugnot to be ready for the appointed day. Two questions remained to be decided—the date of the new constitution and its title. As to the date, Louis XVIII. would not allow a discussion. In his own opinion, he had commenced to reign the day on which the son of Louis XVIII. died; he had reigned even whilst Napoleon, raised to the Empire by the will of the French nation, was gaining the victories of Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, and Wagram, and signing the treaties of Presbourg, Tilsit, and Vienna. These were only different phases of usurpation which disappeared before the immutable principle of legitimacy. Consequently, Louis XVIII. wished that the constitution should be dated from the nineteenth year of his reign. He listened to the opinion of each member as to the title. M. Dambray thought it ought to be called "*Ordinance of Reformation*," like the ordinances formerly issued by the kings for the reformation of certain parts of the French legislation. Louis, at first, approved of this title. However, M. Beugnot proposed another. When the kings of France granted a legal existence either to the commons or to different civil or religious establishments, they did so by means of a deed called a "*charter*," a word taken from the Latin. There was an analogy between the business under consideration and what Louis le Gros had done, which pleased the feelings as well as the kingly pride of Louis XVIII.; and he adopted the word "*charter*," since become so famous, adding to it the epithet *constitutional*, to indicate more clearly its object. These two questions being decided, M. Beugnot had only to consider the minor details of form, and it was expected from his known expeditiousness that all would be finished in a few hours. The King himself wrote the speech which he intended to pro-

nounce ; he learned it by heart, and his speech seemed to form the sole object of his thoughts. When the King should have spoken, the Chancellor (Dambray) was to explain the principles of the charter, and M. Ferrand was to read the original. Several royal ordinances were then to be promulgated in presence of the two great bodies convoked for the inauguration of the new institutions. The list of peers was to be read, which contained eighty-three of the old senators, forty of the ancient dukes, and some marshals, who were not members of the senate. Fifty-five senators were excluded from the peerage—twenty-seven because they were aliens—and twenty-eight because of being regicides, or having taken a leading part during the Revolution and the Empire. The ancient senators, whether comprised in the Chamber of Peers or not, were to hold their emoluments under the title of pensions. The Legislative Corps was to be converted into a Chamber of Deputies, and to sit until a fresh election.

On the morning of the 4th a grand display of French troops, where the National Guards made a conspicuous figure, preceded the royal session in which the great promise of Saint Ouen was to be fulfilled. The larger portion of the foreign troops was already *en route*. The remainder were preparing to depart on that day and the following. The Emperor Alexander, who was anxious to visit the Prince of Wales before returning to his own dominions, had left Paris before the royal session. On the very day of his departure he had insisted that the children of Queen Hortense, whose protector he had constituted himself, should receive the Duchy of Saint Leu, with a large income. He also wished to secure a suitable position for Prince Eugene, but this matter was referred to the Congress at Vienna. He had departed, delighted with the French, whom he had charmed by his grace and amiability, and but little pleased with the royal family, who did not admire his tone of mind. The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria left about the same time. On the very morning of the ceremony there was great excitement at Court. A report was spread that a plot had been laid to blow up the royal family by an explosion of gunpowder. The official agents who had hastened to offer their services to the Count d'Artois, and who, under MM. Ferrier de Montceil and de la Maisonfort, had commenced to form a kind of voluntary police around him, had seen masses of powder on the quay of the Seine, which appeared to them suspicious. They immediately became excited and filled the château with their rumours. M. Beugnot was called upon, who was at the time hurrying with the preamble of the *charter*, and he was called to fling aside his pen and see to his duties as Director of Police. When inquiries were

made, it was found that it was the Russian artillery that were loading their powder on the Seine quay, preparatory to taking their departure.

This excitement being calmed, all assembled at the Tuileries. M. Beugnot wished to read the preamble to the King. But the monarch, entirely occupied in repeating to himself the speech that he was to make before the Chambers, refused to listen, saying that he confided the affair implicitly to him. They then left for the Bourbon palace, talking lightly of serious subjects, because they had not yet learned by the experience of a free government how much influence words have on the public mind. The fear of an explosion having passed away, another succeeded. It was dreaded that either in the Senate or in the Legislative Corps some objection might be raised against the manner in which the charter was about to be promulgated. The Chancellor had orders to silence any who would be so imprudent as to speak; it would have been a disagreeable scene, annoying to the royal dignity, and very much to be regretted, had it taken place. But quickly engrossed by the preparations for the ceremony, all set out for the Palais-Bourbon, without thinking any more of these possibilities.

The King passed through the garden of the Tuileries in his carriage, surrounded by the Princes and Marshals, and arrived at the Palais-Bourbon about three o'clock. He was received therewith the old royal pomp, and entered supported on the arm of the Duke de Grammont. He took his seat on the throne, having on his right and left, on lower seats, the Duke d'Angoulême, the Duke de Berry, and the Duke d'Orleans, and the Prince de Condé. The only person absent from the assembly was the Count d'Artois, who was ill from an attack of gout and vexation, of which we shall presently tell the cause. The public, weary of great military exhibitions, of which they had seen so many, and beginning to acquire a taste for political spectacles, had assembled in crowds. The most respectable persons of Paris had been admitted into the body of the hall; and on the benches of the two chambers sat the future members of the peerage and the entire legislative corps. When the King appeared, he was received with unanimous acclamations, and for some time the cries of "*Vive le Roi*" were repeated with a kind of frenzy. At once moved and re-assured, and calculating on a favorably-disposed audience, he pronounced, in a sonorous voice, and with great rhetorical skill, the following speech, adapted with much tact to existing circumstances:—

"Gentlemen," said the King, "now that, for the first time, I have assembled around me in this building the great bodies

of the state, and the representatives of a nation that does not cease to lavish the most touching marks of affection upon me, I felicitate myself on having become the dispenser of those benefits which Providence deigns to grant to my people.

"With Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia, I have made a peace, in which their allies are included—that is to say, all the princes of Christendom. The war was universal, and so is the peace.

"The rank that France always held among the nations has not been transferred to another, it is still undividedly hers. The security acquired by other states increases hers, and consequently adds to her true power. That part of her conquests which she has not retained should not, therefore, be considered as any diminution of her real strength.

"The glory of the French armies has not been dimmed; the monuments of their valour shall remain, and the *chefs d'œuvre* of art are henceforth ours, in virtue of rights more stable and more sacred than those of victory.

"The paths of commerce, so long closed, are about to be opened. The markets of France shall no longer be exclusively open to the productions of her soil and industry. Those articles which habit has made a want, or which are necessary for the arts she practises, will be furnished by the possessions she recovers. She will no longer be debarred these things, or forced to purchase them at an exorbitant price. Our manufactures will flourish again, our maritime towns spring up anew, and all promises us that a lasting calm abroad, and an enduring tranquillity at home, will be the happy fruits of the peace.

"Still a painful remembrance troubles my joy. I was born, and I flattered myself that I should continue all my life, the faithful subject of the best of kings, and to-day I occupy his place! But, at least, he is not altogether dead; he lives still in this testament that he intended for the instruction of the august and unfortunate child to whom I have succeeded. It is with my eyes fixed on this immortal work, penetrated with the sentiments that dictated it, guided by the experience and aided by the counsels of many amongst you, that I have drawn up this constitutional charter which is about to be read to you, and which places the prosperity of the state on a solid basis.

"My Chancellor will acquaint you more in detail with my paternal intentions."

This discourse, simple, dignified, adroit, and as gracefully pronounced as it was well written, in which as much was said of the peace as of the charter, was at first received in religious silence, which was succeeded by clamorous applause. The King appeared enchanted by a success which was not alone

political but personal. The Chancellor next read a discourse, in which he explained the object of the charter with the evident intention of showing the royalists that it was inevitable, as also to prove that it emanated fully and entirely from the royal authority. M. Ferrard afterwards read the original of the charter in a rather low tone, and, as far as could be judged during a rapid rehearsal, it satisfied even the most critical; for except in its origin—which was exclusively monarchical—it was nearly a transcript of the constitution of the senate. When he had finished reading, the Chancellor admitted the peers and deputies to take the oath, amidst a profound silence and a lively curiosity sometimes excited by the great names of the ancient monarchy which had not been heard for so long a time, and sometimes by the great names of the empire which had so often resounded in the glorious bulletins of Napoleon, and which were now so suddenly inscribed in the list of those who swore inviolable fidelity to the Bourbons.

The ceremony was concluded in perfect order, and without any of the anticipated incidents. Louis XVIII. returned to the Tuileries, loudly applauded by the two Chambers, and personally congratulated by all those whom etiquette permitted to address a compliment to the King. In this solemn spectacle he saw but one thing, his discourse; he was conscious but of one result, his personal success. It is sometimes very wise to applaud princes, as it is also very wise to know when to be silent in their presence. On this occasion the applauses of the Chambers and the people were most apropos, and made the King as contented with the charter as though it had been the offspring of his fondest wishes. He had consented to it without reluctance, which was a great deal, and he was ready to put it into execution, which was still more. But, in justice, we must admit that it was principally the work of the Senate, that is, of the old representatives of the French Revolution, who had recovered the faculty of expressing their true opinions on the day of Napoleon's downfall, and who did not wish that the downfall of that wonderful man should be also that of the principles of 1789. It must be added that the charter was also, in some measure, the work of the allied monarchs, not that they loved constitutional government, but they considered it a point of honour to keep their word with the Senate that had rendered such services; they also feared the folly of the emigrants, and thought it necessary to restrain them, not only for the sake of France, but of Europe. From this we may conclude that the charter, like all acts that are not the result of a transient party feeling, was everybody's work.

However, appearances, whether deceitful or not, must often be taken as reality, and it was well done to attribute the charter

to Louis XVIII., who had more or less part in it. He got the credit of it, and all enlightened men felt indebted to him for it. The Senate had no reason to complain, although some of its members were excluded from the peerage, for those who were excluded could by no means appear in the new order of things, with the exception, however, of certain persons, whose omission was much to be regretted, such as Marshal Massena, not admitted because he was born at a league beyond the frontier of 1790—a circumstance that ought to have been ignored; and Marshal Davout, because that his defence of Hamburg had offended the allies. As to the rest, all, whether excluded or admitted, preserved their old emoluments. The legislative corps was to continue undisturbed until the legal time for re-electing a fifth of the members should arrive.

The charter, putting aside the question of its origin, which seemed at that time only a dispute about words, contained all the principles of a true representative monarchy, and was disapproved by none but extreme royalists. It received the approbation of Sieyes, the best of judges, and the least to be suspected, for he was of the number of excluded senators, and he did not hesitate to say, that with this charter France could be free if she would; and that no advantage gained by the revolution had been lost in the ruin of the empire, except, indeed, our frontiers, the only serious loss, and deserving of long regret.

The treaty of Paris, published at the same time as the charter, did not meet with equal success. Certainly, peace could not be more desired than it was at that time by France, and with very good reason; but the treaty of the 30th of May, which was now published, was not the peace itself, for the country had been enjoying peace since the 23rd April; it was the price of the peace, and a very painful price it was. Consequently the perusal of this treaty produced a most saddening effect, not alone upon the men compromised by the last revolution, but upon the most impartial and disinterested classes of the nation. To their eyes the cruel hand of the stranger was visible in these transactions, especially in the tracing of our frontiers. These men had not certainly flattered themselves that France could preserve her geographical limits; they had not hoped that victorious Europe, having marched to the gates of Paris, would leave us the Rhine frontier, but hearing it incessantly repeated on every side that France, under the Bourbons, would obtain much better conditions than when under Napoleon, people did cherish illusory hopes. But suddenly seeing the sad reality revealed, seeing France alone, of all the European powers, reduced to the position she held in 1790; above all, seeing us in part deprived of our colonies, whose restitution

was to be the recompense of the possessions we abandoned on the continent, a deep feeling of irritation was engendered, particularly in the seaports, where, however, the desire of peace was stronger than in other places. The loss of the Mauritius was most sensibly felt, and was the source of much irritation against England, who was accused of wishing to prevent the revival of our commerce. The bitterest expressions of feeling were uttered against this ever-present rival. Next to England, the nation most execrated was Austria. The conduct of this power, so justifiable when considered in a political point of view, appeared highly blameable when viewed as a question of natural feeling, and rendered Austria very unpopular. Every evil design was attributed to her influence, and the bad feeling thus engendered was exhibited to her sovereign, whom the French received wherever he appeared with extreme coldness.

It would assuredly have been better policy not to refer to the cause, whether true or false, of our misfortunes, but to confine ourselves to seeking the means still within our power of repairing them. But as usual, people took more pleasure in reproaching each other, and seeking in these reproaches subjects of bitter recrimination. The revolutionists and imperialists reproached the Bourbons with having returned to France in the train of foreigners, and returned only to consummate the humiliation of the country. The royalists, instead of replying that if they had come in the company of foreigners, they had not brought them, and that it was Napoleon, who, by his ambition, had opened to them an entrance into France—the royalists, we say, instead of defending themselves by this simple and incontestible truth, did all in their power to turn into ridicule those patriotic lamentations which they ought to have respected, even if they did not share in them. They laughed at the idea of natural frontiers, that fantastic object, as they said, which would cost so much blood to nations if seriously pursued; as if all nations did not propose to themselves a certain territorial limit, more or less legitimate, more or less restricted, to which they tend with more or less prudence, skill, or consideration for others, but which is the ever-acting motive force of all their efforts. As if England had not always laboured to fuse into one the three Britannic kingdoms, without mentioning the Indies, and all the other objects of her ambition! As if Russia had not always endeavoured to obtain possession of Finland, Bessarabia, and the Crimea; and Austria to obtain the sovereignty of the course of the Danube and the shores of the Adriatic; Prussia to extend her empire to the centre of Germany; and lastly, has not Spain always sought to unite under her sceptre as much as she possibly

could of the Peninsula? The royalists said that if France had lost certain territories, she had at least secured a staple peace, which we must admit is the incontestible advantage of all defeated litigants; and they added that France would now be delivered from those false Frenchmen, with the foreign accent, who were putting in claims for public posts; as if it were a subject of self-congratulation to get rid of such Frenchmen as the financier Corvetto, the jurisconsult Lasagni, the mathematician Lagrange, the seaman Verheuel, and the warrior Massena! The royalists added, that if they had lost arable land they had acquired sugar, coffee, and cotton plantations, which were not less needed. They laughed at the idea of the commerce carried on under the empire, and which was condemned to drag its slow course across the whole extent of the empire on carts, and they proudly instituted a comparison between that and the winged maritime commerce that was about to be restored to us. The royalists thus committed the double wrong of mocking high-minded grief, and of displaying in vexing contrast their party triumphs, as they were also wrong in reproaching their opponents with the disasters caused by Napoleon, and not by his admirers. They ought to have consoled themselves with the thought, that if Napoleon had contracted the limits of France in endeavouring to extend them too far, there still remained to us an immense glory, our powerful unity, and the progress of every description which we owed to the revolution and the empire, and, in short, the vitality of the French genius; and that with a few years of peace and a prudently liberal government, we should soon recover the moral and physical superiority which was always essentially ours, and never depended on the possession of a province more or less. This was the real and sole consolation left us. But men in affliction often find a greater comfort in complaining than they could find in the alleviation of their woes, or even in actual cure. Complaining consoles them, and the more bitter the more consolatory. It is best to leave them to their consolation, at the same time reserving to ourselves the privilege of not giving credence to all they say, especially when we have the honour of holding in our hands the scales of history

BOOK LV.

GOVERNMENT OF LOUIS XVIII.

CHANGES effected in the public mind during the months of April and May—Revival of parties—The ultra-royalists throng round the Count d'Artois—This Prince, ill and vexed, makes a long stay at Saint Cloud—Return to France of the Duke d'Orleans—The friends of liberty place their hopes in him, whilst the royalists already make him the object of their attacks—Great reverse of this Prince—The Bonapartists, their dejection and their dispersion—The revolutionists, who were at first pleased at the fall of Napoleon, are, by the violence of the emigrants, induced to join the Bonapartists—M. de Lafayette, M. Benjamin Constant, and Madame de Stael return to Paris, and a constitutional party is formed—Prudent arrangements of the *bourgeoisie* of Paris. The opinions of the capital reflected under various aspects in the provinces. State of Le Vendée and Brittany—The old insurgents again take up arms, refuse to pay certain taxes, and disturb by their threats the holders of the *biens nationaux*—Irritation of the cities in the east of France against the Chouans and the Vendéans—State of the city of Nantes—Dispositions of the southern provinces—Spirit that prevails at Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nîmes, Avignon, Marseilles, Lyon—The presence and ravages of the enemy exasperate the eastern provinces and attach them still more to Napoleon, whom they regard as the energetic defender of the land—Return of the troops from remote garrisons and prisons in England, Russia, Germany, and Spain—Exasperation and arrogance of these troops, who are persuaded that a dark treason has betrayed France into the hands of the enemy—Embarrassment of the Bourbons, who are obliged to reduce the army to a painful extent, and try to keep well with all classes, particularly those who are hostile to them, and obliged (so to speak) to govern by the aid of their enemies in opposition to their friends—First resolutions relative to the finances, to the army, and the navy, &c.—Louis, the minister of finance, finally succeeds in passing a resolution that all the state debts are to be paid, and the *droits réunis* kept up—Limits within which he obliges the war and navy ministers to confine themselves—Project of organizing the army: conservation of the Imperial Guard and re-establishment of the ancient royal military household—Difficulty of reconciling these different institutions, and, above all, of supporting the expense—Maintenance of the Legion of Honor, with a change in the insignia—Great military posts bestowed on the principal marshals—Discontent with which the army receives intelligence of the new system of organization—Meeting at Paris for an immense number of half pay officers and unemployed functionaries—Whilst the military men are hurt by the reductions to which they are obliged to submit, those attached to the principles of the revolution are rendered discontented by imprudent manifestations—Funeral service for Louis XVI., Moreau, Pichegru, Georges Cadoudal—Attacks of the clergy against the possessors of national property—The concordat not having been guaranteed by the charter, the Bourbons determined upon demanding its revocation—Mission to Rome for this object—The Pope is requested to revoke the concordat, and the Pope asks Louis XVIII. to restore Avignon—Police regulations, which render the

observance of Sundays and holidays obligatory—Effect produced by the regulation—The government, by yielding to the party feelings of its supporters, had, within a few months, alienated the military men, the revolutionists, the priests who had taken the oath, the possessors of national property, and the citizen class—The meeting of the chambers, animated by a monarchical and liberal spirit, infuses a better tone into the state of things—M. Durbach denounces in the Chamber of Deputies the regulation touching holidays and Sundays, and the system of legislation that places the daily press under a censorship—The Chamber of Deputies, though condemning the language of M. Durbach, demands a law for these two objects—The King yields to the wishes of the chamber; he orders a law regulating the press to be drawn up, but a law that confirms the censorship—Public excitement—Dawning taste for political discussions—After long debates, it is acknowledged that a censorship is not mentioned in the charter, and the law concerning the press is only adopted as a temporary measure—The King accepts the presented amendments, and sanctions the law such as it has issued from the Chamber of Deputies—The question of Sundays and holidays is referred to a special commission—Several publications against the national sales having been denounced to the chambers, the Chamber of Deputies condemns these writings, and again solemnly confirms the inviolability of the property called “national”—Bills relative to financial measures—M. Louis presents the financial schedule of the empire—Incorrectness of this schedule, but excellence of the minister’s principles—He proposes the integral liquidation of the state debts, the maintenance of the indirect taxes, and the payment of arrears by means of temporary bills bearing an interest of 8 per cent—The royalist oppositionists declare against the propositions of the minister, and without venturing to speak of bankruptcy, wish that the state creditors should be paid—They find some support from the liberal opposition, who, not comprehending the designs of the minister, exclaim against stock-jobbing—M. Louis, by his energy and unstudied eloquence, triumphs over all resistance, and gets his projects adopted, which become the basis of public credit in France—Prudent commercial measures calculated to effect the transition from a state of war to a state of peace—Though the liberals accuse the chambers of timidity, they acquire by a mixture of moderation and firmness the respect of the government and the confidence of the public—Their discussions produce a certain calm—Fête at the Hotel de Ville in honour of Louis XVIII—The body guards dispute with the national guard the honour of guarding the king—Effect of this fête—Defect in the administration, resulting from an error of M. de Montesquieu—This talented minister, who possessed the art of pleasing the chambers, was unfortunately unfit for business, and could neither modify or direct the personal administration—The provinces, left to themselves, adopt the tone of the local passions—Proposed journey of the princes to rally the supporters of the Bourbons—Danger of these journeys, which excite instead of allaying the popular passions—Journey of the Duke d’Angoulême into Lower Normandy, Brittany, Vendée, and Guyenne—His reception at Brittany, and particularly at Nantes—This Prince passes into the heart of Vendée—Sentiments and conduct of the Vendéans of the *Bocage*—Bordeaux; change that had taken place in the disposition of the inhabitants—Return of the Prince through Angers—His journey, a mixture of good and evil, finishes in August—Departure of the Count d’Artois for Champagne and Burgundy—He promises many consolations to all places that have suffered from the effects of the war, lavishes military decorations, and encourages at Dijon the intolerance of the *petite eglise*—His stay and his imprudent conduct at Lyons—His arrival at Marseilles—Enthusiasm of the Marseillais—Their ardent desire to obtain the *franchise* of their port—The Count d’Artois promises it and departs, leaving the people intoxicated with joy—His journey to Nîmes, Avignon, Grenoble, and Besançon—Unbecoming conduct with regard to the Archbishop Lecoz—Return of the Count d’Artois to Paris—His journey has only produced evil, without any admixture of good—Journey of the Duke de Berry into the frontier provinces—This Prince, irritated by the opposition offered by the army, gives way to injudicious anger—After a short interval of quiet in August, the passions of the people are again awakened in October and November by the journeys of the princes, and by the imprudent measures of the government with regard

to the pensioners, to the orphan daughters of the officers of the Legion of Honour, and the military schools—The intervention of the chambers induces a modification or revocation of these measures—Affluence and increasing opposition of the military at Paris—Disagreeable incident with regard to Gen. Vandamme, and commencement of General Exelmains's affair—Disgrace of Marshal Davout—Great sensation produced by the proposition of restoring to the emigrants their unsold property—The principle of the proposed measure is admitted, but the language of the minister Ferrard offends everybody—The chambers censure the minister and pass the law, with various amendments—Amid all this excitement, the party called the chouans, and that of the half-pay officers, experience mutual alarm, each accusing the other of imaginary conspiracies—The official police endeavour to reduce these conspiracies to the simple truth, whilst the officious police of the Count d'Artois try to exaggerate them—Weariness and perplexity of Louis XVIII., beset by the reports of his brother—Part performed by M. Fouché under these circumstances—The King, intending to be present at a representation at the Odeon, a conspiracy against the royal family is immediately talked of, and extraordinary precautions taken in consequence—Affected zeal of Marshal Marmont, who commands the body guard—Outcry against the war minister and the director of police—The King yields to the entreaties of the Count, and replaces General Dupont, war minister, by Marshal Soult, and M. Beugnot, director general of police, by M. d' Andre—He indemnifies M. Beugnot, by appointing him minister for the navy—This palliative infuses great confidence in the court party and the ultra-royalists—State of things in December, 1814.

BOOK LV.

GOVERNMENT OF LOUIS XVIII.

SCARCELY two months had elapsed since the return of the Bourbons, and France already presented the strongest contrast with what she had been or had appeared to be, during the previous fifteen years. At the termination of a sanguinary revolution, during which men had fallen on each other with actual frenzy, we saw them suddenly seized by the powerful hand of Napoleon, and under the empire calmed down into a complete moral and physical immobility, and soon despairing of being able to effect any thing against each other, they fell into a species of forgetfulness of themselves, their passions, and their opinions, and renouncing all interest in public affairs, cast, at most from time to time, an anxious look at the heroic drama that was being enacted before their eyes. The sudden fall of Napoleon, freeing them from the grasp of his iron hand, had awakened in different classes sentiments as diverse as their positions; the royalists experienced an unmixed joy, the revolutionists a joy mingled with anxiety, and the Bonapartists the stunning effect of a sudden and violent blow. But these sentiments soon underwent some modification. The royalists, when the first flush of joy was passed, found that the reality fell much short of their hopes, and they were filled with jealousy, disputing amongst themselves who should have the largest portion of the booty. Taking advantage of the return of liberty, which at the first return of the Bourbons existed only for their advantage, and making use of it to pour forth their hate against the revolution and the empire, they soon made the revolutionists regret their momentary joy, and extinguished in the Bonapartists the stunning effect of their fall, which had suspended the power of self-defence. The appa-

rent unity that had subsisted under the Empire—was thus suddenly exchanged for extraordinary commotion, and as if our history had retrograded seventy years, there were now seen confronting and measuring each other with angry eyes nobles and citizens, religionists and philosophers, priests who had taken the oath and priests who had not taken the oath, soldiers of Condé and soldiers of the Republic, all ready to come to blows, if the government, instead of restraining and calming them, by giving an example of cool good sense, had excited or even allowed them to follow their own inclinations.

In the first place, the spectacle of these dissensions was presented in the court itself. The Count d'Artois, deeply touched by the censure poured out on his short administration, afflicted at hearing the disastrous peace that had been concluded, attributed to the convention of the 23rd April, and his imprudent promises, blamed for the difficulty experienced in collecting the taxes—and these reproaches were encouraged by the King—had taken refuge at Saint Cloud, where he was more vexed than sick, and allowed his friends to form a group of malcontents, around whom all those rallied who thought that too much had been conceded to the revolutionists. And these malcontents did not hesitate to say publicly that the King was a kind of Jacobin, who had again adopted the ideas he had entertained in his youth. The higher classes of the nobility, who, though filling nearly all the high offices of the court, wished to hold also the state appointments, which they were forced to share with the imperialists, were far from being satisfied. They mingled their grief with that of the nobility of the bar, who, it must be confessed, had seldom any sympathies in common with the higher nobility, but who were now offended that they had not been allowed to draw up the new constitution, which they would have done according to their own ideas and for their own advantage. In the same way the surviving members of the ancient parliament had addressed a secret protest to Louis XVIII. against the charter. The provincial nobility, at least those who were not rich, had come in crowds to Paris, to petition for the restitution of their property, and to solicit, *en attendant*, places of every kind, and of every amount of salary. But the minister of finance received these gentlemen very roughly, for he believed that public offices ought to be given to those who had experience in business, and they were received with disdain by the minister of the Interior, who found them a bore. They consequently flocked round the Count d'Artois, saying that the government was abandoned to revolutionists, and that if things went on in that way a little longer, France and royalty would be again sacrificed.

Whilst that within the walls of the Tuileries there was thus formed a royalist party, *more loyal than the King*, as was remarked at the time, an entirely opposite species of party was being formed at the Palais Royal, but, it must be said, without the personal sanction of him who was reported its chief,—this was the Duke d'Orleans' party. This prince, an old and valiant soldier of the republic, well-informed, talented, and prudent, had acquired in an eventful life a precocious experience. He understood the character of the emigrants thoroughly, laughed at them without compunction in the retirement of his own family, and was so happy at revisiting his native land, and recovering there a princely rank and a large fortune, that he thought little of any thing else, his sole solicitude being to protect himself against the malice of the royalists, who were as inimical to him as they had been to his father. Whilst that he was solely occupied with his children, with their education and their scattered patrimony, taking especial care to avoid making partizans, the royalists made them for him in thousands, by persecuting him with their hatred, and so rendering him an object of interest and confidence to revolutionists of every shade. Thus on the right hand of the King was the Count d'Artois, surrounded by the malcontent royalists, and on his left the Count d'Orleans, surrounded by the malcontent liberals, whom he did not seek after, for he thought only of his family affairs, whilst the royalists were unintentionally working out serious political events.

In another sphere, the high dignitaries of the empire, who could not have consistently rallied round the Bourbons, or who had not wished to do so, having recovered a little from the effects of their fall, began to unite, but prudently, and without making any hostile demonstration. There were M. de Caulaincourt, whom even the patronage of the Emperor of Russia had not been able to get admitted to the peerage, and who kept aloof, deeply touched by the disasters of France and the calumnies of which he was the object, in connection with the abduction of the Duke d'Engbien; the Prince Cambacères, more taciturn than ever, and making no greater display than receiving at his table some old friends, as discreet and sensual as himself; the Dukes de Bassano, de Cadore, de Gaëta, de Rovigo, the Counts Mollien and Lavalette, talking within their own circle of the catastrophe they had witnessed, regarding with pardonable satisfaction the embarrassment of their successors in power, and visiting, but with considerable precaution, the Queen Hortense, who had remained at Paris to defend, under the patronage of the Emperor of Russia, the interests of her children. This princess had lately lost her

mother, the Empress Josephine, who died of a chill to which she had exposed herself in receiving the Emperor Alexander at Malmaison. She was universally regretted by those who knew her, on account of the elegance of her manners and the goodness of her heart; she was regretted by the public, who saw in her death an additional calamity amongst many. In fact, of the prisoner of Elba's two wives, one had just died of exhaustion and trouble of mind, the other had returned crownless, and with a portionless child, to the dominions of her father, scarcely acknowledged as a princess, though Archduchess of Austria by birth, and already half forgetful of the husband with whom she had shared the sceptre of the world!

Marshal Soult had also come to Paris, deprived of his command, and deeply irritated at the preference shown to Marshal Suchet, of which he complained with a want of prudence that he seldom displayed. Marshal Massena, too, was at Paris, almost forgetting the injustice of Napoleon in beholding the misfortunes of France, offended at being treated as a foreigner, who should be naturalized in order to become a Frenchman, and living in silence and isolation, never seeking at the Tuileries the flattery which all the marshals were sure to receive; and lastly, there was at Paris the Marshal Davout, proud of the resistance he had made at Hambourg, caring little about what the royalists and the adverse generals said, and preparing, in his estate at Savigny, whither he had retired, a memoir, in which he narrated with daring frankness all he had done in fulfilling his military duties.

In the same class with these men, but not mixing with them, were the revolutionists of every shade of feeling, who, though by no means hostile to the army, lived apart from it, and especially from its chiefs. Pleased for a moment, as we have said, at the downfall of the empire, they now began to regret it. The revolutionists who had most compromised themselves, such as Tallien, Merlin, and others, assembled at the house of Barras, who was still tolerably rich, and deplored in common the destruction of liberty, which they attributed to Napoleon. With these were united some few military men, such as Marshal Lefebvre, who, though distinguished and rewarded by Napoleon, had conserved his ancient opinions and beneath whose glittering marshal's uniform there beat the heart of a republican. The personages we have just named found in the suburbs a certain number of the lower classes who sympathized in their opinions, the old bound by memories of the past, the young by tradition, less daring than they had once been, but ready to resume their former attitude under the influence of events, and the excitement of political discussions. Above and apart from these were the more

decided revolutionists, who had been at first well treated by Napoleon, but who were afterwards separated from him, either in consequence of their convictions or some error in conduct. The greater number of these were senators, excluded from the peerage because they had voted the death of Louis XVI., and on this account called *the voters*. The two most important were MM. Sieyès and Fouché, the former ever morose and solitary in his habits, approving the charter, but doubting whether it would be put into execution; the latter, on the contrary, always untiringly active, keeping up an acquaintance with all parties, endeavouring to win the confidence of all, and though ill-recompensed for the services he had rendered the Count d'Artois, he sought the count's friends in private, and endeavoured to persuade them that he alone, amidst existing difficulties, was capable of guiding and saving the Bourbons.

But France was not exclusively composed of partizans, dreaming of the re-establishment of the ancient régime, or regretting the excesses of the revolution, or deploring the rich appointments held under the empire. There were both amongst the middle-aged and the well-informed young men brought up in the imperial schools, a considerable number of distinguished persons, who turned their thoughts to the future, uninfluenced by the prejudices or interests of any epoch, and seeking liberty under the Bourbons, whom Napoleon's errors had reinstated on the throne of France, a circumstance not to be regretted, should the restored dynasty only know how to accommodate themselves to the opinions and circumstances of the French people. These men assembled most frequently at the house of Madame de Staël, who had returned from the exile in which Napoleon's gloomy suspicions detained her. She pined for Paris, and Paris longed for her, for she was the soul of the French intellectual world, receiving in her *salons* conquerors and conquered, and endeavouring to persuade both parties that they must try to acquire, under the restored Bourbons, British liberty. M. Benjamin Constant had also returned from exile, and was preparing, with his fluent and brilliant pen, to throw light on constitutional questions. M. de Lafayette had issued from his retreat at Lagrange at the appearance of the first ray of liberty, and it was not without some degree of pleasure that he again beheld the Bourbons, under whom he had passed his youth, and whom he was disposed to serve if he found them inclined to serve the country. These were the most distinguished members of this society, which was frequented by the most talented and most esteemed men in Paris, and it was here that party took its rise which has been since known as "the constitutional party."

The well-minded citizens of Paris sympathised with this

class more than with any other. The bourgeoisie were peacefully disposed, moderate, and disinterested, not seeking government places, but solely anxious for the prosperity of trade. They had become familiarized with the idea of the return of the Bourbons, since the necessity of their return had been proved; they had placed their hopes in them, especially in the King, desiring, with peace, a prudent liberty—that which consists in being able to prevent governments from destroying themselves. The bourgeoisie of Paris offered up their best wishes for the Bourbons, and were ready to afford them an efficacious support by means of the National Guard, of which they formed the principal part, provided that their opinions, sentiments, and dignity, were not too rudely hurt. Offspring of the revolution, but unsoiled by guilt—not having contracted either criminal habits or dangerous ambition—having no other interest than the public welfare, the bourgeoisie of Paris was at this moment the truest, the best, and most popular expression of opinion in France.

In the provincial parts, the same shades of politics, but more decided in the colouring, were to be found; and the same passions, good and evil, with fewer modifications. In Lower Normandy, in Brittany, and in Vendée, the rural populations, so profoundly tranquil under Napoleon, were, so to speak, “up.” The Chouans had assembled with incredible celerity under the leadership of their surviving chiefs; they replaced those that were dead, and had, in fact, assumed arms, without knowing what they were about, merely for the pleasure of taking them up and threatening their old adversaries, or, as they said themselves, for the purpose of supporting the King. In their eagerness to obtain arms, they had rushed into the houses of those they called “blues,” and taken forcible possession of their muskets. The local authorities entreated them to remain quiet, assuring them that the king was not threatened with any danger, and consequently did not need their assistance; but secret intriguers, for the most part emigrants who regretted their lost property, or who were ambitious of government employments, assured them that they must not believe the prefects, and that the princes were desirous that they should hold themselves in readiness. Their ill-will was especially directed against the holders of national property. This class of persons was much more general in the country districts than in the large cities, though even here there were many who had purchased ancient mansions and convents. Nearly all who had favoured the revolution of 1789 looked upon the priests and nobles as enemies, and had had little scruple about becoming possessors of their property, which they purchased at a low price, and afterwards rated at its full value.

Such persons were especially numerous in Normandy, Brittany, Vendée, and the southern provinces, and now became alarmed for their personal safety, as well as for their property. Placing little trust in the sincerity of the local authorities, they had not yet taken up arms, but were on the eve of doing so. The inhabitants of the cities, both great and small, even without being holders of national property, but having still fresh in their memory all the horrors committed by the Chouans, sympathised on this account with the holders of national property, and constituted what in the west of France were called "*the blues*," in opposition to the party called "*the whites*." As to the latter, they employed their time in smuggling, waiting a favourable opportunity for engaging, in something more congenial to their taste; they refused to pay the tax on salt, and carried off immense quantities of this commodity from the salt marshes without paying the dues. To all these causes of commotion must be added the passions of the clergy, who were a hundred times more imprudent than any of those who hoped the return of the ancient order of things. The old quarrel between the priests who had *taken the oath* and those who had *not taken the oath* sprang up under a new form, that of submission or resistance to the concordat. Where there existed, (as in the diocese of Rochelle, for example) an ancient titular bishop who had not given in his resignation at the command of the Pope in 1802, and had retired into England, the people refused to obey the bishop appointed by the Emperor and sanctioned by the Pope. Touraine, Mans, and Perigord offered several cases of this kind. The concordat was in these places trampled under foot, and denounced as the fruit of the revolution. The priests who sanctioned it, and who had for the most part taken the oath, fell into great disfavour; people said, that having accepted the civil constitution of the clergy, it was no wonder they found the concordat quite to their taste. In short, the restitution of church property was publicly announced. The clergy and nobility declared openly that if the Bourbons, immediately on their return, had not been able to do them justice, it would soon be done; and that, in any case, the Count d'Artois and his sons ardently desired it, and would ultimately bring over the King to their opinion.

This position of affairs began to cause uneasiness to the bourgeoisie; even to those who, though they had no personal interest in the question of national property, were not uninterested in the question of public order, and would have beheld with alarm any attempt to restore the ancient régime. In the space of two months, things had arrived at that point that Nantes, one of the maritime cities most attached to peace and the Bourbons was become, on account of the chouanism arising on

every side, almost hostile to the restoration. Descending in a southerly direction, there was Bordeaux, which had assumed the title of the "city of the 12th March," because on that day its gates had been opened to the duke d'Angoulême. Bordeaux was not changed in sentiment, but certainly set up pretensions that did not harmonize with the general interest. In the first place, the inhabitants positively refused to pay the *droits réunis*, asserting that they had not supported the cause of legitimacy to submit to the ordinances of usurpation; they complained bitterly that the Mauritius had been abandoned, and burst into violent invectives against the English, whom they had at first received with the warmest enthusiasm. The same feelings prevailed at Toulouse, but with certain differences. In this city there was less animosity manifested against the English because no maritime interests were at stake, but on the other hand there prevailed a violent hatred of class against class, of royalists against revolutionists, because that the nobility, richer and more powerful in an agricultural than in a maritime province, were more frequently placed in antagonism with the bourgeoisie. Throughout the remainder of Languedoc, at Montpellier and Nîmes, the same sentiments prevailed, heightened by the bitterness arising from religious quarrels. The Catholics detested the Protestants, and said they had been excluded by them during five-and-twenty years from all the advantages arising from the possession of power, and wished to proceed to acts of extreme violence, from which they were with difficulty withheld. On the other hand, the Protestants began to take up arms in self defence. Nîmes was like a volcano ready to pour forth flames. Some persons of low birth, assuming the right of representing the Catholic nobility, some through natural excitability of character, and others through love of office, pretended to overrule the magisterial authority and follow no will but their own. They had publicly and in the bitterest language condemned the senatorial constitution, poured forth a thousand imprecations against the senate, demanded an absolute royalty, and protested against the charter. At Arles the same line of conduct was pursued, and in the environs the holders of national property had not merely been threatened but some of the former proprietors had taken forcible possession of their property.*

Marseilles surpassed, if possible, all that we have related of the other cities of the south. It was natural enough that the Marsellaises should refuse to pay the *droits réunis*, but they required besides that the entire commerce of the Levant should be placed in their hands, and to effect this, that they should

* In this description of the state of France, I follow the reports of the police which were every day laid before Louis XVIII.

be emancipated from all the commercial laws that bound the rest of France, that Marseilles should be declared a free city, with permission to trade with the entire world, without being subjected to any of the restrictions established for the protection of the national commerce. Every ordinance that opposed the fulfilment of these wishes ought to be trampled under foot as the work of usurpation, and in order that the King should be free to do what was suitable to his most faithful subjects, it was necessary that he should possess absolute power, unrestrained by chambers or any other institution of revolutionary origin. Consequently Marseilles execrated the charter, and with the charter the English, who had deprived us of the Isle of France. In combining all the follies that triumphant royalism gave vent to in Vendée, at Bordeaux, Nîmes, and other places, it would be difficult to equal the extravagances that found expression in the city of Marseilles, at present so enlightened and so prosperous, but at that time wrought to madness by twenty-five years of fearful sufferings.

Advancing towards the Rhone we find the same violence exhibited at Avignon, with a spirit of vengeance easily conceivable in a district that had witnessed the crimes of *La Glacière*. Mounting still higher, along our great southern stream, that is to say, at Valence and at Lyon, these sentiments gradually assumed an almost opposite character. Though there were at Lyon ardent royalists filled with the remembrance of the siege of 1793, and united under M. de Précý, who had gloriously directed that siege, and had on that account been invested with the command of the national guard, there were also numerous imperialists strongly attached to Napoleon through gratitude for the benefits he had conferred on their city, and the prosperity of their manufactures during his reign, and these dispositions were confirmed by the presence and bad conduct of the foreign troops. More north still, in Franche-Comté, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, and Burgundy, provinces that had been the theatre of the war, the spirit of patriotism had suffered so severe a check that the people had become *Bonapartists*. During the revolution these provinces, which were generally more tranquil than those of the centre and south of France, had never fallen into extreme opinions, but had maintained the moderate sentiments of 1789. Though they had once admired Napoleon as the regenerator of France, and the conqueror of Europe, they had afterwards deplored his errors, and separated from him without hesitation. But seeing him in 1814 struggle with so much glory and perseverance against the European coalition, sharing with him the anxieties and sufferings of the war, they had become again attached to his government. They had conceived an abhor-

rence of the foreign armies, and had grown cold towards the Bourbons, because they had returned in company with the foreigners.

The eastern provinces exhibited towards the King's government a positive coldness, less injurious, however, than the ill-regulated zeal of the royalists in the west and south. To all these elements, fermenting at the same time, there was now added another, in the number of old soldiers who returned to France, either as discharged prisoners, or because of the evacuation of the foreign fortresses. About twenty thousand men had returned from Spain by Perpignan; twelve thousand had returned through Nice and Toulon from Genoa and Tuscany; more than thirty thousand, composing the Italian army, had returned through Chambery; eighty thousand at least, that had evacuated Wurzburg, Erfurt, Magdebourg, Hambourg, Antwerp, Berg-op-Zoom, returned by Strasbourg, Metz, Maubeuge, Valenciennes, and Lille. More than forty thousand, who had outlived the horrors of the English hulks, had landed at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, Havre, Cherbourg, and Brest. A large number of prisoners to be restored by Russia, Germany, England, and Spain, was also expected. All these men wore the tricolour cockade, which no remonstrance could induce them to lay aside. Old soldiers, for the most part, who nourished in the depth of their hearts the sentiments that prevailed in their country when they quitted it, they could not cease, though they had been often irritated against Napoleon, to regard him as the representative of France, of her greatness, and her independence; whilst in the Bourbons they saw the very opposite. The idea that had taken root in their minds was, that in their absence foreigners, aided by some nobles and priests, had effected a revolution, alike disastrous to France and the army. This idea infuriated them, and filled them with contempt for a government which they declared was the tool and accomplice of foreigners. These assertions, though apparently true, were radically unjust, for, as we have already remarked, if the Bourbons in 1814 returned to France in the train of foreigners, it was a misfortune not attributable to them, but to Napoleon, whose fault it was. But this evident truth was disregarded, and the Bourbons were looked on by the old soldiers as the agents and allies of the European coalition.

From what has been said, it is easy to conceive the difficulty the King's government had to encounter in endeavouring to bring under its authority the troops that were returning to France. At Strasbourg some officers, who were present at a theatrical representation got up for the occasion, jumped upon the stage and silenced the royalist songs that displeased them.

At Metz, and in other cities, the tricolour flags and the eagles were displayed in the processions of the *Fête Dieu*. On the sea coast, where these soldiers had landed from England, they carried their violence so far as to wish to remove the cross of Saint Louis from the breasts of our old navy officers. At Rouen they hooted General Sacken, who, however, as governor of Paris, had acted with extreme moderation. They entered the shops of print sellers, and tore up the caricatures that ridiculed Napoleon, and frequently did not respect the portraits of the King and the princes. They sometimes went so far as to sing seditious songs, and at Paris, especially, there was much difficulty in restraining them. The Austrian troops having stuck branches of foliage in their caps, the French soldiers took offence, believing the manifestation was intended to indicate a triumph over them. The Prince de Schwarzenberg deemed it necessary to publish a note, explaining that the manifestation was not meant as an offence, but was merely a customary usage amongst the Austrian troops when in the field, which, however, would be now interdicted them.

The greater part of these soldiers had returned to France after having suffered severely. There were many amongst them who had not received their pay during six, twelve, and eighteen months. They did not blame the empire, but the restoration, for this, because payments were not made at the war office as quickly as they wished, and as their wants demanded.

The system of flattering the heads of the army did not produce the effect of calming and subduing the army itself. Our soldiers did not think themselves at all honoured in the persons of their generals, when they saw Berthier, Oudinot, Ney, Macdonald, Moncey, Augereau, Scrurier, and Mortier, seated at court between the King and the Princes. They, on the contrary, looked on these honours as the price of a dark treason. Marmont, who was certainly guilty, but much less so than was believed, was in their eyes the type of this imaginary treason, to which they attributed our reverses; and reports were every day circulated of his having been killed in a duel, false reports, which were constantly contradicted, and constantly renewed, but which expressed the wishes of those with whom they originated. The King and the Princes, in flattering the heads of the army whom they did not love, only compromised their own dignity and that of the marshals, without gaining the affections of the officers and the soldiers.

Numbers of officers had flocked to Paris to learn their fate, and enjoy the consolation of lamenting together over the change that had taken place in their condition. The repeated commands of the war minister, ordering them to return to

their regiments, and threatening them with the loss of their commissions if the military inspectors did not find them at their posts, were disregarded. The officers took advantage of the general confusion and remained at Paris, flocking to the theatres and public places, where they ridiculed and insulted the Bourbons beyond measure. In the same category were numerous government functionaries, who had returned from the surrendered provinces, custom-house officers, tax gatherers, and police agents, who, far from laughing and jesting, wept over their misfortunes. Altercations were of daily occurrence, and in these affrays our soldiers were not worsted, whilst the government, not daring to employ foreign troops to re-establish order, made use of the national guards, who, with their pacific and respected uniform, restored peace by their presence and advice. The rioters obeyed, because this guard was in their eyes the representative of the nation assembled to protect the public peace, frequently participating in the sentiments of the young men whose sallies they repressed, but who appreciated better than they, the necessity of submitting to circumstances, and of looking to the future, and not the past, for the happiness of France.

We may judge from this plain description the state of the public mind, the embarrassments of every kind that threatened the new government, the difficulties of the task they had to fulfil, and the serious errors into which they were liable to be betrayed. The first object to be considered was the army, which was to undergo reductions, inevitable in a country passing from a state of war to one of peace, and at the same time manage the more difficult operation of reducing an immense military establishment to a very limited one, and effecting these changes in a manner that the army should attribute them neither to ill-will nor a partiality for the principles of the emigration. The government required equal caution not to offend the revolutionists, whose presence recalled so many calamities, and who, if offended, might join the imperialists, which they had not yet done. It was necessary to tranquillize the holders of national property, who constituted a considerable portion of the landed proprietors, and not make them Bonapartists. It was necessary to restrain the clergy who had remained faithful to the Bourbons, and prevent them from maltreating the clergy who had taken the oath, and who formed the larger number, and not alarm the latter about the concordat, which was their sole guarantee. In fact, the object of the government was, not to make implacable enemies of these divers restless classes, all ready to become malcontents, regretting the empire which they did not love; and these precautions were doubly needed whilst the principal and almost

sole support of the government was the wise and prudent bourgeoisie, who entertained only moderate wishes, and who, were their good sense, justice, and love of equality wounded, might be tempted to join the malcontents. But, considered dispassionately, what a severe task was imposed on the Bourbons and the emigrants which had returned with them. They were called upon to prefer the soldiers of Napoleon to the soldiers of Condé; they were expected to show a preference to men who had been the executioners of some of their friends, or who had purchased the property of others for a trifle; they were expected, we say, to prefer these men to their own friends! They were expected to prefer the priests who had conformed to the principles of the revolution to those who had refused to recognise such opinions. They were expected to feign for classes that had sprung up in their absence as much regard, because they were rich and intellectual, as they felt for the nobles, with whom they had lived at court in their youth, and in exile in their riper age! In short, in one word, it was expected that the Bourbons should extinguish in their bosoms memory and feeling, in order to appear in the eyes of France what they were not! It must, therefore, be admitted, even whilst animadverting on the faults of these princes, that it would have been very difficult for them to do otherwise than they did. Revolution, counter-revolution—alas! terrible events, alike distant from the True, the Just, the Possible. The one over-shoots the mark, the other falls short of it; neither stops at the right point. But, as an excuse for both, it must be admitted that if the former has the merit of embodying the spirit of the times, the latter possesses that of obeying the noblest sentiments of the human heart, respect for antiquity and a tender affection for the past.

The question that pressed most on the consideration of the government was what concerned the army. It was first proposed that the soldiers should receive their arrears of pay, of which they stood very much in need, and which brokers sometimes advanced them at the very door of the war office at a profit of 50 per cent. But though the minister of finance intended to discharge all the debts of the state, he could not hope to discharge arrears out of the current resources, which scarcely sufficed for the most urgent necessities. Of these arrears a sum total had been formed, which it was proposed to pay by raising credit, which would necessarily involve some delay. However, an exception had been made in favour of the soldiers' pay, and M. Louis had determined to devote immediately to that object thirty or forty millions in ready money. For this purpose he had opened to the war minister the necessary credit; but two causes delayed the employment of these

means. In the first place, the difficulty of bringing from a distance the accounts of the different regiments; and secondly, the difficulty of reorganizing the war office. General Dupont had not hesitated a moment to restore the mansion occupied by the war office to its former owner—it was the unsold property of an emigrant; he had transferred his offices, and this removal, together with changing several clerks, and combining into one the two departments of the *personnel* and the *materiel*, which under the empire had been kept distinct, had occasioned a momentary confusion in the administration that had retarded business. However, General Dupont had made every effort to pay some accounts sent in from remote garrisons, and he also assisted the discharged prisoners that were thronging into France.

These preliminaries concerning the army having been arranged, it was necessary to proceed to its definite organization, and reduce it to proportions more suited to the extent of our territory and the state of our finances. At one time, by reason of desertions, a fear was entertained that there would be a dearth of soldiers. The conscripts of 1815 had been authorized, as we have seen, to return to their homes; and as to the conscripts drawn anterior to that period, and who had deserted in crowds, the ingenious pretext had been devised—in order to avoid severe measures, and to retain the right of recalling them in case of need—of considering them on a limited leave of absence. But the return of the garrisons and prisoners had soon dissipated the fear of suffering from want of men and had restored to France 400,000, that would enable the government to dispense with the conscription for a long period, and declare the system provisionally abolished, deferring to a later period the passing of a law on the subject of recruitment. By granting to a portion of these men—for example, the most fatigued—a limited congé, and keeping the others under arms, France would possess a superb army, composed of the best soldiers in the world. But was the government in a position to pay these men and make a provision for forty or fifty thousand officers, the glorious remains of our long wars?

This question was warmly debated in the Royal Council where as we have observed, the members of the old provisional government and the ministers had seats. General Dupont was summoned to present his project and he forwarded the command to Baron Louis, in order that the latter might declare what amount of money he was disposed to devote to the army. The Minister of Finance declared that he could not give a definite answer, until he should receive the budget of the different departments, and until he should have succeeded in re-establishing the collection of the taxes.

The Duke de Berry, the youngest and most active of the royal princes, and who exhibited a sincere zeal for the interests of the army, pressed the Minister of Finance to be explicit, and the latter declared he could not promise more than two million francs. For a military establishment comprising more than 400,000 men, soldiers and officers, this was very little, though a soldier does not cost and certainly did not cost at that time a thousand francs.* With great economy, 200,000 men might have been kept on service, but with the inevitable expenses attendant on the transition from a state of war to a state of peace, it was almost impossible, and the utmost that could be done would be to keep 150,000 men on service. A rigorous economy was imperatively called for, that would not permit any sacrifice to luxury or party-feeling.

The next question brought under consideration was the Imperial Guard; what was to be done with it? To dissolve it seemed difficult and dangerous; to retain without confiding to it the care of the sovereign's person, and thus keep the Imperial Guard in a species of semi disgrace, was still more dangerous. However, General Dupont and the princes believed they had found a solution for the difficulty, at once prudent and pleasing. They proposed that the Old Guard should be retained as a *corps d'élite*, with the same high pay, the same privileges, and an honourable title, without, however, being entrusted with the guard of the King's person, an honour reserved for the household troops. The Young Guard having been almost destroyed during the war, and the remains consisting of only a single regiment, originally drawn from the Old Guard, with which it could not be again incorporated, the remnants of both were fused into two infantry regiments, each consisting of four battalions; one regiment of grenadiers, to be called the "*Grenadiers de France*," another regiment of light infantry to be called "*Chasseurs à pied de France*." The

* It is a generally received opinion that in France a soldier costs 1,000 francs, and that 100,000 cost one hundred million. This is an erroneous idea. This calculation was based on the state of our military establishment during the first half of the present century, because at that time a budget of three hundred millions only maintained 300,000 men. But in this sum were comprised all the expenses of our military establishment, that is to say the fortresses, the staffs, the *material*, the pensioners, the gendarmerie, and it was by estimating this expenditure as the cost of the men alone, that each soldier was rated at 1,000 francs. But if, on the contrary, we consider a man, draughted into an existing and paid regiment, where the expenses of the staff and *material* are already liquidated, a soldier under such circumstances is far from costing 1,000 francs. Eighteen years ago, a soldier was maintained in time of peace for about 400 francs. Calculated in this way 100,000 men, recalled from furlough and draughted into existing regiments, ought to cost 40 and not 100 million francs.

cavalry was distributed in the same way, into four regiments, one of cuirassiers, one of dragoons, one of light horse, and one of lancers, enjoying the same advantages and with similar titles, of *cuirassiers*; *dragoons*, *chasseurs*, *lanciers de France*. As to the reserve of artillery, that was broken up and re-incorporated with the regiments from which it had been originally drawn. The entire might amount to about 800,000 men, horse and foot, which would cost some fifteen or eighteen million francs. It was a serious question to consider whether in a great state, there ought to be any *corps d'élite*, but the men who governed in those days solved the question, as we shall see, in a strange manner, by creating two of these bodies, one to guard the person of the sovereign and the other to guard nothing at all, excepting it might be the shade of the glorious monarch, under whom they had served, whose memory they incessantly recalled to others, and which they could never forget themselves.

The next military question was concerning the troops of the line, and it was necessary to reduce the entire to dimensions commensurate with our finances. The minister proposed to retain 90 infantry regiments of the line, each consisting of three battalions of six companies, and 15 light infantry regiments, which would make 105 infantry regiments comprising 300,000 foot soldiers fit for service. These 300,000 soldiers actually existed, and were about being organized when all our soldiers who were detained in foreign parts returned to France; the government not being able to pay more than half, the others were dismissed on unlimited leave, and the men were thus exposed to die of hunger if they did not adopt some trade, and if they did, they would be lost to the army, which would be thus deprived of so many veteran soldiers. How to dispose of the officers was a question that presented still more serious difficulties.

According to the proposed organization, thirty thousand officers would remain without employment. The war council was deeply perplexed. The Duke de Berry insisted that some means of employing them should be found, but it did not occur to any one, that by cutting off the expense of the Imperial Guard and the King's military household, 60 or 80,000 additional soldiers might be retained in service, the number of officers being increased in proportion. A middle course was adopted for the officers, as there had been for the Imperial Guard. Those officers that could not be incorporated in the proposed organization, were attached to the regiments; they were promised half pay with a right to two-thirds of the vacancies that might occur. This procedure involved the double disadvantage of creating a large class of malcontents, and cut-

ting off nearly all chance of promotion from the officers on actual duty. It may be said that the evil was almost inevitable, but it ought not to have been aggravated by useless expense.

The same system was pursued with regard to the cavalry, but not carried out so strictly. Fifty-six cavalry regiments of four squadrons each were formed of which 14 were heavy horse, 21 *cavalerie moyenne*, and 21 light horse, the entire forming an effective force of nearly 36,000 horse. Twelve artillery regiments were retained, of which 8 were infantry, and 4 cavalry, comprising 15,000 artillerymen and three regiments of engineers, the entire amounting to about 4,000 men. In this service as for the infantry, the unemployed half-pay officers were attached to the regiments with a right to two-thirds of the vacancies.

These different services taken together amounted to about 206,000 men; 214,000 including the Imperial Guard, involving an expense which the Minister of Finance estimated at two hundred million francs. This minister, for want of administrative experience, deceived himself strangely, as we shall soon see, for this sum would not suffice to maintain 150,000 men on service. This was evidently not the time to carry out the project of re-establishing the ancient royal military household, and thus creating a body of military nobles, horse and foot, that would cost as much as 50,000 soldiers on actual service, and who would furnish by their luxurious manner of living, painful comparisons with the misery endured by the rest of the army. But there were old gentlemen of ancient family who were devoted to the King, and through poverty, in want of employment; there were young men, filled with enthusiasm, who were desirous of entering by this means on a military career; it was believed that a few thousand brave nobles would be an infallible preservative against future revolutions; moreover, each of these nobles had been allowed to resume the title and rank he had formerly held in the King's household, and there was no need of further discussion—nothing remained but to seek the means of accomplishing a fixed resolution. As to the rest, it was said that a portion of the expense would be borne by the civil list, which certainly might be done, for the civil list amounted to 33 millions, which were equal to 45 millions at the present day. But this was only a weak excuse, for if the civil list could bear such an expense, it would have been wiser to reduce it by that amount, or better still, make it available for the Imperial Guard, which would have remained faithful, had some little effort been made to win the affections of the men, and the expenses of the guard thus transferred, would have afforded a great relief to the army budget. None of these simple ideas occurred to the stultified minds of those who were engaged in the discussion of these grave subjects.

General Beurnonville, who had served both before and after the Revolution, was commissioned to organize the royal household. The ancient red companies were re-established under the names of "gray musketeers, black musketeers, gendarmes, and light horse." Each company was to consist of three or four hundred gentlemen, holding the rank of officer, who were only to perform honorary service on days of ceremony, and these were commanded by the highest nobles of the court. The Body Guards were also re-established, that formerly numbered four, but which were now increased to six companies, because MM. d'Heavré, de Grammont, de Poix, de Luxembourg, titulars of the ancient corps, had resumed their command, and it was thought desirable to confide two companies to marshals of the Empire. The two marshals selected were Berthier on account of his high position, and Marmont, whom it was necessary to recompense in some manner for the service he had rendered. This unfortunate man was already much disappointed in his hopes, and not to give him this appointment would have been to justify those who condemned him without mercy.

The officers commanding the six companies of Body Guards were ordered to form their corps by enlisting the provisional royalists and the disbanded guards of honour; they had even permission to take young brave soldiers from the army, with injunctions to select those who, to military proficiency, added sound political opinions, and who would be attracted by the rank of sub-lieutenant which was assured to them. These six companies, each comprising three or four hundred men were to perform an effective service about the person of the King, dividing amongst them the twelve months of the year. The company of horse grenadiers was re-established, and was given to M. de la Rochejaquelein. There were also re-established the *gardes de la porte*, the *gardes de Monsieur*, &c. &c. To these cavalry troops we must add an infantry corps of about 4,000 men, with fifty or sixty cannon. This list, had it been complete, would not have comprised less than from nine to ten thousand men holding the rank of officer in the cavalry, and of subaltern at least in the infantry.

We may easily suppose what annoyance the pride and luxury of such a corps were likely to occasion the mass of the army, especially in comparing the prodigality of which this corps was become the object, with the parsimony with which those that were not *corps d'élite* were necessarily treated. A few fortuitous meetings between the officers of the royal household and those of the army were sufficient to involve unfortunate collisions and implacable hates. If to all this we add the restoration of the Swiss guards, which under the Empire had

only enjoyed a nominal existence, and whose actual re-establishment was certainly desirable, for it was the only means of associating with us a valiant people, obliged by the law of nations to remain neuter, if, we say, we consider all these circumstances we shall see what a multitude of grievances was heaped on the government, some certainly inevitable, others created voluntarily for the mere gratification of party spirit.

Some other changes were introduced into the army, in order to restore the exterior forms of the period previous to 1789, and to obliterate as far as possible all recollection of the Emperor and the Empire. In the list of regiments many numbers were unrepresented, because several had been destroyed during the war, others had been disbanded. This circumstance was profitted of, to change the numbers of all, by transferring the vacant number to the next regiment, and the number thus left vacant to the succeeding regiment, which induced a general displacement in the series, and entailed on all the regiments the loss of the number under which they had distinguished themselves. This was an attempt to diminish their glory by endeavouring to efface from their minds and those of others, undying memories. With the intention of attaching the army to the monarchy by means of certain honorary titles, the first regiment of the time was called: "the King's regiment," the second: "the Queen's regiment," the third: "the Dauphin's regiment," and so through all the royal princes, whose names could be given to regiments. In order to furnish the Princes with a motive for interfering in military affairs, they were made colonels in the different services. The Count d'Artois was nominated Colonel of the National and Swiss Guards. The Duke d'Angoulême was appointed Colonel of Cuirassiers and Dragoons, the Duke de Berry Colonel of the Chasseurs and Lancers. The old Prince de Condé was made Colonel of the Infantry of the Line, the Duke de Bourbon Colonel of Light Infantry, and lastly the Duke d'Orleans, Colonel of Hussars. These titles had been granted by Napoleon to the most distinguished lieutenant generals of the service, and these gentlemen could not feel otherwise than deeply offended at being thus dispossessed. To soothe their feelings they were allowed to retain the emoluments and to exercise the functions of the rank of which they were deprived. They were appointed Inspectors General of the different regiments of which the Princes were made colonels.

But it was not the army alone which needed a reduction proportioned to our territory and our finances, the navy was to undergo a like change, and in this department of the public service, the retrenchments were to be still greater than in the sister service. Instead of one hundred ships of the line, and

two hundred frigates, which Napoleon had laboured to construct, and which with the immense extent of coast he commanded, he would have been able, in two or three years of peace, to equip fully, we, in time of peace and in the actual state of our finances, could hardly keep up two or three ships of the line and eight or ten frigates, and it was necessary to make proportionate reduction in the *materiel* and *personnel* of our navy. As to building new ships that was not to be thought of for a long time, for the vessels built under the old régime and those remaining from imperial France would be more than sufficient for a war armament. As to the sailors and workmen, maritime commerce offered them a certain means of employment. But the navy officers and engineers would be placed in a most difficult and painful position. For them as for the military officers, the expedient of half-pay was employed, with a right to two-thirds of any vacancies that might occur. They were also allowed to serve on board merchantmen without injury to their rights and rank in the Royal Navy. But these were poor palliatives, wholly inefficacious to soothe the distress of the two services.

One of the dearest interests of the army was yet to be discussed—the Legion of Honour. The charter had decided that it should be maintained and nobody would have dared to propose its suppression. But it was necessary to reconcile the existence of the Legion of Honour with that of other orders, ancient and modern, about which it was imperative that some regulation should be made. The Archbishop of Malines—M. de Pradt—who had become Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour, proposed that a new order should be created, entitled, “the Order of the Restoration.” This order which would have become within a few days as ridiculous as that of the “Lily,” which was conferred on 500,000 persons, was unanimously rejected by the Royal Council. The Order of Saint Louis gave rise to more serious discussion. This was a respectable order created by Louis XIV., for the special reward of military merit, and the insignia of this order still figured on the breasts of some of our old officers who had served in the wars of the previous century. It would be scarcely possible for the Bourbons to abolish the order. M. de Blacas proposed that it should be amalgamated with the Legion of Honour and the two fused into one order, of which Louis XVIII should be the creator, the patron and legislator. The Chancellor Dambray remarked very honestly that such a proceeding would be violation of the Charter, which had stipulated the unconditional maintenance of the Legion of Honour. The Royal Council coincided in this opinion. It was decided that the two orders should exist simultaneously,

and that in order to popularize the cross of Saint Louis, it should be conferred on some of the most distinguished officers of the imperial army, who would thus have two crosses instead of one, and would have the satisfaction of seeing their newly-acquired glory consecrated by the justly-honoured insignia of the glory of former times:

It was also decided that without proscribing the cross of *la Réunion* which recalled vain and even dangerous recollections—the union of territories which under Napoleon had so alarmed Europe—this decoration should not be again conferred on any one. This was a certain means of extinguishing the order. As to the order of the iron crown, which now belonged to the sovereigns of Lombardy, that as well as other foreign orders, could not be worn in France without the king's permission.

In maintaining the Legion of Honour, it would be necessary to modify the decoration, for Louis XVIII., and the princes of his family could not be expected to wear upon their breasts a likeness of Napoleon. M. de Talleyrand was the first member of the Council who spoke on this subject. Treated in general by Louis XVIII. with a politeness unmingled with the slightest shade of gratitude, he felt that to maintain his position he must endeavour to please, and spite of his personal haughtiness, he did not disdain to give himself the trouble. He proposed that the likeness of Louis XVIII. should be substituted for that of Napoleon on the *plaque* of the Legion of Honour. Marshal Oudinot, with great simplicity, eagerly adopted this opinion. The other members of the Council entertaining grave objections to this proposition, but not daring to make them in presence of the king, observed a profound silence. This silence soon became embarrassing for the flatterer who had been so ill supported, and might have become embarrassing to the king himself, had not Louis, with a rather sarcastic smile, appeared to enjoy the confusion of the others without participating in it. Wishing to put a termination to the irksomeness of this mute scene, General Beurnonville proposed that the question should be referred to a special commission selected from the members of the Council. This proposition did not put an end to the silence which still prevailed, as if the members of the Council entertained sentiments which could not find expression in the king's presence. The Duke de Berry—the only member of the Council who was never embarrassed, and the only one for whom, either through affection or fear, the king showed any consideration—spoke out boldly, and made no scruple of saying, that it would appear very strange to see a likeness of Louis XVIII. decorate an order created by Napoleon, for services performed under Napoleon, and proposed the likeness of Henri IV., which might, without fear of instituting comparisons,

replace all others. The hardihood and good sense of the prince untied the fettered tongues, and M. Ferrand with a frankness becoming in friends, adopted and supported the opinion of the Duke de Berry. M. de Blacas then proposed, not a likeness of any king which might suggest comparisons not agreeable to Louis XVIII., but a figure of France. This proposition was too suggestive of republican ideas. Louis XVIII. at length broke the silence which he had hitherto observed, thanked his nephew very much, observed that he was not one of those princes who were desirous of statues whilst they were yet living, and that were he capable of such weakness, the fate of him whose likeness they were about to set aside would be sufficient to correct the folly, but that after having maturely considered the proposal of the Duke de Berry and that of M. de Blacas, he approved the project of adopting the likeness of Henri IV. The skilful flatterer who had sought to please, saw his flattery rejected on every side—rejected even by him to whom it was personally addressed, but he was not a man to be embarrassed about such a trifle. Like the others, he adopted the opinion of the king, and it was agreed that on one side of the medal of the Legion of Honour, the likeness of Henri IV. should appear, and on the other, three *fleur de lis*. It was also arranged that as soon as the change was effected, all the Bourbon princes should wear the cross of the Legion of Honour on their breasts.

The different measures we have just recorded, though dictated, for the most part, by imperious necessity, would have deeply offended the army, even had they not furnished any pretext to malevolence. But considering all that the Bourbons had done merely to please their friends, and the irritation that prevailed amongst military men, and the spirit of injustice, consequent on this irritation, it is no wonder that these proceedings were taken in bad part, provoked bitter criticisms, and often even dangerous resistance. The imperial guard still resided at Fontainebleau. The old guards had not been disbanded, but as they were no longer to guard the sovereign's person, neither should they reside at Paris—a privilege so ambitioned by the troops in general. A report was circulated, which was certainly well founded, that even at Fontainebleau the guards were thought too near the capital, and that the infantry would be sent to Lorraine, and the cavalry to Flanders, Picardy, and Touraine. This intelligence produced a great commotion in the ranks, and a number of the soldiers traversed the streets of Fontainebleau, exclaiming, "*Vive l'Empereur.*"

To the Duke de Berry was confided the task of establishing a good understanding between the army and the house of Bourbon, and no person could be better suited to the task.

He went to Fontainebleau to visit the guards, who had not yet been honoured by the presence of any member of the royal family. Officers whose good-will had been won by flattering their ambition, endeavoured to prepare him a reception. He was received respectfully and in silence. Cries of *Vive le Roi* were uttered by some partizans, but met with no response. However, the prince, accompanied by Marshal Oudinot, who commanded the infantry of the guards, and by Marshal Ney, who commanded the cavalry, was easy and familiar in his manners, and paid many compliments to the old soldiers. The pains he took had the effect of making them conceal the sentiments which sometimes burst forth imprudently, but did not change them in any degree. It is possible that the king might have won the affections of the guards had he frankly confided his person to their keeping, conferring on them exclusively the privileges and title of a *corps d'élite*; at least he would have obtained sufficient influence over them to have been quite safe in their hands. But in re-establishing the household troops and confiding the care of his person to them, he had irrevocably rendered back to Napoleon the affections of the imperial guard.

Since the departure of the foreign troops, especial care had been taken to garrison Paris with the regiments favoured with new titles, such as the regiments of the King, Queen, Monsieur, &c. These precautions did not tend to excite a better feeling in the barracks. In these places cries were every day heard of *Vive l'Empereur*. The Duke de Berry made a point of visiting the barracks frequently, but that did not prevent his frequently hearing seditious cries. Not deficient either in presence of mind or quickness of repartee, when able to control his temper, he drew near a soldier, who during one of his visits had cried *Vive l'Empereur*, and asked him why he uttered that exclamation. "Because Napoleon has a hundred times led us to victory," replied the soldier. "A great miracle, indeed," said the prince, "with soldiers like you." The reply made an impression, and was quickly circulated through the barracks. The prince was highly complimented on his wit, but the sentiments of the army continued unaltered.

But things assumed another aspect when the young men of the household troops appeared in the streets of Paris. Their uniform was very handsome; of this they were proud, as was natural enough; and as they enjoyed the rank of officer, they had a right to the military salute. More than once the soldiers refused this salute, and military punishments had no effect in changing their dispositions. What was still more serious, the national guard became engaged in the quarrel. No sooner was the first corps of the household guard organized, than

this body supplanted the national guard in the interior of the palace, leaving the latter only the external posts. This was, so to speak, giving the national guards the door, and it would have been better either to deprive them of all their privileges, or leave them all. But a fortuitous circumstance aggravated this exclusion from the interior of the Tuileries. The day the body guards were first put on duty, they repaired to their appointed post, at an hour when the greater number of the national guards were gone to dinner. They took possession of the post without ceremony, putting the arms of the absent soldiers outside. When the latter returned, they found their place taken, and their arms displaced without any of the forms usually observed by soldiers towards each other under such circumstances. The national guards complained loudly, and went about communicating their discontent to the neighbouring detachments. Though what had occurred was only the effect of awkwardness, and not of any intention to offend, nevertheless a general commotion was excited through the ranks of the national guard. The legion, generally posted at the Tuileries, declared that they would not mount guard there again, either within or without the palace, and the effect produced was such that M. de Blacas was obliged to write a letter to General Dessoles, thanking the national guards in the king's name and in the most flattering terms for their services. A banquet was even got up between the body guards and a select number of the national guards, but all these measures only served to publish, not to appease the discord.

The king, on his side, continued to show the most marked attentions to the heads of the army. He received Marshal Massena, complimented him largely on his great exploits, and informed him that he should soon be naturalized by an act of the two Chambers. The king also received Carnot in his quality of head inspector of engineers, and Admiral Verhuel as a navy officer, who had remained in the French service, without seeming to remember that the former was a regicide, and that the latter had defended the Texel to the last extremity. After having made so many sacrifices, it would seem that the Bourbons had need to soothe their wounded feelings at the expense of some great military hero of the day. Marshal Davout was the victim devoted to satisfy the resentments of royalty. His resistance at Hambourg, as we have already said, had offended the allied sovereigns; and, as we have observed, this marshal had fired on the white flag, seeing it associated with the Russian. Actuated by these different motives, the Bourbons were strongly irritated against him, and besides, they believed him devoted to Napoleon, which proves how badly they were informed, for the marshal had been in dis-

grace since 1812. He was consequently the only one amongst the marshals whom the king would not receive. The war minister was commissioned to inform him that having compromised the French name on foreign service, it was necessary that he should explain his conduct before he could be admitted to court. The marshal received this intelligence with great indifference, and proceeded with the memoir he was writing, to show France and Europe what his conduct had been at Hambourg.

From this moment Marshal Davout, who had been always much respected, but very little loved by the military, became suddenly their idol. The Boulevard des Italiens and the Palais Royal constituted a kind of public meeting-place for the officers who had left their regiments, and who were not in a hurry to return, notwithstanding the repeated orders of the war minister. Some were possessed of personal property, and spent at Paris the money they received from their families; others had no private fortune, and consumed in a few days their arrears of pay, but preferred remaining in the capital and giving vent to their discontent than to return to their regiments and become what was called half-pay officers. They crowded the Palais Royal and the Boulevard, put their own construction on every act of the Government, ridiculed the impotent king, and contrasted his lumbering heaviness with the rapid movements of the man whose diabolical activity they had lately cursed; they laughed at the king's household troops, and still more at the old emigrants who daily repaired in deputations to the Tuileries, and who certainly afforded abundant food for laughter. Sometimes it was a deputation from one of the Vendean armies, or from the army of Condé, that served so long on the Rhine, or representatives of the celebrated camp of Jales that appeared in the provincial costume of their time; they visited the king, and then visited Monsieur, and poured out all the feelings of their hearts to the latter; they presented petitions, and returned decorated with the order of the lily, or gratified with the promise of a pension. Here was continual subject of merriment for our young officers; and some with the heedless folly of their age, went so far as to borrow the costume of the soldiers of the old régime, and walked through Paris, followed by crowds of their comrades, whom the sight of this disguise threw into roars of laughter. But these scenes did not always end so jocosely, for duels sometimes ensued, but happily not often, few daring to seek a quarrel with officers of the imperial army, and the princes restrained those who would have ventured. But mingled with these wild jests was a well-founded sadness. We have already spoken of the hundreds of government functionaries, custom-house officers, tax-

gatherers, and police officers, who had accompanied the troops on their return, shared their dangers, imitated their heroism, and who were, with their wives and children, dying of hunger at Paris. It was only natural that they should join the groups of discontented officers, and the gaiety of the latter heightened the desolating spectacle of their misery. Baron Louis, more solicitous to establish order in the financial department, than to relieve these unfortunate men, had the folly to refuse them the assistance, which, without adding much to the budget, would have solaced unmerited misfortunes; the consequence was that many committed suicide. This strange combination of scenes, some burlesque, others heart-rending, produced an unfavourable effect upon the public mind, and caused much disquiet.

One of the means devised for re-establishing military discipline, and furnishing high appointments to the marshals who had not obtained offices at court, was to place them in the principal military divisions, with increased powers and rich emoluments. In the first place, the government thought it prudent to disperse the marshals; secondly, the government was well aware that, if the marshals were not always pleased with a court where they felt they were strangers, though highly flattered, yet they did not desire the return of Napoleon, and that, if dispersed through the provinces, they would endeavour to exercise their authority over the troops, and labour to bring them back to their duty. It was therefore determined to send the marshals to the provinces. At Paris, the commander of the military division was placed too near the royal authority to possess much importance. However, a man of determination was needed, and General Maison was chosen, who, at Lille, had displayed such extraordinary energy, and was not reputed a friend of Napoleon's. The marshals were differently disposed of. Marshal Jourdan was sent to Rouen, where he had unfurled the white flag; Marshal Mortier was sent to Flanders, Marshal Oudinot to Lorraine, Marshal Ney to Franche-Comté—the three latter to the provinces where they were born; Marshal Kellerman was sent to Alsace, where he had always had the command of the depots; Marshal Augereau to Lyon, where he had recently commanded; Marshal Massena was appointed to Provence, where he was stationed at the time of the Restoration; Marshal Macdonald was sent to Touraine, and Marshal Soult to Bretagne. The latter, who had fallen into disgrace after the events at Toulouse, had at first shown considerable irritation; but afterwards, yielding to the good advice of General Dupont, had become gradually calmer, and had sent assurances to the king of his sincere loyalty. He had, consequently, obtained the command of the most royalist province in France, where

it was thought his good faith might without risk be put to the proof. We shall soon see the result of these brilliant appointments, of which in the commencement such sanguine hopes were formed.

Whilst such little influence was gained over the soldiers, even in making such great efforts to gain the good will of their chiefs, there was still less success achieved with other classes, whom it was necessary to manage carefully to prevent them joining the discontented military. Scarcely was the royal family established in France, than a funeral service was ordered for Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the other august victims who had perished on the scaffold. There was certainly no event of the revolution more calculated to inspire sad reflection than the death of the unfortunate Louis XVI., whose good intentions had been repaid by an iniquitous condemnation, and celebrating a funeral service for him was merely rendering homage to his misfortunes. But when party spirit runs high, what some do in all simplicity others do maliciously, and the public pay especial attention to the latter. It was to be feared that this homage to great misfortune might become the source of fresh discord. However this may be, the 16th May was chosen—the anniversary of the death of Henry IV.—and a funeral service was celebrated in all the churches of Paris, in honour of the royal victims immolated in 1793. Conformably to the doctrine of forgetting the past, the will of Louis XVI. was read, in which, on the eve of his death, he pardoned in such touching terms all his enemies. But in the provinces, the example which was followed with regard to the ceremony was not observed with regard to the manner of celebrating it. The clergy pronounced funeral orations, and gave utterance on the occasion to incendiary language. The entire revolution was represented as one long crime, where all, both men and things, were stained with guilt, where everything was to be condemned, even the principles of justice, in whose name the revolution had been effected, and which had just been consecrated by the charter.

The royalist press envenomed still more the quarrel, by replying to those who appealed to the oblivion promised by the charter, saying that the sense in which the government had promised the act of oblivion was, that the authors of the revolutionary crimes should never be judicially punished, but that no promise had been made to silence the public conscience in their regard, or to consider as indifferent, acts which were in themselves atrocious, or to suppress, in the eyes of France, tears due to noble victims; that if these testimonies of grief offended the perpetrators of certain crimes, their susceptibility could meet with no attention, as, on the contrary, those persons

ought to consider themselves happy in being allowed to exhibit on the soil of France their barefaced impunity, but that they could not be promised either the esteem or silence of honest people; and that if the days of public mourning were disagreeable to them, it was the duty of criminals, and not of the expiators of crime, to hide themselves during those days, which were so short and so rare. We may easily suppose the effect produced by such language, both on the men directly attacked, and on those connected with them, if not by a community of acts, at least by a community of principles.

Having once betaken themselves to inopportune recollections, the royalists did not know where to stop. After Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, came Madame Elizabeth, the Duke d'Enghien, Moreau, Pichegru, and—can it be believed?—even George Cadoudal, who, before the bar of public justice, had confessed his intention of killing the First Consul on the road to Malmaison. The priest who assisted him in his last moments was sought out, and commissioned to officiate at the funeral ceremony. The royalists went further, and had the impudence to announce that the king would defray the expense of the ceremony. This was gratuitously compromising Louis XVIII., with the moderate liberals, who were disposed to regard him as more prudent than his family and his party. This ceremony produced a great commotion amongst the military, who did not conceal their indignation, and so alarmed the police that they thought it their duty to acquaint the king with the circumstance.

Acting in this manner was sure to bind in a common and close bond the revolutionists, even the most moderate, with the military and all the partizans of the Empire. Nor were the holders of national property and the priests, who had taken the oath, treated with more circumspection. In reality, the Bourbons were deeply grieved that, being re-established in France, they were not able to restore to the emigrants their property; and they were vexed to hear it said that, now in possession of the Tuileries, they did not bestow a thought on those who were starving because of their devotion to the Bourbon cause. The princes need only possess good and grateful hearts, to adopt these opinions and sentiments. But the science of politics, without being either ungrateful or immoral, and solely because it is reason applied to the government of states, is often condemned to make painful sacrifices. But when we consider that the church property might have been legitimately alienated; when we reflect that the property of the emigrants might have been as justly dealt with—for the emigrants had made war on their country—and that the power of confiscating property, since justly abolished, but which was

at that time the law of the land, might have been correctly applied to the acts by which these persons had rendered themselves guilty; and especially when we consider that a general subversion of the ownership of property would have followed the revocation of the national sales, state policy, which was not supposed to feel and reason like the Bourbons, was right to sanction these sales by an irrevocable act. But the Bourbon princes thought as M. Lainé, and wished that the holders of property, sanctioned by law but opposed by public opinion, should restore this property to the ancient proprietors for a pecuniary consideration. Holding these opinions, it was only natural that the Bourbons should encourage or permit every act conformable to such ideas.

The clergy, still more imprudent than the emigrants, began to hold in the provincial pulpits a language still more dangerous. They preached publicly against the Concordat, against the sale of church property and the sale of emigrants' property, and carried their temerity so far as to refuse the sacraments to the holders of such property, who refused, when dying, *to make restitution*, according to an expression at that time in general use.

But they did not limit their attacks to the holders of national property: they were equally severe against the moderate clergy—against those that had accepted the Concordat, and they thus awakened dissension in the bosom of the church. Unfortunately, the constitution drawn up by the senate had not guaranteed the maintenance of the Concordat; and if anything can give an idea of the service rendered by this body in sanctioning afresh the social and political principles of the French Revolution, it is the subversion that now threatened the religious order of things, because the senate had neglected to ratify the Concordat. In fact, nothing less was contemplated than the abolition of all the changes that the revolution had effected in the church, and which had been sanctioned by time, by the law of the land, and by the approval of enlightened men.

We have not forgotten the state in which the First Consul found religion in 1800. A considerable number of priests had accepted the civil constitution proposed to the clergy, either through meekness of temper, through love of peace, or through sincere approval of what was reasonable in this constitution. Others had refused through conscientious scruples, and some through party spirit. The priests, who had sworn to observe the civil constitution, had at this price retained the right to celebrate public worship. Those who refused had incurred the interdict of the government, but preserved the confidence of the faithful. The former celebrated public worship in the churches, in absolute solitude; the latter officiated in private

houses, surrounded by large congregations. The latter declared every official act of the priests who had taken the oath to be void, and re-married and re-baptised all those for whom the others had performed such services; and so of all the acts of civil life in which religion had a part. But the dissonance did not stop here. Many bishoprics had remained vacant, because the Pope refused to consecrate bishops nominated by the temporal power; and in this confusion of opinions, since believers did not know to whom they ought to listen, the unbelievers took occasion to despise alike the priests who had taken the oath and those who had not taken it. They went so far as to proscribe all, as we have seen during the epoch called the Reign of Terror. But whilst the convention proscribed the priests, the royalists in Vendée made use of them to excite, keep up, and foment the civil war. Such was the state of the church immediately previous to the passing of the Concordat. The First Consul, exulting in his then stainless glory and unlimited influence over the public mind, and his then unrivalled power in Europe, had induced the Pope to sanction all that was reasonable in the civil constitution of the clergy, to make the diocesan circumscriptions coincide as nearly as possible with the administrative, to diminish the number of bishoprics (which was excessive), and proportion them to the number of departments, and accept the double principle of a temporal nomination of bishops by the head of the state, and their spiritual consecration by the Holy See. He induced the Pope, moreover, to recognise the principal social changes that had taken place; such as the discharge of civil functions by civil magistrates, the abolition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the alienation of church property, &c. &c. The First Consul had promised, in return, that the state should protect the Catholic worship, give the clergy suitable incomes, and in a word confer on them all the distinction to which they are entitled in a country at once religious and enlightened. In short, wishing to put an end to a deplorable schism, the Pope and First Consul had agreed to abolish the ancient *personnel* of the French church and reconstitute it, by selecting from amongst the *assermentés* and the non-*assermentés* clergy—that is, from amongst those who had taken the civil oath and those who had not taken it—those who were most virtuous, pure, and attached to religion and to France. Such was the great treaty of peace with the church, which did so much honour to General Bonaparte and to Pius VII., because it was conducive alike to the good of the country and the church; a treaty more glorious and more solid than those of Lunerville, Presbourg, and Tilsit, for whilst the latter, the offspring of victory and short-lived as the source from which they sprung,

have been effaced from the national law of Europe, the latter, founded on immutable reason, still subsists, and spite of the exaggerations of certain men, will subsist as long as public worship exists in France, because it is the only rule that an enlightened religion and a policy at once pious and independent can accept.

If there was any single act which tended to strengthen the power of the First Consul and to abridge his passage to the throne, it was incontestably the Concordat. Peace with the church, peace with Europe, and the civil code, had been Napoleon's three dazzling titles to the empire. The Bourbons in their exile had felt the full force of the Concordat. They had feared, opposed, and hated it more than any other act of Napoleon; and they had, by their influence, contributed very much to prevent the bishops from giving in their resignation to the Pope, as he demanded. In fact, thirteen bishops had refused, and ten or twelve of these were still living. But so conformable was the Concordat to public opinion that these recusants retained no authority, and the prelates nominated by Napoleon and Pius VII. to the sees whose former occupants had not given in their resignation, had been recognised, respected, and obeyed like those who had been nominated to vacant sees. Some unbending priests obstinately refused to recognise the bishops whose predecessors had not resigned their functions, and were living in London: these received the ridiculous and deserved appellation of *the little church*—a title that corresponded with their position and importance in the religious world.

Napoleon having, through his own fault, put the Bourbons in possession of the throne, his wisest work was threatened to be involved in the same ruin as his most foolish. In fact, the Bourbon princes, bound by the senatorial constitution, since called *the charter*, were obliged, by policy as well as by law, to respect certain principles; but they were free in religious matters, because no provision had been made for the maintenance of the Concordat, and they wished in this particular to restore absolutely the past form of things. And this mode of thinking on the part of the Bourbon princes was very natural, for besides that their religious principles had that tendency, they were urged to it by the importunities of their friends, against whose arguments they could not, in this case, allege the obligations of an article of the charter. Add to this that the Bourbons not only detested the Concordat, remembering the evil it had caused them, but they detested the Pope himself, whose complaisance to Napoleon they had not yet pardoned; and whom they regarded in the light of a priest who had taken the civil oath, but to whom they were obliged to be

civil, because that his power like their's was based on legitimacy; but they were at the same time determined to abolish all of his works that they could. Let us only imagine the consequences of such an undertaking. We should see the Pope abolishing the existing ecclesiastical dioceses to re-establish the ancient, and a second time demanding their resignation from the bishops in order to restore those he had formerly dispossessed, thus reorganising the clergy of a country in a spirit of blind reaction, which would be in other words, only to fall back on the former distinction between priests *assermentés* and non-*assermentés*, which would be reviving schism in the church, setting the priests at war, and putting the faithful in confusion; whilst the Pope, belying by his own act his infallibility, would have proclaimed himself the most fallible of princes, and the church would have resold, under threat of excommunication, the ecclesiastical property which the Bourbons had pledged themselves, by the conditions of the charter, to leave in possession of the actual holders! Nothing but the profound ignorance of the emigrants with regard to all that concerned France, could excuse an enterprise which, at every step, would have plunged them into inextricable embarrassment and immense danger.

However, being free to make the attempt, the Bourbons were determined to do so; and they began by refusing to recognise certain bishops, or hold any relation with them. Cardinal Maury had already been expelled from his see, because the Count d'Artois had declared that he would not be received by him at Notre-Dame the day he entered Paris. Cardinal Maury was not certainly, even according to the conditions of the Concordat, in a regular position; but a like resolution was adopted with regard to many whom the Pope had nominated, under pretext that some had taken the civil oath, and that others occupied sees whose ancient titulars were living in London, after having, in 1802, refused to give in their resignation to the Pope. These bishops, who had not given in their resignation, quitted London and hastened to Paris, where they were made acquainted with the project, which indeed was no longer a secret, of overturning the conditions of the Concordat. All the clergy were informed of the projected change, and immediately, in all the sees where there were two titulars, schism again sprung up. For example, at Rochelle, as we have already said, the titular appointed by Napoleon in virtue of the Concordat, and installed by the Pope, and consequently possessing the double investiture, temporal and spiritual, was opposed by the ancient titular, who had not given in his resignation. A species of sedition sprung up amongst the clergy. The greater number refused to ac-

knowledge the authority of the modern, but accepted that of the exiled bishop, who opposed the Concordat. This species of schism had made rapid progress in the two Charentes, Dordogne, Vendée, the two Sevres, the lower Loire, Loire-et-Cher, Sarthe, and Mayenne, so that the people no longer knew what religious authority they ought to obey. Consequent on this disorder was the rule of passion, the only influence that then obeyed. Sermons were preached against the Concordat, against the priests who had taken the civil oath, and against the holders of national property; so that, to the ebullitions of political zeal were added those of a religious character. At the other extremity of France—that is to say, in Franche-Comté—where the public mind, though moderate in political matters, was violent in religious, there arose disorders of a somewhat different character, but quite as serious, and more scandalous, if possible. Lecoz, bishop of Besançon, an ancient constitutional prelate and a priest of high character, had, owing to the firmness of the First Consul, been consecrated by Pius VII., and recognised as one of those elected in virtue of the Concordat. He had thus received the twofold installation of the temporal and spiritual powers. He administered his diocese with piety and propriety, but he had given asylum amongst his flock to several priests who had taken the civil oath, without displaying either vindictiveness or partiality towards the others. In short, in his case there did not exist the pretext which the existence of an ancient titular who had refused to give in his resignation, might furnish. Yet a kind of interdict had been pronounced against the Bishop of Besançon, and the people, without refusing him a material obedience in favour of a non-existing competitor, shunned him as a criminal, and refused to see, not only him, but all the priests belonging to the accursed class of *assermentés*. The prefect was the first to give this lamentable example.

Though the French clergy, throughout the kingdom, in the thoughtlessness of their conduct only acted in conformity with the proceedings of the Government, yet they carried things so far as seriously to annoy and embarrass the Government. In fact it was impossible to revoke the Concordat without the sanction of the Pope, and those who through zeal for the church had revolted against her decrees, could not, however, so far ignore her existence as to wish to act independently of her authority. It was, therefore, a matter of absolute necessity, whilst the revocation of the Concordat was being negotiated with Pius VII., that the existing religious authorities should be recognized, under penalty of inducing a general anarchy, for in some parts of France there were persons ready to expel certain priests by violence, and to dis-

possess the holders of national property.* The Abbé de Montesquiou, who clearly foresaw the consequences of such conduct, pointed out the danger to the King, and obtained authority to write a letter to the Bishop of Rochelle, who was actual titular in virtue of the two-fold nomination by the Emperor and the Pope, telling him that he ought to exact obedience from the priests of his diocese, that those who entertained scruples had only to resign their functions, and that if secular authority was needed to secure their obedience, this authority was at his command. But the silence observed in this letter with regard to the Concordat, proved that the Government regarded this treaty only as a provisional regulation of temporary obligation, and that they were inclined to afford the unfortunate Bishop a purely physical, and by no means a moral force. Consequently the letter, written rather for the information of Paris than of Rochelle, had no influence whatsoever, and the police found it necessary to notify to the King its complete inutility.

Meanwhile negotiations were being carried on at Rome. The King had selected M. Courtois de Pressigny, the venerable Bishop of Saint Malo, and appointed him ambassador extraordinary to the Holy See. His instructions were as follows:—Whilst conserving towards the Holy See, the respect which the house of Bourbon could never refuse, Pius VII. was at the same time to be made gently to understand that he had been too indulgent towards the usurper, but that the Bourbons, in consideration of his sacred character and his misfortunes, were willing to forget this; but that if they showed such consideration, he would be expected on the other hand, to erase all traces of his weakness, by ignoring what had taken place, even with his concurrence, since the entrance of the French into Italy, a proceeding that would wholly nullify the Concordat. As the immediate consequence of such an act, the Pope was required to immediately reconstitute the ancient sees to the number of 135, to re-establish in these sees the bishops who had refused to resign in 1802, and who were still living, for, as the court of France said, they had been persecuted and exiled during five-and-twenty years for the true faith, and they had as good a claim to return to their diocese as Louis XVIII. had to return to Paris, or the Pope to Rome. Pius VII. was in fact requested to re-establish a circumscription, that the church herself had pronounced to be unreasonable; he was asked to dispossess bishops that he

* It has sometimes been denied that things had reached this extremity, especially in what regarded national property. It is only necessary to read the police reports laid before Louis XVIII., and the correspondence relative to ecclesiastical affairs, to perceive that there is nothing more than the exact truth in the description we have made.

had himself invested, to reinstate those whose dismissal he had demanded, and who had disobeyed him, and he was required to act thus a second time in twelve years by those who had declared his conduct overweening and illegal, when he had first attempted to put these measures into practice ! What deplorable and scandalous contradictions to impose upon an unfortunate pontiff, whose moral authority ought to have been dear to princes whose interest it was to exalt that divine right from which they pretended kingly power had emanated !

But whilst this embassy was in preparation, reason was not more influential at Rome than at Paris, and Pius VII., wishing to modify the Concordat on some points that touched the Church of Rome intimately, sent a messenger to Louis XVIII., who arrived at the very time that the ambassador whom we have mentioned was leaving for Italy. After having congratulated the head of the house of Bourbon on the re-establishment of his family on the throne of France, the Pope expressed the greatest confidence in his religious sentiments, and advised him not to accept the senatorial constitution (the promulgation of the Charter was not yet known at Rome), he begged him to refuse freedom of religious worship, and to restore to the French Church endowments in landed property. He moreover implored his influence with the other Powers to procure the restoration to the Holy See of the Legations, Ponte-Corvo, and Benevento. (Benevento belonged to M. de Talleyrand, through whom this message was to be transmitted to the King.) He lastly demanded the restoration of Avignon, which was in the hands of the French, and which Louis XVIII., Pius VII. said, could not, as eldest son of the Church, refuse to restore to the Holy See.

It must certainly be admitted that those revolutions that have for their object a remote future, and make no account of the present, are often very unreasonable ; but these counter revolutions that pretend to recall an irrevocable past, are not less so ; and one is unavoidably struck with this truth in beholding Louis XVIII. demanding from the Pope the revocation of the Concordat, whilst the Pope in return requires of him the restoration of Avignon !

Fortunately the pretensions of neither the one nor the other had any chance of meeting serious attention, but the agitation excited in many parts of France had not yet subsided, and there still remained the bad effects of many imprudent acts committed in religious matters, which France was disposed to take in very bad part. Of this there was at the very time a sad and vexatious example.

The Count d'Artois, and the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême, had been much grieved on their return to France to see

the Sabbath so ill observed, and to see on this day appointed for rest and prayer, the shops open from early morning, and men often engaged in the public works until evening; besides places of public amusement were more accessible and more frequented on the Sunday than on any other day of the week. They were surprised, returning fresh from England, where life is, as it were, suspended on Sunday, to find Catholicism less observant of the precepts of Scripture than Protestantism; and they several times declared to M. Beugnot, chief of police, that it was a revolutionary scandal that ought to cease with the return of the legitimate princes. M. Beugnot, touched by these reproaches, and besides looking upon Sunday as an institution as respectable in a social as in a religious point of view, carefully rummaged all the edicts of the monarchy, and even all the ordinances of the republic, touching the observance of the *décadis*, and in his researches brought to light enactments which he believed he had a right to revive. Consequently, on the 7th June he issued a police ordinance, prescribing the rigorous observance of Sundays and holidays. In virtue of this decree, the shops were to be closed on Sunday from morning to evening; no workmen would be allowed to appear on scaffoldings or in workshops, and vehicles used for the transport of goods were forbidden to travel. Public houses and cafés might be opened after noon, and rooms for public dancing in the evening; chemists only and herbalists were allowed to keep their doors open the entire day. These regulations were enforced under penalties varying from one hundred to five hundred francs, and the confiscation of the prohibited goods.

These decrees proved a total ignorance not alone of the spirit of young France, but of France at every period of her history, for she had always preferred personal to political liberty, not brooking restraint in her easy and often careless gait of going when it pleased her to assume such; inclined to find fault and offer opposition still more in little than in great things, sometimes permitting her Government to perpetrate without opposition, an act that might decide her fate, and suddenly taking fire about a public show of which she was debarred; ready to become pious under an infidel Government, and almost impious under a religious one, and yet in reality more sober-minded than any one could suppose who considered only these singular contradictions. A great commotion was raised in Paris, when on Sunday an attempt was made to force the shops to shut in the morning which were generally closed only in the afternoon, and to expel the artisans from the workshops which were usually open for the greater part of the day, and to stop vehicles under pretext that what they carried was interdicted, and enforce for these

delinquencies severe penalties, adduced from edicts published a century before. To call out the national guard for the enforcement of these regulations was scarcely possible, for the men were already fatigued with repressing disturbances of another kind. It was the municipal guard of Paris, though fully occupied with other duties, that was employed on this, which they executed amid the outcries of an active and industrious population.

The effect was nearly the same on all classes, and the government which the people called a government of foreigners, of nobles and emigrants, was now called, in addition, a government of bigots; and the fault-finders who already laughed at its policy, now sneered at its devotion. The public excitement became so strong as to alarm the Council, and bring down upon M. Beugnot from the Duke de Berry, severe reproaches, couched in a soldierly style.

"You wish," he said, "to get us the reputation of being bigots, and you could not select a more certain means of rendering us unpopular in France."

Louis XVIII, who, without being a bigot, was desirous of the abolition of the Concordat, said that on this occasion measures had been too promptly adopted, and were, to say the least, imprudent.

It was scarcely three months since the Bourbons had returned to France, and already without any bad intention, but solely because they had not been able to restrain themselves and their friends, they had alienated the army by reductions which were certainly inevitable, but maladroitly effected at the same time as the re-establishment of the king's military household; and they had hurt the feelings of the men still attached to the Revolution by pious ceremonies, certainly due to the memory of Louis XVI, but accompanied by some serious inconveniences, and induced them to join the Bonapartists, to whom they were by no means attached; the Bourbons had completely alienated the moderate-minded clergy, by far the most numerous of their class, by extravagant attacks against the priests who had taken the civil oath, and against the Concordat. The holders of national property had been alarmed by orations, sanctioned from the pulpit, against the sale of church property, and by numerous remarks that had their origin at the Tuileries. And ill-judged police regulations had exasperated the influential middle-class, whose members without being irreligious, wished to remain free to choose their form of worship or customs of life; to be religious if they wished, or the contrary, if it suited them. And so the Bourbons proceeded, establishing an opposition in all things—not alone against the

personal interests and intelligence of the people, but against their customs and tastes, and even the peculiarities of the time and country.

These different acts following each other in quick succession were to be submitted to a very high tribunal, fortunately a very prudent one, and by no means inclined to bend to court influences; this tribunal was that of the two Chambers constituted by the Charter. The king, it must be remembered, had assembled the Chambers on the 4th of June, to communicate to them the conditions of the Charter, and put them in a position to proceed with their labours. From that period they had regularly met, and had in the first instance laid down regulations by which their debates were to be governed, a labour which ought of necessity to proceed all others, for before commencing to deliberate, it would be necessary to determine the form of their deliberations. After some discussion, this question was decided, and that form of proceeding was adopted which seemed most favourable to the peaceful and serious examination of business. The terrible memories connected with the committee of public safety had brought everlasting odium on permanent committees, which, seizing on certain departments of the government, such as the financial, the war department, foreign or home policy, the magistracy or the police, had established in these departments a kind of sovereignty, and exercised a dangerous, often a sanguinary despotism. But as every assembly must of necessity be sub-divided in order to examine each question in the calm of private meetings, the Chambers adopted the system of selecting committees of twenty or thirty members, to be changed every month by lot, and these were to examine in a summary manner the affairs submitted to them, and transfer to a commission appointed for the purpose, the care of entering more minutely into details and making a report to the assembly in full sitting. This form of proceeding having been adopted, the rest followed, as a matter of course, and it is this mode which has since prevailed, and must always prevail, where a determination exists to escape the tyranny of parties.

These regulations having been agreed to, the two Chambers commenced their sittings, and notified the fact to the king. The Chamber of Deputies, formerly the legislative corps, presented five candidates, from amongst whom the king, according to the conditions of the Charter, was to select a president. The king chose M. Lainé, who had the largest number of votes, and who was indebted for this two-fold preference to his high talents, his good sense, and the part he had played the preceding December, when, acting as representative of the

legislative corps, he so highly excited the anger of Napoleon. The Chamber of Deputies being now fully installed, set to work.

Amid the revival of political passions so long suppressed, the assembling of the two Chambers for business was a grave circumstance; and though they were the same that assembled under the empire, the one consisting of two-thirds, and the other of the entire of the former members, they held in abhorrence the idea of resembling the former assemblies, and were determined not to relapse into the submission with which they had been so often reproached. Happily, the Chambers were composed of prudent, experienced men, imbued with the spirit with which the government ought to have been penetrated. These men had not wished the return of the Bourbons, but Napoleon had become an impossibility; they had recalled the Bourbons as a necessity, and they sincerely wished that these princes should become one with France, such as a prodigious revolution had left her. These men did not wish to hasten events, they had even come to the determination of tolerating many errors, but on condition that the general direction of the government should be rational and directed towards the proper object.

On the other hand, the government, seeing the Chambers in full operation, preparations for which had occupied the month of June, and conscious that certain thoughtless acts would be severely judged in the Chambers, began to consider what line of conduct should be adopted with respect to them. M. de Montesquiou, who, as minister of the interior, had a right, and as ancient member of the Constituent Assembly, believed he had a claim to appear before the Chambers and obtain a hearing, gave it as his opinion that the ministers ought to observe an extreme reserve with regard to the Chambers, to bring few matters under their consideration, and avoid as much as possible bringing forward questions in which they had a right to take the initiative; and the budget once passed, and the financial system accepted, it would be better to adjourn the sittings to afford rest both to the members of the Chambers and the ministers.

The advice thus offered was founded on an opinion more false than true, though very generally received, that the ministers not possessing the patronage which exists in England, would not be able so easily to manage the French Chambers, and not being sufficiently powerful to guide, ought to treat them cautiously.

The Duke de Berry exclaimed against a mode of proceeding which would annul or at least diminish the royal authority, but his remonstrances were disregarded; the ministers were

accustomed to his outbursts of feeling, and the advice of M. de Montesquiou was adopted, with the exception that the mode of conduct traced by that minister was to be modified according to circumstances.

But the Chambers were determined, under any circumstances, to make the ministers act openly, and declare their policy; and their mode of effecting this object, was by acting with vigour themselves. No sooner had the Chamber of Deputies met for business, than notices of motions followed each other in quick succession. M. Bouvier-Dumolard—an ancient prefect of the Empire, and formerly a member of many public bodies, an honest but hot-tempered man, fond of noisy declamation, and more inclined to speak than his auditors were to listen—proposed a petition to the king, requesting that a law should be passed, declaring that the two Chambers were the real parliament of France, and the only public body that had a right to be so called. M. Bouvier-Dumolard wished by this measure to place the two French Chambers in the same position as the English Chambers, and at the same time reply to a protestation said to have been made against the Charter, and much talked of at the time, which was believed to be the work of the surviving members of the ancient parliaments. M. Bouvier-Dumolard's vague proposition produced no effect, but it might have had, had the protestation to which we have alluded possessed a more serious character. Two propositions followed, which met with more attention.

M. Durbach, one of the members for Alsace, a man devoid of all personal pretensions, but full of fervent feeling, and closely connected with the revolutionists, condemned, as contrary to the spirit of the Charter, the proclamation of the police concerning holidays and Sundays, and the royal ordinance, which placed the press under the same regulations as existed in the time of the Empire. He maintained that an inspector of police had no right to levy fines under the pretended sanction of ancient edicts, and that the Charter having promised liberty of the press, it was not conformable either to the text or spirit of that document that the daily press should remain under a censorship. The journals and pamphlets were indeed submitted to a preliminary inspection, which was certainly exercised with much prudence, for the duties of the censorship were discharged by an illustrious philosopher, M. Royer Collard, who became one of the most distinguished personages of the time and a writer of great ability. He was a decided partizan of the Bourbons, but a proud, independent, and liberal-minded man. He certainly would not have lent the sanction of his name to a tyrannical exercise of the censorship. Still the censorship did exist; the director of police

sometimes summoned the chief editors of the journals, and though limiting himself to admonition, he held them to a certain degree in check, which, however, did not prevent the royalists' journals from frequently indulging in the most violent language.

M. Durbach denounced the regulations relative to the press and the proclamation concerning the observance of Sundays and holidays, with a coarseness of language to which the assembly was not accustomed, and in consequence of which his propositions were rejected. Still a general feeling prevailed that these propositions were well-founded, and would have been supported had they been presented and advocated with more moderation. Some days after, M. Faure, incited by a powerful party in the Chamber, brought forward a motion relative to the press alone, begging the king to give instructions for the passing of a law regulating the right of publication. This was saying very plainly that the regulations which had placed this right under a censorship were looked upon as illegal. M. Faure's motion was carried without a dissenting voice.

As to the proclamation concerning the observance of Sundays and holidays, the Chambers were embarrassed as to the line of conduct they ought to adopt, for it was a question which did not admit of definite legislation. In passing a law on the subject, it would scarcely be possible to insert any other conditions than those set down in M. Beugnot's proclamation, for the Chambers could not declare officially that Sunday should only be half observed, neither could they embody in a legal act, the prescriptions that had already so much indisposed the public mind. Not daring to annul them which would seem like abolishing Sunday, and not venturing to support them which would have still more strongly excited public opinion, the question was referred to a commission to be examined seriously and dispassionately.

This promptitude of the deputies in immediately discussing those subjects which occupied public attention, proved how much those were mistaken, who believed that it would be easy to measure out to the Chambers their share in public affairs, and that by a little reserve they could be kept at a distance like a forward person of whom we disembararrass ourselves by not speaking to him on the subject which he is most anxious to discuss. When a legislature decides upon introducing the system of representative assemblies into the government, it must not be done by halves, for these assemblies force the doors that are only half opened to them. If these representative assemblies are to be recognized by a government, let them be recognized frankly, let ministers act towards

them with confidence and determination, and they will be able to direct their councils, that is if ministers themselves understand what they desire, and if what they desire is avowable, if they wish it strongly, and if they possess an eloquence powerful enough to inspire in others, wishes correspondent with theirs. Under such circumstances, these assemblies combine with the government, become interested in its success, advocate measures brought forward by ministers, and are converted from impediments into a sustaining government force.

The government saw clearly that it was impossible to evade the difficulty, and that the Chamber of Deputies, urging the 8th article of the Charter—which declared the press free, with a proviso that abuses should be legally repressed—could not be flung aside like the author of a motion that did not represent the feeling of the country. The first motion, that of M. Durbach, having been rejected on account of the form in which it was couched; and the second, M. Faure's, having been passed unanimously on account of its moderate tone, it was evident that the motion for a law to regulate the press would be incessantly revived, that this motion would be favourably received by the Chamber of Peers, and would inevitably reach the foot of the throne.

The King felt these truths, and the privy council having been convoked on the occasion, the King said:—"The first motion was rejected because Durbach spoke too boldly, but the second, being more moderately expressed, passed unanimously. We must therefore yield with a good grace, if we do not wish to be forced."

The King's prudent advice was followed. There was a mode of proceeding peculiarly agreeable to the King, which was to confirm by the passing of a law the existing régime. This régime was that of the Empire, which submitted books to a censorship, and as to journals, they were abandoned as vulgar things to the surveillance of the police, who, during Napoleon's reign, scarcely meddled with their insignificance. But since the fall of the Empire, passions had been awakened in the public mind, and the journals which were their daily expression, having acquired an importance which pamphlets shared according to their different degrees of merit, the police had been obliged to pay more attention to this class of publications than they had previously done. The police endeavoured, but in vain, to moderate the tone of the royalist press, and treated with great indulgence the liberal press, which was still timid, but in both cases frequent interference was needed. This frequent interference soon became annoying and almost insupportable.

M. de Montesquieu, who was commissioned to draw up the bill, did not hesitate to take the imperial regulations as the basis of the measure. He established a distinction in favour of books, which he proposed to treat differently from pamphlets and journals. Books were distinguished from pamphlets and journals by bulk, whose limit was fixed at 480 octavo pages. Every volume of this size was considered a book, and as such exempt from the examination of the censor before being printed. This privilege was accorded to books in consideration of the reflection the author was supposed to bestow on his work, and to the fact that his readers would be of the more reflecting and least numerous class. Those works that consisted of less than 480 pages, whether periodical or not, should undergo a preliminary examination, that is to say, they should be submitted to a censorship, and the publication deferred, if it were believed that their immediate appearance would be attended with any inconvenience. In order to mollify the rigour of this preliminary-examination, it was said that the prohibition to publish was only temporary, and that at the commencement of each session a commission of three peers and three deputies should inquire how the censorship had been exercised. This amelioration was of little avail, because as far as concerned newspapers and pamphlets, an adjournment of a few months was equivalent to an absolute interdict. Moreover, the printers were made accountable to the police, and in case of misdemeanour could be deprived of their licence, an arrangement which constituted them preliminary censors of the writings they were employed to print.

This law might not have given rise to any serious difficulty, had the Government announced that it was a temporary measure, and called for by circumstances at once novel and grave. But the desire of making the censorship pass for a fundamental institution authorized by the Charter, was founded on groundless pretensions, such as the presumptuous Abbé de Montesquieu could alone have put forth. He was confident of success, and received the royal sanction to bring in the bill, whose bases we have enumerated.

He entered the chamber of deputies with the bill, accompanied by M. de Blacas, Minister of the King's household, and M. Ferrand, Minister of State. M. de Blacas appeared as deputy for the King, and M. Ferrand as publicist of the royalist party. The bill could not be introduced under a more respectable escort. The Chamber of Deputies was very much flattered at seeing the Crown yield so readily to its wishes, and even before these wishes had received the sanction of the peers. The Chamber received the bill gravely

and respectfully, and immediately referred it to a committee.

No sooner was the object of this bill made known than the public mind became violently excited. Hitherto the most important questions had turned upon quarrels consequent on the transition from one regime to another. It was the military who complained of the partiality exhibited towards the soldiers of Condé or Vendée, or revolutionists taking offence at the re-crimination of royalists, or holders of national property becoming alarmed at the attacks to which an entire class of proprietors was subjected. Or, on the other hand, it was the officers of the ancient regime, the priests or the emigrants who complained that the Government paid too much court to the soldiers of the empire, or were too indulgent to revolutionists covered with blood, or too patronizing to holders of usurped property. But there now arose a question of principle which touched neither the interests nor passions of any party. This measure excited, as we have said, a profound but not stormy commotion in the public mind, and occupied in an especial manner the attention of enlightened men, who were anxious to see all the principles laid down in the Charter carried into operation.

The mode of considering public questions depends in a great measure on the impressions of the moment. The liberty of the press, which has experienced so great a variety of fortunes in France had at that time a greater number of advocates than even at present, because instead of having just escaped from the convulsions of the revolution, the nation was just delivered from the despotism of the empire. The people had learned what uncontrolled authority was capable of achieving, and said that had the public bodies of the state or the journals enjoyed freedom of speech, an ambition-blinded conqueror would not have been permitted to sacrifice in Spain, in Russia, and in Germany, a million Frenchmen, abandon our natural frontiers, and at the same time destroy himself. In reviewing the past, the disorders of the revolution certainly stood out conspicuously. But these disorders could not be imputed to the press. In our own days we have seen the press, while the country was quiet and the public mind unimpassioned, excite the strongest commotion, but in 1792 and 1793 the people were moved by the working of their own passions, and their errors were entirely attributable to that source, and the press, when free, reproved the faults of the excited people. Neither the records of the revolution nor the empire offered any argument against the liberty of the press. Besides, the great events that had recently occurred were a powerful argument in favour of all kinds of liberty. The

French revolution, setting out with ideas the most simple and most just, had in a very short time adopted the strangest views of things, and traversing successively the entire circle of human errors, had ultimately returned to its starting-point of truth, and carried the spirit of repentance so far as to recall the dynasty whose chief had perished on the scaffold. In contemplating such a spectacle, the opinion was universally adopted, that allowing truth and falsehood to enter into open competition, truth would ultimately triumph, and the result of this opinion was a wide-spread confidence in the good effects of liberty—a confidence, unfortunately, much weakened in the present day.

We do not now allude to the emigrants, who regarded every free institution as a return to the regime of 1793, nor to the revolutionists, whom the mere aspect of the Bourbons filled with a species of fury. We speak of the peaceful, impartial masses and of the more intelligent class of men that wished to see France enter on the pathways that had conducted England to liberty and glory. As to the former, they were confiding, and did not think of shackling the press. The enemies of the press existed rather amongst the members of the government, who, adducing their experience, demanded that the press should be restrained in its operations. But the peaceful masses, offspring for the most part of the revolution and the empire, seemed rather to defend their personal position than to maintain a principle. Many royalists even were well disposed towards the daily press, of which they made use against the revolutionists, and many young men, who were at the same time royalists and constitutionalists, did not hesitate to say, that the most precious species of liberty that the country possessed should not be sacrificed to protect some upstarts, whose sole anxiety was to secure their own importance and comfort.

In the numerous salons of Paris, where politics excited a lively interest, this question was warmly discussed, and, in general, with sentiments favourable to the press. M. Benjamin Constant defended the interests of the press with pointed wit and powerful argument. The *Journal des Débats*, a journal that had acquired great popularity in the time of the Empire, by the only merit then possible, that of literary criticism, warmly advocated the liberty of the press, arguing that the press ought to be particularly dear to the royalists, for had it been free under the empire or under the committee of public safety, a million of Frenchmen would not have perished on the scaffold or in unwise wars.

The committee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies examined the law in this spirit, and pronounced against it. Affecting to find authority for a censorship in the 8th article

of the Charter, appeared a very insincere assertion. Had the opponents of the press said frankly that the author of the Charter had intended to grant liberty to the press, that he still intended it, but that for the interest of the new order of things, a temporary suspension of this liberty was required: if in this way it was admitted that the censorship was regarded not as a permanent regime, but a merely temporary suspension of a recognized right, the argument might have been listened to.

But the members of the committee were offended and annoyed at hearing it asserted that the censorship was sanctioned by these words in the 8th article of the Charter: "The French have a right to print and publish their opinions, observing at the same time the laws which repress the abuse of this liberty."

This was, in the first place, wishing to make the censorship considered as a principle of the Charter, and next, it was calculated to inspire a doubt as to the sincerity of those who interpreted the text of the Charter, and it was besides a puerile subtilty to assert, as was done, that by *repress* was meant *prevent*. In fact, according to the arguments of those who defended the bill, every law, which merely punished, but did not prevent offences, operated in the spirit of vengeance and not with a regard for the public welfare. To *repress*, therefore, in the true legislative language, meant to *prevent*. This subtilty irritated by its want of frankness.

In reply to these objections it was said that every law prevented by the fact of repressing crime; that in punishing past misdemeanours the law prevented future offences by the fear of punishment; that the law could in no other way prevent offences; that every action must be accomplished before it could be legally pronounced either good or bad; that, otherwise, all human actions should be arrested at the commencement, lest they might terminate in evil; that all free action should be interdicted to mankind; that life should be, so to speak, suspended, did the law take cognizance, not of an accomplished, but a possible act. But putting aside all these quibbles, the question was boldly asked, what was meant by the censorship? and whether it was not a suppression of the liberty of the press? whether, in those countries where the liberty of the press was ignored, the intervention of the government was not limited to a preliminary inspection of works, in order to pronounce upon their fitness for publication? But did not the Bourbon government, in imposing a preliminary examination, annul the liberty of the press, which was a fundamental principle and almost identical with parliamentary freedom of discussion: and did not this government,

within two months after the publication of the Charter, abrogate one of its most essential articles, and that, too, when no important change had taken place in the country, nothing that could reasonably alarm the government, but on the contrary, when the most fortunate revulsion of feeling had occurred—when, notwithstanding the many interests injured, and the many acts of imprudence committed by the dominant party, France, though at first astonished at the return of the Bourbons, had submitted to their sway, and had given efficacious support to their government.

These were powerful arguments; but the committee was offended by the obstinacy exhibited in maintaining that the censorship was sanctioned by the charter, for apart from the falsehood, there was the wrong of wishing to give the censorship the weight of a principal and permanent institution. The committee might have been appeased by a sincere avowal of what the government desired, and by the request of a temporary suspension of the liberty of the press. There was amongst the members of the committee a man, who, though advanced in life, was full of vigour, endowed with high intelligence, sincere, courageous, possessing all the southern vivacity of temperament, and enjoying a brilliant literary fame. This man was M. Raynouard. He had shared with M. Lainé the honour of opposing Napoleon in the session of the preceding December, on which occasion he had given utterance to sentiments as inflexible as high-minded. He was one of those enlightened men, so numerous at that time, who were desirous of a monarchy tempered with liberty, who wished the return of the Bourbons, but wished to see them restrained by the conditions of a judicious constitution. He was, besides, an author, and as such interested in the liberty of the press. He possessed great influence with the other members of the committee, and proposed, as a punishment for the obstinacy exhibited in maintaining the bill in its original form, that it should be rejected. Some of the members, though acknowledging that he was right, feared to give the government too severe a check, and proposed to do what the ministry ought to have done, that is, to declare the liberty of the press a fundamental principle of the Charter, but that, under existing circumstances, it would be temporarily suspended. But M. Raynouard was not satisfied with such a concession. He persevered in his motion, carried the rejection of the bill by a majority of one, and was appointed to make a report of the resolution come to by the committee.

The minority, on the contrary, proposed the adoption of the law, with the three following amendments:—1st, That the line of demarcation between works exempt or not exempt from the

editorship, should be changed ; that works of twenty instead of thirty sheets (320 pages instead of 480) should be dispensed from the preliminary examination ; 2nd, That the editorship should only last to the end of 1816 ; and 3rd, That the opinions of the members of the two chambers should not be obnoxious to the editorship.

Great numbers flocked to the palace, where the sittings of the chambers were held, on the day M. Raynouard presented his report. A like interest had never been exhibited in the deliberations of the legislative corps. The crowds that flocked on the present occasion to the chambers exhibited a thousand different shades of politics, as France herself had exhibited during the last three months. Amongst the throng was the more educated portion of the emigrants, who had accepted the charter through necessity, but whose intellectual tastes were based on a standard as ancient as the French nobility. There were also the friends of liberty—modern men—who accepted the Bourbons as the others did the Charter, through necessity. They were willing to receive liberty from the hands of the restored dynasty, and were resolved to be faithful if the others proved sincere. The malcontents, too, presented themselves—the revolutionists, the military men, and the partizans of the Empire, affecting to be friends to liberty, and becoming really such without perceiving it. All were attracted by different motives : some by the interest they took in the affairs of government, others by the pleasure they took in seeing the ministers opposed. Many were influenced by zeal for the success of the question under discussion, all were actuated by curiosity ; and it must be said, an enjoyment in the eloquent discussion of public affairs, a taste that began to be developed in France. When a people of lively temperament lay aside a long dominant taste, they almost immediately adopt another. If France had long indulged a passion for military glory, she had had, unfortunately, during a lengthened period, opportunities of satisfying the feeling. During eighteen successive years, she had kept her eyes fixed on one man : and at a signal from this man, she had seen blood flow in torrents, with no other final result than his own ruin ! But the patriotism and the intellectual wants of the people now demanded different scenes. The spectacle of men distinguished by their moral character, intellectual power, and varied accomplishments, holding different opinions, and expressing these opinions boldly ; rivals certainly, but not rivals so implacable as those generals who, in Spain, immolated whole armies to satisfy their personal jealousies ; these men, ever occupied with the gravest interests of the nation, and often inspired by the vastness of these interests with the highest eloquence ; these men,

grouped around some leading minds but never enslaved by any, and presenting in this way a thousand intellectual phases, animated, intense, and true as nature always is in a state of liberty—this intellectual and moral spectacle began to lay hold of and fix the attention of France. Even the military men were weary of pouring forth their blood, and were not amongst the least eager to witness these debates and take part in them. Great statesmen had not yet appeared, but they were looked for, hoped for, and their coming believed in; for the French were accustomed to see their country produce whatever she needed. She had produced generals in 1792, and the people felt certain that she would not fail to produce statesmen and orators in 1814. The report drawn up by M. Raynouard was a little diffuse, a little stiffly academical, and did not possess the nervous eloquence of business-like language which practice alone can infuse into French oratory; but the report was listened to with religious attention. It certainly put forth every argument, direct or ancillary, that could support his views, and produced a great effect. That evening, the report formed the general topic of conversation in Paris.

The discussion was adjourned to the 5th of August. On that day all the galleries were filled; so numerous was the attendance that even the hall and the seats reserved for the deputies were encroached on by the public. Remembering what had occurred during the Revolution, the members of the Chambers had made a standing rule that no person but a deputy should enter the main body of the hall. This rule was appealed to by some deputies, who became alarmed at the spectacle presented by the Chamber, and the president ordered all strangers to withdraw. In consequence of this incident the debate was adjourned to the following day, to the great vexation of the crowds that had thronged to witness a spectacle so novel and attractive.

The following day—the 6th—the debates commenced. Parliamentary eloquence, then in its infancy, could not dispense with written speeches, nor maintain a discussion, by replying to unexpected observations with a prompt elocution, inspired by the circumstances of the moment. Each member appeared with his written speech, read it, and received the attention which he was expected to repay to his fellow-readers. But whatever be the mode of discussion adopted, every reason for and against a measure can be adduced, and by patient inquiry a subject will be ultimately placed in the clearest point of view.

The opponents of the law rejected with a severity that prohibited their re-appearance, the subtilities, to which the words *repress* and *prevent* had given rise. They insisted that the

liberty of the press was guaranteed by the 8th article of the Charter, that a censorship would annihilate this liberty, and that the establishment of such an institution was a strange proceeding within a month after the promulgation of the Charter. They asked what had occurred that a right, the spontaneous gift of royalty, should be so quickly annulled. After these observations, based on the spirit and text of the Charter, common sense, of which the orators of the liberal party were most frequently the exponents, was adduced to prove that within twenty-five years everything that could be said had been said; that every imaginable folly had been put into operation; that it would be impossible to conceive a folly that had not seen the light during that time either at the clubs or in the pages of the public journals; that if the public mind could have become a prey to madness, it would have been overtaken by that calamity, but it had remained rational and prudent, and the best proof of its sanity was its present recognition of all that was best in the monarchical and liberal opinions of 1789; in the almost universal adhesion to the Bourbons and the Charter. The opponents of the censorship maintained that it was better to trust to liberty than always to stand in awe of her; that besides, in past times, when the liberty of the press had an existence, that liberty had been used to check the excesses of democracy and despotism; that had the press been free, it would have resisted Robespierre and Napoleon; that even in England the press put a limit to the omnipotence of parliament, an omnipotence to which no other counterpoise could be found; and that in France, where the English form of government was about to be adopted, it would be prudent to raise up against ministers that powerful corrective, the only imaginable check that could be opposed to them.

All these arguments were founded on the opinion that the Revolution was finished, and that we were on the morrow, not the eve of its convulsions. The partizans of government took part with the minority of the members of the committee, who dared not support the bill except with amendments, and who quoted, but with little effect, the ordinary arguments against the liberty of the press, against that capability, as they said, of continually agitating the minds of the public, and urging them to all kinds of excess. They only produced a sensible effect by appealing to personal interests, and alleging in this regard arguments to which, unfortunately, the press has not yet replied under any regime, in a steady and moderate tone.

"Who," said the government supporters, "will protect the public against the attacks of the press, if it be not previously submitted to the inspection of well-meaning men, of acknowledged prudence, who would be themselves responsible to a

committee of the two Chambers?" "And in order to live in peace, is it necessary that a man should be able to defend himself—with the pen or sword?" "Let us suppose," said a deputy, "let us suppose a pamphleteer endowed with Beaumarchais' abilities; should a man in order to escape his attacks, be possessed of his rancorous talent?" Let us suppose an assassin writer—and there are such—must a man be skilled in fencing in order to make himself respected? A public verdict is but a weak indemnification when the character of a man's wife or daughter is attacked, or when he is himself made the subject of accusation, the bare mention of which is an insult, and leaves in the mind recollections whose bitterness is never effaced!"

To these powerful arguments no other reply could be made than an appeal to that contempt for calumny which habit alone can give, a habit, which at that time nobody had acquired, and which is only purchased at the price of bitter suffering; consequently, these arguments produced a certain effect, but were not sufficiently strong to efface a dominant popular idea, which was that the liberty of the press was guaranteed by the Charter, which made no mention of a censorship, and that, consequently, a temporary law only could be passed on the subject. The majority of the Chamber being of a compliant disposition, did not wish to oppose the majority of the committee, who were certainly right, but, at the same time, they did not wish to give too severe a check to the crown in the first proposed act of legislation emanating from that source. They also appreciated, to a certain degree, the danger of suddenly unshackling the press at a period when the public mind was still ruled by passion. The majority of the Chamber was evidently inclined to adopt the opinion of the minority of the committee—that is, to pass the proposed bill with amendments.

This was the opinion which all the partizans of government gave the ministers, who transmitted the intelligence to the king. And after all, two years' censorship was a great amelioration in the first moments of freedom, and represented a considerable space of time in our agitated century. It was, besides, a sort of conciliatory measure, that spared the government the mortification of a defeat. The king, with a moderation that cannot be too highly praised—for in France, royalty has rarely shown so much good sense—consented to the amendments proposed by the minority of the committee, and thus admitted that the law should die a natural death in 1816, if the Chambers did not renew it; that the line of demarcation between writings liable or not to the censorship should be fixed at twenty instead of thirty pages; lastly, that the opinions

of the members of the Chambers should be exempt from all preliminary examination.

M. de Montesquiou, at the termination of a discussion that had lasted five days, rose and announced the adhesion of the king to the amendments proposed by the minority of the committee, and then in a speech flowing in style, moderate in sentiment, delivered with ease, and apparently extempore, he eluded the principal difficulty—that of determining whether the censorship was or was not embodied in the Charter—and claimed the benefit of the doubt for the crown; asserted that the government wished for liberty, but prayed for prudence in the manner of dispensing it: and concluded his speech by adducing very plausible reasons for a temporary censorship. The Minister of the Interior obtained, on this occasion, a signal triumph for himself and for the government. The amended bill having become that of the ministers, passed by a majority of 57 votes in a house of 217 members.

This result satisfied every reasonable man. The liberty of the press was acknowledged as a principle; its suspension was temporary, and necessitated by circumstances. An independent majority had stood forth, that did not seek to curtail the prerogatives of the crown, but would not allow the liberty of the subject to be sacrificed. The power of the king had been checked, without being humiliated; the chiefs of parties had waived their personal feelings in favour of the general interest, and began to feel an inclination to refer their differences to an equitable, firm, and independent tribunal, which was to found in the Chambers, and which, untouched by the rancour of party spirit, and entertaining no extreme opinion, would serve as a moderating power to the violence of all parties, and tend to arrange their differences by negotiations, not by battles.

The vote given on this occasion, followed by several others dictated by the same spirit, infused into the public mind a certain tranquillity, which unfortunately was not destined to be of long duration. The committee appointed to inquire into the police decree concerning the celebration of Sundays and holidays, made a report, in which all the reasons for and against the question under consideration were set forth with great impartiality. The report condemned the imprudent use which some persons sought to make of that article of the Charter that declared the Catholic religion to be the religion of the state, and denied that this article gave authority to submit all forms of worship to the practice of one. At the same time, the necessity of one day of rest in the week was acknowledged, which it was only natural should be the same as that observed

by the religion of the majority of the citizens. But the report added, that great precaution was needed in giving either to religious or social customs an obligatory character; and the report further declared that the law, the law alone, and that a new law embodying the spirit of the times, ought to decide so delicate a question.

Two advocates of considerable reputation, MM. Dard and Falconnet, ardently devoted to the cause of emigration, had written against the validity of the sales called *national*. These writings, which breathed extreme violence, contained some subtle reasoning. It was asserted that the king had not the power to declare sales irrevocable that had not been regularly effected, and that scarcely one of those in question was so; that in any case, there were things which the king could not promise, because impossible even for him. For example, the king could not forcibly take away the property of any of his subjects; whence it followed, that the article of the Charter relating to national sales was void, because not founded in justice. Both these pamphlets revealed the real and crafty policy of the emigration, which was a desire to induce individual negotiations between the ancient and new proprietors, and oblige the latter through fear to restore to the former, at the lowest price, property that the state had alienated. These pamphlets, received with transport by the emigrants, with uneasiness by the mass of the public, and with indignation by the persons immediately interested, were denounced to the chambers in numerous petitions. The Chamber of Deputies, the first called on for an opinion, declared null and void every attempt to injure the irrevocability of the sales called "national;" and the members of the chamber showed, by a unanimous resolution, that they were determined to enforce the observance of the articles of the charter in question. However, an appeal was made to the ministers on this grave question, and the Chief of Police caused MM. Dard and Falconnet to be arrested as disturbers of the public peace, and as having caused dissension between various classes of the citizens. It must be admitted that this demonstration produced no result: but for the moment it exculpated the government, and was of a nature to tranquillise those whose interests were immediately involved. The financial business was next laid before the Chamber of Deputies, and afforded the members a fresh opportunity of displaying their firmness, justice, and intelligence.

The royal council had been long urging M. Louis to bring forward his budget, and explain the means by which he hoped to defray the expenses of the state. The intrepid minister, who had the honour of being the creator of public credit in France, read his budget, and explained his system of finance,

as soon as his colleagues furnished him with a list of their wants. Assisted at first by M. de Montesquiou—who being the intermediary between the king and the Chambers was fully aware of their susceptibility in financial affairs—M. Louis persevered in restricting the expenses of the war department to 200 million, and the expenses of the navy to 51 million francs. M. Louis on this point alone erred; for he would have done better to brave the greatest parliamentary opposition than limit himself to an amount that was evidently insufficient, as by such a proceeding he compromised at the same time the authority of the government and the popularity of the Bourbons with the army. It is true that the budget of 1815 was alone in question, whilst that of 1814—that is, of the current year—remained open to any unforeseen necessity. Be this as it may, the minister of finance—who never lost sight of his main object, the establishment of public credit—remained inflexible, and persevered in fixing the expenditure of the two great departments at the sums he had named, and which were not to be exceeded. The sums allowed for diplomatic expenditure were also diminished. The Minister of the Interior was only allowed what was absolutely necessary for the support of the public roads; 33 million francs were allowed for the expenses of the civil list, which was an extravagant expenditure considering the value of money at that time; but this expense was created, though not acknowledged, by the cost of the king's military household, and by the benevolence of the Bourbon princes towards their former companions in misfortune. The total amount of the budget of 1815 was fixed at 618 million francs, exclusive of the expense of collecting the taxes. In these 618 millions were comprised 70 millions for *arrears*; that is to say, for the unpaid public expenses of 1813 and 1814, such as the pay, provisions, and clothing of the troops, which could not be liquidated by means of credit, and for whose discharge ready money was absolutely needed.

The most important project devised by the minister of finance, was that which related to the general discharge of the debts of the State, whatever their origin. M. Louis had, with rare firmness of principle, enforced his opinion concerning the collection of the taxes and the entire discharge of all the anterior debts of the State, whether incurred by *Bonaparte or not*, to use an expression then common. M. Louis had frequently, by his excitement under contradiction, provoked a smile from the king, but had uniformly won his approbation. "It is not here a question," said the minister, "of abstract theories, about which political economists argue without result. Here, consequences follow immediately on your resolves. I cannot provide for all the expenses of the State without having recourse to credit, for I only live and you only live on the

credit that I have succeeded in creating, the revenue being far from adequate to the daily expenses. Now, I can sustain this provisional credit, and convert it into definite credit only by two means—the rigorous collection of the taxes, and the entire discharge of the debts of the State. Without this two-fold condition, I shall be obliged to close the public coffers, and allow the State functionaries, the clergy, magistracy, and even the army, to die of hunger at the gates of the Treasury.”

In reply to this energetic declaration of principles, the Count d’Artois and the Duke d’Angoulême, who were always embarrassed by the promises they had made to the people on their return to France, endeavoured to fall back on the question of the *droits réunis*. But they were opposed, in the first place, by M. Louis, the vehemence of whose language touched those limits which respect for the royal presence would not allow him to overstep; they were opposed by the king, who cared little about the promises made by his brother and nephews; they were even opposed by the Duke de Berry, who had constituted himself champion of the army, and who, finding himself always met by the cry of financial distress when he advocated the interests of the army, would not on any account consent to a diminution of the resources of the treasury. This prince declared very plainly that those royalists of the South, who wished the abolition of the *droits réunis*, ought to be answered with a discharge of artillery. The tobacco monopoly, which began to yield considerable profits, gave offence in certain provinces, where it was described as a *revolutionary work*. Baron Louis, however, persevered in maintaining this monopoly, and succeeded by his usual arguments. As to the direct taxes, he simply proposed to legalize the decrees by which Napoleon had, in the preceding January, increased them by the addition of some centimes. These centimes having been originally laid on to defray the expenses of the war, it was only natural they should exist as one of the consequences of the war, even after the conclusion of peace. The *droits réunis* would fall heaviest on the cities; the superadded centimes would be felt most in the country districts. It was a general lesson, teaching all that great faults ought to be avoided, but that once committed or permitted, their inevitable consequences must be borne.

As to the question of the entire discharge of the State debts, no matter what their origin, there were no advocates of a national bankruptcy found in the royal Council. The necessity of establishing public credit was too fully recognized by all the members to admit of a single doubt. But these debts being acknowledged, the important point was to find the means of paying them. M. Louis had drawn up the balance-sheet of

his predecessors, M. M. de Gaëte and Mollien, whose portfolios he had received—those of the finance and treasury—in the way that the balance-sheet of a defunct government is generally drawn up—that is to say, with very little justice, not as to the actual figures, but as to their moral worth.

He had estimated the deficit at 1,308 francs, admitting that of this sum only 818 millions could be considered as immediately *demandable*. This acknowledgment alone was sufficient to prove the exaggeration, certainly unworthy of him, with which M. Louis represented the burden transmitted by his predecessors. He had, in fact, added 244 millions to the arrears, a sum which during the past ten years the *domaine extraordinaire* had justly contributed to the treasury; for the *domaine extraordinaire* owing its origin to the benefits derived from the war, it was only natural it should bear the loss, consequent thereon. Moreover, the *domaine extraordinaire* belonging to the State, it was the State that was indebted to the State, and there was no reason for comprising this sum in the total of the debt for which immediate payment could be demanded. Another sum of 246 millions had been also unjustly placed under the same head. These were monies deposited as security for the fulfilment of certain services to the State, and which during many years had been considered as part of the funded debt, for the depositors of such security had, when entitled to withdraw these monies, been always succeeded by others, who invested equivalent sums. Consequently, the State was never obliged to reimburse this money, which bore an interest much below the ordinary rate. It was, therefore, only the securities of depositors abiding in countries now severed from French rule, that could be justly comprised in the *demandable* arrears, and these amounted to a very small sum.

The *demandable* arrears could therefore be reduced to 818 million francs, from which was to be deducted a sum of 12 millions in ready money found in the treasury, and 70 millions added to the budgets of 1814 and 1815, because this sum formed portion of the arrears that were to be paid in ready money. There remained 736 million francs, whose payment could be instantly demanded; and a close inquiry will show, that from this sum many items may be deducted, which were unjustly comprised therein. It may be a matter of doubt whether a sum of about 700 million of francs could be considered a burden that the preceding government had neglected to discharge, when we reflect that this administration had not increased the taxes until reduced to the last extremity, and then only by the addition of some centimes, of which very little had been collected at the time of Napoleon's deposition; it rather becomes a matter of astonishment that two wars like

those of 1813 and 1814 left only a deficit of 700 millions. Whilst deploring the policy that brought allied Europe to Paris, we cannot help admiring the administrative genius that was able to confine within such limits the expenses of a fearful struggle; and we must acknowledge that the most rigorous order had been maintained in our finances, amid the horrors of war.

But M. Louis, though a great financier, was a partizan, and would not acknowledge these truths; for he thought more of his own fame than of the reputation of his predecessors. Be this as it may, it was necessary to provide for a deficit of about 700 millions; but as the claims on this sum would be made successively within two or three years, the entire might be cleared off within that time at the rate of 250 millions per annum.

There were two means of providing for this deficit. It could be met either by means of interminable annuities, or by bills of short date, such as exchequer bills, of which the minister had already issued some millions, and with good effect. But in having recourse to interminable annuities, a serious question arose. Should the interest given to the public creditor be fixed *au pair*, or fluctuate with the current price of the day? If fixed *au pair*, the creditor lost 35 per cent.; for at the actual date, the Five per Cents. were down to 65 francs. To fix the interest at the current price of the day, would be exposing the state to pay more than the real debt; because there were good grounds to hope that the funds would rise with the return of peace and the renewal of credit. The State would have been, besides, bound to pay a continuous interest of 8 per cent., without reckoning the inconvenience of throwing into the market a quantity of stock much greater than the demands of the market would meet. There was a much better means of providing for the emergency, which was to issue bills payable in three years, at an interest proportionate to the circumstances of the capitalists, amounting to about 8 per cent. These bills, favoured by peace and the confidence felt in the minister, were likely to keep pretty near par, and three years allowed leisure to provide for their payment. M. Louis wished to alienate gradually 300,000 hectares of wood: the state still possessed about 1,400 thousand. He also reckoned on the receipt of certain sums arising from the sale of the *biens communaux*. By steadily applying these various resources, as they fell in, to the liquidation of the lately-issued bills, there was a certainty of keeping up their value at about par, and in three years the credit of the state would be re-established, when it would be possible to issue bills at an advantageous rate, and discharge on easy terms the unpaid portion of the

arrears. The finance minister departed, on this occasion, from the principle he had had the honour of being the first to lay down clearly, and whose truth he had verified by experience, which is, that when the rate of money is very high, it is better to borrow on bills of short date than on interminable annuities, because by this means the state is subjected only for a short time to the increased rate of interest.

M. Louis therefore issued temporary bills, called *reconnaisances de liquidation*, bearing an interest of 8 per cent. and payable in three years. These were to be issued as the others were paid off, and the acceptors were to have as security the 300,000 hectares of wood, in addition to the price of the *biens communaux*. M. Louis did not entirely reject the resource of the interminable annuities, and he proposed to grant some to those State creditors who would accept them at par, an offer that would certainly be accepted, when, consequent on the revival of public credit, the stocks would rise. This project was sufficient evidence that the minister who conceived it was endowed with extraordinary perception and unerring forecast. M. Louis had already induced the public to accept some exchange bills at 8 per cent.; but when, in presenting his financial project, the intention to pay the State creditors to the last farthing would be announced, and that as a guarantee of these payments 300,000 hectares of wood would be disposed of, which might be easily effected in three years, public confidence would revive, and the minister would be able to await the time when a government loan might be effected on favourable terms. This was a most able manner of reviving public credit, for had a quicker process been attempted, public credit would have been injured by a breach of faith, which would have been the inevitable consequence of an attempt to force the state creditors to accept stock at par; and this credit would have been burdensome to the state were the stock made to bear the current interest of the day; and in either case, the simultaneous issue of a considerable quantity of government bills would have damped public confidence. There was another and purely political consideration, which the minister abstained from pressing on the consideration of the king and princes, which was, that the alienation of the 300,000 hectares of wood, which had been the property of the ancient clergy, was a measure calculated to inspire the holders of national property with confidence, and to terminate, or at least diminish, one of those sources of uneasiness that most disturbed the Bourbon government. Considered in every point of view, M. Louis' plan was admirably well conceived.

The project was communicated to M. de Talleyrand, who had very just notions in financial matters, and to M. de Mon-

tesquieu, who, though he did not understand the subject, had sufficient good sense to appreciate the wisdom of M. Louis' views; it was then laid before the royal council. The king, who was absolutely ignorant of financial affairs, seeing that the project was universally approved, and being moreover resolved to defer to his ministers in things that they understood better than he, gave his consent. M. de Blacas alone raised some objections. He, though a well-meaning man, was one of those who saw in the *arrears* the concentration of the debts incurred during the Revolution and the Empire, and who, on this account, was not very anxious for their liquidation. Indeed, he would have been very glad to pay "Bonaparte's creditors" with something else than money. Stock at par seemed to him sufficient payment for such creditors, and he made a proposal to that effect. M. Louis became warm, and replied, very justly, that to become bankrupt for the entire or part of a debt was still a bankruptcy; that by such a proceeding, the government took a place amongst those who paid their creditors 50 per cent., instead of not giving anything; that for his part, he did not wish to be classed with either; and if the government acted in that manner, the funds would instantly fall, for two reasons—the breach of faith, and the too great number of bills issued; and that instead of public credit being re-established, it would by such a measure be irrevocably destroyed. M. de Blacas replied, that the reduction in the funds, which the minister wished to prevent, would fall on the lately issued bills, which would be only changing the nature of the evil. But this mode of reasoning had no effect. It only proved that M. de Blacas, who was no financier, had not fully comprehended M. Louis' project, and did not perceive the dependence of each part on the other. M. Louis' plan was adopted and laid before the Chamber of Deputies, supported by a sound statement of the motives that actuated its originator; but the statement did not render justice to the proposed measure, for this able minister was more capable of conceiving than giving expression to his ideas, though on some occasions, when excited, he became eloquent, and expressed himself in terms at once energetic and picturesque.

M. Louis project was referred to the *bureaux* of the chamber, and from the *bureaux* to a select committee. The measure was expected with impatience, and produced a great effect. The real extent of the burdens of the state was now for the first time fully laid bare, and though considerable in the actual state of things, it was not more than France could bear. There was now shown the possibility of making the expenses of the budget tally with the resources of the state, and there was exhibited on the part of the government a frank and sincere

desire to pay the public debts, for which sufficient resources existed. And the public now saw a minister, energetic, able, and thoroughly competent to the task he had undertaken; a task from whose responsibilities he did not shrink, and which he felt convinced he could discharge.

The day M. Louis' project was laid before the royal council, the funds stood at 65 : within a few days they rose to 70, and soon after to 75. It was evident that the minister of finance understood perfectly well the temper of the money market, and how to inspire confidence there; and it can be confidently asserted, that underhand methods of influencing the funds, though often employed, had no share in their rapid rise on this occasion.

The committee examined M. Louis' project in all its bearings, without any feeling of complacency towards the government, and with the desire natural to committees that represent public assemblies, to make improvements in measures proposed for their consideration. But after an attentive examination both of the budget of 1815, and of the means proposed for liquidation of the arrears, the committee acknowledged that the proposed measure was the most certain and least expensive method of extricating the treasury from its embarrassments. With the exception of one or two amendments in the mode of drawing up the statement, the minister's budget and his financial plan were integrally adopted.

The report was laid before the chamber, and discussed in the latter days of August. The public could not be expected to testify the same interest in this as in the law concerning the press; for the subject was less likely to excite the passions, or call forth a brilliant display of eloquence. Besides, the matter was rather abstract. But the subject was deeply interesting to commercial men and to politicians, who fully appreciated the importance of the subject. The galleries of the Chamber of Deputies were less thronged with partizans; but there was a large number of serious-minded men amongst the auditory. M. de Montesquiou accompanied M. Louis to all the sittings where the question of finance was discussed, in order to afford him the aid of his personal influence, and if needs were, that of his eloquence. The discussion lasted twelve days, and was very animated, ably supported on both sides, though exhibiting the inexperience of men who were for the first time called on to discuss serious interests in a really free assembly. The members commenced by a demonstration of zeal for royalty, and passed the civil list, which amounted to 25 millions for the king and 8 for the princes. Afterwards, in a spontaneous outburst of feeling, they offered to pay the debts contracted by the royal family during the emigration, and granted 30

millions to defray an expense that was purely accidental. After this manifestation of loyalty, the members proceeded to business, and began to examine the budget in all its details.

The budget of 1815 was first taken into consideration, for that of 1814 was liable to all the chances of a laborious liquidation, whose result would yet remain unknown for some months. Besides the *arrears* being burdened with the expenditure of 1814, could alone be affected by it, and 50 millions more or less, in the 600 or 700 that were to be raised by credit, were not worth mentioning under the head of resources. The chamber consequently turned its entire attention to the budget of 1815, which represented the future, and about which alone any measures could be taken. According to the habit of public assemblies little accustomed to state affairs, the members exclaimed against the enormity of the expense. There were some deputies who, like M. de Flaugergues, a man of talent and a sincere and upright constitutionalist, complained that this budget of 618 millions was nearly as great as that of the Empire in time of peace, though in the time of the Empire France reckoned 130 departments. The complaint was groundless, for with the exception of military expenses, a few departments more or less could not make any sensible difference in the expenses of a great state. Had the members of the chamber been thoroughly versed in public business—a knowledge that can only be acquired in a free country—they would have criticised M. Louis' budget in a very different spirit; for the real error of the budget was the insufficiency of the sums allowed for some of the principal departments of the state. For example, the ministers of the war and the marine departments, whose expenditure had been so curtailed by the finance minister, had in the end persuaded themselves that they could defray their current expenses, the one with 51 the other with 200 millions, which was a complete illusion, attributable not to a wish to deceive, but to their inexperience. Expenses to the amount of at least 100 millions had been unintentionally dissembled in this budget. But that was of little importance at the time. The great point was to re-establish public credit by an open discussion of the state of the finances, and by a statement not wholly disheartening of the resources of the state. Succeeding years would bring forth calculations more correct, and more conformable with the real state of things. The budget was consequently criticised in a sense inverse to the truth; but the objections produced no effect, because they did not touch the essential question, one that would awaken the passions—that is to say, they were not brought to bear upon the proposed plan of raising credit. A few words were

said about the state revenue. Some deputies, who represented the wine-growing departments, remonstrated, but without being supported, against the indirect taxes. The chamber, though constituted several years before the Restoration, was essentially imbued, as we shall see presently, with the spirit of landed proprietorship, and was more concerned about the direct than the indirect taxes. The chamber silenced by not giving attention to the deputies from the south; and appeared to attach importance only to the additional centimes that had been levied by a simple decree within the last three months of the Empire, and converted into a law in the budget of M. Louis. The sum total of these centimes, whether for the expenses of the departments or for general expenses, amounted to sixty. The chamber seemed inclined to reduce them, but deferred a final determination until the day when the amendments should be debated.

A general feeling of impatience at length brought on the question of the arrears, and the means proposed to defray them. M. Louis' plan was opposed by two classes of adversaries; the deputies, who were certainly few in number, that participated in the sentiments of the emigration, and who wished to pay the State creditors with paper, and not with timber belonging to the clergy. And there were the ultra-liberals, such as M. Durbach, who with good intentions, but without discernment, looked upon the proposed means of raising credit as a system of stock-jobbing, not perceiving that nothing could be more opposed to stock-jobbing than paying one's debts punctually. Both parties uttered with much pomposity a vast number of puerilities.

Those who were well-disposed towards the emigration dared not propose a national bankruptcy. It must be said, for the honour of those times, that ideas of financial honesty had already made so much progress that no one would have ventured to deny the principle of the total liquidation of the State debts, whatsoever their origin. We must even add, for the honour of the members of the legislative corps, that they would not have suffered it. But indirect ways were adopted; it was asserted that it would be sufficient to pay the State creditors with stock at par; that it would be placing them in the same position as all the holders of government stock, and that they would have no right to complain. The supporters of this view insinuated besides that amongst the State creditors there was a number of government contractors who had largely defrauded the Treasury, and that paying them in the proposed manner, there could be no doubt but that they would receive more than their due. The alienation of three hundred thousand hectares of wood was next condemned. The speakers

repeated those arguments so often adduced against the destruction of timber, but they carefully abstained from alluding to the point which weighed most with them, which was that the wood in question had been the property of the clergy. They said that the proposers of this measure were about to injure forest property, by putting up for sale such a quantity of timber, and considerably diminish the quantity of timber belonging to the State, for the State possessed in all 1,400,000 hectares of forest; that of these, 400,000 would return to the former proprietors, should their unsold property be restored to the emigrants; that, consequently, there would not remain, at the utmost, more than a million; that if of these, 300,000 were sold, there would only remain 700,000; that the forest property of the State would be thus reduced to half, which would entail a serious injury on the country, as it was only the woods belonging to the State whose preservation was secured. All this was said in an irritated tone, and with a great want of candour. But the legislative corps saw very clearly the motives that inspired these speakers.

As to the ultra-liberals, they exclaimed against the creation of a fresh paper currency, and, above all, against an interest of 8 per cent., which, in their opinion, was excessive. They forgot that the minister had already created this paper money, that a large quantity had been already issued under the title of exchequer bills; that he had succeeded in getting them accepted, thanks to his recognized principles, and thanks to an interest of 7 per cent.; that an interest of 7 per cent. on bills of three or six months supposed at least 8 per cent. for bills payable in three years; that it was fortunate that such a plan had been devised and had succeeded, for the taxes had not brought 200 millions to the Treasury, and 350 millions had been paid away, thanks to the plan devised by the minister. Not being aware of these facts, or neglecting to inquire into them, not having a desire to learn them, nor possessing sufficient talent to seek them, the provincial deputies said what provincial deputies often say, that the government was seeking to increase the facilities for stock-jobbing, and sacrificing the property of the people to Paris speculators.

One opponent alone proposed something less futile, which was to give the State creditors bills at 5 per cent., redeemable at 3 per cent., which would render the liquidation more prompt, and keep these bills at a much higher value than the stock, which was only redeemable at 1 per cent. But this proposal, apparently favourable to the Treasury, as it seemed to show that at an equal expense the public debt could be much sooner liquidated, was, in reality, only an attempt to frustrate the financial plan of the minister. In fact, by making part of the

interest redeemable, it was reduced to 5 per cent., consequently lower than the commercial rate, which was 7 per cent. for bills of three and six months, as was shown in the case of the exchequer bills. It was, therefore, only a puerile effort to evade the common commercial law, which is to pay for things at their actual value. As to the rest, the project in question, though subtle in itself and supported by arguments still more subtle, was not favourably received, nor warmly supported.

The project of M. Louis was supported by the committee, and many well-informed deputies, who adduced excellent reasons for their opinions, but all these arguments were in writing, for the most part without order or connection, but they produced an effect, for sound reasoning will ultimately prevail, whatever be the form in which it is put forth. The best defender of the ministerial plan was the minister himself, who, in a written and sound discourse, discussed all the parts of his system, in a manner comprehensible to the humblest intelligence. But when details came to be examined, the discussion became warmer, and, consequently, more serious and more effective, and the written speeches being laid aside, the minister produced a still greater impression on the Chamber. M. Louis was not endowed with the gift of eloquence, and, besides, he spoke with a kind of stammer, the effect of his extreme vivacity; but there was an energy in his language, consequent on intense thought, and which produced a powerful effect on his hearers. He began by saying that he had never neglected any means of reducing the public expenses, and that he had carried economy to its extreme limits. As to the taxes, he treated with contempt those orators who affected to pity the tax-payers, and said that the first of all duties was to provide for the wants of the State, which represented the most imperious wants of every individual; for people could no more do without soldiers, judges, and roads, than without bread; that the direct and indirect taxes were indispensable; that they should be submitted to; and that besides, of all the countries of Europe, France was one of the least burdened by taxation; that, in short, France should pay the price of her errors, which was the most certain way to get rid of them. Passing afterwards to the question of the arrears and the proposed plan for raising credit, the minister maintained that, as a principle, the State ought to pay the public debts, and pay them fully; that such was in the first place the duty of honest men, and, in the next place, the policy of wise men; that instead of becoming poor, the people became rich by acting in this manner; for public credit would be thus re-established, and with public, private credit, and with private credit, the vitality of commerce; that, in fact, there was not a member of the govern-

ment who thought otherwise; that the king subscribed to the principle of paying the arrears, no matter what their amount, nor by whom contracted. The minister expressed these opinions with the energy of profound conviction; and added that not being able to pay the State debts by means of the taxes, and not wishing to increase them as they were already thought too heavy, no other way remained to him but credit; that he was sure of succeeding by this means, as he had found by recent experience, but that his success depended on two conditions: first, that the government should establish a claim to credit by the punctual discharge of existing engagements, and by paying according to the actual rate of the money market; that if the government pretended to pay the State creditors by giving them stock at par, they would defraud the creditors of 25, 30, and 40 per cent.; that if, on the contrary, the interest was to be rated at the current price of the day, the State would be exposed to pay more than the actual debts, and would be, moreover, bound to an interminable interest of 8 per cent.; and that, lastly, the money market would be inundated by the quantity of bills issued; that for all these reasons, bills at short date were preferable, which would certainly bear an interest of 8 and even 9 per cent.; but the burden would be only temporary, and would neither defraud the State nor the creditors, as by this means nothing more than the capital really due would be paid; that these bills were not a chimera, but a reality, for those already issued at three and six months' date continued to bear an interest of 7 and $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., which was equivalent to about 8 per cent. on securities payable in two or three years; that the woods in question were much more a guarantee than an actual alienation of forest property; that if a portion of this wood were sold, to the amount of a hundred million francs, for example, and that with this money, the bills issued should be redeemed, public credit would become so stable, that the government might then obtain a loan, with which the unpaid portion of the arrears could be paid off; and of the woods whose alienation was proposed, it was not probable that more than a third would be sold. Besides, as for what concerned forest property, the government proposed to sell only those woods of small extent, which could be better managed by private individuals than by the State; but the woods containing timber suited for ship-building or important from public considerations, should remain intact; and the fears conceived or expressed on this subject were perfectly chimerical; that the financial project devised for the accomplishment of all these objects, formed a whole, whose parts were intimately dependent on each other, and to withdraw one, involved the destruction of the entire. And the minister finally

declared that he knew no better means to adopt, nor did he wish to try any other, being certain, after five months' experience, of the efficacy of the means proposed.

M. Louis repeated these reasons several times in the course of the discussion, as circumstances called them forth, and with an emotion of voice and features that testified to the sincerity of his conviction. The members of the chamber were persuaded. Seeing that they had to do with a man of talent, who understood perfectly well what he was about, they closed the debate, notwithstanding the cries of a many-shaded opposition. The examination of the details was then commenced, and adjourned to the next sitting.

After having ascertained the real feelings of the Chamber, the two ministers recognised the necessity of making a concession, not upon the budget nor the financial plan, but in the matter of the additional centimes. The spirit of landed proprietorship that prevailed in the Chamber, demanded a sacrifice in favour of the direct taxes. The additional centimes were consequently reduced from 60 to 30, but no alteration was made in the sum total of the budget, which remained fixed at 618 million francs—a proceeding that implied a pledge on the part of the Chamber to make up this total the following year, by some means or other. The thing being agreed on, the amendment was proposed at the final sitting, and accepted by M. de Montesquiou. The minister of finance left the Chamber at this moment, not wishing to be responsible for a concession that was repugnant to the inflexibility of his principles; for he argued, that the Chamber having voted the expenses, ought at the same time to have voted the resources that were to meet these expenses. The amendment was put to the vote, and carried.

The last point of difference remained to be decided. The opposition had rallied all their forces for the discussion of an amendment that proposed to reduce the interest on the lately issued exchequer bills from 8 to 6 per cent. The amendment presented serious dangers. In the first place, medium measures suit public assemblies, that for the most part seek truth in a middle course. Besides, many honest men, but profoundly ignorant of financial affairs, believed that by this diminution of the interest they were protecting the public money; and there were many malicious opponents who saw in the proposed amendment the ruin of the minister's project, a prospect highly gratifying to the ultra-royalists, who did not wish to pay "Bonaparte's creditors;" and it was equally pleasing to the enemies of the Bourbons, as it would be a severe check to the restored dynasty. M. Louis made a vigorous opposition. He said that, in proposing 8 per cent., he had not made an arbi-

trary but a necessary proposition; that money had a commercial value independent of the will of governments; that he had already obtained money at 7 and $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on bills of short date; that possibly he would be obliged to pay 8 per cent. on bills of a longer date; that if possible he would make a better bargain, but it was indispensable that he should enjoy a discretionary power on this point, a refusal of which would be equivalent to a rejection of the entire financial project, and even of the budget, in which case he would leave to the authors of the amendment the task of meeting the difficulties of the position.

A courageous sincerity in a ministry visibly attached to the public welfare, never remains without response in a general assembly. The amendment, however popular, was only supported by 101 voices, and rejected by 122, which gave, it is true, only a majority of 21 for the government; but this majority did not represent the Chamber, for when the total of the ministerial proposition was put to the vote, 140 members voted for, and only 66 against it—giving a majority of 74, which was enormous considering the number of voters.

This triumph produced a great effect on the public, who saw on the one side a powerful and rational majority, decided to support the government; and on the other side, this government, steady, prudent, skilled in financial affairs, knowing what was desirable, and desiring it ardently. The following day the Five per Cents., which had risen from 65 to 75 francs on the presentation of the financial project, rose when it passed the Chamber to 78; and should the peace continue, it was not chimerical to believe that the funds would rise to 90, an extraordinary figure at that period. Under these circumstances, it would be easy for the government to effect a loan, and immediately pay off the entire of the arrears, alienating only part of the woods ordered to be sold.

But questions of finance were not the sole difficulties on which M. Louis was called to decide. The termination of the Continental blockade, which occurred at the same time as the fall of the Empire, necessitated an immediate consideration of the state of commerce and manufactures. Napoleon had not persevered sufficiently long in the Continental blockade to conquer England by commercial means; but he persevered long enough to lay the foundations of our manufactures, and it naturally followed that, when our country was invaded, and the barriers that opposed the influx of foreign manufactures fell, our commercial market should be powerfully disturbed, and add to the military, to the civil functionaries, and holders of national property, a new class of malcontents, disposed to regret the Empire.

We have already seen that, immediately after the return of the Bourbons, M. Louis had taken some provisional measures to accommodate our commercial legislation to the new state of things. For example, he had reduced the duty on raw cotton to a mere *droit de balance*, in order to enable our manufactures to work cheaper. He reduced the duties on sugars and coffee to a rate that enabled the French to compete with the British commerce. But these measures were only temporary, and many others were needed to secure the existence and development of our manufactures. But as always happens in such cases, each class demanded a prohibitory duty for its own advantage, refusing at the same time a merely protective one to others; and the Chambers, as the arbitrating power, were beset with pressing petitions from all our manufacturers. The minister had endeavoured to satisfy the greater number of these demands by the introduction of moderate measures, calculated to obtain the consent of the Chambers.

In the first place, he had re-established custom-houses along our frontiers, and had at the same time stopped a species of fraud resulting from the exceptional circumstances of the time. The districts added to our territorial possessions of 1790 by the treaty of Paris, though not of great extent, held at that time considerable quantities of merchandise. These additions, lying in the direction of Belgium, the Rhine, and Savoy, were filled with English manufactured goods, which became French property, as a matter of right, the day we took definite possession of the new territories. With regard to these goods, the minister ordered the re-exportation of those that were prohibited, and demanded duty for those whose entrance was authorised by the tariff. He prohibited goods made of thread or cotton. With respect to woollen cloths, it was only necessary to enforce the existing laws. Our cotton spinners and weavers being at length able to obtain the raw material, not at the price that prevailed during the Continental blockade, but at the rate current through Europe, were that year able to compete at the Leipzig fair with English manufactured goods. In fact, ours were found to be of a better quality. Our manufacturers had certainly sustained a considerable loss, immediately after the abolition of the duty on raw cotton; for they were obliged to sell their goods at the rate to which the suppression of this duty had reduced them. The loss thus sustained was stated at 30 million francs, and the manufacturers did not hesitate to demand the reimbursement of this sum from the Chambers, as the consequence of a tax unduly collected. M. Louis angrily rejected the claim, and the Chamber agreed in his opinion. The deputies looked on the loss thus sustained by the manufacturers as one of the inevi-

table evils of war, and which a government can no more avert from a certain branch of manufacture, injured by an alteration in the frontiers, than they could from a province occupied by an enemy.

Next to cotton, the most important of our modern manufactures was of iron. This metal, made to replace stone and wood in a thousand uses, was destined to become one of the most active instruments of modern civilisation. The manufacture of this metal had been greatly developed in France, in consequence of the Continental blockade, which prohibited the entrance of foreign iron brought by sea. The abolition of this interdict exposed our metallurgic manufactures to a formidable rivalry. A great revolution had been accomplished in England in this branch of trade by the substitution of sea coal for wood as a combustible, and by the use of the rolling mill instead of the hammer in working the metal. The consequence was that the English were able to sell iron at 350 francs the ton, which the French could not do at less than 500. It is true that the French iron, smelted by the action of wood and worked by the hammer, possessed incontestable advantages as to quality, but could not support the impending rivalry. Consequently, our metallurgic manufacturers were amongst the most restless and anxious. The great iron manufacturers declared, and with reason, that if they were not protected against foreign iron, they would be obliged to stop their works, which would deprive France of an article of the first necessity, and render her dependent on the English, who would soon make her pay a higher price than the French themselves. These were supported by the great timber proprietors, who could find no market for their goods if the manufacturers of iron ceased to purchase. These petitioners were opposed by the inhabitants of the seaports and the wine-growing provinces, who hoped to export their wines to those northern countries that might send iron to France. Not daring to avow their true motives, they asserted that France, deprived of Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, would not be able to furnish a quantity of iron sufficient for her wants, an assertion that experience has belied. The iron manufacturers demanded a prohibitory duty, whilst, on the contrary, the merchants and proprietors of vineyards clamoured for free trade. The minister proposed to put a duty of 150 francs per ton on foreign iron, which added to 350—the English market price—would bring it up to the rate of 500 francs. He thought this protective duty would be sufficient. There was a lively discussion in the Chambers, where both the opposing parties found warm defenders. An amendment proposing a duty of 250 francs was presented and largely supported, but the duty

of 150 francs was carried, and in this affair also the wishes of the Government prevailed in the Chambers.

After the iron manufacturers came the sugar refiners, who addressed strong remonstrances both to the government and the Chambers. Sugar refining was an ancient branch of French manufacture, and one of the most extensive and productive, especially when France, possessing St. Domingo, drew thence large quantities of raw sugar, which, being refined, found a sale in all the markets of Europe. War, which had favoured our national manufactures, had also served some rival productions, amongst which was the refining of sugar in other countries. The French refiners remonstrated. They appealed to the mighty memories of our colonial prosperity: they were listened to, and a prohibitory duty was passed.

The agriculturists also put in their claims, and found amongst the members of the legislative corps many inclined to hear them favourably. Our agriculturists wished to profit of the opening of the seas, to export their grain and wool. Grain of all kind had been retained in France during the late times of scarcity, and as to wool, Napoleon had prohibited not alone its exportation, but that of sheep, because he wished that the great importation of merino sheep should tend exclusively to the improvement of French woollen goods. The agriculturists, consequently, demanded free trade in corn, wool, and sheep; but they were opposed by the inhabitants of the sea coast—that is, by the people of Normandy, Brittany, and Vendée—who were violent royalists. They were also opposed by all those who worked in wool; in the first place, the manufacturers of woollen cloth; and next, the manufacturers of those various tissues, known as “merinos,” which have become a real blessing for the people by their extensive use and low price. But the agriculturists had sound arguments on their side; for if, for the protection of national manufactures, it is natural to prohibit the importation of foreign produce, it does not appear so reasonable to prohibit the exportation of home produce. The agriculturists appeared to be right. Their arguments were popular, and the Chamber of Deputies, adopting the views of the finance minister, sanctioned the exportation of grain, subject to a fluctuating duty that varied with the price of the commodity. The exportation of wool was also permitted, that of rams alone being subject to duty.

Such were the principal measures used to modify the transition from the Continental blockade to a free marine commerce. We have already said that the duty was suppressed on foreign raw materials, such as raw cotton, dyes, dyeing woods, which Napoleon had overtaxed, as articles connected with British

commerce. Cotton manufactured goods were still prohibited, in order to afford the home manufactures an absolute protection. A duty was put on iron equivalent to the difference between the price of that article in the English and French markets; and as to goods of large consumption—such as sugar and coffee—the duty imposed on them being exclusively for the benefit of the exchequer, was much diminished, and this was done with a view to lessen the incentives to smuggling, which had much increased since the return of peace. Lastly, foreign refined sugar was prohibited, and the exportation of our agricultural products was declared free, or nearly so.

These measures, conceived in a praiseworthy spirit of moderation, met with general approbation. The government was thus alternately supported and checked by the Chambers, that had become the tutelar authority, beneath whose shelter all the aggrieved classes of the community flocked. Still, some men, who entertained exaggerated ideas of liberty, often expressed regrets that the Chamber of Deputies did not act in a more decided manner. These men wished, for example, that the Chamber had unconditionally rejected the law concerning the press. But by making this law temporary, the Chamber of Deputies had preserved the principle of liberty, and for prudent men that was enough; for to go further would have been to give the crown a check which would have weakened the kingly power, and deeply irritated the Bourbons against the new order of things. Politically speaking, this mode of conduct was evidently the wisest.

The Chamber of Peers, on the other hand, had not acted less wisely than the Chamber of Deputies. The peers had thoroughly discussed the law of the press, and had passed it after retrenching the preamble, which seemed to imply that the censorship was a principle of the Charter. The peers addressed an excellent reply to the Minister of the Interior, on the occasion of a report presented to the Chambers on the state of France. Napoleon, we must remember, caused a statement to be every year laid before the legislative corps of the position of the empire, in order to ascertain the general state of progress. The new government thought it well to follow this example, and took advantage of the opportunity to dilate upon the state of desolation in which the Empire and the Revolution had left France. The statement of the Minister of the Interior, considering France from one point of view, was only true in the description made of the miseries resulting from war. The Chamber of Deputies replied to this document by a simple vote of thanks; but the Chamber of Peers, of whom two-thirds were members of the senate, would not allow the Revolution nor even the Empire to be so unjustly treated. The

peers made a thoughtful reply, in which were recounted the immense benefits that France owed to the application of the principles of 1789, to the abolition of wardenships, and all the shackles that formerly fettered manufactures in the interior of France; to the division of landed property; to the increase in the number of landed proprietors, the improvement of land, the establishment and advancement of manufactures; and after recapitulating these various benefits, the peers added that they saw in these things, as well as in the peace and liberty for which France was indebted to the Bourbons, motives for hoping a speedy return of public prosperity. The reply, though perfectly respectful, was dignified, veracious, and pointed.

It was evident that the two Chambers, though not so enthusiastic as the liberal party, deserved the confidence of enlightened men, and had begun to obtain it. They were also gradually acquiring the power of restraining and supporting the government, two conditions alike desirable. Unfortunately, the opposition that the government met, though it did not irritate the members against the constitutional *régime*, had not in any way ameliorated their feelings. The king was pretty much as usual—that is to say, tranquil, considering political questions quietly, and inclined to allow his ministers to do as they pleased when the principle of his authority, or any of the essential interests of the emigration, were not in question. To these interests he was deeply attached. Thus, with regard to the national property, he actually did himself violence: and had it been in his power, he would have restored it to the ancient proprietors. He had especially disapproved the arrest of MM. Dard and Falconnet, authors of the two pamphlets that condemned the irrevocability of the national sales. After a short imprisonment, these two lawyers had been set at liberty amid the loud applause of the high emigrant party, who had visited and offered them the most lavish attentions during their short captivity, and continued to throng their houses after their liberation. The king also took part with his body-guards in their quarrels with the national guards and the soldiers, and expressed his intention of supporting them at all hazards. His ministers, without contradicting him, contented themselves with trying to prevent new collisions, or to correct the effects when they had not been able to prevent the cause. With these exceptions, the king allowed his ministers to follow the bent of their inclinations. As to the Count d'Artois, who had returned from Saint Cloud to Paris, after an absence induced by ill health and bad humour, he as usual made himself very busy. He turned an attentive ear to those provincial petitioners, who came to beg places as a recompense for their

loyalty; made them promises that he could not fulfil, and sympathised in their exaggerated feelings, which made him more and more the object of the hopes and love of the ultra-royalists. Influenced by a spirit of curiosity, a fondness for meddling in government affairs, and the distrust that characterises weak minds, he had allowed a kind of police to gather round him, composed of the plotters of every *régime*—the worn-out remnants of former police forces, who sought at what was then called the *Pavillon Marsan*—the Prince's residence at the Tuileries—employment that they were refused in the government police. The Prince was delighted to receive through these channels, reports, either annoying or alarming, which he carried to the king, to prove to him that he was badly served, or that he had made a bad choice in his officials; and that whilst he was reading his classic authors, the monarchy was undermined and threatened with fresh calamities. Louis XVIII., being privately informed by M. Beugnot of the groundlessness of the information brought by Monsieur, had several times enjoined his brother to give up this gossiping, and allow him to live in peace. The Duke d'Angoulême, the eldest son of Monsieur, was not very talented, but he was prudent and modest, and did not pretend to play a more important part than that allotted him. He was then travelling in the west, endeavouring to recover for the royal authority that respect which in these provinces had declined very much. The other son, the Duke de Berry, who was not deficient in talent, but uncontrollably irritable, had at first succeeded with the troops, to whom he paid the most lavish attentions; but he ultimately offended them by the violence of his temper, which he had at first restrained, but could not entirely suppress, and which became more apparent as each succeeding day proved the difficulty of attaching the army to the Bourbons. Thus these three Princes, notwithstanding their difference of disposition, participated too largely in the prejudices of their friends to be able to resist their influence or avoid their errors. Scarcely a day passed that some manifestation on their part did not add to those incidents, of which party ill-will is only too glad to profit.

The 15th of August was the day on which under, the Empire, the feast of Saint-Napoleon was celebrated. It would have been better to take no notice of the day and allow it to pass unobserved. But the royal family wished, on the contrary, that the day should be still a fête, but a royalist fête. The 15th of August was the day on which Louis XIII. in gratitude for the pregnancy of Anne of Austria, had by a solemn vow placed France under the protection of the Blessed Virgin. However interesting this historical souvenir might be,

it would have been well to consider the actual circumstances of the time before enjoying the pleasure of recalling it. But the Bourbons did nothing of the kind, and ordered a solemn procession throughout France to revive and confirm the vow of Louis XIII. At Paris the princes walked in the procession, carrying tapers in their hands, and this spectacle did not produce a favourable effect on those whom the religious zeal of the Bourbons was calculated to offend. The half-pay officers were much amused by the devotion of the princes, and the soldiers bought candles to celebrate the feast of Saint-Napoleon by illuminating their barracks. It was not without considerable difficulty that this seditious illumination was extinguished in the evening.

A manifestation of a different character produced on the 29th of August a not less disagreeable effect. The king was invited by the city of Paris to a magnificent banquet, and went to dine at the *Hôtel de Ville*, which he had not done since his return to France. Scarcely was he arrived when it became necessary to appease a quarrel that arose between the body-guard and the national guards. The body-guard wanted to occupy the inner apartments and banish the national guard to the outer. This was a pretension that involved inconvenience, for the national guard was, in fact, the city of Paris itself that took up arms to do honour to the king, and at the *Hôtel de Ville* the members of the national guard were in their own home. To banish them to the gate of the palace, whilst the body-guards occupied the interior, would be a strange forgetfulness of the decencies of life. The quarrel became warm, the king took part in it, and it was agreed that the national guards and the body-guards should occupy in equal numbers the inner apartments of the *Hôtel de Ville*.

The fête commenced by a dinner to the king; a ball was to follow. The magnificence and taste displayed on this occasion were worthy of the great city that received its king, and of the august guest that she received. Louis XVIII. sat at the chief table with the princes of his family, and admitted to the same table, by an infraction of ancient customs, thirty-six ladies. In this number were comprised the most distinguished ladies of the ancient court, and only three or four of the modern nobility. But this was not the most remarkable circumstance of the entertainment. The prefect, standing behind the chair of the king, waited on the monarch, and the prefect's wife, in the same attitude, waited on the Duchess d'Angoulême. The members of the municipal council performed the same services for the princes. It is true that in earlier times, princes and even kings had waited upon emperors, but we may add, without adopting any vulgar democratic prejudice, that the time

for such exhibitions had passed away. Napoleon, with all the prestige of his glory and his power, had not been able to renew these customs, but he had never tried the experiment on so large a scale. The morrow of the fête at the *Hôtel de Ville*, the court flatterers were loud in their encomiums on the magnificence and moral beauty of the spectacle presented on the previous evening. They spoke of the fêtes of the Revolution and the Empire with profound contempt; they said that neither had ever presented anything like what they had just witnessed; that it was legitimate authority alone, recognized and accepted by all, that could command such a spectacle; and that those who had the happiness of witnessing it, would preserve during their lives ineffaceable recollections of the scene. Those sycophants dealt out in this way common-places that are uttered after every public fête, and which obtain favour only with those who have partaken of the banquet. It is true, and happily so, that even in our days crowned heads can still command respect, but it is when they exhibit much virtue, simplicity of manner, and correctness of taste, and testify for the rest of mankind a respect equivalent to what they demand for themselves.

The masses judge by their eyes, and, for the most part, form their opinion of the moral strength of a government by its external manifestations. The part played by the magistrates at the city feast, with regard to the king, was in their eyes only a counterpart of the task that certain men would wish to impose on France herself; and they connected the scene enacted at the *Hôtel de Ville* with the extravagant acts in which certain landed proprietors had lately indulged in Normandy, Brittany, Languedoc, and Provence. Some of these seigneurs required that in their village churches, the incense should be swung before them; others insisted that the consecrated bread should be offered to them before being presented to the municipal authorities; these pretensions had induced ridiculous contests, accounts of which had been eagerly propagated by the journals, and the acts themselves denounced in the Chambers. But these incidents would have been trifles under a staple and rigorously legal government, consistent with the institutions it had granted and animated by the spirit displayed in the Chambers. Unfortunately, such a spirit could not exist in a ministry that had neither unity, head, nor a steady principle of conduct, and was, consequently, without influence. M. de Montesquiou, minister of the interior, had more direct intercourse with the country than any of his colleagues. His manners were amiable, when he laid aside the self-sufficiency of which he was sometimes accused; he was moderate, considering his birth and the party to which he be-

longed; he spoke with fluency, and was listened to with attention in the Chambers, but he was, spite of these advantages, the most incompetent of the ministers, because he possessed neither firmness nor application to business. After recalling the special commissioners, he had left the imperial prefects in office, without entering into any explanation, without telling them whether they should be continued in office, or be dismissed. It was reasonable enough to retain special functionaries, such as clerks in the finance, the roads and bridges, the war and marine departments; nothing could be better, for it would have been difficult to find substitutes for the men who filled these places. But it was a dangerous experiment to retain in office the prefects who were exclusively political personages, and who were supposed to represent literally the spirit and sentiments of the new government. However, for want of suitable men, M. de Montesquiou had been obliged to continue in office a great number of the prefects of the Empire, for the royalists, long removed from the sphere of business, were unfit for these posts. It would have been wiser to have transferred these men to new departments, which would have given their appointment a sort of royal sanction, and spared them the annoyance of appearing self-contradictory in the eyes of their fellow-functionaries.

M. de Montesquiou had taken none of these precautions, he contented himself with appointing as prefects, and sub-prefects, in some departments, certain ancient nobles who were reputed fit for public business, and these he left to act according to their own inclinations, without entering into any explanation about the imperial prefects. The consequence was, that the royalist prefects indulged all the passions of partizans, and the imperial prefects who were retained in office exhibited extreme weakness of character, fearing to excite the anger of the royalists. So, one party boldly did the evil, and the other complacently allowed it to be done, and suffered it to be publicly said that the Charter was a temporary expedient; that the Bourbons once firmly fixed on the throne, would complete the Restoration by reviving the tithes, and restoring the property of the church and the emigrants. To obviate the commission of all these errors, the minister would have been obliged to read a voluminous correspondence, and reply immediately to all these letters, and give directions, in a word, he would have been obliged to act, and of this M. de Montesquiou was incapable. He scarcely seemed to perceive the most serious accidents, even when followed by a scandal like that connected with the Bishop of Rochelle; and when forced upon his attention, he interfered with a cold inefficacious letter. M. de Beugnot, a man of high intelligence, to whom the

direction of the police was confided, had foreseen this state of things, and had sent into the departments sensible enlightened agents, who had sent him a succession of well drawn up reports, describing the strange position of France at that period. It was a delicate task to communicate these reports to Louis XVIII., for it was in other words, to denounce as mad, and sometimes as very criminal, his most zealous friends. When M. Beugnot happened to receive a very piquant report, one capable of amusing a sarcastic monarch, he profited of the opportunity to lay the truth before his eyes. Louis XVIII. read the report, returned it to M. Beugnot, and contented himself with joining his minister in a laugh against persons whom he designated the friends of his brother. Things remained in this state, and such was the entire system of government. But the weakness of the administration was confessedly acknowledged, and the princes persuaded themselves that they ought to appear in person, that their presence would animate and subdue every heart, and kindle on every side the flame of loyalty. They were strangely mistaken, and did not perceive that instead of diminishing they were about to increase the evil. Good government on the part of the king under such circumstances would have consisted in restraining his friends, but sending the princes into the provinces was only exciting the popular feeling, whose sole fruit would be some few acclamations of loyalty, vain as the acclamations of the populace generally are, who applaud when their passions are roused, and forget on the morrow the shout of the previous evening, ready to utter a different cry on a new morrow should their passions be aroused in favour of an opposing cause.

It was thought prudent to send one of the princes immediately to the West, which was the most disturbed part of France. The Duke d'Angoulême was selected for this purpose, and a better choice could not be made. The prince consecrated the months of July and August to his tour. It was decided that in September and October the Count d'Artois should visit Champagne, Burgundy, Lyons, Provence, Dauphiné, and Franche-Comté, and that at the same time the Duke de Berry should visit the frontier provinces, where the soldiers were stationed in great numbers.

The western provinces, that is to say, Lower Normandy, Brittany, and Vendée, had greatly offended Louis XVIII., because they seemed to make little account of him, and spoke much more of M. de la Rochejacquelein and other royalist chiefs than of the king himself. The insurgents of these provinces, as we have already said, had assembled, and armed themselves at the expense of the blues, whose muskets they

seized; they recalled their ancient chiefs, and elected new ones in cases where the former had died, and obeyed these leaders much more strictly than they did the government. To the Duke d'Angoulême was confided the task of informing them that there was a king in France, that there was but one, and that it was his authority alone they ought to recognize and obey. To avoid fixing public attention on a journey into provinces formerly insurgent, the prince announced his intention of visiting the seaports of the English Channel, that is to say, Brest, Nantes, Rochelle, &c., &c. Conformably with this announcement, he left the country of the Chouans on the left, and proceeded directly through Lower Normandy to Rennes and Brest. He was received with a warmth of feeling and demonstrations of joy which might be naturally expected in provinces where his presence brought back the memory of many sufferings endured for the Bourbon cause, and where there were numbers of old men to whose eyes these memories brought tears. The Prince found that the royalists, both ancient and modern, spoke very lightly of the Charter, and looked upon the maintenance of the national sales as a merely temporary act of prudence; they considered the Concordat as another kind of Charter, that had lost its force on the abdication of Bonaparte. He found the people disposed to regard the taxes as a remnant of imperial tyranny that ought to be cast aside as soon as possible. They were, besides, determined not to suffer the exportation of corn, though decreed by a royalist government. The holders of national property were alarmed, and ready to combine for self-defence. The magistrates were distrustful, and expecting with anxiety the new investiture they had been promised; and, lastly, the army was dispirited, hostile in feeling, and scarcely respectful in manner. The prince had not sufficient penetration to appreciate the tendency of this state of things, but he possessed sufficient good sense and uprightness to perceive that it was opposed to order, and in direct opposition to the promises made by the king, which, in his opinion, ought to be honourably fulfilled; and he spoke admirably well on every point with the exception of religion, for on that subject the Bourbon family held most dangerous opinions. The prince took especial pains to persuade the people that there were not two kings, one residing at the *Pavillon de Flore*, called Louis XVIII., an ancient Jacobin, as the provincialists called him, very crafty, and making promises that he never intended to keep: the other, the Count Artois, residing at the *Pavillon Marsan*, whose heart was filled with the true sentiments of a good royalist; the former represented by the prefects, who ought not to be either obeyed or believed, the second by some

Chouan chiefs whose advice alone ought to be listened to and followed. The prince declared that there was but one king, that his orders ought to be obeyed, the taxes paid, and corn allowed to be exported, that the holders of national property ought not to be disturbed; in a word, that people ought to live peaceably and enjoy the restored public tranquillity, and allow it to be enjoyed by others. He spoke less prudently to the priests, in whose errors he seemed to participate, excepting in what concerned tithes and church property. He strengthened as much as he could the legal authorities, called forth the enthusiasm of the masses by the mere fact of his being a Bourbon, and satisfied honest men by his moderation and uprightness, but unfortunately did not fascinate anybody, and after having traversed Laval, Rennes, Brest, Lorient, he left the country as disturbed as he found it, because though he spoke rationally, his presence excited deep emotion, and at that moment emotion of all kind was an evil, because it awakened passions that ought to have been suppressed.

To visit Nantes was an important point. This city contained a rich commercial population, attached to the principles of the Revolution, but detesting its excesses, of which many cruel instances had occurred before their eyes, and hating as strongly the Vendean insurrection, and discontented with the arrogance of the nobility on both banks of the Loire. The people of Nantes entertained an exceeding dislike to Napoleon's government, because under that their commerce had been destroyed, and this aversion naturally inclined them to look favourably on the Bourbons, who brought with them peace and the Charter. But the extravagancies of the priests and the emigrants on the one hand, and on the other the difficulty they found in re-establishing their commerce, had rendered them discontented. They bitterly regretted the Mauritius, attributed to the English the worst designs, and entertained an ill-feeling against the Bourbon government on account of the partiality shown to England. Our colonies, on which the merchants of Nantes had reckoned so much, were now under the protection of the British flag, stocked with European produce, and under existing circumstances no great traffic could be expected in that quarter. Influenced by all these motives, the people of Nantes were sincere royalists, already somewhat disappointed in their hopes, but still perfectly constitutional. The Vendéans having announced their intention of erecting a post on the left bank of the Loire, bearing the inscription, "Here Vendée commences," the Nanteans declared they would erect a post at the gates of their city, with this inscription, "Here Vendée was foiled."

The Duke d'Angoulême was well received by the Nanteans;

he addressed them in a tone of moderation that produced an agreeable impression, and brought them back to an excellent frame of mind. On quitting Nantes, he journeyed through the centre of Vendée, stopping first at Beaupréau. He was now in the "Bocage," this wooded and almost inaccessible country, where nobles lived after a patriarchal fashion with their tenants, whom they had formerly led to battle against the armies of the Republic. In these rural districts, there abode much sincerity of feeling and simplicity of manners, and very little of the spirit of intrigue and brigandage that had characterized the progress of *Chouannerie*. The peasants of the Bocage were tolerably quiet under the direction of their seigneurs, who bade them have patience and obey the orders of the king. The only symptom of insubordination exhibited by these people was a reluctance to pay the taxes, which they hoped to see soon abolished. About five or six thousand of them arrived at Beaupréau, with their seigneurs and their white banners, deeply touched by the sight of the prince, as was natural when they recalled the many struggles, the many sorrows, and heavy losses they had endured in the royal cause. Their language was not unreasonable; besides, they remembered the concessions made since 1789, and had no wish to see tithes and feudal rights revived. Here, in the centre of the Bocage, many touching scenes had taken place, and scarcely one that could awaken regret. At Bourbon-Vendée, the prince found the public spirit less simple and less innocent amongst the people of the Marais. In this region, the people were less agricultural than commercial, they were fond of excitement, and assumed a certain importance; they smuggled and evaded the payment of taxes, and exhibited on the whole rather turbulent passions. The clergy, especially, displayed a total want of common sense. The prince repeated here to those who came to hear him what he had already said throughout his progress, and his discourse was not without effect. He afterwards repaired to Rochelle, where he might have done a great deal of good by receiving the titular bishop, against whom the clergy of the diocese had revolted, preferring the ancient bishop, who had not given in his resignation. Unfortunately, the Duke d'Angoulême, who was the most pious of the Bourbon princes, refused to receive the titular bishop, and by this conduct gave a most deplorable contradiction to M. de Montesquiou's letter. The "little church" was transported with joy, and became more arrogant than ever, for no act could be more significantly favourable to her than a refusal on the part of the prince to receive the prelate *en fonction*, to whom the government had but lately enjoined a complete obedience. This was declaring by the

mouth of the prince that the official government was a delusion, of which nobody ought to be the dupe.

At Bordeaux, the prince found himself, so to speak, in his capital. It was there that the Bourbons had first appeared on their return to France, and the Bourbon who represented the family on that occasion was himself. But at Bordeaux, as elsewhere, the first fervour of the people had passed away, as well as their alluring hopes. After having looked upon the English as liberators, and also as extensive consumers of their produce—for they had carried off and drunk a great deal of wine—they were exasperated against them, since they had learned the loss of the Mauritius and the state of our colonies, whose markets were filled with British merchandize. And the Bordelais were, besides, displeased at some imprudent outbursts on the part of the Guyenne nobility, and especially irritated by the obstinate maintenance of the *droits réunis*. Hatred of the English, dissatisfaction against the nobility, and irritation against the *droits réunis*, were the three prevailing sentiments of the Bordelais, and which the Duke d'Angoulême was called upon to remove or at least moderate. The prince did all in his power, and admitted which was true—that the English had not acted like generous conquerors, but maintained that they had not done anything to prevent the revival of French commerce, and that with a little time and industry trade would again flourish. He treated the rich citizens with distinction, and finally insisted on the absolute necessity of the indirect taxes, without which the expenses of the State could not be met. On this point, he succeeded in producing an effect on the minds of the more enlightened of the Bordelais merchants.

After leaving Bordeaux, the prince repaired to Mont-de-Marsan, Bayonne, Pau, Toulouse, and Limoges, making sensible speeches everywhere, giving here and there useless advice, and exciting, unintentionally, the passions of the royalists more than was beneficial either to the interests of France or his family. He returned to Paris by Angers and Mans.

Angers was one of the most disturbed and one of the most important cities of the West. The citizens and the nobility held opposite opinions on every subject which at that time occupied public attention. The infantry of the national guard was for the most part composed of the citizen class, and the cavalry of the nobility, because the latter being richer could provide for the maintenance of horses. The cavalry had adopted a special uniform, which they called the "Vendean uniform," and which, notwithstanding reiterated commands from Paris, they refused to lay aside. The cavalry had, moreover, declared their intention of exclusively surrounding the prince, and con-

stituting themselves his personal guard. These pretensions were exhibited in more than one place, and especially at Mans, in the centre of the ancient country of the Chouans. But the latter had announced a more serious project, which was no other than to assemble to the number of twenty thousand, with their chiefs and banners, and so accompany the Duke d'Angoulême during his stay in the province. During more than two months previously, the prefects of Angers and Mans had used every effort to prevent manifestations of this kind, but had not succeeded. However, as the Duke d'Angoulême drew nearer, thanks to several sage admonitions emanating from the prince, the prefects succeeded in making their silly fellow-citizens listen to reason; and at Angers, in particular, the cavalry guard promised to abstain from all pretentious display, and the infantry made a like promise. Notwithstanding these pacific assurances, when the prince arrived at the gates of Angers, and the authorities, accompanied by the troops, went out to meet him, a company of the infantry, national guards, who suspected the intentions of the cavalry, broke the line of the *cortège*, and suddenly surrounded the prince, whom they placed in a kind of square. Neither the prince nor the military authorities dared act with severity, for the innovators were supported by public opinion, and the prince was obliged to enter the city escorted in this fashion. Having arrived at Angers, he determined to make both parties feel his authority. He dissolved the company of infantry that had disturbed the tranquillity of the fête, but adjusted the balance by addressing a sharp remonstrance to one of the principal nobles. "It is you, Sir," he said, "who wish to be here more king than the king himself; it is you who wish that the soldiers should present arms to you and obey you, instead of obeying the legally constituted authorities; it is you whose pretensions disturb a country where you ought to give an example of peace and submission to the laws. Royalists such as you are more dangerous than the most formidable enemies. You may withdraw."

This scene, which soon became the subject of conversation throughout the city, delighted the citizens, and would have produced a highly beneficial effect had it been made known through the entire of France. But the journals were forbidden to allude to the circumstance. The prince afterwards pardoned the company of the national guards that had been dissolved, allowed it to be formed again, and left all the sensible people of Angers perfectly satisfied with him.

At Mans, the Chouan chiefs had been induced to listen to reason, an effect that was in a great measure attributable to the fact, that they were not able to enlist so many of their old soldiers as they had expected, and amongst the new, very few

could afford to make a journey of fifteen or twenty leagues at their own expense, to take part in a political demonstration. The prince was, consequently, spared some annoyance. But he saw many ardent royalists, numbers of old soldiers, remnants of the civil wars, who gave utterance to sentiments by no means moderate, without, however, proceeding to any vexatious demonstration. The prince returned to Paris about the middle of August. He had set out on his journey with the intention of doing good, but it had been his fate, in several instances, to do evil, by unintentionally exciting districts that most needed to be tranquillized.

Immediately after the return of the Duke d'Angoulême, the Count d'Artois proceeded to visit Champagne and Burgundy. He was authorised to make large promises of government favours, and not to refuse any merely honorary distinction, the measure in the latter case not depending either on the budget or the tyranny of custom. He could confer on the majority, the order of the lily, on military men and magistrates the cross of the Legion of Honour, on select royalists the cross of Saint Louis, and he was not a man to keep his hand closed when he had the king's permission to open it. He first visited the banks of the Seine and the Aube, and particularly the cities of Nogent, Méry, Arcis sur-Aube, Brienne, Bar-sur-Aube, and Troyes, where the war had made fearful ravages. He found part of the population sunk in wretchedness, and living in the midst of ruins. He was compassionate and demonstrative; he was touched by all the sorrows he beheld, he did not conceal his emotion, and won the affection of the sufferers by the sympathy he displayed. As he journeyed along, he melted in tenderness over those that were afflicted; he even wept with them, he called them his friends, his children, and promised to acquaint the king with their misfortunes, as if the king possessed the means of remedying these woes. The minister of finance had taken precautions against the prodigality of the prince, and laid it down as a principle that the State could do nothing for the districts ravaged by the war; that the utmost amelioration that could be afforded would be the reduction of the taxes, but that only in cases where the impossibility of payment was proved. Monsieur promised all the districts he visited to petition for exemption from taxes; he even promised them loans of money, and gave them permission, meanwhile, to cut down 120,000 trees in the State forest, to help in rebuilding their houses. To these aids, which were only just and of some importance, he added alms as large as the civil list permitted, which was already burdened by grants made to the emigrants. To these aids, he added the decoration of the lily, which he bestowed at the rate of five or six hundred

at a time, relieved occasionally by some crosses of the Legion of Honour or Saint Louis. He quitted the people of these districts, leaving as the chief consolation of their sorrows the emotion caused by a prince's visit; and hope, which whether groundless, or well-founded, always cheers the human heart.

After this visit to the provinces, suffering from the effects of war, the Count d'Artois went from Troyes to Dijon. Dijon was an ancient parliamentary city, inhabited by an old *noblesse de robe*, formerly well educated, still very pretentious, and unwilling to recognise any other liberty than that of the privilege of *remonstrating*. The inhabitants of Dijon were consequently imbued with a bad spirit, and encouraged in these dangerous sentiments by a prefect who shared in them. They treated the bishop, who owed his elevation to the Concordat, very badly, and accused him of favouring the priests who had taken the civil oath, because he had taken it himself. These people declared openly and with great self-sufficiency, that they could have arranged matters much better than Louis XVIII. had done; they pronounced the Charter to be a detestable production, but said that there was still time to repair the faults committed, by acting differently when the opportunity presented itself. Thus, whilst in Champagne, there prevailed a certain degree of calm, disturbed solely by the sufferings resulting from war, in Burgundy, on the contrary, the public mind was extremely agitated, one portion of the inhabitants ardently desiring a return of the ancient form of things, a feeling that excited in the minds of the others, a profound alarm. Monsieur, as might be expected, was received with transport by the royalists, in whose sentiments it was well known he shared; and with his usual facility of temper, he did not question anything they told him, believed all he heard, and recommended patience. As to the manifestation which ought to have been the most significant, he did not fail to render it the most vexatious; for he refused to receive the bishop, a circumstance that made a profound impression in the district, and tended to increase rapidly the dissensions that were already beginning to disturb the clergy.

Monsieur found affairs in a bad position at Dijon: he left them in a worse state, and repaired to Lyons. This great city, at that time the most important in the kingdom, next to Paris, did not present a less troubled aspect than the others. On one side was a host of ancient royalists, filled with recollections of the siege of 1793; detesting the Revolution and its results, and now united in a state of high enthusiasm under their former chief, M. de Précý. On the other side was the rich class of merchants and manufacturers, too young to remember anything of 1793, but sensitively alive to the memory of all

Napoleon had done to repair the misfortunes of their city, and above all to protect their trade, which during his reign had increased prodigiously. The maritime war, that had ruined Nantes, Bordeaux, and Marseilles, had, on the contrary, enriched Lyons. This city, situate on the Saône and the Rhone, at the conflux of all the fluvial communications with Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain, had become the centre of a most active and extensive trade. The possession of Italy and the faculty of procuring thence raw silks at a low price, the facility of transporting rich stuffs to all parts of the Continent, together with large orders from the Imperial palace, were advantages that Lyons had fully appreciated, but which had visibly diminished since the opening of the seas; for the fluvial navigation lost what the maritime had gained, and the English having as much power in Italy as the Austrians, raised the price of raw silk by purchasing for their own consumption. If we add to these annoyances the exactions committed by the Austrians, and for which the Bourbons were unjustly blamed, we may comprehend the divers motives that rendered cold, if not hostile, to the royal cause the Lyonnaise merchants, as well as many of the richest and most influential persons of the country. The people, imitating these dissensions, were also divided. A small but enthusiastic number had joined the royalists; the remainder adhered to the opposite party. The royalists held their meetings in a café, since become remarkable by the violence of the speeches uttered there; and thence they sometimes issued in search of their adversaries, intending to provoke them to quarrel; but the latter, though far more numerous, were timid. The mayor, a quiet honourable-minded man, a royalist by birth and connection, allowed himself to be carried away by the current of Lyonnaise passion, and quarrelled with the prefect, M. Bondy, who endeavoured in vain to allay the disorder. The prefect, though actuated by the best motives, was left to struggle alone between the extreme parties, for neither M. de Précý, head of the National Guard, nor the Marshal Augereau, who commanded the troops, afforded him any assistance. The latter was despised by the troops and the bulk of the population for not having defended Lyons against the Austrians; he was also despised on account of his famous proclamation, and consequently possessed no influence, and could not unite the local authorities in a common line of conduct, at once firm and conciliatory.

It was into this blazing furnace that the Count d'Artois came to throw fresh fuel. His arrival excited violent commotion. The *precursor of legitimacy*, as he was at that time called, the brother of the king, and in the opinion of the extreme royalists, the real king, ought naturally to be received

with enthusiasm. M. de Pr cy, commander of the National Guard, and M. d'Albon, the mayor, accompanied by the most enthusiastic of the population, received him at the gates of Lyons, and in his presence took an oath, in the name of all the inhabitants, to remain ever faithful to the Bourbons. The by-standers confirmed by their acclamations this pledge, which was taken in all sincerity. The prince was afterwards conducted through the city, and the municipal authorities, pausing in the most public places, renewed on their knees the oath never to acknowledge any other dynasty than the Bourbon. It was after this fashion that the prince was conducted to the palace, where he was to take up his abode. During the following days he visited the public establishments, and inspected several manufactories, whose owners were very much flattered by this distinction, and became for the moment good royalists. He was next shown traces of the siege, of which Napoleon had not allowed a great number to remain; and, lastly, there were presented to him all that remained in the city of those that had assisted at that memorable siege, those who had been wounded, or had suffered in any way on that occasion. They were introduced by M. de Pr cy, than whom none could be found better fitted for the office. The prince embraced these brave men with his accustomed cordiality, gave the cross of St. Louis to several, and afterwards laid the first stone of a monument intended to perpetuate the memory of the resistance made by Lyons to the National Convention in 1793. No government had ever made more promises to forget than did the restored Bourbons, and no government had ever shown a more retentive memory! Monsieur was made to please, those especially who were of his own opinion; and after having passed some days at Lyons, he won the hearts of all his own party, and enkindled passions which it would have been wiser to extinguish. He had not been unfriendly either to the prefect or Marshal Augereau, for he was incapable of offending anybody; but he had not strengthened their position. But he had, on the contrary, poured forth his feelings to the mayor, to M. de Pr cy, and some of their friends; telling them all that, without doubt, many concessions had been made to the revolutionary party, but that it was better to be patient; that the king would in time repair all that was reparable, but that for the moment prudence should be observed, in order not to furnish pretexts to their adversaries. The prince was himself so imprudent, that the prefects of the environs having come to Lyons to visit him, he said to one, who had served under the Empire and was noble by birth, "Well, my dear prefect, what do you think with regard to the national property? Do you think it could be restored to the ancient proprietors?" The

prefect replied, that if the government wished to excite an immediate and violent revolution, nothing would effect that object more certainly than making such thoughts public. The prince, perceiving that he had ill chosen his confidant, hastened to retract his opinion, and explain what he had said as best he could. We may divine the tone of his conversation with his own adherents.

The Count d'Artois left the city of Lyons in a state of violent excitement, and the inhabitants more at variance than ever. At Valence, he permitted a manifestation of feeling that produced a very bad impression. He was invited to a public dinner, that was served on several tables, in order to accommodate the numerous guests, amongst whom were the members of the council of the department. One of these, a rich and influential man, was son of a citizen who in former times had had the weakness to sign one of the numerous addresses presented to the Convention after the death of Louis XVI. Local malevolence had taken the trouble to recall this circumstance, and communicate it to the retinue of Monsieur. Some of the officers who accompanied the prince were seated at the table where the obnoxious member was to dine; they rose when he made his appearance, and retired with an affectation of disgust. This circumstance gave occasion to some sharp observations, and was, within a few hours, talked of throughout the district.

The prince traversed Avignon, where he pursued the same line of conduct, and finally arrived at Marseilles, where he was expected with extreme impatience.

This great city, formerly the queen of the Mediterranean, and which has again become so, though by means very different to what she then contemplated, had many reasons to hate both the Revolution and the Empire, for through them she had not only ceased to be prosperous, but had been reduced to beggary. During five-and-twenty years she had seen more than three hundred merchant vessels fast anchored at her quays, and rotting there.* From time to time, indeed, but very rarely, a vessel laden with corn or sugar entered the port, having by a miracle escaped the enemy. The English had seized several within the mouth of the harbour, and even

* Born and brought up at Marseilles, this spectacle is still present to my eyes. I can fancy that I still see that vast number of motionless vessels, several lines deep, extending from what is called *la place de la Cannebière* to the foot of fort Saint Jean. A child at that time, I was often brought down to the quays, where I acquired the habit of remarking these vessels; I knew their names, and can still recall their forms, as one does the houses of a street one is accustomed to frequent, and I never saw a single vessel change place during the latter years of the Empire. Consequently, the fall of the Empire occasioned an outburst of joy at Marseilles, greater than I have ever witnessed at any time under any circumstances.

under the fire of the forts. This unfortunate city had fallen into fearful distress, and suffered so much, that the inhabitants would certainly have revolted, had not an energetic prefect, the Count Thibaudeau, restrained them with a hand of iron. The sole comfort afforded to their misery was, when from time to time they committed to the flames the English merchandize they had seized, and which was burned in one of the principal squares of the city, before the eyes of a starving people, who saw destroyed in a few hours wealth that would have relieved all their wants. Consequently, the day of Napoleon's downfall and the return of the Bourbons, was one of frantic joy; of a joy of which no description could give an idea. But joy is transient, for it frequently consists in picturing to ourselves unattainable happiness. And Marseilles soon witnessed the loss of the Mauritius, with which her merchants had kept up an extensive commerce. The Marseillaise conceived so great a hatred against the English, that they could scarcely endure to see them enter their harbour. The Marseillaise merchants found the colonies restored to us stocked with European, and wholly destitute of colonial produce; all the commercial relations were changed. Spain was in disorder—the Mediterranean was in the hands of the English and the Greeks—the harbour of Marseilles, formerly a free port, was now beset with imperial custom-houses; and, lastly, the *droits réunis*, to which they imputed a great part of their sufferings, were maintained and confirmed. Consequently, the joy of the Marseillaise cooled down rapidly, and they sought with bitterness the cause of their delusion. Marseilles was not aware that a vast manufactural industry would soon be developed around her walls, that a new empire acquired by France—Algeria—and a general *renaissance* of the Mediterranean countries, would render her the queen of the southern seas, and richer in her regal power than she had ever been; but, like many others, she sought for her lost crown in the past instead of the future. She fancied that her former prosperity resulted from her being a *free port*, a freedom that consisted in receiving without inspection, and without payment of duty, the merchandize of the entire world, which was exempt from dues within two leagues of the walls of Marseilles; as if removing a line of custom-houses to a distance of two miles could alter the fate of a city, or restore commercial relations once lost. A mart may facilitate commercial relations, but cannot create them. Hamburg, one of the most important trading cities in the world, owes its greatness not to being a free port, but to the Elbe, which renders it the thoroughfare of German commerce with the rest of the world. But Marseilles, poor emigrant, rendered frantic by thinking over the

past, longed to become again what she called a *free port*, and fancied that under these conditions, the restoration of the Bourbons would be for her the greatest of benefits, a benefit such as she had pictured in her fondest dreams.

The visit of Monsieur revived the former illusions of the Marseillaise. They received him with transport, and entertained him with discourses more extravagant than any he had heard during his journey. They said they had wished to see amongst them the king, the true king, the independent king, emancipated from every restraint, in a position to secure the welfare of his subjects, unfettered by the shackles with which revolutionists sought to fetter him. This was saying, in other words, that they wished to see the prince removed from the influence of any sensible people who might raise an objection against making Marseilles a free port. In addition to all this, the prince heard vehement declamations against the *droits réunis*, but he conducted himself at Marseille as he had done elsewhere. He told the Marseillaise that he was of their opinion; that they were certainly right; that he believed he could promise them speedy satisfaction, but that it was necessary to have a little patience, and give the king time to accomplish the contemplated good. The people were so happy to look upon him, to press his hands, that they seriously believed all he said, and under this impression prepared him magnificent fêtes. On such occasions, every city puts forth its best. Marseilles displayed her fine haven, which was far from being then what it has since become, and which on this occasion was made the scene of brilliant aquatic exercises. At the close of one of those days of amusement, as the shadows of night were closing in, a mountain that overlooks the harbour suddenly burst into flames, presenting the appearance of a volcano. This effect was produced by the use of a thousand casks, filled with inflammable materials. The mayor told the Count d'Artois that the picture presented to his eyes was only a feeble image of the ardent sentiments of the Marseillaise. After this exhibition, the prince was conducted to the principal theatre of the city. Here a scene occurred, in which the public joy bordered on delirium. Monsieur had written to the king, asking the freedom of the port. This request was strongly opposed in the royal council, but the king wrote to his brother that he hoped soon to obtain it by forcing the will of his ministers. The prince, regarding as done what was only promised, announced in the open theatre the freedom of the port as a *fait accompli*, whereupon the mayor, falling on his knees, kissed the prince's hand in the name of the entire population of Marseilles. The audience rose from their seats eight or ten times, uttering cries of joy and gratitude.

After having passed some days amongst people that were nearly wild with joy, the prince repeated to the Marseillaise what he had already said to Lyonnaise, to the Burgundians, and to the Champenaise—that the days passed with them had been the happiest of his life. He left Marseilles and went to Toulon; then, retracing his steps, he visited Nîmes, where he might have done a great deal of good by restraining the Catholics and giving confidence to the Protestants, neither of which he did. He journeyed on to Grenoble, where he was warmly received by the royalist party, small in number, but fervent in feeling, and at length reached Franche-Comté.

The state of parties at Besançon was such as required the most prudent and steady conduct. A haughty nobility, entertaining the strongest prejudices, and the prefect of the department one of the local nobility, who excited instead of restraining the violence of party feeling, all of which circumstances had strongly indisposed the mass of the population. One fact in particular aggravated this state of things. The Archbishop Lecoz was located at Besançon. This prelate, of whom we have already spoken, was an old constitutionalist, a very worthy but obstinate man. He had afforded protection to the priests, who had taken the civil oath; but in other matters, his nomination had not occasioned any regret either to the spiritual or temporal authorities. On the downfall of the Empire and the accession of the Bourbons, the “little church” had poured forth its anger on the archbishop, the nobility had joined their voices to the outcry, the prefect had added fuel to the fire, and the result was a species of religious war, which, however, went no further than evil speeches, the combatants never proceeding to the use of arms. The prefect and his partisans announced openly that the prince, in passing through Besançon, would not receive the archbishop; to which the archbishop, with his accustomed obstinacy, replied, that he would not fail to appear at the levée of the Count d’Artois. Piqued by such boldness, the prefect declared, that if the archbishop kept his word he would keep his, and have him arrested. Such were the remarks publicly exchanged at Besançon between the civil and religious authorities, and as no secret was made of these quarrels, all the inhabitants of the district heard and repeated these insulting speeches.

Monsieur might, on this occasion, have done what would have been both wise and salutary. He might, by his conduct, have contradicted the remarks of an imprudent prefect, by entering into at least official relations with the prelate; relations which were supposed to exist until the revocation of the Concordat, and which were besides an inevitable consequence of the letter written by the Abbé Montesquiou to the Bishop of

Rochelle. Unhappily, it could not be expected that Monsieur would adopt such a line of conduct. Having arrived at Besançon, where he was greeted by the warmest demonstrations on the part of the ultra-royalists, he would not go to the cathedral for fear of meeting the archbishop there; and fearing that the prelate might visit him, he caused it to be intimated that he would not receive him. The prefect had orders to transmit this communication, which he was only too willing to do. The bishop, as obstinate as his adversaries were imprudent, asked the prefect to put his communication in a written form, as he ought, in such a case, to assume all the responsibility of his acts. The prefect, quite as unreasonable as any of his party, wrote to the bishop; and not content with this exaggerated mode of proceeding, he completed the scandal by making the chief of the gendarmerie bearer of the document. This brave officer, who participated in the upright sentiments of his corps, whose members have at all times admirably discharged their duties, went to the archbishop, expressed his regret at what had occurred, and entreated him not to leave the episcopal palace during the prince's stay at Besançon, giving him at the same time to understand that he was empowered to enforce this advice. The prelate submitted for once, and remained within doors; but he wrote immediately to Paris, determined to denounce such scandalous proceedings to the two Chambers. The effect produced in the surrounding district was immense. The clergy presented the appearance of two opposing forces, behind whom the people ranged themselves; but the numbers of the latter were unequally divided, the greater portion taking part against the nobility and those of the clergy who had excited these stormy proceedings.

Monsieur, continually fêted by his partizans, proceeded on his way towards Paris, having by his graceful manners won the affection of those whom he had not offended by some act of imprudence; having lavished the Cross of the Lilly by thousands, and those of the Legion of Honour and Saint Louis by hundreds. He left the districts through which he passed more disturbed than he had found them, nor had he, like the Duke d'Angoulême, given any good advice along his route. Monsieur arrived at Paris about the end of October.

Meanwhile his second son, the Duke de Berry, had performed an exclusively military journey along the frontiers. He had visited Maubeuge, Givet, Metz, Nancy, Strasbourg, Colmar, Huningue, Belfort, and returned to Paris by Langres. He had given his entire attention to inspecting the troops, and putting them through their exercises. He gave them standards, distributed crosses amongst them, and neither found nor left them satisfied. This prince, who was short of

stature, endeavoured to imitate Napoleon in his bearing, and succeeded in gaining some degree of favour with the army during the first days of the Restoration. But whether attributable to the difficulty of winning the affections of the malecontent soldiers, or to the faults of the government, or to the prince's own faults, his success with the army was very short-lived. Instead of becoming more lavish of his attentions, in order to soothe those adverse spirits, he became angry when he encountered opposition, and especially during his last tour, he abandoned himself to outbursts of passion, which the tongues of the malevolent retailed, exaggerated and talked of in every direction, and which produced consequences as injurious as the acts of political and religious imprudence committed by his father.

The princes had not effected by their presence in the districts through which they passed, all the good they hoped, though they had been received in the different cities with great enthusiasm. To render their journeys really useful, there should have existed in France a government determined in its views, immovable in its resolutions, and animated by the spirit of the Chambers, a spirit at once liberal and moderate; and in addition to this, the princes should have declared on all occasions to their friends, a truth, of which the latter seemed wholly ignorant, which was, that the Charter was a solemn act, whose entire consequences they were resolved to abide by. With such a government at Paris, and princes acting as its organs in the provinces, the exaggerated feelings of friends might have been calmed down, and the alienated affections of the people won back; and with the people thus gained over, the army might have been restrained, whose discontent would not have been, under such circumstances, a hopeless evil. But such a government, as we have shown, did not exist in France. There was a moderate-minded but careless king, who certainly did not restrain the actions of his ministers; but neither did he restrain his brothers and nephews in the commission of errors. There were princes totally divergent in their modes of conduct. One—the Duke d'Angoulême—sensible, but not brilliant; another—the Count d'Artois—amiable, but possessed by a spirit of interference, and never interfering in a profitable manner; a third—the Duke de Berry—rather intellectual, rather military in his tastes, but inconsistent in his conduct, alternately flattering or offending the army, not knowing how to respect the feelings of the soldiers, nor to make himself respected by them. There were ministers without a leader, without system; alternately bold or timid in their conduct towards the Chambers, with the exception of one. This combination was not a government: it

was a party in power; and a party in power is a naughty child, wielding a thunderbolt.

The position of affairs had deteriorated considerably during the months of September and October, the months dedicated to the journeys of the princes. Various measures, the necessary consequence of the course public affairs had taken, had been very badly received, and met so determined a resistance in the Chambers, that they were of necessity withdrawn. For example, the War Minister, embarrassed by the unexpected expenses imposed on him, had endeavoured to economise as much as he could, and made an effort to save two millions out of the sum allotted for the support of the *Invalides*. Our protracted wars had greatly multiplied the number of wounded and indigent soldiers; and branch establishments had been erected for them at Arras and Avignon. The minister intended to lighten his expenses by giving those pensioners who, since the alteration in the frontiers, could no longer be considered Frenchmen, a small sum of money; and by sending to their homes a portion of those who were French, allowing them an annual pension of 250 francs. He fancied that this pension would be sufficient to support them in their villages, whilst that at Paris, in the *Hotel Royal des Invalides*, the support of one man cost 700 francs. Of the saving thus effected there could be no doubt, but the measure appeared very harsh; for 250 francs would be far from sufficient for men, who for the most part possessed no family ties; and it was said that soldiers wounded in the service of their country were expelled from their asylum, whilst money and promotion were lavished on men who had fought against France. And in fact, a commission had been appointed to pay the army of Condé, and distribute aid amongst the old Vendéan soldiers. Another measure, as ill-advised as that touching the pensioners, excited an equally great degree of discontent.

It became necessary to make an inquiry into the state of the funds appropriated to the maintenance of the Legion of Honour. The endowment had been converted into funded property, and was not sufficient to meet the expenses of the nominations made by Napoleon on account of the last war. It had been determined that no pensions should be attached to the appointments made since the last war, until the resources of the institution would warrant the expense. But it was necessary to furnish funds for the establishments appropriated to the education of the daughters of poor soldiers. The establishments of Saint-Denis and Ecouen were to be supported as well as several secondary institutions, of which two were known as *Des Barbeaux* and *des Loges*. These houses were filled with young girls, the greater number of whom had become orphans

in consequence of our long wars. It was proposed to suppress three of these institutions—those of Ecouen, *des Barbeaux*, and *des Loges*, and to treat the young girls thus expelled from their asylum in the same manner as the wounded soldiers, by giving them a pension of 250 francs each. There was a circumstance that tended to complicate the question still more. The chateau of Ecouen belonged to the princes of Condé. It was therefore natural to believe that in order to restore the chateau to its former masters, a number of young orphan girls were about to be thrown into the streets, whose fathers had fallen in the service of France. When this intelligence became bruited about, the military, already discontented, became still more so, and the public caught up the same feeling of sympathy for these poor children, who could not live on 250 francs, and of whom some had neither father nor mother. The marshals took up the cause, and Marshal Macdonald remonstrated in the Chamber of Peers, of which he was a member, and even pleaded with the king, to whose presence he had access.

Lastly, an unfortunate project of the war minister with regard to the military schools completed this combination of ill-concerted measures. The minister wished to combine into one, the three military schools of Saint Cyr, Saint Germain, and la Flèche, to give them, as he said, more unity, and *to allow the nobility of the kingdom to enjoy the advantages secured to them by the edict of January, 1751*. A royal ordinance was accordingly issued decreeing the fusion of the three schools into one—that of Saint Cyr. The general tone of the ordinance seemed to imply an intention of excluding the citizens from the military schools in order to fill them exclusively with the nobility, by whom the profession of arms would, consequently, be alone exercised, as was formerly the case.

To describe the effect produced by these different measures would be indeed difficult. Though the opinions uttered by a discontented public, and the journals that acted as their interpreters, were of course exaggerated, still it was evident that in order to meet unreasonable expenses, such as the re-establishment of the king's household troops, or the pensions of emigrant officers, the misery of the army was increased; and it was no less evident that the project of introducing the ancient order of things was entertained, by which the nobility should enjoy all the high military grades. Remonstrances rose from every side. The importance of the right to petition is little felt in ordinary times, when there are no serious wrongs to be redressed, but if ever its utility was recognised it was on the present occasion. Numerous petitions were addressed to both Chambers. The Chamber of Deputies wished to hear the report immediately, and spite of the opposition of a minority de-

voted to the emigrants, and spite of the imprudence of another minority devoted to the opposite party, the Chamber of Deputies condemned the proceedings of the government by presenting the petitions in question, accompanied by a request couched in mild but positive terms, that the obnoxious acts should be revoked. The government was, consequently, obliged to undo its work. It was publicly declared that the allusion to the edict of 1751 did not imply a preference for the nobility in the admission to the military schools. It was decided that the branch establishments of the *Invalides* should be supported until the demise of the soldiers who occupied them; that none should be sent home with pensions except at their own express wish; that the same rules should be observed with regard to the female orphans of the Legion of Honour; and that the houses of *des Barbeaux* and *des Loges* should be re-opened for those young girls who either would not or could not return to their families.

The Chambers, though moderate in tone and sincerely loyal, were always prompt to check an undue assumption of power on the part of the Crown, and it would have been desirable that offended partizans had confided in the Chambers, instead of seeking satisfaction and security elsewhere. But irritated passions look for more than justice—they seek for vengeance, and are not scrupulous in the employment of means. The half-pay officers who thronged the capital, some frequenting the salons of Paris, and others the public places, held language which every day became more violent and more irritating. Their audacity provoked the government, and brought down upon themselves inevitable punishment; and provocation followed provocation until the result was a kind of open war, which, beginning in angry words, might unfortunately terminate in violent acts.

Murat had, up to this time, thanks to his defection, remained king of Naples. But his presence on the throne of Lower Italy disturbed not alone the Italians, but the Spanish and French Bourbons, who demanded his deposition at the Congress of Vienna. The rival police, one belonging to the government, the other to the Count d'Artois, indulged in all kinds of suspicions and inventions, and fancied that the agitation of the public mind resulted, not from the faults of the government, but from the action of hostile parties. Excited by the reports of these two police forces, the government sought elsewhere than in itself the cause of the evil, and fancied that Murat and Napoleon, who had been recently reconciled, and possessed considerable riches, made use of these to keep alive the hostile spirit of the military and unemployed functionaries.

Lord Oxford, a fantastic Englishman, of whom there are many such, had conceived an intense admiration for Bona-

parte, a sentiment so contrary to the general feeling of his compatriots. He passed through Paris on his way to Italy, and was believed to be the bearer of a secret correspondence between Naples, the isle of Elba, and the discontented French military. The French Government had a communication with the English embassy; Lord Oxford was arrested, not with the intention of depriving him of his liberty, but for the purpose of taking away his papers. The examination of these papers caused a degree of surprise which the members of the government would not have experienced were they endowed with more self-possession. The most culpable document amongst these papers, was one written by General Exelmans, and the guilty secret it contained amounted to very little, as we shall soon see. General Exelmans having heard that one of the allied armies was to be sent against Murat, wrote to this prince, under whom he had long served, and who had loaded him benefits, saying that there were many officers as well as himself, who would offer him their swords were the throne of Naples in danger. But there was not a word relative to the Bourbons of France, or to any project against their government.

This letter, though it did not contain a tittle of what had been suspected, irritated the king and princes exceedingly. They wished to avenge on General Exelmans all the imaginary conspiracies of which they had no proof, but in whose existence they persevered in believing. It was resolved to arraign him on a criminal charge of having kept up a correspondence with the external enemies of the state, a crime aggravated by the fact of his being an officer on active service. General Dupont, the war minister, though often weak, resisted on this occasion in the most prudent and honourable manner. He observed that the king of Naples had been hitherto recognized by all Europe; that France, though soliciting his deposition at Vienna, had not yet declared open war against him; that French subjects could consequently, without incurring the imputation of criminality, offer him their services; that no tribunal would think of attaching criminality to General Exelmans' letter; that the general being on service, and consequently aware of the sentiments entertained by the court of France towards the court of Naples, might be accused of indiscretion and want of zeal, and thereby subject himself to be reprimanded, but nothing more. Though the king was quite as much irritated as the princes against General Exelmans, he comprehended the reasons adduced by the war minister, and admitted that a reprimand was the severest punishment that ought to be inflicted. The war minister sent for General Exelmans and reproved him for his conduct, and for the

moment, this affair, destined at a later period to excite a terrible commotion, was suppressed, thanks to the wisdom displayed by General Dupont on the occasion.

The young officers who thronged Paris, and disturbed it by their remarks, quickly learned what had befallen General Exelmans, and though he had only suffered a slight punishment, they made a great noise about the matter. These gentlemen were soon furnished with another grievance of the same nature. General Vandamme was an officer of great merit, but of violent temper; he held extreme revolutionary principles, calculated, if not to justify, at least to provoke calumny, and was wrongfully reputed a most wicked man. He shared with Marshal Davout the hatred of the enemies of France. Returning from a Russian imprisonment, he had been shamefully insulted in passing through Germany, and this incident ought to have excited a universal interest in his favour throughout France. But the effect was quite different, and the king was advised, should General Vandamme appear at the Tuileries, to make him an exception to the flatteries lavished on the heads of the army. No sooner had the General arrived at Paris, than he repaired to the Tuileries on the day appointed for the reception of officers of his rank. He was refused admission to the palace, and the body-guards expelled him, so to speak, from the royal dwelling. This old soldier, who had passed his life fighting for his country, became indignant at receiving such treatment from young men who had never heard a musket fired; he filled Paris with his complaints, and found many-tongued echoes of his grievances.

Whilst one of the oldest soldiers of France was treated in this manner, a report was suddenly put into circulation that the family of Georges Cadoudal had received a patent of nobility. Nobody could deny the courage of Georges, nor his devotedness, but neither could anybody approve the means he had determined to employ against the First Consul, and which he had acknowledged before the bar of justice. We need not say what bitter thoughts and violent expressions such a circumstance was calculated to excite.

Whilst young unemployed officers hurried restlessly from one part of Paris to another, there was one who lived quietly and in solitude. This was Carnot, who after the defence of Antwerp, had retained the post of inspector of engineers, and was even presented to the king, but shunning the court and the revolutionists, he retired into one of the most remote quarters of Paris. He cared little about the insults to which the military were subjected, as he regarded them for the most part as giddy-headed men, but he was deeply moved at the manner in which the government treated the ancient patriots,

whilst Chouan chiefs were raised to the rank of nobles. Carnot was a man of vigorous mind, but not a correct reasoner; he was a proud honest man, led astray by the passions, and above all, by the logic of the Revolution; he was convinced that he exercised a legal authority, and was perfectly right in condemning Louis XVI. to death. Influenced by this belief, he came to the strange resolution of discussing the question of regicide, and discussing it in a memoir addressed to the king himself. He had not made up his mind as to the use he should make of this memoir, but writing it was a consolation to his feelings. In this memoir which was written with great vigour, bitterness, and irony, but which contained no insult against the royal authority, he discussed this fearful question of regicide, reproducing those arguments that prevailed in the days of the Convention.

Are kings inviolable? "This," he said, "is a serious question, decided in different ways at all times, in every country, and even in the Bible. In any case, this inviolability admitted many exceptions, for it could not be asserted that monsters like Nero and Caligula should be inviolable in the eyes of their people. Besides, the French nation, in nominating the Convention, had invested its members with a mission to judge Louis XVI. Had they judged well or ill? History would decide that question, but in any case, his judges were not called on to give an account to any earthly authority. They might have been mistaken, but they erred in good faith, and upon all occasions they had given proofs of an intrepid patriotism. Now, they were attacked, and called criminals, but in whose name? by what right? France had by numberless addresses confirmed the judgment they pronounced, and raised the judges of Louis XVI. to the highest offices of the state: should France be called a regicide, or the accomplice of regicides? But this was not all. Europe had lowered her uplifted sword before these men, and signed with them treaties such as that of Bâle. Should Europe, too, be designated a regicide? In short, who were these accusers, who now returned from foreign lands to insult those amongst their countrymen—who during five-and-twenty years had fought for France and for liberty? It was these very emigrants who, instead of making a rampart of their bodies for Louis XVI., had taken flight under pretext of making war on the Rhine; and who, in addition to the crime of bearing arms against their country, had committed the enormous error of exciting against Louis XVI. a storm of anger that entailed the destruction of the unfortunate king."

Such was the terrible logic of the old Conventionalist, from which only one conclusion could be drawn, which was, that

in these formidable times, whose events bore down the strongest minds, everybody had erred, and the wisest mode would have been to shelter everybody under the oblivion promised by the Charter. Unfortunately, the act of oblivion promised by one party, and asked by the other, was not in reality conformable to the wishes of either.

It appears probable that Carnot had not intended to print the memoir we have just analyzed; but, blinded by revolutionary prejudices, he believed he could get it presented to the king, and so discuss the question of regicide *tête-à-tête* with the brother of Louis XVI. Though living so retired, he frequented the society of certain regicides, such as MM. Gard, Fouché, and some others, and to these he showed his memoir, impelled by the necessity of giving vent to his feelings. To give it to be read was to run the risk of soon seeing it printed; and in any case, if he desired a prudent counselor, it was not such a man as M. Fouché whom he ought to have taken into his confidence. The memoir was scarcely shown to a few persons when it was copied, printed, and within a few days circulated as widely as M. Necker's famous financial report had been. It was printed by thousands, both in France and abroad. In fact, it chimed in with the prevailing passions of the hour, with the irritation of the revolutionists, who still formed a numerous party, and was equally gratifying to the holders of national property, who were still more numerous than the revolutionists; it accorded with the discontent of the military and the unemployed functionaries; it even pleased the liberal party, who certainly did not approve regicide, but who looked upon this memoir as a deserved retaliation for all the acts of indiscretion committed by the emigrants. Lastly, the emigrants themselves, in their anger, were eager to read a memoir universally talked of. All this was sufficient to render Carnot's memoir, within a few days, known—not alone throughout France, but throughout Europe.

As might be expected, this memoir produced a wonderful sensation amongst the emigrant party. This party replied, and the reply, as to justice and moderation of sentiment, was no ways inferior to the attack. Carnot was told that there were men, who if they possessed a gleam of common sense, would think themselves happy in being allowed to enjoy the impunity in which unprecedented goodness was willing to allow them to exist; that they ought to be satisfied, and seek an asylum in the most profound obscurity, and by such conduct win for themselves, if not indulgence, which would be impossible for such a crime as theirs, at least forgetfulness, which would be accorded them, on condition that they did not

continually recall their existence to the execration of contemporaries, and that to their abominable crimes they did not add apologies still more abominable—that, as to the rest, their writings corresponded with their acts. The authors of the reply added, that amongst these men there was one whom they had had the weakness to set apart from his fellows, in giving him credit for some honesty and good sense, but that the puerility of his reasoning equalled its wickedness; that the authors of the 24th January were decidedly superior to the present writers; but that, in short, these men ought only to think of avoiding the observation of the indignant world, and make up their minds, after having shed the blood of the fathers, to respect the repose of the sons.

But invectives were not the only reply. The government commenced a prosecution against Carnot's memoir. The author was summoned, and he proudly avowed what he had written, adding that he was not accessory to the publication, and his word was believed, for his adversaries esteemed his character more than they cared to acknowledge. Inquiries were made of several booksellers suspected of issuing clandestine publications, for the purpose of ascertaining what part they might have had in propagating the memoir in question. They were all brought up for examination—a circumstance which contributed not a little to increase the public agitation. The *voters* who assembled at the house of Fouché and Barras were very much excited, and made fresh advances towards the military, that is to say, towards the Bonapartists, who seemed every day more inclined to join them. Incidents soon multiplied, as if destiny had decreed that every person and every circumstance should in some way tend to hasten the approaching crisis.

It was with considerable reluctance, as we have seen, that the emigrants submitted to the article of the Charter that guaranteed the inviolability of the national sales. They never ceased complaining, and said that the Bourbons, having recovered the crown, believed they had recovered everything, and allowed those who had made great sacrifices for their cause to remain in distress. Private negotiations, from which much had been hoped, produced no great result, though supported by intimidation, violent sermons, and even the power of the confessional. The new proprietors expected to be paid if they gave back the property they held, and very few amongst them, particularly the peasants, would consent to give up possession, even on condition of receiving a reasonable price. Wishing to know what right they really possessed, they made inquiries, and found that the Charter and the Chambers would afford them all-powerful protection. Consequently,

all those that the clergy had not won over by disturbing their consciences, firmly upheld their rights, and would not listen to any compromise. The government, conscious of its weakness in this matter, but willing to give some satisfaction to the men who complained that the Restoration had been of no advantage to them, resolved to restore the unsold national property. The amount of this kind of property held by the State was very considerable, and consisted for the most part of timber. It comprised three or four hundred thousand hectares of forest land of great value. The Charter did not protect this property: it only protected the property already sold. There was one circumstance connected with this projected restitution of property, which rendered it particularly agreeable to the king and the princes, which was, that the property in question belonged for the most part to the old nobility, to families with whom they were personally acquainted, and with whom they were in daily intercourse; and to satisfy the wishes of these persons would be to silence the most troublesome grumblers. The restitution of this property was therefore determined on: it only remained to consider the arrangements.

Had this restitution been dictated by an unbiassed spirit of justice, it would have been carried out in a manner very different to what was designed. The high nobility were certainly not the most to be pitied, for they had by their imprudence contributed to aggravate the violence of the Revolution. It was the numerous emigrants of the lesser nobility and the *bourgeoisie*, who, involved almost without being aware of it in the common disaster, had paid the price of our dissensions sometimes with their lives, and almost always with their property. These certainly deserved consideration; but the government ought to have relieved them without disturbing the public tranquillity, and without committing, for the advantage of these persons, acts of injustice as great as those from which they suffered, and the assistance thus afforded ought to have been distributed so as to aid those that deserved most pity and least blame. The principle might have been laid down, and put into immediate operation, that an indemnity was to be granted by the State, not to a few individuals, but to all who had lost their property; and that this indemnity was to be furnished in a great part by the State property. This indemnity might have been so distributed that the poorest should be best treated; and with this might have been combined a financial operation, based on the three or four hundred thousand hectares of timber still in the possession of the State, and to which, when the state of the exchequer permitted, two or three hundred millions of francs might have been added.

By this means might have been accomplished a work, not alone of reparation, but of pacification. The ancient proprietors being indemnified, if not to the full extent of their wishes, at least as far as possible, would have been deprived of all pretext for quarrelling with the new holders, and the latter would have been left in peaceable possession. But no such idea was conceived.* The princes thought only of satisfying the ancient nobility, whose misfortunes had certainly the fewest claims on compassion, and who were the most importunate in their clamour. The crown held the landed property of these families, and the Bourbons thought only of restoring this property to satisfy and silence the owners, without reflecting that they were depriving themselves of a valuable pledge that might have served as basis to a general operation for alleviating the misfortunes of the entire mass of sufferers.

The bill on this subject was drawn up by a committee, of which M. Ferrand was president, and laid before the Council for discussion. The principle laid down was the unconditional restoration of the property that the State had not alienated. But this principle, apparently so simple, presented serious difficulties in the application. For example, certain parishes possessed a considerable quantity of this unsold property, which was applied to the use of the hospitals. The sinking fund also possessed a portion, which served as security to the annuitants. To take back the lands possessed by the parishes would be to strip the poor and the sick. To take back the lands held by the sinking fund, would be to injure public credit. Spite of their inclinations, the authors of the bill were obliged to abandon their project, and content themselves with holding out vague hopes to the proprietors of the unsold property. There was also property of this nature applied to certain public services, such as mansions converted into State offices, and works of art transferred to the different museums. For example, a portion of the Artillery Museum might be claimed by the Condé family, who, as was well known, would not be slow to assert its claims. Many serious inconveniences would have resulted from the restitution of this property; the idea was therefore abandoned, and it was decided that the State should retain this species of property, whether landed or personal, paying the value to the former proprietors. It was agreed that a certain sum should be added to the budget for this purpose. These difficulties being removed another arose, whose importance became apparent after a few moments' reflection. The clause of the bill regarded the arrears due to the treasury by the new holders of property, as being in reality due to the

* The records that remain of the debates in Council, prove that this question was never even suggested.

ancient proprietors. The principle laid down that the State ought to restore, as ill got, the property in question, was only saying in other words that the unpaid portions of the purchase money were really owed to the so-called legitimate proprietors. But as the institution of the laws about national property had kept pace with the depreciation of the assignats, and were consequently very complicated, there was scarcely a holder of national property whose possessions might not give rise to quarrels about pretended arrears, which would serve to reinstate the former proprietors. In fact, the passing of this law would put them in a position to commence law proceedings against all the holders of national property. It would be arming them with a formidable weapon, that might triumph over the protecting power of the Charter.

The clause in question would have passed without objection, thanks to the inattention of the members of the Council, who were for the most part ignorant of business, if the sagacity and vigilance of the Minister of Finance had not raised an obstacle. He pointed out the bearing of the proposed measure, and the Council, alarmed, immediately abandoned it. M. Ferrand did not persist. The bill was then submitted to the two Chambers, with the proposed modifications.

Unfortunately, a statement of the motives that dictated the measure, and which were quite as important as the bill itself, had not been laid before the Council. Even the king had not read it. The whole business was confided to the principles and talent of M. Ferrand, who was a man advanced in life, mild-tempered, well informed, and a good writer; but he was obstinate, devoid of tact, and an ultra-royalist.

He had condensed his statement of motives into a sentiment, which was shared by the court, that the government, in restoring the unsold property of the emigrants, scarcely fulfilled its duty; that it was painful not to be able to do more, but that, in default of additional satisfaction, the government would give hopes of future compensation; in a word, that the government would do all that was possible at the time, and promise to do more at a future period.

M. Ferrand entered the Chamber of Deputies accompanied by MM. de Montesquiou and Louis, and read his statement in a low, drawling voice, which at first weakened the effect. In this statement, which was particularly addressed to the emigrants, the king apologised for not doing more for them, and for being so tardy in doing what he did. But on the morrow of a great revolution, obstacles spring up so rapidly, that it is difficult to return to the ways of justice and truth. It was only slowly and with precaution that good could be effected. "Undoubtedly," said M. Ferrand, "*the king will*

rejoice in the happiness of those to whom he is about to restore their property, and he stood in need of this satisfaction to mollify the regret he felt at not being able to make this act of justice as complete as he could wish. But he hoped that, thanks to the prudence of his administration, and thanks to the order observed in the public expenditure, the day would come when the state of the finances would diminish successively the painful exceptions necessitated by existing circumstances."

The intensity of this regret proved what violence the king did himself in adhering to the conditions of the Charter, and these vague but ill-defined promises, giving so much ground of hope to some, and consequently causing so much alarm to others, could not fail to produce a bad impression. One passage in this statement produced a sensation of a different kind, resulting from an offence offered to the entire nation. Endeavouring, with a flagrant want of tact, to estimate the moral merit of those who had emigrated and those who remained in France, M. Ferrand added, "It is universally acknowledged at present, that so many good and faithful Frenchmen, in leaving their country, only contemplated a short separation. Wandering in foreign lands, they wept over the calamities of the country which, they still flattered themselves, they should again behold. It is well known that the fondest prayers of the French who remained at home, as well as of those who emigrated, were for a happy change in the state of their country, even when they dared not hope for it. The result of these misfortunes and convulsions was, that both parties found themselves in the same position: both had arrived at the same point; *the one party in following the right line, without ever deviating from it, and the other after having followed more or less the phases of the Revolution, amid which they had remained.*"

These words, though pronounced in a voice little calculated to excite the passions, produced a strong emotion, an emotion which gradually increased until it assumed the magnitude of an event. It was, then, a recognised fact in the eyes of the king that the emigrants alone had followed *the right line*, and that all other Frenchmen had, more or less, abandoned this line. And so the entire nation, with the exception of twenty or thirty thousand individuals, had deviated from the right path! And so, all those who had lost their lives endeavouring to snatch France from the hands of furious demagogues, had deviated from the right path! And so Malherbes, who had not followed the princes, but who died for having defended the king; and Boissy d'Anglas, who had nobly held his place in presence of the bleeding head of Ferrand, had deviated from the right path! The king, Louis XVI. himself,

was excusable, only because he had failed in the journey to Varennes! And so, all those who, during twenty years, had so ably governed France; all those who had died, by hundreds of thousands, to save her from the power of foreigners, or to exalt her to the summit of glory, all those had deviated from the right path! Desaix, Kleber, Marceau, Lannes, were all wrong-headed men, who had deviated from the *right line*! It was only those men who, during five-and-twenty years had plotted or prayed incessantly that France might be at length conquered or invaded—it was these alone who had followed the right path!

These reflections arose at first confusedly before the minds of the hearers, but the next day they became more distinct, and the following day still clearer, until the strong impression produced on the first day in the assembly became stronger on the succeeding days, and continued to increase. This feeling was transmitted by the members of the assembly to the minds of the general public, and passed from Paris to the provinces. Propagated by a press that was scarcely restrained by the censorship, the sentiment soon became as vivid as universal. In addition to this, M. Ferrand's unfortunate expressions were maliciously applied to every possible circumstance. *The right line* became all at once a proverb: everybody was on the *right line* or the *curved line*—that is to say, those who had emigrated possessed real merit. There were different degrees of merit, but those who had not emigrated were barely excusable. Though malevolence strangely exaggerated the sense in which these words ought to be taken, and attributed to them a significance that M. Ferrand never contemplated, it was unfortunately true that they did represent the opinions of the king, the princes, and the emigrants. When in the royal Council, the conditions that should determine the pensions of the emigrant officers were laid down, the princes drew a line of demarcation between the emigrants themselves. It was not sufficient to have followed the king or served under Condé to be entitled to a reward, for if these emigrants had returned to France without the sanction of the princes, their claim became less, and their pensions diminished proportionately. It was not, therefore, the mass of the nation alone that was excluded from the great merit of having emigrated; there were amongst the emigrants themselves some who, fatigued with ten years' exile, and thinking that their native land, pacified by the First Consul, was still a country worthy of being loved and inhabited, it was these, too, who had deviated in some degree, a degree that was quite appreciable, and which the committee appointed to award pensions was expected to determine exactly.

The universal belief of the country at this period was that

the government was composed of emigrants imbued with all the principles of that party, and ready to put those principles into action if the opportunity served. This opinion, without being a definite condemnation of the government, was the foundation of much disaffection. But there were the Chambers, upon whom the people could depend to check the government, and if they could not inspire its members with patriotic sentiments, which was not in their power, they could at least oblige them to listen to such. The Chambers responded to the hopes placed in them, and did not betray their mission.

All the *bureaux* of the Chamber received the proposed law as an act of justice, for even the liberal party wished to defend the principles but not the excesses of the Revolution. But in accepting the measure as an act of justice, they expressed strong indignation against the avowed motives, demanded that they should be suppressed, and a vote of censure passed upon the minister who had drawn up and presented the bill, and that a public protestation should be made against his anti-national language.

The members of the committee appointed to examine the projected law, were imbued with the sentiments of indignation expressed by the *bureaux*, and acted under the impulse of the moment. They passed the law, with some changes insignificant as to its operation, but very important as to its moral tendency. Thus, for the word *restitution*, *resignation* was substituted, which ignored all right on the part of the emigrants to the restored property. This property being held by the State was given up to the emigrants, in order to put an immediate termination to their distress. As to the property that had been applied to public services, such as to hospitals and the sinking fund, and of whose restitution the law made an exception *for the present*, the words *for the present*, which made the exception provisional, were suppressed, and by this means all promises with regard to the future were cancelled. The members of the committee requested the chairman to make his report the antithesis of the minister's statement of motives.

M. Bedoch, who was chairman, read his report in the Chamber on the 17th of October, and condemned severely all that M. Ferrand had said. He announced that he was appointed to re-establish public confidence, which had been shaken by the imprudent expressions of the minister, who had attributed to Louis XVI., personally, sentiments which the king of France ought neither to entertain nor express. The balance of good and evil in our vast revolution could not be nicely discriminated, for it would be necessary to examine the conduct of those who by a misplaced zeal had accelerated the misfortunes of the king,

and of France. And even, could such a task be accomplished, it ought not to be attempted. The king had promised to look on France as one large family, composed of his children, and he ought not to attempt to establish invidious distinctions, nor ought others to do so for him. The king's profound regret was spoken of, but the king ought to entertain no other sentiment than a firm determination to keep his promises, and amongst these promises none was more sacred than that which implied a respect for property, no matter from what source derived. As to the future, it was not possible to anticipate a time when the emigrants should be better treated than at the actual period, for it was to be hoped that the taxes would be always applied to the wants of the State.

The report, as may be seen, was firm and severe, and contained a direct lesson addressed to those higher placed than the minister. Though the members of the Chamber approved the report, they hesitated when the question of printing it was put. It had been printed in the ordinary way, like all reports, but discourses highly approved by the Chamber were favoured by an order for a special reprint. The Chamber dared not grant the latter distinction.

M. Ferrand, taking advantage of this hesitation, thought it afforded him a favourable opportunity of replying to the chairman, and for that purpose, making use of the most accredited of the royalist journals, he asserted that the Chamber interpreted his speech in the same sense as himself, which was evident from the fact that M. Bedoch's statement was refused the honour of being printed.

No sooner was this assertion put into circulation than a sudden revulsion of feeling took place in the Chamber of Deputies. A member of the committee made a speech, in which he reminded the house that the *bureaux* had demanded either the refutation or the suppression of the minister's discourse; that the members of the committee had, therefore, only obeyed the formal mandate of those by whom they had been nominated, and that the chairman had been their faithful organ. But, in consequence of the doubts now raised, it was necessary that the Chamber should pronounce a decided opinion, and declare whether the report in question had been approved by the members. The opinion of the Chamber was now unmistakably expressed by a large majority. The report and the speeches made on the subject were ordered to be printed. The discussion on the bill still continued. It was long and stormy, and occupied the latter part of the month of October. The debate called forth a display of angry feeling on both sides. A member of the *right* (the fashion had already commenced of designating the different parties by their relative positions in the

Chamber)—M. de la Rigaudie—in a vehement speech, interrupted every moment by murmurs of disapprobation, arraigned the entire Revolution, and excited such a commotion that the police forbid the journals to publish a full account of the proceedings. A reply was made to this speaker, and, fortunately, not in the exaggerated style he had employed. M. Durbach made a very reasonable proposition to the Chamber, which was, to take possession of all the unsold national property and make it the basis of a financial operation, by which an indemnification could be made, not to a privileged class of emigrants, but to all, and particularly to the poorest. This proposition was rejected, and the bill passed with the amendments proposed by the committee. An almost unanimous vote of censure was passed on M. Ferrand's speech.

The prosecutions carried on against the memory of Carnot, the different events relative to the *Invalides*, to the female orphans of the Legion of Honour, to the military schools, and to the generals Vandamme and Exelmans, the journeys of the princes, the conduct pursued with regard to the Archbishop of Besançon, the law about the surrender of the unsold national property, and the expressions of M. Ferrand about the *right line*, had rendered the months of October and November a period of great agitation. The species of tranquillity that had prevailed after the first legislative discussions, and especially after the vote on the budget, which was a measure stamped with wisdom, had given place to violent agitation, not less violent amongst the partizans of the emigration than of the Revolution. The latter comprised at this period not alone those revolutionists who had seriously compromised themselves, such as the *voters*, but also the functionaries of the Empire, the military, the moderate liberals, and a great number of the citizen-class, who were offended by the pretensions of the nobility and clergy. The public journals, though restrained by the censorship, reflected clearly the irritation of both parties. Paris presented a highly-animated spectacle. It was the beginning of the winter season, and many persons of importance had returned to the capital. The police kept a strict watch on them. These were MM. de Bassano, de Vicence, de Montalivet, de Cadore, de Rovigo, Lavalette, and others, who did not enter into conspiracies, but who lived amongst revolutionists, and who could not be sorry for the errors of a government that they regarded as adverse to them. The government would have been glad to expel them from Paris, but dared not. These gentlemen were so cautious that Prince Cambacérès, who enjoyed the society of his friends only at his own table, forebore to invite the military for fear of exciting suspicion.

There was one circumstance which much perplexed the

police, and though of no importance in reality, kept them in continual agitation. This was the presence of some of the marshals, who ought to have been in their departments, but who had come to Paris, one after another, by mere chance, and without any political motive. The names of Soult, Suchet, Oudinot, Massena, and Ney were mentioned. Marshal Soult had come to prefer a petition, and, as we shall presently see, the Bourbons had nothing to fear from him. Marshal Suchet, who had commanded the two armies in Spain, was at Paris only because these two armies had been disbanded. He was of a peaceful disposition, and generally looked upon as the man best fitted to become war minister. Marshal Massena having obtained his letters of naturalization, had set out for Provence, whither his duties called him. Marshal Oudinot had only remained some days at Paris. Marshal Ney took up a permanent abode in the capital. More flattered by the princes than any of his brother marshals, he had in the commencement seemed very much pleased, but had suddenly become discontent. Having flattered himself that, by the intervention of Louis XVIII., and the favour of the Emperor Alexander, he could retain his emoluments, which were the produce of foreign possessions, he was disappointed in this hope, and reduced to his pay. Burthened with a large family, he found himself embarrassed. The war, which to him as to others had seemed protracted, was, however, a source of glory and profit, which was now closed; he already regretted warfare, and preferred it to an idleness mingled with many causes of annoyance. In fact, the false flatteries of which he had been the object, had gradually assumed their true character, and contempt peeped out from amid compliments. His beautiful and haughty wife had experienced at the Tuileries from the court ladies, who were less prudent than their husbands, annoyances which she felt deeply, and which had greatly offended her irritable husband.* One circumstance had put the acmè to the Marshal's ill-humour. The Duke of Wellington had been appointed English ambassador at Paris, and displayed in the French capital considerable vanity, the only weakness of this simple and strong mind. He enjoyed with much self-complacency at the court of France the glory of his conquests, which the royalist party took pleasure in exalting. At this moment there was a universal outburst of angry feeling against England, for to her were attributed the severe condi-

* A gentleman whose character and high position put his testimony beyond doubt, assured me that he saw in the hands of Madame Ney a letter from her husband, written at Lons-le-Saulnier, the very day he abandoned the cause of the Bourbons for that of Napoleon. In the letter were these words, "My love, you shall not again have cause to weep on leaving the Tuileries."

tions of the treaty of Paris. The destruction of Washington, recently burned by the English army (the war was still going on between England and America), had exasperated all parties to such a degree, that it became necessary to restrain even the royalist journals. Besides, the English army had passed from Bordeaux to Brussels overland. Lord Wellington, though at Paris, seemed to command this army, and the French people, as if they had foreseen the fast-coming future, were deeply irritated. This feeling rose to such a pitch, that the police were obliged to keep continual watch lest Lord Wellington should be publicly insulted.

When Marshal Ney compared the loneliness in which he and his wife found themselves at the Tuileries, with the eager flattery of which the British general was the object, his soul was filled with bitterness. "This man," he said, speaking of Lord Wellington, "has been successful in Spain owing to the errors of Napoleon, and not of our generals; but should we happen some day to meet him in a position where fortune has not prepared everything for his triumph, the world shall see what he is. And then to see him flattered in this way in the presence of French marshals, he, the bitterest enemy of France!"

The generous indignation that the Marshal experienced, became so strong, that he could no longer conceal his feelings; he even renewed his intimacy with Marshal Davout, with whom he had been at variance since the fatal day of Krasnoé. Marshal Davout who, as we have said, had retired to his estate at Savigny, had drawn up a circumstantial statement of his conduct at Hamburg, in which he demonstrated beyond all possibility of doubt, the baseness of the calumnies of which he had been made the object. He asked the king's permission to publish the memoir. The king, instead of treating this faithful servant of his country with the distinction he deserved, contented himself with telling the war minister that the reasoning of the memoir was strong, so strong that it would be impossible to treat the production with severity (this silly idea had been entertained), and that the publication would be permitted. And notwithstanding this declaration on the part of the king, the Marshal was allowed to remain in the kind of real, though not avowed exile in which he lived at Savigny. But, it must be said, that it was the Marshal who had banished himself to Savigny; he seldom went to Paris, where he could not appear without being beset by spies.

The conduct pursued towards the glorious defender of Hamburg, was one of the principal causes of the exasperation of the military. They said, and with justice, that such conduct was shameful, and insulting to the entire army. Ney

repeated these expressions wherever he went, and declared that the marshals ought to unite, and lay their complaints at the foot of the throne.

The princes would have been glad to silence these indiscreet men whom they had uselessly flattered, but they dared not strike hard enough to effect that object. The audacity of the emigrant party, and their desire of vengeance, had not yet risen so high as to aim at the glorious head of Ney. To engender such an ambition, fresh disasters and a vast catastrophe must happen. No stronger measure was adopted than to send General Vandamme away from Paris, who since he had been denied the entrée of the Tuileries, had given utterance to the most imprudent expressions. But the evil was not remedied by these means, and during the month of November, the public disquietude increased daily. The funds went down, and the five per cents., which M. Louis' financial plan had raised from 65 to 78 francs, fell to 70, though the financial position of affairs was visibly improving, though the indirect taxes were coming in, and the *reconnaissance de liquidation* were negotiable on 'change at a very low premium. Public confidence was severely shaken, and the cause of this disturbance was political, not financial.

M. de Chateaubriand took up his pen on the occasion, and, unlike his wont, his style was steady, sober, and rational. He endeavoured to calm all parties by proving to them that extreme desires were irrational, and impossible to be realised; whilst, on the contrary, rational desires were either realised, or about to be so; that consequently all parties ought to be satisfied, and contribute to the triumph of a state of things, in which both had an equal interest: the Royalists, because it was the cause of the Bourbons, the Revolutionists and Bonapartists, because it was the cause of liberty, which was the sole possible guarantee for the rights and security of all. He thus gave all parties, and particularly his own, good and prudent lessons—lessons more prudent than his own conduct. He gave these lessons in articles inserted in the *Journal des Débats*, or contained in pamphlets which the king praised publicly. But nothing could allay the general disquietude and the fear with which each party inspired the other.

Both believed they were plotted against, and that the plots were ripe for execution. The Bonapartists—that is to say, the military men and the revolutionists—united in common hate against the royalists, were persuaded that twelve or fifteen hundred of the most daring Chouans had been brought to Paris with the intention of securing their assistance in removing the king to Compeigne, that the government would be afterwards changed, the Charter abolished, the most re-

markable persons amongst the military and the revolutionists seized, the principal put to death, the others exiled, and then the unconditional re-establishment of the ancient *régime* proclaimed. On the other hand, the royalists, to whom these projects were attributed, were convinced that the young generals who flocked to Paris, and who had some thousands of unemployed officers under their command, and could reckon on the adhesion of some regiments, were about to execute a *coup de main*, carry off the royal family, murder or send them beyond the seas, treat the French nobility in the same manner, and proclaim Napoleon I. or Napoleon II., and commence a new imperial reign, by ravaging Europe for the advantage of a race of mamelukes, the offspring of war, and in whom peace could not satisfy. This great conspiracy was, in the opinion of the royalists, concerted in conjunction with Napoleon and Murat, who had been lately reconciled, and who subsidised all the conspirators. The suppositions about Napoleon were boundless, as was the idea entertained of his ceaseless activity and his prodigious influence. Never had he occupied a larger place in the imagination of men than when banished to the wretched isle that served as his asylum, for whilst hate laboured to paint him as a vile wretch, devoid alike of genius and courage, fear converted him into an indefatigable giant, exhaustless in resource, always on the alert, and now on the eve of overturning the world. He had, it was said, carried off vast treasures to Porto Ferrajo, whence he guided the thread of all the European conspiracies, particularly those of Vienna, where the Powers were at this moment assembled in general congress. He fanned the flame of discord in that capital, and held his weak-minded father-in-law in subjection, as he was about to put himself at the head of the Austrian armies, and fall upon the French and Spanish Bourbons. At other times, the current report was that Napoleon had escaped and taken the command of the American armies against England, or of the Turkish armies against Europe, or of the Neapolitan against Austria, for contradictory reports cost nothing. In a word, Napoleon was believed to be everywhere, and the fear felt by his enemies compensated for the efforts their hate made to diminish his greatness. Of the thousand plots which each party attributed to the other, how much was true? All and none. All, if we consider as plots the empty remarks of partizans; nothing, if we only regard as plots projects maturely concerted between chiefs and agents who understand each other perfectly well, who have at their command means proportioned to the object in view, and who have appointed, or are ready to appoint, the day for executing their project. But nothing of this kind existed. It was cer-

tainly impossible to deny that, had they been able, the royalists would have annihilated the Charter, and had they been as wicked as their words, they would willingly have got rid of the heads of the army, and the chiefs of the revolutionist party. But they were more powerless than their adversaries, they possessed far less courage, and contented themselves with uttering extravagant expressions, which being repeated to the revolutionists and the Bonapartists, threw them into actual terror. But, on the other hand, it was equally true, that had the Bonapartists and the revolutionists possessed the power, they would have seized the royal family and their court, and done, no matter what with them, provided they could only get rid of them. It is equally true, that had they agreed amongst themselves, combined and pulled together, they would have been able to accomplish all they wished, for public opinion was entirely in their favour. It is also true, that perceiving what they might have been able to do, they foolishly declared that they were about to do it, and by the intemperance of their language they rendered themselves as formidable as they were really powerless. The public mind might have regained tranquillity, had the public been able to perceive the real state of parties; but according to custom, the public estimated the designs of parties by their words, and by their own fears. Consequently, both sides took precautions. Frequently did these agitated military men pass the night standing, with their swords and pistols in their belts, convinced that they were about to be attacked; whilst the terrified police, having given the alarm to the authorities, the national guard, the companies of the body guard, and all the disposable forces, were called out, excepting the garrison troops, who were held in suspicion; both parties continued in this state until day dawned, each causing the other daily alarm.* On a night spent in this fashion, in the month of November, the patrols crossed each other in hundreds, without any other result than exciting a general panic, which destroyed all public confidence, and lowered the funds, to the great detriment of the finances.

The principal police—that is, the government force, commanded by M. Beugnot—did not indulge in these ridiculous alarms, or at least only in a very slight degree; and they, in their reports, endeavoured to tranquillize the king, which was no difficult task, for his majesty, through natural indolence and love of ease, was inclined to take pacific views of things.

* Nothing can be more amusing than the succession of police reports, drawn up by M. Beugnot. It is evident from these reports that the month of November was one of groundless alarms, which induced the ministerial changes we are about to relate.

But Monsieur, who could not remain quiet, and his police, who were equally incapable of enjoying tranquillity, declared that France was on the brink of a volcano, which was ready to break forth, that the official police were incompetent, that they actually betrayed the trust reposed in them, and that the royal family ran the risk of being carried off some morning, in consequence of their blind credulity. Monsieur went to the king, told him he was badly served, and that he was on the eve of a catastrophe. The king rejected his advice, and told him that he was, as usual, the tool of intriguers, and yet the king was somewhat disturbed by these incessant alarms, and fell into a kind of perplexity.

His nephews, whose opinion the king valued much more than his brother's, joined the Count d'Artois, declaring that things were in a bad state, and ought to be remedied in some way. But this was the difficulty. Things were undoubtedly in a bad state, and the remedy was one which governments will never recognise, which is, to resist the promptings of their own passions, and still more, to reject the passion-prompted advice of their friends, to tranquillize the mass of the nation, who were not partizans, and desired only the general good. But they were far from reasoning in this fashion, and complained of those who governed—that is to say, of the ministry, who are generally held responsible for everything that occurs in a state that is free, or nearly so. The ministry, it was said, had no unity, which was perfectly true. But, in order that the ministry should possess unity, it ought to have been constitutionally organised—that is to say, the ministry ought to constitute the sole council of the crown, from which the princes should be excluded; and one, or at most two, principal men chosen, in whom implicit confidence should be placed. But the government was far from thinking of such means, and complained not of the council or its formation, but of each individual minister, and of the war minister in particular. He did not restrain the army, it was said; he possessed no influence over the soldiers, and knew neither how to govern nor content them. Such is the recompense reserved for weak-minded ministers! General Dupont was as unfortunate during this short ministry as he had been in Spain. He was a man of talent, and well-intentioned; he had done all in his power to satisfy his ancient companions-in-arms; he had concealed their follies, and, in short, endeavoured to satisfy them and the emigrants, but had only succeeded in rendering both parties discontented. It would have been impossible, in his position, not to commit faults, as it would have been impossible to content the army, that was obliged to undergo severe reductions, and submit to a

régime highly displeasing to the military of every grade. And he had committed faults, and serious ones, but who obliged him to commit them? Those very princes who accused him; it was they who had done so, by establishing the Military Household, and by lavishing commissions as rewards for services during emigration, &c., &c. When the anticipated and inevitable result of these faults became apparent, the princes blamed the too-complaisant minister, who had acted at their suggestion, and said that it would be dangerous to leave the army under his control. The king made no objection, for he did not understand the business, and seemed inclined to yield implicit credence to his nephews, who busied themselves very much in the affair.

There was another subject on which the king was disinclined to listen to the remarks made; in the first place, because these remarks originated with his brother, and in the next, because his judgment was sufficiently clear to let him see that they were made without sufficient foundation. He was told that the police were badly, deplorably constituted—that it was a matter of which M. Beugnot, intelligent as he was, understood nothing, that he was duped by the Bonapartists, and was unconsciously deceiving the king, and hurrying the destruction of the monarchy. Louis XVIII. was annoyed in the highest degree by these remarks, which he plainly saw originated with his brother, who was ever inclined to interfere, and was the constant dupe of the intriguers of every *régime*. The king regularly read M. Beugnot's witty and amusing reports, which were seasoned with a little skilful flattery, and presented a piquant picture of contemporary personages. The truth of these reports was evident to his good sense, and their piquancy amused him, whilst their flattery gratified his self-love. But Monsieur tried to persuade him that M. Beugnot only entertained him with gossip, and that there was but one man in France who, if his majesty would venture to confide in him, could properly fulfil the functions of minister of police, and save the kingdom. Will it be believed that this man was the regicide Fouché! Monsieur, even when he did not hate people, could never do them justice, through want of discernment and coolness of judgment, but he had suddenly become not only impartial, but indulgent, even friendly, towards M. Fouché. The latter, as we have already said, was not in Paris at the time the revolution of 1814 occurred, but since then he had sought to take up the part he would have played on that occasion, by interfering wherever his interference would be permitted. When Monsieur sought to be invested with the lieutenant-generalship of the kingdom by the senate, he had found the Duke of Otranto

officious, zealous, skilful, and although a regicide, free from hatred of the Bourbons, and at least as anxious to please them as to get the senate out of its embarrassing position. He had, consequently, conceived the most favourable opinion of the man, and entertained a friendly feeling towards him. These favourable dispositions had been confirmed by the reports of the agents of the *Pavillon Marsan*. There were, undoubtedly, many royalists amongst these agents, but the greater number was composed of men ready to assist any *régime*, men whom the police employ and fling aside when their services are no longer needed, and who, when rejected, offer their services to any one that will enable them to procure their daily subsistence. They are an abject race, whom an honest man never employs, only from necessity, when it is his duty to watch over the safety of the State; and whom he is only too happy to break with, once he is relieved of the cares of government. Far from avoiding the society of such men, M. Fouché eagerly sought their acquaintance, and often supported them at his own expense, when he could not dispose of the resources of the State. By these means, he collected information of all kinds, true and false, without however always distinguishing the one from the other, which, added to what he himself collected in his visits, alternately paid without offending any of them, to MM. Carnot, de la Fayette, de Blacas, de Bassano, and even the foreign ministers, whose doors opened to the talisman of news—he thus acquired the air of a magician, knowing all things, guiding everything; and possessing the secrets, the confidence, and guiding the will of all parties, whom he could restrain or set loose as he pleased. In a word, he seemed the king of this chaos, which he alone could organise and govern.

These agents, repelled by the official police and received at the *Pavillon Marsan*, were the assiduous panegyrists of M. Fouché to the Count d'Artois, and succeeded in inducing the prince to receive him. Yielding to his natural taste for intrigue, the Count d'Artois admitted M. Fouché, and was charmed by the conversation he had with him. M. Fouché, unlike Carnot, far from boasting of being a regicide, expressed on the contrary the humiliation and repentance that it caused him; and speaking with respect and submission, declared his ardent desire to repair his fault by supporting and saving the Bourbons. Then, making use of his knowledge of men and things, he dazzled the prince, to whom he appeared the saviour to whose care the destiny of the monarchy ought to be entrusted; and thus the Count d'Artois, the idol of the ultra-royalists, passed to the opposite extreme, even to the region of regicides, to associate with an unprincipled intriguer, and be-

stow on him the confidence that he refused to the most respectable friends of liberty.

It was under these circumstances he conceived the idea of getting the Duke d'Otranto appointed Minister of Police to Louis XVIII.—an appointment of which he not only gave him hope, but almost certainty. The Duke d'Otranto left the prince with the most sanguine expectations, and proclaimed to every one his desire and hope of re-entering the ministry. M. d'Artois had, however, promised too much. It was not in his power to bestow portfolios as he would; and his good opinion, far from winning that of Louis XVIII. for the same object, had a contrary effect. The promised portfolio not appearing, M. Fouché was offended, and went about Paris telling that he had been offered the Ministry of Police, but had refused. All this was very skilfully related to Louis by M. Beugnot, and the king laughed at his brother whenever he was not made too angry by these provoking accounts.

The Ministers of War and Police were both thus attacked at Court, the sole employment of the latter being Director-General, with the title of Minister of State. The king, fond of repose, averse to change, and seeing that there was more of danger than utility in the proposed remedies, told M. de Blacas of the annoyances with which he was beset. M. de Blacas agreed with the monarch; for though prejudiced, he was not devoid of good sense, and was besides willing to agree with his master. However, he was too sincere to conceal the truth from the king, or to hide from him that many complaints were made against the War Minister and the Chief of Police. The king was perplexed, and had it been possible, would have been very much agitated; but his cumbrous body weighed down his mind, and often oppressed it even to inertia.

The month of November had passed in domestic anxieties, which were seldom revealed to the gaze of the public, when, on Wednesday, the 30th of November, the king, being about to go with great pomp to a theatrical representation at Odeon, Monsieur's police took alarm and hastened to the Tuileries, where they announced a plot that was to be put into execution on that very day. The object of this plot, they said, was to seize the king and royal family, and either fling them into the Seine or carry them off to some other country, and then change the government. This bold stroke was to be accomplished by some hundreds of audacious and intrepid military men. These were in communication with the heads of the different parties, and all arrangements were made for what was to follow, once the deed was accomplished. The official police knew nothing of all this, which was an additional reason for the extreme royalists giving it explicit credence. Marshal Marmont and

his company of body guards came to attend the king. He was as credulous as thoughtless, and moreover detested General Dupont, because this minister occupied a place he thought due to himself, and which he had still a vague hope of obtaining. He was, consequently, one of those who most frequently asserted that the army was not properly guided, and was left a prey to conspirators. On the morning of the 30th, he was awakened by one of those official agents who usually disturb the repose of courts, and being informed of the plot that was to be executed that evening, he ran all breathless to the king, to whom he made the greatest display of devotion, without however exciting either gratitude or anxiety in that prince; for Louis had little faith in the danger that was announced to him. The Marshal commanded his guards to mount, sent a message to General Maison, commanding the First Military Division, and General Dessoles, commanding the National Guards, both of whom hastened to call out their soldiers; whilst Marmont took very good care not to give the least information to the Minister of War, who ought to have been the first informed. The principal persons of the court resumed their military dress, secreted arms of every kind about their persons, and proceeded to Odeon armed to the very teeth. The streets were filled with troops, the boxes of the theatre with uniforms, which gave the affair rather the air of a review than of a theatrical representation. In the midst of this display of uniforms, one man alone—the War Minister—arrived, dressed in a black coat, and with an air of indifference and ignorance that was most offensive to all those who were oppressed by zeal, terror, or prudence.

The king was applauded as usual, and retired without being attacked or offended. The next day, the newsmongers laughed loudly at this violent alarm; but those who pretended that they had saved the king—and Marshal Marmont was at the head of these—were indignant at the carelessness of the War Minister and the Director of Police. There was the most unheard-of excitement at court; and as some change was necessary to calm people's minds after all this agitation, a modification of the ministry was demanded. The king's nephews demanded the appointment of a new War Minister, and his brother begged that there should be a new Director of Police. The king, wearied, and believing in the end that he had been in danger, yielded, and consented to the desired changes.

He would not listen to the proposal of making the Duke d'Otranto Minister of Police, and confided the functions of this office to M. d'André, an old constituent, a well-informed functionary, industrious and sensible, and who had corre-

sponded with the Bourbons during their residence in England, for all which reasons he inspired the emigration party with sufficient confidence. But whilst he gratified his brother by removing M. Beugnot, Louis XVIII. did not mean to sacrifice him, but rather to elevate his position, which he did by appointing him Naval Minister, an office that had just become vacant by the death of the distinguished and lamented M. Malouet. M. Beugnot was thus doubly recompensed for his witty and sensible reports; for he was not only freed from the police, and was appointed minister, with a portfolio.

The War Minister was still to be appointed. The army at that time possessed two men—Marshals Davout and Suchet—who united in an eminent degree the rare qualities required in a War Minister, and in whom moral influence was joined to administrative talents. The appointment of Marshal Davout was impossible, for he was an object of hatred both to the Allies and the emigrants. He could not even be thought of. Marshal Suchet, whose natural disposition inclined him to that sagely liberal government which the Bourbons might have established in France, and besides being very well liked at court, had been more than once spoken of as suited to the office of War Minister. He had, indeed, without his knowledge, figured in all the ministerial combinations which the Duke d'Otranto had proposed to Monsieur. However, being a man of great reserve, he had not testified sufficient devotion to win the good opinion of the court. Marshal Soult, contrary to what might have been expected, had succeeded completely with the royalists, whose idol he had become, as M. Fouché was that of the Count d'Artois' coterie. We shall now see by what means he reached this high degree of favour.

He had been ill-treated at first, because of his having fought the battle of Toulouse, after peace had been declared, and ill-treated most unjustly, for he was ignorant of the state of affairs of Paris at the time, and consequently became a malcontent, and a daring malcontent, so unmeasured was the expression of his feelings. General Dupont, an excellent man, who was seeking to gain as many adherents as he could for the Bourbons, had received and listened to Marshal Soult, whom he inspired with some little hope, and succeeded, at the same time, in calming his feelings somewhat. This minister, pursuing his work, resolved to give an appointment to Marshal Soult, that he may attach him definitely to the Bourbons, and for that purpose determined to send him to Alsace, but upon reflection he preferred Brittany, a province that would test the fidelity of a doubtful functionary. The loyalty of this province was such as to call forth all sorts of danger, whilst, at the same time, it afforded an opportunity of ascertaining the sincerity of

the man's conversion who should be employed there. The war minister's calculations were crowned with success. Marshal Soult, surrounded by the most ardent royalists, had given them perfect satisfaction, and had shown himself their equal, at least in political sentiments, for he did not hesitate to declare that for twenty-five years past the Bourbons had been the "good cause;" that those who had served another had been deceived, but that they were ready to repair their error by an unbounded devotion. He did not confine himself to mere words, but went to visit the mournful battle-field of Quiberon, where he found some unburied bones, as often happens on a field of battle, and opened a subscription for the erection of a monument to the French officers who had fallen on that fatal day. Those brave men most undoubtedly deserved to be held in sad remembrance, who, employing their bravery so ill, had perished on the gloomy banks of the Quiberon; but this was not the time to renew such memories, and one may be indeed surprised to find them awakened by the new governor of Brittany.

The astonishment of the army was as great as the satisfaction of the Royalists. Marshal Soult was a valuable conquest that merited preservation. He had been excluded from the peerage, together with the Marshals Massena and Davout, and therefore when he completed the subscription for the monument at Quiberon, he returned to Paris to renew his solicitations for that distinction; he was very badly received by his old comrades, but very well by the Court. He was still occupied in this pursuit when the office of war minister became vacant. It was almost unanimously agreed to confer it upon him at once, notwithstanding the pretensions of Marshal Marmont, which nobody considered serious. As Marshal Soult combined with an unusual application to business the deportment of a determined man accustomed to command, he seemed the very personification of an accomplished minister of war. This choice filled the public with surprise, and the Court with joy and hope.

These different appointments were published on the 4th of December by royal ordinance. The king had rather consented to than desired them. A strange circumstance, but a natural one for the time, and which shows the idea entertained of a constitutional government at its commencement, was that the Royal Council learned these ministerial changes only a few hours before the general public. M. de Blacas informed his colleagues, in the name of the king, of what had occurred; they were much surprised, but did not apprehend that the harmony of the Cabinet would be disturbed by these events. M. de Blacas dispatched a courier with an account of the

ministerial changes to M. de Talleyrand, who had already set out for the Congress of Vienna, and he with whom these modifications ought to have originated, was scarcely made acquainted with them even after their accomplishment. As Louis the XVIII. disliked explanations, because that his repose and royal dignity suffered somewhat by them, he would not speak himself to Marshal Dupont. He had avoided receiving him since the scene at Odeon, sometimes alleging illness as a cause, and sometimes that he was about to take his customary exercise; but on the 3rd of December he sent M. de Blacas to demand his portfolio, and offer him a pension of 40,000 francs, together with a provincial appointment. M. de Blacas took care to inform General Dupont that he was not the author of this change, which was indeed true; he surprised him not a little by announcing the name of his successor, and attributed his dismissal to the king.

Thus ended the crisis, by the dismissal of the war minister, to whom were attributed the bad feelings of the army, and by the change of the minister of police, who was blamed for imaginary conspiracies, merely because he would not believe in their existence. As always happens in such cases, a short calm ensued until the inutility of the remedy had been felt, and the sinister prophecy of Napoleon had been realised—“*The Bourbons will reconcile France with the rest of Europe, but set her at war with herself.*”

BOOK LVI.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

STATE of Europe since the peace of Paris—Discontent of the Belgian and Rhine Provinces, which were annexed to Protestant countries, and ill-treated by foreign armies—confusion that threatens—The Germans expect their promised liberty in vain, and the small states dread being swallowed up by the larger—Outbreak in Switzerland in consequence of the struggle between the old and new cantons—Sad state of Italy—Bad government of the King of Piedmont, and rigorous proceedings of the Pontifical Government at Rome—Revocation of the French Concordat which was on the point of being granted, but is deferred—Murat is surprised to find himself still on the throne of Naples, the Powers are displeased at it—State of Spain—Perfidious and cruel conduct of Ferdinand VII.—To please the English he abandons the family compact—Whilst Europe is in this state of excitement, the allied sovereigns are present at several brilliant fêtes in London—They renew their promise to remain united, without, however, entering on any explanation of disputed points—The Congress of Vienna put off till September—Dispositions with which they meet—Only two sovereigns, the Emperor Alexander and the King Frederick William, arrive there on good terms with each other—They consider that Europe owes them everything, the one wishes to get all Poland, the other Saxony—England sees nothing of this; Austria discovers it, but is silent, in the hope of disappointing them without disturbing the European union—This state of affairs would have been very profitable to France if she had come to Vienna free of engagements, and without having signed the treaty of the 30th of May—M. de Talleyrand is left at liberty to act as he thinks proper—The king imposes but one condition on him, that Murat should be expelled from Naples—Departure of M. de Talleyrand, accompanied by the Duke Dalberg—His desire to play an important part, and his determination to take legitimacy as the groundwork of his policy at Vienna—Solemn entry of the allied sovereigns into the Austrian capital—Magnificent and expensive hospitality with which the Emperor Francis receives them at the palace of Schoenbrunn—The pretensions of Prussia and Russia to Saxony and Poland are soon discovered, and become the universal subject of conversation—The German princes protest against these pretensions—Embarrassment of England and Austria, who are anxious about the maintenance of the Alliance of Chaumont—The more danger there is of disunion, the less they affect to believe it, and promise to remain united—Secret arrangement of Austria, England, Russia and Prussia to arrange everything themselves, and to allow the presence of the other sovereigns only as a matter of form—This agreement being soon discovered, is a new source of discontent to the powers of the second rank, who fear that their exclusion is only a means for their destruction—The members of the French legation do not confine themselves, in their irritation, to protesting against these projects of exclusion, but they immediately take the part of Saxony against Russia and Prussia—Prussia avenges herself by saying that France intends to resume the Rhine boundary—The members of the French

legation are reduced to make protestations of being disinterested in order to correct the effects of their hasty proceedings—Alexander's anger is principally directed against M. de Talleyrand—His interview with the French plenipotentiary—When some weeks have been passed in parleys and bitter remarks, a general cry is raised for the assembly of the Congress—The *four*, that is England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, feeling the danger of a general and immediate meeting, propose a delay of a month, which defers the Congress until the 1st November, under pretence of preparing the different questions—M. de Talleyrand places himself at the head of the opposition—He requires that the Congress take place immediately, and wishes to profit of the occasion for the coming to a decision concerning the admission of the representative of Saxony, and the rejection of the Neapolitan representative, which would be an indirect manner of deciding immediately the two most important questions of the moment—Resistance of the *four*—After some days discussion, the Congress is deferred until the 1st November, when all promise to meet, and some expressions are used which give some hope of their respecting what was called public justice—Having prevented the exclusion of the secondary powers, the members of the French legation, instead of refraining from engaging farther in the Saxony question, declare themselves even more decidedly—The Russians and Prussians, on their side, express themselves with the greatest haughtiness—Activity of the lesser states, particularly Bavaria—The latter unite with the French legation—Increasing embarrassment of England and Austria—Lord Castlereagh, dreading a quarrel with Prussia, whom he needs in his policy with regard to the Low Countries, will give her Saxony in order to save Poland—M. de Metternich, on the contrary, wishing rather to save Saxony than Poland, disapproves of this plan, and yet lets it go on in hopes that it will not succeed, for Frederick William will not be satisfied unless Alexander is so too—Lord Castlereagh speaks out boldly—Warm conversations with Alexander, followed by firm and bitter notes—Bavaria, always the most active, does not hesitate to speak of war, and tells Austria that it is better to think of an alliance with France—M. de Metternich, dreading disunion, says that France has not an army—Bavaria reports his expressions to the French legation to pique their honour—M. de Talleyrand advises Louis XVIII. to prepare his armaments—Deliberation on this subject in the Royal Council—The minister of finance agrees to give fifty million francs in order to equip the army—M. de Talleyrand is delighted, and is anxious to announce the preparations going on in France—Meanwhile, disputes are as warm as ever at Vienna—M. de Metternich is obliged to yield to the tactics of Lord Castlereagh, and advises Prussia for her own sake not to accept Saxony, but consents to give it to her on certain conditions that Prussia will not accept—Alexander, in his anger, seems determined to brave everything—He gives up Saxony, which he held, to Prussian troops, and concentrates all his forces on the Vistula—Irritation at Vienna, general desire that the Congress should assemble on the 1st November—Violent altercation between Alexander and M. de Metternich—Assembly of Congress at the appointed time—The eight who had signed the treaty of Paris, France, England, Austria, Russia, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, take the initiative in the convocations and resolutions—Division of the Congress into committees—Committee for the verification of credentials—Committee of six, composed of France, Spain, Austria, England, Russia and Prussia for the great European affairs—Committee for German affairs, for Italian affairs, for Swiss affairs, for the liberty of the negroes, for the free navigation of rivers, &c., &c.—It is decided that, when the principal persons concerned in each question should confer in committee, the eight should come to assist in their decisions, and ratify their resolutions—Labours of each committee—Italian affairs—Questions concerning the annexation of Genoa to Piedmont, and the succession to the crown of Savoy—Questions of Parma and Naples—M. de Metternich's wise reasons for protracting the discussion on the affairs of Naples—Swiss affairs: continuation of the struggle between the old and new Cantons—Influence of France over the aristocratic canton of Berne, and over the democratic cantons of Uri, Glaris Unterwalden; she is employed to bring about an accommodation—Whilst the affairs of Switzerland and Italy approach an accommodation, those of Saxony and Poland become more complicated—Lord

Castlereagh's exertions to detach Prussia from Russia—Alexander perceives this and forces Frederick William to an explanation—After the explanation, the two sovereigns embrace, and promise to be more united than ever—Proclamation of Prince Reppin, temporary governor of Saxony, which announces that this kingdom is about to pass into the possession of the king of Prussia, with the consent of England and Austria—These two powers deny it vehemently—The entreaties the German princes make to the Prince Regent of England oblige Lord Castlereagh's instructions to be modified—The latter changes his tactics, and joins M. de Metternich for the determined defence of Saxony and Poland—War seems to threaten—Plan of the campaign decided on by Prince Schwarzenberg, who disposes of the troops of France without consulting her—Plan of introducing in the spring 200,000 Austrians and Germans into Poland, 150,000 into Silesia, and 100,000 into Franconia and Westphalia—On the 10th December, M. de Metternich presents a note, in which he withdraws the half consent that he had given to the sacrifice of Saxony, on the pretext that Prussia had not fulfilled any of the conditions required by Austria—The irritated Prussians wish to make an outbreak, but Alexander endeavours to restrain them—After several conversations with Prince Schwarzenberg, the Czar is convinced that the Powers are determined to resist his designs, and he thinks of making some sacrifices—He determines to keep all Poland, and abandon the duchy of Posen to Prussia that she may have less claim in Germany, and at the same time he endeavours to be on friendly terms with Austria, relative to the Prussian frontier in Galicia—By Alexander's advice, Prussia replies in moderate terms to Austria—Austria's reply, in which she proves that, in giving 3,000 or 4,000 souls to Prussia in Saxony, the engagement of restoring her position of 1805 will be fulfilled—Prussia enters into those calculations, and the question then becomes one of figures—Formation of a commission of valuation, into which France is admitted, although it was first intended to exclude her—The questions of quantity are warmly debated in this commission—The news of the peace concluded between England and America restores all his energy to Lord Castlereagh—A violent scene takes place between the English and Prussians—Lord Castlereagh goes in a passion to M. de Talleyrand—The latter profits of the opportunity, and proposes an alliance offensive and defensive to the British minister—Treaty of 3rd January, 1815, by which Austria, England, and France unite, and promise to furnish each 150,000 men to ensure the success of their projects—Hard condition imposed on M. de Talleyrand, that if war should be declared he should confine himself to the limits of the treaty of Paris—A French General is sent to discuss the plan of the campaign—The convention of the 3rd January, though secret, is communicated to Bavaria, Hanover, the Low Countries, Sardinia, in order to gain their alliance—Notwithstanding this secrecy, Russia and Prussia perceive that their adversaries have come to an agreement, and therefore they determine on deciding the different questions—Half its territory and one-third of its population is taken from Saxony to be given to Prussia—Last struggle for the city of Leipzig, which is left to Saxony—Frederick Augustus is summoned to Pesh, in order to extort his consent—The great question which divides Europe being decided, and Lord Castlereagh being summoned to the British parliament, the others hasten to conclude—Decision of the questions in debate—Definite constitution of the Low Countries—Re-establishment of Hesse Cassel and Hesse Darmstadt—These houses give up Westphalia to Prussia for a compensation—Exertions of Prussia to obtain a continuity of territory from the Meuse to the Niemen—Unjust conduct towards Denmark—Luxembourg falls to the Low Countries—Mayence becomes a federal fortress—Bavaria gets the Rhine palatinate, and the duchy of Wurzbourg, and gives the Tyrol with the line of the Inn to Austria—Germanic constitution—Austria refuses the Imperial crown, and obtains the perpetual presidency of the Diet—Organization of the Federal Diet—The cessation of Swiss disputes chiefly due to France—The new cantons preserve their existence by paying a pecuniary indemnity—Berne gets a territorial indemnity in Porentruy and the duchy of Basle—The Swiss constitution taken almost entirely from the act of mediation—Difficulties of the Italian question—M. de Talleyrand not having demanded anything as the reward of his assistance in the affairs of Saxony and Poland, is in danger of being totally abandoned in the affair of Naples—Happily for him, Murat

solves the difficulty by addressing an imprudent summons to the Congress—Austria replies by announcing that an army of 150,000 men will be sent into Italy—General determination to destroy Murat—Difficulties of the affair of Parma—At the demand of the two houses of Bourbon, the Congress is inclined to restore Parma to the Queen of Etruria, and to leave Maria Louisa only the duchy of Lucca—The latter is advised to resist, and succeeds in awakening the tenderness of her father and the generosity of Alexander—Lord Castlereagh, without M. de Talleyrand's knowledge, is commissioned to negotiate, at Paris, a direct arrangement with Louis XVIII., in order that Parma may be left to Maria Louisa for her life, and that in the mean time the Queen of Etruria should have only the duchy of Lucca—It is decided that the Legations should be restored to the Pope—Resolutions adopted as to the liberty of negroes and the opening of navigable rivers—All these questions being decided in February, the monarchs prepare for their departure, and leave to their ministers the charge of drawing them up—It is decided that there shall be a general instrument, signed by the eight Powers who took part in the treaty of Paris, containing all resolutions of general interest, and that there shall be particular treaties between the interested parties for what concerns them individually—When they are about to separate, the news of Napoleon's landing surprises all persons—It is determined to remain together until the termination of the new crisis—All European arrangements which had been adopted are maintained—True character of the Congress of Vienna, and what may be thought of its results, which, with a few changes, have lasted half a century.

BOOK LVI. .

CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

We have seen in what position the Bourbons had placed France, although they were bound by a written constitution, and watched over by public opinion of a most censorious character, and though they were actuated by the best motives, but they yielded to the reactionary influence which tended to re-establish the old *régime* on the ruins of the Revolution and the Empire. We should next consider Europe divided into a number of governments, unrestrained by law or public opinion, and consequently at liberty to seek the re-establishment of the old order of things, and determined to resume the territories they had lost, or to appropriate those to which they had no claim. This unhappy Europe was fearfully disturbed by *its* emigrants, as short-sighted as our's, as well as by its ambitious chiefs, who were tearing it to tatters. It thus presented a kind of chaos, where avidity struggled with madness. The man who was then called the "Genius of Evil"—Napoleon—might from the watch-tower of his isle say, with all that bitterness of which he was accused, and which he indeed possessed, that his fall had not been the triumph of disinterestedness and moderation. We must consider this distracted Europe for a moment, in order to form a just idea of her state at the period which was called that of her deliverance.

The Belgian provinces, which had at first felt a real relief in escaping from our yoke, were surprised and annoyed to find themselves oppressed by another quite as heavy, and, at the same time, opposed to all their national feelings. It was the conscription, the *droits réunis*, the closing of the ports, and regulations in matters of religion, which had alienated these provinces from us. They were freed from the conscrip-

tion for the moment, but not from indirect imposts, which were still maintained. The ports, indeed, were open, but only to allow the English, those rivals of the Belgians, to bring in their goods, whilst they were debarred from intercourse with France, whose commerce had so much contributed to enrich them. The Pope was re-established at Rome, whilst the Belgians were placed under the rule of a Protestant nation for which they felt no affection. They were annoyed by the presence of the British army, which was constantly increasing in order to protect the new kingdom of the Low Countries, and they accused Austria, that had principally contributed to their separation from France, of having betrayed and sold them to England.

The Rhenish provinces were no better satisfied. If, like the Belgians, they were no longer subjected to conscription, and the Rhine, the chief source of their wealth, was allowed free communication with the sea, the French markets were no longer open for the products of their industry, which had greatly increased under the Empire, nor was the commerce of Prussia a compensation for that of France. In a word, it seemed as little natural to them to be fellow-citizens of the inhabitants of Königsberg as of the Parisians, and the liberty of the Pope was no more consolation to them than to the Belgians for being ruled by a Protestant sovereign. They also experienced the inconveniencies of foreign occupation, for the Prussian army was in their territory, and they were horribly ill-treated by Blücher's soldiers, who had not yet learned to consider the inhabitants of Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle as fellow-countrymen.

Beyond the Rhine, discontent resulted from other causes. The Prussians were satisfied, and justly, for they were conquerors, and expected great aggrandizement; but they hoped to receive as the reward of their patriotism, the liberty that had been promised them, but which, it seemed, there was no hurry to grant. Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse, whilst anxiously awaiting the decision of their fate, were devastated by the passage of the allied armies. Saxony, that had abandoned the French on the field of battle, was thrown into despair by the prospect of falling under the power of Prussia, and losing her nationality as the reward of her defection. Meanwhile, she had the mortification to see her sovereign a prisoner at Berlin. The princes of the smaller German states were disturbed by the projects imputed to the more powerful sovereigns of the country, and the peoples were discontented by the little liberty that appeared in the principles avowed by their princes. Bavaria having considerable claims to indemnification for what Austria was about to deprive her of, she felt

little pleasure at the prospect of being compensated on the left bank of the Rhine, quite close to France, with which power it was thus intended to compromise her.

Switzerland had fallen into a state of confusion from which it was impossible to free her, and which put all her interests in opposition, all her populations in arms. The act of mediation, making a happy application in the Alps of the principles of 1789, by setting the old subjugated countries at liberty, and forming all into nineteen independent cantons instead of thirteen, had abolished the inequalities of condition, together with all kinds of oppression, and had created a perfectly well-balanced state of things, which had rendered Switzerland perfectly happy during ten years, and which would have left her nothing to desire had not war disturbed the happiness of the whole world.

It was this same act of mediation which the inhabitants of Berne had intended, and succeeded in destroying by introducing the Allies into Switzerland during the preceding Decem̄ber. Immediately all the old pretensions were renewed, Berne wanted to bring Pays de Vaud and Argovia under her yoke, and deprive them of their position of federal cantons. Uri wished to deprive Tessin of the vale of Levan, and actually took possession of it without an appeal to any authority. Schweitz and Glauris were preparing to snatch back the territories of Utnach and Gazter from the Canton of St. Gall, and for that purpose excited disturbances in these ancient districts. Zug claimed Argovia as her dependency, and Appenzell flattered herself with the hope of recovering the Rheinthal. On the other side, the threatened cantons put themselves on the defensive. The citizens of Vaud, Argovia, Thurgovia, Saint Gall, and Tessin, had taken up arms to the number of twenty thousand men. The interior policy of the cantons was in no less danger than their territorial possessions. The subjection of class to class was about to re-appear. It was at least intended to re-establish the system, and all the new and legitimate interests, which had been recognised by the act of mediation, seeing the threatened danger, were ready to revolt.

The diet having assembled at Zurich, wishing to put a stop to this state of anarchy, had tried to reconstitute Switzerland. But the five cantons, which were meditating these territorial changes, viz., Berne, Uri, Schweitz, Glaris, and Zug, having induced the cantons of Fribourg, Soleure, Lucerne, and Unterwalden, which shared in their sentiments, to join them, formed a counter diet, which would neither yield to that held at Zurich or recognised its acts. The diet at Zurich was composed of the cantons whose liberties were in danger—viz., Vaud, Argovia, Thurgovia, Saint Gall, and Tessin, together with the so-called

impartial cantons of Zurich, Basle, Schaffhausen, Appenzell, and the Grisons. The latter diet represented ten cantons; its opponents nine.

Fortunately for the cause of justice and good sense, Alexander, liberal both from feeling and education, besides being influenced by M. de Laharpe and General Jomini, had no idea of lending his aid to such a work of destruction. Under his influence the allied sovereigns declared that they would recognise no other diet than that of Zurich, nor would they consent to the suppression of a single one of the existing cantons; and that as Berne had lost much they would endeavour to compensate her with some portion of the territory recovered from France.

The Diet of Zurich, strengthened by this support, conquered and even absorbed the dissenting cantons. This Diet had drawn up the plan of a federal union, recognising the existence of the nineteen cantons, and which, leaving to the Congress of Vienna the care of deciding territorial questions, had preserved all that was good in the act of mediation with regard to civil equality and legislative power. But this plan being rejected by the dissenting cantons, those cantons whose existence was threatened refused to lay down their arms. Pays de Vaud was transformed into a sort of camp, and instead of being, as once, the seat of wealth and repose, presented nothing but a scene of anxiety and agitation. This was all that Switzerland had gained, at least for the present, by the deliverance of Europe. It depended on the Congress of Vienna to restore order and justice, if possible.

As we pass the Alps the prospect becomes sadder and drearier. The French, in retiring, had left the wrecks of their Italian army at Milan, and the Austrians had left the remnant of their army in the fortresses of Lombardy. Notwithstanding his noble fidelity to Napoleon, Prince Eugene flattered himself that he would be able to retain a part, at least, of his vice-royalty. For this he had counted on the influence of his father-in-law, the King of Bavaria, and the personal consideration enjoyed by himself in Europe. The wisest amongst the Italians would have desired him for their prince, and the Lombard Senate was considering how the object might be effected, when the Milanese populace, weary of the abode of the French amongst them for eighteen years, and also excited by some members of the nobility and clergy, revolted, attacked the Senate, and massacred Prina, the finance minister. They were about to murder the war minister, when their violence was checked. General Pino, having placed himself at the head of the public forces, a kind of regency was formed of intelligent patriots, who demanded a sovereign from the Congress of

Vienna. The reply to this demand was, as may be expected, the occupation of the country by Austrian troops. Marshal Bellegarde, at the head of fifty thousand Austrians, invaded Lombardy as far as the Po, dissolved the provisional regency, and took possession of the country, in the name of the imperial Court of Austria. Although it was not yet announced to what power these countries were to be subjected, it was easy to foresee that they were about to become Austrian provinces.

The Austrian rule was harsh, but conducted with legal forms, in Lombardy, whilst, from the very first day, it was exercised with disorderly severity in Piedmont. The old King of Sardinia, having passed the period of his exile at Rome, and assisted at the Pope's return, at whose feet he had prostrated himself, returned to Turin and took possession of his dominions, which the English proposed increasing by the addition of Genoa. He governed after the fashion of the most short-sighted of emigrants. He not only re-established absolute power, but he employed it in punishing all who had served under France, and persecuting those who did not abstain from flesh meat on Fridays and Saturdays, and in all things acted with the most violent intolerance, in a country which, during twenty years, had been imbued with the French spirit. A great number of Piedmontese officers fled to Murat, who received them with delight, and those who remained, either refusing to serve, or detesting the new government, were very little suited to support it. A general insurrection would certainly have broken out but for the neighbourhood of the Austrians on the Tessino and the Po.

Genoa thoughtlessly yielded to the English, and was promised her independence by the complaisant and liberal Lord Bentinck, but she was thrown into despair when she saw the fate that was being prepared for her. It was remarkable that at first all the seaport towns of Europe stretched forth their arms towards England, that is to the sea, but now drew them back in anger. Genoa acted like Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, Antwerp, &c., &c.

The Legations, which under the Empire had been included in the viceroyalty of Lombardy, were occupied by Murat, who had invaded them in the name of the Coalition. In conformity with the opinions of the day, that each prince should recover what he had formerly possessed, the Legations ought to be restored to the Pope, and he was justified in expecting that they would. But the Pope at his return having refused to recognize Murat's title, the latter avenged himself by continuing to occupy these provinces, not indeed ill-treating the inhabitants, but leaving them in a painful state of uncertainty as to their future destiny.

At this period—September and October, 1814—Tuscany was the only country in Italy, and perhaps in Europe, that was at rest. Under the Empire, Tuscany had been restored to the Archduke Ferdinand, Duke of Wurzburg, and after being tossed about for twenty years from one sovereignty to another, found herself at last under the government of a wise and moderate prince, who did not seek to deprive her of the privileges she had obtained from the French, nor persecute those who had served under Napoleon, but, on the contrary, placed MM. Fossombroni and Corsini, the most distinguished members of the French administration, at the head of his government. Thus Tuscany, fully aware of the advantages of her position, was the only Italian state that neither regretted nor desired anything. The turbulent Leghorn, having obtained the freedom of the sea, and, unlike Genoa, not being threatened with a foreign ruler, was as contented and peaceful as the rest of Tuscany.

The Romans had got back the Pope, whom they received on their knees on the *Place du Peuple*. Amongst those prostrated before him might be seen poor Charles IV., his wife, and the Prince de la Paix, sad remains of the Spanish family, collected at Rome like the waifs of some great shipwreck. Pius VII., generally so mild and moderate, seemed to have flung aside these qualities the moment he was restored to his own sacred domain, and put into practice the most unwise and least humane rigours of the church. He immediately annulled all the improvements that the French had introduced into the administration, he persecuted most pitilessly all those priests or laymen who had served under them, he annulled the sales of church property, and proclaimed the re-establishment of the Jesuits, which caused no little inquietude to all enlightened men. These imprudent resolutions were not suggested by Cardinal Consalvi, who was gone to solicit the support of the European courts in the affair of the Legations, but by his temporary substitute, Cardinal Pacca. Cardinal Maury had been banished to his diocese of Montefiascone, and was forbidden to appear before the Holy Father. Why? Because he was a bishop appointed by Napoleon, who had been crowned by Pius VII. All the Cardinal's relations had been deprived of their appointments. Things were carried so far that Pius VII. began to be ashamed of proceedings so contrary to the usual generosity of his disposition.

We have already explained the relations existing between the Pope and the Bourbon government concerning the revocation of the Concordat. At the same time that Pius VII. asked the support of the Bourbons in the question of the Marshes and the Legations, he demanded the restoration of

Avignon and Benevento. He requested Louis XVIII. not to accept the Charter because of the liberty of worship therein guaranteed; he also demanded the abolition of divorce—a change in the law of marriage which would restore to the religious ceremony its superiority over the civil; he also demanded a dotation in land for the church. In return, the old bishop of Saint-Malo, ambassador of Louis XVIII., had presented the demands of his court, which consisted in the unconditional abolition of the Concordat, and the restoration of the French clergy to the same position they held before 1802. Whilst the Bishop of Saint-Malo presented this demand with all the respect due to the Holy See, he yet gave Pius VII. to understand that the Bourbons were far from approving of his reign, and would even blame its weakness, had they dared to utter a reproach against the representative of God on earth.

On his side, the Pope, who saw nothing strange in his demanding the restitution of Avignon or opposing freedom of worship, thought it both astonishing and offensive that he should be asked to undo his own work by the re-establishment of the ancient French church; or that it should be insinuated that he had done wrong in signing the Concordat. The doctrine held by him and his negotiators was, that the Holy See could not err. Had the Bourbons been consistent, they would not have disputed this; but as in this case everybody was inconsistent, the minister of Louis XVIII., to obtain the abolition of the Concordat, asserted that the Pope could err; and thus declared himself a Gallican; whilst the Pope asserted ultramontane principles in order to defend the Concordat, the least ultramontane of his acts.

However, as both parties needed each other's assistance, they endeavoured to come to an understanding, and Pius VII. appointed a congregation of cardinals to examine the important question of the revocation of the Concordat, and resolve the numerous difficulties dependent thereon. Amongst the demands of the court of France, there was one very agreeable to the court of Rome, which was an increase in the number of episcopal sees. This measure was therefore admitted, not as a revocation of the Concordat, but as a simple increase of the number of bishoprics—a demand which the church has not refused to grant at any time. As far as individuals were concerned, the Pope was equally ready to yield, and made no objection to reinstate all the ancient titulars that were still in existence, numbering about twelve or thirteen, notwithstanding the self-contradiction of re-appointing prelates whom he had deposed. But at the same time, he demanded and obtained well-secured pensions for the prelates he was about to depose,

after having appointed them himself. However, these negotiations, as often happens at Rome, proceeded very slowly, which on this occasion was very fortunate both for Pius VII. and the Bourbons, neither of whom suspected the benefit conferred by this delay in the accomplishment of their wishes.

Naples still remained with what wrecks of the imperial dynasty still existed in that kingdom. Murat's astonishment at finding himself on the throne of Naples, could only be equalled by that which Europe felt at seeing him there. In the first days of 1814, whilst the Allies were still doubtful of their victory, Austria, in order to detach Murat from Napoleon, had guaranteed him the throne of Naples, and England confirmed the act. Now that the Allies were completely victorious, they repented of having bound themselves so early and so formally. The powers that had not taken part in the negotiation, blamed the precipitancy of England and Austria, who, indeed, were ashamed of what they had done; and though they could not venture to undo their work themselves, were very well disposed to allow it to be undone by others.

All the princes of Italy, and the Pope in particular, had refused to recognise Murat, who avenged himself on the latter, as we have seen, by occupying the Legations and the Marches. Whilst this neighbour, so morally powerful, refused to recognise Murat, another, Ferdinand IV., king of Sicily and Palermo, regarded him as an adventurer, whom the confusion of European affairs had allowed to continue on an usurped throne. As might be expected, the legitimate heir of the Neapolitan Bourbons made every exertion to recover his patrimony. Murat could now estimate at Naples, as Marmont at Paris, what one gains by abandoning a course to which he is naturally allied, whatever excuse unjust treatment might furnish for such conduct. Regret is the commencement of remorse; and Murat already regretted deeply having abandoned his true interest when he abandoned Napoleon. His sister-in-law, the Princess Pauline, aided by the queen, did all she could to make him feel what he only felt too deeply already. She then left for Porto Ferrajo, to bring about a reconciliation between the brothers-in-law.

But Murat was determined not to give the powers assembled at Vienna a pretext for dethroning him, by appearing unfaithful to his engagements; and whilst he sent messages of repentance to the island of Elba, he avoided any act that might compromise him, and always addressed the Allies as a member of the Coalition, who rejoiced at having aided in conquering the tyrant of Europe. But he gave a most friendly reception to the Piedmontese and Lombard officers who sought refuge in his dominions. He acted in the same manner towards the

French officers who came to offer him their services, although an order of Louis XVIII. recalled the latter to France: and he paid them all well, for his finances were in excellent condition. He made every exertion to increase his army, which already amounted to 80,000 men; for he knew that a large military force would constitute his very best title with the negotiators of Vienna. He had many partizans amongst the nobility and citizens of Naples, who dreaded all that the return of Ferdinand IV. would entail. If the better educated classes, whom he did not offend, were on his side, it was not the same with the *lazzaroni*, who had a lively remembrance of their ancient masters, although they often applauded him because of his noble person, which he frequently displayed by riding through the streets of Naples. He was not altogether unpopular; but he was no longer the hero of Italy, as he had been for a few months. No; the real hero of Italy was elsewhere: he was in the isle of Elba. Having at first wished to free themselves from the conscription and the *droits réunis*, the affections of the Italians soon returned to Napoleon, and they saw in him the ideal representative of their cause conquered, and Prometheus-like, chained to a rock. With the exception of Tuscany, the dominant wish, from the Alps to the Straits of Messina, was that the sovereign of Elba might quit his isle, put himself at the head of the Neapolitan army, and march on Milan. There was very little probability of such an event; for Napoleon would not leave his island, in order to attempt, with the assistance of the Italians, what he had failed in when aided by the French; or in other words, to undertake a desperate struggle against victorious Europe, to do battle for the unity of Italy, a cause in which he had never taken any great interest. However, it is certain that, had he appeared, all who were disgusted with the military *régime* of Austria, with the pious tyranny of Piedmont, and the domination of the Sacred College, would certainly have risen at his voice, and repeated one of those attempts so often made by the Italians, but in which they have not yet succeeded.

Italy, like the rest of Europe, after having desired and invoked what was called their common deliverance, was now very little satisfied with it. But there was one country more dissatisfied than any other—a country justly indignant at the deceptions that had repaid her efforts: this country was Spain. Spain had shed torrents of blood and supported a heroic struggle for the restoration of her king, and for all this blood and all these efforts, she had only obtained a stupid and sanguinary tyranny.

Ferdinand VII., who, as we have seen, had by Napoleon's orders been conducted to the frontiers of Spain and restored

to the Spanish troops, had entered Gironne on the 24th of March. From Gironne he proceeded to Saragossa, where he found deputies from the regency and the Cortes, who, before restoring him the royal authority, required that he should swear to observe the constitution of Cadiz, a proceeding similar to that adopted by the senate with regard to Louis XVIII. Let us imagine how the Bourbons would have acted at Paris, had they been unrestrained by public opinion and by the presence of the imperial army at Fontainebleau; and instead of depending exclusively on the support of foreign armies, obedient to the will of Alexander, had they rested on a Vendean army, we shall easily understand the conduct of Ferdinand VII. in Spain. This prince refused at first to enter into any explanation with the deputies from the regency and the Cortes, and proceeded from Saragossa to Valencia, greeted as he passed by the homage of the people, who were delighted at his return and the restoration of peace. At Valencia he was received with transports of delight. The army even came voluntarily to take the oath of allegiance, and this general good feeling, which his presence inspired, continuing to increase, he considered himself sufficiently strong to enter into explanations with the authorities at Madrid. Enlightened men were indeed of opinion that he could not, without some modifications, accept the constitution of Cadiz—a constitution still more defective than ours of 1791. General Castanos, the conqueror of Baylen, and the most distinguished man at that time in Spain, together with M. de Cevallos, the most enlightened of the ministers, advised him to negotiate, and confine himself to demanding modifications of the constitution, and not to break off with men who had defended his throne with their blood. Nothing would induce him to adopt conciliatory measures; for he felt more indignant against men who sought to limit his royal authority after having conserved it for him, than against those who had sought to deprive him of it for ever by shutting him up at Valency. Unfortunately, the heads of the Cortes, unwise as he, were quite as unwilling to make concessions, and the unity, whose result might have been the establishment of rational institutions in Spain, was become an impossibility.

The Cortes having commissioned the Archbishop of Toledo to go to the king, and request him to declare his decision concerning the constitution, his Majesty said he would not accept it, and sent back the archbishop to Madrid, resumed the plenitude of his authority, annulled all the acts of the Cortes, and ordered the troops to march upon the capital. The people and the army, who only saw in him the king for whom they had fought so long, and understanding nothing, or almost

nothing, of the theoretic dispute between the sovereign and the Cortes, and even feeling astonished that the royal authority could be refused to him for whom it had been preserved at the expense of such exertions, had encouraged him by their enthusiastic submission to dare everything, and he entered Madrid as an absolute monarch, that is to say, free to pursue those measures that might lead to his ruin. Scarcely was he settled in his palace, when he exiled or imprisoned those who had struggled hardest to preserve his crown; sent to his diocese the Archbishop of Toledo—the head of the regency, the man who had supported the royal prerogative with all his might; he re-established the Inquisition with all its consequences, and thus added to what was ridiculous in an impossible restoration, the odium of the blackest and basest ingratitude. There were, however, men in Spain who, without entirely participating in the liberal opinions of the Cortes, were yet impressed by them; and who, considering the present re-action absurd, were determined to oppose it. These men abode chiefly in Catalonia. They were joined by several members of the Cortes, and it looked as if an organised resistance were about to commence in that quarter. When these men saw in what manner the son of Charles IV. behaved, they thought of recalling the old king, whose want of intellectual power was compensated by the gentleness of his temper.

The difficulties of the position increased visibly, and Ferdinand VII., attributing the present movement to the intrigues of the Prince de la Paix, who was staying at Rome with Charles IV., preferred a request to the Holy See that this old minister of his father should be exiled to Pesaro. Charles IV., whose affection for his favourite had never wavered, was indignant at hearing this, and seemed inclined to go to Barcelona or to Vienna, and appeal to Spain or to Europe to restore his throne, and avenge him on an unnatural son. It was with difficulty that he was pacified, and it needed all the Pope's sacred authority to restrain him.

Such was the spectacle that Spain presented, and in contemplating it we cannot but feel inclined to thank the senate for having drawn up a rational constitution for us; nor can we refuse our gratitude to the foreign sovereigns who supported it, and Louis XVIII. who accepted it, and thus spared us the disgraceful re-action which recompensed the devotion of the Spaniards. Although the Bourbons who reigned over us did not imitate the odious conduct of Ferdinand VII., they still committed faults that sufficed to open a new career of adventures to Napoleon, and a fresh source of misfortunes to France.

We shall complete this picture of Spain by a short explana-

tion of its relations with the cabinet of the Tuileries. The treaty of peace was signed in July, the bulwark of the Pyrenees being no unimportant argument in its favour; and nothing now remained to be done but to make a reciprocal exchange of prisoners. But France had secretly promised to assist Spain in getting a double restitution from Vienna, that of Parma for the Queen of Etruria and Naples for Ferdinand IV., who during the past eight years had no territory but Sicily. It did not require much entreaty to induce France to support these demands, as indeed she would have made them herself. At this very time, Spain contracted a secret engagement with England, by which she bound herself not to renew the family compact with the Bourbons, and abruptly broke off her engagements with us, for a very strange reason. The guerilla chief Mina, from whose enterprises we had suffered so much, and to whom Ferdinand VII. was so much indebted, was one of those whom the restored monarch persecuted for opposing his assumption of absolute power. This celebrated man had taken refuge at Bayonne, where he was arrested by the Spanish consul, with the concurrence of the French authorities, who had the weakness to consent to his arrest on French ground. Louis XVIII. and the Duke de Berry were indignant at such an insult to the French crown, and demanded that Mina should be set free; that the French agent who had assisted in this illegal act should be deprived of his place; and that reparation should be demanded from the Spanish court. Ferdinand VII., instead of granting satisfaction, demanded that reparation should be made to him, and consequently all diplomatic relations ceased between the two courts. Thus Ferdinand VII. first quarrelled with the Spaniards who had saved his crown, and then with the Bourbons of France, his only relatives, his only allies in the whole world, and sacrificed the family compact to England without being assured of her support—for she blamed him loudly for the injurious reaction, of which indeed he was as much the instrument as the author.

Such was the state of Europe, freed from Napoleon's power, but exposed to a species of universal counter-revolution; nor were these the sole evils with which Europe was threatened! After fifteen years of suffering caused by the exorbitant ambition of Napoleon, the fall of this insatiable conqueror might have served as a lesson, and taught moderation to all. But it had no such effect, and the victorious powers seemed, from their boundless avidity, more inclined to justify Napoleon than to cause the world to bless his fall. This was the painful spectacle they presented at Vienna, where they had appointed to meet on the 1st of August.

The allied sovereigns, on leaving Paris, had all, with the exception of the Emperor Francis, who was no lover of tumult, gone to pay a visit to the Prince Regent of England, and received in London such an ovation as the English know well how to bestow when their passions are inflamed, and their interests satisfied. Rome, Madrid, Vienna, Berlin, had echoed to loud acclamations, but all were surpassed by the enthusiastic delight exhibited in London when the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia appeared. Their reception verged on folly. Not wishing to disturb these magnificent fêtes by discussions on business which might have marred the universal joy, it was decided that they should remain good friends, and if necessary, even make reciprocal sacrifices, and maintain, at any cost, the alliance of Chaumont, by which they had rid themselves of the tyrant of Europe. France, it was said, though restored to the Bourbons, was not resigned to her fate, nor was Napoleon forgotten, though banished to the isle of Elba, and unforeseen events might arise which could only be overcome while the Allies remained united. Without entering, therefore, into any explanation concerning European arrangements, the monarchs swore an eternal friendship, and promised to meet at Vienna with the same sentiments.

According to the 32nd article of the treaty of Paris, which fixed the meeting of the approaching Congress within the next two months, the representatives ought to meet on the 1st of August. But as this date would not allow sufficient time for all that was to be done, the meeting was therefore deferred to the month of September.

After the fêtes in London, the King of Prussia, notwithstanding his modesty, went to receive the congratulations of his subjects. On the other hand, the Emperor Alexander had gone to Warsaw to excite the foolish imagination of the Poles in favour of a pretended reconstitution of Poland which he meditated, and, consequently, the two monarchs could not meet at Vienna before the 25th of September. They made a brilliant entry into the Austrian capital, worthy of their joy and their success. The Emperor Francis, who took part in these displays rather for the sake of his allies than from any feeling of personal gratification, went to meet the two monarchs, embraced them in the presence of his people, and then returned with them into his capital amidst the enthusiastic applause of the inhabitants. The Kings of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Denmark arrived successively, and after them all the German, Italian, and Dutch princes who had their interests to defend in the approaching negotiations. Princesses were as abundant as princes at Vienna, and amongst the

former, none was more conspicuous than Alexander's sister, the Grand Duchess Catherine, widow of the Duke of Oldenburg, an active-minded and intellectual woman, who possessed a certain amount of influence. To these crowned heads were joined the generals and diplomatists of the Coalition, anxious to compliment each other on their military and political successes. Some came merely to receive felicitations, and rejoice in the common triumph, whilst others came to represent their governments, but all alike greedy of rewards, fêtes, pleasures, news, and forming, with the sovereigns, the most dazzling and tumultuous assembly that ever was seen. But from this brilliant meeting of monarchs, two personages were absent—the unfortunate King of Saxony, imprisoned at Berlin, for having been the last to break his alliance with the French, and Maria Louisa, buried in the palace of Schoenbrunn, whence she heard with a sort of envy the noise of the festivities, and where she was occupied, not in preparing to join her husband in Elba, but in disputing her duchy of Parma with the two houses of Bourbon, under the guidance of M. de Neiperg, who was appointed her adviser. He was an experienced officer, acquainted with war and diplomacy, and capable of informing her of all that was necessary for her to know, and in the profound isolation into which she had fallen, the Count was becoming daily more her counsellor, advocate, and friend.

After some days devoted to amusement of every kind, it was time to think of matters of more serious import; a change of occupation unwelcome to all. Whilst the sovereigns always declared that unanimity ought to be maintained, they had not entered into explanations on any subject, with the exception of some points already decided in the treaty of Paris. Written documents had already been drawn up, by which England was to get Belgium and Holland, and therewith form the kingdom of the Low Countries, as a protection against France; Austria was to have Italy as far as the Tessino and the Po; Prussia was to be reconstituted, and put in the same position with regard to territory as she had been in 1805; whilst Russia, freed from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (Napoleon's attempt at a French Poland), should share its wrecks with the neighbouring states. But there was so little desire to disturb the general happiness, that no arrangement had been made as to the disposition of the vacant territories, all debates on this difficult and doubtful point being referred to the autumnal meeting.

There could be no dispute as to Italy, which, as far as the Po and the Tessino, was given to Austria, nor the Low Countries, where the French frontier of 1790 was accepted as a

definite boundary; but ample subject, not only of debate but of contention, would be found in the centre of Europe, in the territories touching on Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia were each secretly determined to have entire possession, the one of Poland, the other of Saxony.

These two princes, equals in age and rank, though very different in disposition, had in the commencement of their reigns been firm friends. But their friendship was destroyed by the events of 1807, when, both being conquered, they experienced such very different treatment. Provinces were bestowed on Alexander, whilst Frederick William was deprived of half his dominions; in 1813 they renewed their alliance under the harsh oppression of Napoleon, and on the battle-fields of Lutzen and Leipzig their ancient friendship revived, and they vowed that nothing thenceforward should disunite them. They had, consequently, no secrets from one another; each felt perfect confidence in his friend; they were of the same opinion on every subject, and whenever Alexander spoke it was pretty certain that Frederick William would echo his sentiments. As Alexander not only spoke but thought first, he guided the opinions of his friend, though not to the disadvantage of Prussia, for they were as closely united by political interest as by personal affection. These two princes esteemed each other highly, looking upon themselves as the honestest men of their age, whilst they considered England the most egotistical of all powers, and Austria the most astute. If they were to be believed, the whole civilized world would be still in a state of bondage, if Alexander had not given the signal of resistance in 1812, and if Frederick William had not joined him in 1813, or if, when they had reached the Oder, they had not pressed forward, carrying all Europe in their train, until they reached the Elbe, the Rhine, and even the Seine. They esteemed nobody so highly as themselves, and this esteem was not altogether ill-founded, for though Frederick William sometimes exhibited a duplicity not uncommon in weak-minded men; and though Alexander's fickleness made him sometimes appear false, still the former was upright and modest, and the latter generous in disposition and fascinating in manner. But, as often happens to honest people who pique themselves on their honesty, these two monarchs believed they were impeccable, and even looked upon their ambition as a virtue. If the one desired to obtain possession of Poland, and the other of Saxony, it was, according to them, from the purest and noblest motives. Alexander desired to get Poland that he might re-organize the country. And, indeed, in his youth he had often thought and said that the division of

Poland by Catherine, Frederick the Great, and Maria Theresa, was an odious crime, and ought by all means to be repaired. But he was very much annoyed at Napoleon's attempts at this reparation from 1807 to 1812, and did all he could to prevent him. But, thinking the moment was now come when he could undertake the task himself, he commenced his preparations with the ardour that characterized all his movements. He possessed many facilities for carrying out his project, for he was master of the greater number of the Polish provinces. By joining to these the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, comprising Warsaw, Thorn, Posen, and Kalisch, he might compose a magnificent kingdom, extending from the Niemen to the Crapach range. On this kingdom he intended to bestow free institutions, and assume the crown himself, remaining at the same time Emperor of all the Russias. He would thus assume the double title of emperor and king—the very summit of human power—and would be in the eyes of Russia the equal or even the superior of Catherine and Peter the Great, since in the course of a single reign he should have added to Russia, Finland, Bessarabia, and Poland. These dreams of ambition seemed to him but schemes for the benefit of humanity. Many Poles, who considered France too distant to befriend Poland, which they believed could only be efficaciously done by Russia, together with many others who had adopted the same views since our misfortunes, now collected round Alexander, and contributed not a little to excite his ambitious views. He determined to become the restorer, the liberal restorer of Poland; for though he meant to place his new kingdom under the Russian sceptre, he did not mean to subject it to Russian despotism; the government should somewhat resemble the English. By acting in this manner, Alexander did not look upon himself at all as a conqueror; on the contrary, he said that he would deprive himself of Lithuania and Volhynia in order to create this new kingdom, of which, if it would give less offence to European jealousy, he would make his brother Constantine king, and be himself only suzerain. In his opinion, the Congress of Vienna by assisting in this plan, would put the acmè to the glory of victorious Europe, and would be in a position to say it had reconstituted the world on the bases of justice, liberty, and true political wisdom. We must pardon such illusions, for it is something gained when ambition thinks it necessary to assume the appearance of honesty, a point on which so many are indifferent, satisfied if they can obtain what they desire, without seeking to give their conduct even the semblance of justice.

There was, however, one objection to this fair vision, to which Alexander did not blind himself, but for which his

reply was prepared. The territories of which the Grand Duchy of Warsaw had been composed had been formerly divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The principal part had belonged to Prussia, whose rule extended as far as the Vistula, including Warsaw. This large portion, then, was to be taken from Prussia, who would certainly demand compensation somewhere; and this extension of the Russian frontier from the Vistula to the Oder should be sanctioned by Europe—an extension which would be a real subject of alarm to the entire continent, and would be also contrary to the treaty of Kalisch (28th February, 1813), to the treaty of Reichenbach (15th June, 1813), and to the treaty of Tœplitz (9th September, 1813), treaties which had successively formed the bonds of the Coalition. By the conditions of these treaties the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was to be distributed between the co-sharers of Poland, agreeable, or very nearly so, to the old partition that had been made of it; besides, Prussia should get ten thousand additional subjects, and Illyria was to be restored to Austria. This was what they had promised each other when they formed the European coalition against France in 1813; but the unexpected success of this coalition had permitted them to extend the sphere of these restitutions, for Austria, instead of getting Illyria alone, was to get back the Tyrol and the north of Italy, with the addition of Venice, that she had never possessed before. England, that would have been very well satisfied to deprive France of the seaports of Hamburg and Bremen, and still happier if she could deprive her of Holland, was now, in addition to these, about to rob her of Belgium, which she intended for the house of Orange. If all these Powers had in this manner enlarged their original demands, was Russia alone, asked Alexander, to confine herself within the narrow views she had formed at a time when the utmost the Allies hoped was to reach the Elbe, but had no expectation of touching the Rhine? Certainly not; and Russia's share should, as well as that of the others, be proportioned to the unhelped-for success of the Coalition.

Saxony, Prussia's compensation, was ready; the possession of this kingdom would be the realization of all her wishes. This power, since Frederick the Great, by the united genius of policy and arms, had put it together in bits and scraps, had always presented a kind of geographical deformity. On the map of Europe it appeared as a state of disproportioned length, extending from the Niemen to the Rhine, with many long intervals, and, above all, wanting solidity in the centre. If Dresden were added to Berlin, this awkward configuration would be partly remedied, and Prussia would obtain possession of that field for military operations, whose import-

ance had been proved by Napoleon in the nineteenth and by Frederick in the eighteenth century. And by this arrangement, Prussia, instead of disaffected Poles, would have honest German subjects, and, still better, she would thus become one of the chief German powers, and be placed in a position to bring about that Germanic unity, the bare mention of which is sufficient to excite the Prussian mind, whilst Alexander believed that he was performing a duty to the human race in remodelling Poland. Frederick William believed it was a duty he owed Germany to make this first great step towards her unity, and flattered himself that he would thus pay for all the blood she had shed in the common cause, never permitting himself to perceive that it was more for Prussian than for German unity he was working; that the lesser German States would be seriously alarmed by such a move; that Austria would be offended, and that all Europe would be terrified at the prospect of paying for German unity by abandoning Poland to Russia. Like Alexander, he had answers for all the objections that could be made to his projects, for the prism of desire always shows objects as we wish to see them. Prussia had been promised, he said, ten thousand subjects, without mentioning the locality, and she would not exceed this number in taking possession of Saxony; she would merely choose what suited her best. The King of Saxony's interests could not be alleged against this measure, for he was a traitor who had deserted the cause of Europe. Besides, when Russia and Prussia were united they need fear no opposition. Austria and England were so much occupied in satisfying their avidity—the one in Italy, the other in the two hemispheres—that neither would take notice of what was going on. France deserved no consideration. In short, Europe was under so many obligations to both Russia and Prussia that she could not refuse them the gratification of such honest and legitimate desires. So did Frederick William argue with himself, and he thought his reasoning excellent. Alexander and Frederick William had pledged their word to each other, and they came to Vienna persuaded that they should have Poland and Saxony.

Was it possible that England and Austria entertained no suspicion of these projects, and, if they suspected that, they made no opposition? This certainly looks very strange, when we reflect on the violent opposition that soon burst forth. But, as we have said, the fear of disturbing the general harmony had prevented all explanations. The re-constitution of Poland had been often spoken of, as well as the deserved punishment of the King of Saxony; and the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw was provided for by the treaties. The re-constitution

of Poland had even been mentioned as one of the questions that might be submitted to the Congress. But so many places had been parts of Poland for the last fifty years, that in speaking of the country no precise boundaries were understood. This threw a vagueness over the subject, which was very agreeable to all parties; besides, the all-absorbing interests of the present excluded all thought of the future. England could not yet forget how the continental ports had been shut against her, and it was to prevent the recurrence of such an event that she formed the kingdom of the Low Countries; that she sought to give Hanover more importance, and endeavoured to make Prussia the ally of both, for which reason she was ready to make every concession to Frederick William to induce him to adopt her views. Austria, more clear-sighted than England, had more quickly detected the views of Russia and Prussia, for it was a serious consideration for her that Prussia should take possession of Saxony, and that the Slavonic race should extend to the foot of the Crapach mountains. But these were not her only cares, and in the midst of her present prosperity she was oppressed by greater and more serious anxieties than she had ever known before. In the west and north she had to apprehend Prussia and Russia; she had to watch over the re-constitution of Germany, and fix her own position amongst the Germanic powers; she had to organise Italy, to restrain Murat, to watch over the prisoner of Elba, to keep an observant eye on France, and at the same time be cautious that in treating these different interests she did not allow one to mar the other. Austria was, therefore, determined to employ all the means at her disposal—patience, tact, vigilance, and, if necessary, force. Of the three hundred thousand soldiers at her disposal, she had assembled two hundred and fifty thousand in Bohemia and Hungary, and left but fifty thousand in Italy, where she was exposed to be attacked by Murat, the Italians, and perhaps the prisoner of Elba. Austria had, consequently, silently made her preparations in the direction of Poland and Saxony, but the more her difficulties increased, the more she desired to overcome them by the union, by the good understanding of the Four—that is, of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia; for, in her opinion, were France and the lesser German States allowed to interfere, all would be plunged into a real chaos, whence would spring the modern Lucifer—that is to say, Napoleon, who was not yet forgotten, and who certainly was determined not to allow himself to pass from men's minds, although he affected to slumber in that profound sleep that might naturally be supposed consequent on his long fatigues. Under the influence of these impressions, the first words spoken at Vienna were the last that had been pro-

nounced at London—that the Allies should remain united in opinion, at any sacrifice; and this was the oftener repeated, as they felt that the day of disunion was approaching.

Such were the dispositions of those that formed the Congress; all were extremely anxious to maintain unity, and all were filled with a boundless avidity, little compatible with such union. If ever the fault that France had committed in signing the Treaty of Paris with so much precipitation, was evident, it was at this moment, when destiny decreed that Europe should be disunited, for it was impossible that Austria would consent that Prussia should take possession of Dresden, or Russia of Cracow; or that the lesser German powers would allow Saxony, the most respectable amongst them, to be suppressed because of her alliance with France—a fault that was common to them all—or that England would sanction the execution of these ambitious projects in the face of the British Parliament. If, amid these divided interests, France had come to Vienna, unrestricted by a treaty which marked out her frontiers, there can be no doubt but that her position would be better than it was in Paris in the month of May. Whilst, on the one hand, Russia and Prussia were determined to have Poland and Saxony, at any price, and on the other hand, England and Austria were determined that they should not get them, France would have been able to give so decided a preponderance to whichever party she joined, that certainly no concessions would be spared to gain her support. Russia and Prussia were the two powers most inclined to make concessions to France, for their interests were connected with the Elbe and the Vistula, and not with the Rhine and the Scheldt. It is evident that, had we joined these powers, we should have got very different frontiers to those assigned us by the Treaty of Paris. Had we only gained the line of fortresses demanded by our negotiators, it would have been a great advantage; and being gained by diplomacy alone, would have obtained for the Bourbons that popularity of which they stood so much in need. It was indeed a misfortune that we came to Vienna clogged by the Treaty of Paris. However, the evil was not altogether irremediable, and it was still possible to profit of the new state of things. It was evident that the discussion would be warm, for both Russia and Prussia seemed prepared to proceed to every extremity in order to obtain Poland and Saxony. If it went so far as the forming of new alliances, or preparing for war, it is not likely that the Treaty of Paris would prove a greater restraint than that of Chaumont had been. Of course, we could not ourselves proclaim an intention of not abiding by the Treaty of Paris, but by prudence in our expressions, and giving hope of our support,

whilst we lingered in according it, Russia and Prussia were both so ardent, that they would probably pronounce the words we dare not utter, and offer us what we could not venture to demand. We cannot say how much our condition may have been improved, but undoubtedly it would have been ameliorated, and that in proportion to the seriousness of the conflict. We may add that, united with Russia and Prussia, we should have nothing to fear from the dispute, however violent it may be. It is even probable that England and Austria, not daring to venture on war, would have yielded, and we should have become the arbitrators, the well recompensed arbitrators of the contention. Consequently, the treaty of Paris was not an insurmountable difficulty, but only an obstacle that may be overcome by a little address; and it must be allowed that address was quite permissible against adversaries who had both used and abused force in dealing with us.

This line of conduct supposes our consent to the wishes of Russia and Prussia; and what loss would be incurred by these concessions? Had Russia obtained Poland, of which she already possessed the greater part, she would have advanced from her long-established position on the Vistula as far as the Wartha. Prussia, in getting Saxony, would have come nearer to Austria. By these movements, Russia would occasion more uneasiness to Germany, and Prussia more jealousy to Austria. Ought France to become uncomfortable at such results? Was it our duty to guard the union of the three Continental powers that had helped to conquer us, and after our defeat had imposed on us the treaty of the 30th of May; and that for forty years has held our policy under the yoke of a permanent coalition? If the Prussians were to be an inconvenience to any one, was it not better that they should be so to Austria by getting possession of Dresden, than to us by getting Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle? It is true, that had the house of Saxony been removed from the banks of the Elbe to the left of the Rhine, as Alexander and Frederick William proposed, the Germanic equilibrium—a component part of the European balance of power—would have been shaken. But what was the use of this Germanic equilibrium, which had been so largely encroached on during our century? What was its use either to us or the rest of Europe? It was only interposing small states between greater, in order to break the shock of their collision. Would it not be more to our interest that German states should be interposed between us and Prussia, in order to prevent collision between us, than that they should be placed between her and Austria to spare the latter a shock? And Saxony having abandoned us on the field of battle, and Europe having lost all sense of moderation

in her dealings with us, were we not justified now more than at any other time, or under any other circumstances, in thinking of ourselves, and of ourselves alone?

These questions contain their own reply; and now, at the end of half a century, one is surprised at the strange view that was taken of them at the period of which we are relating the history. Unfortunately, at that time our foreign was as defective as our home policy, and these questions were not even raised in the royal council. In the same manner, as it was not even asked whether it would not be better to defer for two months that convention of the 23rd of April, by which we surrendered such important pledges, without hastening the departure of the Allied armies by a single day, so it was not asked whether it were not better to put off the treaty of Paris for six months—that is, to a time when the powers assembled for our spoliation should quarrel over the division of the spoil—nor was it even decided what line of policy should be adopted at Vienna. The defective organisation of the royal council was the cause of this, and not a want of intelligence in the men who composed it. This council consisted, as we have already seen, of a confused mixture of princes and of ministers, with and without portfolios, acting under a literary king, who was both inattentive and idle, quite willing to allow himself to be governed, but not to allow a head to his cabinet whose active vigilance would extend to every subject—such a council could only produce results as disconnected as itself. In any department provided with a special minister, gifted with a real capacity for business, everything went on well. The finance department, which enjoyed this advantage, was admirably well administered. In the other departments, and particularly that of the interior, everything was left to chance, and was governed by the passions of the dominant party. As to foreign affairs, they were given up to the King, as king, and to M. de Talleyrand, who enjoyed the reputation of being more conversant in such matters than any man in France. We shall soon see what was the result of this state of things.

The views of Louis XVIII. with regard to foreign policy were, as in all things else, moderate, and tolerably wise, but as limited as his wishes.* Happy at finding himself again in

* There does not, perhaps, exist any subject within the history of our times on which both French and foreign historians are worse informed than the Congress of Vienna, nor is there one more important, since it was in this Congress that modern Europe took its present proportions, and that state of things was established which has now lasted nearly fifty years. Whilst I write, I have before me the most authentic documents, both French and foreign, together with the private correspondence of Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand. The letters of the minister contain the personal anecdotes of this great scene, with every detail that could interest an intellectual, sarcastic king, who was fond of scandal, and free from every prejudice but what regarded his own descent, which he

the kingdom of his fathers, which he got back not alone entire, but increased by the addition of two or three fortresses, and a magnificent museum, in which he took little interest, he felt no desire to increase his dominions, and did not make the very simple reflection that if France remained the same as she had been in 1792, whilst the other States extended their possessions, she became relatively less, and that if she succeeded in recovering her superiority, she would be indebted for it to the Revolution, the benefits of which he was far from appreciating. Louis XVIII. possessed a certain dignified self-respect, but no ambition, and would not lightly risk the public peace, which his age, infirmities, and misfortunes, added to the exhausted state of France, made him value dearly. Besides, the desire of interfering in foreign affairs being an imperial tradition, was not agreeable to him, and he desired that the attitude of France at Vienna should be dignified and pacific. There was only one point about which he felt anxious, it was that Murat should be removed from the throne of Naples. To allow a lesser usurper to hold possession of an European throne, after the greater had fallen, was, in his eyes, an inconsistency, a disgrace to all the powers, and a real danger for France. *Flagitio addit damnum*, said he, in his usual fashion of expressing himself in Latin adages. He considered Naples as a stepping-stone on which Napoleon might descend at any moment, and march to the Alps with eighty thousand Italians, and thence excite all those elements that still fermented in France. As he attributed the difficulties he met in the internal government of his kingdom to Napoleon's intrigues and money, he refused to pay him the income of two million francs which had been stipulated by the treaty of the 11th of April, and even demanded that Napoleon should be transported to the Azores. Besides this removal of Napoleon, and dethronement of Murat, he wished that the Duchy of Parma should be taken from Maria Louisa, as he considered her holding it another source of danger, and another inconsistency of the

considered superior to any other upon earth. The materials for this correspondence were furnished by M. de Talleyrand to M. de la Besnardière, who put them into proper form, and M. de Talleyrand then copied them. The king generally wrote his own replies, though he sometimes employed M. de Blacas. Business, properly so called, was transacted by the Duke Dalberg, who corresponded with the cabinet, and this correspondence was directed by M. de Jancourt during M. de Talleyrand's absence. The latter correspondence, less piquante but more serious than the other, leaves nothing to be desired with respect to matters of business, which are set forth with clearness, precision, and a remarkable knowledge of things, all regarded, be it understood, from that point of view in which the French legation was placed. I cannot quote all the foreign documents from which I have drawn information, but they are equally authentic, and justify me fully in considering the following recital as true and complete.

European policy. He wished that the duchy should be given to the house of Parma, an ally of the Bourbons. As the son of a Saxon princess, he considered it becoming his crown to save the King of Saxony. But this last consideration yielded precedence to all the others. He would not venture on a war, nor even incur a disquietude, for the accomplishment of any of these objects, but he desired that everything should be done that diplomacy could effect. He thought alliances admissible for political reasons, but he would not ally himself too closely with any power, for he considered that close alliances often entailed war. Amongst the four great European powers with whom he could seek an alliance he preferred England, for he found in each of the others something that displeased him. In Russia, he disliked the imprudence of the sovereign; in Prussia, the too-liberal opinions of the nation, and in Austria, her relationship with Napoleon. He carried this prejudice so far as to refuse an alliance with Russia, which might have had the most beneficial results. As he had no heirs but his nephews, and one of these, the Duke d'Angoulême, being married and having no children, it was necessary that the Duke de Berry should marry, in order to keep the crown in the elder branch of the family. Count Pozzo di Borgo proposed that the Duke de Berry should espouse the Grand Duchess Anne, the same whom Napoleon was once about to marry, and entering into this project with all his wonted ardour, he extolled the services that Russia had already rendered, and could still render to France, and dilated upon all the advantages that would result from such a union. But Louis XVIII. considered an alliance with the Romanoffs a degradation to the house of Bourbon, and would not bind himself either to Russia or Alexander; he therefore made some objections on the score of religion, about which he cared little, required that the princess should abjure her faith before coming to France, and, in fact, put a thousand obstacles in the way. He would have preferred an alliance, as we have said, with England, but even with that power he would not form an unreserved alliance. His whole policy was limited to being on good terms with England, without being too closely united to her, and by her help to get rid of Murat and the prisoner of Elba, to obtain Parma for the house of Etruria, and ameliorate in some sort the King of Saxony's fate. But for the accomplishment of none of these projects, except, perhaps, for the dethronement of Murat and the removal of Napoleon, would he have consented to brave any serious difficulties. Having explained his moderate wishes to his negotiator, he left him free to do as best he could, and hardly bestowed a glance on a voluminous memoir drawn up at the Foreign Office, entitled

"Instructions," in which the political position of Europe was minutely detailed. He signed almost without reading it.

It was M. de Besnardière who drew up this memoir, and being intimately acquainted with all the details of European affairs, he had added to the wishes of Louis XVIII. the desires of France on a few points. As the fortresses of Luxembourg and Mayence had passed from our possession, it was necessary to take care that they should not become the property of Prussia or Austria. They could only be left, with safety, in the hands of Holland or Bavaria. With regard to Italy, there was a more important question to be resolved than dispossessing Murat in favour of Ferdinand IV., or Maria Louisa for the ancient Queen of Etruria; and this question was the regal succession in the house of Savoy. The old King of Sardinia had no children, neither had his heir. It was therefore necessary that the succession should be secured to the Carignan branch, lest by marriage Piedmont should fall under the yoke of Austria. In fine, it was necessary to see that the French donees, the principal of whom were Marshals, should not lose their emoluments in the general wreck. These were the secondary but very important points added by the framer of the instructions to the task of our negotiator.

This negotiator, so fashioned by circumstances that no other could possibly be chosen, was M. de Talleyrand. Associated with him was the Duke de Dalberg, who, from his vast connections in Germany and great sagacity, was very well suited for the office. Indeed, the moderate wishes of Louis XVIII. made the task of his two representatives at Vienna very simple. If, abiding by the treaty of 30th of May, they only demanded Murat's deposition, the concession of some lands to the house of Parma, and that the King of Saxony should retain some part of his dominions, everything was in their favour, and they were almost certain to succeed. It was evident that Murat, —whose position was a monstrous anomaly in the actual state of Europe,—unsupported except by Austria, whose protection he forfeited on the commission of a single fault, would soon free her from her engagements with him, and he would consequently sink beneath the combined influence of the two houses of Bourbon. In a congress in which Francis II. held a preponderating influence, it would indeed be more difficult to dispossess Maria Louisa in favour of the house of Parma. But it was not impossible that Italy, in its vast extent, would offer some compensation to her; and as for Saxony, it was certain that Austria would never consent that the Prussians should take possession of Dresden, or that the Russians should establish themselves at the foot of the Bohemian mountains. It was equally certain that the secondary powers of Germany

would rise at the mere suggestion of suppressing a State like Saxony; that England would not be deaf to their complaints; and that, above all, the British Parliament would become indignant at the idea of seeing Russia take possession of all Poland. And if to all this opposition France should join hers, Russia and Prussia would certainly be obliged to yield. It was therefore only needed to let things take their own course, and the moderate wishes of Louis XVIII. would be fulfilled. On the other hand, if France wished to annul the treaty of Paris by joining Russia and Prussia, the task would be more laborious and difficult, though not very dangerous, and almost certain of success; for, in truth, Austria and England would never venture on war, if in addition to Russia and Prussia they had France to contend with. In adopting either course, that of tranquil resignation to the treaty of Paris, or seeking a change of frontier through the disunion of the other powers, there was every prospect of success. Still, whichever line of policy we adopted, a difficulty would be found in Europe's repugnance to reveal her internal disunion to us, or to allow us to interfere in her affairs; for it would be unwise to acknowledge her divisions, and allow us to assume the important part of arbitrator. So long as this feeling lasted, there was but one course to be pursued at Vienna: to wait patiently, without putting ourselves forward, until the other powers, becoming disunited, should have recourse to us; in fact, to let our intervention be sought, not offered. Should we offer to interfere, we should only awaken distrust, and obtain less remuneration afterwards. Patience mingled with pride was the attitude best suited to us, and that most likely to produce a good result; for two things were certain, the division of interests, and the necessity the three powers would feel of France's aid; and considering these two inevitable results, our expectant policy would inevitably succeed.

If ever man was eminently fitted for this task, it was M. de Talleyrand. Noble by birth, and eminent by the position he had held for thirty years; distinguished by his style of living, and by the imposing and disdainful grace of his demeanour, he had almost transformed inertia into a virtue, and even an epigram, under a prince who seemed to consider activity a vice; and if an error should ever result from over-eagerness in action, that error would certainly not be committed by M. de Talleyrand at Vienna. But, however, temperament will yield to passion; and he who appears the most phlegmatic of men, becomes the most impetuous, when goaded by self-love or ambition. Of this truth, M. de Talleyrand was about to give an extraordinary proof.

During the last fifteen years, M. de Talleyrand had played

the principal part in all European assemblies; and those very men who were now to appear before him as the ministers of the victorious powers of Europe, had always held a rank inferior to his, and yielded to his opinion. Under the Empire, M. de Metternich had come to Paris as the modest minister of a vanquished and oppressed court; M. de Nesselrode was a simple secretary to the embassy. It must have been painful to M. Talleyrand not to find himself at least on a level with these men, formerly so submissive and so deferential; and the result of this consciousness was an uncomfortable feeling, which could not fail to produce an injurious effect upon his deportment at Vienna. Averse to the trouble of reflecting or anticipating events, he had not paused to consider whether the divisions amongst the European powers might not afford an opportunity of ameliorating the condition of France. He only thought what attitude that long dominant country would assume at Vienna, now that she was herself conquered; and in what position he would appear as her representative. He said to himself that, to represent justice—which he defined by a happily chosen word, “legitimacy,” and which was universally adopted—would be a very dignified and becoming part, and by no means inferior to that he had already acted as the representative of all-powerful genius.

He set out for Vienna, determined to assure himself a suitable position by means of the talisman of legitimacy, which, though powerful for many purposes, was not equal to all. It would be very efficacious in the dethronement of Murat, or in exciting sympathy for the King of Saxony, but could not be made universally applicable; for were legitimacy adopted as a principle, it would not be possible to treat with Bernadotte, whom the Allies were anxious to flatter: negotiations should be entered into with Gustavus IV., who was wandering through Europe as a fugitive. Nor, were legitimacy admitted as a principle, could the representative of Ferdinand VII. be received at the Congress of Vienna, for he was king only in prejudice of his father, Charles IV., who, far from renouncing his rights, was quite ready to assert them. The admission of this principle would also necessitate a summons to the representatives of Genoa, Venice, Malta, to the ancient electors of Cologne, Treves, and Mayence, and many other victims, whose spoils were about being divided. The Congress would, under such circumstances, be filled with phantoms, to the exclusion of actual and powerful existences. This word, “legitimacy,” therefore, however true and respectable, was not at this moment sufficiently powerful to defend the more serious interests of France; it awakened a smile on the lips of the practical men who were about to assemble at Vienna, and who used or rejected the word as suited

their purpose. But this assertion of legitimacy entailed one inconvenience—it placed us in the same category with England and Austria, and bound us to their policy, and in presence of the two great parties that were about to divide Europe, deprived us of our principle strength—freedom of choice.

With incontestable superiority as a negotiator, M. de Talleyrand arrived at Vienna in a frame of mind not the best suited to profit of the circumstances arising from our new position. That he would assume a dignified position, there could be no doubt; that he would act prudently was not quite so certain. In any case, France was certain, when represented by M. de Talleyrand, not to play the part of a conquered, and, far less, of a humiliated power.

Be this as it may, M. de Talleyrand left Paris on the 15th of September, and arrived at Vienna on the 23rd. It was two days before the arrival of the sovereigns, but their chancellors and staffs had arrived some days before, and from the time of their arrival their tongues had been very busy. Many points that had hitherto been left in doubt now began to be cleared up. The Russians and Prussians, who were informed of their masters' designs, were by no means anxious to conceal them. The Russians boastingly declared that they would have all Poland; and the Prussians, with equal lack of modesty and prudence, said that they should have Saxony. Both seemed to think that these concessions could not be refused in return for their important services.

These desires, announced with so much confidence, had from the very first day excited the greatest commotion in the Congress. The lesser princes of Germany, and other countries, were offended that a State of their own rank should be suppressed to gratify an ambitious neighbour, and for a fault that was common to them all—an alliance with imperial France. The representatives of the other States were alarmed at seeing Russia, with the connivance of Prussia, boldly advancing from the Vistula—her boundary at the commencement of the century—to the Wartha and the Oder. They spoke openly on the subject, and said that it was not worth the trouble of overturning the power of Napoleon, if it were to be replaced so quickly and so completely by another equally dangerous tyranny. This ambitious design, so boldly announced, was not less offensive than the avowed design of leaving the entire management of affairs between the four legations of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, to the exclusion of all others. The French legation was, consequently, expected with the greatest impatience; and although no love was felt for France, especially in a place abounding with Germans, all were ready to place themselves under her direction, provided

that, putting forth no pretensions for herself, she lent her aid to the oppressed, the excluded, and the offended. The aggrieved were, in short, willing to be defended, saved, and avenged, gratuitously, by France.

The exercise of a little of M. de Talleyrand's habitual phlegm would have allowed these desires time to ferment until they became converted into passion; but from the moment of his arrival at Vienna he yielded to the influence of the scene of which he was witness. The ministers of each court received him with all the attention due to one of the most illustrious personages of Europe—the representative of legitimacy, as he had once been of victory; and, besides, the last type of the elegant dignity of the past, so much admired at that time. His house was frequented by diplomatists of every grade, by whom he was treated with profound respect; but when business came to be discussed, a different line of conduct was pursued towards him. The *Four*—that is, the representatives of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia—whilst they treated him with the greatest deference, conversed very little on business, and showed only too plainly that his influence was not as welcome as himself, and that they intended to arrange everything themselves, though there was less unity in their interests than in their intentions. The representatives of the lesser courts, generally restless, well-informed of passing events, and accustomed to excite the ministers of the greater courts against one another, because they derived advantage from such disunion,—all these assembled round M. de Talleyrand, and either directly or through M. de Dalberg, revealed to him the project which the *Four* had formed of retaining the direction of affairs in their own hands, and of giving Saxony to Prussia, who would deliver Poland to Russia. These revelations were accompanied by malicious commentaries on the good understanding subsisting between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia; the incompetency of Lord Castlereagh, and the want of firmness of M. de Metternich, both of whom were ready to allow the most violent outrages on public justice—the one because he had not the ability, and the other because he had not the courage to prevent them.

M. de Talleyrand need only to have waited a few days, and he would have seen the project of the *Four* disappear before the general disapprobation. But the resolution, which the greater powers had formed, of excluding him from their councils, and which had been revealed to him by the lesser States, piqued him to the quick. He immediately declared, that as France was now under the rule of true equity, she would at Vienna, if necessary, be its disinterested and only represen-

tative; that there were improprieties she would not suffer, and iniquities which she would not sanction. These resolutions being publicly proclaimed, produced a great sensation, delighted the lesser German powers, irritated Russia and Prussia, and very much embarrassed England and Austria, who, though they were undoubtedly dissatisfied at the eagerness shown to seize on Poland and Saxony, still were alarmed at the prospect of the storm, which France, at the head of the inferior German States, seemed about to raise.

The diplomatists, especially the Prussians, who were offended by the position we had so suddenly taken, began to say, that France had already thrown off the mask; that, at first, she seemed resigned to her new condition, though she was not so in reality; that she still wished her frontier to extend along the Rhine—a boundary which she sought to recover by exciting disunion amongst the Allies, and that if a strong combination were not formed against her, that she would still do great harm. These calumnies were answered by our legation, and by its most active member, M. de Dalberg, who was on the best terms with the Germans, by saying, that France desired nothing for herself; she was no longer ambitious; that she was not thinking of her own aggrandizement, but of checking the excessive ambition which threatened the safety of all Europe. It was very annoying to be obliged to make such protestations thus early at Vienna, and be forced to declare ourselves satisfied, after the manner in which we had been treated in the negotiations at Paris. If, on the contrary, we had waited a little, and not revealed our plans so soon, each power, in order to gain our support, would rather have fomented our ambition than blamed it, and offers would have been made us, instead of our being obliged to make protestations of disinterestedness, which bound us to our existing condition even more than did the Treaty of Paris.

Be this as it may, before the lapse of a week, the secret project of each power was bruited about Vienna. It was well-known that Russia wished to get the whole of Poland, that Prussia demanded Saxony, that the second-rate States of Germany were indignant, and eagerly sought the support which France as eagerly offered, and that Austria and England embarrassed by this tumult, were still determined, although suspecting the designs of Russia and Prussia, to transact all business with these latter, to the exclusion of all the other powers. The splendour of public fêtes only threw a veil over agitation the most intense, and anxiety the most profound.

It would be impossible to describe the Emperor of Russia's irritation and astonishment. He was so convinced of Europe's

great obligations to him, that he could hardly understand his wishes being opposed. In his anger he considered every one ungrateful; the Germans, because they would not allow him to advance as far as the Oder; the Bourbons, because they refused to give him up their cousin, the King of Saxony; and even England and Austria, because by their silence they seemed to approve the clamour that was raised against him. All this had such an effect on Alexander, that he, who was usually so mild and affectionate, became all at once cold, haughty, and severe. His anger was strongest against us. He had, he said, saved France as far as he could from the hands of the conquerors, he had placed the Bourbons on the throne, and M. de Talleyrand at the head of affairs. He had bestowed innumerable favours upon the country, king, and prime minister, and had met with ingratitude from all. Louis XVIII. had shown as little personal respect for him as consideration for his advice; he had not followed his councils: he had not even thought of offering him the "Cordon bleu," which he had so eagerly offered to the Prince Regent of England; had even refused him to raise M. de Caulaincourt to the peerage, and had put almost offensive obstacles to the marriage of the Duke de Berry with the Grand Duchess Anne. The Emperor Alexander recounted these offences with great anger and very little discretion, and he considered them even exceeded by the attitude which M. de Talleyrand had so suddenly assumed at Vienna. The prudent Count Nesselrode, constantly occupied in extinguishing the flames that others kindled, sought to calm the Emperor's feelings towards everybody, but more especially towards France, for whose alliance he was extremely desirous. He advised M. de Talleyrand to ask an audience of the Emperor. This was almost a duty incumbent on M. de Talleyrand on his arrival at Vienna, and one by no means disagreeable to him, for he was more anxious to extend than limit his sphere of action. He did ask this audience, but Alexander made him wait several days for an answer. At last the Czar replied, and received the representative of France at the imperial palace of Schoenbrunn, where he was staying. Instead of receiving M. de Talleyrand in his usual affectionate and familiar manner, he treated him with the greatest haughtiness, which, however, did not at all embarrass the illustrious diplomatist, an accomplished master in the art of preserving his self-possession in the presence of the highest earthly potentates. The Czar questioned him rudely and rapidly about the state of France, like one who did not expect to hear a good account of what was doing there, and who almost doubted whether Europe had acted wisely in recalling the Bourbons. M. de Talleyrand

replied respectfully, but firmly, to all the Emperor's questions, and the following sententious conversation took place between them:—"In what state is your country?" "Very good, Sire; as good as your Majesty could desire, and better than could be hoped." "And the public mind?" "Becomes calmer every day." "And the progress of liberal opinions?" "These opinions do not make a more regular or truer progress anywhere." "And the press?" "Is free, with the exception of a few restrictions which are necessary at first." "And the army?" "Excellent; we have thirty thousand men under arms, and can raise our numbers to three hundred thousand within a month." "And the marshals?" "Which, Sire?" "Oudinot." "He is most loyal." "Soult?" "At first he was a little out of humour, but he got Brittany, and is satisfied, and expresses the greatest loyalty." "Ney?" "He is depressed from the loss of his emoluments, but he depends on your Majesty to redress his grievances." "Your Chambers?" "It is said that they are not on good terms with the government." "Who could have said such a thing to your Majesty?" "As in every commencement, we have met some difficulties, but after twenty-five years of revolution, it is miraculous to have attained such a state of calmness as we enjoy at present." "Are you content with your position?" "Sire, the king's confidence and goodness exceed my hopes." As Alexander heard each of these replies, which he scarcely allowed M. de Talleyrand time to finish, an expression of ironical incredulity played over his features. But he soon discontinued these inquiries as to the state of France, inquiries that might have become offensive, had not M. de Talleyrand's respectful haughtiness sustained him in the difficult part he had to play. The Emperor then said quickly, "Let us speak of our affairs. Shall we finish them?" "It depends on your Majesty to terminate them to your own glory and the advantage of Europe." The Czar could scarcely restrain himself, and expressed as much surprise as displeasure at the resistance he met from France; he said to M. de Talleyrand, "I think the Bourbons owe me something." Without disputing his master's obligations to Alexander, M. de Talleyrand spoke of the rights of Europe, which ought to be respected, especially after the fall of a man who was accused of trampling them under foot. "These European rights," said Alexander, "that you raise up to oppose me, I know them not; between sovereigns, right means that which suits each, and I recognize no other." M. de Talleyrand turned away his face, and raising his hands above his head, cried, "Hapless Europe! hapless Europe! what will become of you?" The Emperor was more irritated than restrained by this significant exclamation, and said in a

tone that M. de Talleyrand had never before heard him use, "If that be the case, war! war! I have two hundred thousand men in Poland, come and expel me from it. Every power has consented to my holding it, you alone oppose, and break an agreement that was nearly universal." M. de Talleyrand had, under the Empire, sustained the attacks of a more formidable lion than Alexander. He appeared more afflicted than disturbed by the Emperor's violence, and replied that France neither desired nor dreaded war, but if unfortunately she should be forced to it, she would support the rights of all, aided by the sympathy of all, and the assistance of many allies, for he was certain that the universal agreement, the thought of which was so flattering to the Emperor, did not exist. At the termination of this painful conversation, M. de Talleyrand bowed coldly, but respectfully, and proceeded towards the door of the imperial cabinet. Alexander then advanced towards him, took his hand, and pressed it with a convulsive movement, which revealed both his excitement and irritation. It was in such situations, as the representative of one great power before another, that M. de Talleyrand was unrivalled. And had the true interests of France lain at that time in the direction of the Elbe and the Vistula instead of the Rhine and the Alps, never could they have been more proudly asserted, or more thoroughly served.

The end of September was devoted to *fêtes* and desultory discussions. But it was time that the Congress should assemble officially, under some form or another, either fully or in part. The representatives of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England—that is, MM. de Nesselrode, de Hardenberg, de Metternich, and Lord Castlereagh, the FOUR, as they were called—arrived first. The more complicated matters became, the more anxious were they to keep the management in their own hands. They proceeded to debate the conditions that should regulate the proceedings of the Congress, whilst they secretly agreed upon what they considered the best mode of proceeding.

The most celebrated Congresses of past times offered contradictory precedents, none of which was wholly applicable to actual circumstances. Never before had representatives from every nation assembled to decide the fate of almost the entire civilised world, not alone with regard to its territorial, but its legislative interests. The plenipotentiaries who composed the Congress of Westphalia had only to decide on the affairs of Germany, whilst those assembled at Vienna were called upon to arrange not alone the affairs of Germany, but of Europe, and even of the two hemispheres. It would seem that nothing could be easier and simpler than that the minis-

ters of the several states should assemble and deliberate in common. But how could they deliberate together on subjects that concerned some directly, and others indirectly? How, for example, could Berne decide on the affairs of Portugal, or Portugal on those of Norway, or both on the constitution of Germany and Italy? How attach the same value to the vote of those who represented fifty millions of men, or to the vote of those who represented but a million or less? If all these difficulties were taken into consideration, how could they be calculated with sufficient precision? It was evidently impossible to define such distinctions, and the plenipotentiaries of the different powers could not be assembled in a kind of *constituent* European assembly; for if there were some like Austria, Prussia, France, England, and Prussia, who were interested in all the questions, great and small, the greater number represented interests, either too exclusively local, or too trifling, to give their votes either the disinterestedness or weight that could influence the assembly. Besides, there were plenipotentiaries whom some would admit and others reject. Prussia and Russia refused to admit the minister of the King of Saxony, having already declared that this monarch ought to be deprived of his crown; the two houses of Bourbon rejected the envoy of the actual King of Naples, as the representative of an usurper; and none would admit the representative of the ancient republic of Genoa, whose existence was not recognised. A general assembly was therefore impossible, and it was more natural that those who had signed the Treaty of Paris, and who had adjourned their meeting to Vienna, should now assume the part of the mediating powers of former Congresses, and constitute themselves mediators, or, if necessary, arbitrators between the interested parties. Therefore the eight powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris could open the Congress, examine credentials, form committees of the interested parties to discuss individual questions, reserving to themselves the right to decide all difficult points, and thus establish a kind of unity. Special treaties being drawn up on each point, all should be afterwards combined into one general treaty, which should be signed by all the states, without exception, to render it binding upon all Europe. It is true, that amongst the eight states that had signed, two—Portugal and Sweden—found themselves called upon to play the part of first-rate powers, a part by no means due to their real influence, but which arose from the accidental circumstance of their being authorised as belligerents to sign the Treaty of the 30th of May with France. But this was a very trifling inconsistency, and was compensated by the advantage arising from the apparent legality of

the mediation of the eight who had signed the Treaty, and convoked the Congress.

This was the only good and practicable form of holding the Congress, provided, however, that certain powers did not take advantage of it to arrogate all authority to themselves; and this mode was adopted by the plenipotentiaries of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, who were secretly occupied in arranging the mode of proceeding. They therefore agreed to do all they could to make this arrangement acceptable to the numerous representatives of Europe actually assembled at Vienna. The question of formalities being decided, there still remained two important questions unsettled—the partition of the immense territories lately vacated, and the definite constitution of Germany. Italy and Switzerland gave rise of course to important considerations, but of restricted interest, as concerning only France, Austria, and Spain. It was agreed that this question could be decided later, when the two more important had been arranged. It was then agreed by the FOUR, that the eight states that had signed the treaty of Paris should take the initiative in opening the congress, and that two committees should be afterwards formed, the one to regulate the division of territory and the general affairs of Europe, and the other to fix the condition of Germany. The first, which was to be the great European committee, was to include the FOUR; but it would be impossible to exclude France, the representative of the elder branch of the Bourbons, and with her Spain, the representative of the younger—Spain, on whose support the Allies reckoned, because that she was Spain; because that she was under the sway of Ferdinand VII.; and because that they knew that the two houses of Bourbon were disunited. It was agreed at last, that whilst, for form sake, these six powers were to constitute the great European committee, all important questions should be secretly decided beforehand by the FOUR; by which means, whilst apparently dividing authority, they should retain it all to themselves.

The affairs of Germany were to be entrusted to Austria and Prussia, who would play the same part in this question that the FOUR did in European matters; that is, they would, after deciding all the points between themselves, submit them as a matter of form to the inferior German states, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover. (The latter had been formed into a kingdom for the advantage of the reigning house of England.) Saxony, being more or less condemned by the FOUR, and lightly esteemed by all, was to have no part in this German Committee; nor the two Hesses, which were not yet re-established; nor Baden, considered too unimportant to be taken into account.

Such was the result of the first Conferences, at the opening of the Congress, between the ministers of the four great courts, as to the mode of dividing the authority. It was strange, and even ridiculous, to see these **FOUR** arrogate to themselves universal sovereignty, in virtue of a union which their rapacity made impossible, and which was sure to be violently dissolved at the bare announcement of their reciprocal pretensions. There was, therefore, no reason for serious alarm at their intrigues. However, a general commotion was excited in a few days by the first glimpse of their projects. All those excluded from the deliberations, and who considered their exclusion only as preparatory to their ruin, complained loudly; and asked why every question should be decided by four, by six, or even by eight powers; and why the congress was not formally assembled? The French legation, highly offended at being excluded from these preliminary and secret arrangements, propagated the idea of a general assembling of the congress—an idea very acceptable to all the excluded, that is, to almost every one. This idea was warmly supported by the Spanish representative, M. de Labrador, a very sensible man, who, notwithstanding the bad feeling existing between the courts of Paris and Madrid—which he did not consider right to announce at Vienna—was most anxious that, as the two houses of Bourbon had the same interests to support, they should adopt the same attitude, conduct, and language. He followed M. de Talleyrand in everything, adopted his ideas, and repeated his words. Thus, under the influence of the French legation, but more especially under the influence of self-interest, but one question was heard in the saloons of Vienna—"When will the Congress assemble? when will it be summoned?"

The **FOUR** were alarmed at the idea of assembling the entire Congress in the present state of the public mind. However, they must show some symptom of life, and communicate with the many diplomatists assembled for some weeks past at Vienna, and who waited vainly for some communication. The **FOUR**, therefore, conformably to their private arrangement, resolved that the eight who had signed the treaty of Paris should, at least apparently, take the initiative in the operations of the Congress, and publish a declaration announcing that, conformable to the 32nd article of this treaty, which convoked the assembly of the representatives of Europe at Vienna, they had now assembled there, and were occupied in a preliminary examination of the important questions that were to be decided, but had not yet come to perfect understanding; that, consequently, they would adjourn for a month, and employ that time in endeavouring to assimilate the general interests, and recon-

cile contending opinions; that, afterwards, the congress should be assembled after whatever fashion was judged most suitable, in order to give an authentic and official form to the resolutions previously decided on.

Pursuant to this arrangement, M. de Metternich determined to assemble at his house, not the eight who had signed the treaty of Paris, but the six principal plenipotentiaries—that is to say, the representatives of Austria, England, Russia, Prussia, France, and Spain, who, according to the plan previously arranged in secret, were to form the European committee, and to these he resolved to submit the proposed declarations. This *réunion*—for the invitations having been sent in confidential notes, the character of the assembly was strictly private—seemed to imply no other desire than that the invited guests should come to a private understanding about a manifestation that had become indispensable. The invitations were issued on the 29th for the 30th of September, in order that the declaration may be dated the 1st of October, and the meeting be adjourned to the 1st of November.

M. de Talleyrand, having previously come to an understanding with M. de Labrador, repaired to this meeting, which instead of eight, only comprised six of those who had signed the treaty of Paris. He was the last that arrived, and entered with his wonted air of haughtiness and indifference; on his habitually inexpressive countenance, a slight shade of irony was discernible. Around M. de Metternich's table were assembled, M. de Nesselrode, the representative of Russia; Lord Castlereagh, of England; M. de Metternich, of Austria; MM. Hardenberg and Humbolt, of Prussia; M. de Labrador, of Spain, and De Gentz, the celebrated pamphleteer, who was to draw up the resolutions. M. de Talleyrand took his place between Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich, as though he were at home, and then, with a careless air, demanded what was the object of the meeting, and in what character the persons present were summoned. M. de Metternich undertook to reply to the French plenipotentiary, and said that he wished to assemble the members of the cabinet in order that they might come to an understanding concerning a declaration that was not only necessary, but indispensable. "The heads of the cabinet," said M. de Talleyrand, as he looked at those present, "M. de Labrador is not one, nor is M. de Humbolt." M. de Metternich, a little embarrassed, replied that as Spain had no other representative than M. de Labrador at Vienna, they had been obliged to summon him, and that M. de Humbolt was there to assist M. de Hardenberg, who was very deaf. "If infirmities confer a right," said M. de Talleyrand, "I, too, might have brought some one to aid me." He

then asked why their number was but six and not eight; if it were those who had signed the treaty of Paris that were to meet, why he did not see assembled around this table all those interested in the questions that were to be decided at the Congress; and, in a word, why were six to decide upon the interests of all? He was told that the point about to be considered was merely a preliminary declaration, which especially concerned those who had signed the treaty of Paris, because they were the originators of the Congress, and that to judge of the merits of the declaration it should be read. The declaration was then read.

In this document the word *allies* was repeated several times, and employed so that it evidently referred to the belligerent powers that had concluded the treaty of Chaumont against France. When this word was pronounced, M. de Talleyrand interrupted the reader, and said, "I know of no allies here, for allies imply war, and the war ended on the 30th of May, 1814." He listened to the remainder like one who did not comprehend what he heard, and yet could not be accused of want of intelligence. He disconcerted all present by his expressions of surprise, by his numerous questions, and at last succeeded in throwing them into indescribable confusion. "I do not know," he repeated, "in what character we are here, or by what right we represent all the European powers. I do not know who these are that call themselves '*allies*,' who take upon them to adjourn the Congress for a month, instead of assembling it immediately, in order at least to examine credentials, and afterwards decide on matters of form and the time for commencing deliberations." M. de Metternich replied that a word was of no consequence, and that "*allies*" had merely been used from custom. "It is a custom that must be changed," interrupted M. de Talleyrand. M. de Metternich resumed, and said that a deliberative assembly could not be convoked without first deciding who were to be summoned, by what title members were to be admitted, and the amount of influence that was to be allowed to each; that the power of deciding on the interests of Russia, which possessed fifty millions inhabitants, could not be confided to a prince who had but as many thousand subjects; and besides, that this declaration was merely to announce the opening of the Congress, and to ask a month's delay, in order to make amicable arrangements between the interested parties, by means of friendly and confidential communications.

These reasons, which were extremely good, if they did cover the intention of restricting all power to four, did not seem to make the least impression on M. de Talleyrand, whom no argument could move. "But we cannot," said M. de Har-

denberg, "allow the affairs of Europe to be decided by the princes of Lippe and Liechtenstein." "Nor can we," replied M. de Talleyrand, "allow them to be decided by the representatives of Russia and Prussia." Somebody happening to mention Murat as a proof of the difficulty of deciding who should be admitted to the Congress, "We do not know that man," replied M. de Talleyrand, with a peculiar expression of contempt, and the air of one who was not much inconvenienced by the remembrance of his past career. In fact, he threw all present into the greatest embarrassment, and the conference broke up without coming to any decision.

It was undeniably a success to prevent the chariot of the four great allied powers from rolling unimpeded over the soil of Vienna. But this success ought not to be carried too far, for whatever policy France might adopt, whether she joined Russia and Prussia in the hope of ameliorating her own condition, or sided with Austria and England to save Saxony, there were two powers of the four whom it was important to separate from the others, and whom it would not be prudent to irritate, or even embarrass too much. There would have been sufficient publicity given to this scene by the eagerness of those who feared being excluded from the Congress, and who were delighted at seeing the project of the exclusives defeated. They told everywhere of the attempt that had been made to defer the assembling of the Congress, and to restrict the entire direction of affairs to four powers, and the resistance which had defeated these designs. The FOUR, Prussia especially, were most active in repeating what they had already said, that it was useless for France to try to conceal her secret wishes, that she only affected to be satisfied with the treaty of Paris, that she regretted the Rhine frontier, and sought to regain it by causing general disunion; a most unmerited calumny, which necessitated fresh declarations of disinterestedness, which were a new engagement neither to desire or demand anything beyond the terms of the treaty of Paris.

This state of excitement was increased by a note drawn up by M. de Talleyrand, of which the reasoning was most logical, and such as could not easily be answered. In this note he proved that six powers were no better qualified than eight to decide for all, that of course as these powers had, by the treaty of Paris, appointed Vienna as the place where the Congress was to be held, it was only natural that they should take the initiative in the first declaration, but that this declaration should be conformable to the claims and rights of all the States; that to fulfil this condition the plenipotentiaries of all the States ought to be summoned, were it only that their

credentials might be examined, and the Congress constituted according to the proper formalities. The different members might afterwards be divided into committees to examine questions individually interesting to the different powers, or the Congress might be adjourned were confidential communications needed to bring about a better understanding; that this first meeting would not present the difficulties that were apprehended, for the lesser States did not pretend to decide on the affairs of the greater, and were only anxious to protect their own interests; that even did these alleged inconveniences exist, they would present as great obstacles at the close as at the commencement of the Congress; that, consequently, all the plenipotentiaries ought to be assembled, were it but once, in order that their credentials might be examined, if even the Congress should be adjourned next day; that the prerogative of the eight who had signed the treaty of Paris, consisted exclusively in the right, 1st., to convoke this first meeting; and, 2nd., to determine by what title members should be admitted.

The entire aim of this logically irrefutable declaration was contained in the last proposition. M. de Talleyrand's object was, that the right of admission should be determined in such a manner that the King of Saxony's representative should be admitted, and Murat's rejected. England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia made a terrible outcry upon reading the French note. In the first place, they desired that everything should be done in a friendly quiet manner, for fear of warning or exciting the interested parties. Secondly, the very idea of assembling the Congress terrified Prussia, who expected a storm, should only two Germans be present, at the proposal to suppress Saxony. But this was doing more than speaking on the subject, it was solving the question by admitting to the Congress the representative of King Frederick Augustus, as it would be solving the Neapolitan question to reject Murat's representative.

Though nobody felt an interest in the last-named sovereign, his interests were carefully considered by M. de Metternich, on account, it was maliciously said, of this statesman's great friendship for the Queen of Naples; but that was a mistake; his real motives were very different. M. de Metternich had used his personal influence at the Court of Naples to induce Murat to join the Coalition, and he considered himself morally bound to protect him, unless Murat compromised himself by some crime against the general interest of Europe. It was not difficult to foresee that Murat would commit some error, and M. de Metternich waited the event, to avoid doing what might seem an act of treachery. Besides, having assembled two hundred and fifty thousand men in Bohemia, Gallicia, and Moravia, in

order to support his policy against the pretensions of Russia and Prussia, and having but fifty thousand in Italy, where the public mind was in a state of ferment, and where Murat had eighty thousand men, principally commanded by French officers, M. de Metternich did not wish, as he very sensibly said, *to set fire to both ends of the house*. However anxious the members of the French Legation might be to gratify the wishes of Louis XVIII. with regard to Naples, they might have adopted the policy of the Austrian minister; for it was not because his views were so different from ours that he sought to gain time, but because he knew better than we how to attain his object.

Though M. de Gentz was very violent when he wielded his pen, he was very moderate in action. In his efforts to bring about a conciliatory state of feeling, he hurried from one embassy to another—to the French especially, for he was convinced, as was everybody else, that it was necessary to soothe the discontented parties, if an outbreak was to be avoided. Another meeting was agreed to, and the six plenipotentiaries assembled at M. de Metternich's. The first thing asked of M. de Talleyrand was to withdraw his note, as it would be difficult to avoid answering it, and still more difficult to answer it without touching on very delicate questions. Whilst M. de Talleyrand was alleging reasons for not complying with this demand, M. de Labrador said that the suppression of the note was no longer possible, as he had sent a copy of it to his court. In a momentary burst of ill-humour, M. de Metternich, turning to M. de Nesselrode, said, "I think we should have done better by arranging our affairs amongst ourselves."—"As you please," said M. de Talleyrand; and when M. de Metternich pressed for a further explanation, he added, "I shall not again attend any of your meetings, but, as a member of the Congress, I shall await the convocation of that assembly." This was announcing that France, heading the dissenting party, would demand the general assembling of the Congress, by refusing to recognise all that should be decided without its precincts. This was a serious threat. Therefore, all present, anxious to avoid coming to extremities, endeavoured to restrain themselves and conduct the deliberations with more moderation. M. de Metternich remarked to M. de Talleyrand, as was very true, that nothing was yet prepared; that not a single question had as yet been touched on; and that it would be very embarrassing to meet the Congress in such a state. M. de Talleyrand replied that he was quite willing to yield as to the time for assembling the Congress, and concede the three or four weeks that were thought necessary for preparation, but on condition that this general assembly should be decided on, and that the terms of admission should be pretty nearly the following:—

“That the representative of every prince should be admitted whose territories had been involved in the late war—territories of which he had been anteriorly and universally recognized as sovereign, and which he had not abandoned either by cession or abdication.”

This was coming back to the old difficulty, for this principle excluded Murat, who had not been universally recognized as sovereign, and admitted the King of Saxony, who had not yielded his territories either by *cession* or *abdication*. This was deciding by a question of form, a fundamental principle, with regard to the two most difficult questions that were to be brought before the Congress. The plenipotentiaries could not agree, and the meeting consequently broke up. As the members were retiring, Lord Castlereagh endeavoured to bring M. de Talleyrand to reason, by insinuating that his obstinacy was unwittingly injuring those interests that he had most at heart. Unfortunately, not wishing to avow that England and Austria were ready to abandon Russia and Prussia, and unskilled in that art which expresses much in half a word, he did not succeed in making himself understood. On the other hand, M. de Talleyrand had committed himself too far to draw back easily.

However, all parties felt the necessity of coming to an understanding, for the FOUR saw how impossible it was to realise their project of transacting all the business themselves, even though, for form's sake, they should increase their number to six or eight, whilst so many interests were arrayed against them; and M. de Talleyrand, although more excited than usual, felt that by constantly piquing Lord Castlereagh, and more particularly, M. de Metternich, whom he did not like, he would end by uniting the FOUR more closely, who, driven to extremities, would, perhaps, end by sacrificing all those interests which the French Legation was commissioned to defend. All were, therefore, disposed to make concessions, and after three or four days' negotiations, they finally came to terms, making use of the skilful pen of M. de Gentz, and deducting something from the declaration of each party. A document was drawn up, couched in very general and evasive terms, which conceded one important point to M. de Talleyrand—the assembling the Congress within a month; and yielded one equally important to MM. de Metternich and de Hardenberg—that the principle of admission should be passed over in silence. This document declared that the representatives of the eight powers, that had signed the Treaty of Paris, having promised to meet again at Vienna, had kept this promise and were come there; that they had already conferred with the representatives of the different courts interested in

their proceedings, but that to come to an amicable understanding, longer confidential communications were needed; that they, therefore, deferred the opening of Congress for a month, when they would be in a position to accomplish their task in a manner more suitable to the interests of Europe, the expectation of contemporaries, and the esteem of posterity.

This declaration being drawn up, it was agreed that the plenipotentiaries should again assemble on the 8th of October, at M. de Metternich's house, their number increased from six to eight by the addition of the representatives of Sweden and Portugal to those of Russia, France, Prussia, Austria, England, and Spain. M. de Metternich invited M. de Talleyrand to come an hour before the others, in order to decide about the final form of the declaration. M. de Talleyrand kept the appointment, and M. de Metternich told him that he had desired this *tête-à-tête*, in order to concert with him concerning the declaration that was about being proposed, and which he was certain would satisfy him. M. de Metternich looked for the document, but not finding it, M. de Talleyrand said, with the ironic smile that sometimes enlivened his hueless countenance: "Probably the declaration is being discussed by *the allies*." "Let us make no further mention of allies," replied M. de Metternich. He then exhorted his interlocutor to act with confidence, and putting all bickerings aside, seek by their common efforts to secure the common interests. M. de Talleyrand replied by asking how it happened that M. de Metternich left to him the task of defending Dresden from Prussian, and Cracow from Russian cupidity. M. de Metternich might have replied, that it was quite as strange to see M. de Talleyrand so anxious to espouse the interests of Austria, and not leave her to take care of herself. But his purpose was to come to terms, and not to offend. M. de Metternich endeavoured to persuade M. de Talleyrand that were he allowed to act, he would defend those interests that seemed most in danger. M. de Talleyrand sought, by being more explicit himself, to induce M. de Metternich to explain himself further; he declared that France desired nothing for herself, that she was quite ready to sign the declaration, but that there were some things to which, considering the common interest, she could never consent. For example, she would never consent that Prussia should have Luxembourg and Mayence, that she should get Dresden, or that Russia should extend her frontier beyond the Vistula. He added, that the King of Saxony should be satisfied to make some sacrifices, but that France would never consent to his being deprived of all his dominions. Here M. de Metternich interrupted him, and taking his hand, said, "We are nearer to coming to an

understanding than you think. Prussia shall have neither Luxembourg nor Mayence; we shall do our best to preserve the greater part of his dominions for the King of Saxony, and to keep Russia as far as possible from the Oder; but have patience, and do not raise useless obstacles." He then spoke of that which M. de Talleyrand had not mentioned, although it was his essential interest. "I know," he said, "your principal aim" (he alluded to Naples); "everything is in your favour, but do not be in a hurry; you would only involve consequences that neither you nor I, nor indeed any of us, could control.

M. de Talleyrand affected a perfect indifference about Neapolitan affairs; it was a question of principle, and not of family interest; and he felt assured that Europe, for her own honour, would no longer support a state of things in Italy, that was at once a scandal and a danger.

This short explanation had a very mollifying effect on M. de Talleyrand, who from that time showed a greater inclination to negotiate. The other plenipotentiaries having arrived, MM. de Talleyrand and de Metternich joined them. M. de Nesselrode represented Russia, M. de Talleyrand France, M. de Metternich Austria, MM. de Hardenberg and Humboldt Prussia, Lord Castlereagh England, M. de Labrador Spain, M. de Palmella Portugal, and M. de Loewenhielm Sweden. M. de Gentz acted as amanuensis. The two declarations were read, that first proposed by M. de Talleyrand, and that drawn up by M. de Metternich, in which he adopted part of the French note. The latter was generally preferred, because, whilst it announced the general assembling of the Congress at the expiration of a month, it did not decide as to the right of admission. M. de Talleyrand felt that he must yield, since he had gained the most important point—the promise of assembling the Congress; but wishing to gain another advantage before giving up, he declared that he was ready to adopt the proposed project, if to the phrase, which declared that by the delay of a month the proceedings of the Congress would be more conformable to the *expectation of contemporaries*, these words should be added, *and to European international law*, a phrase which he believed to possess a most useful signification, without particularising anything.

These words raised a storm. The Prussians saw in them an allusion to Saxony and its preservation, and were filled with fear and anger. It is true that international law was invoked as a shield for Saxony. Evident as the allusion was to some, others were quite unconscious of it, and, indeed, in any case the question could not be decided by allusions. M. de Hardenberg rose, and in that excitement usual to

persons who do not comprehend clearly either their own meaning or that of others, he exclaimed, "What need is there to speak of international law? Nothing, of course, will be done contrary to it. There can be no doubt of that." "If there is no doubt of it," replied M. de Talleyrand; "it will be still better to declare it." "But what influence has international law here?" persisted M. de Humboldt. "It is owing to international law that you are here," replied M. de Talleyrand; "you and the other plenipotentiaries." This tumult lasted some minutes, and these ten grave diplomatists made as much noise as the most numerous assembly. Lord Castlereagh, anxious to put an end to this scene, took M. de Talleyrand aside, and said to him, "Will you be more compliant, if this point is ceded to you?" "I will," replied M. de Talleyrand; "but you must do me one service. You have influence with M. de Metternich—promise me to use it against Murat." "I promise you," replied Lord Castlereagh. "Give me your word." "I give it." After this short dialogue, the British minister returned to his colleagues, and said that it would be difficult to refuse the insertion of so inoffensive and respectable a phrase as international law. M. de Gentz and M. de Metternich said the same to the others, and the phrase was accepted. The following form of declaration was then adopted, dated October 8.

DECLARATION.

The plenipotentiaries of the different courts that signed the Treaty of Paris on the 30th of May, 1814, have taken into consideration the 32nd article of that Treaty, which says that the powers engaged on both sides in the late war should send plenipotentiaries to Vienna, in order to regulate, in a general Congress, the arrangements for carrying out the designs of the said Treaty; and after mature deliberation on their position and duties, they find that they cannot better fulfil their obligations than by establishing in the first instance free and confidential communications between the plenipotentiaries of the several powers. They are also convinced that it will be to the advantage of all parties concerned, to defer the general meeting until the questions to be decided on shall be so matured as that the result shall correspond with the principles of national law, with the stipulations of the treaty of Paris, and the just expectation of contemporaries. The formal opening of the Congress is, therefore, deferred until the 1st of November; and the aforesaid plenipotentiaries flatter themselves that the labours to which the intermediate time will

be devoted, by determining views and conciliating opinion, will essentially advance the great work which is the object of their common mission.

Vienna, 8th October, 1814.

Nobody at Vienna misunderstood the import of the words *principles of international law*, which were looked upon by all as a first step gained in the cause of Saxony. It was a source of great joy to the Germans, who all, perhaps with the single exception of Prussia, were most anxious for the conservation of this State. And even among the Prussians, there were many who considered that Saxony would be dearly bought should the acquisition be paid by abandoning Poland to Russia. Great gratitude was felt to the French legation, for having checked the ambition of certain powers, and having established the principle that each State had a right to be heard at the congress. France ought to have rested satisfied with a success which had only been obtained at the expense of very great inconvenience, especially the being obliged to repeat to absolute weariness that we were satisfied—that we had nothing further to desire, and we besides ran the risk of embarrassing and offending England and Austria, of whom we were in absolute need in the limited policy we were forced to adopt.

Undoubtedly, had we boldly joined Russia and Prussia—a measure that policy suggested, and which, as far as we were concerned, was not forbidden by justice either towards Saxony or Europe—we should not have been forced to take so many precautions; for both Russia and Prussia were so eager and unreserved, that we needed not to be more cautious than they; and, besides, prudence might have been thrown aside, were the swords of France, Prussia, and Russia united. But by taking the other side, and merely seeking to save Saxony, or at the utmost to dispossess Murat and Maria Louisa, we were obliged to accommodate ourselves to all the susceptibilities add weaknesses of the over-fastidious party we had joined, and even to avoid causing embarrassments by showing too great a disposition to be of use. Both Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich feared to compromise themselves by uniting their interests to ours. M. de Metternich especially, dreading that we should advance too rapidly, and having, as we have said, left but 50,000 men in Italy that he may be able to keep 250,000 in Moravia, Bohemia, and Gallicia, he would not allow the question concerning Murat to come on until the fate of Saxony had been decided. And even the Germans, spite of their gratitude, had to be treated with great precaution; for owing to their old mistrust of France, they soon took the alarm if they saw us very much interested or very busy. The

fear of co-operating with us was such, that both Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich reproached M. de Labrador severely for having modelled his policy on ours, and told him that such conduct on the part of Spain was the blackest ingratitude to Europe. Now that M. de Talleyrand had so skillfully succeeded in outwitting those who wished to make such offensive exclusions, he ought to have proceeded cautiously, for fear of anticipating persons who dreaded almost as much being saved by us as being swallowed up by Russia and Prussia. It is often in politics as in commerce, where an offer lowers the price of an article which a demand will cause to rise, if the owner has patience to wait. Had we delayed giving our assistance in the affair of Saxony, in which we were but slightly interested, we should have been more certain of carrying our point in the concerns of Naples and Parma, which were of essential importance to us, at least according to the views of the French cabinet. The most dignified and most profitable policy for us would have been to follow, instead of anticipating, the interests of the German policy.

These German interests had not, however, slumbered. The German States of the second rank opposed with great animation what they called the avidity of Prussia, the tyranny of Russia, the incapacity of England, and the weakness of Austria. These States were headed by Bavaria, the most excited of them all. This latter State had many reasons for opposing the sacrifice of Saxony, whose existence was necessary to preserve the equilibrium of Germany, and whose only crime was having suffered the alliance of France, which Bavaria, instead of suffering, had actually sought. It is quite certain that, were Saxony suppressed, Bavaria and the other States would be too weak to resist the influence of Austria and Prussia, that were always ready to unite when an opportunity arose of bringing the Germanic body under their domination. Bavaria had not only good reasons for defending Saxony, but she also possessed the means of doing so. She was well represented at Vienna. Besides that the king had come there in person, she had as minister at Congress the Prince de Wrède, who, spite of more than one military fault, was one of the most esteemed generals of the coalition, and possessed considerable influence.

The Prince de Wrède did not hesitate to say—and he was not contradicted by his king—that Saxony should be saved even at the expense of a war; nor ought any objection be made to accepting aid from France, in order to keep Prussia within the limits of Brandenburg, and Russia on the other side of the Vistula. He offered 50,000 Bavarians to support his views, and visited M. de Talleyrand and the Duke Dalberg constantly, urging them to bestir themselves more than they did. But whilst the

King of Bavaria sent the most affectionate and pressing messages concerning their common interest to M. de Talleyrand, he did not dare to meet him personally, lest it might give offence on account of his old intimacy with the French.

This policy was also supported by another German State—Hanover—which had become independent again in 1813. The King of England, with universal consent, had assumed the title of king, instead of Elector of Hanover, because he did not wish to bear in Germany a title inferior to that of the sovereign of Wurtemberg, who had been created king by Napoleon. Hanover was represented at the Congress by M. de Munster, who formally declared himself on the side of Saxony. But, though the two countries had been united for more than a century, the Hanoverian minister did not find that his views always coincided with those of the representative of England, who was guided exclusively by the interest of his own country, and that of his Cabinet with the Parliament. Still, Hanover could be of great service to Germany by inducing the Prince Regent of England to use his influence with the British ministers, and induce them to adopt views more favorable to Saxony; and this influence, as we shall presently see, was of great utility. Hesse, Baden, and almost all the lesser German States, were ready to join Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, and only waited for a signal from the more important ones to make a decisive manifestation in favour of Saxony. In order to occupy the German princes during the suspension of the Congress and the adjournment of public business, a committee was formed of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, for the purpose of drawing up the plan of a German constitution. Bavaria presided in this committee, a privilege accorded to her as a compensation for her exclusion from the great European committee. This German committee, in which the lesser princes had a preponderating influence, manifested on every occasion a strong determination to defend the existence and independence of German States against the cupidity of their too powerful and too ambitious confederates.

To all this Germanic fervour was added Austrian zeal, which, dissimulated for reasons we have already mentioned in the Cabinet of Vienna, was openly declared by the nation, the court, and the army. The Austrian staff, especially, felt and expressed the greatest indignation at the two-fold project of Russia and Prussia, each of which was equally alarming to the country. The military men of Austria asserted that the cause of Europe had at least been as much advanced by them as by the other allied armies; for they said that but for them the Russian and Prussian armies, after the defeats of Lutzen and Bautzen, would have been driven back upon the Vistula;

and they now demanded whether all the blood they had shed was to be repaid by placing them in a worse position than they had been in under the rule of Napoleon; and whether it was really intended to surround the Bohemian mountains with Russians and Prussians—the one on the left, the other on the right, and thus abandon to the common enemy those defiles, whose importance had been proved both by Napoleon and Frederick the Great. Little inclined as they were to recommence the war, they declared that as they were prepared for it, it was better to have it now than later, and thus prevent a disastrous and two-fold usurpation. Austria had two hundred and fifty thousand men ready for action, in Bohemia, Moravia, and Gallicia; the other German States could add one hundred thousand; and though England, on account of the American difficulties, could furnish no assistance, still they were sure of one hundred and fifty thousand from France, making altogether five hundred thousand men, and with this force, they said, there could be no doubt of success.

By leaving all these feelings to ferment, and by not interfering too much ourselves, we should have been certainly soon called on to play an important and decisive part, according to the policy adopted by France. The two men to whom were committed the task of unravelling the tangled skein of European politics—Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich—the one simple-minded, sensible, and firm, though sometimes deficient in tact; the other profound and deeply versed in German politics—though anxious to untie the Gordian knot, did not wish to employ the sword of Alexander, for this sword would be that of France; such a line of conduct would be to conduct the French armies again into Germany—a proceeding that seemed to them to present a singular contradiction, and be fraught with serious peril. But, though agreed as to their ultimate object, they were not agreed as to the means to be employed in attaining it. M. de Metternich would not yield either to Russia or Prussia, but wished to avoid a rupture by employing the greatest patience in his opposition. Lord Castlereagh, on the other hand, was willing to gratify Prussia, win her over to his views, and make use of her against Russia, which would be to save Poland at the expense of Saxony. These opinions of Lord Castlereagh arose from a mode of viewing British interests, peculiar to the ministers of that time, and which must be explained to be understood.

The Continental blockade had caused so much terror to the English, that they were in constant fear of seeing it renewed by the Bourbons, if not by Napoleon; an apprehension as irrational as the suggestions of terror generally are. It was this apprehension that induced them to give Holland and

Belgium to the house of Orange; and lest the new kingdom should not be sufficiently strong, the English secured it as allies—Hanover, which they intended to strengthen, and even Prussia, whom they had in some measure forced to accept the Rhenish provinces, in order to render her of necessity our enemy. And still fearing that Prussia was not thoroughly won, they were anxious to give her Saxony, and hoped to justify the abandonment of this country to their parliament by pleading the usual system of Britannic alliances. But as they saw that there was no possibility of inducing the parliament to agree to abandoning Poland, they resolved to oppose Russia, and on that account wished to alienate Prussia from her by the cession of Saxony. They hoped by these means to isolate Russia so completely, that she would be obliged to abandon her prey.

This intricate policy was very displeasing to M. de Metternich, who was equally anxious to save Poland and Saxony. But as it is not easy to change the English when they once see their interests in a certain light, M. de Metternich, seeing that nothing but experience would convince Lord Castlereagh, let him go on, convinced within himself that defending one of the threatened States would be sufficient to save both. In fact, Alexander and Frederick William had promised each other Saxony and Poland, and the King of Prussia would be a traitor both to honour and friendship, if he occupied Saxony when Poland was not given to Russia. Add to this, that Frederick William being allowed to retain Posen, if all Poland were not given to Russia, he would lose the only specious argument he could adduce for demanding Saxony. Therefore, refusing to abandon Poland was refusing to abandon Saxony, and the safety of the one was the safety of the other. Perfectly conscious of all this, M. de Metternich offered no opposition to Lord Castlereagh, but let him act as he thought fit, knowing that he could not oppose a more formidable rival to Alexander. Independent of his own obstinacy of temper, Lord Castlereagh had the advantage of representing the power that had least interest in the disposal of Continental States, and the one besides that paid all the others. The superiority which the giver has over the receiver was always evident in the intercourse of his policy, demanded an interview of Alexander, and immediately obtained it.

The Czar had, at that time, overcome his first feeling of surprise and anger. He was impressionable, though wily as an Asiatic, and at the same time amiable and good, and so influenced by his desire to please that he could not possibly long sustain the part of an irritated man. Yielding as much to his

natural inclination as to circumstances, he was most affectionate in his manner to every one at Vienna, but more especially to military men. He visited the scenes of all the battles that had been fought during the campaign of Wagram; and though conversing with the conquered, he paid them many a compliment. He was to be seen almost constantly on foot, leaning sometimes on the arm of a diplomatist, sometimes on the arm of an officer. He appeared as a private individual in all the saloons of Vienna; made himself acquainted with persons of every grade, and by every means sought to avoid obtruding his rank upon the numerous princes who thronged to the Congress. In a word, he sought in every way to please, and succeeded; for nobody possessed the power of doing so in an equal degree. Every one noticed his intimacy with Prince Eugene, whose mother and sister he had protected at Paris, and who was come to solicit the principality that had been promised him by the treaty of the 11th of April. Alexander presented him everywhere, praising his fidelity to Napoleon—which, indeed, he did not find so great an obstacle, as the difficulty of obtaining a small portion from the universal cupidity. Alexander exerted all his powers to make himself agreeable, and these exertions were needed to counterbalance the bad effects of his policy.

He replied to Lord Castlereagh's demand of an audience by immediately repairing to the British minister's residence. The latter was touched by this, and testified all the gratitude and respect that such a proceeding was calculated to inspire; but at the same time, he remained an Englishman—that is to say, fixed in his determination; and though he wished to conciliate all parties, he did not conciliate any.

He endeavoured, in the first instance, to prove to the Czar that England had always sought to please him. In 1812, she had assisted him to conclude the peace of Bucharest with the Turks, and to obtain Bessarabia; that she had induced Persia to yield him a better frontier in the direction of the Caspian sea; that, in short, notwithstanding her repugnance to abandon Norway to Sweden, she had consented to the measure, in order to secure the conquest of Finland to Russia. Having thus proved his claim to the gratitude of Russia, he cited, one by one, the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz, which had been concluded in the February, June, and September of 1813, and showed how they formally prescribed the partition of the duchy of Warsaw by the three Continental powers, which certainly did not imply that one should have it all. He then passed on to general considerations; showed what anxiety Russia caused all Europe; spoke strongly of the fears she had already excited amongst the Allies; and did not

hesitate to say that the Congress of Vienna, from which it had been hoped to date the reign of justice and moderation amongst civilised nations, would soon, if care were not taken, present a scene of ambition sufficient in itself to make Napoleon regretted. Lord Castlereagh said all this in that simple and positive manner which neither exaggerates nor softens anything, and which, by representing things as they really are, makes their importance more evident.

Unfortunately, not one of the four powers, who were disputing the remnants of the European continent, could read the others a lesson of morality without running the risk of retaliation; and Alexander might have seriously embarrassed the British minister by tracing the chart of English ambition from the occupation of Malta to that of the Cape and the Mauritius. He restrained himself, although very much excited. However, he did not wish to lie under the weight of England's pretended services; and with much tact and raillery, showed Lord Castlereagh that, if the peace between Persia and Russia, and between Russia and Turkey, had been facilitated by England, it was that the Russian may be free to turn their arms against France; and that if Norway was ceded to Bernadotte, it was to win him from his engagements to Napoleon; and that, consequently, in considering the motives of her benefactor, Russia might feel herself justified in lessening the amount of her gratitude. Then, passing to the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz, he showed how they were drawn up under conditions that no longer existed; that at the time these treaties were formed, the utmost that had been hoped was to offer some opposition to Napoleon's then almost unlimited power, but that no expectation was entertained of driving him back to the Rhine, much less of hurling him from his throne; that by the unexpected success of the common efforts, Austria had gained the Inn, the Tyrol, and Italy; England, Holland and Belgium; and that it was not just that Russia and Prussia, that had encountered greater dangers than England, should have no part in this unexpected increase of good fortune; and besides, that as to what concerned Saxony, he was pledged to his friend the King of Prussia, and for Poland to the Poles themselves. Alexander declared that, in his opinion, the partition of Poland was a crime, whose moral effects were still felt in Europe—a crime, for which it was both honest and politic to make atonement. Russia alone, he said, possessed the means of making this reparation, for she possessed the greater portion of the Polish provinces, which was not the case with France, that had vainly sought to reconstitute Poland, nor of Prussia nor Austria, neither of which powers had ever conceived such a project.

Russia, by stripping herself of the provinces she possessed, could, by a slight sacrifice on the part of Prussia—a sacrifice for which the compensation was already provided—establish a separate kingdom, endow it with liberal institutions, whose operations she could moderate, and accomplish a work which would be the glory both of Europe and of the Congress of Vienna. This was the noble aim he had proposed to himself; he was on the eve of attaining it, and he did not intend to turn aside from his purpose. Besides, on entering Poland, he had made promises to the Poles in order to detach them from Napoleon, and these promises he was determined to keep. He was not one of those sovereigns ready to make promises in time of need, and retract them when the emergency had passed. He had made a promise, and would keep it: and he considered that he had rendered sufficiently important services to Europe, to expect some concession on her part.

The Emperor Alexander possessed both subtlety of understanding and romantic exaltation of feeling, a combination which prevented his pursuing at once the paths of ambition and sincerity. It is true, that his nobler feelings were flattered by the glory of re-establishing the kingdom of Poland, and he almost persuaded himself that he was making a sacrifice in giving up Lithuania and Volhynia for its formation, as though the new kingdom were not to belong to him but to another. The indignation he expressed at the resistance offered to his project was not altogether insincere.

His indignation had very little effect upon Lord Castlereagh, who returned to the charge, armed with all the reasons good and bad that his position afforded. He could make no valid reply with respect to the three treaties of 1813, for they had been concluded when but a small success was expected, and Russia had as good a right as the others to a share of the unhoped-for spoils. Lord Castlereagh could only meet Alexander on this point by adducing motives of moderation and justice, most excellent reasons, indeed, but which could have but little weight coming from him, unless Austria should resign Italy, and England give up her claim to Belgium. But many reasons could be adduced in favour of the reconstitution of Poland, and on these he expatiated with all imaginable emphasis.

The partition of Poland, he told the Czar, was a crime, and it was not England, who had always opposed it, that would now assert the contrary. She was therefore prepared to consent to the restoration of Poland, if it were done completely, honestly, and with suitable conditions. If, for example, Austria, Russia and Prussia gave up the Polish provinces they held, and that an independent kingdom was formed, with a

Polish king, and if not a Pole, at least somebody not under the control of either of the three sovereigns who now shared the country between them, and if, in addition, the new kingdom should be endowed with liberal monarchical institutions, England was ready to approve, and even to assist in the work, at any expense to herself. But would the three co-divisionists consent to such sacrifices? Would a suitable king be found? And, finally, would the reunited Poles live together in amity, and comport themselves like a rational people, worthy of the liberty conferred on them. This was not only doubtful, but almost impossible, and the much talked-of reconstitution of Poland was a nullity—a mere dream. And if instead of this truly moral and European reparation, a false and incomplete kingdom was to be formed, called Poland for the sake of increasing its extent as much as possible, whilst in reality it belonged to Russia; this would be a mere illusion, to which Europe would never submit.

Lord Castlereagh then spoke to Alexander of the alarm his project had excited; he told him that but for his well-known principles of honour, these alarms would have already dissolved the Congress, and he implored him for the sake of his own fame, as well as for the general tranquility, to give up a project that could never be permitted to succeed. It was with great difficulty that Alexander restrained himself during this conversation, for with all his power of pleasing he could not produce the least impression on the solid English minister, who, on his side, with his personal awkwardness, was as incapable of influencing the plastic and mobile disposition of the Czar. They parted, with no other result arising from their interview than mutual dissatisfaction.

Lord Castlereagh, fearing that he had not said all that he had to say, and desirous to impress the memory of his august interlocutor, at the same time that he was anxious to take every precaution for his own justification before Parliament, drew up a long note on the following day, and sent it to the Czar, together with a confidential letter, making a formal declaration of his opposition to the pretensions of Russia. He was not satisfied with this, and, notwithstanding the system of secrecy that had been resolved on with regard to France, he sought to obtain her approbation for his firmness, and informed M. de Talleyrand both of the conversation and note. The latter was delighted to see Lord Castlereagh, although he was very little pleased by England's indifference in the cause of Saxony. The singular tactics of England inspired him with the idea of adopting a similar policy, though in an opposite sense. Desiring to restore as far as possible the balance in favour of Saxony, which had been disturbed by Lord

Castlereagh's desertion. He profited of the frequent visits of Prince Czartoryski to the French legation, to inform Alexander, through him, that France would never yield Saxony, but was quite willing to give up Poland. This was a skilful manœuvre, for while one party refused what the other was willing to concede, the unity of opinion which would be needed to satisfy both Russia and Prussia was impossible.

All this time, the lesser German princes continued their opposition. In the committee, where they were assembled to decide on a constitution for Germany, they opposed all Prussia and Austria's efforts to assume the domination in the Confederation. It would be impossible to revive the ancient title of Emperor of Germany, which the house of Austria had so long borne, and which Francis II. had abdicated in 1806, when Napoleon instituted the Confederation of the Rhine. Austria would certainly have accepted the title, were it made hereditary in the house of Hapsburg, but she would never consent to make it elective, for that would subject her to a disagreeable dependence on the electors, and perhaps expose her to the possibility of one day seeing a Prussian prince styled Emperor of Germany. The last consideration would be sufficient to make her reject such an offer. As the title of emperor, to which the direction of the Confederation naturally belonged, was to be given up, it was necessary that there should be directing states, as in Switzerland, and to this Prussia was quite willing to agree, provided that the authority alternated between herself and Austria. Austria did not approve this arrangement, and Bavaria, Hanover, and Wurtemberg declared that they would not agree to it unless the directing authority was limited to the two great German powers. It was thus that the condition of German affairs was commenced which continues still,—a simple presidency of the Diet given in perpetuity to Austria, as an emblem of the old imperial authority resident in her house, lessened, however, by the suppression of the title, but enhanced by the condition of perpetuity. But this arrangement still left undecided the serious question of the military command.

A no less important question than that of the direction of the Germanic body, was the condition of the confederate States, and the nature of their relations with the European powers. Up to the present time, the confederate States, although united by a federal bond, had enjoyed an independent sovereignty, that is, they possessed the power of sending ambassadors to foreign courts, and of raising armies and employing them as they pleased. This two-fold privilege had often led to the formation of alliances contrary to the interests of the two predominating German powers, if not to the Confederation itself; and if this

had sometimes induced foreign intervention, it also secured the safety of their common independence. Prussia would have the confederate States deprived of these advantages. But she was alone in her opinion, and met with the greatest opposition in the committee. On almost every occasion, the three kingdoms of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover declared that they would give no opinion on the points in dispute until Saxony's fate should be decided. They even threatened to draw up a protestation, signed by all the German States, against the projects attributed to certain powers with regard to Saxony. The committee broke up, resolved not to meet again unless this great question should be decided.

As the adjournment had been signed on the 8th of October, the 1st of November was not very distant. It was to be feared that the appointed day would arrive before the different powers should come to an understanding. Bavaria, the most important and the most active of the lesser German States, had declared her intention of taking up arms in defence of Saxony. Her army had been recruited, and now amounted to 75,000 men; she urged on M. de Metternich, whom she denounced for what she called his weakness, and offered to furnish twenty-five thousand men for every hundred thousand furnished by Austria. From M. de Metternich, her emissaries hastened to M. de Talleyrand, who certainly needed no urging, and begged him not to confine himself to mere words, but to use threats, and effective threats, by declaring, for example, that the King of France was determined to use force, if necessary. They declared that if M. de Talleyrand acted according to this advice, that neither England nor Austria could have an excuse or motive for subterfuge, and would formally declare themselves, and save the independence of Germany and Europe. M. de Talleyrand replied that France was ready, but that it did not become her to undertake alone what should be done by powers more interested in the question, and who should, at least, explain their intentions, and express some desire on the subject: that then France would answer their first cry for assistance, but that, hitherto, scarce a word was addressed to the French legation, that was excluded from all negotiations, and that, in fact, France could not force her assistance on persons who did not seem to desire it.

Bavaria was not slow to repeat these remarks to M. de Metternich, who did not refuse to act, but would not come forward immediately, alleging, as an excuse for his dilatoriness, the strange policy of England, who wished to save Poland by sacrificing Saxony, together with the intentions of France, whose ambition, in his opinion, ought always to be distrusted. This was strange reasoning, when France was the only one amongst the powers assembled at Vienna that did not show

any symptoms of ambition! M. de Metternich added, that it would be assuming a most serious responsibility to introduce a French army into Germany, especially as Frenchmen had been so recently despotic and detested there; and he added that a French army did not exist, at least for the Bourbons, who were incapable of assembling or conducting one; that France spoke a great deal, but neither could nor would act; that she only wished to cause disunion and dissension, and recover her position by promoting a misunderstanding between the Allies, who had conquered her. These replies were made to the Prince de Wiède, who immediately communicated them to us; and these remarks had not only been made by the minister but by the Emperor and several of the Archdukes, with the evident intention that they should be transmitted to us, and provoke us to come to an explanation. This tone, which was unwillingly assumed by the Austrians in their own defence, took the form of raillery and boasting when uttered by the Prussians, who wished to impress every one with the idea of the impotency of France; nor was it less offensive in the Russians, who were no less anxious to propagate a belief in the weakness of the Bourbons.

Such language could not be heard with indifference, and it was become necessary to put an end to it by some decided and convincing manifestation. M. de Talleyrand declared that France was both able and willing to act, which she would prove when occasion required, but that, in any case, she would soon show both her determination and her resources. He wrote immediately to the king, and desired the Duke Dalberg to write to the Cabinet, and proposed to both the double resolution of taking arms, and publicly announcing why. Knowing that neither Louis XVIII. nor the council had any wish for war, though the Duke de Berry was well inclined thereto, he told them that there was no probability of war, (which was true,) but that the terror of war was such, that whichever power would make a demonstration, would be sure to rule the others; that at Vienna, things would not go beyond a simple declaration, but that it was necessary to be in a position to make these demonstrations, and to make them after a serious fashion; that the consideration in which France would be held depended on this, as also her influence and the accomplishment of her wishes; that, for example, what she desired in Italy depended on what would happen in Germany, and that she would possess no power on one side, if she did not strengthen herself on the other.

To speak of Italy—that is, of Naples and Parma—was attacking the king on his weak side, and the surest way to gain his attention. The council was sensible and sincere, although

by a strange chance, as we shall presently see, these qualifications did not render it profitable to the Bourbons.

When these despatches, written about the middle of October, reached Louis XVIII., they did not fail to excite him greatly. As we have said, he was very anxious for peace, of which France was in great need, because it was his family's principal title to popularity, and because it was the condition best suited to his age, his infirmities, and his turn of mind. He was grateful to his representative at Vienna for so loudly asserting the principle of legitimacy, and for having defeated the project of excluding France from the common deliberations; he saw, with delight, that there was a possibility of Murat's downfall, and felt a certain pleasure at the prospect of saving his cousin of Saxony; but he thought the French Legation had been too busy, and feared it would lead him further than he wished to go. He deliberated on what was proposed him, first in his family circle and afterwards in full council. There could be no doubt as to the resolution to be taken—a resolution in favour of which were combined so many reasons, great and small, good and mediocre. In the first place, France's position at Vienna was in question, and it would not be wise, either for her sake or that of the Bourbons, to allow the opinion to gain ground that she had become powerless since the restoration of the old dynasty. Such an opinion would be as injurious to the country as to the reigning family. Secondly, on our influence at Vienna, the favourable solution of the Italian question depended—a solution to which Louis XVIII. attached so much importance, and which ought to be as dear to his ministers as to him; for the security of France depended on that of the Bourbons. Thirdly, the safety of the Saxon monarchy had a certain importance for France; once she had renounced the pursuit of territorial possessions at Vienna. The King of Saxony was considered, whether justly or unjustly, as the victim of his attachment to us, and saving him would, doubtless, do us honour in the eyes of all those who piqued themselves on their patriotism. Success would, therefore, secure popularity, without taking into account the rights of legitimacy. Finally, it was absolutely necessary to increase the army, which had been allowed to fall below the contemplated proportions, in consequence of the financial restraints imposed on the war minister, and the accessory expenses unwisely added to the budget. The different regiments were no more than skeletons, incapable of effective service. How this happened will be better understood if we consider that the army of two hundred thousand men, which had been expected to be supported with a budget of two hundred million francs, had been first

reduced to one hundred and fifty thousand, and afterwards, from want of resources, to one hundred and thirty thousand men. Limiting France to such an effective force in the existing state of European armies, was consenting to her annihilation. These reductions had also caused great discontent amongst military men, and it would be advantageous both to the home and foreign policy to put the army on a better footing. For all these reasons, the proposals of the French Legation were taken into serious consideration, and presented, with strong recommendations, to the king's council.

The difficulties of this question had never been other than financial. When the council was assembled, the king appealed to the patriotism of the minister of finance. The latter, though most rigorous in the expenditure of money, and perhaps, in consequence of it, had always declared that, in case of necessity, he could place a hundred millions of francs at the king's disposal. He had, indeed, secured a vast resource by the restoration of public credit, and by the firmness of his financial policy. His *reconnaisances de liquidation* had had immense success on the exchange, bearing an interest of seven or eight per cent. Besides, thanks to his perseverance, the indirect taxes began to come in, and he was, consequently, not embarrassed by having to meet an unexpected demand of fifty millions.

M. Louis, however, was astonished at being so quickly taken at his word, and called on to prove the extent of his resources. But he was no less skilled in diplomacy than finance; and the war minister having declared that forty millions would suffice, he said that he was prepared, and would give them as needed. Here was an immediate recompense for the good sense shown by the government in following the advice of the upright and vigorous mind that directed the financial department.

The funds for military expenses being secured, it only remained to consider how they should be employed. General Dupont, who was still war minister, wished that this money should be spent on the two hundred thousand old soldiers who had returned from abroad and been dismissed on leave of absence, pursuant to the system of forming a reserve, by allowing the soldiers to remain at their own homes and exercising them from time to time. The introduction of this system would be facilitated by the existence of thirty thousand officers on half-pay, who thus obtained a means of employing their energies, whilst they received additional pay. This system had not yet been well tried, nor was its nature understood even in Prussia, where it was an administrative *ruse*, employed to exceed the limits appointed by Napoleon for the Prussian army. Still, the Bourbon government dreaded to employ so many

men—officers and soldiers—of suspected opinions, and whose operations would be slow, when immediate and certain results were required. Influenced by all these reasons, and by the wise advice of the Duke de Berry, it was thought better to recall seventy thousand soldiers, a measure that would increase the army from one hundred and thirty to two hundred thousand men, and put the regiments on a better footing. To raise this number, it was not necessary to employ conscription, which was nominally suppressed, but merely to call out some of the men considered on leave of absence, which had either been given them, or had been taken by themselves in deserting.

In addition to the official despatches in which M. de Talleyrand was informed of the resolutions of the government, the ministers of war and finance were to send him private letters, that he might show in confidence, and in which they informed him of the flourishing state of the finances and army. The war minister was commissioned to tell him that he was about raising two hundred thousand men, and, if necessary, could raise three hundred thousand, all old soldiers, and well inclined to fight, which was true, provided it was against a foreign enemy. The king wrote to M. de Talleyrand to express his personal feelings. He said, that notwithstanding his desire for peace, he would not have France sink below her natural position, or appear unable to support the cause of legitimacy, but he recommended him expressly not to enter into any coalition in which he would have but Austria and the lesser German States as allies. He was desirous that England should be included in the alliance, for he wished to continue on good terms with that country, as with such an ally the result of a war would be more certain, should so disagreeable a necessity arise. He again directed his attention to the two essential objects of his mission—the expulsion of Murat from the throne of Naples, and the translation of the prisoner of the Isle of Elba to one of the Azores.

Whilst these replies were coming from Paris to M. de Talleyrand, the excitement continued at Vienna, as did also the debate between the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh, the latter persisting in his efforts to save Poland at the expense of Saxony. It was well known that the Prince Regent of England, as future king of Hanover, did not approve of this sacrifice, and was even very much opposed to it; and great exertions were made to induce him to demand a modification of Lord Castlereagh's instructions. Meanwhile, Lord Castlereagh pursued his plan, in the hope of detaching Prussia from Russia, and by this isolation inducing the latter to yield. Although it was so difficult to detach Frederick William from Alexander, the Prussian ministers were not as inflexible as

their king, and some of them were disturbed by the idea of Russia's advancing into the centre of Europe, and by the bad effect produced in Germany by the annexation of Saxony to Prussia. In a word, they did not admire the Russian alliance as much as their master did. Lord Castlereagh perceived the difference of opinion that existed between Frederick William and his ministers, and flattered himself that he could induce an alliance between Prussia and Austria, and make use of these two powers to force Russia to remain at the other side of the Vistula, without having recourse to France, that would be thus still excluded from participation in all the great European affairs. He hoped that, with England, Austria, Prussia, and all the German States, he could form a central power in Europe which would restrain Russia, be independent of France, and become the supreme arbitrator in European questions.

M. de Metternich, compelled by the cries of Germany and the Austrian army, declared his intentions sooner than he wished; but abandoned by England on the Saxony question, he had been compelled, in a certain degree, to yield to Lord Castlereagh's policy, and send a despatch to Prussia, in which he announced the intentions of the Emperor Francis and his cabinet. In this despatch, dated the 22nd of October, some days before the official opening of the Congress, M. de Metternich, addressing Prussia with the greatest cordiality, recalled how, in the commencement of 1813, even before Frederick William had broken with Napoleon, Austria had advanced the principle of the complete reconstitution of Prussia, and made it an essential condition of her policy; and that, consequently, she could not be considered as affected by the old jealousy which had formerly divided the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna. He then requested Prussia to consider whether it would not be for her own interest to give up the idea of adding Saxony to her dominions, since it should be purchased at the expense of allowing Russia to establish herself on the Oder—a project that was blamed by every German, and so hateful that Austria, by merely consenting to the measure, would perhaps become as unpopular as Prussia, who would effect the deed. M. de Metternich asked whether it would not be better, by punishing King Frederick Augustus by depriving him of some of his territories and allowing the nucleus of the kingdom of Saxony to exist, to get rid of the unwise promises that had been made to Russia concerning Poland, and thus gratify the wishes of all Germany, and at the same time act in conformity with the spirit of political reparation, which had been so boastfully promised to Europe, but which had not as yet been put in practice. Having thus expressed his opinion in the form of

an advice, M. de Metternich added, that if, contrary to his inclinations, he should be induced to sacrifice Saxony, it would be only on conditions from which Austria would not recede. First, Prussia should promise to break her engagement with Russia concerning Poland, and join Austria and England when this question was to be decided on. Secondly, That notwithstanding the desire to preserve the most perfect cordiality between the courts of Berlin and Vienna, it would be necessary to maintain a certain equilibrium between them, by establishing a just proportion between the mass of States in the North and in the South, which constituted their dependencies. Austria desired that the Mein on the right of the Rhine, and the Moselle on the left, should constitute the territorial boundaries of the northern and southern States, in order that Mayence should not belong to the north, that is, to Prussia.

M. de Metternich could not have extricated himself more skilfully from the embarrassing position in which Lord Castlereag's strange policy had placed him than by this note; though the conditions proposed to Prussia relative to the boundaries of the northern and southern States might be accepted, Frederick William could scarcely agree to that which required his abandoning Russia on the Polish question; and so whilst M. de Metternich pursued the path traced out for him by England, he was not the less likely to gain his own ends, and save both Poland and Saxony.

The Emperor Alexander was greatly irritated by the position Austria had taken, for he saw that everybody was turning against him, and endeavouring to separate him from Prussia. With the intention of striking his opponents with awe, he determined on a decisive step that would prove that his and Prussia's determination was irrevocable. Saxony was still occupied by Russian troops, and he advised the King of Prussia to replace them by Prussians, and immediately commence the administrative and political organization of the country. On his side, he sent the Russian troops which had evacuated Saxony into Poland, so as concentrate all his forces on the Vistula, and present an iron barrier to all who should seek to deprive him of his prey. At the same time he sent into Warsaw his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, who, report said, was to be made king of Poland, in order to commence the organization of the new kingdom. He could not more boldly defy the opinions and dignity of the powers assembled at Vienna, for, without waiting for their decision, he had taken possession of States of which they alone could confer the sovereignty.

There was a universal outcry against such daring and arrogant conduct. All the Germans blamed the weakness of M. de Met-

ternich, but he replied, that instead of annoyance, it ought to be a subject of rejoicing to see the Russians return to the north, and free Germany from their presence. This excuse was not well received in the diplomatic circle, and it was said that France was right in demanding the assembling of the Congress, for had it been assembled, such audacious conduct would not have been attempted. Even Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich almost admitted the same. Many persons who were discouraged by this state of affairs, asserted that there was but one way of acting with the two usurpers, which was to abandon them to the public opinion of Europe, and convoke a new Congress, which, authorized by a special mandate, would become the organ of the universal feeling. More determined spirits declared that there was no occasion to retract, that the only course that remained was to fulfil the declaration of the 8th of October, and assemble the Congress on the 1st of November, when it would be seen whether these two august monarchs would retain their hardihood before the assembled Congress. The latter was the prevailing opinion: the 1st of November was at hand, and the efficacy of this plan would soon be tested.

The Emperor of Russia, who, though very simple in his own person, always kept up great state, which added not a little to the expense that Austria incurred for her guests, determined to go to Ofen, in Hungary, to assist at the funeral solemnities of his sister, the deceased wife of the Archduke Palatine of Hungary. He wished to appear in Hungarian costume, and for this purpose summoned many Greeks, both lay and clerical, from the adjoining provinces, for at this time his attention was as much directed to the East as to the West. The Emperor of Austria and several princes promised to accompany him, and as the journey would take up four or five days, they would be thus brought to the end of October. Before he left, he had two conversations with M. de Talleyrand and M. de Metternich, which caused a great deal of excitement, and contributed not a little to fixing definitely the opening of the Congress for the 1st of November.

We have already seen how M. de Talleyrand, in order to counterbalance Lord Castlereagh's policy of saving Poland at the expense of Saxony, had insinuated to Alexander, through Prince Czartoryski, that France attached more importance to Saxony than to Poland, and was willing to sacrifice the latter to him, provided the former could be saved. In fact, this was not yielding anything to Russia, for the destinies of Saxony and Poland were indissolubly united. However, it was a new point of view that had struck M. de Nesselrode, and which became the subject of a conference between Alexander and M. de Talleyrand. It was only for mere form's sake that M. de Talleyrand consented to

demand an interview, for, in truth, it was made at M. de Nesselrode's evident insinuation. This was the second interview that the French plenipotentiary had with the Czar during the month and a-half they were at Vienna; he had, of course, met him in public, but had not had a private audience since the interview we spoke of before.

The Emperor Alexander was more complaisant on this occasion to the representative of France. He regretted that he did not see M. de Talleyrand oftener, to which the latter replied with gratitude and dignity, and then, without loss of time, entered on the important subject that occupied all minds. The Czar wished to discover what the French really thought, and why they were so indifferent to the fate of Poland. "At Paris," he said to M. de Talleyrand, "you expressed yourself favourable to the restoration of Poland." "Certainly, Sire," replied M. de Talleyrand, in a firm and respectful tone, "both I and every Frenchman would rejoice at the restoration of Poland, but it should be really Poland. But the restoration now contemplated interests us very little. It is now only a frontier question between you and Germany, and it is for Prussia and Austria to consider whether it suits them that you should advance as far as the Oder. In this state of things we, the constant defenders of public justice in Europe, can only espouse the cause of Saxony." Alexander, who had restrained himself at first, replied in bitter terms, quite unworthy of him, that justice and treaties were mere words that every one used as suited him; that he was not deceived by them, and the question was not one concerning principles or justice, but of different interests, which each State interpreted in its own fashion. Alexander added, that he had promised Saxony to Frederick William, and would not break that promise, for he esteemed his word more than treaties, which were mere falsehoods; that the King of Saxony was a traitor to the cause of Europe, and would end his days a prisoner in Russia, nor would he be the first Saxon prince who had thus expiated his pretensions to Poland. M. de Talleyrand expressed as much horror at the announcement of such principles as respect would allow. "The epithet of traitor," he said, "should never be applied to a king (for in any case he could only be a vanquished enemy), nor should such an expression ever be uttered by lips so august as your Majesty's. Justice is something very definite and very sacred, and is what preserves us from a state of barbarism, and I hope that your Majesty will reflect more before you thus offend the unanimous opinion of Europe." Then Alexander replied abruptly, that both England and Austria gave up Saxony to him, and that his friend the King of Prussia should be King of Prussia and Saxony, and himself Emperor of Russia and King of Poland. M. de Talleyrand bowed respect-

fully, and said that he doubted it, for nothing could be more uncertain than the consent of Austria and England. Then Alexander interrupting the conversation said, "You have come here to advocate interests that you hold very dear (he meant Murat) and my complaisance towards France shall depend on her complaisance to Russia." "France," replied M. de Talleyrand, "does not need complaisance, she only asserts principles at Vienna." This was equivalent to saying that he would not seek the assistance of the Czar.

Alexander met with so much opposition on every side, that his resentment towards us abated. He spoke with less asperity to the French plenipotentiary, but he expressed himself in a more decided tone than on the former occasion, and affected in his manner the curtness and harshness of an unchangeable will. This inflexible will was met by M. de Talleyrand in his usual skilful manner, by mingling with his respectful tone a slightly ironical doubt, which seemed to imply that Alexander did not speak seriously.

The interview with M. de Metternich was also very violent, though in another fashion. The Prussians had informed Alexander of M. de Metternich's despatch containing the intentions of Austria, and which plainly showed the efforts of the Anglo-Austrian diplomacy to isolate Russia by gratifying Prussia. The Czar, though he had determined to be calm, could not control his excitement. As his conversation with M. de Metternich could only refer to Poland, Saxony being conceded for the time, he expressed himself at great length, repeated his former remarks upon the shamefulness of the original partition of Poland, and the utility and morality of restoring this kingdom, as if the reconstitution of a Poland, subject to the most dangerous of her co-partitionists, could be considered a reparation made to Europe. When Alexander repeated that Russia, by the extent of her Polish possessions, was called upon to make this reparation, M. de Metternich very simply remarked that Austria also possessed a great many Polish provinces, and would undertake as well as any one to make a reparation that would cost so little. At these words, Alexander could contain himself no longer, and did not hesitate to apply the terms false and unbecoming to the minister's remarks. He forgot himself so far as to tell M. de Metternich that he was the only man in Austria who would dare to assume so *rebellious* a tone in addressing Russia. Excepting the absence of genius, M. de Metternich might have thought himself in the presence of Napoleon, when at Dresden he threatened him during several hours with the exercise of all his power, after having sought to overwhelm him by the force of his intellect. M. de Metter-

nich was not to be moved, but deeply offended by the language of the Czar, he said that if such were the terms which in future were to exist between the cabinets, he would request his Emperor to appoint another representative for Austria at the Congress. He parted from Alexander in a state of excitement such as he had never before exhibited.

When this strange scene became known it caused loud murmurs. "Why," it was said, "did we cast off the yoke of Napoleon if we are to submit to another as harsh as his, and far more humiliating, for Alexander does not possess that prodigious ascendancy which had been Europe's excuse for her ten years subjection." On the same day, the Emperor Francis set out to join Alexander at Ofen. He felt himself in a very strange position with regard to him. The Czar, as well as the other sovereigns that had come to Vienna, had been the Austrian Emperor's guest for more than a month. He was, consequently, bound to him by all the duties of a host, and had often obliged to meet him with a smiling countenance, that was far from expressing his real feelings. However, the Emperor Francis, with great tact, gave the Czar a well-deserved lesson, with all the appearance of the greatest simplicity. "After long experience," said he to him, "I think it better to leave the management of business to my ministers. I consider it a good plan, for our ministers can act with more freedom, perseverance, calmness, and possess more knowledge of business than we ourselves. Mine act under my orders, according to their own fashion, of course, but always according to my intentions, and at all times you may consider their will as mine." He could not have chosen a better mode of confirming what had been done by M. Metternich, or reproach the Czar in a more delicate manner for the impropriety of his conduct. In general terms, but with the greatest tact, he then spoke to him of the state of affairs. He was bound, he said, to his people. He had sacrificed everything to them, even his very daughter, and whenever he found them disturbed, he was obliged to attend to their anxieties, and endeavour to remove the cause. Alexander remarked that the known and tried sincerity of his character ought to be sufficient security for the Austrian people. "Yes," replied the Emperor Francis, "the sincerity of a prince is an excellent guarantee, but a good frontier is still better."

Whilst these monarchs continued their travels in Hungary, mingling worldly festivities with funeral solemnities, and whilst Alexander lavished not altogether disinterested caresses on the Hungarians and Greeks who thronged to meet him, the diplomatists at Vienna were occupied in fulfilling the engagements they had made for the 1st of November. Each

day public opinion declared itself more decidedly in favour of the assembling of the Congress, though great disunion prevailed on the most important questions. But the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia had exhibited so much audacity in their actions, as well as in their words, that it was absolutely necessary to make them feel the authority of Europe, which could not be done in a better, more natural, or more regular manner than by assembling this same Europe in the persons of her representatives. It certainly would not be possible, as we already remarked, to summon them to a kind of European *constituent* assembly, for they did not possess an equal right to inquire into and decide on each other's affairs, but there were some questions on which the advice of all should be taken, whilst there were other special questions on which it was necessary to hear, and, if possible, to conciliate those interested in them. In short, since an assembly had been appointed at Vienna to regulate the affairs of Europe, it was necessary, in whatever manner the conference was to be carried on, that the representatives of Europe should be assembled, their credentials examined, and the mode of proceeding arranged, and this was, in fact, to assemble the Congress, and proclaim the existence at Vienna of a legitimate, incontestable, and European authority, whose moral influence might, under certain circumstances, avert dangerous disturbances.

On the 30th of October M. de Metternich assembled at his house the eight representatives who had signed the treaty of Paris, in order to consult as to the execution of the engagement contained in the declaration of the 8th of October. He said that the important questions which divided certain cabinets had not yet been solved, though their solution had been an object of incessant consideration, but that they would yet be arranged, that the important question of the Germanic constitution was already far advanced, and that it was hoped that a Germanic equilibrium would be established, which would contribute not a little to fix the balance of power in Europe, but that, meanwhile, there was no reason why the representatives assembled at Vienna should not be convoked, their credentials examined, and committees formed, to whom might be submitted the questions on which they were to decide.

This opinion was universally adopted. But as M. de Metternich took, perhaps, a little too much pains to impress on those present that it was not intended to form a single assembly, where all, on the mere authority of being present, as in the British parliament, should deliberate in common on the universal interests, and that the committees were only intermediate powers, meant to conciliate the interested parties, M.

de Talleyrand, who felt no affection for the Austrian minister, and thought him too desirous of restraining the sovereignty of the Congress, replied with asperity, and some harsh words passed between them, which was to the advantage of Russia and Prussia, and by no means to ours, for having adopted a policy opposed to that of these two countries, it was our interest to conciliate Austria. Fortunately, these personal misunderstandings went no further. It was agreed to call successively the plenipotentiaries of the several powers, demand their credentials, and submit these to a committee of three powers, chosen by lot. Chance favoured England, Russia, and Prussia. Should any doubt arise about the credentials of a plenipotentiary, the matter was to be referred to the eight powers that had signed the treaty of Paris, and who, having convoked the congress at Vienna, would naturally consider themselves the directing authority, and accept the responsibility of such a position.

M. de Talleyrand did not again refer to his principle of admission, which was no longer of importance, as the preservation of Saxony and the expulsion of Murat had become subjects of serious negotiation, and could no longer be resolved incidentally by the decision on a mere question of form. It was then agreed that those plenipotentiaries whose credentials would not be admitted, should, however, attend the conferences, and be summoned on committees, to give information, or express the wishes of their sovereigns, but should not be permitted to vote.

As the question of precedence amongst the different courts might give rise to embarrassing difficulties, it was agreed that every question of this nature should be deferred to the end of the Congress, and that during the sittings there should be no distinction, except that Prince Metternich, as representative of the monarch, in whose capital the Congress was held, should exercise the functions and prerogatives of president.

The succeeding day's meetings were held, to decide the manner of proceeding on each subject. In all that concerned convocations, the distribution of labour, the arrangement of committees, and their mode of deliberation, it was evident that the eight, who had signed the Treaty of Paris, as they had taken the initiative in assembling the Congress, would be the directing authority; but on fundamental questions, where the decisions might become the subject of public or private treaties, the unrestrained agreement of the interested parties should be the only deciding power. As the eight, who had signed the Treaty of Paris were universally accepted as an authority in all that referred to matters of form, it only remained to appoint committees for fundamental questions, and which were to be

composed not only of those immediately interested, but of mediators, who might reconcile the adverse parties.

The questions relative to the future constitution of Germany were still confined to the committee that represented Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, with the proviso, that the representatives of the other sovereigns of Germany should be admitted when their presence became necessary.

The great territorial questions of Europe were of two kinds—those that referred to the North, and those that related to the South. Those of the North, concerning Holland, Germany, Saxony, and Poland, were the most important and the most complicated. The consideration of these questions could only be confided to the principal of European powers, some having a direct territorial interest in them; the others being interested in the preservation of the balance of power, were, consequently, in a position to exercise a conciliatory authority. These questions were, therefore, laid before the five greatest European powers—Russia, Prussia, Austria, England, and France. These were to decide on the questions of Saxony and Poland, besides many referring to the Low Countries, Hanover, Denmark, Bavaria, &c., &c. Theirs was, consequently, the most difficult task; and, should they agree amongst themselves, nobody possessed the right or power to dispute their decisions.

The affairs of the South referred almost exclusively to Italy. The two powers most interested in Italian affairs were Austria and Spain. The latter demanded the patrimony of the house of Parma from Maria Louisa, and Naples from Murat. France also felt an interest in Italy, principally on account of Naples; nor were the other great European powers altogether indifferent. It was, therefore, thought better to join France, England, and Russia, to Austria and Spain; the three former being free from all territorial pretensions, were less inclined to dispute, and better suited to act as mediators.

All Europe felt the greatest interest in Switzerland. A committee that represented Austria, France, Russia, and England, was appointed to hear the cantons, and endeavour to reconcile them. Another committee that represented Prussia, France, Austria, and England, was appointed to consider the free navigation of rivers; and, finally, one exclusively composed of maritime States, to decide upon the slave trade.

This division of labour once effected, the negotiations concerning Saxony and Poland, which had been commenced with so much warmth, were still continued; and negotiations commenced about the affairs of Italy and Switzerland, which had been already talked of incidentally, but not formally debated.

The affairs of Italy presented difficulties of every kind.

There was Genoa to be re-united to Piedmont, as had been promised to the King of Sardinia; there was the house of Parma, supported by Spain, to be reconciled with Maria Louisa, who was supported by her father and the Emperor Alexander; there were the Legations that had been occupied by Murat, and which were to be restored to the Pope; and, lastly, there were the two houses of Bourbon to be satisfied concerning Naples—France, especially, who almost considered her safety depended on the downfall of Napoleon's brother-in-law.

This last subject was very important; M. de Talleyrand felt an extraordinary interest in it, as he had received a special mission on that subject from Louis XVIII., and was every day further stimulated by that monarch's pressing letters. Every State wished the fall of Murat, and Austria no less than the others, for she saw clearly that he would never remain quiet, and would in his constant excitement seek the support of the liberal party in Italy, and thus become a perpetual source of disquietude. However, as M. de Metternich was personally pledged to the court of Naples, he wished to be freed from his promises by the errors of this court, and besides, as he had thought proper to assemble two hundred and fifty thousand men in Bohemia and Galicia, he did not wish to be obliged to keep one hundred and fifty thousand more in Italy. He, therefore, constantly repeated to the representative of Louis XVIII., who was become the most impatient amongst the diplomats, "Wait a little, many months will not pass before your wishes are accomplished. You support the cause of Saxony even more warmly than we, let us decide that question, and do not oblige us to solve too many at once." This advice was certainly very wise, for in the existing state of Italy, and the discontent that reigned there, from the Julian Alps to Calabria (Tuscany excepted), and having to do with so rash a man as Murat, who had been lately reconciled with Napoleon, and had 80,000 soldiers at his disposal, 50,000 Austrian troops were not sufficient in Italy, and yet that was all she could send at the moment. M. de Talleyrand took no heed of these reasons, and declared that a few thousand Frenchmen would suffice to terminate the affair. M. de Metternich replied that French soldiers would be faithful to their standards beyond the Rhine, against Russia and Prussia, but that their fidelity could not be relied on when fighting against Murat, and perhaps against Napoleon. M. de Talleyrand only replied by complaining of M. de Metternich's weakness, and by filling Vienna with unpleasant remarks upon that minister himself, and the motives of his leniency to the court of Naples, remarks which were very offensive to the Austrian premier, and

very injurious to the interests of the French legation, and even to the success of her fondest wishes.

M. de Talleyrand's zeal was greatly excited on another point, because of the importance attached to it by Louis XVIII., and this was, the translation of Napoleon to the Azores. M. de Metternich, bound by no engagement here, agreed as fully with M. de Talleyrand's opinions and wishes on this question as he did on that of Naples. He had always considered it highly imprudent to send Napoleon to the Isle of Elba, where he was within four hours' journey of Italy, and but forty-eight hours distant from France. But, if uncontrolled by any engagements, he was shackled by the essential difficulties of the affair itself. The Emperor Francis had not allowed his policy to be restricted by any ties of relationship, but he was not altogether insensible to family affections; and, although he did not love his son-in-law, he would not consent to become his executioner by sending him to a climate acknowledged to be fatal to human life. He might not, perhaps, have resisted a prudential measure resolved on by his Allies, but he would not take the initiative. England also considered that Napoleon could not be safely left so near the coasts of Europe, and Lord Castlereagh had unhesitatingly said so; but he considered the treaty of the 11th of April an obstacle, because of the British Parliament, an assembly that could not be easily brought to approve a breach of faith. He, therefore, wished to wait some act of Napoleon, or of those who were supposed to be his accomplices, which would justify the precautions that might be taken against him. He frequently demanded from France the payment of the two millions stipulated by the treaty of the 11th of April, in order that the European Powers may not be the first to infringe this treaty. His colleagues at Vienna addressed the same entreaties to M. de Talleyrand, who transmitted them to Louis XVIII., but without effect. Prussia had no objection to any personal violence that may be offered to Napoleon. The true obstacle was elsewhere: it lay in the generosity, honour, and, if the truth must be told, in the calculations of Alexander. This prince was the real author of the treaty of the 11th of April, with which he was too often reproached to be able to forget it. Regardless of reproaches, he considered it a point of honour to insist on the execution of this treaty, and daily urged its observance, sometimes by demanding a princely allowance for Prince Eugene; sometimes by supporting Maria Louisa in Parma, and sometimes by bitterly blaming the French exchequer for not paying the subsidy of two millions. Besides, he was not so well pleased with Austria as to be desirous of freeing her from the redoubtable neighbour he had given her, when he placed Napoleon in the Isle of Elba.

His language, even on this subject, had been most imprudent since his late irritation against M. de Metternich. "If it is necessary," he said, "we must only unchain this monster, who terrifies Austria and the others so much." This expression was soon repeated, and with bad effects, through all Vienna. But it would be calumniating one of the noblest characters of modern times to suppose this Alexander's sole motive in opposing any violence offered to the prisoner of Elba. It was so well known that both his honour and generosity would prevent his ever consenting to such a proceeding, that nobody ever ventured to address him on the subject. It was a measure of prudence that was contemplated but not spoken of, lest its publication should prevent its accomplishment, but to which all the Allies, with the exception of Alexander, were very much inclined, though they had not yet come to a decided resolution. It was one of those numerous points which M. de Metternich said should be left to time.

Murat's deposition, and the removal of Napoleon to the Azores, were the most delicate of the Italian questions. M. de Metternich was very much embarrassed when the representatives charged with the consideration of Italian affairs first introduced this subject. He alluded to the complications that he dreaded in Italy, and which great prudence alone could avert, a remark that elicited more than one disagreeable observation from M. de Talleyrand. In following a geographical order, Naples would be the last Italian question to be decided; and the only concession that could be obtained from the French plenipotentiary was, that this classification should be made. By following this order, the question of Genoa and Piedmont took precedence of all the others. It was, consequently, the first taken into consideration.

It was generally agreed to carry out the Treaty of Paris, and abandon Genoa to the King of Sardinia as a compensation for Chambery. But the Genoese did not approve of this. Their representative at Vienna was the Marquis de Brignole, a person distinguished both by birth and by his personal qualities, to whom the greatest respect was paid at Vienna, but whose credentials had not been recognised, because such a recognition would be admitting the political existence of the republic of Genoa, which the other powers had determined to ignore. This ancient republic was told, "You gave yourself up to France in 1805; France accepted you, and became your sovereign, and in right of the power thus obtained she bestowed you on Piedmont in 1814. You could only claim existence as a French province—a province which France resigned—an act which we both approve and confirm." Genoa objected to this mode of reasoning; said that she had given

herself to France and not to Piedmont; and added, what was perfectly true, that she had admitted the English only on Lord Bentinck's express promise that her independence should be restored. Lord Castlereagh took great pains to bring the Genoese to reason, but the committee, caring little whether the inhabitants were satisfied or not, decided that Genoa should be united to Sardinia, with a promise that her liberty and commerce should be guaranteed. As the Treaty of Paris spoke only of the city and not of the territory of Genoa, new difficulties arose, but these were soon settled in virtue of the authority which had been assumed over all European States; and the committee charged with the consideration of Italian affairs, finished the Genoese question in two or three sittings.

Next came on the question of the order of succession in the house of Savoy. It was evident that this throne would become vacant unless the succession were secured to the branch of Savoy-Carignan, as all the princes of the elder branch were childless. Austria alone, influenced by the hope of gaining this crown by marriage, could be expected to raise objections to the proposed arrangement. But she would not dare to put forth such pretensions at a moment when she was taking possession of the greater part of Italy. As no objection was made France carried her point, and the succession was fixed in the Savoy-Carignan-branch.

The third question in the adopted order was that of Parma. Spain, supported by France, demanded, as a consequence of the universal restoration going on in Europe, that the house of Parma should get back its ancient duchy of Tuscany, which, under the title of the kingdom of Etruria, it had obtained from the First Consul, at the request of Charles IV., whose daughter married the Prince of Parma. No objection could be made to so well-founded a demand. As Etruria, in virtue of the principle of universal restoration, had been given back to the Grand-duke of Tuscany, it would only be just to restore Parma and Placentia to the Queen of Etruria. In that case, what would become of the Treaty of 11th of April, or of Maria Louisa, whose revenue depended on it?

This princess, as we have already mentioned in the commencement of this book, was residing in the palace of Shoenbrunn, where, from the apartments she occupied, she could hear the noise of the *fêtes* that celebrated her downfall; and can it be believed, she almost felt annoyed, that she could not participate in these festivities, so completely was her weak and frivolous mind already a prey to *ennui*.

Flung, without her own consent, into the chasm of revolution, in the expectation that her marriage with Napoleon would close the gulf; in this fearful trial, her memory, consciousness,

and strength gave way. The poor creature was exhausted; she retained but two sentiments—her affection for her son, and the desire to obtain the duchy of Parma, whither she wished to retire, and fulfil her maternal duties in peace.

For a moment she thought of going to Elba, but she quickly abandoned the intention on being told that her son should not accompany her. It would have been too great a risk to leave that child in the hands of Napoleon. Compelled to choose between her duties as a mother and a wife, she unhesitatingly preferred the former, and whatever regret she may have felt, decreased daily, beneath the influence of M. de Neiperg, who, as we have said, was become the recipient of her entire confidence. As the reward of her submission to the wishes of her father and the allied sovereigns, she only asked the patrimony promised to her son, where she begged to be allowed to live in peace, forgetful of the brilliant dream that for a moment had dazzled her youth. We might certainly wish that Napoleon's wife had exhibited more energy of character, but if the consort he chose from political motives, abandoned him through weakness, he had little right to complain, and we ought to deal mercifully with this victim whom kings and peoples immolated to their repose, at one time elevating her to the noblest of thrones, and then flinging her from it, to secure themselves momentary advantages, without caring to inquire what she thought or suffered; like the worm on whom man heedlessly tramples, and on which he does not even bestow a glance. She was at Vienna, interceding with her father, who demanded, in her name, the execution of the promises contained in the treaty of the 11th of April.

Who would not experience an emotion of pity for this unfortunate creature? And when M. de Metternich told Russia, England, France and Spain that Francis II., who had already sacrificed so much to the common interest, could not be expected to rob his own daughter, all present, even the representatives of France and Spain were embarrassed. Russia, that is, Alexander, wished that the promises which had been made should be fulfilled. England thought it would be difficult to annul them altogether. As to France, Louis XVIII. would have yielded everything provided he was promised the expulsion of Murat, and it was rather from a feeling of family respectability that Ferdinand VII. of Spain, demanded a portion of the Italian States, however insignificant, than from attachment to a sister for whom he had never felt any affection. In this state of feeling an accommodation was proposed, which consisted in giving Parma and Placentia to the Infanta, the former queen of Etruria, and one of the Legations to Maria Louisa, reversible to the Pope, who would

thus be obliged to wait the death of the Archduchess to obtain the sovereignty of a territory, that legally belonged to him. However, the Catholic feeling of the time, and the desire of securing the prosperity of the Holy See, to whose financial prosperity the Legations were indispensable, prevented the adoption of this plan. Still everything tended towards an arrangement of almost all the Italian questions, even that of Murat, who had always been suspected, and now began to appear guilty, and was about to become a political criminal in the eyes of Europe.

The committee charged with the consideration of the affairs of Switzerland found them in the state we have already described. Ten cantons, of which some were modern, and formed from what had been once independent territories, and others of ancient date, but influenced by a spirit of equity, demanded the maintenance of the nineteen cantons, and the confirmation of the liberal principles contained in the act of mediation. These were opposed by the nine other cantons, partizans of the old regime; amongst which were found the aristocratic canton of Berne, and the democratic cantons of Schweiz, Uri, and Glaris, for democracy does not always imply justice and is often as conservative as aristocracy itself. These nine cantons, at first, refused to acknowledge the Diet of Zurich, but afterwards admitted its authority, and demanded that the territories they had formerly possessed should be restored to them, by which the cantons of Vaud, Argovia, and Tessin, would become dependent. Both parties had continued in arms, Berne as well as Vaud, Argovia, and Thurgovia.

At first, the other powers wished to exclude France from this complicated negotiation, as well as from every other, because they wished to annihilate her influence in Switzerland as well as in Germany and Italy. But by a strange peculiarity of the existing state of affairs, Berne, an essentially aristocratic canton, together with Fribourg and Lucerne, where the spirit of reaction was strongest, were, at the same time, those that felt most attachment to France, that is, to the Bourbons. This was principally owing to the great number of Swiss that had formerly served in France, and who felt sincere gratitude for the rank, honour, and emoluments, they had gained there. They had consequently demanded most decidedly, that a French plenipotentiary should take part in the consideration of Helvetic affairs, and this it was found impossible to refuse. The Duke de Dalberg was appointed to represent the French Legation in this Committee.

This French intervention produced most excellent results. When Berne, Uri, Schweiz, Lucerne, and Fribourg saw that however warmly MM. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg

might espouse their cause, they still dared not demand that Vaud, Argovia, and Tessin should be flung back into a state of dependence, and that distinctions of class should be revived in a republican state, these cantons, the most desirous of the restoration of the old system, lost all hope of gaining what they sought. The Emperor Alexander, faithful to his liberal sentiments also insisted that the nineteen cantons and the act of mediation should be maintained, with the exception of some slight alteration, and as France did not contest the justice of this resolution, Berne and her associate cantons began to yield, and a pacific arrangement of the affair was almost certain. It was decided, that the nineteen cantons should be preserved, that the principles of civil equality should be maintained in the confederacy, that four or five of the principal cantons should be alternately invested with the federal authority, and that Berne should be compensated either in Porentruy or the bishoprick of Basle (both of which had been taken from France) for the sacrifices required from her. Pecuniary compensation was to be made to the other cantons, for the territories which they demanded, but which it was impossible to reduce again to a state of dependence.

The Italian and Swiss questions were in a fair way of being arranged, the greater number was even decided, except that of Naples, which, it was expected, Murat himself would solve. In this state of things, Saxony and Poland were the only subjects of abiding anxiety; but the interests involved were so serious that a universal commotion was dreaded.

Lord Castlereagh had not relaxed in his endeavours to detach the Prussian Ministers from their King and the Emperor of Russia. He was unwillingly assisted by M. de Metternich, who, obliged to adopt Lord Castlereagh's tactics, regretted the sacrifice of Saxony, although conditional on his part, for it was extremely displeasing to the Austrians, who considered the sacrifice of Saxony as even more dangerous than that of Poland. However, Lord Castlereagh's warm entreaties and M. de Metternich's cold counsel had a certain degree of success. The Prussians were told that the abandonment of Poland would be a misfortune for all Germany, and a serious risk for Prussia, lying so near Russia; that the last partition of Poland had not been so dangerous, as it had, at least, left the Vistula as a barrier between Germany and Russia; that to allow Russia to pass the Vistula, and, above all, allow her to take possession of Warsaw, the head and heart of Poland, would be to furnish her with the means of reconstituting that country; not, indeed, as an independent, but as a subject, Poland, that would be in the hands of the Czars a valiant slave, fighting bravely for her masters, who would not fail to restore her

scattered members by taking Galicia from Austria, and Dantzic, Graudentz, and Thorn from Prussia. They were told that if Frederick the Great had eagerly taken possession of a portion of the Polish provinces at the time of the first partition, it was with the intention of uniting Old Prussia with Silesia, which would, otherwise, remain separated, and resemble the two sides of a right angle, only joined at the apex; that Russia once established on the Netz and Wartha, between Thorn, Bromberg, Posen, and Kalisch, she needed to take but one step and divide Prussia in two, leaving Old Prussia and Pomerania on one side and Silesia on the other, like two branches of a tree separated from the parent stem; that all that Prussia could gain on the Elbe from Wittenberg to Dresden would not compensate for the danger of having the Russians at Posen; and that the Prussians ought, for their own sakes, to oppose the Czar's designs on Poland. The Prussians were moreover told that the territories they desired on the Elbe would not be refused; that England and even Austria would abandon Saxony to them, but, on condition that they should join the European cause, and separate from the ambitious ally to whom they were so unfortunately bound. They were lastly reminded that this bond consisted only in their king's friendship for the Czar, but that the destiny of States ought not to depend upon the affection of princes, and that it was the duty of the Prussian Ministers to enlighten Frederick William as to the interests of his kingdom, and to oppose if they did not convince him.

These considerations had great weight, particularly with military men, who considered the establishment of Russia on the lower Wartha as extremely dangerous, and also produced a certain impression on the Prussian Ministers, who, in their turn, did not fail to influence their king a little. At least Alexander thought so, and was very much affected by it; for if Prussia abandoned him, he would be left alone in opposition to all Europe, without being able to count on the assistance of France, who had adopted the German policy, and whom there was no longer time to gain over. Thus reduced to the limits of the old partition, he would be humbled in the eyes of Poland, and obliged to hear his own subjects say that he had gained nothing by the late wars, although he had run such risk in undertaking them. It is true that he had gained Finland and Bessarabia, but as these conquests were due to his alliance with France, they would only be a condemnation of his policy in joining the allies, and would afford no greater satisfaction to the national ambition than what a hungry man feels in the recollection of a dinner eaten in bye-gone days.

In this disagreeable position of affairs, Alexander brought about an explanation with the King of Prussia, by means of a *tête-à-tête* dinner, on which occasion he gave vent to his feelings with the greatest vehemence. He reminded Frederick William of the mutual vows of friendship they had made in 1813, at the time of their meeting on the Oder, when, after some years of coolness, again united by a common danger they had promised to fall together, or, united, save, at the same time, their own dominions and Europe. He reminded him of the devotedness with which he (Alexander) had held out his hand to free the Germans, at a time when his most faithful subjects advised him to remain on the Vistula and treat with Napoleon. He told him that but for this devotedness on his part, Germany would be still enslaved, and Prussia reduced to five million subjects; that to their union alone so favourable a change was due; that the Allied Powers wished to profit of their improved position, to exclude Russia, to whom they were indebted for the advantages they enjoyed; that confining the Russians to the Vistula, would be to leave them unrecompensed for all the blood they had shed from the Oder to the Seine; for Napoleon, after the disaster of Moscow, had offered them the frontier of the Vistula, and they might have returned to their homes without exposing themselves to new dangers, without sacrificing two or three hundred thousand soldiers to continue the war of 1813, having rid themselves of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and possessed themselves of Bessarabia and Finland; but now, nobody seemed to remember the heroism of their determination in passing the Vistula, in opposition to the prudent Kutusoff; that some of the Allies, Austria, in particular, who had been compelled to join this European crusade, and who had not shed one quarter of the blood lost by the Russians, wished to enjoy the fruits of victory alone; they who had not had a single village burned, refused compensation to Russia for the ruins of Moscow; that it was very well for diplomatists to act in this way—it was their trade—but that princes, like Alexander and Frederick William, actuated by principles of honour, united by similarity of age, and the vicissitudes of their lives, by their common reverses and successes, should not allow themselves to be disunited by the ingratitude of others; that they, who were always fortunate when united, and unfortunate when separated, might be allowed to entertain a superstitious belief in the necessity of being allied, and for their own happiness as well as for that of their peoples, ought to live and die united.

There was a great deal of truth in all this, at least, when seen from the Russian or Prussian, but not from the European point of view; for it is certain that if Prussia separated from

him, Alexander would be forced to remain on the other side of the Vistula, and would have good reason to regret having passed it at the end of the year 1812, and not treated with Napoleon in the beginning of 1813, except that he had the glory of having entered Paris, and behaved there as a generous and courteous conqueror.

Frederick William was sensitively alive to the duties of honour and friendship, besides that he was perfectly conscious of all the obligations that Germany was under to Alexander; for very different would have been the course of events if the latter, after the passage of the Beresina, had followed Kutusoff's advice and treated with Napoleon. He was also moved by Alexander's vehemence, which (according to M. de Hardenberg's account) was extraordinary. Touched to the very heart, and entertaining a kind of superstitious belief in the potency of the Czar's friendship, he flung himself into his arms, and swore to be faithful to him. But Alexander told him that the king's fidelity was of little value without that of the ministers, of which he had every reason to doubt. To make sure of this, M. de Hardenberg was called, and the explanation that was commenced with the king was concluded with his prime minister. The Czar exhibited as much vehemence of manner with the latter as he had done with the sovereign himself. When the minister alluded to the reasons adduced by the English and Austrians for opposing the approach of the Russians to the Prussian frontier, he was fiercely contradicted; and, after a vain attempt at resistance, was compelled to yield, and promise to support the policy to which Alexander and Frederick William had again most solemnly engaged themselves.

The project which both agreed to defend was, that the greater part of the Polish provinces should be delivered to Russia, on condition that Prussia should get all Saxony. In pursuance of his ambitious and romantic plan of re-constituting Poland, Alexander was most desirous of getting possession of Warsaw, which in the last partition had been allotted to Prussia, in order that the head may be severed from the body, and that this hapless country may for ever remain deprived of existence.

In fact, the three partitions of Poland, which had taken place in 1772, 1793, and 1795, had successively disjointed that country in such a manner that a re-combination of the parts was impossible. In the first partition (that of 1772, devised and carried out by Frederick the Great), each of the co-partitionists took the part that suited him best. Prussia took the mouths of the Vistula, and both banks of that river as far as Thorn (exclusively), in order to unite Old Prussia and Pomerania by the suppression of the intervening Polish territories.

Austria took Gallicia, lying at the foot of the Crapach mountains; Russia seized the territory so warmly disputed in the middle ages by the Muscovites, and the Poles—that is, the country opening between Smolensko and Vitebsk, between the sources of the Dwina and the Dnieper, and a territory further on between Jacobstadt and Rogaczew, forming the eastern part of Lithuania.

In 1793 and 1795, the entire country was portioned away, each spoiler in seizing what suited himself, taking especial care so to dismember hapless Poland that a re-union of the scattered parts would be impossible. Thus, Prussia took the Grand Duchy of Posen in order to unite Silesia to Old Prussia, to which latter she also added all that part of Lithuania, which extends to the Niemen from Drogitchin to Kowno; and, lastly, Warsaw itself, which was refused to Prussia, because as she was to have the greater part of the body, it was not thought advisable that she should also have the head. Austria had descended the left bank of the Vistula, as far as the Pilica, and the right as far as the Bug. Russia had all the rest—that is, all Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, &c. When, in 1807 and 1809, Napoleon thought of re-constituting Poland under the name of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, being under the necessity of conciliating Austria and Russia, but not Prussia, he deprived the latter of the mouths of the Vistula, of Dantzic, which he erected into a so-called free city, of the Duchy of Posen, the territory to the left of the Niemen, and, above all, of Warsaw. He next deprived Austria of both banks of the Upper Vistula, as far as the Pilica and the Bug, leaving her only Gallicia; but he took nothing from Russia, because having made her the pivot of his policy, he was still more anxious to conciliate her than Austria. From these different acquisitions he formed the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which comprised the basin of the Vistula from its source, near the Carpathian mountains, to its embouchure in the Baltic, and almost touched the Oder on one side, and extended to the Niemen on the other, but it did not comprise Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and Gallicia, that is, more than two-thirds of the Polish territory.

When Russia, in 1814, thought, in her turn, of re-constituting Poland, she had a great advantage over Napoleon, inasmuch as she possessed a far larger portion of the Polish territory; but should Alexander be compelled to pause in his progress at the Vistula, he could have but one shore of this river; nor could he have Warsaw if the partition made by the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz was rigorously adhered to. But Alexander was desirous of having both banks of the Vistula; in the first place, that he might get possession

of Warsaw, which was the head and heart of the body he sought to resuscitate; and next, that on the left bank he may have sufficient territory to prevent the capital of his new State from being a frontier town.

On this account he wished to obtain possession of the Duchy of Posen, by which he would become master of both banks of the Wartha. He also wished to be master of both shores of the Vistula, as far as Cracow inclusively. But this would be asking Germany, and especially Prussia, to allow Russia to advance to the Oder, which would bring her very near Dresden and Berlin; and it would be asking Austria to let her approach the Carpathians, a movement by which Austria would entirely lose her portion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which it had been agreed to divide as formerly. It is true, as Alexander said, that when the partition of this duchy was agreed on, neither the Tyrol, Italy, Holland, or Belgium had been re-conquered; and as Austria had gained so much by these acquisitions, she may very well leave him her share of the Grand Duchy.

As Russia had now renewed her alliance with Prussia, it was again decided that she should cross the Vistula, and get possession of the left bank as far up as possible. Her progress towards the Wartha should be regulated by what Prussia should obtain in Central Germany—that is to say, in Saxony. This was a point to be decided after the settlement of the Saxony question, and would be dependent on the success of that negotiation. With regard to Austria, Alexander meant to leave her Gallicia, which she had possessed since the first partition, but he intended to take those portions of Poland which fell to Austria in the second and third partitions—that is, the left bank of the Vistula as far as the Pilica, and the right as far as the Bug; and in this he was right, for without these territories Warsaw would be on the east a mere frontier town. But this was, in plain terms, asking Austria for her entire portion of the Grand Duchy, which, according to agreement, was to be restored to the ancient co-partitionists. It was possible, indeed, by insisting on the acquisition of the Tyrol and Italy, which had not been anticipated in 1813, to mollify the sacrifice required from Austria, and by giving her the salt mines of Wieliczka, upon which she set great value. If Cracow could be made a free city, as was intended to do with Thorn and other disputed towns, to Austria might also be given the rich and populous district of Tarnopol, constituting eastern Gallicia, and which had been given to Russia by Napoleon in 1809. Besides, necessity might be adduced as a reason for the contemplated changes, as Warsaw would have no suburbs without the annexation of the territory situated between the Pilica and the Bug.

In the negotiations between Austria and Russia, Prussia was to act as intermediary in the concessions offered by Russia to Austria, in exchange for the Upper Vistula, and would thus fulfil, as far as possible, one of the conditions which M. de Metternich attached to the sacrifice of Saxony—that of joining the Western Powers in the question of Poland. We have already said that M. de Metternich, forced to co-operate in Lord Castlereagh's policy, had consented to give up Saxony to Prussia, but on certain conditions, which he hoped would not be complied with. These were, that Mayence should belong to the Confederation; that the Mein and Moselle should separate the northern from the southern states of Germany; and, lastly, that Prussia should join England and Austria in the Polish question. As Prussia was determined to yield the points concerning Germany, by affecting to assist Austria in tracing the Polish frontier in the direction of Galicia, she might say that she had fulfilled the conditions required for obtaining Saxony, and consider the Cabinet of Vienna pledged to her. The success of this comedy was of great importance to Alexander, for Russia's progress into Posen would be measured by Prussia's acquisitions in Saxony.

Alexander and Frederick William having renewed their friendship, were become more fixed in their ambitious views, and more determined in their language. However, Prince de Hardenberg, whom Lord Castlereagh had hoped to win over by yielding Saxony to Prussia, on the above-mentioned conditions, could not conceal from the English representative the new bonds that bound Russia and Prussia. He related the scene that had taken place between Alexander and Frederick William, declaring that he had never witnessed the like, and that it would be impossible to withstand its influence. Lord Castlereagh saw all his calculations disappointed, and M. de Metternich saw his hopes realized, for he had only affected to consent to the sacrifice of Saxony under the conviction that Prussia would never fulfil the proposed conditions. Lord Castlereagh reproached Prince de Hardenberg most bitterly, and told him that he ought rather to have resigned office than yielded, but he did not induce him to take this step, and Prussia continued more closely bound to Russia than ever.

Meanwhile, an unexpected event contributed to show the fallacy of the English policy, and even brought about a crisis. We have already seen how Russia and Prussia had ventured to take possession of the disputed provinces; Russia by evacuating Saxony in favour of Prussia, and concentrating her forces on the Vistula, and by sending the Grand Duke Constantine to Warsaw to organize the new kingdom of Poland; Prussia, by ostensibly occupying all Saxony, and sending

thither civil officers empowered to establish the Prussian rule. This double occupation had given great offence, and had not a little contributed, as we have already said, to the immediate assembling of the Congress. An accidental announcement, the inevitable consequence of Russia and Prussia's imprudence, completed this ill-feeling, and excited their adversaries to the highest degree of exasperation.

When Prince Reppin, the Russian governor of Saxony, and who had fulfilled the duties of his office with great prudence, was about to leave, he thought he ought to take a formal leave of the Saxons, and in a declaration that was afterwards published, told them that, in consequence of an arrangement with England and Austria, they were about to pass under the rule of Prussia. He added that their country would not be divided, but should remain entire, as had been promised, under one sovereign, and this sovereign, Frederick William, well-known for his virtues, would ensure their rights and happiness as he had done that of his other numerous subjects. He said that, undoubtedly, the Saxons ought to regret their old king, who during forty years had secured their happiness, but now the fiat of a superior destiny had gone forth, and after having paid a just tribute of regret to Frederick Augustus, they would be faithful to Frederick William, and prove themselves worthy of his benefits by their submission and loyalty.

The sincerity of this declaration, and the excellent sentiments it contained, heightened the effect it produced, because they showed how far things had advanced. It produced an extraordinary effect on all the Germans assembled at Vienna. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich were assailed with questions. They were asked whether it was with their consent that Saxony was become a Prussian province, and whether the Congress so solemnly assembled at Vienna had only been summoned to consummate an usurpation no less odious than those for which Napoleon was so much blamed. The general excitement was fearful, and Lord Castlereagh feared that a policy which had been willing to sacrifice Saxony to save Poland would not be understood in England, whilst M. de Metternich was quite certain of the bad impression it would produce upon the Austrians; consequently both hastened to contradict Prince Reppin's assertions. They denied the truth of what he said, both verbally in private, and in public through the medium of the press, asserting that the Russian governor had announced as done what had not even been resolved on, and which depended on very difficult negotiations that were far from being completed. The Russians and Prussians replied with much asperity that this was only playing on

words, that certainly no document had been signed, but that in a formal note Austria had approved of the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, and that England had made no opposition. In reply to these assertions, the Austrians said that they were only calculated to mislead the legations assembled at Vienna, that Austria had always considered the sacrifice of Saxony a misfortune for Germany, and consequently for Europe, and had constantly advised Prussia to renounce her designs on Saxony as eventually inimical to her own interests, and that, in any case, Austria's consent to this sacrifice had been fettered with conditions, the chief of which was yet unfulfilled, namely, that the Prussian cabinet should abandon Russia on the Polish question. The public mind was still more exasperated by a new event that occurred in the midst of these contradictions and denials. This was a proclamation which the Grand Duke Constantine addressed to the Poles, and in his brother Alexander's name called on them to rally round the old standard of Poland to defend their existence and threatened rights.

This last manifestation completed the general indignation. Those who were opposed to the views of Russia and Prussia considered that such effrontery ought to be met by something else than newspaper articles, and remarks made in the drawing-rooms of Vienna, and they did not hesitate to say that it was imperatively necessary to summon a military force and prepare to restrain those ambitious men, who sought to parcel out Europe as they pleased. The Bavarians and Austrians were the most excited of all, the former, because that the suppression of so important a state as Saxony was a terrifying example for all the princes of the Confederation: the latter, because that the intimate union of Russia and Prussia, and their establishment at the foot of the Bohemian and Carpathian mountains, were calculated to endanger the security of Austria. The Austrians, in particular, were most indignant at the arrogance of Russia and Prussia, and asked what would have become both of the one and the other if the Austrian army had not come to their assistance after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen? or if the Austrians had not borne the principal burthen of the war at Dresden and Leipzig? "If," they said, and with perfect truth, "if the safety of Europe, as some insolently assert, was exclusively the work of one portion of the Allies, would it not be more just to attribute the good work to those who in 1813 had, at the risk of their existence, declared themselves, and who, breaking the bonds of family affection, had decided everything, than to those who, when left to themselves, were not able to defend either the Saal, the Elbe, or the Oder?"

Prince Schwarzenberg was generally esteemed, and though not in the habit of arrogating to himself the exercise of authority, he was rough, and even harsh, when urged too far. He had several conversations with Alexander, by whom he was always treated with consideration and courtesy. He did not spare the Emperor, and was so excited by the general complaints as to say that he almost repented the blind confidence he had felt in the Emperor's personal sincerity. He added, that had he foreseen what had occurred, he would neither have advised his sovereign to unite the Austrian forces with those of Russia or Prussia, nor would he have accepted the command of these armies, nor have so freely shed his blood, borne so many affronts, or assumed so much responsibility to secure the success of the common cause. He recalled the entreaties and supplications employed by the Allies to win the support of Austria, and the ingratitude with which she had been afterwards treated; he pointed out the bad effects of these audacious pretensions, pretensions that fully justified Napoleon's conduct; he also pointed out the danger of letting Europe see that she had only made an exchange of masters. "Napoleon," continued Prince Schwarzenberg, "though secluded in his island is still all-powerful in his influence over the public mind, and what would be the consequence if, whilst the European courts present so scandalous a spectacle of disunion and cupidity, he suddenly appeared in either camp?"

The Austrian generalissimo was violently excited, and embarrassed the Czar by the vehemence of his language. Alexander endeavoured to exculpate himself, denied the ambitious designs of which he was accused, again appealed to his well-known sincerity and generosity, said that he was bound both to the Poles and Prussians, and expressed his surprise at the indignation exhibited against an arrangement that he considered quite natural. He expressed some regret that things had proceeded to such extremities, or that he had gone so far. Still, notwithstanding his apologetic tone, it was evident that he had not renounced his plans.

However much the allies might desire to avoid war, or have recourse to the interference of France, which would be inevitable in case of a rupture, they began to think of such a necessity. Lord Castlereagh found his position changed by instructions he had just received from England, and which modified his conduct not a little. Hitherto he had acted like all British ministers, and made little account of Hanoverian interests, which were dearer to the reigning family than to the English nation. He had taken little heed of the wrongs of German princes, and in the question of Saxony seemed to forget that he was minister of the King of Hanover as well as

of the King of England. The true motive of his conduct was, that he believed a stronger sympathy existed in the English Parliament for Poland than for Saxony. However, it was not possible, that he would be long allowed to follow such a policy. A number of letters, principally by the Coburg princes, had been addressed to the Prince Regent of England from Vienna. Although these princes had, during the late wars, espoused the cause of Russia, and served in her armies, they had not forgotten their duty to the King of Saxony, the head of their house, who had always protected them against Napoleon, and they now pleaded his cause, with a most honourable fidelity. One of these princes was at Vienna, daily braving the rage and threats of Alexander; the other was at London, making preparations, it was said, for his marriage with the Princess Charlotte of England. Both, aided by the Austrian ministers, had impressed on the Prince Regent, the future monarch of Hanover and of England, the danger of sacrificing Saxony, and the prince, in his turn, had insisted that the British Cabinet should formally command Lord Castlereagh to defend the interests of Saxony. The order was issued, and arrived at Vienna in the beginning of December.

This order could not have come more *à propos*. It obliged Lord Castlereagh to change his policy, and, at the same time, furnished him with a most natural excuse for this change. Had these instructions arrived a few days earlier, he might, perhaps, have been annoyed; but now that he saw himself the dupe of his complaisance to the Prussians, he was very well pleased to receive them. He consequently agreed perfectly with M. de Metternich in his absolute refusal to sacrifice either Saxony or Poland, and showed the two allied sovereigns that he was determined to oppose them by every means. Prince de Wrède, the ever-active and useful representative of Bavaria, was constantly advising the adoption of energetic resolutions. He offered, in the name of his court, twenty-five thousand men, for every hundred thousand furnished by Austria, and also advised a good understanding with France, for without her aid the balance of strength would be uncertain. Austria had three hundred thousand men, of whom she could employ two hundred thousand against Russia and Prussia; Bavaria could furnish about sixty thousand, though she promised to raise more; and the other German princes, who were removed from Prussian and Russian influence, could furnish about forty thousand, and the Low Countries, perhaps, as many more; but a greater number could not be reckoned on, as all England's forces were still engaged in the American war. The whole, thus collected, would not

amount to more than three hundred and fifty thousand men, a number not exceeding the combined armies of Russia and Prussia, as the one could easily assemble two hundred thousand, and the other one hundred and fifty thousand men. The numbers being equal, and their valour and resources assumed to be so, the event would be most uncertain, and they might continue slaughtering each other for years, without any result, whilst France would be a mere spectator of a conflict so beneficial to her. To secure a certain result France should be engaged in the quarrel, and furnish one hundred thousand men, who would attack Prussia either in the Rhenish Provinces or in Franconia. Certainly the price of this assistance might be something alarming, were it solicited, but here it was freely offered by the French Legation, and not only offered, but urgently pressed upon those who needed it.

These reasons adduced principally by Bavaria, were decisive, and had risen spontaneously in everybody's mind. It would have been folly to refuse the proffered aid of France, which would be most valuable, though some had affected to doubt it. Intelligence of our warlike preparations, instigated by M. de Talleyrand, was now noised in every direction, and Vienna was filled with letters from Paris, relating all that was going on there. These letters spoke of the internal state of France, and the discontent felt at the proceedings of the Bourbons, but whilst mentioning the discontent that prevailed amongst the military, the writers added that the army was increasing daily, that it had never been composed of better soldiers, and that employed on foreign service, the French soldiers would sustain the glory they had already acquired. The letters received by the Russians and Prussians were less flattering to France, and still less to the Bourbons, but those written by the Duke of Wellington and M. de Vincent, the English and Austrian Ambassadors at Paris, though they admitted the political errors of the restored dynasty, agreed in admiring the French army, and admitted the advantages that such a force could offer. These letters also mentioned the flourishing state of our finances, whose prompt reestablishment appeared inexplicable, though from the ease with which each department was carried on there could be no doubt of their good condition.

There was no longer any reason to doubt, as Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich had appeared to do, of the efficacious assistance that France could offer. Nor could there be any doubt of her willingness to furnish aid, since M. de Talleyrand's entreaties to be allowed to take part in this European crusade in favour of Saxony, and the constant communications exchanged between the French and Bavarian

legations left no doubt on this point. However, no anxiety was felt to take France into confidence, or let her know that the Allies were making warlike preparations against each other. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich were restrained by a certain party feeling, and did not wish to make advances to M. de Talleyrand, who they knew, would come forward on the slightest hint. Besides, they knew, that he would learn sufficient from Bavaria to hold himself in readiness. A plan was drawn up, to be put in execution in the month of March 1815, in which the French forces were disposed of as though their aid was certain. In virtue of this plan, proposed by Prince Schwarzenberg and Marshal de Wrede, three hundred and twenty thousand Austrians, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, Badeners, Saxons, &c., were to be divided into two armies, and sent into Moravia and Bohemia. One of these armies, consisting of two hundred thousand men under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg, was to proceed through Moravia to the Upper Vistula; and the other, consisting of one hundred and twenty thousand, under Marshal de Wrede, was to pass through Bohemia to the Oder, whilst fifty thousand French, entering Franconia, would prevent the Bohemian army from being outflanked; and another force of fifty thousand men was to proceed to the Rhenish Provinces, to act in concert with the Hollando-Belgians. There was no doubt but that Prussia would be overwhelmed by such a mass, and Russia forced to retreat beyond the Vistula. No soldiers were to be required from England until the end of the American war, but she was to subsidize the new Allies, with the exception of France, that no longer needed either the purse or sword of strangers. These plans, which were to be further matured before being put into execution, were to remain a secret between England, Bavaria, and Austria, and not communicated to the French, except through the officious indiscretion of Bavaria. As a preliminary precaution, Austria sent a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men into Galicia, where she already had forty thousand.

On the strength of these arrangements, M. de Metternich entered into a categorical explanation with the Russians and Prussians, and in a note dated 10th December, declared that, in consequence of the unanimous opinion of Germany, and the definite resolutions of England, announced in Lord Castlereagh's late instructions, and the opinion of all the great European powers, France in particular, and in consequence of the non-compliance with the conditions imposed on Prussia at a time when her wishes were about being complied with, Saxony was to be maintained in her actual state, with the exception of some territorial sacrifices deemed necessary for de-

fining more accurately the Prussian frontier, and which, in any case, would be the punishment of the faults committed by King Frederick Augustus.

This positive declaration of Austria produced a great effect at Vienna. She would never have used such language without having taken a decided determination to proceed to extremities, without having calculated her resources, prepared the means of executing her plans, and formed new alliances. Besides, even a superficial glance seemed to show that Austria, England and France were united, and determined to act in common. The union of all the other European powers had scarcely sufficed to conquer France, and what was now to become of Russia and Prussia alone against united England, Austria, and France? The two northern powers would not be able to hold their ground. The Prussians, against whom this manifestation was principally directed, were violently indignant. King Frederick William, then at Vienna, was surrounded by the principal Prussian generals, amongst whom Marshal Blucher was conspicuous, and who besieged him with their haughty demands, asserting in the loftiest terms that they were the sole conquerors of Napoleon, the sole saviours of Europe. If they were to be believed, nothing ought to be refused them, and whoever opposed their pretensions should be prepared to feel the temper of their swords. Influenced by the same sentiments, the Prussian ministers prepared to reply immediately, and in the same tone, to the Austrian despatch. They were about to embody in their reply all the vehemence of the Prussian staff, and intended to retort upon Austria the charge of faithlessness, when the Emperor Alexander, who, although much excited, was not inclined to urge things so far, prevented them from yielding to their first emotions of anger, or using such violent language in their reply. He restrained them, and proceeded to act with all that tact that was natural to him when not thrown off his guard. He first visited the Austrians, commencing with Prince Schwarzenberg and the Emperor Francis. He found the former, not indeed excited like the Prussians, but severe and determined, and was so dissatisfied with him, that he complained to M. de Metternich, whom he accused of inspiring the commander-in-chief of the Austrian army with false ideas. He next visited the Emperor Francis, who treated him with all the urbanity due from a host to his guest, but with a calm determination that often produces a greater effect than anger. His next interview was with M. de Talleyrand. This was their third meeting, for since Alexander had come to Vienna he was chary of his interviews with the illustrious diplomatist, at whose house he had not hesitated to take up

his abode at Paris. He now almost solicited an interview, for meeting M. de Talleyrand in a drawing-room of the Austrian capital, he took his arm, and made an appointment with him. When M. de Talleyrand appeared on the appointed day, the Czar received him, if not with the seductive charm of former times, at least with a gracious friendliness which invited intimacy; the Emperor now spoke with the greatest moderation on subjects whose discussion a little before deprived him of all self-command. He asked M. de Talleyrand how it happened, that he, who at Paris had expressed himself in favour of the restoration of Poland, was now so much opposed to it. M. de Talleyrand replied that he was still favourable to the project, but it should be the restoration of a free and independent Poland—a European, and not a Russian Poland. The French diplomatist, in conformity with the policy already employed, added, that Poland no longer interested France, that since it was not Poland that was to be restored, but a frontier to be decided on between Russia and Germany, he left the business to those interested in it, and that as far as this question was concerned, Russia would meet with no opposition from France. This was certainly a concession, but it was no advantage to the Czar to gain Poland unless he got Saxony at the same time. M. de Talleyrand appeared inflexible on this latter point, and no longer adducing arguments based on the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, he endeavoured to prove to Alexander that the peace of the world, and the glory of Europe, depended on the recognition of the principle of legitimacy under all circumstances, and in every place. Such opinions had little influence with the Czar, especially coming from the lips of M. de Talleyrand. He did not seem to attach much importance to these professions of faith uttered by the ancient minister of the usurper, and repeated to him that he was bound to the Prussians, that his policy was to be faithful to his word, but that if M. de Talleyrand could induce the Prussians to release him from his promise, he would yield. M. de Talleyrand replied that some other than he should be employed to influence the Prussians, and that Alexander himself possessed the means of doing so, by restoring them their portion of Poland. “You wish, then,” replied Alexander, “that I should despoil myself to satisfy you. That would not suit me. But,” he added, “let us make a bargain. I know your secret; I know your principal object here; you are seeking to dethrone Murat! Well,” he said, extending his hand to M. de Talleyrand, “let us form a contract; I will take your side on that question, and it will be soon decided according to your wishes, provided that you yield Saxony to me.” At this moment the expression of Alexander’s countenance was animated and insinuating,

showing how anxious he was to gain his end, and it is quite evident that had France pursued a different policy at Vienna, and not confined herself to seeking the safety of Saxony, she could have obtained every concession from Russia. But as M. de Talleyrand's course was marked out for him, he remained unmoved by Alexander's seductive proposal, and said he could not entertain such a proposition, which was no other than to tolerate usurpation in one quarter of Europe, in order to secure the triumph of legitimacy in another; that for his part, he desired to see the rights of legitimacy universally maintained. M. de Talleyrand delivered these sentiments with a pontifical air, which unfortunately made Alexander smile.

This proposal not having succeeded, the Czar, wishing to derive some advantage from the interview, sought to learn from M. de Talleyrand what were those warlike preparations going on in France so much spoken of at Vienna, and for what they were intended. Without seeming to attach much importance to these questions, though he turned his good ear to M. de Talleyrand (he heard badly in one), he asked him in what condition was the French army, and whether it had been considered necessary to reorganise it, as was reported at Vienna. Then with all that art which he possessed in so high a degree, and with an expression of the greatest indifference, M. de Talleyrand related what had been, and what was still being done to reform the French army, to attach the soldiers to the new government, and, above all, to render the army as fit as ever for foreign service. He said, quite carelessly, that at present France had 200,000 soldiers, and would have 300,000 in March, all veterans who had returned from abroad, and taken the place of the conscripts drawn for 1815. He gave those details like one who was neither desirous nor conscious of producing an effect. Alexander could not conceal his feelings as well as M. de Talleyrand, and they parted with formal politeness, the Czar deeply impressed by what he had heard, for he had no doubt but that these newly-raised French troops would be at the service of England and Austria should a war arise on the Polish and Saxon question.

However, in order to be still more certain, Alexander sent Prince Czartoryski to M. de Talleyrand. This prince was deeply interested in the fate of Poland, for whose sake he was most anxious to bring about a union between France and Russia. The motive of this visit was a phrase in M. de Metternich's despatch, in which he alleged that all the European States, and France in particular, were opposed to the sacrifice of Saxony. Prince Czartoryski was commissioned to discover the true meaning of this phrase, which seemed to indicate a

formal compact between France and Austria. As M. de Talleyrand divined this motive, he persisted in his tactics of making a greater show than the reality justified, and of intimidating Alexander by the idea of a coalition existing between France, England, and Austria, but took care, at the same time, that of the three powers France should appear the least opposed to Russia. He expressed a decided preference for the latter power, and an extreme desire to be on good terms with her, but, at the same time, he did not deny that, with regard to Saxony, France would join those who defended her, even to the shedding of blood. He boasted, indeed, a little; for Prince Czartoryski was led, by this conversation, to believe that M. de Talleyrand enjoyed more of England and Austria's confidence than was really the case. But the desired effect was produced, and this was the essential point considering the policy that was adopted.

Every species of opposition now rose against the projects of Alexander and Frederick William. The German princes of the North and South, most of whom were assembled at Vienna, were desirous of making a protestation in common against the annexation of Saxony to Prussia. One prince alone dissented—the son of the King of Wurtemberg, who had served with the French in Russia, and who, whether fighting with or against us, always distinguished himself by his bravery and brilliant daring, and who, now captivated by the charms of his affianced bride, the Grand Duchess Catherine, was entirely devoted to the Russian policy. This prince, who seldom agreed in opinion with his father, used all his influence to prevent the intended declaration. He succeeded in restraining the lesser princes, by threatening them with the anger of Prussia, if they signed the declaration. However, the result was the same; and the members of the committee entrusted with the consideration of German affairs, declared that they would suspend their labours until the fate of Saxony should be decided, which meant, that their resolutions would entirely depend on the decisions made with regard to this kingdom, in whose fate the German States felt as much interest as in their own.

Opposed by so many difficulties, both moral and physical, Alexander felt that he should make some concessions, and he reluctantly yielded to necessity. In the first exaltation of his feelings, he had intended to demand the entire territory of ancient Poland. But these pretensions he was obliged to renounce in consequence of the resistance he met on every side. Still, he was determined to demand, and obtain at any price, all the territory that essentially constituted Poland—that is, the basin of the Vistula from Sandomir to Thorn.

He would thus have Warsaw, surrounded on every side with

sufficient extent of territory. And, in possessing Warsaw, he might boast of having re-constituted Poland, and in such a position he would have, so to speak, won the wager he had laid against all Europe, as much through self-love as from ambition or chivalrous feeling. He was ready to make some concession, the fundamental point of his project being gained.

The principal concession was to be made on the Prussian side in the Grand Duchy of Posen. Had Alexander taken all the territory of ancient Poland on this side, he would touch the Oder, as these possessions extended nearly to the confluence of the Wartha and Oder, and terminated not far from Custrin, Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and Glogau. There remained, consequently, but a very narrow strip of territory on the right of the Oder to constitute the country of Silesia. Alexander would have thus penetrated through the junction of the angle formed by Old Prussia and Pomerania with Silesia, and would have made an angular advance into the heart of the Prussian monarchy, which would be most alarming to the Germans and even to the Prussians; for amongst the latter, those who were more influenced by rational geographical considerations than by self-love, considered that their country was in more need of being strengthened from Thorn to Breslau, than extended from Wittenberg to Dresden. By leaving the actual Duchy of Posen—that is, the greater part of the basin of the Wartha, to the Prussians, they would get a fine territory more populous than that nearer to Warsaw; nor would it be impossible to trace a good frontier between Poland and Prussia. By following the Prosna to its confluence with the Wartha, a little below Konin, and by drawing a line from this point to the neighbourhood of Thorn, Prosna would form a first point of separation; and then from Konin to Inowracław the succession of lakes whence the Netze takes its rise, would present a line of obstacles of real importance as a frontier. This formidable point being directed towards Prussia would not injure the Polish frontier, for the country around Warsaw would be still sufficiently extensive. Of the two millions and a half of Poles, that Prussia might claim as her portion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, if this Grand Duchy were restored to its ancient co-partitionists, she would get one million, and as many more in the centre of Germany. Therefore, if an arrangement could be made in Germany, as in Poland, by detaching a portion of territory from Saxony, Prussia might be restored to the position she held in 1803, which was what had been promised her.

The arrangements with Austria would not be so easy, as more was to be demanded than conceded. But here the demands of Russia were really well-founded, at least, if the principle of re-constituting Poland as a separate kingdom were

admitted. Austria had always held Galicia since the time of the first partition, nor had even Napoleon thought of depriving her of it, except, indeed, in 1812, when he flattered himself for an instant to be able to overpower Russia and create a French Poland. This enterprise failed; Galicia still belonged to Austria, and not the most impassioned Pole, not even Alexander himself, would have thought of demanding it from the Cabinet of Vienna. But there were provinces on both banks of the Vistula, extending to the Pilica on one side and to the Bug on the other, which Austria had acquired in the last partition, and of which Napoleon had taken possession, when about to create the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Were these territories restored to Austria, she would possess the country on each side of the Vistula, even to the very gates of Warsaw, in which case it would be impossible to say that Poland was re-constituted. Austria saw this; and, besides, she might be told, that if the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz, which were concluded when but a limited success was hoped for by the Allies; if these treaties required that the different portions of the Grand Duchy should be restored to their old possessors, still, Austria had benefited so much in the Tyrol, in Italy, and in Bavaria, by the unexpected success of the Allies, that she could not deny the justice of Russia's claims to an equal advantage. Now, this latter State could only pretend to acquisitions gained on the banks of the Vistula; therefore, no very serious opposition was to be dreaded on the part of Austria. Besides, other concessions, of a certain value, were to be offered to Austria: she would be allowed to retain the salt mines of Wieliczka, by erecting Cracow into an independent city (as Alexander thought to do with Thorn); and Galicia would get back the beautiful district of Tarnopol, of which Napoleon had deprived her in 1809, to punish Austria for having declared war against us at that time.

Russia, therefore, resolved to yield the important Duchy of Posen to Prussia, a concession which would render the latter power less exacting in Germany, and induce her to come to an amicable arrangement with Austria relative to the Polish frontier. M. de Hardenberg was, consequently, desired to address a very moderate reply to Austria, and endeavour to attain the principal objects of the Prussian policy without coming to a rupture which might be fatal to Russia and Prussia, and would certainly entail general disgrace.

Whilst Alexander, in consequence of these conciliatory resolutions, sought to come to an understanding with Austria concerning the frontier that was to separate them, M. de Hardenberg, pursuant to the instructions he had received, replied on the 20th of December to the note of the 10th, by a

note whose tone was exceedingly conciliatory, and the arguments, ably supported, considered from the Prussian point of view. In this document the Prussian minister expressed his surprise that after the formal consent of England, and the conditional approbation of Austria to the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia, that a discussion should now be resumed on a subject that had been in some sort decided. The excuse, founded on the non-fulfilment of the conditions imposed by Austria was not valid, he said; for Prussia agreed to all that she required concerning the limits of the northern and southern German States, to the destiny contemplated for Mayence and to everything connected with the balance of power in Germany. As to the Polish question, Prussia had interfered, and would continue to do so, in order that everything might be arranged, as far as possible, according to the desires of the Austrian cabinet. M. de Hardenberg asserted that there was as little foundation for the principle of sovereignty, which was brought forward in favour of the King of Saxony. Saxony had been conquered in nine pitched battles, especially at Leipzig, where he did not hesitate to say that Prussia had borne the entire burden of the days of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of October, and that, consequently, the right of conquest, recognised by all publicists might be confidently appealed to. The application of this right to the King of Saxony was founded on incontestable principles, and no less so on equity. Frederick Augustus, though pledged to the cause of Europe by the intervention of the Austrian cabinet, and received at Prague by the Emperor Francis, had left that retreat where he was in safety, abandoned the cause which he had promised to serve, and embraced that of the common oppressor, to whom he gave up Torgau, the Saxon army, and the Upper Elbe. He might, therefore, be punished without any scruple of conscience, and his punishment would serve as a good example. Besides, his chastisement would not be very severe; he would not be dethroned, but merely transferred from one country to another. A new State could be given him on the left bank of the Rhine, a State peopled with Catholics, an arrangement which would terminate the disagreeable disunion existing in Saxony between a Catholic government and a Protestant people. Prussia herself would furnish the materials for this new kingdom, by yielding a part or even the whole of the provinces destined for her on the left of the Rhine, for she attached little importance to possessions that brought her into such close contact with France, and had accepted them only *for the public good*, and in conformity to the wishes of Great Britain. This renunciation on the part of Prussia would put the King of Saxony in a position equal, if not superior, to that of the princes of Baden, Nassau, and Hesse.

He should also have a voice in the Diet, and all these arrangements would tend to the maintenance of the Germanic equilibrium. Such transfers of sovereignty were not rare in history. Charles V. furnished an example in his dealings with this very house of Saxony, by transferring the actual reigning branch from a simple duchy to the throne of Saxony. Austria and France afforded an example in the last century, when the house of Lorraine was transferred to Tuscany. The arrangement now proposed with regard to Saxony would be much better than cutting up that kingdom, which would be done were the design put into operation of only punishing Frederick Augustus by a diminution of territory. In the first place, this dismemberment would afflict the Saxons, who had been promised that they should not be separated; besides that, Saxony, reduced to the third or the half of her proportions, would not be in a position to support royal state, or her beautiful capital, the centre of art in Germany. A nest of malcontents would remain in the country, who, discontented with the new order of things, would be ever plotting the re-constitution of a revolutionary Poland governed by a Saxon prince. Considered in any light the worst possible arrangement would be to partition Saxony, instead of giving it entire to Prussia, and transferring Frederick Augustus to the left of the Rhine. Nor would there be any reason why Austria should take offence at Prussia's closer neighbourhood, for Saxony in her actual state would form but a feeble barrier between the two great German powers. This had been proved by Frederick the Great, for in his different wars one step was sufficient to bring him to Dresden, and enable him to establish himself at Kœnigstein, and also more recently by Napoleon; and it was thus that the Prussian government would always act, should it unfortunately happen that war broke out between Austria and Prussia. In order that Austria may feel less anxiety on this point, her wish that Dresden should remain unfortified should be gratified. Finally, M. de Hardenberg recapitulated all that Europe owed to Prussia for contributing so much to the common welfare, and the promise made to her of re-construction, which, in securing her the same amount of population she possessed in 1805, would afford her a better geographical configuration. This latter point had been formally stipulated, for every one admitted her defective configuration, which would be only increased were she compelled for interests not her own to stretch from Kœnigsberg to Aix-la-Chapelle, unless she were permitted, at the same time, to strengthen her centre by extending her possessions as far as Dresden. Acting otherwise would be treating Prussia with ingratitude, besides breaking a solemn promise, and neglecting the interests of Europe, which were

involved in the well-being of Prussia. It should also be admitted, that the ambition of which she was accused was the result of a desire to correct her defective geographical conformation; and were her present demands gratified, she might be tranquillized for a long time, if not for ever.

Doubtless, more than one reply might be made to these assertions, some well-founded, others specious, and they were put forth in a tone of moderation that showed more inclination to conciliate than to quarrel.

The question having assumed this form, a pacific arrangement was to be hoped for. Austria, on her side, determined to make some concessions. Having recovered the Tyrol and Italy, of which she had no expectation when the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz were concluded, it would ill become her to dispute any advantage that Russia might obtain, and where could Russia gain territorial advantages except in Poland. Had Austria been less apprehensive of war, or were she better supported on this point by France, she might have disputed the reconstitution of a Poland which would necessarily be only a Russian Poland. But as Prussia had promised to support Russia on this point, and France had only shown a disposition in favour of Saxony, Austria was not in a position to dispute a proposal which Alexander made an absolute condition, and, in some sort, a point of honour. The principle being conceded that Poland should be reconstituted as a vassal of Russia, Austria could not pretend to retain the country on each side of the Vistula as far as the Pilica and the Bug, which would be extending her dominions to the very gates of Warsaw. She consequently consented to negotiate on this subject, only claiming the Vistula as far as Sandomir. At Sandomir, the San should become the boundary of Gallicia, which would be restoring the old Gallician frontier. Disputes arose touching Cracow, Tarnopol, and the salt mines of Weiliczka, but Russia, delighted at becoming mistress of the basin of the Vistula as far as the Pilica and the Bug, was most accommodating on these points. She yielded a portion of territory lying round Cracow, and still more, recognized the independence of this city, so famous in Polish annals. Russia looked upon Cracow as a floating remnant of Poland, which might be at a later period absorbed into the new Russian Poland. Russia also gave up the salt mines of Wieliczka, and, lastly, she voluntarily surrendered the district of Tarnopol to Austria, as a compensation for provinces which she had been promised, but did not obtain.

The more yielding Austria was in the direction of Poland, where, however, by the annexation of Gallicia to her dominions, she secured a long strip of territory along the Carpa-

thian mountains, the more firm she could and would be with regard to Saxony.

She persisted in asserting that the principal condition imposed on Prussia, that of joining England and Austria on the Polish question, had not been fulfilled, that she had not been bound concerning any particular frontier, but on the fundamental question, and that, consequently, Austria was freed from her engagements. She reminded Prussia that it was against her will she had ever consented to the sacrifice of Saxony, and had only yielded through complaisance, and a desire for concord, and had always advised Prussia not to take advantage of this sacrifice, for the suppression of Saxony would be a severe shock to the political equilibrium of Germany, and be a grave offence to the moral sentiments of her people. She added, that England having maturely reflected, had retracted her consent to the suppression of Saxony, and that, consequently, the idea of incorporating that country with Prussia could no longer be entertained. Austria declared herself formally on this point, and said that she would only consent to some slight dismemberment of Saxony, which in punishing Frederick Augustus for the faults he had committed, would serve to define the Prussian frontier, and, at the same time, fulfil the promise made to Prussia to restore her the position she held in 1805.

Details being entered into, Austria took great pains to show that, in order to restore Prussia to the position she held in 1805, it would not be necessary to sacrifice Saxony. Out of less than ten million subjects, Prussia had lost, through Napoleon, 4,800,000, that is, nearly half of what she possessed. Since the Allies had victoriously crossed the Elbe and the Rhine, she had, by the recovery of Dantzic, Magdeburg, Westphalia, &c., got back about 1,500,000. She still required 3,300,000 in order to be fully indemnified. She might claim as her share of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 2,500,000 subjects; 500,000 for the principalities of Anspach and Bayreuth, which had been given to Bavaria in 1806, and were still held by that state; 300,000 for an addition that was promised to Hanover at the expense of Prussia; 50,000 for a recompense promised to the house of Saxe Weimar, making altogether 3,350,000, which added to the 1,500,000 she had already recovered, would amount to 4,850,000, being a little more than she had lost. By getting the duchy of Posen from Russia, she would gain one million souls; the provinces on the left of the Rhine, and the Grand Duchy of Baden on the right contained at least 1,600,000, and it was only necessary to find 750,000 more. These might by management be procured from the lesser princes, and the deficient 200,000 made up in this way:

Hanover was willing to give up the 300,000 that had been promised to her. There were, therefore, but 200,000 or 300,000 more to be found in order to satisfy Prussian ambition, and by demanding these from Saxony, whose population amounted to 2,100,000, she would still retain her position, for she would not influence the Germanic balance less with 1,800,000 subjects than with 2,100,000.

These calculations, which were certainly true, excited great indignation amongst the Prussians, and gave rise to the reproach, so often repeated since, that the Congress of Vienna portioned out human beings as though they were flocks of sheep. The Prussians denied the correctness of these calculations, and adduced others, as difficult to admit as to contest. Without a competent authority, invested with the power of giving a final decision on these estimates of men and territory, it was not possible to come to an agreement, for differences arose not alone as to the quantity, but the quality, of these human beings. It was said that a Pole from the neighbourhood of Posen, given by Russia to Prussia, was of greater value than one from Klodawa or Sempolno, which were still under her sway; and that an old Frenchman from Aix-la-Chapelle or Cologne, was infinitely superior to a Pole from Kalisch or Thorn, for whom he was to be given in exchange. Consequently, the quality as well as the number of the subjects apportioned to each power was to be taken into consideration.

It was determined, that besides the great Committee of Five empowered to deliberate upon the most important questions, a special committee should be formed to examine and pronounce upon the estimates brought forward on each side.

Towards the close of December, Lord Castlereagh called on M. de Talleyrand to speak with him on the subject, and suggested this committee as an excellent means of settling the difficulties resulting from these contradictory calculations, and saving Saxony by reducing the question to one of arithmetic. M. de Talleyrand made no objection to this committee of valuation, but he told the British plenipotentiary, that it would be degrading the subject to treat it so; that it was better to discuss principles than figures, and then introducing his favourite theme of legitimacy, he proposed that England, Austria, and France should conclude a short but precise convention, by which these powers would bind themselves to maintain the existence of Saxony on principle, though yielding some of her territory to Prussia. Lord Castlereagh recoiled some steps, like one taken by surprise. "You propose an alliance," he said, "and an alliance implies either certain or possible warfare. We do not desire war, and would

only have recourse to it at the last extremity. Should we be compelled to make war, we shall then think of the means of carrying it on, and of the best alliances to form."

M. de Talleyrand, thus repelled, did not persist. It was agreed to form a committee of valuation, where France should be represented. The suggestion of this committee was well received by the parties most interested; but the proposal of admitting a French commissioner met with great opposition. This was considered an infraction of the promise made by the allies to each other, that France should have no voice in the disposal of the territories taken from her, a promise renewed at Paris, on the 30th of May, and again at Vienna during the first days of the Congress. It is true, that since then they had been compelled to act conjointly with France, for the idea of deciding definitely on European questions without her participation was soon perceived to be as ridiculous as impracticable. But though she had been consulted on all important territorial questions, still the secret and formal engagement subsisting between the FOUR, of settling everything themselves, had not been revoked.

M. de Metternich and Lord Castlereagh ought to have acknowledged that in their great anxiety, they had initiated France into the Saxony question, and could not decently reject her further interference. This avowal they had not the courage to make; and as Prussia showed an extreme repugnance to admit a power, avowedly inimical to her, to form one of a tribunal empowered to decide definitely on her claims, the others did not insist, and France was excluded from the committee of valuation.

Lord Castlereagh did not dare to carry this intelligence to M. de Talleyrand; he sent to M. de Talleyrand his brother, Lord Stewart, the English Ambassador at Berlin, who presented himself at the French embassy with many excuses and embarrassed explanations. As M. de Talleyrand was not to be trifled with, when the interests of the French legation at Vienna were at stake, he asked Lord Castlereagh's brother very drily, who those were that opposed the admission of France to the committee, and added with bitter irony, that doubtless, it was the *Allies* who did not desire her presence. Lord Stewart ingenuously admitted it was, and M. de Talleyrand, transported with rage, exclaimed; "Since you are still the *Allies of Chaumont*, settle your affairs amongst yourselves. This very day the French Embassy shall leave Vienna, and your future acts shall be invalid in her eyes, as in those of the kingdoms whose interests are sacrificed. Europe shall learn what has occurred. France shall be informed of the part she was expected to play, and England shall be told of the

weak and inconsistent conduct of her representative. She shall be told, that after abandoning Saxony and Poland, he rejected the aid by which he might have saved them." These words contained serious threats against Lord Castlereagh, and implied that his position with regard to the British Parliament would be rendered very embarrassing. Lord Stewart was very much alarmed, and lost no time in informing his brother of the storm that was gathering. Though M. de Talleyrand's menaces were not taken literally, still the dread of their consequences not only on the tranquility of Europe, but still more on the British Parliament, when it should become known, that Saxony and Poland might have been saved, and were not, because of adhesion to a ridiculous system of exclusion carried out against France, influenced Lord Castlereagh so powerfully, that he spoke to the *Allies* in a tone he had never before assumed. He assembled them immediately and pointed out the danger of provoking an explosion that might set Europe in flames, and declared that, for his part, he would not assume such a responsibility in the eyes of England. He was warmly supported by M. de Metternich, and in spite of the Prussians, it was decided that France should be represented in the committee. This intelligence was communicated to M. de Talleyrand, the same evening, in a polite note from Lord Castlereagh.

The Duke de Dalberg was chosen to represent France in the committee of valuation. The members met on the 31st of December. The Russian representative was appointed to state the Russian and Prussian pretensions, and he was in a position to do so with propriety, as Russia, by her arrangements concerning the frontiers of Galicia with Austria, and her abandonment of Posen to Prussia, appeared as a disinterested party in the question. He consequently spoke in the names of both countries, and made the following proposals: that Prussia, besides the duchy of Posen, which Russia had resigned, in order to smooth away the newly-arisen difficulties, should also get the entire of Saxony as a compensation for the losses she had sustained. According to the Russian commissioner, less could not be done to restore Prussia to the position she held in 1805, or to fulfil the promise made to her that her geographical configuration should be improved. The King of Saxony was to be transported to the banks of the Rhine, where Prussia would give him a territory containing seven hundred thousand inhabitants, and with the pretty town of Bonn as a capital. He should also have a voice in the Diet. This Prince, surrounded by a Catholic population, placed on the frontiers of France, would prevent all contact between that country and Prussia. As to Poland,

the Russian Government would bestow on her a separate existence and government, and would ultimately enlarge her dominions by the addition of the ancient Polish provinces in the actual possession of Russia, subject, however, to the will of the Emperor, who would organise the kingdom of which he was the head, according to his own views. The Emperor would henceforth bear the title of Czar of Russia and King of Poland. The other powers, co-partitionists of Poland, who in virtue of the present peace would retain certain Polish provinces, should pledge themselves to give these provinces local governments calculated to secure them a certain civil independence, a *régime* conformable to their national customs and favourable to the development of their commercial and agricultural interests.

This project supported by the most specious reasoning was a last effort attempted by Alexander to gain Saxony for his ally, the King of Prussia. But it was very evident that his own wishes being gratified, he would not proceed to extremities to support his proposition.

The further consideration of these propositions was adjourned to the second of January.

On the first of January, Lord Castlereagh received important intelligence, which produced a very great change in his position. England had just signed articles of peace with the United States, and was henceforth at liberty to employ all her forces on the European continent. She had been very much occupied by this American war, in which she had employed all the troops that the protection of the kingdom of the Low Countries left at her disposal. Being freed from this anxiety, she was now in a position to assemble eighty-four thousand men in Holland, in the spring of 1815, and thus furnish a large contingent, should it be necessary to form a new coalition against Prussia and Russia.

The committee of valuation reassembled on the second of January to discuss the propositions presented in the Emperor Alexander's name. The Prussians had left the exposition of the common project to the Russians, but now undertook its defence themselves. This was an important juncture for them. It was their last attempt to get possession of Saxony; and should the verdict of a diplomatic tribunal decide against them, no resource was left but an appeal to arms. Their agents assembled in great numbers at Vienna, united great zeal to all the wonted animation of the military men of their nation, and were constantly boasting that it was they alone who had saved Europe, and that, consequently, they could not expect a refusal; that Saxony was their special conquest, won at Leipsic, on the fearful days of the

16th, 17th, and 18th of October, 1813, that refusing to give them possession of it, was depriving them of their own property, but that supported by their companions in arms, the Russians, they would not allow the price of their blood to be wrested from them ; that, besides, they were not alone working for Prussia, but for Germany, as every territorial aggrandizement of the latter was a step towards German unity, which could only be accomplished by Prussia. It was, M. de Stein, especially, seconded by many German patriots, who repeated these assertions, and constantly recapitulated what he and those who shared his opinions had suffered in the cause of Germany.

Under the influence of this excitement, the Prussian legation exhibited in the committee all the ardour of the national feeling. Perfectly conscious of the opposition that these bold assertions and pretensions would meet, they became angry instead of calm, and even went so far as to say, that should what they asked be refused, they would, if necessary, obtain it by force. Lord Castlereagh, who possessed all the pride of an Englishman, and who was surprised at meeting such treatment from persons to whom he had shown so much favour, proudly met the declaration and threats of Prince de Hardenberg, and told both Russians and Prussians that England was not of a temper to submit to dictation, nor would she do it, but would meet force by force. He left the assembly in a state of excitement very unusual to him, and immediately hastened to the French embassy, where he was sure to find a response to his resentment. Forgetting now the *Allies* of Chaumont, he told M. de Talleyrand all that had passed, and again declared that England would not suffer such insolence. Freed from the incubus of the American war, Lord Castlereagh had recovered his firm bearing, and showed a determination to brave the worst rather than submit to the arrogance of the Russians and Prussians. His adroit interlocutor skillfully flattered all his opinions, and reminded him of what he had said a few days before, that a few written words binding England, Austria, and France, would put an end to the boasting of Russia and Prussia. "Put your ideas on paper," replied Lord Castlereagh, and M. de Talleyrand, without waiting for a second invitation, took up his pen. Between them, they drew up a project, by which Austria, France, and England bound themselves to furnish 150,000 men each, to act in common should the defence of the balance of power in Europe expose them to the attacks of enemies. These enemies were not named, but very plainly indicated. Lord Castlereagh took this plan with him, promising to return the following day, when he should have seen and consulted with M. de Metternich.

M. de Talleyrand had attained the great object of his wishes.

He came to Vienna apprehensive that the existence of the French embassy might be ignored, instead of which, the French legation was called upon to play an important part in the dissolution of the alliance of Chaumont, and by the formation of a new alliance, was destined to support the principle of legitimacy. An important point was certainly gained by placing France in such a position, and it was no less a gain to dissolve the coalition of Chaumont, and substitute another in its stead; but it would have been well to consider what was the object of this new alliance, for if it were to support equivocal or inimical interests, there would be less reason for congratulation, and the advantages gained might have been waited for a little longer, if by patience they could have been made more profitable to France.

Lord Castlereagh lost no time, for he seemed to hear already the cries of the British Parliament, reproaching him with having passed under the Russian and Prussian yoke. He sought M. de Metternich, whom he found quite as ready as himself to throw aside his ancient alliance prejudices, and accept the assistance of France against ungrateful and exacting allies. Having arranged all these points with the Austrian minister, he returned to M. de Talleyrand on the morrow—3rd of January—and brought with him the plan of the previous day, now skilfully elaborated. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich had taken great pains to give the project a pacific, and, above all, a defensive character. In fact, no attack was to be made. But should one of the contracting powers, in all sincerity, and without any interested views, support a plan in conformity with the balance of power in Europe, and thereby incur the displeasure of other powers, in that case, France, England, and Austria bound themselves to furnish 150,000 men each in defence of the party attacked. Lord Castlereagh wished to add to these stipulations, which were drawn up at great length, another, which, in his opinion, was indispensable, and not to be disputed by any one. It was as follows:—

“As it was not now a question of ambitious projects, but rather of plans of conservation, and the maintenance of a sacred principle—the preservation of legitimate princes on their thrones—there could be no objection to announcing beforehand that in case of war, *which God forbid, each power should consider itself bound by the Treaty of Paris, according to whose principles and text all States and frontiers were to be portioned out.*”

Now, was M. de Talleyrand taken in a terrible snare. If in the commencement he had been less forward, and less decided in declaring himself for Saxony, if, instead of eagerly

offering his aid, he had waited to be asked, he would not have been obliged to submit to these conditions, and, probably, they would not have been proposed. A profound silence would have been observed, and war should have borne its own expenses according to the issue, and the services rendered by each power. But having so hastily declared his opinion in the case of Saxony, and blamed the different cabinets for their indifference, it was not possible for him to draw back, now that he was taken at his word, nor avow that France could, in certain cases, seek her own interests, having previously asserted that she only sought the maintenance of a principle. Had he sought any advantage for France, his proffered assistance would have been rejected, and England and Austria would have come to an understanding with Russia and Prussia, by yielding to their demands. In truth, this would have been no great evil, for the policy supported by these two powers was the most disadvantageous for us; the house of Saxony might have been transferred to the Rhine, and she would be our neighbour instead of Prussia.

And we might have done as well by striving to attain such a result in conjunction with the Russians and Prussians, who would have paid us in some way, and not asked us to make war for the sole honour of being their allies. But having so long supported the English and the Austrians, whom we were constantly urging and imploring to act, we could not now raise an objection, and reject the proposed condition; and yet this condition was very hard! Now, at the end of twenty years of desolating warfare, when we had hardly entered upon the enjoyment of peace,—a peace that constituted the Bourbons' best title to popularity,—to compromise that peace, and run the risk of again pouring forth French blood in torrents, merely that Germany might have less cause of uneasiness from Russia, or that Prussia might give less umbrage to Austria; and to act thus whilst those very powers for whom we were about to combat, retained our spoils the more securely because of our aid, and we, recovering nothing of what we had lost, should be reduced to the honour of fighting gratuitously for the very conquerors who had contributed most to bring us back to our frontier of 1790! This was, indeed, a sad fate! But, we repeat, it was now too late to draw back, for after all that we had said and done, we could not refuse the Convention of the 3d of January, nor the condition which, in case of war, bound us to make the treaty of Paris the basis of a future peace. M. de Talleyrand signed without making a remark, and he was right, for it was only in silence that such a condition could be accepted. It should either be rejected with indignation and flung back to those who proposed it, or signed without a word of observation. So

it was M. de Talleyrand acted. He did not even think of asking, in return, a promise of Murat's dethronement, an event that interested Louis XVIII. much more than the fate of Saxony. He feared to retard for one moment the accomplishment of a result he had laboured so hard to bring about; and this treaty so much desired by M. de Talleyrand, because of the importance it added to the French legation, was signed on the night of the 3d—4th of January, and dated the 3d. It must be confessed this treaty was of little advantage to the reigning French dynasty, whose prejudices at most it could be said to flatter. The contracting parties pledged themselves to profound silence to avoid furnishing the Russians and Prussians with an excuse for a quarrel, and, perhaps, for war. Nor did they wish that the enemies of the coalition should enjoy the triumph of seeing it so scandalously divided. An exception, however, was made in favour of Bavaria, Hanover, the Low Countries, and Sardinia, whose adhesion was worth seeking, and was indeed almost certain. The Prince de Wrède, on the part of Bavaria, and the Count of Munster as the representative of Saxony, immediately gave their sanction to what had been done. The Low Countries and Sardinia joined a few days later. The secret was still preserved intact. A plan of military operations was to be concerted between Austria, Bavaria, and France, as the powers most likely to take an active part in the war; and a wish was expressed that a skilful and friendly-disposed French general should come to Vienna to take part in the arrangement of this plan. M. de Talleyrand thought of General Ricard, who had fallen into disgrace under the Empire at the time of the unsuccessful attempt to obtain the sovereignty of Portugal for Marshal Soult. He was a man of talent as well as a distinguished officer, and very well calculated to figure at a Congress composed of the highest personages of Europe. M. de Talleyrand immediately informed Louis XVIII. of the treaty he had concluded, and requested that General Ricard should be sent to Vienna.

Though the secret of the new coalition was scrupulously kept, still from the similarity of sentiments expressed by the Courts of England, France, and Austria, it was evident that they had come to an understanding, and were resolved to support their views to the last extremity. The attitude assumed by Bavaria was a no less significant symptom. Though all the German States, including those of the north, shared in her opinions, she alone—thanks to the strength she had acquired during the last fifteen years, and to her geographical position, which removed her from Prussian interference—dared to speak as she felt, or hint the possibility of war. It was all in vain that the Prussians, both publicly and in the committee, exclaimed and threatened; they

were allowed to talk, but nobody swerved from the essential point,—the preservation of Saxony,—always excepting the loss of some territory, to be applied to improving the configuration of Prussia; and meant, as was said, to punish King Frederick Augustus. It was a mere concession to the passions of the moment to say that this unfortunate prince should be punished, for everybody knew that the fact of joining Napoleon for self-aggrandisement was a very general crime, which had been committed by the greater as well as the lesser German princes; and it was equally well known that the unfortunate King of Saxony, had only acted on compulsion; that the duplicity of his conduct in his dealings between Europe and Napoleon, was the result of weakness of character, and could his conduct be compensated by defection from France, the Saxon army had seceded with sufficient *éclat* to obtain the pardon of its sovereign.

But though it was agreed that the King of Saxony should lose a certain portion of his States, nobody would consent that all the confiscated territory should be given to Prussia, and it was evident that on this subject a determination was come to that could not easily be shaken. The imprudent chiefs of the Prussian army were disposed to make the attempt, but their king did not wish it, nor would Alexander have sanctioned such temerity, which would be nothing less than a pursuit of the impossible. When Alexander asserted in the Committee of Evaluation that all Saxony ought to be given to Prussia, and consented at the same time to resign the Duchy of Posen, he did all that his friend Frederick William could expect, nor would this friend have dared to ask him to engage in a war against France, England, and Austria, and almost all the German states. The state of opinion was soon evident in the committee itself, from the attitude assumed by the different Legations. Although Russia and Prussia still persisted in demanding Saxony, they did not hesitate to discuss arithmetical calculations when introduced by Austria. The latter power undertook to prove that, considering what Prussia had already obtained in Poland, Westphalia, and the Rhine provinces, she could not claim more than three or four hundred thousand inhabitants from Saxony to recover the position she held in 1805, and to which it had been promised she should be restored.

The Prussian diplomatists took part in this controversy, and opposing valuation to valuation, asserted that they ought to get more than half Saxony in territory as well as in population. Taking up this position was equivalent to admitting they were defeated, for they accepted the principle of their adversaries—the conservation of Saxony—with the excep-

tion of some sacrifices of greater or less extent. The Treaty of the 3rd January, though kept secret, had by combining the antagonists of Russia and Prussia, contributed not a little to solve the fundamental question. And, in fact, once the discussion was reduced to an arithmetical calculation, there could be no doubt of a good understanding being come to.

The month of January was devoted to discussions of this kind. One circumstance in particular contributed to bring about a definite result. The British Parliament was to assemble, as usual, in February. Lord Castlereagh had been recalled by his colleagues, in order to justify his conduct which was not understood by the general public, and was in the opinion of the better-informed, subject to the charge of inconsistency, for though, at the close, he defended the cause of Saxony, he had at the commencement consented to sacrifice her. The Duke of Wellington was to leave Paris, and replace Lord Castlereagh at Vienna. The illustrious British Secretary of State, now certain of making Prussia submit on the fundamental question, was anxious to compensate her by smaller concessions, and so win her back by his favourite system of alliance, and at the same time, facilitate the termination of the Congress, by his compliance in ancillary points. He did not wish to leave Vienna until the principal questions should be decided, and until he had something positive to communicate to Parliament. The desire to return to home was universal. The Sovereigns, both those who received and he who gave hospitality (it had already cost the latter twenty-five million francs), were weary of this *mélange* of frivolous festivals and bitter discussions. They had passed two entire years—1813 and 1814—in all the anxieties of a fearful war and of an armed and agitated diplomacy. They were impatient to return home, to look after their own affairs, and enjoy the peace with their subjects. It is weariness rather than reason that terminates long disputes. Now, every thing tended to concord, when for two months past every thing seemed to threaten a serious rupture, and a new war to determine the partition of the fruits of victory.

M. de Talleyrand, who was as anxious about appearances as essentials, even whilst he despised the former, had in order to flatter the imprudent party that preponderated in France, persuaded the assembled sovereigns to mingle a funeral ceremony for Louis XVI., in the almost uninterrupted course of their festivities. This would naturally take place on the 21st January. M. de Talleyrand attached great importance to this on account of the double effect it would produce at Vienna and at Paris. At Vienna it would be an act of marked deference to the French legation, whilst it would please the royalists at Paris, and prove

how much influence M. de Talleyrand exercised over crowned heads. Such a proposition, whether opportune or not, could not be rejected, for none could refuse a tribute of homage to the august victim of the 21st January, nor could it be unwelcome to the sovereigns as it was a new malediction pronounced upon the French Revolution. The Emperor Alexander, though he offered no opposition, made a simple observation. He said, that nobody could doubt the sentiments that all Europe entertained for the unfortunate Louis XVI., but that this was a display of party feeling which, impolitic at Paris, could only obtain a bad and unworthy imitation at Vienna. He added, that should the ceremony be performed, he would of course attend as the members of the French Legation must best understand the feelings of their government.

This assemblage of crowned heads, that had a little before incurred such ridicule by the excess of their amusements and luxury, now suddenly donned habiliments of woe, and repaired in a body to the beautiful cathedral of St. Stephen, on the 21st January, to assist at a solemn service in honour of Louis XVI. Nothing was wanting to the pomp of this ceremony. All the sovereigns came accompanied by their courts, a French priest pronounced the funeral oration of Louis XVI., and Maria Antoinette, and after a few hours of political mourning, they returned to the festivities and business of the Congress, of which, indeed, the former are as celebrated as the latter.

M M. de Metternich, de Talleyrand, and Lord Castlereagh, seeing Prussia nearly conquered, concerted, under the direction of Prince de Schwarzenberg, the representative of Austrian military interests, how they could best divide Saxony, and satisfy the cupidity of her neighbour without entirely destroying her existence. It was at first agreed to deprive her of her territories, on the right of the Elbe, particularly of Upper and Lower Lusatia. Saxony proper was more on the left of the Elbe, the possessions on the right being only annexed provinces. However, though deprived of Upper and Lower Lusatia, she would retain the territories that bordered on Bohemia, that is, Bautzen and Zittau.

It was next decided to diminish the Saxon territories on the left of the Elbe, in the direction of Misnia and Thuringia—that is, towards the extensive and level but least populous portions of the country, leaving her the mountainous districts inhabited by an industrious race, and interesting to Austria, whose frontier they touched. It was at first intended to take but four or five hundred thousand souls from the hapless monarchy, thus exposed to the spatula of the geographers of the Congress; but, in compliance with Lord Castlereagh's en-

treaties, who was anxious to recover the friendship of the Prussians, and, above all, to bring things to a speedy termination, it was decided to take seven thousand inhabitants out of the two millions one hundred thousand that the old Saxon territory contained. She was thus deprived of a third of her population, and of very nearly the half of her territory. The places she held on the Elbe possessed a value far greater in proportion than the extent of territory. One—Torgau—was very warmly disputed. Having given up Wittenberg, it would be serious loss to abandon Torgau, which, in Napoleon's opinion—an opinion supported by his acts—was become the principal fortress on the Upper Elbe. Prince de Schwarzenberg and M. de Talleyrand resisted this demand, but, being abandoned by Lord Castlereagh, they were obliged to yield. A plan was finally arranged by which Prussia, in addition to the important fortresses of Torgau and Wittenberg, obtained one-half of the Saxon territory and a third of her population. It is true, that Frederick Augustus retained the principal cities and the richest territories of Saxony.

This plan, decided on by Austria, France, and England, whilst the members of the committee were disputing, and often disputing violently, was presented to the committee of valuation in the beginning of February. This was evidently a concerted plan, and it was plain that the Russians and Prussians would not obtain much more, even if they proceeded to an open rupture. The promises made to Prussia were more than fulfilled, for she was restored to the position she held in 1805, and a better configuration was given to some of her frontiers. From a second, Saxony was become a third-rate German State. Russia, having resigned Posen and run the risk of war for Prussia, could not be expected to do more. Prussia saw this, and determined to yield. But there was one point which touched her nearly, because it involved the self-love of her army and the commercial interests of her merchants, and this was the possession of the celebrated city of Leipzig. The acquisition of Leipzig would be an indemnification to the pride of the Prussians for the humiliation of being obliged to evacuate Saxony, which, they said, they had been allowed to occupy, which was equivalent to a promise of permitting them to keep the country for ever.

Consequently, on the 8th of February, Prussia presented a note in which she, for the first time, consented to the proposed arrangement, but demanded the city of Leipzig, in consideration of having received the poorest and least populous portion of Saxony—a portion that did not contain a single important city. She insinuated, though in very moderate terms, that whilst she was restored to the position she held in 1805

Austria gained, in addition to what she possessed at that period, fifteen hundred thousand souls directly, and at least two millions, indirectly, in her collateral branches at Florence, Modena, Parma, &c.

As it generally happens, the last day of discussion was one of the most stormy. King Frederick William had an interview with Lord Castlereagh, and told him that there was a combination to dishonour him, and render his return to Berlin impossible by depriving him of Saxony after having been allowed to occupy it; and that the possession of Leipzig could alone mollify the bitterness of such a sacrifice. It was easy to reply, that it was his own fault if evacuating Saxony was so disagreeable, for he had taken possession of it by a kind of *coup de tête*, which it was impossible to support, and he had only to blame himself for the consequences. Lord Castlereagh communicated Frederick William's entreaties to his allies; but besides that England, for commercial reasons, would prefer that Leipzig should belong to a small, rather than a large state, the British Minister met with so much resistance that he yielded the point. But it was agreed that some further concession should be made to Prussia, who disputed obstinately, thousand by thousand, the souls in the contested territory. England, on Hanover's part, gave up 70 thousand souls out of the 300 thousand she was to get from Prussia, and 50 thousand in the Low Countries, whilst Alexander, in his desire to satisfy all parties, made a still greater sacrifice. He had wished that Cracow, from its moral, and Thorn, from its military importance, should remain free and neutral cities. He abandoned this idea, and consented that Thorn should be given to Prussia, who would thus be put in possession of all the fortresses on the Lower Vistula, Thorn, Graudenz, and Dantzic, after having already obtained all the fortresses on the Elbe, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdebourg, &c., &c. It was at this price that Leipzig was preserved to Saxony, and that Prussia agreed, at last, to the proposed arrangements. She certainly had no cause to complain; and yet the irascible Blücher, giving way to an exaggeration of expression unworthy his well-known bravery, exclaimed that no soldier could wear the Prussian uniform with honour. He had proved, and was fated to prove again, that it could be worn with honour.

The principal difficulties of the Congress were thus removed, and if the questions still to be solved called for exertion and even sacrifices, still none were of a nature to excite apprehensions of war, of which the sovereigns were so convinced, that they showed a disposition to return to their homes, and leave their ministers to settle the remaining business.

Still there was a final difficulty to be overcome with regard to Saxony, and one not to be despised even by the allies, powerful as they were; this was to obtain the consent of King Frederick Augustus. This gentle and affable prince, a prisoner at Berlin, had resolved never to give his sanction to any act inimical to his authority, and especially to any attempt to remove the seat of his power from Saxony. Now, according to the principle laid down then and at all other times, no territorial possession could be justly and irrevocably acquired without the free and voluntary consent of the lawful sovereign. This principle, which had been constantly asserted by M. de Talleyrand with the intention of employing it afterwards against Murat, gave great moral strength to the King of Saxony at an epoch when the *definite* was the passion of the moment, and when the common desire was to exchange the instability of the revolution for the stability of monarchy, all acquirers of new states were most anxious to obtain the consent of the old possessors. To obtain the King of Saxony's consent, it was determined to set him at liberty, and bring him to Austria; not, indeed, to Vienna, where he would find his despoilers as well as defenders, but to Presbourg, whither the three principal ministers of the courts that had espoused his cause, M. de Talleyrand, M. de Metternich, and the Duke of Wellington (he had replaced Lord Castlereagh), should repair, and use all their influence to induce him to resign.

With the exception of Italy, almost all the European questions were solved. The formation of the kingdom of the Low Countries, which had been stipulated by England at Chaumont and Paris was definitely agreed on at Vienna. It was decided that the Prince of Orange, the representative of this house should receive the united sceptres of Holland and Belgium, with the title of King of the Low Countries. Some other territorial arrangements were added to this. It would not be allowed that Luxembourg and Mentz should become Prussian fortresses. The duchy of Luxembourg was given to the future King of the Low Countries, together with the fortress of that name, which was to remain federal, and Prussia, who was already mistress of all we had possessed on that side, was to be compensated by the hereditary states of the Prince of Orange, which she could exchange with the house of Nassau. By these arrangements France would touch but a very small part of the Prussian frontier, that is, from Sarreguemines to Thionville, instead of from Sarreguemines to Mezières.

Many changes were made to give a better configuration to the Prussian territory. Under the title of the Rhenish provinces she got the old ecclesiastical electorates of Cologne and Trèves, together with the duchy of Juliers, all which, since 1803, had composed a large part of the French territory on the left of the

Rhine. There still remained of our possessions on this shore, the old Palatinate, called the Palatinate of the Rhine, comprising the country between the Rhine and the Moselle, from Lanterberg to Worms, and from Bohrbach to Kreuznach. There was no great difficulty on this subject, as Austria and Prussia had agreed that the Moselle should be the line of demarcation between their dependencies. The Rhine Palatinate was given to Bavaria, and what remained of the territories of the Elector of Mayence was given to Hesse Darmstadt, which had been restored together with Hesse Cassel. Mayence, which had been given to Hesse Darmstadt, was to be a federal fortress, in which the German States were to keep a common garrison. In return for these acquisitions Hesse Darmstadt gave Prussia the ancient duchy of Westphalia, by which Prussia, that was already in possession of the grand duchy of Berg, which we had held on the right of the Rhine, acquired a continuation of territory from the Rhine to the Elbe, and only interrupted by the territories of minor German princes dependent on her. Besides the principality of Hildesheim, Prussia gave Hanover Ostfriesland, which England ambitioned, because it lay contiguous to the sea, and Hanover gave her the duchy of Lauenbourg on the right of the Elbe, of which Prussia intended to make a very important use by giving it to Denmark in exchange for Swedish Pomerania.

The unfortunate King of Denmark was little better treated than the King of Saxony. He had been faithful to France, because his maritime principles united him to her against England. He had acted honourably throughout, and when our defeat obliged him to abandon us, he did so without any duplicity. But badly recompensed in these days of violence, for his honourable conduct, he was deprived of Norway, which was given to Bernadotte and Finland, both as an indemnity for Finland, in order to procure him a degree of popularity that might compensate for his want of birth. When these territories were taken from Denmark she was promised Swedish Pomerania, containing the fortress of Stralsund and the island of Rugen, trifling remnants of the old Swedish possessions on the German continent; she was also promised further indemnities. The King had come to Vienna to demand the fulfilment of this promise, but though he conducted himself with the greatest discretion and dignity, and defended his incontestable rights with the greatest moderation, and though his claim was fully allowed, still, no notice was taken of him, nor were his ministers admitted to the Congress. The celebrated phrase, *Væ victis* was never more completely verified, and out of the thirty-two million inhabitants, taken from the French Empire, a small number could not be found to compensate this prince for what had been taken from him; and this for the sake of the general good, as was said, which good consisted in giving Norway to

Bernadotte. Besides, it was not even certain that he should get the miserable indemnity of Swedish Pomerania, as Bernadotte refused to give it up under the pretence that the allies had not fulfilled their engagement to give him Norway, as the Norwegians had resisted by force of arms.

The measure of iniquity would, in all probability, have been filled, but that Prussia wished to get Swedish Pomerania. In fact, the Prussian territory, which had not been formed by nature, but by the ambition of its princes, who had put it together by scraps and morsels, was now undergoing a general remodelling, and the time was well chosen, for after the short opposition that had been made to the Prussians, they were now allowed to do as they pleased; by England, because she wished to recover their alliance for the sake of the Low Countries, by Russia through complaisance, and by Austria that she may not be disturbed in Italy. Prussia was, consequently, seeking exchanges that would secure her a continuity of territory from the Rhine to the Niemen. It was for this reason that she gave Luxembourg, as we have said, to the house of Orange, in exchange for its hereditary possessions, in order that she might exchange these with Nassau for different places in Hesse. For the same reason, she had demanded a portion of the old electorate of Mentz, which she meant to give Hesse Darmstadt for the duchy of Westphalia. Lastly, she wished to get Swedish Pomerania, that she may have all the mouths of the Oder, and the shores of the Baltic, from Mecklenburg to Memel. In return, she offered Denmark the duchy of Lauenbourg, which she had just got from Hanover, and which was contiguous to Holstein. But Denmark did not consider this as an equivalent for Swedish Pomerania, and anything but a fulfilment of the solemn promise made her of a full indemnification for Norway. Prussia thought to supply the deficiency by some millions of crowns, for territory she would have by purchase, if she could not succeed by force. The King of Denmark, seeing the hopelessness of his case, and considering that a territory contiguous to his states in Holstein was better than one so distant as Pomerania, which, besides, he was not certain of getting, as Sweden refused to give it up, yielded at last to the wishes of Prussia. Denmark deserved better treatment, as well in consideration of the personal qualities of her sovereign and people, and the honourable manner in which she had acted, as for the guardianship of the Sound, which made her of more importance to the balance of power in Europe, than many others. But she was conquered; and if, when the victor is one man, like Napoleon, the conquered have some chance of touching his generosity, they have none when subdued by many, as was now the case, for all, occupied with their individual interests, and seizing what they could, had neither

feeling nor shame, because that, in a corporation, each member casts upon the entire body the responsibility of acts for which the individual would blush.

In order to complete her projects of exchange, Prussia was obliged to submit to the recognition of Bavaria's claim to the principalities of Anspach and Bayreuth, in Franconia, and which had formerly belonged to Prussia, that she may in return obtain the Grand Duchy of Berg, which had formerly belonged to Bavaria.

Thanks to all these arrangements, Prussia was now as well circumstanced as she could expect. Her territories extended without interruption from the Meuse to the Niemen, and expanded a little, though not as much as she desired, in the direction of Saxony, and by the restitution of Posen she was better enclosed by the provinces of Silesia and Old Prussia, at the same time that she got possession of the different fortresses on the rivers that watered it—Thorn, Graudenz, and Dantzic, on the Vistula; Breslau, Glogau, and Stettin, on the Oder; Coblenz and Cologne, on the Rhine. She had but one thing to regret, which was being placed on the left of the Rhine, not because of the neighbourhood, which, fortunately, is not an infallible cause of hostility, but of the distrust she must feel in the possession of a territory that had belonged to France for twenty years. To the honour of her good sense, it must be admitted, that she had never wished and had only accepted it, through complaisance to England, who wished to keep her at enmity with France as long as possible. Had Saxony been ceded to Prussia, she would willingly have abandoned the left bank of the Rhine, even though France should get the better part of what she left.

Now that the re-constitution of Prussia and the re-establishment of the two houses of Hesse were effected, and the account with Denmark so unjustly closed, the most important business of the Congress was the arrangement of the Bavarian territory. This had been commenced even in Paris. It was understood, that Bavaria should restore the line of the Inn, the Tyrol, and Vorarlberg to Austria, who would give her in return, the Grand Duchy of Wurzburg, which was become vacant by the return of the Archduke Ferdinand to Tuscany, the principality of Aschaffembourg, which had been taken from the Prince Primate, the deposed head of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the greater part of the ancient Rhine Palatinate, which had formerly belonged to Bavaria. This, under the pretext of restoring each State to its old position, was a new plan of the Allies of Chaumont for keeping Bavaria as well as Prussia at enmity with France. Once that the question of Saxony and Poland, by which a new war had been threatened, was decided, it would

seem that a spirit of compliance had taken possession of all, and through the mediation of France, the courts of Austria and Bavaria, with both of whom she was allied since the 3rd of January, were on the eve of coming to an understanding. The sole remaining cause of disagreement was the old Bishopric of Salzbourg, which was necessarily to be divided as the line of the Inn and La Salza was taken as a frontier. Bavaria was desirous of retaining at least Berchtolsgrad, which had been formerly so contested on account of its salt mines. To avoid giving a decision in this case, France urged the disputants to come to an arrangement, and they were about to do so.

Every question relating to the north of Europe was now settled. The principles of the new Germanic constitution were decided on. Austria, who had acted with great prudence throughout, had refused the revival of the Germanic crown, which would have been willingly conceded, nor would she accept the Belgian provinces, where her sovereignty was preferred to that of Holland, and which England would have willingly accorded, in order to bring her, as well as Prussia and Bavaria, into contact with France. Though Austria was very well satisfied that others should commit themselves, she had no desire to compromise herself by taking possession of the Belgian provinces, which, though rich, beautiful, and well situated, were remote from her capital and too near France. The Venetian and Milanese provinces, less industrial, but equally fertile, and better situated with regard to her, suited her better. She had already felt the weight of the Germanic crown, and did not desire to possess it again, should it be elective. But, as Prussia, in hope of obtaining it one day herself, insisted on this condition, Austria had the good sense to refuse a cumbersome crown, which each successive emperor could only obtain by flattering the electors at the commencement of his reign, and which might possibly be transferred to Prussia. She preferred having this crown abolished, and converted into what was more useful to her, the perpetual presidency of the German Diet. It is true, that by this arrangement, a most important question—the military command of the Confederation—was left undecided, and would become a future difficulty. At this moment peace was the absorbing thought, for it seems that the public mind is capable of entertaining but one idea at a time.

The ancient Diet, simplified with Austria as perpetual president, was the system generally preferred. Instead of the divisions into different orders, and a large number of voters, it was determined to yield to the spirit of the time, and concentrate the votes as well as the sovereignty. An ordinary assembly of seventeen members was established, of which each had but one vote, however extensive his possessions, be

it Austria or Baden, Prussia or Mecklenburg; whilst the inferior princes were to be united in different groups, with a vote to each group. The free cities—which were reduced to Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfort, and Lubeck—were to have but one vote between them. Besides this ordinary assembly, established in perpetuity at Frankfort, for the arrangement of current business and for the decision of cases of competency, another assembly was established, called the General Assembly, consisting of sixty-nine voters, in which each member should have votes proportioned to his possessions, when fundamental laws on the great interests of the Confederation were in question.

It must be admitted that this new constitution of the Germanic Confederation was in conformity with the annihilation of social distinctions, and with the decreased number of petty princes, and, in a word, with the simplification of modern society. The confederates preserved their independent sovereignties, could have their separate armies, and send representatives to the different courts of Europe; but they could not contract any alliance inimical to the federal compact or the safety of the Confederation, and were bound to furnish, each according to his possessions, a contingent in defence of the general interest.

These were healthy ideas, and though capable of misapplication under certain circumstances, may be considered as some of the best decisions of the Congress. When the month of February arrived, these different resolutions were either reduced to writing or agreed on; for all these minor questions had been under consideration during the discussion of the important interests which seemed to threaten a universal conflagration. When the results obtained by the particular treaties contracted between the interested parties had been approved, it was determined to draw up a general treaty, composed of all that these minor treaties contained of a general and permanent interest, and which was to be signed as arbiters and guarantees by the eight powers who had subscribed the treaty of Paris, and which the other States represented at Vienna were also to sign, as interested and personally engaged parties. This is what was afterwards published under the title of "Final Act of Vienna."

The drawing up of these different acts was commenced in February, 1815, but could not be finished for several weeks. Meanwhile, the last doubtful questions were taken into consideration. That of Switzerland was of the number. This question had been a subject of serious consideration to the special committee intrusted with its arrangement, and also to the three powers who interfered privately, Russia,

Austria, and France. The Emperor Alexander, influenced by liberal principles, did not wish to appear in Switzerland as the author of an extravagant counter-revolution; Austria, who cared little about liberal sentiments, sought only what was practicable and reasonable; whilst France, who had adherents both in Berne and in the small democratic cantons, was anxious to bring about a decision that would not offend either. From this general spirit of moderation nothing could result but what was rational and conformable to the spirit of the times. We have already seen that the three principal powers were opposed to the new cantons being again reduced to a state of dependence, and had laid it down as a principle that the nineteen cantons, constituted by the act of mediation, should be maintained. France, whose aid against this decision was implored by the inhabitants of Berne, Uri, Lucerne, Schwitz, and Unterwalden, was happily represented by an enlightened man, the Duke Dalberg, who succeeded in making those cantons understand that no other principle was admissible; for it would be impossible to reduce Vaud, Argovia, Saint Gall, &c., to their ancient state of dependence, without a civil war—an idea revolting to Europe. The principle of the nineteen cantons was, consequently, definitely admitted. However, as Berne had been formerly so extensive and rich a canton, and was now become so small, it was only just and prudent to make her some compensation. Imperial France, whose spoils were used to satisfy every demand, had left some fragments of territory (Porentruy and the ancient bishopric of Basle) vacant on this side of the Jura. These were offered as an indemnification to Berne, and were finally accepted. It was also decided that the new cantons should make a pecuniary compensation to the old that had been injured by their separation. The new cantons, happy to secure their existence at this price, consented to make this compensation, and thus all difficulties were smoothed away. It was also required in the federal compact, that the principle of civil equality, both between the cantons and the different classes of citizens, should be proclaimed and approved. Finally, Switzerland was presented with some gems that had fallen from the imperial crown of France; for Neuchâtel, which had been given to Prince Berthier; Geneva, which had been lately restored to its primitive state of a free city; together with Valais, which was vibrating between France and Italy, were formed into three new cantons, and added to the nineteen.

The plan of transferring the federal government alternately to the different cantons, which had been suggested by the Act of Mediation, was continued in operation. Alexander, still

under M. de la Harpe's influence, wished to exclude Berne. But France, from a sense of justice and in consideration of her Swiss adherents, objected to this; as did also Austria through sympathy with the aristocratic party, therefore Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne, continued to be the three cantons, between which the Government of the Swiss Confederation was to alternate.

By these arrangements, the act of mediation was almost renewed, whilst some réparation was made to the interested parties, and three cantons were added, that had been taken from France. These resolutions being communicated to Switzerland, and having received the approbation of the different cantons, were about to receive the sanction of Europe with the usual guarantee of perpetual neutrality.

Italy still remained, and here were two questions of great importance, those of Naples and Parma, which had been deferred, hoping that time would bring about a solution. As we have already said, the Sardinian question had been decided by giving Genoa to Piedmont, and by securing the succession to the Carignan branch. Austria did not allow any one to decide in her affairs, but having adjudged Lombardy so far as the Po and Tessin to herself, she had put the collateral branches of the imperial family into immediate possession of the Duchies of Tuscany and Modena. There remained to be decided only Parma and Naples, which the two houses of Bourbon demanded for the Queen of Etruria and Ferdinand IV. M. de Talleyrand, who in the commencement had been so anxious about the Neapolitan affairs, had allowed himself to become so involved in the Saxon question, that he had hardly spoken of Italy to M. de Metternich, and had not stipulated that Austria should support France on the Naples question, as a reward for the assistance he had given in the affairs of the North. He had contented himself with the unimportant reservation, that all votes on Italian affairs should be provisionary, until the question of the Two Sicilies should be decided. This precaution was of no great use, for the only question that could have been decided, was that relating to Sardinia, and we were more interested than any other power in rendering these decisions definite.

M. de Talleyrand left all to the good feeling of the Congress, until the very last day, and in the desire that every one felt to leave, it was very much to be feared that the Congress would break up without coming to a decision, which would save Murat, who being in possession, needed only silence to gain his cause.

However, Louis XVIII. did not cease to urge his plenipotentiary on this subject, which interested him much more

than Saxony. This monarch, whose views in foreign policy were narrow though sensible, had no desire that his legation should play an active part at Vienna. He was proud, as we have said, of being a Bourbon, he was happy at being placed on the throne of France, and thought himself sufficiently great, if he could only hold his position. He only wished to get rid of Murat, whom he regarded as the secret accomplice of Napoleon, ready to provide him with the means of coming again into action, either in France or Italy, in which views it must be admitted that he showed more foresight than M. de Talleyrand, who concentrated all his energies on Saxony. However, now that the Saxon question was decided, M. de Talleyrand urged on by Louis XVIII. began to speak of Italy to all the members of the Congress; but he was now powerless, in consequence of not having taken his precautions beforehand with England and Austria. That he should have given time to M. de Metternich for the Neapolitan question, which required time for its full solution, was very proper, but that he should ally himself gratuitously to England and Austria for the sole pleasure of signing a treaty, without making any stipulation with regard to Murat, was a mode of proceeding for which he might have paid dearly and which did eventually cost him dear. The Emperor of Russia, to whom he spoke on the subject, listened as though he had fulfilled all his obligations towards France, Lord Castlereagh listened like an ally who wished to make himself agreeable, but who took no interest in questions of legitimacy, and was besides embarrassed by the promises made to Murat. M. de Metternich listened to the French ambassador like a wily diplomatist, who having made use of France, did not trouble himself about being grateful, and was constantly apprehensive of exciting a commotion in Italy.

Happily for M. de Talleyrand, he found a support in the Duke of Wellington, who had lately arrived at Vienna. Louis XVIII. had, during his residence in England, acquired much of the English habits and manners, and had adroitly flattered the British generalissimo, and won him over to his interests. When Lord Wellington arrived at Vienna, he rendered important service to Louis XVIII. by the manner in which he spoke of him and his government. "Many faults are committed at Paris," he said, "but the king, who has more sense than any of his family, is generally esteemed. The army is more formidable than ever. It might be dangerous to employ the soldiers at home, but abroad they would be both faithful and terrible. The finances are re-established, and even flourishing. A government alone is wanting; there are ministers, but no ministry; but that can be provided for. Of

all the European powers, France is the best prepared for war, and would be the least embarrassed were warfare renewed. She must not be neglected." These words were of more service to us than all the exertions of the French legation; and being uttered when the Russians and Prussians were called upon to come to a decision, had a very marked influence upon them.

Lord Wellington had fully adopted M. de Talleyrand's ideas with regard to Naples. And this for more practical reasons than the principle of legitimacy, for, as M. de Talleyrand wittily said in one of his letters to Louis XVIII., the English *had formed their moral notions on this subject in India*. The Duke of Wellington believed that the Bourbons reigning at Paris, at Madrid, and at Palermo, whilst Murat remained unsupported at Naples, it would soon become impossible to remain at peace with him, and that within six months all Europe would be thrown into confusion, which would give Napoleon an opportunity of again coming into action. This he explained to the Emperor Alexander, to the King of Prussia, the Emperor Francis, and more especially to M. de Metternich, who was the least inclined of all to interfere. These observations were met by an objection quite as true, that the execution of the project would be most hazardous, as it would certainly involve all Italy in war. M. de Talleyrand replied, that France and Spain would become responsible for the risk, and provided that a simple declaration were made, importing that the powers assembled at Vienna would only recognise Ferdinand IV. as King of the Two Sicilies, France would promise to bring the affair to a conclusion. To this was objected the engagements that had been made with Murat, and also some doubts as to the means of execution, not that any one supposed it would be difficult for the French troops to beat the Neapolitans, but it was doubted whether the French army, when led on against Murat, and probably against Napoleon, would remain faithful to the Bourbons.

Nobody at Vienna felt any interest in Murat. On the contrary, all wished his dethronement. But now that the Saxon-Polish question was decided, and the wishes of the different Powers gratified, they were only anxious to leave, and scarcely listened to what was said about Naples; in fact, all were resolved to subscribe on the last day to whatever determination France and Austria should arrive at. In the midst of this universal indifference, an accidental circumstance came to M. de Talleyrand's assistance. Lord Castlereagh wanted his help on the question of the slave trade, in which the English people took the greatest interest, but about which the continental cabinets cared little, who only took part in that as in the Neapolitan question through complaisance. Lord Castlereagh was returning to England to

announce the conclusion of peace, and the long-wished-for humiliation of France, with the establishment of the kingdom of the Low Countries, the definite possession of Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, the Isle of France, and many other magnificent gifts; but still he needed something else to gratify the popular feeling, which, though most noble in its object, for it was the abolition of slavery, exhibited the characteristics of most popular wishes—want of reflection and impatience. Excited by the speeches of popular orators, the English people were seized with an absolute passion for the emancipation of the blacks, and this passion was sincere: but we must be permitted to say, that, though sincere, this passion was not wholly disinterested. If the abolition of slavery involved a political convulsion in India, the English might have been less anxious for its success. But as it only endangered America, they were free to indulge their feelings without risk to their interest. The English were, consequently, passionately anxious for the abolition of the slave trade, and as Louis XVIII. was aware of the intensity of their feelings on this subject, he very craftily advised M. de Talleyrand to have no scruple in drawing what advantage he could from their sentiments.

As the continental powers had neither interest nor opinion on a question that only concerned the maritime states, which were France, Spain, and Portugal, and as of these, France had most authority, M. de Talleyrand would necessarily have great influence, which he promised to use in Lord Castlereagh's interest, provided that, in return, the latter would assist him in the affair of Naples. These two questions, which were left for last, were on the part of the Congress, mere acts of politeness towards the Cabinets interested in them.

Lord Castlereagh first demanded the absolute and immediate abolition of the slave trade on the shores of Africa, and even required that the maritime states should have the right of watching each other, that is, the right of search, to be certain that none took part in the slave traffic; and he further demanded that the colonial goods of nations that refused to join this humane league should be refused admission to the other markets. This was asking a great deal, for the right of search could only be exercised by England, who alone took an active part in the pursuit of slave dealers. This negotiation was at first confined to the maritime powers, but as Lord Castlereagh felt himself isolated amongst them, he had induced the continental states to take part in the debate, a measure which gained him some support. He endeavoured to prove to France, Spain, and Portugal, that the slave trade was injurious to them, that it was dangerous to have a great number of blacks in their colonies opposed to a small number of whites, and that it would be much better to

content themselves with the negroes they had, and the posterity they would have when better treated. He was told in reply, that in all probability he was right, but that in Spanish and Portuguese colonies the number of blacks and whites was nearly equal, whilst in the English dependencies there were about twenty negroes to one white, which made his advice very applicable to his own countrymen, who had taken their precautions, and filled their colonies with blacks during the maritime war, which neither the French, Spanish, or Portuguese had been able to do : that consequently they would not, for some years, have a sufficient number of hands, and would not until then be in a position to abolish the slave trade. After a good deal of discussion, France for herself was satisfied with a term of five years, and had induced Spain and Portugal to be content with eight, at the termination of which period the slave trade was to be abolished.

This was not exactly what Lord Castlereagh desired ; but his arguments produced no result. The reciprocal right of search, which was now brought forward for the first time, surprised and displeased everyone. It had been maintained, as a principle, that each nation should have the jurisdiction of her own flag in time of peace. As to a repressive commercial measure against the maritime nations who would not join in the English system, the difficulty was avoided by referring its decision to the time when the slave trade, being abolished, a penalty might be attached to its infringement. In order to satisfy Lord Castlereagh, who wished to have something definite to present to the British Parliament, a declaration, addressed to all nations, was drawn up in the names of the powers assembled at Vienna, condemning the slave trade as a moral enormity, declaring it a crime against civilization and humanity, and expressing a wish for its speedy abolition. In this the allies of Chaumont, supported by the representative of the French Restoration, put forth a declaration, which, though essentially true, equalled in style the most declamatory emanations of the Constitutional Assembly. MM. de Nesselrode, Metternich, and Talleyrand supported Lord Castlereagh in terms, at which they smiled in secret, for the interest they felt in the emancipation of the blacks might be easily divined from the manner in which they disposed of European peoples.

Now that the Congress was approaching its close, and that questions of self-interest had been so largely cared for, it was thought proper to bestow some consideration on questions of a moral nature, and many excellent regulations for the free navigation of large rivers, were adopted. It was decided that all should be open, and that the States on their shores could refuse any merchandize they did not wish to accept, but could

not prevent their transit to other States, that only a duty on tonnage could be enforced, and that independent of the quality or value of the cargoes, that these dues should be always expended for the maintenance of the navigation of the rivers; and lastly that these dues should furnish sufficient means of towing. These noble principles, dictated by justice and good sense, and announced in perfect sincerity, have done lasting honour to the Congress of Vienna, and are with the neutrality of Switzerland, and the abolition of slavery, the sole amongst its decrees which have been enrolled amongst the laws of nations.

All was now finished at Vienna except the questions of Parma and Naples, which were still in suspense, and all that M. de Talleyrand could obtain from Lord Castlereagh whom he had so ably assisted on the slave question, was that on the very day of his arrival in London he would lay the Neapolitan question before the British Cabinet. The question as to whether Napoleon was to be left at Elba or transferred to the Azores, was considered involved in that which touched Murat, and all discussion on that subject was avoided, in consideration of the treaty of the 11th April, by which Alexander considered himself personally bound. Both, it was said, would be arranged the same day, but it would be difficult to come to an immediate decision. It was insisted that the two millions promised by the treaty of the 11th April, should be paid to Napoleon, and M. de Talleyrand was told that it was not only mean, but dangerous to refuse, as the non-payment would give Napoleon a legitimate excuse for considering himself freed from his engagements to Europe.

The Congress was about to close, and no decision had been come to on those questions that were most important to the Bourbons. Lord Castlereagh was to leave on the 15th of February, and Alexander, after many delays, on the 20th, when Murat, as was his wont came to the aid of those, who desired his ruin, but who could not accomplish it. His minister at the Congress, the Duke de Campo-Chiaro, had been excluded for the same reason as the representatives of Saxony, Denmark, and Genoa. From this gentleman he received constant information of the efforts of the two houses of Bourbon against him, and of the possibility of an explosion on the question of Saxony. Poor Murat thinking this a good opportunity, sent a note through the Duke de Campo-Chiaro, in which he detailed all that had been done contrary to his interests in the Congress of Vienna, and demanded whether he was to consider himself at peace or war with the two houses of Bourbon, and insinuated that in case he should be forced to defend himself, he would be obliged to pass through several Italian States. Murat flattered himself that this declaration arriving at the very moment of a rupture between the greater powers would furnish him both the

right and the opportunity of acting against the enemies of his crown. Thus was M. de Metternich's prophecy fulfilled, that the allies need only wait a little while, and they would have a specious pretext for considering themselves freed from their engagements to the hapless Murat. Besides, the papers that had been found on Lord Oxford, whose arrest we have already mentioned, together with other intercepted documents, proved that Murat had a part in all the troubles, that threatened Italy. There were, therefore, sufficient reasons now to urge against those who still considered themselves bound to Murat.

When the Duke de Campo-Chiaro, received the above-mentioned note, he at once saw how inopportunistly it arrived, for the question of Saxony and all others that had threatened the unity of the Cabinets had been definitely decided. He immediately waited on M. de Metternich, showed him the document he had received, but begged him to consider it as non-existent, for that he would take upon himself to suppress it. This did not prevent M. de Metternich from telling of its arrival to the Duke of Wellington and Lord Castlereagh, who told it to M. de Talleyrand, who told everybody. This document, a seasonable arrival to persons who sought a cause of complaint, produced as much effect as though it were officially announced. for persons are never more powerfully excited than when they wish to be so. M. de Metternich in concert with M. de Talleyrand and the Duke of Wellington decided, that as Austria was now free from all anxiety with regard to Saxony and Poland, she should assemble one hundred and fifty thousand men on the Po, and declare that these precautions were taken to protect her territory and that of the Austrian princes established in Italy. This was almost a decided declaration of war against Murat, and at same time, gave Lord Castlereagh an opportunity of revealing all the intricacies of this affair to Parliament. It was reserved for France to strike the last blow. M. de Talleyrand was satisfied with a measure which was almost the solution he had desired, and which he had almost despaired of obtaining.

The Parma question was decided at the same time. The question had undergone many vicissitudes. At the earnest entreaties of France and Spain, the committee appointed to examine into Italian affairs had admitted that amid the universal restoration of hereditary princes, it would be difficult to refuse the re-establishment of the house of Parma. But the treaty of the 11th of April, constantly defended by Alexander, was a restraint, as was also consideration for Maria Louisa's father. It was almost impossible to get out of this embarrassment. At one time, it was thought to decide the question at the Pope's expense, by giving Maria Louisa one of the legations, which at her death should revert to the Holy See. But the Pope's

representative asserted very justly, that his master had as much right to the legations as the other restored monarchs had to their dominions, and that these provinces, the richest belonging to the States of the Church, were absolutely needed for the support of the Pope's finances. As this could not be denied, M. de Metternich thought of another expedient, that of giving Parma to the Queen of Etruria, and Lucca to Maria Louisa, by which she would be nearer the sea and the island of Elba, together with a pension, of which France and Austria should pay half. At Maria Louisa's death, Lucca instead of descending to her son, should revert to Tuscany, and spare France the offence of seeing a descendant of Napoleon on an Italian throne. However, when Austria consented that Parma should pass out of her family, she stipulated that she should be allowed to keep Plaisance, on account of the bridge across the Po.

This arrangement was accepted by France and Spain, but had not been yet proposed to Maria Louisa. M. de Metternich was chosen to make the communication to her: He had an interview with the Princess, and speaking in the name of the European powers and of her father, endeavoured to make her understand the difficulties of this affair; but to his great surprise he was very badly received. Though this princess was not naturally endowed with much strength of character, she obstinately refused to resign Parma, which she defended as her son's patrimony and her own dowry.

Her skilful counsellor, the Count de Neiperg, had advised her to appeal to her father, and to the Emperor Alexander, and embarrass them by the steadiness of her opposition, assuring her that this was the only way to succeed. She followed this advice, and succeeded in arousing her father's affection, and piquing Alexander's pride, which gave her so much courage, that when M. de Metternich returned, she decidedly refused the offer that was made her, alleging to M. de Metternich's surprise, what it would have been much more to her own honour to conceal, that she was more repelled than attracted by the neighbourhood of Elba, as she was determined never to join her husband. She had evidently sought in other ties, that domestic happiness which she preferred to rank, grandeur, and even to her own dignity.

It was now necessary to inform the committee, appointed to consider Italian affairs, that the proposed arrangement was rendered impossible by Maria Louisa's resistance. The case was embarrassing when M. de Metternich asked M. de Talleyrand for a few days' delay, assuring him that this last difficulty should be decided before he left Vienna. As the more important affair of Naples was about being arranged, M. de Talleyrand thought

he could afford to wait the decision of the Parma question, and he did so. Here is the solution of the difficulty devised by M. de Metternich, and of which he made a mystery to the French representative.

Lord Castlereagh had left Vienna for London, and intended to pass through Paris on his way. He was to see Louis XVIII., and as he possessed great influence over this prince as head of the British cabinet, it was hoped that he could induce him to agree to certain arrangements, a concession that could not be expected from M. de Talleyrand, who considered the affair of Parma as exclusively dynastic, and felt an almost personal interest in having it decided exactly as the Bourbons desired. As the cabinets of London and Vienna were more united than ever, Lord Castlereagh undertook to perform this service for Austria, and ask Louis XVIII. in the name of the Emperor Francis, and in considerations of the domestic sacrifices he had already made, to leave Parma to Maria Louisa during her life. That meanwhile the Queen of Etruria should have Lucca with a pension, and that at Maria Louisa's death Parma should revert to the Queen of Etruria or her children, and Lucca to Tuscany.

This, which was not in itself an unacceptable arrangement, being directly proposed to Louis XVIII. by his Britannic Majesty's chief Secretary of State, and in the name of two courts on whose decision the Neapolitan question depended, had every prospect of success. This was the cause of its being concealed from M. de Talleyrand, and his being requested to wait a few days.

When Alexander was about leaving Vienna, he wished to know what was to be done concerning a family project that interested him very much, the marriage of his sister, the Grand Duchess Anne with the Duke de Berry. The acute Count Pozzo considered that this marriage would be serviceable to France by procuring her a powerful alliance, and to Russia, that would thus obtain a higher matrimonial connection than she had yet made. This latter consideration had very little weight with Alexander, who was only desirous of a political union of the two countries, and certainly, had this alliance been accepted, and had we joined the Russian and Prussian policy on the Saxon and Polish question, there were few advantages that Alexander would have refused to France. His mother, a most respectable princess, entertaining all the sympathies of a French emigrant, was most anxious for an alliance that would be so flattering to her pride. The French court, less eager for the connection, would have acted like those noble families, who consent to form advantageous marriages in an inferior rank, but the Bourbons were restrained by the question of religion, and demanded, as we

have already said, that the Princess should change her faith before coming to France. Alexander, dreading lest he should seem to purchase this alliance by an act of apostasy, required that the Princess should remain a member of the Greek Church, until she had quitted the Russian dominions, but that she may change her faith anywhere else that was decided on. These were very trifling objections on both sides, when the union was recommended by so many important political reasons. But this question had lost much of its interest at Vienna, since M. de Talleyrand had so openly quarrelled with Alexander. However, this marriage was not altogether impossible, and before the end of the Congress Louis XVIII. desired his minister to free him from the demands of the Russian court, if he should think it necessary to reject them definitely, in which case he wished to have reasonable cause for drawing back.

M. de Talleyrand, convinced that by the treaty of 3rd of January, he had procured France better and more solid allies, and anxious to lessen the importance of a marriage to which he had raised so many obstacles, wrote a long letter to Louis XVIII. which is perfectly characteristic of the policy of the time. If the court of France, he said, in the early days of the Restoration, when she was still weak, had attached importance to a closer union with Russia, she was no longer in the same position. She had contracted the highest and strongest alliances, and was again become the centre of European policy. It was others who should now seek her support, she stood in need of none. The Russian alliance was of very little importance at present. Alexander was a very thoughtless prince, imbued with the wildest ideas, and with whom it would be impossible to act in concert. Besides, the reigning family of Russia was far inferior in point of birth to the Bourbons, to whom it would be a sort of degradation to accept its alliance. Austria would be more worthy of such a union, but as the marriages contracted with that house had been unfortunate for both countries, he unhesitatingly advised taking a princess in the house of Bourbon itself.

When Louis read this letter, he considered that his minister's opinions on those subjects were very just, that he entertained very sound ideas on the different gradations of crowned heads, and that his advice ought to be adopted. He consequently gave up all idea of the Russian alliance, and left M. de Talleyrand to free him from it with the tact which this great diplomatist exhibited on all occasions.

As long as anything remained to be done at Vienna, M. de Talleyrand avoided entering into any explanation on the projected marriage. However, on the eve of the general departure, he was obliged to put aside his reserve. In a last conversation, Alexander said to him, with an indifference that was only

assumed, "I have been asked for my sister's hand, but I will not dispose of it without entering into definite explanations with the court of France. My mother would be very much pleased by this marriage, and I would consider it a very honourable connection, but I wish to have everything decided. I have refused some offers, and" he said smiling, and in a tone of humility the most natural, "I have also met with refusals. Ferdinand VII. asked for my sister in marriage, but finding she belonged to the Greek church, he withdrew his demand." M. de Talleyrand smiled in his turn, and replied with as much ease as his august interlocutor, "The conduct of His Catholic Majesty must explain to you the embarrassment of His Very Christian Majesty." Then turning this serious subject into a jest, he told the Czar that the most pious Louis XVIII. was inflexible on the question of religion. Alexander did not insist, and did not seem to attach much importance to an affair that offended him deeply, for the Russian court was most anxious for the marriage of the Grand Duchess with the Duke de Berry. It was the fate of this princess to be disappointed in two alliances that would have made her a participator in the vicissitudes of our revolutions, and to be finally seated on the throne of the Low Countries, where she felt their reverberation.

This was the last question of importance that M. de Talleyrand had to conclude, and the manner in which he conducted this and all others in which he was engaged, are characteristic of the man, his time, and his court.

The Congress had now brought its great work to a conclusion, and the sovereigns were about to take their departure, leaving to their ministers the less important part of drawing up their decisions in proper form, when, in the beginning of March, a piece of intelligence suddenly burst upon them, which, however, did not surprise any one, for all had a secret presentiment of its coming. A despatch from the Austrian Consul at Genoa announced that Napoleon had escaped from Elba, and disembarked at the Gulf of Juan. Whither was he going? What was his object? were the questions asked in terror. According to M. de Metternich he would go to Paris, and this was the most natural supposition. M. de Talleyrand, anxious to deceive himself, said that Napoleon was gone to Italy. All were in the greatest excitement, and for some days public opinion hovered between these two fears, of which, indeed, one was far more probable than the other. The first feeling of terror was succeeded by anger. All were indignant with Alexander, as the author of the treaty of 11th April, by which Elba had been assigned to Napoleon as a residence. Alexander sincerely admitted his fault, but promised to repair the injury into which his generosity had betrayed him, by gigantic efforts against the

common enemy. All departures were immediately countermanded, and it was arranged that the sovereigns should not separate until this new danger should be past.

All the resolutions that had been decided on were to be maintained, and although their sanction by the final act of Vienna was delayed for six months, they were no less definite, and their existence was to be dated from the six last months of the year 1814, whose events we have recorded. We may, therefore, consider the Congress of Vienna as terminated at this period, at least as far as concerned the limits and constitution of states, and this is the fittest moment to pronounce an opinion on the European arrangement that has resulted from it, and which has been one of the most permanent recorded in history, having endured for nearly half a century.

In considering the Congress of Vienna under the double aspect of justice and policy, this is in our opinion what may be said of it, and in delivering this opinion we lay aside all national prejudices, for the historian ought not to identify himself with any country or century, that so he may the more freely approach the eternal springs of truth.

In hearing the complaints of those who are suffering from the crimes of others, and in listening to the generous indignation they pour out against these vices and against those who abandon themselves to their influence, we are tempted to say that these men could never become guilty of the like crimes. But, alas! the generous maxims of the eve are not always the guide of the morrow's conduct. Every power in Europe had suffered from the boundless ambition of Napoleon, and had so execrated its excess, that the world might be justified in believing that should these oppressed sovereigns ever become the arbiters of Europe, justice and moderation would be the characteristics of their reign. We have just seen how their acts corresponded with their words. The only difference of conduct discernible between Napoleon and the Allies is, that they were four instead of one, and that the ambition of each was restrained by that of the three others. As to France, she was treated as a conquered nation, which was natural, if not just. France, or rather he who governed her, had tyrannized in the hour of victory, and our conquerors did the same in their turn! It is childish to complain in such circumstances, and ridiculous to assert one's dignity at a rival's tribunal. It is on ourselves, on our own courage and prudence, and not upon others, that our dignity depends; and if we wish to avoid the consequences of errors, we should neither commit them ourselves, nor allow others to do so in our name.

However, we may, without subjecting ourselves to the accusation of national prejudice, be permitted to say, that though the Allies justly blamed the ambition of Napoleon, they fell into the

same excesses themselves, that after the different partitions of Poland and the Germanic secularizations, which so much extended the dominions of the Continental powers, after having seized those colonies, which gave such unlimited extent to the naval rule of England—having done all this, we say, it was neither just nor conformable to the general balance of power, to reduce France to the position she held at the end of the eighteenth century. We may be permitted to say, that if France had not outstripped all calculations by the fertility of her genius, of her soil, and of her Revolution, and had not become as great in peace as she had been in war, Europe would have felt a want—Europe, that cannot without risk be deprived of one of the states of which she is composed, and of France less than of any other, for England sometimes needs her against Russia, Russia against England, Prussia against Austria, Austria against Prussia, Germany against the two latter—and, finally, there is one cause that can never progress without the aid of France—the cause of civilization.

But a truce, we repeat, a truce to useless complaints against treatment that we drew upon ourselves. Let us speak of others! All that did not belong to the FOUR or did not directly interest them, was shared like booty found in a sacked city. The lesser German princes, the free cities, the property of the Teutonic knights, the property of the knights of Malta, ecclesiastical principalities and old republics, were absorbed, without pity, into the territory of the conquerors or their dependents. Were it necessary to calm the jealousy of a neighbour, to subsidize a useful ally, to give a better contour to the frontier of one of the FOUR, or give another a more extended sea-board, or a more convenient boundary, a German prince was immediately sacrificed, a free city was incorporated, an old republic suppressed, or a German ecclesiastical state secularized. No objection was raised when Austria took Venice, or Piedmont Genoa. Woe to any state in which one of the FOUR did not take an interest. Denmark, that represented no other interest than that of the freedom of the seas, at that time regarded as an entirely French interest, was deprived of Norway, to increase Bernadotte's popularity in Sweden. In return, Denmark got Swedish Pomerania, but Prussia wished to have this province in order to continue her line of coast from Stralsund to Memel, and Denmark was deprived of this weak indemnity, which was replaced by one still more illusory—the Duchy of Lauenburg, and some million crowns. Unfortunate Saxony, that had abandoned us at the battle of Leipzig, for which she deserved some reward from the conquerors, was defended, because her preservation was of importance to Austria and Germany, but though she found advocates, still half her territory was sacrificed to Prussia, that during ten years had not ceased

to complain of the spoliation of German states. Poland found protectors, because of the jealousy that England and Austria felt towards Russia, but it was finally given to Alexander under a pretext which veiled the ambition of the one and the weakness of the others, namely, that this country was again to become a kingdom, and be placed under one master; a sad illusion, that could not last, for the semi-independence thus bestowed on Poland would awaken the desire, and supply her with the means of throwing off the Russian yoke. She would naturally revolt and entail upon herself the punishment of being reduced to a Russian province, and Europe would then learn that she had enlarged Russia by the addition of all Poland. As France, whose feelings were little regarded, could alone take an interest in Italy, the country was given to Austria, to Austrian princes and Austrian influence, a ponderous gift, whose weight the Cabinet of Vienna would one day feel and regret. No restraint was imposed on England. In addition to Gibraltar, she wished to have the Ionian Isles, the Cape, the Isle of France, and some of the Antillas, and she met with no opposition. She also wished to have the mouths of the Scheldt and Rhine, in order to form the kingdom of the Low Countries in opposition to us, and this wish was gratified, without the least consideration for the dislike of the Belgians to the Dutch. Sometimes, indeed, one or other of these four co-partitionists of the world, amazed, not at his own cupidity, but at that of his three associates, felt inclined to blame, but the words of reproof faltered on his lips, so ill qualified was any of the FOUR to pronounce a lesson on moderation.

It is no vulgar resentment that leads us to these reflections, but having exposed the faults of Napoleon, we possess the right to point out the faults of those who succeeded to his rule, and who, under pretence of avenging Europe, had only divided it amongst themselves. It is the duty of a historian to lay bare the faults of all without distinction, and we may be permitted to remind the reader that our errors were those of a man, and not of France, and that when the allies crossed the Rhine, they solemnly promised that this distinction should be remembered—a promise, alas! that was soon forgotten, as the treaty of Paris proved.

Having considered the Congress of Vienna with reference to equity, we shall now look upon it from a political point of view. The whole policy of that assembly had but one design—to accumulate precautions against France. Instead of being ruled by the Bourbons, France should have been still in the hand of the dreaded conqueror on whom they wished to be avenged, when so many precautions were taken against her. And in that case England should have been allowed to act, and she would

have neglected no precaution. Still mindful of the continental blockade, she was determined to prevent us from ever approaching the shores of the North Sea or the Mediterranean, and she could not bear the idea of our ever again visiting Antwerp or Genoa. It was on this account that she founded the kingdom of the Low Countries, and favoured the revival of Piedmont. She chose well when she selected the houses of Orange and Savoy to oppose us, for besides the recent injuries endured by both, the one had acquired its glory in fighting against France, the other by making use of, and then betraying her.

She, therefore, entrusted them with Antwerp and Genoa. She did not stop there, but acting on an idea of Mr. Pitt, she compelled Prussia to accept the Rhenish provinces, in order to establish an enduring animosity between that power and us. But even these precautions did not satisfy her. In order to place Bavaria in the same position as Prussia, she, together with Austria, restored her the Palatinate of the Rhine. It was not from hatred, but policy, that Austria adopted the views of England; but though she was willing to compromise others with France, she would not compromise herself, nor would she ever listen to the proposal of resuming the sovereignty of Belgium. Prussia, though very indignant with us, understood very clearly the part that was forced upon her, complained of it to England, and insisted that she should get Saxony instead of the Rhenish provinces, but in the end was compelled to accept what she was offered. Alexander saw through all these plans, at which he often smiled, and would willingly have helped us, but seeing us so obstinately and incomprehensibly allied to England and Austria, he drew back, expressing his contempt for our foolish policy.

In thus accumulating distrustful interests, and inimical states around us, the Congress of Vienna originated the policy of the Holy Alliance, which has ruled Europe for nearly half a century, a policy which its authors meant to be eternal, but which, like everything else, has yielded to the influence of time, for the kingdom of the Low Countries, founded on the union of two hostile peoples has been dissolved, and England, the obstinate enemy of revolutions, has learned to look upon them in another light, Savoy, after forty years of blind hostility to France, has suddenly returned to her old policy of making use of her, whilst Austria, oppressed by the burden of her Italian possessions, has resigned a part of them; a policy that has nearly passed away, as a natural consequence of its weakness, but which the jealousy of Europe, and the imprudence of France might revive at any time, and which it is the interest of both to terminate, for with regard to Europe, this policy has the bad effect of making her neglect all her interests for one—that of checking us, and has made her in some sense the adversary of human progress, the

patroness of antiquated abuses, and not unfrequently the protectress of bad governments, and above all, by this policy, she procures for demagogy the powerful aid of France; a policy no less injurious to France, whom it isolates, whom it condemns to permanent opposition to Europe, by seeing her most legitimate plans rejected merely because they are hers, whom it leaves without allies either in peace or war, and makes the accomplice of demagogy, and the terror instead of the admiration of the world; a policy which it would be sin and madness in her to retort, by alarming Europe, and compelling all nations to seek their safety in uniting against us!

Indeed, this policy was quite natural at the epoch of which we speak. It was the necessary result of a long and fearful struggle, and we must not be too severe in reproving the diplomatists, who believed they were only using a legitimate means of defence when they built up this antagonistic policy against France. Nor must we forget that those who directed the Congress, though enemies of France, and especially of the revolution, against which they had struggled for twenty-five years, were now carried away by a violent reaction, which, however, they endeavoured to restrain within certain limits. In many things they had acted very wisely, for, after all, they were the greatest men of their age, the most skilful and the most enlightened, and though at the head of the counter-revolution, they were much more rational than the counter-revolutionists of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, or France. As it was in their power to restrain the counter-revolutionists of Switzerland, they did so, and not being able to do more than advise those of Spain and France, they gave them excellent counsels. In fine, though each of the FOUR listened only to the dictates of national ambition when boundaries were to be traced, still they have left in the treaties on the abolition of slavery, and the freedom of river navigation principles, worthy of the French revolution, of which they were by birth and duty the inflexible opponents.

Now that we have spoken of victorious Europe, and of the manner in which she acted at Vienna, let us speak of ourselves and of our government, and endeavour to pronounce a just judgment on both.

Three opportunities occurred, by which the fate of France might have been decided: the armistice of the 23rd of April, the treaty of peace on the 30th of May, and at the Congress of Vienna.

Unpopularity has long lain, and still lies heavily upon the armistice of the 23rd of April, when the French negotiator abandoned, as was said, with *a stroke of his pen*, all the great fortresses of Europe, and an immense war *matériel*. This unpopularity, whose weight fell on M. de Talleyrand and the Count

d'Artois, we consider quite undeserved. A wild and unanimous cry demanded the evacuation of the French territory; this cry, extracted by suffering, was uttered without reflection. Whatever might have been done, the allied troops could not retire in less than two months, and in that time peace might be signed, and in fact was signed. The armistice ought to have been deferred until the conclusion of peace, an arrangement that might have been easily effected, as warfare had ceased, and then some compensation might have been obtained for the surrender of the European fortresses. But the cry that demanded the evacuation of our territory was so natural and so strong that it was not in human nature to resist, and more than excusable to yield to it. Now, demanding the evacuation of our territory, necessarily originated the demand that we should evacuate the foreign territories, of which we were still in possession, the one naturally induced the other. It may be answered, that in giving up Magdeburg, Hamburg, Texel, Breda, and Berg-op-Zoom, we might have kept Antwerp, Luxembourg, and Mayence. Had we made the attempt, the negotiators on the other side would have considered it a proof of our secret intention of preserving the line of the Rhine, to which they never would consent. The passionate desire for the evacuation of the French territory naturally induced the evacuation of foreign possessions, and the armistice of the 23rd of April was the inevitable consequence. The popular cry which condemned this armistice, after having imperatively called for it, is utterly unjust, and in equity we are bound to absolve the prince and the negotiator who signed it.

The armistice once signed, there was no need of treating immediately of peace even at Paris, nor of adding the precipitation of a definite treaty to the precipitation of the armistice. At Paris, our adversaries were united for our spoliation; at Vienna they might quarrel over the spoils. We ought, therefore, to have awaited the opening of Congress before deciding our fate. There was no occasion to hurry, as the armistice had made every one's position bearable. Blood no longer flowed; the powers had got possession of the fortresses they had so much desired; the Prussians had Magdebourg, the English, Antwerp, and the Germans Luxembourg and Mayence. We were restricted to the frontier of 1790, and therefore this delay could not arouse any prejudice in our favour. Besides, as the powers could not decide separately on the fate of any of their colleagues, they could not adopt a different conduct with regard to us. This so-much-blamed armistice restored us 300,000 men, which gave us a power of action, and our refusal to sign would have stopped all further proceedings. What we now assert is proved by the fact, that once the fortresses were restored, the coalition negotiators were no longer so eager to conclude. Alas! it was we who were

eager, and that from want of foresight, General Dessoles being the only person in the council who saw the advantage of our coming to Vienna free of all engagements; and, in the second place, we erred through impatience—impatience to sign, announce, and celebrate a peace which constituted the essential title, glory, and merit of the Bourbons.

It was through these combined causes—want of foresight and impatience—after the first excusable error of too hastily signing the armistice of the 23rd of April, that we committed a second, which was wholly inexcusable. We concluded a treaty of peace at Paris, whilst our adversaries were still united, instead of signing it at Vienna, where they would have inevitably been divided.

The peace of Paris being signed, it would have been very difficult at Vienna to make any change in our fate. Still every chance was not lost, provided we did not side too hastily with either of the two parties who were about to portion out Europe, and not add to the weighty chain of the treaty of Paris the still heavier shackles of immature decisions. There was no need of haste in the choice to be made between those powers, whose dissensions were already evident. On one side we had Russia and Prussia eager to get Poland and Saxony at any price, and even willing to relinquish their hostility to us, provided we forwarded their views; and on the other, England and Austria, whose only object was to shackle us, and unite all Europe in opposition to us. Under these circumstances, it is evident that we ought not to have hesitated in our choice; for if Posen and Dresden involved European interests, the Scheldt, the Rhine, and the Alps presented an interest exclusively French. The conduct of Saxony at Leipsic, and of Europe at Paris, justified us in preferring our own interest to that of others. And supposing that we ought to have been equally distrustful of all these opposing ambitions, that very circumstance ought to have rendered us more cautious in coming to a decision. Had M. de Talleyrand been less impatient, when he arrived at Vienna, to make a choice, whose merit was very doubtful, or to announce the principle of legitimacy so dogmatically; had he not been so eager to assume a part in important affairs, which was eventually sure to fall to him; had he contented himself with saying, with all that disconcerting phlegm which he possessed in so high a degree, that as France had been treated without any consideration, or rather deceived, in the May of 1814, when she had been promised an increase of territory and population, that was afterwards refused,—she was now at liberty to seek only her own interest; that her ambition should no longer disturb the world, but that when the world should be disturbed by the ambition of others, she would choose the part consonant

with her own policy. And having declared these sentiments, France might have waited until her assistance should be sought (as it infallibly would have been) by the divided parties. France's position would have been thus considerably changed. Alexander and Frederick William were so earnest and so anxious, they would have offered anything; and as the Rhine, the Scheldt, and the Alps, involved only English and Austrian interests, they would have made any concession we desired in that direction, and the largeness of their offers would have been proportioned to our slowness in coming to a decision. Had the dispute led to war, there is no doubt but that we might have got a part, at least, of the left bank of the Rhine. On the other hand, if matters did not go so far as war, Austria and England, alarmed at seeing us united to Russia and Prussia, would have been obliged to yield to the pretensions of the latter, and we should have thus obtained, without war, a better result than we did; for Saxony, instead of Prussia, would have been our neighbour on the Rhine, where she would have succeeded the complaisant, accommodating, and much-regretted ecclesiastical electors of Mayence, of Treves, and of Cologne, who were formerly our neighbours, and whose place is now occupied by the most military powers of the Confederation—Bavaria and Prussia. Thus, whatever followed, war or peace, our fate would have been better. Had war been the result, we should have had a chance of a better frontier; had peace succeeded, more tranquil neighbours. But it was not so. The Cabinet of Paris, without unity or foresight, considered only what was immediately before its eyes; whilst Louis XVIII., intellectual but absent-minded, and quite indifferent to foreign policy, looked upon intervention in foreign affairs as a sad legacy bequeathed by Napoleon. He consequently left M. de Talleyrand full freedom of action, having perfect confidence in his skill, experience, and the influence he exercised in European diplomacy. When the latter arrived at Vienna, determined to support the principle of legitimacy, he found the FOUR determined to decide everything between themselves, which so irritated him, that he placed himself at the head of the small German Courts, who flattered him by the eagerness with which they sought his aid, and he was thus compelled to become the defender of Saxony. He joined England and Austria, who were firmly resolved to confine us to the terms of the treaty of Paris, against Russia and Prussia, who would willingly have made us some concessions; whilst he loudly declared that France wanted nothing for herself—nothing but the triumph of principle, that is of legitimacy.

Henceforth there was no chance of making any important alteration in our fate. We were, undoubtedly, in very good company when we joined England and Austria; but the society

of Russia and Prussia was not to be despised. But the greatest advantage we could hope from this alliance would be to commence a fresh war with Russia and Prussia; and this, that Austria should obtain the entire of Italy; that England should have Malta, Corfu, the Cape, and the Mauritius; that the kingdoms of the Low Countries and Piedmont should stand like great fortresses at our very gates; that Prussia and Austria, separated by Saxony, might have less cause of mutual jealousy; that Russia should be less contiguous to Germany; and if we conquered in the service of our masters, we should enjoy the advantage of still remaining bound by the treaties of 1815! Truly, considering the benefits to be obtained, it was not worth while to risk the advantages of the lately-concluded peace.

But this is not all: even taking the part we did, which assuredly was not the wisest, we ought not to have been so eager in offering our aid; we ought at least to have waited until we were asked. But, stung to the quick, M. de Talleyrand committed the error least consonant with his character—he was too precipitate. It is certain that had he waited, he would soon have been admitted to the discussion of the most important affairs, and, in short, enjoyed all the consideration due to the representative of France. But he became a solicitor, instead of being solicited, as he ought to have been; and whilst offering the aid of 150,000 French, he appeared in the light of one who was asking instead of conferring a favour. And he consented, unconditionally, that in case of war, France should remain bound by the treaty of Paris. In his impatience to acquire importance in the eyes of the great Powers, he forgot to stipulate for the expulsion of Murat, the only question in which Louis XVIII. took an interest; and had not Murat himself furnished an excuse for his dethronement, the sovereigns would have quitted Vienna without coming to a decision on the Neapolitan question. M. de Talleyrand was an able negotiator; dignified, haughty, and endowed with admirable readiness of reply, when called upon to reprove the sallies of pride-swollen conquerors; but he was less a far-seeing politician than a skilful negotiator; and M. de Talleyrand committed the error, after having too hastily signed the peace at Paris, of forming his resolves too quickly at Vienna, and having come to a determination, he decided in favour of the powers from whom we had nothing to hope, and against those who might have ameliorated our condition; and in making this choice, he asked no other recompense than the honour of gratuitously serving his new allies, to secure the triumph of what was at that time called the principle of legitimacy. Undoubtedly, if under ordinary circumstances, and in the normal state of things, with Europe in a state of profound tranquillity, when each Sovereign would have found himself

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
in a position consonant with the spirit of the times and of existing treaties; if, under such circumstances, it was proposed to suppress a kingdom like Saxony, even though that suppression ensured the greatest advantages to France, justice and sound policy would have induced us to oppose such an act; for every political convulsion which is not inevitable, every territorial dispossession which is not counselled by the strictest equity or by the irresistible course of events, is inhuman, imprudent, and dangerous; and M. de Talleyrand, in defending the cause of Saxony, would have served at the same time the cause of justice and sound policy.

But amid the wreck of the ancient order of things, at a moment when the fate of no kingdom of Europe was decided, when all were in suspense, and each sought aggrandizement in the spoils taken from France, at a moment when the Continental Powers, after having swallowed up Poland, felt no scruple in devouring Venice, Genoa, the free cities, the intermediary German princes, a moment when England seized upon every important maritime position on the globe, when the lesser States were not less eager for spoils than the great, a moment in short when self was the predominant thought, it was surely at such a time lawful for France to think of herself, and not limit her entire policy to the conservation of a German State, in which no other power took an interest, and which had forfeited all title to France's protection. Under other circumstances, the policy of defending Saxony would have been not only the most generous, but the most prudent. But at an epoch when all established rights and treaties succumbed during a fearful war of two and twenty years duration, and when all were about to be re-established on a new basis, M. de Talleyrand neglected the interests of France too much in advocating the cause of Saxony, and his conduct which would have been otherwise inexplicable, can only be attributed to his impatience to play an important part and loudly defend a principle. But the sovereigns assembled at Vienna, could not believe him serious, for the Austrian, English, and French diplomatists who so warmly defended this principle at Dresden, sacrificed it at Vienna, Genoa, Malta, Stockholm, and in a hundred German principalities.

Thus twice within two years, the fate of France was decided by the most frivolous motives. At Prague in 1813, Napoleon had it in his power to secure to France an extent of territory, greater than was even desirable for her solid greatness, but blinded by an insensate ambition, he neglected the opportunity! And the Bourbons in 1814, neglected an opportunity of recovering some fragments of our lost greatness, and this through impatience to proclaim a peace, on which they based their principal title to popularity, as well as through want of reflection,

want of experience, and a desire to uphold and see others uphold a principle that flattered their pride of birth. Sad fate of our country, after having been tossed by the storms of a fierce revolution, to find herself sometimes dependent on the whim of one man, sometimes on the blunder of a faction. Fortunately material greatness is not everything, and France has by her moral greatness recovered the position of which events had deprived her. But in casting a glance over the desolating scenes we have described, let us pour forth a prayer that there may be at length established in France, a political system of government, which, regardless of dynastic or party interests, unmoved by the passion of the hour, without a dominant taste for either peace or war, in short free from all predilections, guided solely by state reasons, and having no other object in the direction of public affairs than the safety and prosperity of the country. May the Almighty deign to accord us this blessing, and France will then enjoy what she has never possessed, at least enduringly, a position proportioned to her intelligence, to her valour, and the torrents of blood she has shed.

END OF THE XVIII. VOL.



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